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strict 2

PATCH In review Russell Coker 2 participants 3 messages Jan 20, 2021 – Jan 21, 2021

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 strict 2

Second set of strict configuration patches. Ready for inclusion.

policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +21 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
===================================================================
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',`
 	dontaudit $1_t user_tty_device_t:chr_file ioctl;
 
 	kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t)
+	kernel_read_crypto_sysctls($1_t)
+	kernel_read_vm_overcommit_sysctl($1_t)
 	kernel_dontaudit_list_unlabeled($1_t)
 	kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_files($1_t)
 	kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_symlinks($1_t)
@@ -3552,6 +3554,25 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_runti
 ')
 
 ########################################
+## <summary>
+##     write user runtime socket files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##     <summary>
+##     Domain allowed access.
+##     </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`userdom_write_all_user_runtime_named_sockets',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute user_runtime_content_type;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 user_runtime_content_type:dir list_dir_perms;
+	allow $1 user_runtime_content_type:sock_file write;
+')
+
+########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	delete user runtime files
 ## </summary>
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +19 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
===================================================================
@@ -33,11 +33,22 @@ ifndef(`enable_mls',`
 # Local policy
 #
 
+allow sysadm_t self:netlink_generic_socket { create setopt bind write read };
+
+# for ptrace
+allow sysadm_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create write nlmsg_read read };
+
+allow sysadm_t self:capability audit_write;
+allow sysadm_t self:system status;
+
 corecmd_exec_shell(sysadm_t)
 
 corenet_ib_access_unlabeled_pkeys(sysadm_t)
 corenet_ib_manage_subnet_unlabeled_endports(sysadm_t)
 
+domain_getsched_all_domains(sysadm_t)
+
+dev_read_cpuid(sysadm_t)
 dev_read_kmsg(sysadm_t)
 
 mls_process_read_all_levels(sysadm_t)
@@ -55,6 +66,9 @@ init_admin(sysadm_t)
 userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(sysadm_t)
 userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(sysadm_t)
 
+# for systemd-analyze
+files_get_etc_unit_status(sysadm_t)
+
 ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',`
 	optional_policy(`
 		init_run_daemon(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
@@ -1121,6 +1135,10 @@ optional_policy(`
 ')
 
 optional_policy(`
+	systemd_dbus_chat_logind(sysadm_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
 	tboot_run_txtstat(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
 ')
 
@@ -1188,6 +1206,7 @@ optional_policy(`
 ')
 
 optional_policy(`
+	dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(sysadm_t)
 	usbmodules_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
 ')
 
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +5 -1
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
===================================================================
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
 	xserver_xsession_entry_type($2)
 	xserver_dontaudit_write_log($2)
 	xserver_stream_connect_xdm($2)
+	xserver_use_user_fonts($2)
 	# certain apps want to read xdm.pid file
 	xserver_read_xdm_runtime_files($2)
 	# gnome-session creates socket under /tmp/.ICE-unix/
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ interface(`xserver_role',`
 	gen_require(`
 		type iceauth_home_t, xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmpfs_t, xauth_home_t;
 		type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_config_t;
-		type mesa_shader_cache_t;
+		type mesa_shader_cache_t, xdm_t;
 	')
 
 	xserver_restricted_role($1, $2)
@@ -184,6 +185,8 @@ interface(`xserver_role',`
 
 	xserver_read_xkb_libs($2)
 
+	allow $2 xdm_t:unix_stream_socket accept;
+
 	optional_policy(`
 		xdg_cache_filetrans($2, mesa_shader_cache_t, dir, "mesa_shader_cache")
 	')
@@ -1239,6 +1242,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xkb_libs',`
 	allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
 	read_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
 	read_lnk_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
+	allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:file map;
 ')
 
 ########################################
policy/modules/services/dbus.if +14 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
===================================================================
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
 
 	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
 	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
+	allow $1_dbusd_t $3:dbus send_msg;
 	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:fd use;
 
 	allow $3 system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
@@ -99,9 +100,13 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
 
 	allow $1_dbusd_t $3:process sigkill;
 
+	allow $1_dbusd_t self:process getcap;
+
 	corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
 	corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
 
+	dev_read_sysfs($1_dbusd_t)
+
 	auth_use_nsswitch($1_dbusd_t)
 
 	ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
@@ -111,6 +116,15 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
 	optional_policy(`
 		systemd_read_logind_runtime_files($1_dbusd_t)
 	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
+		init_dbus_chat($1_dbusd_t)
+		dbus_system_bus_client($1_dbusd_t)
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
+		xdg_read_data_files($1_dbusd_t)
+	')
 ')
 
