xfs: fix FORTIFY_SOURCE complaints about log item memcpy
RFC PATCH 1/1 xfs: fix FORTIFY_SOURCE complaints about log item memcpy
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Starting in 6.1, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE checks the length parameter of memcpy. Unfortunately, it doesn't handle VLAs correctly:
------------[ cut here ]------------ memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 48) of single field "dst_bui_fmt" at fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c:628 (size 16) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1804618 at fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c:628 xlog_recover_bui_commit_pass2+0x124/0x160 [xfs] CPU: 3 PID: 1804618 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc1-djwx #rc1 3cfc72b0505a6cb79c5c4f0cd6795f002233c489 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:xlog_recover_bui_commit_pass2+0x124/0x160 [xfs] Code: 68 ff ff ff b9 10 00 00 00 4c 89 e6 4c 89 04 24 48 c7 c2 50 20 7c a0 48 c7 c7 88 20 7c a0 c6 05 f4 31 13 00 01 e8 a6 3c 03 e1 <0f> 0b 4c 8b 04 24 e9 37 ff ff ff 4c 8b 4c 24 40 48 89 fa 41 b8 91 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000999ba30 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88829180bc00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff81e18f2b RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff8882ac881840 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82060660 R10: 000000000008cce8 R11: 000000000008cd18 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: 000000010000001d R14: ffff8882a9504000 R15: ffff8882a95040a0 FS: 00007f455dc5d800(0000) GS:ffff888477d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055a54338ed10 CR3: 0000000285832005 CR4: 00000000001706a0 Call Trace: <TASK> xlog_recover_items_pass2+0x4e/0xc0 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] xlog_recover_commit_trans+0x305/0x350 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] xlog_recovery_process_trans+0xa5/0xe0 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] xlog_recover_process_data+0x81/0x130 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] xlog_do_recovery_pass+0x19b/0x720 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] xlog_do_log_recovery+0x62/0xc0 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] xlog_do_recover+0x33/0x1e0 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] xlog_recover+0xda/0x190 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] xfs_log_mount+0x14c/0x360 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] ? register_shrinker+0x7f/0x90 xfs_mountfs+0x51b/0xa60 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] ? xfs_filestream_get_parent+0x80/0x80 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] xfs_fs_fill_super+0x6ca/0x970 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] ? xfs_open_devices+0x1e0/0x1e0 [xfs 4f10e8ff409327812fa306e09a95edf69716aed1] get_tree_bdev+0x175/0x280 vfs_get_tree+0x1a/0x80 ? capable+0x2f/0x50 path_mount+0x6f5/0xa30 __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7f455de56eae Code: 48 8b 0d 85 1f 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 52 1f 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffffc92dcf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f455de56eae RDX: 000055eeb7473f80 RSI: 000055eeb7473fc0 RDI: 000055eeb7473fa0 RBP: 000055eeb7473cc0 R08: 000055eeb7473f20 R09: 000055eeb7474cd0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000055eeb7473f80 R14: 000055eeb7473fa0 R15: 000055eeb7473cc0 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
From this definition of struct xfs_bui_log_format, we see that it has a VLA at the end of the structure:
struct xfs_bui_log_format {
uint16_t bui_type; /* bui log item type */
uint16_t bui_size; /* size of this item */
uint32_t bui_nextents; /* # extents to free */
uint64_t bui_id; /* bui identifier */
struct xfs_map_extent bui_extents[]; /* array of extents to bmap */
};The error message tells us that the computed size is 16 bytes, which is only enough bytes to reach the start of the VLA area. 48 bytes is the size of the log item with a VLA length of 1. We know the memcpy going on here is correct because I've run all the log recovery tests with KASAN turned on, and it does not detect actual memory misuse.
My first attempt to work around this problem was to cast the arguments to memcpy to (char *). Unfortunately, it turns out that gcc 11's implementation of __builtin_object_size is smart enough to see through the cast, so the error does not go away.
My second attempt changed the cast to a (void *), with the same results as the first attempt.
My third attempt was to pass the void pointers directly into xfs_bui_copy_format, but it turns out that gcc 11 inlines the function into its caller, which means that __builtin_object_size sees the log item (and not a void pointer) and the error does not go away.
