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SGI UV: uv_ptc_proc_write security hole

PATCH Applied Cliff Wickman 2 participants 2 messages Jun 23, 2008 x86

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PATCH 1/1 SGI UV: uv_ptc_proc_write security hole

From: Cliff Wickman <[email protected]>

Someone could write 0 bytes to /proc/sgi_uv/ptc_statistics, causing
optstr[count - 1] = '\0';
to write to who-knows-where.

(Andi Kleen noticed this need from a patch I sent for
similar code in the ia64 world (sn2_ptc_proc_write()).)

(count less than zero is not possible here, as count is unsigned)

Diffed against 2.6.26-rc6

---
 arch/x86/kernel/tlb_uv.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/tlb_uv.c +1 -1
Index: linux/arch/x86/kernel/tlb_uv.c
===================================================================
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ static ssize_t uv_ptc_proc_write(struct 
 	long newmode;
 	char optstr[64];
 
-	if (count > 64)
+	if (count == 0 || count > sizeof(optstr))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (copy_from_user(optstr, user, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
Applied
#1 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Cliff Wickman

From: Cliff Wickman <[email protected]>

Someone could write 0 bytes to /proc/sgi_uv/ptc_statistics, causing
optstr[count - 1] = '\0';
to write to who-knows-where.

Quoted 6 lines

(Andi Kleen noticed this need from a patch I sent for
similar code in the ia64 world (sn2_ptc_proc_write()).)

(count less than zero is not possible here, as count is unsigned)

Diffed against 2.6.26-rc6

applied to tip/x86/uv - thanks Cliff.

Ingo