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net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows

PATCH Superseded Dan Carpenter 4 participants 6 messages Nov 30, 2020 – Dec 3, 2020 1 message not in the archive

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#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows

In reply to a message not in the archive

From: "kiyin(尹亮)" <[email protected]>

The .x25_addr[] address comes from the user and is not necessarily NUL terminated. This leads to a couple problems. The first problem is that the strlen() in x25_bind() can read beyond the end of the buffer.

The second problem is more subtle and could result in memory corruption. The call tree is:
x25_connect()
--> x25_write_internal()

      --> x25_addr_aton()

The .x25_addr[] buffers are copied to the "addresses" buffer from x25_write_internal() so it will lead to stack corruption.

The x25 protocol only allows 15 character addresses so putting a NUL terminator as the 16th character is safe and obviously preferable to reading out of bounds.

---

 net/x25/af_x25.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/x25/af_x25.c +3 -0
index 0bbb283f23c9..3180f15942fe 100644
@@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ static int x25_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr[X25_ADDR_LEN - 1] = '\0';
+
 	/* check for the null_x25_address */
 	if (strcmp(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, null_x25_address.x25_addr)) {
 
@@ -779,6 +781,7 @@ static int x25_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = -ENETUNREACH;
+	addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr[X25_ADDR_LEN - 1] = '\0';
 	rt = x25_get_route(&addr->sx25_addr);
 	if (!rt)
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Dan Carpenter

From: "kiyin(尹亮)" <[email protected]>

The .x25_addr[] address comes from the user and is not necessarily NUL terminated. This leads to a couple problems. The first problem is that the strlen() in x25_bind() can read beyond the end of the buffer.

The second problem is more subtle and could result in memory corruption. The call tree is:
x25_connect()
--> x25_write_internal()

Quoted 9 lines
      --> x25_addr_aton()

The .x25_addr[] buffers are copied to the "addresses" buffer from x25_write_internal() so it will lead to stack corruption.

The x25 protocol only allows 15 character addresses so putting a NUL terminator as the 16th character is safe and obviously preferable to reading out of bounds.

OK, I see the potential danger. I'm just wondering what is the better approach here to counteract it:
1. check if the string is terminated or exceeds the maximum allowed length and report an error if necessary.
2. always terminate the string at byte 15 as you suggested.

Quoted 30 lines

---

 net/x25/af_x25.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/x25/af_x25.c +3 -0
index 0bbb283f23c9..3180f15942fe 100644
@@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ static int x25_bind(struct socket *sock, struct
 sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr[X25_ADDR_LEN - 1] = '\0';
+
 	/* check for the null_x25_address */
 	if (strcmp(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, null_x25_address.x25_addr)) {
@@ -779,6 +781,7 @@ static int x25_connect(struct socket *sock, struct
 sockaddr *uaddr,
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = -ENETUNREACH;
+	addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr[X25_ADDR_LEN - 1] = '\0';
 	rt = x25_get_route(&addr->sx25_addr);
 	if (!rt)

goto out;

#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows

The .x25_addr[] address comes from the user and is not necessarily NUL terminated. This leads to a couple problems. The first problem is that the strlen() in x25_bind() can read beyond the end of the buffer.

The second problem is more subtle and could result in memory corruption. The call tree is:
x25_connect()
--> x25_write_internal()

      --> x25_addr_aton()

The .x25_addr[] buffers are copied to the "addresses" buffer from x25_write_internal() so it will lead to stack corruption.

Verify that the strings are NUL terminated and return -EINVAL if they are not.

---
The first patch put a NUL terminator on the end of the string and this patch returns an error instead. I don't have a strong preference, which patch to go with.

 net/x25/af_x25.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/x25/af_x25.c +4 -2
index 9232cdb42ad9..d41fffb2507b 100644
@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static int x25_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 	int len, i, rc = 0;
 
 	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_x25) ||
-	    addr->sx25_family != AF_X25) {
+	    addr->sx25_family != AF_X25 ||
+	    strnlen(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, X25_ADDR_LEN) = X25_ADDR_LEN) {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -769,7 +770,8 @@ static int x25_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_x25) ||
-	    addr->sx25_family != AF_X25)
+	    addr->sx25_family != AF_X25 ||
+	    strnlen(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, X25_ADDR_LEN) = X25_ADDR_LEN)
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = -ENETUNREACH;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
#4 lore raw

RE: [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows(Internet mail)

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maintainer Acked-by on v2 1/1
#5 lore raw
In reply to Dan Carpenter
Quoted 54 lines · Dan Carpenter

The .x25_addr[] address comes from the user and is not necessarily NUL terminated. This leads to a couple problems. The first problem is that the strlen() in x25_bind() can read beyond the end of the buffer.

The second problem is more subtle and could result in memory corruption.
The call tree is:
x25_connect()
--> x25_write_internal()

      --> x25_addr_aton()

The .x25_addr[] buffers are copied to the "addresses" buffer from x25_write_internal() so it will lead to stack corruption.

Verify that the strings are NUL terminated and return -EINVAL if they are not.

---
The first patch put a NUL terminator on the end of the string and this patch returns an error instead. I don't have a strong preference, which
patch to go with.

 net/x25/af_x25.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/x25/af_x25.c +2 -1
index 9232cdb42ad9..d41fffb2507b 100644
@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static int x25_bind(struct socket *sock, struct
 sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 	int len, i, rc = 0;
 
 	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_x25) ||
-	    addr->sx25_family != AF_X25) {
+	    addr->sx25_family != AF_X25 ||
+	    strnlen(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, X25_ADDR_LEN) = X25_ADDR_LEN) 
 {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
net/x25/af_x25.c +2 -1
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -769,7 +770,8 @@ static int x25_connect(struct socket *sock, struct
 sockaddr *uaddr,
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_x25) ||
-	    addr->sx25_family != AF_X25)
+	    addr->sx25_family != AF_X25 ||
+	    strnlen(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, X25_ADDR_LEN) = X25_ADDR_LEN)
 		goto out;
 
Quoted 1 line

rc = -ENETUNREACH;

maintainer Applied
#6 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · On Wed, 02 Dec 2020 10:27:18 +0100 Martin Schiller wrote:
Quoted 14 lines · Dan Carpenter

The .x25_addr[] address comes from the user and is not necessarily NUL terminated. This leads to a couple problems. The first problem is that the strlen() in x25_bind() can read beyond the end of the buffer.

The second problem is more subtle and could result in memory corruption.
The call tree is:
x25_connect()
--> x25_write_internal()

      --> x25_addr_aton()  

The .x25_addr[] buffers are copied to the "addresses" buffer from x25_write_internal() so it will lead to stack corruption.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Verify that the strings are NUL terminated and return -EINVAL if they are not.

Applied, thanks!