My fourth attempt collapsed the _copy_format function into the callers directly, which at least turned the fortify errors into compile-time errors. As a side effect, we drop 80 LOC, do all the recovered log intent item validation before we start allocating things, and the error reports now consistently tell us which filesystem experienced log corruption.
This is the fifth attempt at fixing the problem, which fixes the problem by creating a stupid helper function to extract the recovered log item data from the recovery buffer that sets up the "unsafe" memory copy. It also sets up a memcpy_array helper to fix the complaints when we copy log intent item data as part of relogging an log intent item.
From commit 54d9469bc515 ("fortify: Add run-time WARN for cross-field memcpy()") which introduces this mess:
"However, one of the dynamic-sized destination cases is irritatingly unable to be detected by the compiler: when using memcpy() to target a composite struct member which contains a trailing flexible array struct. For example:
struct wrapper {
int foo;
char bar;
struct normal_flex_array embedded;
};struct wrapper *instance;
...
/* This will incorrectly WARN when len > sizeof(instance->embedded) */ memcpy(&instance->embedded, src, len);
"These cases end up appearing to the compiler to be sized as if the flexible array had 0 elements. :( For more details see:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=101832
https://godbolt.org/z/vW6x8vh4P ".
I don't /quite/ think that turning off CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is the right solution here, but in the meantime this is causing a lot of fstest failures, and I really need to get back to fixing user reported data corruption problems instead of dealing with gcc stupidity. :(
--- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_log_recover.h | 19 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/xfs/xfs_attr_item.c | 38 +++++++---------------------------- fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c | 41 +++++++++----------------------------- fs/xfs/xfs_extfree_item.c | 6 +++--- fs/xfs/xfs_linux.h | 19 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/xfs/xfs_refcount_item.c | 41 +++++++++----------------------------- fs/xfs/xfs_rmap_item.c | 42 +++++++++------------------------------ 7 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_log_recover.h +19 -0
@@ -99,6 +99,25 @@ struct xlog_recover_item {const struct xlog_recover_item_ops *ri_ops; }; +/* +* Copy recovered log item data into the @dst buffer, allowing for @dst to be a +* log intent item with a VLAs at the end. gcc11 is smart enough for +* __builtin_object_size to see through void * arguments to static inline +* function but not to detect VLAs, which leads to kernel warnings. +*/ +static inline void +xlog_recover_item_copybuf ( +void *dst, +const struct xlog_recover_item *ri, +unsigned int buf_idx) +{ +ASSERT (buf_idx < ri->ri_cnt); + +unsafe_memcpy (dst, ri->ri_buf[buf_idx].i_addr, + ri->ri_buf[buf_idx].i_len, + VLA size detection broken on gcc11); +} +struct xlog_recover {struct hlist_node r_list;xlog_tid_t r_log_tid;/* log's transaction id */
fs/xfs/xfs_attr_item.c +8 -30
@@ -245,28 +245,6 @@ xfs_attri_init(return attrip; } -/* -* Copy an attr format buffer from the given buf, and into the destination attr -* format structure. -*/ -STATIC int -xfs_attri_copy_format ( -struct xfs_log_iovec *buf, -struct xfs_attri_log_format *dst_attr_fmt) -{ -struct xfs_attri_log_format *src_attr_fmt = buf->i_addr; -size_t len; - - len =sizeof (struct xfs_attri_log_format ); -if (buf->i_len != len) { -XFS_ERROR_REPORT (__func__,XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW ,NULL ); -return -EFSCORRUPTED ; - } - -memcpy ((char *)dst_attr_fmt, (char *)src_attr_fmt, len); -return 0 ; -} -static inline struct xfs_attrd_log_item *ATTRD_ITEM (struct xfs_log_item *lip) { return container_of(lip, struct xfs_attrd_log_item, attrd_item);
