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Behaviour of /proc/self/fd/NN

DISCUSSION Nikolaus Rath 2 participants 6 messages Nov 14, 2018 VFS

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#0 lore raw

Hi,

If I understand Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.md correctly, then the "symlinks" in /proc/self/fd/NN are not true symlinks but just presented as such to userspace. Does this mean that I can access (e.g., open(), setxattr(), or chmod()) these files without the possibility of race conditions? I.e., there is no way for someone to rename the target after the kernel has "looked up" the target but before the operation is applied?

Secondly, under which conditions can I open the files in /proc? Does this still work if the destination file has been unlinked? Does it always follow renames? What if I mounted something over the destination?

(Background: I'm trying to ascertain how well a true bind mount can be emulated by a passthrough FUSE filesystem).

Best,
-Nikolaus

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#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Nikolaus Rath

Hi,

If I understand Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.md correctly, then the "symlinks" in /proc/self/fd/NN are not true symlinks but just presented as such to userspace. Does this mean that I can access (e.g., open(), setxattr(), or chmod()) these files without the possibility of race conditions? I.e., there is no way for someone to rename the target after the kernel has "looked up" the target but before the operation is applied?

Exactly. The only limitation is that if the target is a symlink (fd
opened with O_PATH) then the neither the symlink following, nor the non-following variants will do the right thing (see *xattr ops in passthrough_ll for example).

Quoted 2 lines

Secondly, under which conditions can I open the files in /proc? Does this still work if the destination file has been unlinked?

Yes.

Quoted 2 lines

Does it
always follow renames? What if I mounted something over the destination?

It works in all those cases.

Thanks,
Miklos

#2 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Miklos Szeredi
Quoted 9 lines · Nikolaus Rath

Hi,

If I understand Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.md correctly, then the "symlinks" in /proc/self/fd/NN are not true symlinks but just presented as such to userspace. Does this mean that I can access (e.g., open(), setxattr(), or chmod()) these files without the possibility of race conditions? I.e., there is no way for someone to rename the target after the kernel has "looked up" the target but before the operation is applied?

Quoted 4 lines

Exactly. The only limitation is that if the target is a symlink (fd
opened with O_PATH) then the neither the symlink following, nor the non-following variants will do the right thing (see *xattr ops in passthrough_ll for example).

A workaround for that case would be to use readlink() and then act on that without eg lgetxattr. That would introduce a race condition, but it would work where that's not a concern, right?

That said, I also noticed the following code to handle utimens for symlinks:

res = utimensat(inode->fd, "", tv,

		AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
if (res == -1 && errno == EINVAL) {
	/* Sorry, no race free way to set times on symlink. */
	errno = EPERM;
}

So it looks as it at least utimensat() does the right thing under at least some conditions...?

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Secondly, under which conditions can I open the files in /proc? Does this still work if the destination file has been unlinked?

Yes.

Quoted 2 lines

Does it
always follow renames? What if I mounted something over the destination?

It works in all those cases.

Did you mean it *always* works, or it works in the cases I listed but there are other cases where it can fail?

Thanks!
-Nikolaus

Signature · 3 lines
GPG Fingerprint: ED31 791B 2C5C 1613 AF38 8B8A D113 FCAC 3C4E 599F

             »Time flies like an arrow, fruit flies like a Banana.«
#3 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Nikolaus Rath
Quoted 11 lines · Miklos Szeredi
Quoted 9 lines · Nikolaus Rath

Hi,

If I understand Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.md correctly, then the "symlinks" in /proc/self/fd/NN are not true symlinks but just presented as such to userspace. Does this mean that I can access (e.g., open(), setxattr(), or chmod()) these files without the possibility of race conditions? I.e., there is no way for someone to rename the target after the kernel has "looked up" the target but before the operation is applied?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Exactly. The only limitation is that if the target is a symlink (fd
opened with O_PATH) then the neither the symlink following, nor the non-following variants will do the right thing (see *xattr ops in passthrough_ll for example).

A workaround for that case would be to use readlink() and then act on that without eg lgetxattr. That would introduce a race condition, but it would work where that's not a concern, right?

Right, readlink + op would work most of the time, but in the corner cases you describe (deleted, race with rename, overmount of ancestor) it would not, and the result would be arbitrary, failure is not guaranteed.

Quoted 4 lines

That said, I also noticed the following code to handle utimens for symlinks:

res = utimensat(inode->fd, "", tv,

Quoted 8 lines
                AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
if (res == -1 && errno == EINVAL) {
        /* Sorry, no race free way to set times on symlink. */
        errno = EPERM;
}

So it looks as it at least utimensat() does the right thing under at least some conditions...?

Not yet upstream. Here's the patch:

https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=154158217810354&w=2

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Secondly, under which conditions can I open the files in /proc? Does this still work if the destination file has been unlinked?

Yes.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Does it
always follow renames? What if I mounted something over the destination?

It works in all those cases.

Did you mean it *always* works, or it works in the cases I listed but there are other cases where it can fail?

It always works if symlink following is enabled, because internally it just copies the logical path that the open file refers to.

Thanks,
Miklos

#4 lore raw

[Trimming Cc since this gets fuse specific]

Quoted 25 lines · Miklos Szeredi
Quoted 24 lines · Nikolaus Rath
Quoted 9 lines · Miklos Szeredi
Quoted 7 lines · Nikolaus Rath

If I understand Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.md correctly, then the "symlinks" in /proc/self/fd/NN are not true symlinks but just presented as such to userspace. Does this mean that I can access (e.g., open(), setxattr(), or chmod()) these files without the possibility of race conditions? I.e., there is no way for someone to rename the target after the kernel has "looked up" the target but before the operation is applied?

Quoted 4 lines

Exactly. The only limitation is that if the target is a symlink (fd
opened with O_PATH) then the neither the symlink following, nor the non-following variants will do the right thing (see *xattr ops in passthrough_ll for example).

That said, I also noticed the following code to handle utimens for symlinks:

res = utimensat(inode->fd, "", tv,

                AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
if (res == -1 && errno == EINVAL) {
        /* Sorry, no race free way to set times on symlink. */
        errno = EPERM;
}
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

So it looks as it at least utimensat() does the right thing under at least some conditions...?

Not yet upstream. Here's the patch:

https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=154158217810354&w=2

Thanks!

Is there any reason that we don't try to open *files* as O_RDWR or such and only fall back to O_PATH if that doesn't work? That should enable us to use fsetxattr et all in many cases, right? The kernel already does permission checking (so that's not a concern), and we should never need a dirfd for a file...

Best,
-Nikolaus

Signature · 3 lines
GPG Fingerprint: ED31 791B 2C5C 1613 AF38 8B8A D113 FCAC 3C4E 599F

             »Time flies like an arrow, fruit flies like a Banana.«
#5 lore raw
Quoted 35 lines · Nikolaus Rath

[Trimming Cc since this gets fuse specific]

Quoted 25 lines · Miklos Szeredi
Quoted 24 lines · Nikolaus Rath
Quoted 9 lines · Miklos Szeredi
Quoted 7 lines · Nikolaus Rath

If I understand Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.md correctly, then the "symlinks" in /proc/self/fd/NN are not true symlinks but just presented as such to userspace. Does this mean that I can access (e.g., open(), setxattr(), or chmod()) these files without the possibility of race conditions? I.e., there is no way for someone to rename the target after the kernel has "looked up" the target but before the operation is applied?

Quoted 4 lines

Exactly. The only limitation is that if the target is a symlink (fd
opened with O_PATH) then the neither the symlink following, nor the non-following variants will do the right thing (see *xattr ops in passthrough_ll for example).

That said, I also noticed the following code to handle utimens for symlinks:

res = utimensat(inode->fd, "", tv,

                AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
if (res == -1 && errno == EINVAL) {
        /* Sorry, no race free way to set times on symlink. */
        errno = EPERM;
}
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

So it looks as it at least utimensat() does the right thing under at least some conditions...?

Not yet upstream. Here's the patch:

https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=154158217810354&w=2

Quoted 7 lines

Thanks!

Is there any reason that we don't try to open *files* as O_RDWR or such and only fall back to O_PATH if that doesn't work? That should enable us to use fsetxattr et all in many cases, right? The kernel already does permission checking (so that's not a concern), and we should never need a dirfd for a file...

That wouldn't help the symlink case though.

I'm not saying passthrough_ll coudln't be improved, in fact it probably will need to be, since it's the base of the soon to be announced virtio-fs server...

Thanks,
Miklos