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Issue of historical file and script invocation when using IMA for runtime attestation

RFC Wang, Nicholas 3 participants 5 messages Feb 13, 2025 – Feb 18, 2025 Keys-trusted

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Linux-integrity community,

Hi, I'm Nicholas Wang from UIUC, and we are researching the potential challenges of a remote runtime attestation tool using IMA, Keylime, under a simulated deployment environment. In the process, we conducted multiple experiments, and we encountered some issues that we realize may not be able to be solved entirely in userspace.

To sum up the first issue, IMA may not reflect the whole picture of invocation or activation history. In particular, we are in question about "Once the earlier measurements are verified, there is no need to verify them again" according to IMA event log documentation. First off, Keylime uses directories or paths for matching and ignoring files in their policy file; in IMA policy, "dont_measure" filters out filesystems. We see two potential scenarios in which malicious actors may silently bypass the attestation. We assume Keylime user does not use "dont_measure" filters in IMA policy and IMA indeed measured everything while Keylime attest the digests according to its own policy. Keylime would filter and ignore certain files based on its own directories and file filtering, and such ignored files would only appear in IMA log once as long as the system is not rebooted. Now the issue arises: 1. if the file being moved within the same filesystem, it will never re-appear in IMA logs even with further invocations, as IMA treated them the exact same file. This may allow an attack to persist throughout until a fresh reboot. 2. In case of a long-lived system which has patched a vulnerable version of one software, the old, vulnerable version which has been in the IMA log before will not appear in case of further activation before a reboot. Thus, we believe that the design which measures each file once may in some cases not reflect a comprehensive state of the machine to meet runtime attestation needs.

The other issue we run into is script invocation. We find this is tricky as we realize that scripts being too versatile and hard to enforce the attestation upon execution, and executing them directly (through shebang) versus passing it to interpreters/shell as arguments results in a drastically different attestation result as the latter only attests the interpreter binary itself. While a naive solution would be turning on attestation for file read operations in IMA policy or use SELinux file types to facilitate, however, we suspect it would still be an unmanageable task with unbearable performance. As the nature of the problem is essentially to distinguish code from data, the only reasonable solution we currently have thought is to have interpreters themselves to do the task, and indicate IMA what is code through API. Alternatively, the only probable way would be any attestation tool eventually had to have their own kernel modules and extended file types for IMA policy, and decide on what to be measured in separate components.

We wonder whether there is or has been discussions around these questions. If so, we would like to learn more about any ongoing efforts or plan on changing the current situation, or if not, would like to hear the opinions from the kernel community regarding the two issues.

Best regards,

--
Nicholas Wang

#1 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Nicholas

Linux-integrity community,

Hi, I'm Nicholas Wang from UIUC, and we are researching the potential challenges of a remote runtime attestation tool using IMA, Keylime, under a simulated deployment environment. In the process, we conducted multiple experiments, and we encountered some issues that we realize may not be able to be solved entirely in userspace.

Hi Nicholas

thanks a lot for your questions. Will try to answer to the best of my knowledge.

Quoted 9 lines

To sum up the first issue, IMA may not reflect the whole picture of invocation or activation history. In particular, we are in question about "Once the earlier measurements are verified, there is no need to verify them again" according to IMA event log documentation. First off, Keylime uses directories or paths for matching and ignoring files in their policy file; in IMA policy, "dont_measure" filters out filesystems. We see two potential scenarios in which malicious actors may silently bypass the attestation. We assume Keylime user does not use "dont_measure" filters in IMA policy and IMA indeed measured everything while Keylime attest the digests according to its own policy.

I think the basic principle of the dont_measure rules, is that the files in the pseudo filesystems are kernel-controlled, meaning that they don't have random content but they have to be formatted according to what the kernel expects (needs to be verified if it is the case). Sure, also tmpfs is skipped, but in this case the initial state is that the volume is empty and it is the running system filling it. It is more a problem of run-time integrity, rather than load-time.

Quoted 5 lines

Keylime would filter and ignore certain files based on its own directories and file filtering, and such ignored files would only appear in IMA log once as long as the system is not rebooted. Now the issue arises: 1. if the file being moved within the same filesystem, it will never re-appear in IMA logs even with further invocations, as IMA treated them the exact same file. This may allow an

Yes, we are not giving trusted path guarantees. In the past there was a patch set from Dmitry Kasatkin about directory protection
(https://lwn.net/Articles/574221/), but the work didn't progress.

What matters from the IMA point of view is what the process reads, as it has the potential of corrupting the process. From where data are read, it is not relevant for the purpose of assessing whether or not the process got access to malicious data.