@@ -731,7 +709,7 @@ xlog_recover_attri_commit_pass2(struct xfs_attri_log_nameval *nv;const void *attr_value =NULL ;const void *attr_name; -int error; +size_t len; attri_formatp = item->ri_buf[0 ].i_addr; attr_name = item->ri_buf[1 ].i_addr;
@@ -747,6 +725,12 @@ xlog_recover_attri_commit_pass2(return -EFSCORRUPTED ; } + len =sizeof (struct xfs_attri_log_format ); +if (item->ri_buf[0 ].i_len != len) { +XFS_ERROR_REPORT (__func__,XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW , mp); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; + } +if (attri_formatp->alfi_value_len) attr_value = item->ri_buf[2 ].i_addr;
@@ -760,9 +744,7 @@ xlog_recover_attri_commit_pass2( attri_formatp->alfi_value_len); attrip =xfs_attri_init (mp, nv); - error =xfs_attri_copy_format (&item->ri_buf[0 ], &attrip->attri_format); -if (error) - goto out; +xlog_recover_item_copybuf (&attrip->attri_format, item,0 );/* * The ATTRI has two references. One for the ATTRD and one for ATTRI to
@@ -774,10 +756,6 @@ xlog_recover_attri_commit_pass2(xfs_attri_release (attrip);xfs_attri_log_nameval_put (nv);return 0 ; -out: -xfs_attri_item_free (attrip); -xfs_attri_log_nameval_put (nv); -return error; }/*
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +10 -31
69 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/xfs/xfs_extfree_item.c +3 -3
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ xfs_efi_copy_format(xfs_log_iovec_t *buf, xfs_efi_log_format_t *dst_efi_fmt) (src_efi_fmt->efi_nextents -1 ) *sizeof (xfs_extent_64_t);if (buf->i_len == len) { -memcpy ((char *)dst_efi_fmt, (char *)src_efi_fmt, len); +memcpy_array (dst_efi_fmt, src_efi_fmt,1 , len);return 0 ; }else if (buf->i_len == len32) {xfs_efi_log_format_32_t *src_efi_fmt_32 = buf->i_addr;
@@ -690,11 +690,11 @@ xfs_efi_item_relog( tp->t_flags |=XFS_TRANS_DIRTY ; efdp =xfs_trans_get_efd (tp,EFI_ITEM (intent), count); efdp->efd_next_extent = count; -memcpy (efdp->efd_format.efd_extents, extp, count *sizeof (*extp)); +memcpy_array (efdp->efd_format.efd_extents, extp, count,sizeof (*extp));set_bit (XFS_LI_DIRTY , &efdp->efd_item.li_flags); efip =xfs_efi_init (tp->t_mountp, count); -memcpy (efip->efi_format.efi_extents, extp, count *sizeof (*extp)); +memcpy_array (efip->efi_format.efi_extents, extp, count,sizeof (*extp));atomic_set (&efip->efi_next_extent, count);xfs_trans_add_item (tp, &efip->efi_item);set_bit (XFS_LI_DIRTY , &efip->efi_item.li_flags);
fs/xfs/xfs_linux.h +19 -0
@@ -254,4 +254,23 @@ int xfs_rw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, sector_t sector, unsigned int count,# define PTR_FMT "%p"#endif +/* +* Copy an array from @src into the @dst buffer, allowing for @dst to be a +* structure with a VLAs at the end. gcc11 is smart enough for +* __builtin_object_size to see through void * arguments to static inline +* function but not to detect VLAs, which leads to kernel warnings. +*/ +static inline int memcpy_array (void *dst,void *src,size_t nmemb,size_t size) +{ +size_t bytes; + +if (unlikely (check_mul_overflow (nmemb, size, &bytes))) { +ASSERT (0 ); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + + unsafe_memcpy(dst, src, bytes, VLA size detection broken on gcc11 ); +return 0 ; +} +#endif /* __XFS_LINUX__ */
fs/xfs/xfs_refcount_item.c +10 -31
66 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/xfs/xfs_rmap_item.c +10 -32
67 lines not on this page · raw message
Quoted 4 lines · Darrick J. Wong
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Starting in 6.1,
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCEchecks the length parameter of memcpy. Unfortunately, it doesn't handle VLAs correctly:
Nit-pick on terminology: these are "flexible array structures" (structures that end with a "flexible array member"); VLAs are a different (removed from the kernel) beast.
Quoted 1 line
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 48) of single field "
dst_bui_fmt" atfs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c:628(size 16)
Step right up; XFS is next to trip[1] this check. Let's get this fixed...
