open_by_handle_at and CVE-2020-35501
Hello,
There was an announcement on the oss-security mail list a week ago:
https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2021/q1/155
regarding auditing of the open_by_handle_at system call. They are using a rule like this:
-a always,exit -F path=/path/to/file -F perm=wr
and expecting that we have an audit record when opened using the name_to_handle_at/open_by_handle_at syscall pair.
I run a study of my system by adding audit rules for each of the syscalls. What I found was that the name_to_handle_at seems to be used by systemd and it only passes a relative file name. This makes the audit event next to useless.
And interestingly I have no events for open_by_handle_at in spite of systemd preparing to use it. So, I don't have any idea what the audit event would look like.
In any event, they are asking what upstream audit is going to do about this? In looking into open_by_handle_at, I found that it was used in an exploit against docker some time ago where it was possible to bruteforce the handle. Of cource you need CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH to call it.
https://www.programmersought.com/article/54607139735/
I think we should do something, not sure what. Simply adding the syscall to the open perms machinery will get an event, but probably nothing usable. You could at least see who is doing it and with what program.
In the meantime, people can use the syscall rules to audit for any occurance. I think the default rules do include it.
Cheers,
-Steve
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Quoted 8 lines · Steve Grubb
Hello,
There was an announcement on the oss-security mail list a week ago:
https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2021/q1/155
regarding auditing of the
open_by_handle_atsystem call ...
The *at() syscalls are a known issue with respect to audit; we have a few open GH issues related to the topic, the oldest appears to be the one below:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/9
Quoted 1 line
... In any event, they are asking what upstream audit is going to do about this?
I recognize it sounds a bit trite here, but "patches are always welcome". Basically someone needs to have the time and motivation to look into this and put forth some patches that we can discuss and iterate over. The problem is that historically audit has attracted very few kernel developers outside the occasional development push by a distro preparing a OS release for a certification effort. I was just lamenting this fact on a private mail thread with some other kernel developers a couple of weeks ago ...
Signature · 7 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Hello Paul,
Quoted 7 lines · EST Paul Moore
Quoted 6 lines · Steve Grubb
Hello,
There was an announcement on the oss-security mail list a week ago:
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
regarding auditing of the
open_by_handle_atsystem call ...The
*at()syscalls are a known issue with respect to audit; we have a few open GH issues related to the topic, the oldest appears to be the one below:
Yes, that is true. But this is a bit different because at least those *at functions get triggered by -F perm=xrwa. Should one or both of the syscalls be added to the filter? And name_to_handle_at() appears to be yet another kernel system call who's arg4 has something that is security relevant.
So, it looks like there are probably 3 work items: 1) add syscall(s) to the perm filter, 2) add an auxiliary record to grab the arg4 flags variable, 3) add to the list of functions that have *at path resolution issues.
-Steve
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 2 lines
... In any event, they are asking what upstream audit is going to do about this?
I recognize it sounds a bit trite here, but "patches are always welcome". Basically someone needs to have the time and motivation to look into this and put forth some patches that we can discuss and iterate over. The problem is that historically audit has attracted very few kernel developers outside the occasional development push by a distro preparing a OS release for a certification effort. I was just lamenting this fact on a private mail thread with some other kernel developers a couple of weeks ago ...
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