Quoted 6 lines

attack to persist throughout until a fresh reboot. 2. In case of a long-lived system which has patched a vulnerable version of one software, the old, vulnerable version which has been in the IMA log before will not appear in case of further activation before a reboot. Thus, we believe that the design which measures each file once may in some cases not reflect a comprehensive state of the machine to meet runtime attestation needs.

Yes, we still need to have a good rollback detection, for example by adding a measurement of outdated binaries. We still need to come up with a good solution.

Quoted 6 lines

The other issue we run into is script invocation. We find this is tricky as we realize that scripts being too versatile and hard to enforce the attestation upon execution, and executing them directly (through shebang) versus passing it to interpreters/shell as arguments results in a drastically different attestation result as the latter only attests the interpreter binary itself. While a naive solution would be turning on attestation for file read operations

Quoted 8 lines

in IMA policy or use SELinux file types to facilitate, however, we suspect it would still be an unmanageable task with unbearable performance. As the nature of the problem is essentially to distinguish code from data, the only reasonable solution we currently have thought is to have interpreters themselves to do the task, and indicate IMA what is code through API. Alternatively, the only probable way would be any attestation tool eventually had to have their own kernel modules and extended file types for IMA policy, and decide on what to be measured in separate components.

Michael Salakun upstreamed a patch set to let the interpreters query the kernel (also IMA) on whether or not a script should be executed:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/

Following on that, Mimi upstreamed a patch:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c?h=v6.14-rc2&id=95b3cdafd7cb74414070893445a9b731793f7b55

that makes IMA measure scripts even if they are passed as argument to the interpreter.

All the interpreters need to be extended to make such kernel query, but potentially scripts would be measured regardless of how they are invoked.

Roberto

Quoted 9 lines

We wonder whether there is or has been discussions around these questions. If so, we would like to learn more about any ongoing efforts or plan on changing the current situation, or if not, would like to hear the opinions from the kernel community regarding the two issues.

Best regards,

--
Nicholas Wang

maintainer
#2 lore raw
In reply to Wang, Nicholas
Quoted 20 lines · Nicholas

Linux-integrity community,

Hi, I'm Nicholas Wang from UIUC, and we are researching the potential challenges of a remote runtime attestation tool using IMA, Keylime, under a simulated deployment environment. In the process, we conducted multiple experiments, and we encountered some issues that we realize may not be able to be solved entirely in userspace.

To sum up the first issue, IMA may not reflect the whole picture of invocation or activation history. In particular, we are in question about "Once the earlier measurements are verified, there is no need to verify them again" according to IMA event log documentation. First off, Keylime uses directories or paths for matching and ignoring files in their policy file; in IMA policy, "dont_measure" filters out filesystems. We see two potential scenarios in which malicious actors may silently bypass the attestation. We assume Keylime user does not use "dont_measure" filters in IMA policy and IMA indeed measured everything while Keylime attest the digests according to its own policy. Keylime would filter and ignore certain files based on its own directories and file filtering, and such ignored files would only appear in IMA log once as long as the system is not rebooted. Now the issue arises: 1. if the file being moved

Quoted 8 lines

within the same filesystem, it will never re-appear in IMA logs even with further invocations, as IMA treated them the exact same file. This may allow an attack to persist throughout until a fresh reboot. 2. In case of a long-lived system which has patched a vulnerable version of one software, the old, vulnerable version which has been in the IMA log before will not appear in case of further activation before a reboot. Thus, we believe that the design which measures each file once may in some cases not reflect a comprehensive state of the machine to meet runtime attestation needs.

Hi Nicholas,

Can you explain what you mean by "patched"? In general, software packages on long-lived systems can and would be updated (e.g. dnf, apt). The new software would be a different inode and would be measured on first access.

There's been discussion on resetting the measured/appraised flags after a configurable period of time, but nobody has actually submitted patches. There were a couple of ideas:
- Walk the rb tree to reset the measured/appraised flags. (Obsolete)
- Include a timestamp in the iint to detect "expired" measured/appraised flags on access.

I welcome a patch set that enables re-measuring/re-appraising files.

Quoted 15 lines

The other issue we run into is script invocation. We find this is tricky as we realize that scripts being too versatile and hard to enforce the attestation upon execution, and executing them directly (through shebang) versus passing it to interpreters/shell as arguments results in a drastically different attestation result as the latter only attests the interpreter binary itself. While a naive solution would be turning on attestation for file read operations in IMA policy or use SELinux file types to facilitate, however, we suspect it would still be an unmanageable task with unbearable performance. As the nature of the problem is essentially to distinguish code from data, the only reasonable solution we currently have thought is to have interpreters themselves to do the task, and indicate IMA what is code through API. Alternatively, the only probable way would be any attestation tool eventually had to have their own kernel modules and extended file types for IMA policy, and decide on what to be measured in separate components.