Quoted 3 lines
We know the memcpy going
on here is correct because I've run all the log recovery tests with KASAN turned on, and it does not detect actual memory misuse.
Yup, this is a false positive.
Quoted 8 lines
My first attempt to work around this problem was to cast the arguments [...]
My second attempt changed the cast to a (void *), with the same results [...]
My third attempt was to pass the void pointers directly into [...]
My fourth attempt collapsed the_copy_formatfunction into the callers [...]
The point here is to use a better API, which is fallible and has the ability to perform the bounds checking itself. I had proposed an initial version of this idea here[2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/?q=%22field-spanning+write%22
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/llvm/[email protected]/
Quoted 9 lines
"These cases end up appearing to the compiler to be sized as if the flexible array had 0 elements. :( For more details see:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=101832
https://godbolt.org/z/vW6x8vh4P ".I don't /quite/ think that turning off
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCEis the right solution here, but in the meantime this is causing a lot of fstest failures, and I really need to get back to fixing user reported data corruption problems instead of dealing with gcc stupidity. :(
I think XFS could be a great first candidate for using something close to the proposed flex_cpy() API. What do you think of replacing the memcpy() calls with something like this instead:
- if (buf->i_len == len) {
- memcpy(dst_bui_fmt, src_bui_fmt, len);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (buf->i_len == len &&
+ flex_cpy(dst_bui_fmt, src_bui_fmt,
+ bui_nextents, bui_extents) == 0)
return 0; XFS_ERROR_REPORT(__func__, XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW, NULL); return -EFSCORRUPTED;
To avoid passing in the element count and element array fields, the alias macros could be used:
struct xfs_bui_log_format {
uint16_t bui_type; /* bui log item type */
uint16_t bui_size; /* size of this item */
/* # extents to free */
DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY_ELEMENTS_COUNT(uint32_t, bui_nextents);
uint64_t bui_id; /* bui identifier */
/* array of extents to bmap */
DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY_ELEMENTS(struct xfs_map_extent, bui_extents);
};What do you think about these options? In the meantime, unsafe_memcpy() should be fine for v6.1.
BTW, this FORTIFY_SOURCE change was present in linux-next for the entire prior development cycle. Are the xfstests not run on -next kernels?
-Kees
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 14 lines · Darrick J. Wong
[...]
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +0
-13-/* -* Copy an BUI format buffer from the given buf, and into the destination -* BUI format structure. The BUI/BUD items were designed not to need any -* special alignment handling. -*/ -static int -xfs_bui_copy_format ( -struct xfs_log_iovec *buf, -struct xfs_bui_log_format *dst_bui_fmt) -{ -struct xfs_bui_log_format *src_bui_fmt; -uint len; -
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c static const struct xfs_item_ops xfs_bui_item_ops = { · line 633
Quoted 10 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +0
-10- src_bui_fmt = buf->i_addr; - len =xfs_bui_log_format_sizeof (src_bui_fmt->bui_nextents); - -if (buf->i_len == len) { -memcpy (dst_bui_fmt, src_bui_fmt, len); -return 0 ; - } -XFS_ERROR_REPORT (__func__,XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW ,NULL ); -return -EFSCORRUPTED ; -}
This is the place where flex_cpy() could be used:
flex_cpy(dst_bui_fmt, src_bui_fmt);
Quoted 6 lines
[...]
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +0
-0
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c xfs_bui_item_relog( · line 596
Quoted 8 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +1
-1@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ xfs_bui_item_relog(set_bit (XFS_LI_DIRTY , &budp->bud_item.li_flags); buip =xfs_bui_init (tp->t_mountp); -memcpy (buip->bui_format.bui_extents, extp, count *sizeof (*extp)); +memcpy_array (buip->bui_format.bui_extents, extp, count,sizeof (*extp));atomic_set (&buip->bui_next_extent, count);xfs_trans_add_item (tp, &buip->bui_item);set_bit (XFS_LI_DIRTY , &buip->bui_item.li_flags);
Looking more closely, I don't understand why this is treated as a flex array when it's actually fixed size:
xfs_bui_init():
buip = kmem_cache_zalloc(xfs_bui_cache, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
...
buip->bui_format.bui_nextents = XFS_BUI_MAX_FAST_EXTENTS;fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.h:#define XFS_BUI_MAX_FAST_EXTENTS 1
Quoted 9 lines
[...]
