selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking
PATCH 1/2 selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking
[followup to dump_common_audit_data() changes from this winter; in vfs.git#work.audit] Does anybody have objections to the below?
From 663a40ab49308b5acaba8a335190fce66e17d969 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:40:54 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking
dump_common_audit_data() is safe to use under rcu_read_lock() now; no need for AVC_NONBLOCKING and games around it
--- security/selinux/avc.c | 28 ++++++++-------------------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++----------- security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ---- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
security/selinux/avc.c +8 -20
@@ -758,7 +758,11 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) } } -/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */ +/* +* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint. +* Note that it is non-blocking and can be called from under +* rcu_read_lock(). +*/ noinline int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
@@ -825,7 +829,7 @@ int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events)* @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made * @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node -* @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_NONBLOCKING, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0. +* @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0. * * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT. * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
@@ -844,21 +848,6 @@ static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,struct hlist_head *head;spinlock_t *lock; -/* -* If we are in a non-blocking code path, e.g. VFS RCU walk, -* then we must not add permissions to a cache entry -* because we will not audit the denial. Otherwise, -* during the subsequent blocking retry (e.g. VFS ref walk), we -* will find the permissions already granted in the cache entry -* and won't audit anything at all, leading to silent denials in -* permissive mode that only appear when in enforcing mode. -* -* See the corresponding handling of MAY_NOT_BLOCK in avc_audit() -* and selinux_inode_permission(). -*/ -if (flags &AVC_NONBLOCKING ) -return 0 ; - node =avc_alloc_node (avc);if (!node) { rc = -ENOMEM ;
@@ -1119,7 +1108,7 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,* @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass -* @flags: AVC_STRICT, AVC_NONBLOCKING, or 0 +* @flags: AVC_STRICT or 0 * @avd: access vector decisions * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
@@ -1204,8 +1193,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,struct av_decision avd;int rc, rc2; - rc =avc_has_perm_noaudit (state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, - (flags &MAY_NOT_BLOCK ) ?AVC_NONBLOCKING :0 , + rc =avc_has_perm_noaudit (state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,0 , &avd); rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -11
@@ -3164,17 +3164,13 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, {struct common_audit_data ad;struct inode_security_struct *isec =selinux_inode (inode); -int rc; ad.type =LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE ; ad.u.inode = inode; - rc =slow_avc_audit (&selinux_state, +return slow_avc_audit (&selinux_state,current_sid (), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, audited, denied, result, &ad); -if (rc) -return rc; -return 0 ; }static int selinux_inode_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask)
@@ -3209,8 +3205,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)return PTR_ERR (isec); rc =avc_has_perm_noaudit (&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, - no_block ?AVC_NONBLOCKING :0 , + sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,0 , &avd); audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
@@ -3218,10 +3213,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)if (likely (!audited))return rc; -/* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */ -if (no_block) -return -ECHILD ; - rc2 =audit_inode_permission (inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);if (rc2)return rc2;
security/selinux/include/avc.h +0 -4
@@ -134,9 +134,6 @@ static inline int avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state, audited =avc_audit_required (requested, avd, result,0 , &denied);if (likely (!audited))return 0 ; -/* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */ -if (flags &MAY_NOT_BLOCK ) -return -ECHILD ;return slow_avc_audit (state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, audited, denied, result, a);
@@ -144,7 +141,6 @@ static inline int avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,#define AVC_STRICT 1/* Ignore permissive mode. */ #define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2/* update extended permissions */ -#define AVC_NONBLOCKING 4/* non blocking */ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
PATCH 2/2 kill unused 'flags' argument in avc_has_perm_flags() and avc_audit()
From 565799de3ee0a295842a07a5f9a459db5e793beb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:57:49 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] kill unused 'flags' argument in avc_has_perm_flags() and
avc_audit()
--- security/selinux/avc.c | 7 +++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++--- security/selinux/include/avc.h | 7 ++----- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
security/selinux/avc.c +3 -4
@@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, &avd); rc2 =avc_audit (state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, - auditdata,0 ); + auditdata);if (rc2)return rc2;return rc;
@@ -1187,8 +1187,7 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,int avc_has_perm_flags (struct selinux_state *state,u32 ssid,u32 tsid,u16 tclass,u32 requested, -struct common_audit_data *auditdata, -int flags) +struct common_audit_data *auditdata) {struct av_decision avd;int rc, rc2;
@@ -1197,7 +1196,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state, &avd); rc2 =avc_audit (state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, - auditdata, flags); + auditdata);if (rc2)return rc2;return rc;
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -3
@@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);if (!(opts &CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT )) {int rc2 =avc_audit (&selinux_state, - sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad,0 ); + sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);if (rc2)return rc2; }
@@ -3154,8 +3154,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,return PTR_ERR (isec);return avc_has_perm_flags (&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,FILE__READ , &ad, - rcu ?MAY_NOT_BLOCK :0 ); + sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,FILE__READ , &ad); } static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
security/selinux/include/avc.h +2 -5
@@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,* @avd: access vector decisions * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit * @a: auxiliary audit data -* @flags: VFS walk flags * * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance * with the policy. This function is typically called by
@@ -127,8 +126,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state, u16 tclass, u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd, int result, - struct common_audit_data *a, - int flags) + struct common_audit_data *a) { u32 audited, denied; audited =avc_audit_required (requested, avd, result,0 , &denied);
@@ -154,8 +152,7 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state,int avc_has_perm_flags (struct selinux_state *state,u32 ssid,u32 tsid,u16 tclass,u32 requested, -struct common_audit_data *auditdata, -int flags); +struct common_audit_data *auditdata); int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH 2/2] kill unused 'flags' argument in avc_has_perm_flags() and avc_audit()
Quoted 7 lines · Al Viro
From
565799de3ee0a295842a07a5f9a459db5e793bebMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:57:49 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] kill unused 'flags' argument inavc_has_perm_flags()and
avc_audit()
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/avc.c | 7 +++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++--- security/selinux/include/avc.h | 7 ++----- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
I'm looking at patch 1/2 now, but if we can safely get rid of the flags arg then we might as well do away with avc_has_perm_flags() altogether and just convert the callers to avc_has_perm().
Quoted 16 lines
security/selinux/include/avc.h +1
-3@@ -154,8 +152,7 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state,int avc_has_perm_flags (struct selinux_state *state,u32 ssid,u32 tsid,u16 tclass,u32 requested, -struct common_audit_data *auditdata, -int flags); +struct common_audit_data *auditdata); int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, --2.11.0
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 12 lines · Al Viro
[followup to
dump_common_audit_data()changes from this winter; in vfs.git#work.audit] Does anybody have objections to the below?From
663a40ab49308b5acaba8a335190fce66e17d969Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:40:54 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] selinux:slow_avc_audithas become non-blocking
dump_common_audit_data()is safe to use underrcu_read_lock()now; no need forAVC_NONBLOCKINGand games around it
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/avc.c | 28 ++++++++-------------------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++----------- security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ---- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
This looks okay to me, thanks Al. If you want to fix patch 2/2 I can pull both into selinux/next.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Quoted 20 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 12 lines · Al Viro
[followup to
dump_common_audit_data()changes from this winter; in vfs.git#work.audit] Does anybody have objections to the below?From
663a40ab49308b5acaba8a335190fce66e17d969Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:40:54 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] selinux:slow_avc_audithas become non-blocking
dump_common_audit_data()is safe to use underrcu_read_lock()now; no need forAVC_NONBLOCKINGand games around itQuoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/avc.c | 28 ++++++++-------------------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++----------- security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ---- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
Quoted 2 lines
This looks okay to me, thanks Al. If you want to fix patch 2/2 I can pull both into selinux/next.
Done and force-pushed into the same branch... Do you want a formal pull request?
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 21 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 20 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 18 lines · Al Viro
[followup to
dump_common_audit_data()changes from this winter; in vfs.git#work.audit] Does anybody have objections to the below?From
663a40ab49308b5acaba8a335190fce66e17d969Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:40:54 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] selinux:slow_avc_audithas become non-blocking
dump_common_audit_data()is safe to use underrcu_read_lock()now; no need forAVC_NONBLOCKINGand games around itSigned-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/avc.c | 28 ++++++++-------------------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++----------- security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ---- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This looks okay to me, thanks Al. If you want to fix patch 2/2 I can pull both into selinux/next.
Done and force-pushed into the same branch... Do you want a formal pull request?
Thanks for the offer, but I can just pull those top two patches from work.audit. However, this mail came in just as I was shutting down for the evening so I'll take care of it tomorrow.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 22 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 21 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 20 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 18 lines · Al Viro
[followup to
dump_common_audit_data()changes from this winter; in vfs.git#work.audit] Does anybody have objections to the below?From
663a40ab49308b5acaba8a335190fce66e17d969Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:40:54 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] selinux:slow_avc_audithas become non-blocking
dump_common_audit_data()is safe to use underrcu_read_lock()now; no need forAVC_NONBLOCKINGand games around itSigned-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/avc.c | 28 ++++++++-------------------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++----------- security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ---- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This looks okay to me, thanks Al. If you want to fix patch 2/2 I can pull both into selinux/next.
Done and force-pushed into the same branch... Do you want a formal pull request?
Thanks for the offer, but I can just pull those top two patches from work.audit. However, this mail came in just as I was shutting down for the evening so I'll take care of it tomorrow.
Both are now in selinux/next, thanks Al.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com