misc kernel and system patches with Dominick's changes
PATCH 1/1 misc kernel and system patches with Dominick's changes
This patch has the changes that Dominick suggested and the things that needed more discussion removed. I think it's ready to merge.
Signed-off-by Russell Coker <[email protected]>
policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc +0 -1
@@ -305,7 +305,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',` /usr/sbin/sesh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/smrsh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) -/usr/share/mdadm/checkarray -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/(.*/)?bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/ajaxterm/ajaxterm\.py.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/ajaxterm/qweb\.py.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
policy/modules/kernel/devices.if +36 -0
@@ -4309,6 +4309,42 @@ interface(`dev_mount_sysfs',` ######################################## ## <summary> +## remount a sysfs filesystem +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`dev_remount_sysfs',` + gen_require(` + type sysfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 sysfs_t:filesystem remount; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## unmount a sysfs filesystem +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`dev_unmount_sysfs',` + gen_require(` + type sysfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 sysfs_t:filesystem unmount; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> ## Do not audit getting the attributes of sysfs filesystem ## </summary> ## <param name="domain">
policy/modules/kernel/domain.if +1 -1
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ interface(`domain_read_all_domains_state ######################################## ## <summary> -## Get the attributes of all domains of all domains. +## Get the attributes of all domains ## </summary> ## <param name="domain"> ## <summary>
policy/modules/kernel/files.if +19 -0
@@ -5408,6 +5408,25 @@ interface(`files_delete_kernel_symbol_ta ######################################## ## <summary> +## Delete a system.map in the /boot directory. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`files_mounton_kernel_symbol_table',` + gen_require(` + type boot_t, system_map_t; + ') + + allow $1 boot_t:dir search_dir_perms; + allow $1 system_map_t:file mounton_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> ## Search the contents of /var. ## </summary> ## <param name="domain">
policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if +18 -0
@@ -159,6 +159,24 @@ interface(`selinux_unmount_fs',` ######################################## ## <summary> +## Mount on the selinuxfs filesystem. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`selinux_mounton_fs',` + gen_require(` + type security_t; + ') + + allow $1 security_t:dir mounton_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> ## Get the attributes of the selinuxfs filesystem ## </summary> ## <param name="domain">
policy/modules/system/authlogin.te +3 -1
@@ -98,12 +98,13 @@ optional_policy(` allow chkpwd_t self:capability { dac_override setuid }; dontaudit chkpwd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow chkpwd_t self:process { getattr signal }; +allow chkpwd_t self:process { getcap getattr signal }; allow chkpwd_t shadow_t:file read_file_perms; files_list_etc(chkpwd_t) kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chkpwd_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chkpwd_t) domain_dontaudit_use_interactive_fds(chkpwd_t)
@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(chkpwd_t) files_dontaudit_search_var(chkpwd_t) fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(chkpwd_t) +fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(chkpwd_t) selinux_get_enforce_mode(chkpwd_t)
policy/modules/system/fstools.te +2 -0
@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ mount_exec(fsadm_t) # for /run/mount/utab mount_getattr_runtime_files(fsadm_t) +mount_rw_runtime_files(fsadm_t) + seutil_read_config(fsadm_t) userdom_use_user_terminals(fsadm_t)
policy/modules/system/init.if +36 -0
@@ -3029,6 +3029,24 @@ interface(`init_relabel_utmp',` ######################################## ## <summary> +## Watch utmp. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`init_watch_utmp',` + gen_require(` + type initrc_runtime_t; + ') + + allow $1 initrc_runtime_t:file watch; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> ## Create files in /var/run with the ## utmp file type. ## </summary>
@@ -3483,6 +3501,24 @@ interface(`init_manage_all_unit_files',` ') ######################################## +## <summary> +## stat systemd unit files +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`init_getattr_all_unit_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute systemdunit; + ') + + allow $1 systemdunit:file getattr; +') + +######################################## ## <summary> ## Allow unconfined access to send instructions to init ## </summary>
policy/modules/system/init.te +1 -0
@@ -1041,6 +1041,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',` init_get_all_units_status(initrc_t) init_manage_var_lib_files(initrc_t) init_rw_stream_sockets(initrc_t) + init_stop_system(initrc_t) # Create /etc/audit.rules.prev after firstboot remediation logging_manage_audit_config(initrc_t)
policy/modules/system/logging.te +3 -1
@@ -515,7 +515,8 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',` # for systemd-journal allow syslogd_t self:netlink_audit_socket connected_socket_perms; allow syslogd_t self:capability2 audit_read; - allow syslogd_t self:capability { chown setgid setuid sys_ptrace }; + allow syslogd_t self:capability { chown dac_read_search setgid setuid sys_ptrace audit_control }; + allow syslogd_t self:cap_userns sys_ptrace; allow syslogd_t self:netlink_audit_socket { getattr getopt read setopt write nlmsg_write }; # remove /run/log/journal when switching to permanent storage
@@ -533,6 +534,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',` domain_getattr_all_domains(syslogd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(syslogd_t) + domain_signull_all_domains(syslogd_t) init_create_runtime_dirs(syslogd_t) init_daemon_runtime_file(syslogd_runtime_t, dir, "syslogd")
policy/modules/system/lvm.te +2 -0
@@ -345,6 +345,8 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + apt_use_fds(lvm_t) + dpkg_script_rw_pipes(lvm_t) ')
policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc +2 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /etc/pki(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0) /etc/pki/.*/private(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tls_privkey_t,s0) /etc/ssl(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0) +/etc/ssl/private(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tls_privkey_t,s0) +/etc/letsencrypt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tls_privkey_t,s0) /etc/timezone -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_debian',`