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +8
-0+/* +* Copy an array from @src into the @dst buffer, allowing for @dst to be a +* structure with a VLAs at the end. gcc11 is smart enough for +* __builtin_object_size to see through void * arguments to static inline +* function but not to detect VLAs, which leads to kernel warnings. +*/ +static inline int memcpy_array (void *dst,void *src,size_t nmemb,size_t size) +{
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c
Quoted 10 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +10
-0+size_t bytes; + +if (unlikely (check_mul_overflow (nmemb, size, &bytes))) { +ASSERT (0 ); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + + unsafe_memcpy(dst, src, bytes, VLA size detection broken on gcc11 ); +return 0 ; +}
This "unsafe_memcpy" isn't needed. FORTIFY won't warn on this copy:
the destination is a flex array member, not a flex array struct (i.e. __builtin_object_size() here will report "-1", rather than a fixed size). And while the type bounds checking for overflow is nice, it should also be checking the allocated size. (i.e. how large is "dst"? this helper only knows how large src is.)
-Kees
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 28 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 14 lines · Darrick J. Wong
[...]
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +0
-13-/* -* Copy an BUI format buffer from the given buf, and into the destination -* BUI format structure. The BUI/BUD items were designed not to need any -* special alignment handling. -*/ -static int -xfs_bui_copy_format ( -struct xfs_log_iovec *buf, -struct xfs_bui_log_format *dst_bui_fmt) -{ -struct xfs_bui_log_format *src_bui_fmt; -uint len; -fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c static const struct xfs_item_ops xfs_bui_item_ops = { · line 633
Quoted 10 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +0
-10- src_bui_fmt = buf->i_addr; - len =xfs_bui_log_format_sizeof (src_bui_fmt->bui_nextents); - -if (buf->i_len == len) { -memcpy (dst_bui_fmt, src_bui_fmt, len); -return 0 ; - } -XFS_ERROR_REPORT (__func__,XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW ,NULL ); -return -EFSCORRUPTED ; -}This is the place where
flex_cpy()could be used:
Quoted 1 line
flex_cpy(dst_bui_fmt, src_bui_fmt);
<nod>
Quoted 18 lines
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[...]
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +0
-0fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c xfs_bui_item_relog( · line 596
Quoted 8 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +1
-1@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ xfs_bui_item_relog(set_bit (XFS_LI_DIRTY , &budp->bud_item.li_flags); buip =xfs_bui_init (tp->t_mountp); -memcpy (buip->bui_format.bui_extents, extp, count *sizeof (*extp)); +memcpy_array (buip->bui_format.bui_extents, extp, count,sizeof (*extp));atomic_set (&buip->bui_next_extent, count);xfs_trans_add_item (tp, &buip->bui_item);set_bit (XFS_LI_DIRTY , &buip->bui_item.li_flags);Looking more closely, I don't understand why this is treated as a flex array when it's actually fixed size:
Quoted 6 lines
xfs_bui_init():buip = kmem_cache_zalloc(xfs_bui_cache, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); ... buip->bui_format.bui_nextents = XFS_BUI_MAX_FAST_EXTENTS;fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.h:#define
XFS_BUI_MAX_FAST_EXTENTS1
Yeah, after a few more iterations of this patchset I realized that *most* of the _relog functions are fine, it's only the one for EFI items that trips over the not-flex array[1] definition. I decided that the proper fix for that was simply to fix the field definition to follow the modern form for flex arrays.
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
[...]
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +17
-0+/* +* Copy an array from @src into the @dst buffer, allowing for @dst to be a +* structure with a VLAs at the end. gcc11 is smart enough for +* __builtin_object_size to see through void * arguments to static inline +* function but not to detect VLAs, which leads to kernel warnings. +*/ +static inline int memcpy_array (void *dst,void *src,size_t nmemb,size_t size) +{ +size_t bytes; + +if (unlikely (check_mul_overflow (nmemb, size, &bytes))) { +ASSERT (0 ); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + + unsafe_memcpy(dst, src, bytes, VLA size detection broken on gcc11 ); +return 0 ;
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
+}
This "
unsafe_memcpy" isn't needed. FORTIFY won't warn on this copy:
the destination is a flex array member, not a flex array struct (i.e.__builtin_object_size()here will report "-1", rather than a fixed size). And while the type bounds checking for overflow is nice, it should also be checking the allocated size. (i.e. how large is "dst"? this helper only knows how large src is.)