 #######################################
policy/modules/services/ssh.if +1 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
===================================================================
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
 		xserver_use_xdm_fds($1_ssh_agent_t)
 		xserver_rw_xdm_pipes($1_ssh_agent_t)
 		xserver_sigchld_xdm($1_ssh_agent_t)
+		xserver_write_inherited_xsession_log($1_ssh_agent_t)
 	')
 ')
 
policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te +1 -1
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
===================================================================
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ attribute exec_type;
 #
 # bin_t is the type of files in the system bin/sbin directories.
 #
-type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t };
+type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t systemd_analyze_exec_t };
 corecmd_executable_file(bin_t)
 dev_associate(bin_t)	#For /dev/MAKEDEV
 
policy/modules/system/systemd.te +1 -4
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
===================================================================
@@ -55,10 +55,6 @@ type systemd_activate_t;
 type systemd_activate_exec_t;
 init_system_domain(systemd_activate_t, systemd_activate_exec_t)
 
-type systemd_analyze_t;
-type systemd_analyze_exec_t;
-init_daemon_domain(systemd_analyze_t, systemd_analyze_exec_t)
-
 type systemd_backlight_t;
 type systemd_backlight_exec_t;
 init_system_domain(systemd_backlight_t, systemd_backlight_exec_t)
@@ -1361,6 +1357,7 @@ tunable_policy(`systemd_tmpfiles_manage_
 ')
 
 optional_policy(`
+	dbus_manage_lib_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
 	dbus_read_lib_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
 	dbus_relabel_lib_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
 ')
policy/modules/services/cron.te +1 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/cron.te
===================================================================
@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ kernel_getattr_core_if(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_getattr_message_if(system_cronjob_t)
 
 kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
+kernel_read_fs_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_read_irq_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_read_network_state(system_cronjob_t)
policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te +1 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te
===================================================================
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ userdom_search_user_home_content(pulseau
 userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(pulseaudio_t)
 userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(pulseaudio_t)
 userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(pulseaudio_t)
+userdom_write_all_user_runtime_named_sockets(pulseaudio_t)
 
 tunable_policy(`pulseaudio_execmem',`
 	allow pulseaudio_t self:process execmem;
#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Russell Coker

Second set of strict configuration patches. Ready for inclusion.

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/system/userdomain.if template(`userdom_base_user_template',` · line 72

Quoted 5 lines
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +2 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',`
 	dontaudit $1_t user_tty_device_t:chr_file ioctl;
 
 	kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t)
+	kernel_read_crypto_sysctls($1_t)
+	kernel_read_vm_overcommit_sysctl($1_t)

Probably more suitable for userdom_unpriv_user_template() instead

This is the least required user template and so an effort should be made to keep this one really minimal.

Quoted 14 lines
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +7 -0
 	kernel_dontaudit_list_unlabeled($1_t)
 	kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_files($1_t)
 	kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_symlinks($1_t)
@@ -3552,6 +3554,25 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_runti
 ')
 
 ########################################
+## <summary>
+##     write user runtime socket files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##     <summary>
+##     Domain allowed access.
+##     </summary>

policy/modules/system/userdomain.if interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_runti · line 3573

Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +10 -0
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`userdom_write_all_user_runtime_named_sockets',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute user_runtime_content_type;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 user_runtime_content_type:dir list_dir_perms;
+	allow $1 user_runtime_content_type:sock_file write;
+')

I think this is just too broad. see below.

Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +2 -0
+
+########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	delete user runtime files
 ## </summary>

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te ifndef(`enable_mls',` · line 40

Quoted 8 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +4 -0
@@ -33,11 +33,22 @@ ifndef(`enable_mls',`
 # Local policy
 #
 
+allow sysadm_t self:netlink_generic_socket { create setopt bind write read };
+
+# for ptrace
+allow sysadm_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create write nlmsg_read
 read };

r_netlink_socket_perms (i suppose, but i dont know how this relates to ptrace ... might be the wrong place to add this)

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te ifndef(`enable_mls',` · line 42

Quoted 2 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +2 -0
+
+allow sysadm_t self:capability audit_write;

Can you explain the above permission?

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te ifndef(`enable_mls',` · line 42

Quoted 1 line
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +1 -0
+allow sysadm_t self:system status;

the status permission is *theorically* systemd specific (needs an ifdef init_systemd?)