Perfect timing. As Roberto mentioned, you should look at Mickaël Salaün's "[PATCH v23 0/8] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC)" patch set. It was upstreamed in the current open window (6.14).

Mimi

Quoted 10 lines

We wonder whether there is or has been discussions around these questions. If so, we would like to learn more about any ongoing efforts or plan on changing the current situation, or if not, would like to hear the opinions from the kernel community regarding the two issues.

Best regards,

--
Nicholas Wang

#3 lore raw

Hi,

Thank you both Roberto and Mimi for your timely replies! I have been discussing with our collaborators since and we believe the information definitely helps us more on understanding the issue from IMA's perspective. While I cannot immediately give a comprehensive reply, I can quickly clarify some of it whichever I can.

Quoted 33 lines · Mimi
Quoted 23 lines · Nicholas

Linux-integrity community,

Hi, I'm Nicholas Wang from UIUC, and we are researching the potential challenges of a remote runtime attestation tool using IMA, Keylime, under a
simulated deployment environment. In the process, we conducted multiple experiments, and we encountered some issues that we realize may not be able to be solved entirely in userspace.

To sum up the first issue, IMA may not reflect the whole picture of invocation or activation history. In particular, we are in question about "Once the earlier measurements are verified, there is no need to verify them again" according to IMA event log documentation. First off, Keylime uses directories or paths for matching and ignoring files in their policy file; in IMA policy, "dont_measure" filters out filesystems. We see two potential scenarios in which malicious actors may silently bypass the attestation. We assume Keylime user does not use "dont_measure" filters in IMA policy and IMA indeed measured everything while Keylime attest the digests according to its own policy. Keylime would filter and ignore certain files based on its own directories and file filtering, and such ignored files would only appear in IMA log once as long as the system is not rebooted. Now the issue arises: 1. if the file being moved within the same filesystem, it will never re-appear in IMA logs even with further

Quoted 8 lines

invocations, as IMA treated them the exact same file. This may allow an attack to persist throughout until a fresh reboot. 2. In case of a long-lived system which has patched a vulnerable version of one software, the old, vulnerable version which has been in the IMA log before will not appear in case of further activation before a reboot. Thus, we believe that the design which measures each file once may in some cases not reflect a comprehensive state of the machine to meet runtime attestation needs.

Quoted 5 lines

Hi Nicholas,

Can you explain what you mean by "patched"? In general, software packages on long-lived systems can and would be updated (e.g. dnf, apt). The new software would be a different inode and would be measured on first access.

By patched I meant exactly updated to a patched version, and I believe in most cases your arguments should hold: old executable is either directly overwritten, or been deleted and then replaced with new version by the package manager. HOWEVER, I believe the inode assumption does not apply to the scenarios I tried to describe. In case 1, assuming attacker "moves" the file, inode would stay the same, result would be that executable being executed in a new directory without reflecting in the IMA log; In case 2, assuming a software is updated, new binary now has a new inode, and is executed therefore attested by IMA after update. IMA log now shows an entry of the vulnerable version, as well as an entry of the updated version, with the same path. Now if attacker replace updated executable with the previous vulnerable version at the exact same path, based on our testing, further execution of the vulnerable version would never cause a third entry to appear in IMA log, regardless inode is same or different (as long as it has identical path to the first (vulnerable version exec.) IMA log entry).

Quoted 8 lines

There's been discussion on resetting the measured/appraised flags after a configurable period of time, but nobody has actually submitted patches. There were a couple of ideas: - Walk the rb tree to reset the measured/appraised flags. (Obsolete) - Include a timestamp in the iint to detect "expired" measured/appraised flags on access.

I welcome a patch set that enables re-measuring/re-appraising files.

Thanks for the information and we will look into the past discussions and further discuss with our team, see if we would propose a feasible solution and potentially submit a patch set to upstream.

Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 7 lines

The other issue we run into is script invocation. We find this is tricky as we realize that scripts being too versatile and hard to enforce the attestation upon execution, and executing them directly (through shebang) versus passing it to interpreters/shell as arguments results in a drastically different attestation result as the latter only attests the interpreter binary itself. While a naive solution would be turning on attestation for file read operations in IMA policy or use SELinux file

Quoted 8 lines

types to facilitate, however, we suspect it would still be an unmanageable task with unbearable performance. As the nature of the problem is essentially to distinguish code from data, the only reasonable solution we currently have thought is to have interpreters themselves to do the task, and indicate IMA what is code through API. Alternatively, the only probable way would be any attestation tool eventually had to have their own kernel modules and extended file types for IMA policy, and decide on what to be measured in separate components.

