netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix OOB read in sip_skip_whitespace()
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix OOB read in sip_skip_whitespace()
Summary: sip_skip_whitespace() in net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c has two distinct "ran out of data" outcomes but only signals one of them to its caller. When every remaining byte up to the buffer limit is a space or tab, its own for-loop condition ends the loop and it returns dptr == limit, instead of the NULL that its sibling sip_follow_continuation() returns on its own "no more data" path. ct_sip_get_header() only checks for the NULL case; the next statement dereferences *dptr before checking it against limit, causing a 1-byte out-of-bounds read.
Affected version: Linux mainline, commit 3d6d817622b0a9721e3cc404df 3469171582be13 (2026-08-12), current as of this report. Verified identical (empty diff) against origin/master of torvalds/linux on 2026-08-13; no prior fix exists upstream.
File / function: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c, sip_skip_whitespace() (around line 422), consumed by ct_sip_get_header() (around line 493).
Impact: out-of-bounds read of 1 byte past the end of the SIP payload buffer. Confirmed by AddressSanitizer against a userspace harness linking the unmodified, extracted parsing functions from this file. In the real call path (sip_help_tcp()), dptr/datalen come directly from the linearized skb with no slack: dptr = skb->data + dataoff, datalen = skb->len - dataoff, so limit is exactly skb->data + skb->len, the true end of packet data -- unlike some other conntrack helpers that operate on a slightly larger scratch buffer, there is no spare byte here. Impact is a potential crash (denial of service) if the byte read falls on an unmapped page.
Conditions: requires the nf_conntrack_sip helper to be attached to a TCP/UDP flow on the SIP port (5060 by default, or any port configured via the "ports" module parameter) -- a commonly enabled helper on routers/firewalls doing VoIP/SIP NAT. No authentication or established call state is required; ct_sip_get_header() is the primary header lookup used throughout SIP request/response and SDP processing, called for every recognized header (Via, From, To, Contact, CSeq, Expires, Content-Length, Call-Id).
Reproducer: a 7-byte input triggers the bug directly against ct_sip_get_header(): a recognized header name followed only by spaces/tabs running exactly to the end of the payload, no colon present. Tested against the exact kernel source (functions extracted verbatim, unmodified, from net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c) compiled into a small userspace harness, reusing the kernel's own in4_pton()/in6_pton()/hex_to_bin() (net/core/utils.c, lib/hexdump.c) rather than reimplementing them. AddressSanitizer reports:
heap-buffer-overflow, READ of size 1
#0 ct_sip_get_header nf_conntrack_sip.c:493
Also reproduced organically via libFuzzer+ASAN against the same extracted functions (ct_sip_parse_request, ct_sip_get_header, ct_sip_parse_header_uri, ct_sip_parse_param, ct_sip_parse_address_param, ct_sip_parse_numerical_param, ct_sip_get_sdp_header, ct_sip_parse_sdp_addr), from a well-formed INVITE seed within ~2200 executions.
The reproducer bytes are not attached to this message; available on request.
Details: sip_skip_whitespace() is:
static const char *sip_skip_whitespace(const char *dptr, const char *limit)
{
for (; dptr < limit; dptr++) {
if (*dptr == ' ' || *dptr == '\t')
continue;
if (*dptr != '\r' && *dptr != '\n')
break;
dptr = sip_follow_continuation(dptr, limit);
break;
}
return dptr;
}If every byte from dptr to limit is a space/tab, the for loop exits via its own condition with dptr == limit, which is returned as-is -- a different "no more data" signal than the NULL returned by sip_follow_continuation() on its own exhausted-input path. The caller, ct_sip_get_header(), only guards the NULL case:
dptr = sip_skip_whitespace(dptr, limit);
if (dptr == NULL)
break;
if (*dptr != ':' || ++dptr >= limit) /* OOB read when dptr == limit */
break;Before reporting, I checked every netfilter-devel thread touching nf_conntrack_sip.c from 2026-03 through 2026-08 (~15 threads, via marc.info since patchwork.ozlabs.org sits behind an anti-bot challenge), plus targeted searches for ct_sip_get_header and sip_skip_whitespace. None address this issue. Summary of what does exist, all distinct root causes, all already merged or in unrelated
threads: port parsing after the address in sip_parse_port (merged, present in current mainline); a datalen integer-wraparound in sip_help_tcp()'s NAT rewrite-delta computation (KASAN symptom lands in ct_sip_get_header, but the root cause is in the caller); a NULL skb_dst() crash in set_expected_rtp_rtcp() under tc-ingress/openvswitch (two patches, unrelated SDP external-media code path); a memory-leak fix around nf_ct_expect_alloc() ordering in process_register_request(); a cosmetic u_int*_t -> standard-types rename. None of these touch sip_skip_whitespace() or the dptr check that follows it in ct_sip_get_header().
Proposed fix (tested: reproducer no longer crashes under ASAN; 500000-iteration fuzz regression run clean, no behavior change on the existing corpus): make sip_skip_whitespace() report both "no more data" outcomes the same way, matching the convention its own sip_follow_continuation() already uses and that both existing call sites already check for:
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c +1 -1
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static const char *sip_skip_whitespace(const char *dptr, const char *limit) dptr =sip_follow_continuation (dptr, limit);break ; } -return dptr; +return dptr < limit ? dptr :NULL ; }