powerpc: possible access beyond TASK_SIZE in start_thread
Hi Rusty,
I was looking at the diff between kernel v3.12 and recent master (after 3.13-rc7), and noticed that in the following commit:
commit 94af3abf995b17f6a008b00152c94841242ec6c7
Author: Rusty Russell <[email protected]> Date: Wed Nov 20 22:15:02 2013 +1100
powerpc: ELF2 binaries launched directly.
on powerpc, those lines appear in start_thread():
+ /* start is a relocated pointer to the function
+ * descriptor for the elf _start routine. The first + * entry in the function descriptor is the entry + * address of _start and the second entry is the TOC + * value we need to use. + */
+ __get_user(entry, (unsigned long __user *)start);
+ __get_user(toc, (unsigned long __user *)start+1);
Note the "__" before get_user(), which bypass any kind of validation on the addresses.
Amongst the callers, if we look at fs/binfmt_elf.c:load_elf_binary(), we see:
elf_entry = loc->elf_ex.e_entry;
if (BAD_ADDR(elf_entry)) {
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_dentry;
}and the elf_entry gets passed to start_thread().
If we craft a binary with elf_entry address of
TASK_SIZE - 1 (1 byte before TASK_SIZE), then I think we could make both __get_user() calls access data beyond TASK_SIZE, because elf_entry address is verified, but there is no validation on its range AFAIU. Is it expected ? Am I missing something ?
Thanks,
Mathieu
Signature · 3 lines
Mathieu Desnoyers EfficiOS Inc. http://www.efficios.com
Quoted 4 lines · Mathieu Desnoyers
Hi Rusty,
I was looking at the diff between kernel v3.12 and recent master (after 3.13-rc7), and noticed that in the following commit:
Cool!
I just moved the code, so any problem exists before this, too.
Quoted 29 lines
commit
94af3abf995b17f6a008b00152c94841242ec6c7Author: Rusty Russell <[email protected]> Date: Wed Nov 20 22:15:02 2013 +1100powerpc: ELF2 binaries launched directly.
on powerpc, those lines appear in
start_thread():(quoted diff) +8
-0+ /* start is a relocated pointer to the function + * descriptor for the elf _start routine. The first + * entry in the function descriptor is the entry + * address of _start and the second entry is the TOC + * value we need to use. + */ + __get_user(entry, (unsigned long __user *)start); + __get_user(toc, (unsigned long __user *)start+1);Note the "__" before
get_user(), which bypass any kind of validation on the addresses.Amongst the callers, if we look at fs/binfmt_elf.c:load_elf_binary(), we see:
elf_entry = loc->elf_ex.e_entry; if (BAD_ADDR(elf_entry)) { force_sig(SIGSEGV, current); retval = -EINVAL; goto out_free_dentry; }
Quoted 8 lines
and the
elf_entrygets passed tostart_thread().If we craft a binary with
elf_entryaddress of
TASK_SIZE- 1 (1 byte beforeTASK_SIZE), then I think we could make both__get_user()calls access data beyondTASK_SIZE, becauseelf_entryaddress is verified, but there is no validation on its range AFAIU. Is it expected ? Am I missing something ?
Yes, looks like we can read the first 15 bytes of kernel space. That's not likely to be interesting, but we should probably check anyway.
Thanks!
Rusty.
===
Subject: powerpc: don't allow entry point to be read from kernel.
Mathieu points out that while start is checked, it could be TASK_SIZE-1, which means this code could read the first 15 bytes of kernel space. That's text for now, but let's be paranoid.
start_thread() doesn't have a return value, so easiest to use get_user:
you'll get a jump to zero if it fails.
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +2 -2
@@ -1113,8 +1113,8 @@ void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long start, unsigned long sp)* address of _start and the second entry is the TOC * value we need to use. */ -__get_user (entry, (unsigned long __user *)start); -__get_user (toc, (unsigned long __user *)start+1 ); +get_user (entry, (unsigned long __user *)start); +get_user (toc, (unsigned long __user *)start+1 );/* Check whether the e_entry function descriptor entries * need to be relocated before we can use them.