Quoted 15 lines

Perfect timing. As Roberto mentioned, you should look at Mickaël Salaün's "[PATCH v23 0/8] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC)" patch set. It was upstreamed in the current open window (6.14).

Mimi

Quoted 9 lines

We wonder whether there is or has been discussions around these questions. If so, we would like to learn more about any ongoing efforts or plan on changing the current situation, or if not, would like to hear the opinions from the kernel community regarding the two issues.

Best regards,

--
Nicholas Wang

--
Nicholas Wang

maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 48 lines · Nicholas

Hi,

Thank you both Roberto and Mimi for your timely replies! I have been discussing with our collaborators since and we believe the information definitely helps us more on understanding the issue from IMA's perspective. While I cannot immediately give a comprehensive reply, I can quickly clarify some of it whichever I can.

Quoted 33 lines · Mimi
Quoted 23 lines · Nicholas

Linux-integrity community,

Hi, I'm Nicholas Wang from UIUC, and we are researching the potential challenges of a remote runtime attestation tool using IMA, Keylime, under a
simulated deployment environment. In the process, we conducted multiple experiments, and we encountered some issues that we realize may not be able to be solved entirely in userspace.

To sum up the first issue, IMA may not reflect the whole picture of invocation or activation history. In particular, we are in question about "Once the earlier measurements are verified, there is no need to verify them again" according to IMA event log documentation. First off, Keylime uses directories or paths for matching and ignoring files in their policy file; in IMA policy, "dont_measure" filters out filesystems. We see two potential scenarios in which malicious actors may silently bypass the attestation. We assume Keylime user does not use "dont_measure" filters in IMA policy and IMA indeed measured everything while Keylime attest the digests according to its own policy. Keylime would filter and ignore certain files based on its own directories and file filtering, and such ignored files would only appear in IMA log once as long as the system is not rebooted. Now the issue arises: 1. if the file being moved within the same filesystem, it will never re-appear in IMA logs even with further

Quoted 8 lines

invocations, as IMA treated them the exact same file. This may allow an attack to persist throughout until a fresh reboot. 2. In case of a long-lived system which has patched a vulnerable version of one software, the old, vulnerable version which has been in the IMA log before will not appear in case of further activation before a reboot. Thus, we believe that the design which measures each file once may in some cases not reflect a comprehensive state of the machine to meet runtime attestation needs.

Quoted 5 lines

Hi Nicholas,

Can you explain what you mean by "patched"?  In general, software packages on long-lived systems can and would be updated (e.g. dnf, apt).  The new software would be a different inode and would be measured on first access.

Quoted 15 lines

By patched I meant exactly updated to a patched version, and I believe in most cases your arguments should hold: old executable is either directly overwritten, or been deleted and then replaced with new version by the package manager. HOWEVER, I believe the inode assumption does not apply to the scenarios I tried to describe. In case 1, assuming attacker "moves" the file, inode would stay the same, result would be that executable being executed in a new directory without reflecting in the IMA log; In case 2, assuming a software is updated, new binary now has a new inode, and is executed therefore attested by IMA after update. IMA log now shows an entry of the vulnerable version, as well as an entry of the updated version, with the same path. Now if attacker replace updated executable with the previous vulnerable version at the exact same path, based on our testing, further execution of the vulnerable version would never cause a third entry to appear in IMA log, regardless inode is same or different (as long as it has identical path to the first (vulnerable version exec.) IMA log entry).

Hi Nicholas,

Right, the renamed file (case 1) would not be re-measured unless the file was also modified. As Roberto explained, the file name is part of the directory, not metadata associated with the inode. Refer to the getdents man page.

The case 2 concern was addressed by enabling CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE. For an explanation, please refer to commit 52c208397c24 ("IMA: support for duplicate measurement records") patch description.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines

There's been discussion on resetting the measured/appraised flags after a configurable period of time, but nobody has actually submitted patches. There were a couple of ideas: - Walk the rb tree to reset the measured/appraised flags. (Obsolete) - Include a timestamp in the iint to detect "expired" measured/appraised flags on access.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

I welcome a patch set that enables re-measuring/re-appraising files.

Thanks for the information and we will look into the past discussions and further discuss with our team, see if we would propose a feasible solution and potentially submit a patch set to upstream.

Sounds good.

Mimi