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x86 fixes

GIT PULL Merged Ingo Molnar 2 participants 2 messages Aug 28, 2022

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Linus,

Please pull the latest x86/urgent git tree from:

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-urgent-2022-08-28

# HEAD: 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

Misc fixes:

- Fix PAT on Xen, which caused i915 driver failures
- Fix compat INT 80 entry crash on Xen PV guests
- Fix 'MMIO Stale Data' mitigation status reporting on older Intel CPUs
- Fix RSB stuffing regressions
- Fix ORC unwinding on ftrace trampolines
- Add Intel Raptor Lake CPU model number
- Fix (work around) a SEV-SNP bootloader bug providing bogus values in boot_params->cc_blob_address, by ignoring the value on !SEV-SNP bootups.
- Fix SEV-SNP early boot failure
- Fix the objtool list of noreturn functions and annotate snp_abort(), which bug confused objtool on gcc-12.
- Fix the documentation for retbleed

Thanks,

Ingo

------------------>
Borislav Petkov (1):
x86/sev: Mark snp_abort() noreturn

Chen Zhongjin (1):
x86/unwind/orc: Unwind ftrace trampolines with correct ORC entry

Jan Beulich (1):
x86/PAT: Have pat_enabled() properly reflect state when running on Xen

Juergen Gross (1):
x86/entry: Fix entry_INT80_compat for Xen PV guests

Michael Roth (1):

      x86/boot: Don't propagate uninitialized boot_params->cc_blob_address

Pawan Gupta (1):
x86/bugs: Add "unknown" reporting for MMIO Stale Data

Peter Zijlstra (2):
x86/nospec: Unwreck the RSB stuffing
x86/nospec: Fix i386 RSB stuffing

Salvatore Bonaccorso (1):
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

Tom Lendacky (1):
x86/sev: Don't use cc_platform_has() for early SEV-SNP calls

Tony Luck (1):
x86/cpu: Add new Raptor Lake CPU model number

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |  1 +
 .../hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst          | 14 ++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h                    | 12 ++-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c                     |  8 ++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S                   |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h                 |  5 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h                |  2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h               | 92 ++++++++++++----------
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h                         |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                         | 14 +++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                       | 42 ++++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/sev.c                              | 18 ++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c                       | 15 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c                          | 10 ++-
 tools/objtool/check.c                              | 34 ++++----
 15 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +1 -0
index 5bf61881f012..760c889b6cd1 100644
@@ -523,6 +523,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <[email protected]>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst +14 -0
index 9393c50b5afc..c98fd11907cc 100644
@@ -230,6 +230,20 @@ The possible values in this file are:
      * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
        - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
          enabled.
+     * - 'Unknown: No mitigations'
+       - The processor vulnerability status is unknown because it is
+	 out of Servicing period. Mitigation is not attempted.
+
+Definitions:
+------------
+
+Servicing period: The process of providing functional and security updates to
+Intel processors or platforms, utilizing the Intel Platform Update (IPU)
+process or other similar mechanisms.
+
+End of Servicing Updates (ESU): ESU is the date at which Intel will no
+longer provide Servicing, such as through IPU or other similar update
+processes. ESU dates will typically be aligned to end of quarter.
 
 If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to
 the above information:
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +11 -1
index 4910bf230d7b..62208ec04ca4 100644
@@ -132,7 +132,17 @@ void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr);
 void snp_set_page_shared(unsigned long paddr);
 void sev_prep_identity_maps(unsigned long top_level_pgt);
 #else
-static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
+static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+	/*
+	 * bp->cc_blob_address should only be set by boot/compressed kernel.
+	 * Initialize it to 0 unconditionally (thus here in this stub too) to
+	 * ensure that uninitialized values from buggy bootloaders aren't
+	 * propagated.
+	 */
+	if (bp)
+		bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
+}
 static inline void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void) { }
 static inline bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
 {
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +8 -0
index 52f989f6acc2..c93930d5ccbd 100644
@@ -276,6 +276,14 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 	struct msr m;
 	bool snp;
 