But regardless, and this is personal:

Why associate all these permissions with the sysadm_t shell. Shells do not have systemd awareness. Why not just target whatever command is doing this instead so that we can enforce some integrity in the sysadm_t domain?

Quoted 13 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +4 -0
+
 corecmd_exec_shell(sysadm_t)
 
 corenet_ib_access_unlabeled_pkeys(sysadm_t)
 corenet_ib_manage_subnet_unlabeled_endports(sysadm_t)
 
+domain_getsched_all_domains(sysadm_t)
+
+dev_read_cpuid(sysadm_t)
 dev_read_kmsg(sysadm_t)
 

mls_process_read_all_levels(sysadm_t)

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te init_admin(sysadm_t) · line 70

Quoted 5 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +2 -0
@@ -55,6 +66,9 @@ init_admin(sysadm_t)
 userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(sysadm_t)
 userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(sysadm_t)
 
+# for systemd-analyze
+files_get_etc_unit_status(sysadm_t)

See above

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te optional_policy(` · line 1139

Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +3 -0
+
 ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',`
 	optional_policy(`
 		init_run_daemon(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
@@ -1121,6 +1135,10 @@ optional_policy(`
 ')
 
 optional_policy(`
+	systemd_dbus_chat_logind(sysadm_t)
+')

shells do not dbus chat with systemd-logind. associating rules with the sysadm_t shell instead of targeting commands will eventually lead to sysadm_t becoming a unconfined_t clone

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te optional_policy(` · line 1209

Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +3 -0
+
+optional_policy(`
 	tboot_run_txtstat(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
 ')
 
@@ -1188,6 +1206,7 @@ optional_policy(`
 ')
 
 optional_policy(`
+	dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(sysadm_t)

shells do not write usb devices. If you want this kind of access then why not use unconfined_t shell?

Quoted 25 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +0 -0
 	usbmodules_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
 ')
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/xserver.if +2 -1
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
 	xserver_xsession_entry_type($2)
 	xserver_dontaudit_write_log($2)
 	xserver_stream_connect_xdm($2)
+	xserver_use_user_fonts($2)
 	# certain apps want to read xdm.pid file
 	xserver_read_xdm_runtime_files($2)
 	# gnome-session creates socket under /tmp/.ICE-unix/
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ interface(`xserver_role',`
 	gen_require(`
 		type iceauth_home_t, xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmpfs_t, xauth_home_t;
 		type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_config_t;
-		type mesa_shader_cache_t;
+		type mesa_shader_cache_t, xdm_t;
 	')
 
 	xserver_restricted_role($1, $2)

policy/modules/services/xserver.if interface(`xserver_role',` · line 188

Quoted 4 lines
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +1 -0
@@ -184,6 +185,8 @@ interface(`xserver_role',`
 
 	xserver_read_xkb_libs($2)
 
+	allow $2 xdm_t:unix_stream_socket accept;

Looks weird, why would $2 have to accept connections on xdm_t unix stream sockets?

Quoted 17 lines
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +2 -0
+
 	optional_policy(`
 		xdg_cache_filetrans($2, mesa_shader_cache_t, dir, "mesa_shader_cache")
 	')
@@ -1239,6 +1242,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xkb_libs',`
 	allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
 	read_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
 	read_lnk_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
+	allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:file map;
 ')
 
 ########################################

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/dbus.if template(`dbus_role_template',` · line 87

Quoted 4 lines
policy/modules/services/dbus.if +1 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
 
 	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
 	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
+	allow $1_dbusd_t $3:dbus send_msg;

I do not believe this is needed, or that it should be part of this template (too broad)

Quoted 18 lines
policy/modules/services/dbus.if +4 -0
 	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:fd use;
 
 	allow $3 system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
@@ -99,9 +100,13 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
 
 	allow $1_dbusd_t $3:process sigkill;
 
+	allow $1_dbusd_t self:process getcap;
+
 	corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
 	corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
 
+	dev_read_sysfs($1_dbusd_t)
+
 	auth_use_nsswitch($1_dbusd_t)
 
 	ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`

policy/modules/services/dbus.if template(`dbus_role_template',` · line 122

Quoted 7 lines
policy/modules/services/dbus.if +4 -0
@@ -111,6 +116,15 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
 	optional_policy(`
 		systemd_read_logind_runtime_files($1_dbusd_t)
 	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
+		init_dbus_chat($1_dbusd_t)
+		dbus_system_bus_client($1_dbusd_t)

Why did you add this? is this to resolve dynamic users with systemd? Using dbus to resolve dynamic users was a fluke and has been reimplemented. So if this was added for that then its obsolete and it should be revisited with modern systemd

policy/modules/services/dbus.if template(`dbus_role_template',` · line 127

Quoted 5 lines
policy/modules/services/dbus.if +5 -0
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
+		xdg_read_data_files($1_dbusd_t)
+	')

Is this for ~/.local/share/dbus-1? I would probably consider creating a private xdg_data type for that , but thats subjective.

policy/modules/services/ssh.if template(`ssh_role_template',` · line 442

Quoted 12 lines
policy/modules/services/dbus.if +0 -0
 ')
 
 #######################################

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/ssh.if +1 -0
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
 		xserver_use_xdm_fds($1_ssh_agent_t)
 		xserver_rw_xdm_pipes($1_ssh_agent_t)
 		xserver_sigchld_xdm($1_ssh_agent_t)
+		xserver_write_inherited_xsession_log($1_ssh_agent_t)

this access should probably be allowed on application_domain level, but thats a personal opinion. Basicall stdout of all application domains is directed to the xsession log AFAIK.

No strong feelings about this though as xserver is dead anyway.

policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te attribute exec_type; · line 16

Quoted 13 lines
policy/modules/services/ssh.if +0 -0
 	')
 ')
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te +1 -1
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ attribute exec_type;
 #
 # bin_t is the type of files in the system bin/sbin directories.
 #
-type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t };
+type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t systemd_analyze_exec_t };

I wouldnt remove systemd_analyze_t but i will leave that for others to decide (obviously)

Quoted 51 lines
policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te +0 -0
 corecmd_executable_file(bin_t)
 dev_associate(bin_t)	#For /dev/MAKEDEV
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/system/systemd.te +1 -4
@@ -55,10 +55,6 @@ type systemd_activate_t;
 type systemd_activate_exec_t;
 init_system_domain(systemd_activate_t, systemd_activate_exec_t)
 
-type systemd_analyze_t;
-type systemd_analyze_exec_t;
-init_daemon_domain(systemd_analyze_t, systemd_analyze_exec_t)
-
 type systemd_backlight_t;
 type systemd_backlight_exec_t;
 init_system_domain(systemd_backlight_t, systemd_backlight_exec_t)
@@ -1361,6 +1357,7 @@ tunable_policy(`systemd_tmpfiles_manage_
 ')
 
 optional_policy(`
+	dbus_manage_lib_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
 	dbus_read_lib_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
 	dbus_relabel_lib_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
 ')

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/cron.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/cron.te +1 -0
@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ kernel_getattr_core_if(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_getattr_message_if(system_cronjob_t)
 
 kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
+kernel_read_fs_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_read_irq_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_read_network_state(system_cronjob_t)

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te +1 -0
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ userdom_search_user_home_content(pulseau
 userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(pulseaudio_t)
 userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(pulseaudio_t)
 userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(pulseaudio_t)
+userdom_write_all_user_runtime_named_sockets(pulseaudio_t)
 
 tunable_policy(`pulseaudio_execmem',`
 	allow pulseaudio_t self:process execmem;
Signature · 4 lines
gpg --locate-keys [email protected]
Key fingerprint = FCD2 3660 5D6B 9D27 7FC6  E0FF DA7E 521F 10F6 4098
https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xDA7E521F10F64098
Dominick Grift
#2 lore raw
Quoted 304 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 9 lines · Russell Coker

Second set of strict configuration patches. Ready for inclusion.

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/system/userdomain.if template(`userdom_base_user_template',` · line 72

Quoted 5 lines
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +2 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',`
 	dontaudit $1_t user_tty_device_t:chr_file ioctl;
 
 	kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t)
+	kernel_read_crypto_sysctls($1_t)
+	kernel_read_vm_overcommit_sysctl($1_t)

Probably more suitable for userdom_unpriv_user_template() instead

This is the least required user template and so an effort should be made to keep this one really minimal.

Quoted 14 lines
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +7 -0
 	kernel_dontaudit_list_unlabeled($1_t)
 	kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_files($1_t)
 	kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_symlinks($1_t)
@@ -3552,6 +3554,25 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_runti
 ')
 
 ########################################
+## <summary>
+##     write user runtime socket files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##     <summary>
+##     Domain allowed access.
+##     </summary>

policy/modules/system/userdomain.if interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_runti · line 3573

Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +10 -0
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`userdom_write_all_user_runtime_named_sockets',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute user_runtime_content_type;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 user_runtime_content_type:dir list_dir_perms;
+	allow $1 user_runtime_content_type:sock_file write;
+')

I think this is just too broad. see below.

Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +2 -0
+
+########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	delete user runtime files
 ## </summary>

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te ifndef(`enable_mls',` · line 40

Quoted 8 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +4 -0
@@ -33,11 +33,22 @@ ifndef(`enable_mls',`
 # Local policy
 #
 
+allow sysadm_t self:netlink_generic_socket { create setopt bind write read };
+
+# for ptrace
+allow sysadm_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create write nlmsg_read
 read };

r_netlink_socket_perms (i suppose, but i dont know how this relates to ptrace ... might be the wrong place to add this)

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te ifndef(`enable_mls',` · line 42

Quoted 2 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +2 -0
+
+allow sysadm_t self:capability audit_write;

Can you explain the above permission?

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te ifndef(`enable_mls',` · line 42

Quoted 1 line
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +1 -0
+allow sysadm_t self:system status;

the status permission is *theorically* systemd specific (needs an ifdef init_systemd?)

But regardless, and this is personal:

Why associate all these permissions with the sysadm_t shell. Shells do not have systemd awareness. Why not just target whatever command is doing this instead so that we can enforce some integrity in the sysadm_t domain?

Quoted 13 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +4 -0
+
 corecmd_exec_shell(sysadm_t)
 
 corenet_ib_access_unlabeled_pkeys(sysadm_t)
 corenet_ib_manage_subnet_unlabeled_endports(sysadm_t)
 
+domain_getsched_all_domains(sysadm_t)
+
+dev_read_cpuid(sysadm_t)
 dev_read_kmsg(sysadm_t)
 

mls_process_read_all_levels(sysadm_t)

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te init_admin(sysadm_t) · line 70

Quoted 5 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +2 -0
@@ -55,6 +66,9 @@ init_admin(sysadm_t)
 userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(sysadm_t)
 userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(sysadm_t)
 
+# for systemd-analyze
+files_get_etc_unit_status(sysadm_t)

See above

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te optional_policy(` · line 1139

Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +3 -0
+
 ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',`
 	optional_policy(`
 		init_run_daemon(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
@@ -1121,6 +1135,10 @@ optional_policy(`
 ')
 
 optional_policy(`
+	systemd_dbus_chat_logind(sysadm_t)
+')

shells do not dbus chat with systemd-logind. associating rules with the sysadm_t shell instead of targeting commands will eventually lead to sysadm_t becoming a unconfined_t clone

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te optional_policy(` · line 1209

Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +3 -0
+
+optional_policy(`
 	tboot_run_txtstat(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
 ')
 
@@ -1188,6 +1206,7 @@ optional_policy(`
 ')
 
 optional_policy(`
+	dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(sysadm_t)

shells do not write usb devices. If you want this kind of access then why not use unconfined_t shell?

Quoted 25 lines
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +0 -0
 	usbmodules_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
 ')
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/xserver.if +2 -1
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
 	xserver_xsession_entry_type($2)
 	xserver_dontaudit_write_log($2)
 	xserver_stream_connect_xdm($2)
+	xserver_use_user_fonts($2)
 	# certain apps want to read xdm.pid file
 	xserver_read_xdm_runtime_files($2)
 	# gnome-session creates socket under /tmp/.ICE-unix/
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ interface(`xserver_role',`
 	gen_require(`
 		type iceauth_home_t, xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmpfs_t, xauth_home_t;
 		type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_config_t;
-		type mesa_shader_cache_t;
+		type mesa_shader_cache_t, xdm_t;
 	')
 
 	xserver_restricted_role($1, $2)

policy/modules/services/xserver.if interface(`xserver_role',` · line 188

Quoted 4 lines
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +1 -0
@@ -184,6 +185,8 @@ interface(`xserver_role',`
 
 	xserver_read_xkb_libs($2)
 
+	allow $2 xdm_t:unix_stream_socket accept;

Looks weird, why would $2 have to accept connections on xdm_t unix stream sockets?