policy/modules/system/modutils.te +3 -1
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',` # insmod local policy # -allow kmod_t self:capability { dac_override net_raw sys_nice sys_tty_config }; +allow kmod_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search net_raw sys_nice sys_tty_config }; allow kmod_t self:process { execmem sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal }; # for the radeon/amdgpu modules dontaudit kmod_t self:capability sys_admin;
@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ optional_policy(` dpkg_manage_script_tmp_files(kmod_t) dpkg_map_script_tmp_files(kmod_t) dpkg_read_script_tmp_symlinks(kmod_t) + apt_use_fds(kmod_t) + apt_use_ptys(kmod_t) ') optional_policy(`
policy/modules/system/mount.te +8 -0
@@ -218,6 +218,14 @@ optional_policy(` samba_run_smbmount(mount_t, mount_roles) ') +optional_policy(` + ssh_rw_pipes(mount_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + xen_read_image_files(mount_t) +') + ######################################## # # Unconfined mount local policy
policy/modules/system/raid.fc +2 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ /usr/bin/mdmpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/raid-check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/share/mdadm/checkarray -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0) + # Systemd unit files /usr/lib/systemd/system/[^/]*mdadm-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_unit_t,s0) /usr/lib/systemd/system/[^/]*mdmon.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_unit_t,s0)
policy/modules/system/raid.te +2 -0
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files(mdad dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files(mdadm_t) dev_read_realtime_clock(mdadm_t) +domain_dontaudit_search_all_domains_state(mdadm_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(mdadm_t) files_read_etc_files(mdadm_t)
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(mda optional_policy(` cron_system_entry(mdadm_t, mdadm_exec_t) + cron_rw_tmp_files(mdadm_t) ') optional_policy(`
policy/modules/system/systemd.fc +0 -1
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ /run/log/journal(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_journal_t,s0) -/usr/bin/systemd-analyze -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_analyze_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/systemd-cgtop -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_cgtop_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/systemd-coredump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_coredump_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/systemd-detect-virt -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_detect_virt_exec_t,s0)
policy/modules/system/systemd.te +40 -3
170 lines not on this page · raw message
policy/modules/system/udev.te +6 -0
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ selinux_compute_access_vector(udev_t) selinux_compute_create_context(udev_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context(udev_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts(udev_t) +selinux_use_status_page(udev_t) storage_watch_fixed_disk(udev_t)
@@ -329,6 +330,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` raid_domtrans_mdadm(udev_t) + raid_read_mdadm_runtime_files(udev_t) ') optional_policy(`
@@ -378,6 +380,10 @@ allow udevadm_t udev_runtime_t:dir watch dev_rw_sysfs(udevadm_t) dev_read_urand(udevadm_t) +fs_getattr_cgroup(udevadm_t) +fs_getattr_tmpfs(udevadm_t) +fs_search_cgroup_dirs(udevadm_t) + files_read_etc_files(udevadm_t) files_read_usr_files(udevadm_t)
policy/modules/system/unconfined.if +1 -1
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ interface(`unconfined_domain_noaudit',` # Use most Linux capabilities allow $1 self:{ capability cap_userns } { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid setpcap linux_immutable net_bind_service net_broadcast net_admin net_raw ipc_lock ipc_owner sys_rawio sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_pacct sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config mknod lease audit_write audit_control setfcap }; - allow $1 self:{ capability2 cap2_userns } { syslog wake_alarm }; + allow $1 self:{ capability2 cap2_userns } { syslog wake_alarm bpf perfmon }; allow $1 self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; # Transition to myself, to make get_ordered_context_list happy.
policy/modules/system/unconfined.te +4 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + certbot_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` cron_unconfined_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) ')
policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt +2 -0
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ define(`manage_dir_perms',`{ create open define(`relabelfrom_dir_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom }') define(`relabelto_dir_perms',`{ getattr relabelto }') define(`relabel_dir_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto }') +define(`mounton_dir_perms',`{ getattr mounton }') # # Regular file (file)
@@ -169,6 +170,7 @@ define(`manage_file_perms',`{ create ope define(`relabelfrom_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom }') define(`relabelto_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelto }') define(`relabel_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto }') +define(`mounton_file_perms',`{ getattr mounton }') # # Symbolic link (lnk_file)
policy/modules/system/lvm.if +1 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ interface(`lvm_run',` lvm_domtrans($1) role $2 types lvm_t; + allow $1 lvm_t:sem rw_sem_perms; ') ########################################
Quoted 13 lines · Russell Coker
This patch has the changes that Dominick suggested and the things that needed more discussion removed. I think it's ready to merge.
Signed-off-by Russell Coker <[email protected]>policy/modules/system/systemd.te +1
-0@@ -967,8 +987,14 @@ tunable_policy(`systemd_nspawn_labeled_n # manage etc symlinks for /etc/localtime files_manage_etc_symlinks(systemd_nspawn_t) files_mounton_runtime_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t) + files_mounton_kernel_symbol_table(systemd_nspawn_t) files_search_home(systemd_nspawn_t)
[...]
policy/modules/system/systemd.te tunable_policy(`systemd_nspawn_labeled_n · line 1018
Quoted 8 lines
policy/modules/system/systemd.te +1
-0@@ -986,6 +1012,7 @@ tunable_policy(`systemd_nspawn_labeled_n selinux_getattr_fs(systemd_nspawn_t) selinux_remount_fs(systemd_nspawn_t) selinux_search_fs(systemd_nspawn_t) + selinux_mounton_fs(systemd_nspawn_t) init_domtrans(systemd_nspawn_t)
I think I'm ok with the other rules, but this makes me think. We already have several mount points that nspawn is using and it seems like a slippery slope. While conceivably you could make nspawn mount anywhere, maybe this is a candidate for mounting on all init_mountpoint_type ?
Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito