slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v2 1/1 slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
If init_on_free is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object. Afterward, if slub_debug=F and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED are set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
Object's freepointer thus needs to be avoided when stored outside the object if init_on_free is set.
To reproduce, set slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7 on the command line of a kernel build with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y.
dmesg sample log:
[ 10.708715] ============================================================================= [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt [ 10.712695] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 10.712695] [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2) [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c [ 10.716698] [ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00 .... [ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
---
Changes since v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zij_fGjRS_rK-65r@archlinux/
* Jump above out of object freepointer if init_on_free is set instead of initializing it with set_freepointer() as suggested by Vlastimil Babka.
* Adapt maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr() to avoid wiping out of object on alloc freepointer as suggested by Chengming Zhou.
* Reword commit message.
--- mm/slub.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/slub.c +8 -3
@@ -2102,15 +2102,20 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init)* * The initialization memset's clear the object and the metadata, * but don't touch the SLAB redzone. +* +* The object's freepointer is also avoided if stored outside the +* object. */ if (unlikely (init)) {int rsize; +unsigned int inuse; + inuse =get_info_end (s);if (!kasan_has_integrated_init ())memset (kasan_reset_tag (x),0 , s->object_size); rsize = (s->flags &SLAB_RED_ZONE ) ? s->red_left_pad :0 ; -memset ((char *)kasan_reset_tag (x) + s->inuse,0 , - s->size - s->inuse - rsize); +memset ((char *)kasan_reset_tag (x) + inuse,0 , + s->size - inuse - rsize); }/* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */ return !kasan_slab_free (s, x, init);
@@ -3789,7 +3794,7 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,void *obj) { -if (unlikely (slab_want_init_on_free (s)) && obj) +if (unlikely (slab_want_init_on_free (s)) && obj && !freeptr_outside_object (s))memset ((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag (obj) + s->offset),0 ,sizeof (void *)); }
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Quoted 7 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
Commit
284f17ac13fe("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functionsslab_free()andslab_free_bulk()which leadsslab_free()to callslab_free_hook()directly instead ofslab_free_freelist_hook().
Quoted 5 lines
If
init_on_freeis set,slab_free_hook()zeroes the object. Afterward, ifslub_debug=FandCONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENEDare set, thedo_slab_free()slowpath executes freelist consistency checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a "Freepointer corrupt" detection incheck_object().
To make this explanation complete, we should also say that with slab_free_freelist_hook() this doesn't happen as it always sets the freepointer to a valid value after the zeroing.
Quoted 2 lines
Object's freepointer thus needs to be avoided when stored outside the object if
init_on_freeis set.
It would be good to add more reasoning why we're not just doing the same freepointer re-init as slab_free_freelist_hook(), but we decided instead to allow check_object() to actually catch any overwrite by the user of the allocated object, which means it did a buffer overflow. And for that we need to stop wiping or re-initing the outside-object freepointer ourselves...
Quoted 18 lines
To reproduce, set
slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7on the command line of a kernel build withCONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y.dmesg sample log:
[ 10.708715] ============================================================================= [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt [ 10.712695] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 10.712695] [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2) [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c [ 10.716698] [ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00 .... [ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
Quoted 1 line
Co-authored-by Chengming Zhou <[email protected]>
So per Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst the canonical name is
Co-developed-by: and Chengming Zhou should respond with his Signed-off-by:
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
Otherwise seems correct, thanks! So if you could just resend with updated changelog, would be great.
Quoted 52 lines
---
Changes since v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zij_fGjRS_rK-65r@archlinux/* Jump above out of object freepointer if
init_on_freeis set instead of initializing it withset_freepointer()as suggested by Vlastimil Babka.* Adapt
maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr()to avoid wiping out of object on alloc freepointer as suggested by Chengming Zhou.* Reword commit message.
--- mm/slub.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)mm/slub.c +8
-3@@ -2102,15 +2102,20 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init)* * The initialization memset's clear the object and the metadata, * but don't touch the SLAB redzone. +* +* The object's freepointer is also avoided if stored outside the +* object. */ if (unlikely (init)) {int rsize; +unsigned int inuse; + inuse =get_info_end (s);if (!kasan_has_integrated_init ())memset (kasan_reset_tag (x),0 , s->object_size); rsize = (s->flags &SLAB_RED_ZONE ) ? s->red_left_pad :0 ; -memset ((char *)kasan_reset_tag (x) + s->inuse,0 , - s->size - s->inuse - rsize); +memset ((char *)kasan_reset_tag (x) + inuse,0 , + s->size - inuse - rsize); }/* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */ return !kasan_slab_free (s, x, init);@@ -3789,7 +3794,7 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,void *obj) { -if (unlikely (slab_want_init_on_free (s)) && obj) +if (unlikely (slab_want_init_on_free (s)) && obj && !freeptr_outside_object (s))memset ((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag (obj) + s->offset),0 ,sizeof (void *)); }