+	/*
+	 * bp->cc_blob_address should only be set by boot/compressed kernel.
+	 * Initialize it to 0 to ensure that uninitialized values from
+	 * buggy bootloaders aren't propagated.
+	 */
+	if (bp)
+		bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
+
 	/*
 	 * Setup/preliminary detection of SNP. This will be sanity-checked
 	 * against CPUID/MSR values later.
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +1 -1
index 682338e7e2a3..4dd19819053a 100644
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat)
 	 * Interrupts are off on entry.
 	 */
 	ASM_CLAC			/* Do this early to minimize exposure */
-	SWAPGS
+	ALTERNATIVE "swapgs", "", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
 
 	/*
 	 * User tracing code (ptrace or signal handlers) might assume that
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +3 -2
index 235dc85c91c3..ef4775c6db01 100644
@@ -457,7 +457,8 @@
 #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
 #define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA		X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
-#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
+#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +2 -0
index def6ca121111..aeb38023a703 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
  *		_X	- regular server parts
  *		_D	- micro server parts
  *		_N,_P	- other mobile parts
+ *		_S	- other client parts
  *
  *		Historical OPTDIFFs:
  *
@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@
 
 #define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE		0xB7
 #define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_P		0xBA
+#define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_S		0xBF
 
 /* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */
 
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +51 -41

112 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +1 -1
index 4a23e52fe0ee..ebc271bb6d8e 100644
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);
 void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);
 void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void);
 bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp);
-void snp_abort(void);
+void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void);
 int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, unsigned long *fw_err);
 #else
 static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +12 -2
index 510d85261132..da7c361f47e0 100644
@@ -433,7 +433,8 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 	u64 ia32_cap;
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
-	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+	     boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN) ||
+	     cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
 		return;
 	}
@@ -538,6 +539,8 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 		pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
 		pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+	else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+		pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n");
 }
 
 static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -2275,6 +2278,9 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
 
 static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
 {
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+		return sysfs_emit(buf, "Unknown: No mitigations\n");
+
 	if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
 		return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
 
@@ -2421,6 +2427,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 		return srbds_show_state(buf);
 
 	case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+	case X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN:
 		return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
 
 	case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
@@ -2480,7 +2487,10 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *
 
 ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
-	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+		return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
+	else
+		return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 }
 
 ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +27 -15

77 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +15 -3
index 63dc626627a0..a428c62330d3 100644
@@ -701,7 +701,13 @@ static void __init early_set_pages_state(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npage
 void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
 					 unsigned int npages)
 {
-	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+	/*
+	 * This can be invoked in early boot while running identity mapped, so
+	 * use an open coded check for SNP instead of using cc_platform_has().
+	 * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data
+	 * in the cc_platform_has() function.
+	 */
+	if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
 		return;
 
 	 /*
@@ -717,7 +723,13 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long padd
 void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
 					unsigned int npages)
 {
-	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+	/*
+	 * This can be invoked in early boot while running identity mapped, so
+	 * use an open coded check for SNP instead of using cc_platform_has().
+	 * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data
+	 * in the cc_platform_has() function.
+	 */
+	if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
 		return;
 
 	/* Invalidate the memory pages before they are marked shared in the RMP table. */
@@ -2100,7 +2112,7 @@ bool __init snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
 	return true;
 }
 
-void __init snp_abort(void)
+void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void)
 {
 	sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
 }
arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c +10 -5
index 38185aedf7d1..0ea57da92940 100644
@@ -93,22 +93,27 @@ static struct orc_entry *orc_find(unsigned long ip);
 static struct orc_entry *orc_ftrace_find(unsigned long ip)
 {
 	struct ftrace_ops *ops;
-	unsigned long caller;
+	unsigned long tramp_addr, offset;
 
 	ops = ftrace_ops_trampoline(ip);
 	if (!ops)
 		return NULL;
 
+	/* Set tramp_addr to the start of the code copied by the trampoline */
 	if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS)
-		caller = (unsigned long)ftrace_regs_call;
+		tramp_addr = (unsigned long)ftrace_regs_caller;
 	else
-		caller = (unsigned long)ftrace_call;
+		tramp_addr = (unsigned long)ftrace_caller;
+
+	/* Now place tramp_addr to the location within the trampoline ip is at */
+	offset = ip - ops->trampoline;
+	tramp_addr += offset;
 