<nod> I realized that these helpers introducing unsafe memcpy weren't needed. Later on after chatting with dchinner a bit I came to the conclusion that we might as well convert most of the _copy_format functions to memcpy the structure head and flex array separately since that function is converting an ondisk log item into its in-memory representation, and some day we'll make those struct fields endian safe. They aren't now, and that's one of the (many) gaping holes that need fixing.
I sent my candidate fixes series to the list just now.
--D
Quoted 5 lines
-Kees
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 8 lines · Darrick J. Wong
<nod> I realized that these helpers introducing unsafe memcpy weren't needed. Later on after chatting with dchinner a bit I came to the conclusion that we might as well convert most of the
_copy_formatfunctions to memcpy the structure head and flex array separately since that function is converting an ondisk log item into its in-memory representation, and some day we'll make those struct fields endian safe. They aren't now, and that's one of the (many) gaping holes that need fixing.
Ah, perfect! Yeah, this is one of the other standard solutions -- header and flex array handled separately. I'm still working on APIs to handle the common cases, though. XFS probably will want to keep it separate as you've done.
Quoted 1 line
I sent my candidate fixes series to the list just now.
Thanks! I'll go check them out.
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 28 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 14 lines · Darrick J. Wong
[...]
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +0
-13-/* -* Copy an BUI format buffer from the given buf, and into the destination -* BUI format structure. The BUI/BUD items were designed not to need any -* special alignment handling. -*/ -static int -xfs_bui_copy_format ( -struct xfs_log_iovec *buf, -struct xfs_bui_log_format *dst_bui_fmt) -{ -struct xfs_bui_log_format *src_bui_fmt; -uint len; -fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c static const struct xfs_item_ops xfs_bui_item_ops = { · line 633
Quoted 10 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +0
-10- src_bui_fmt = buf->i_addr; - len =xfs_bui_log_format_sizeof (src_bui_fmt->bui_nextents); - -if (buf->i_len == len) { -memcpy (dst_bui_fmt, src_bui_fmt, len); -return 0 ; - } -XFS_ERROR_REPORT (__func__,XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW ,NULL ); -return -EFSCORRUPTED ; -}This is the place where
flex_cpy()could be used:
Quoted 1 line
flex_cpy(dst_bui_fmt, src_bui_fmt);
How does flex_cpy() know how much memory was allocated for dst_bui_fmt? Doesn't knowing this imply that we have to set the count field in dst_bui_fmt appropriately before flex_cpy() is called?
If this is the case, this flex_cpy() thing just looks like it's moving the problem around, not actually solving any problem in this code. If anything, it is worse, because it is coupling the size of the copy to a structure internal initialisation value that may be nowhere near the code that does the copy. That makes the code much harder to validate by reading it.
Indeed, by the time we get to the memcpy() above, we've validated length two ways, we allocated dst_bui_fmt to fit that length, and we know that the src_bui_fmt length is, well, length, because that's what the higher level container structure told us it's length was. And with memcpy() being passed that length, it is *obviously correct* to the reader.
Hence I don't see that this flex array copying stuff will make it harder to make mistakes, but ISTM that it'll make them harder to spot during review and audit...
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[...]
