SGI UV: uv_ptc_proc_write security hole
PATCH 1/1 SGI UV: uv_ptc_proc_write security hole
From: Cliff Wickman <[email protected]>
Someone could write 0 bytes to /proc/sgi_uv/ptc_statistics, causing
optstr[count - 1] = '\0';
to write to who-knows-where.
(Andi Kleen noticed this need from a patch I sent for
similar code in the ia64 world (sn2_ptc_proc_write()).)
(count less than zero is not possible here, as count is unsigned)
Diffed against 2.6.26-rc6
--- arch/x86/kernel/tlb_uv.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/tlb_uv.c +1 -1
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ static ssize_t uv_ptc_proc_write(structlong newmode;char optstr[64 ]; -if (count >64 ) +if (count ==0 || count >sizeof (optstr))return -EINVAL ;if (copy_from_user (optstr, user, count))return -EFAULT ;
Ingo Molnar
AppliedQuoted 7 lines · Cliff Wickman
From: Cliff Wickman <[email protected]>
Someone could write 0 bytes to
/proc/sgi_uv/ptc_statistics, causing
optstr[count - 1] = '\0';
to write to who-knows-where.
Quoted 6 lines
(Andi Kleen noticed this need from a patch I sent for
similar code in the ia64 world (sn2_ptc_proc_write()).)(count less than zero is not possible here, as count is unsigned)
Diffed against 2.6.26-rc6
applied to tip/x86/uv - thanks Cliff.
Ingo