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ima: related TPM device driver interal kernel interface

PATCH Reiner Sailer 2 participants 2 messages May 20, 2005 – May 21, 2005

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James Morris <[email protected]> wrote on 05/20/2005 04:32:58 PM:

Quoted 12 lines · Reiner Sailer
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Why are you using LSM for this?

LSM should be used for comprehensive access control frameworks which significantly enhance or even replace existing Unix DAC security.

I see LSM is framework for security. IMA is an architecture that enforces access control in a different way than SELinux. IMA guarantees that executable content is measured and accounted for before it is loaded and can access (and possibly corrupt) system resources.

Quoted 7 lines

LSM is an access control framework. Your (few) LSM hooks always return zero, and don't enforce access control at all. You even have a separate measurement hook for modules.

I suggest implementing all of your code via distinct measurement hooks, so measurement becomes a distinct and well defined security entity within the kernel.

This is certainly possible. This means that there will be 5 more hooks (such as the one in kernel/module.c, see PATCH 4 of 4).

If the kernel maintainers are in favor of this approach, then there is not much that stands against this.

Quoted 4 lines

LSM should not be used just because it has a few hooks in the right place for your code.

Quoted 8 lines

- James

Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>

Thanks
Reiner

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Quoted 21 lines · Reiner Sailer

James Morris <[email protected]> wrote on 05/20/2005 04:32:58 PM:

Quoted 12 lines · Reiner Sailer
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Why are you using LSM for this?

LSM should be used for comprehensive access control frameworks which significantly enhance or even replace existing Unix DAC security.

I see LSM is framework for security. IMA is an architecture that enforces access control in a different way than SELinux. IMA guarantees that executable content is measured and accounted for before it is loaded and can access (and possibly corrupt) system resources.

Quoted 7 lines

LSM is an access control framework. Your (few) LSM hooks always return zero, and don't enforce access control at all. You even have a separate measurement hook for modules.

I suggest implementing all of your code via distinct measurement hooks, so measurement becomes a distinct and well defined security entity within the kernel.

Quoted 5 lines

This is certainly possible. This means that there will be 5 more hooks (such as the one in kernel/module.c, see PATCH 4 of 4).

If the kernel maintainers are in favor of this approach, then there is not much that stands against this.

Yes, and it will force you to justify those hooks :)

Good luck,

greg k-h