ima: related TPM device driver interal kernel interface
James Morris <[email protected]> wrote on 05/20/2005 04:32:58 PM:
Quoted 12 lines · Reiner Sailer
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Why are you using LSM for this?
LSM should be used for comprehensive access control frameworks which significantly enhance or even replace existing Unix DAC security.
I see LSM is framework for security. IMA is an architecture that enforces access control in a different way than SELinux. IMA guarantees that executable content is measured and accounted for before it is loaded and can access (and possibly corrupt) system resources.
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LSM is an access control framework. Your (few) LSM hooks always return zero, and don't enforce access control at all. You even have a separate measurement hook for modules.
I suggest implementing all of your code via distinct measurement hooks, so measurement becomes a distinct and well defined security entity within the kernel.
This is certainly possible. This means that there will be 5 more hooks (such as the one in kernel/module.c, see PATCH 4 of 4).
If the kernel maintainers are in favor of this approach, then there is not much that stands against this.
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LSM should not be used just because it has a few hooks in the right place for your code.
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- James
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Thanks
Reiner
Quoted 21 lines · Reiner Sailer
James Morris <[email protected]> wrote on 05/20/2005 04:32:58 PM:
Quoted 12 lines · Reiner Sailer
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Why are you using LSM for this?
LSM should be used for comprehensive access control frameworks which significantly enhance or even replace existing Unix DAC security.
I see LSM is framework for security. IMA is an architecture that enforces access control in a different way than SELinux. IMA guarantees that executable content is measured and accounted for before it is loaded and can access (and possibly corrupt) system resources.
Quoted 7 lines
LSM is an access control framework. Your (few) LSM hooks always return zero, and don't enforce access control at all. You even have a separate measurement hook for modules.
I suggest implementing all of your code via distinct measurement hooks, so measurement becomes a distinct and well defined security entity within the kernel.
Quoted 5 lines
This is certainly possible. This means that there will be 5 more hooks (such as the one in
kernel/module.c, see PATCH 4 of 4).If the kernel maintainers are in favor of this approach, then there is not much that stands against this.
Yes, and it will force you to justify those hooks :)
Good luck,
greg k-h