 	/* Prevent unlikely recursion */
-	if (ip == caller)
+	if (ip == tramp_addr)
 		return NULL;
 
-	return orc_find(caller);
+	return orc_find(tramp_addr);
 }
 #else
 static struct orc_entry *orc_ftrace_find(unsigned long ip)
arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c +9 -1
index d5ef64ddd35e..66a209f7eb86 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 
 static bool __read_mostly pat_bp_initialized;
 static bool __read_mostly pat_disabled = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_PAT);
+static bool __initdata pat_force_disabled = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_PAT);
 static bool __read_mostly pat_bp_enabled;
 static bool __read_mostly pat_cm_initialized;
 
@@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ void pat_disable(const char *msg_reason)
 static int __init nopat(char *str)
 {
 	pat_disable("PAT support disabled via boot option.");
+	pat_force_disabled = true;
 	return 0;
 }
 early_param("nopat", nopat);
@@ -272,7 +274,7 @@ static void pat_ap_init(u64 pat)
 	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, pat);
 }
 
-void init_cache_modes(void)
+void __init init_cache_modes(void)
 {
 	u64 pat = 0;
 
@@ -313,6 +315,12 @@ void init_cache_modes(void)
 		 */
 		pat = PAT(0, WB) | PAT(1, WT) | PAT(2, UC_MINUS) | PAT(3, UC) |
 		      PAT(4, WB) | PAT(5, WT) | PAT(6, UC_MINUS) | PAT(7, UC);
+	} else if (!pat_force_disabled && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+		/*
+		 * Clearly PAT is enabled underneath. Allow pat_enabled() to
+		 * reflect this.
+		 */
+		pat_bp_enabled = true;
 	}
 
 	__init_cache_modes(pat);
tools/objtool/check.c +18 -16
index 0cec74da7ffe..ad51689dfb41 100644
@@ -162,32 +162,34 @@ static bool __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
 
 	/*
 	 * Unfortunately these have to be hard coded because the noreturn
-	 * attribute isn't provided in ELF data.
+	 * attribute isn't provided in ELF data. Keep 'em sorted.
 	 */
 	static const char * const global_noreturns[] = {
+		"__invalid_creds",
+		"__module_put_and_kthread_exit",
+		"__reiserfs_panic",
 		"__stack_chk_fail",
-		"panic",
+		"__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable",
+		"cpu_bringup_and_idle",
+		"cpu_startup_entry",
 		"do_exit",
+		"do_group_exit",
 		"do_task_dead",
-		"kthread_exit",
-		"make_task_dead",
-		"__module_put_and_kthread_exit",
+		"ex_handler_msr_mce",
+		"fortify_panic",
 		"kthread_complete_and_exit",
-		"__reiserfs_panic",
+		"kthread_exit",
+		"kunit_try_catch_throw",
 		"lbug_with_loc",
-		"fortify_panic",
-		"usercopy_abort",
 		"machine_real_restart",
+		"make_task_dead",
+		"panic",
 		"rewind_stack_and_make_dead",
-		"kunit_try_catch_throw",
-		"xen_start_kernel",
-		"cpu_bringup_and_idle",
-		"do_group_exit",
+		"sev_es_terminate",
+		"snp_abort",
 		"stop_this_cpu",
-		"__invalid_creds",
-		"cpu_startup_entry",
-		"__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable",
-		"ex_handler_msr_mce",
+		"usercopy_abort",
+		"xen_start_kernel",
 	};
 
 	if (!func)
merge bot Merged
#1 lore raw
The pull request you sent on Sun, 28 Aug 2022 16:57:20 +0200:

The pull request you sent on Sun, 28 Aug 2022 16:57:20 +0200:

Quoted 1 line

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-urgent-2022-08-28

has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/2f23a7c914317ac0b2a7e2bbe48dc00213652f98

Thank you!

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