Proposal: install policy.conf
Now that we've completed a version of seuser, and somewhat of a follow on to the comments in
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=selinux&m=102192722227366&w=2, I have a specific proposal for operationally managing policies.
I suggest that policy.conf be installed in /etc/security as the "official installed" policy (rather than /ss_policy), that load_policy or equivalent commands effectively do a "checkpolicy -o /etc/security/policy.conf; install -m 644 -o root -g root policy /ss_policy; load_policy /ss_policy" as the only accepted means of installing a new policy.
What we'd like to see is /etc/security/policy.conf treated as the definitive policy for a system, allowing all sorts of tools to change, create, or otherwise manage all or portions of the installed policy.
Frank
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Quoted 3 lines · Frank Mayer
What we'd like to see is
/etc/security/policy.conftreated as the definitive policy for a system, allowing all sorts of tools to change, create, or otherwise manage all or portions of the installed policy.
Do we want to include something in the compiled policy (currently installed into /etc/security/selinux/policy.VERSION) that helps to associate it with a particular policy.conf? For example, we could compute a message digest of the policy.conf file and include it in the compiled policy header.
With regard to the issue of using policy.conf as the basis for tools that are used to create or change the policy, I'm somewhat concerned by the loss in modularity provided by the separation of .te files and the loss in higher level abstraction provided by the macros. I suppose that we could extend the base language itself to provide direct constructs for "modules" and for some of the higher level abstractions currently expressed via macros.
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Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
[email protected]
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Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 3 lines · Frank Mayer
What we'd like to see is
/etc/security/policy.conftreated as the definitive policy for a system, allowing all sorts of tools to change, create, or otherwise manage all or portions of the installed policy.Do we want to include something in the compiled policy (currently installed into
/etc/security/selinux/policy.VERSION) that helps to associate it with a particular policy.conf? For example, we could compute a message digest of the policy.conf file and include it in the compiled policy header.
I agree with your comments below, which is why I can't see any benefit in what you suggest above. But of course if there's demand for such a thing, then why not.
Perhaps people who have different requirements should consider writing their own checkpolicy program? Then you could reserve a section of the file for an identifier with a length field so they can store whatever they like,
Quoted 7 lines
With regard to the issue of using policy.conf as the basis for tools that are used to create or change the policy, I'm somewhat concerned by the loss in modularity provided by the separation of .te files and the loss in higher level abstraction provided by the macros. I suppose that we could extend the base language itself to provide direct constructs for "modules" and for some of the higher level abstractions currently expressed via macros.
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Quoted 7 lines
With regard to the issue of using policy.conf as the basis for tools that are used to create or change the policy, I'm somewhat concerned by the loss in modularity provided by the separation of .te files and the loss in higher level abstraction provided by the macros. I suppose that we could extend the base language itself to provide direct constructs for "modules" and for some of the higher level abstractions currently expressed via macros.
I guess this is the real point. The make directory structure is one, dare I say somewhat limited, structure for building policies. I would hope we would not force compatibility at that level.
We're writing near-term tools (and others I understand are looking at longer term tools with richerlanguage semantics). In either case, I think we will find
compatibility with the make directory difficult and limiting. For example, we
considered adding a role management tab in our seuser tool. However, given our
attempt to maintain compatibility with the make directory, and given that that
directory was recently restructured to scatter the role definitions throughout the
directory structure (understandably for better management within the make structure), we gave up on roles. Users on the other hand are placed in a single file in
the make directory.
What I would rather do is break backward compatibility with the make directory,
and maintain separate, local copies of users and role definitions, and as part of the
policy install/load/update process, put those definitions into policy.conf directly.
Frank
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Quoted 7 lines · Frank Mayer
What we'd like to see is
/etc/security/policy.conftreated as the definitive policy for a system, allowing all sorts of tools to change, create, or otherwise manage all or portions of the installed policy.
My colleagues and I agree with this suggestion: It puts the "definitive policy" in a single location, with an unambiguous semantics. We think it's desirable to separate the actual policy itself from a particular approach to policy management (embodied in the current multi-file, build process), which may or may not turn out to be the ideal way to understand and construct policies.
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> replied (in part):
Quoted 8 lines
Do we want to include something in the compiled policy (currently installed into
/etc/security/selinux/policy.VERSION) that helps to associate it with a particular policy.conf? For example, we could compute a message digest of the policy.conf file and include it in the compiled policy header.
Definitely: that way, analysis proving that a policy.conf satisfies some security goal can be tied to an actual running system in an unambiguous, remotely verifiable way (e.g. with the help of TCPA-enabled hardware).
Cheers --
Joshua
Signature · 11 lines
Joshua D. Guttman <[email protected]> MITRE, Mail Stop S119 Office: +1 781 271 2654 202 Burlington Rd. Cell: +1 781 526 5713 Bedford, MA 01730-1420 USA Fax: +1 781 271 8953 -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.