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +0
-0fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c xfs_bui_item_relog( · line 596
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fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +1
-1@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ xfs_bui_item_relog(set_bit (XFS_LI_DIRTY , &budp->bud_item.li_flags); buip =xfs_bui_init (tp->t_mountp); -memcpy (buip->bui_format.bui_extents, extp, count *sizeof (*extp)); +memcpy_array (buip->bui_format.bui_extents, extp, count,sizeof (*extp));atomic_set (&buip->bui_next_extent, count);xfs_trans_add_item (tp, &buip->bui_item);set_bit (XFS_LI_DIRTY , &buip->bui_item.li_flags);Looking more closely, I don't understand why this is treated as a flex array when it's actually fixed size:
Quoted 6 lines
xfs_bui_init():buip = kmem_cache_zalloc(xfs_bui_cache, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); ... buip->bui_format.bui_nextents = XFS_BUI_MAX_FAST_EXTENTS;fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.h:#define
XFS_BUI_MAX_FAST_EXTENTS1
We have a separation between on-disk format structure parsing template that implements the BUI/BUD code (i.e. same implementation as EFI, RUI, and CUI intents) and the runtime code that is currently only using a single extent in the flex array.
The use of template based implementations means modifications are simple (if repetitive) and we don't have to think about specific intent implementations differently when reasoning about extent-based intent defering and recovery.
Further, the high level code that creates BUIs could change to use multiple extents at any time. We don't want to have to rewrite the entire log item formatting and parsing code every time we change the number of extents we currently track in a given intent....
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[...]
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +17
-0+/* +* Copy an array from @src into the @dst buffer, allowing for @dst to be a +* structure with a VLAs at the end. gcc11 is smart enough for +* __builtin_object_size to see through void * arguments to static inline +* function but not to detect VLAs, which leads to kernel warnings. +*/ +static inline int memcpy_array (void *dst,void *src,size_t nmemb,size_t size) +{ +size_t bytes; + +if (unlikely (check_mul_overflow (nmemb, size, &bytes))) { +ASSERT (0 ); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + + unsafe_memcpy(dst, src, bytes, VLA size detection broken on gcc11 ); +return 0 ;
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+}
This "
unsafe_memcpy" isn't needed. FORTIFY won't warn on this copy:
the destination is a flex array member, not a flex array struct (i.e.__builtin_object_size()here will report "-1", rather than a fixed size). And while the type bounds checking for overflow is nice, it should also be checking the allocated size. (i.e. how large is "dst"? this helper only knows how large src is.)
The caller knows how large dst is - it's based on the verified size of the structure it is going to copy. Compile time checking the copy doesn't oblivate the need to perform runtime checking needed to to set up the copy correctly/safely...
Cheers,
Dave.
Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner [email protected]
Quoted 29 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 28 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 14 lines · Darrick J. Wong
[...]
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +0
-13-/* -* Copy an BUI format buffer from the given buf, and into the destination -* BUI format structure. The BUI/BUD items were designed not to need any -* special alignment handling. -*/ -static int -xfs_bui_copy_format ( -struct xfs_log_iovec *buf, -struct xfs_bui_log_format *dst_bui_fmt) -{ -struct xfs_bui_log_format *src_bui_fmt; -uint len; -fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c static const struct xfs_item_ops xfs_bui_item_ops = { · line 633
Quoted 10 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_item.c +0
-10- src_bui_fmt = buf->i_addr; - len =xfs_bui_log_format_sizeof (src_bui_fmt->bui_nextents); - -if (buf->i_len == len) { -memcpy (dst_bui_fmt, src_bui_fmt, len); -return 0 ; - } -XFS_ERROR_REPORT (__func__,XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW ,NULL ); -return -EFSCORRUPTED ; -}This is the place where
flex_cpy()could be used:
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flex_cpy(dst_bui_fmt, src_bui_fmt);How does
flex_cpy()know how much memory was allocated fordst_bui_fmt? Doesn't knowing this imply that we have to set the count field indst_bui_fmtappropriately beforeflex_cpy()is called?
Right -- this is why I had originally sent my API proposal with the *_dup helpers included as well. The much more common case is allocate/copy and allocate/deserialize. The case of doing flex-to-flex is odd, because it implies there was an external allocation step, etc. But, that said, allocation and bounds recording are usually pretty well tied together.
Quoted 3 lines
Hence I don't see that this flex array copying stuff will make it harder to make mistakes, but ISTM that it'll make them harder to spot during review and audit...
I think the transition to a fallible routine is an improvement, but yes, I expect flex_cpy() not to be used much compared to flex_dup(), or mem_to_flex_dup(), both of which collapse a great many steps and sanity checks into a single common, internally-consistent, and fallible operation.
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook