mesh: Add features of Segmented Control message
PATCH v3 4/4 mesh: Add features of Segmented Control message
According to Mesh Protocol v1.1, with the addition of Transport Control messages with variable length PDU such as 'Friend Subscription List Add' and 'Friend Subscription List Remove', it is necessary to support segmentation in the Lower Transport layer because the Upper Transport Control PDU can be larger than the size of a single Network PDU.
This is achieved by performing the segmentation function for Transport Control messages, where the segmentation of Transport Control messages is the same as for Access messages, but with different message fields and lengths, so the segmentation is controlled by branching.
It was written to perform the function as little as possible without changing the existing design. We avoided modifying arguments outside of static functions, and kept the existing working design unchanged. However, some macro definitions had to be modified because they were written based on Access messages, so we changed them to work by comparing the Transport Control message flag.
This commit does not support segmentation for control messages as a friend of Low Power Nodes. This should be added later.
--- mesh/crypto.c | 69 +++++----- mesh/net.c | 279 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- mesh/net.h | 33 ++++- unit/test-mesh-crypto.c | 6 +- 4 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 139 deletions(-)
mesh/crypto.c +40 -29
@@ -532,7 +532,8 @@ bool mesh_crypto_packet_build(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl, uint8_t *packet, uint8_t *packet_len) { uint32_t hdr; -size_t n; +size_t hdr_offset =9 ; +size_t payload_offset =10 ;if (seq >SEQ_MASK )return false;
@@ -543,50 +544,44 @@ bool mesh_crypto_packet_build(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl,l_put_be16 (src, packet +5 );l_put_be16 (dst, packet +7 ); - n =9 ; -if (!ctl) { -uint32_t tmp = segmented ?0x1 :0 ; + hdr = (segmented ?0x1 :0 ) <<SEG_HDR_SHIFT ; + +if (segmented) { + hdr |= (seqZero &SEQ_ZERO_MASK ) <<SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT ; + hdr |= (segO &SEG_MASK ) <<SEGO_HDR_SHIFT ; + hdr |= (segN &SEG_MASK ) <<SEGN_HDR_SHIFT ; + payload_offset +=3 ; + } - hdr = tmp <<SEG_HDR_SHIFT ; +if (!ctl) { hdr |= (key_aid &KEY_ID_MASK ) <<KEY_HDR_SHIFT ;if (segmented) { hdr |= szmic <<SZMIC_HDR_SHIFT ; - hdr |= (seqZero &SEQ_ZERO_MASK ) <<SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT ; - hdr |= (segO &SEG_MASK ) <<SEGO_HDR_SHIFT ; - hdr |= (segN &SEG_MASK ) <<SEGN_HDR_SHIFT ; } -l_put_be32 (hdr, packet + n); - -/* Only first octet is valid for unsegmented messages */ -if (segmented) - n +=4 ; -else - n +=1 ; - -memcpy (packet + n, payload, payload_len); - -l_put_be32 (0x00000000 , packet + payload_len + n); -if (packet_len) - *packet_len = payload_len + n +4 ; }else {if ((opcode &OPCODE_MASK ) != opcode)return false; - hdr = opcode <<KEY_HDR_SHIFT ; -l_put_be32 (hdr, packet + n); - n +=1 ; + hdr |= opcode <<OPCODE_HDR_SHIFT ; + } + +l_put_be32 (hdr, packet + hdr_offset); -memcpy (packet + n, payload, payload_len); - n += payload_len; +memcpy (packet + payload_offset, payload, payload_len); -l_put_be64 (0x0000000000000000 , packet + n); +if (!ctl) { +l_put_be32 (0x00000000 , packet + payload_offset + payload_len);if (packet_len) - *packet_len = n +8 ; + *packet_len = payload_offset + payload_len +4 ; + }else { +l_put_be64 (0x0000000000000000 , packet + payload_offset + + payload_len); +if (packet_len) + *packet_len = payload_offset + payload_len +8 ; } -return true; }
@@ -665,6 +660,22 @@ bool mesh_crypto_packet_parse(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,if (payload_len) *payload_len = packet_len -9 ; + }else if (is_segmented) { +if (seqZero) + *seqZero = (hdr >>SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT ) & +SEQ_ZERO_MASK ; + +if (segO) + *segO = (hdr >>SEGO_HDR_SHIFT ) &SEG_MASK ; + +if (segN) + *segN = (hdr >>SEGN_HDR_SHIFT ) &SEG_MASK ; + +if (payload) + *payload = packet +13 ; + +if (payload_len) + *payload_len = packet_len -13 ; }else {if (payload) *payload = packet +10 ;
mesh/net.c +178 -101
444 lines not on this page · raw message
mesh/net.h +26 -7
@@ -26,13 +26,32 @@ struct mesh_node;#define KEY_CACHE_SIZE 64#define FRND_CACHE_MAX 32 -#define MAX_UNSEG_LEN 15/* msg_len == 11 + sizeof(MIC) */ -#define MAX_SEG_LEN 12/* UnSeg length - 3 octets overhead */ -#define SEG_MAX (seg, len) ((!seg && len <= MAX_UNSEG_LEN) ? 0 : \ - (((len) - 1) / MAX_SEG_LEN)) - -#define SEG_OFF (seg) ((seg) * MAX_SEG_LEN) -#define MAX_SEG_TO_LEN (seg) ((seg) ? SEG_OFF((seg) + 1) : MAX_UNSEG_LEN) +#define MAX_CTL_UNSEG_LEN 11/* msg_len == 7 + sizeof(MIC) */ +#define MAX_CTL_SEG_LEN 8/* UnSeg length - 3 octets overhead */ +#define CTL_SEG_MAX (seg, len) ((!(seg) && (len) <= MAX_CTL_UNSEG_LEN) ? 0 : \ + (((len) - 1) / MAX_CTL_SEG_LEN)) + +#define MAX_ACC_UNSEG_LEN 15/* msg_len == 11 + sizeof(MIC) */ +#define MAX_ACC_SEG_LEN 12/* UnSeg length - 3 octets overhead */ +#define ACC_SEG_MAX (seg, len) ((!(seg) && (len) <= MAX_ACC_UNSEG_LEN) ? 0 : \ + (((len) - 1) / MAX_ACC_SEG_LEN)) + +#define MAX_UNSEG_LEN (ctl) ((ctl) ? MAX_CTL_UNSEG_LEN : MAX_ACC_UNSEG_LEN) +#define MAX_SEG_LEN (ctl) ((ctl) ? MAX_CTL_SEG_LEN : MAX_ACC_SEG_LEN) +#define SEG_MAX (ctl, seg, len) ((ctl) ? CTL_SEG_MAX((seg), (len)) : \ + ACC_SEG_MAX((seg), (len))) + +#define CTL_SEG_OFF (seg) ((seg) * MAX_CTL_SEG_LEN) +#define MAX_CTL_SEG_TO_LEN (seg) ((seg) ? CTL_SEG_OFF((seg) + 1) : \ + MAX_CTL_UNSEG_LEN) + +#define ACC_SEG_OFF (seg) ((seg) * MAX_ACC_SEG_LEN) +#define MAX_ACC_SEG_TO_LEN (seg) ((seg) ? ACC_SEG_OFF((seg) + 1) : \ + MAX_ACC_UNSEG_LEN) + +#define SEG_OFF (ctl, seg) ((ctl) ? CTL_SEG_OFF(seg) : ACC_SEG_OFF(seg)) +#define MAX_SEG_TO_LEN (ctl, seg) ((ctl) ? MAX_CTL_SEG_TO_LEN(seg) : \ + MAX_ACC_SEG_TO_LEN(seg))#define SEGMENTED 0x80#define UNSEGMENTED 0x00
unit/test-mesh-crypto.c +4 -2
@@ -1087,7 +1087,8 @@ static void check_encrypt(const struct mesh_crypto_test *keys) app_msg =l_util_from_hexstring (keys->app_msg, &app_msg_len);if (keys->szmic) { - seg_max =SEG_MAX (keys->segmented, app_msg_len +8 ); + seg_max =SEG_MAX (false, keys->segmented, + app_msg_len +8 ); enc_msg =l_malloc (app_msg_len +8 ); status = mesh_crypto_payload_encrypt(aad, app_msg,
@@ -1097,7 +1098,8 @@ static void check_encrypt(const struct mesh_crypto_test *keys) keys->szmic, keys->akf ? app_key : dev_key); }else { - seg_max =SEG_MAX (keys->segmented, app_msg_len +4 ); + seg_max =SEG_MAX (false, keys->segmented, + app_msg_len +4 ); enc_msg =l_malloc (app_msg_len +4 ); status = mesh_crypto_payload_encrypt(aad, app_msg,
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2.34.1