Quoted 17 lines
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +2 -0
+
 	optional_policy(`
 		xdg_cache_filetrans($2, mesa_shader_cache_t, dir, "mesa_shader_cache")
 	')
@@ -1239,6 +1242,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xkb_libs',`
 	allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
 	read_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
 	read_lnk_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
+	allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:file map;
 ')
 
 ########################################

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/dbus.if template(`dbus_role_template',` · line 87

Quoted 4 lines
policy/modules/services/dbus.if +1 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
 
 	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
 	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
+	allow $1_dbusd_t $3:dbus send_msg;

I do not believe this is needed, or that it should be part of this template (too broad)

Quoted 18 lines
policy/modules/services/dbus.if +4 -0
 	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:fd use;
 
 	allow $3 system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
@@ -99,9 +100,13 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
 
 	allow $1_dbusd_t $3:process sigkill;
 
+	allow $1_dbusd_t self:process getcap;
+
 	corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
 	corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
 
+	dev_read_sysfs($1_dbusd_t)
+
 	auth_use_nsswitch($1_dbusd_t)
 
 	ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`

policy/modules/services/dbus.if template(`dbus_role_template',` · line 122

Quoted 7 lines
policy/modules/services/dbus.if +4 -0
@@ -111,6 +116,15 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
 	optional_policy(`
 		systemd_read_logind_runtime_files($1_dbusd_t)
 	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
+		init_dbus_chat($1_dbusd_t)
+		dbus_system_bus_client($1_dbusd_t)

Why did you add this? is this to resolve dynamic users with systemd? Using dbus to resolve dynamic users was a fluke and has been reimplemented. So if this was added for that then its obsolete and it should be revisited with modern systemd

policy/modules/services/dbus.if template(`dbus_role_template',` · line 127

Quoted 5 lines
policy/modules/services/dbus.if +5 -0
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
+		xdg_read_data_files($1_dbusd_t)
+	')

Is this for ~/.local/share/dbus-1? I would probably consider creating a private xdg_data type for that , but thats subjective.

policy/modules/services/ssh.if template(`ssh_role_template',` · line 442

Quoted 12 lines
policy/modules/services/dbus.if +0 -0
 ')
 
 #######################################

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/ssh.if +1 -0
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
 		xserver_use_xdm_fds($1_ssh_agent_t)
 		xserver_rw_xdm_pipes($1_ssh_agent_t)
 		xserver_sigchld_xdm($1_ssh_agent_t)
+		xserver_write_inherited_xsession_log($1_ssh_agent_t)

this access should probably be allowed on application_domain level, but thats a personal opinion. Basicall stdout of all application domains is directed to the xsession log AFAIK.

No strong feelings about this though as xserver is dead anyway.

policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te attribute exec_type; · line 16

Quoted 13 lines
policy/modules/services/ssh.if +0 -0
 	')
 ')
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te +1 -1
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ attribute exec_type;
 #
 # bin_t is the type of files in the system bin/sbin directories.
 #
-type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t };
+type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t systemd_analyze_exec_t };

I wouldnt remove systemd_analyze_t but i will leave that for others to decide (obviously)

Quoted 33 lines
policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te +0 -0
 corecmd_executable_file(bin_t)
 dev_associate(bin_t)	#For /dev/MAKEDEV
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/system/systemd.te +1 -4
@@ -55,10 +55,6 @@ type systemd_activate_t;
 type systemd_activate_exec_t;
 init_system_domain(systemd_activate_t, systemd_activate_exec_t)
 
-type systemd_analyze_t;
-type systemd_analyze_exec_t;
-init_daemon_domain(systemd_analyze_t, systemd_analyze_exec_t)
-
 type systemd_backlight_t;
 type systemd_backlight_exec_t;
 init_system_domain(systemd_backlight_t, systemd_backlight_exec_t)
@@ -1361,6 +1357,7 @@ tunable_policy(`systemd_tmpfiles_manage_
 ')
 
 optional_policy(`
+	dbus_manage_lib_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
 	dbus_read_lib_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
 	dbus_relabel_lib_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
 ')

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/services/cron.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/cron.te +0 -0
@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ kernel_getattr_core_if(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_getattr_message_if(system_cronjob_t)
 
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/services/cron.te +1 -0
 kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
+kernel_read_fs_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_read_irq_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
 kernel_read_network_state(system_cronjob_t)

Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te userdom_search_user_home_content(pulseau · line 159

Quoted 4 lines
policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te +1 -0
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ userdom_search_user_home_content(pulseau
 userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(pulseaudio_t)
 userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(pulseaudio_t)
 userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(pulseaudio_t)
+userdom_write_all_user_runtime_named_sockets(pulseaudio_t)

forgot to comment on this one. this looks wrong. why did you add this? dont want pulseaudio to write my gpg-agent sock file in /run/user/UID/gnupg or anything except the pulseaudio socket for that matter

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te +0 -0
 tunable_policy(`pulseaudio_execmem',`
 	allow pulseaudio_t self:process execmem;