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3 of 5 IMA: LSM-based measurement code

PATCH Reiner Sailer 2 participants 2 messages Jun 15, 2005

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Chris Wright <[email protected]> wrote on 06/15/2005 05:53:01 PM:

Quoted 10 lines · * [email protected] ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 7 lines · Chris Wright
Quoted 3 lines

The primary purpose of the hooks is access control. Some of them, of course, are helpers to keep labels coherent. IIRC, James objected because the measurement data was simply collected from these hooks.

Ok, so to be clear, any module which does not directly impose some form of access control is not eligible for an LSM?

That's exactly the intention, yes.

Chris,

Access control is a very broad term. Before I go into details, I would like to make clear that I do not have a preference for or against LSM. We are working hard to make the functionality available and it does not matter to the user where IMA will be located. The true potential of Trusted Computing will only show with experimenting going on outside the research labs. IMA can help by being one modest building block for experiments only if it is broadly available.

Regarding the access control discussion, one can map (almost) anything onto access control. There are (many) people that teach today that the whole security issue is about access control. The question is:
controlling access of whom to what?

IMA does control access by forcing measurements on executables before they are loaded. Access control is more than saying yes or no at some point on the code path. IMA enables remote parties to figure out whether a system has some (usage dependent) properties. This can serve as the basis for controlling such systems' access to resources. IMA supplies input into a remote Access Control Decision Function.

These properties neither justify IMA to be excluded as LSM, nor force IMA to be an LSM.

Quoted 2 lines

thanks,
-chris

Thanks
Reiner

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Quoted 7 lines · * Reiner Sailer ([email protected]) wrote:

Access control is a very broad term. Before I go into details, I would like to make clear that I do not have a preference for or against LSM. We are working hard to make the functionality available and it does not matter to the user where IMA will be located. The true potential of Trusted Computing will only show with experimenting going on outside the research labs. IMA can help by being one modest building block for experiments only if it is broadly available.

Yeah, understood.

Quoted 4 lines

Regarding the access control discussion, one can map (almost) anything onto access control. There are (many) people that teach today that the whole security issue is about access control. The question is:
controlling access of whom to what?

OK, let's look at it another way. Say your access control model used kernel profiling data as part of policy. It still makes sense to let oprofile do that collection, and the LSM is just a consumer of that data when it makes an acces control decision. Perhaps a klunky analogy, but do you see the idea?

Quoted 6 lines

IMA does control access by forcing measurements on executables before they are loaded. Access control is more than saying yes or no at some point on the code path. IMA enables remote parties to figure out whether a system has some (usage dependent) properties. This can serve as the basis for controlling such systems' access to resources. IMA supplies input into a remote Access Control Decision Function.

Right, the measurement data collection stand alone, which no access control decisions in sight (talking about the IMA LSM now), is what tipped the scale.

thanks,
-chris