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slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free

PATCH In review Nicolas Bouchinet 4 participants 5 messages Apr 30, 2024 – Aug 26, 2024

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free

From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>

Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().

If init_on_free is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object. Afterward, if slub_debug=F and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED are set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().

During bulk free, slab_free_freelist_hook() isn't affected as it always sets it objects freepointer using set_freepointer() to maintain its reconstructed freelist after init_on_free.

For single free, object's freepointer thus needs to be avoided when stored outside the object if init_on_free is set. The freepointer left as is, check_object() may later detect an invalid pointer value due to objects overflow.

To reproduce, set slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7 on the command line of a kernel build with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y.

dmesg sample log:

[   10.708715] =============================================================================
[   10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G    B           T ): Freepointer corrupt
[   10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[   10.712695]
[   10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
[   10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
[   10.716698]
[   10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.720703] Object   ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.720703] Object   ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.724696] Padding  ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.724696] Padding  ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00                                      ....
[   10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed

---
Changes since v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZjCxZfD1d36zfq-R@archlinux/

* Reword commit message in order to clarify the patch approach as suggested by Vlastimil Babka

Changes since v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zij_fGjRS_rK-65r@archlinux/

* Jump above out of object freepointer if init_on_free is set instead of initializing it with set_freepointer() as suggested by Vlastimil Babka.

* Adapt maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr() to avoid wiping out of object on alloc freepointer as suggested by Chengming Zhou.

* Reword commit message.

---
 mm/slub.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/slub.c +8 -3
index 3aa12b9b323d..173c340ec1d3 100644
@@ -2102,15 +2102,20 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init)
 	 *
 	 * The initialization memset's clear the object and the metadata,
 	 * but don't touch the SLAB redzone.
+	 *
+	 * The object's freepointer is also avoided if stored outside the
+	 * object.
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(init)) {
 		int rsize;
+		unsigned int inuse;
 
+		inuse = get_info_end(s);
 		if (!kasan_has_integrated_init())
 			memset(kasan_reset_tag(x), 0, s->object_size);
 		rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad : 0;
-		memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + s->inuse, 0,
-		       s->size - s->inuse - rsize);
+		memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + inuse, 0,
+			s->size - inuse - rsize);
 	}
 	/* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */
 	return !kasan_slab_free(s, x, init);
@@ -3789,7 +3794,7 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
 static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,
 						   void *obj)
 {
-	if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj)
+	if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj && !freeptr_outside_object(s))
 		memset((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag(obj) + s->offset),
 			0, sizeof(void *));
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 40 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet

From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>

Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().

If init_on_free is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object. Afterward, if slub_debug=F and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED are set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().

During bulk free, slab_free_freelist_hook() isn't affected as it always sets it objects freepointer using set_freepointer() to maintain its reconstructed freelist after init_on_free.

For single free, object's freepointer thus needs to be avoided when stored outside the object if init_on_free is set. The freepointer left as is, check_object() may later detect an invalid pointer value due to objects overflow.

To reproduce, set slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7 on the command line of a kernel build with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y.

dmesg sample log:

[   10.708715] =============================================================================
[   10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G    B           T ): Freepointer corrupt
[   10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[   10.712695]
[   10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
[   10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
[   10.716698]
[   10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.720703] Object   ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.720703] Object   ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.724696] Padding  ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.724696] Padding  ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00                                      ....
[   10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
Quoted 1 line

Chengming Zhou, could you provide your s-o-b please?

Quoted 1 line

Added to slab/for-6.9-rc7/fixes, thanks!

#2 lore raw
Quoted 41 lines · Vlastimil Babka
Quoted 40 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet

From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>

Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().

If init_on_free is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object. Afterward, if slub_debug=F and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED are set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().

During bulk free, slab_free_freelist_hook() isn't affected as it always sets it objects freepointer using set_freepointer() to maintain its reconstructed freelist after init_on_free.

For single free, object's freepointer thus needs to be avoided when stored outside the object if init_on_free is set. The freepointer left as is, check_object() may later detect an invalid pointer value due to objects overflow.

To reproduce, set slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7 on the command line of a kernel build with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y.

dmesg sample log:

[   10.708715] =============================================================================
[   10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G    B           T ): Freepointer corrupt
[   10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[   10.712695]
[   10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
[   10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
[   10.716698]
[   10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.720703] Object   ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.720703] Object   ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.724696] Padding  ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.724696] Padding  ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00                                      ....
[   10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

Chengming Zhou, could you provide your s-o-b please?

Of course.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Added to slab/for-6.9-rc7/fixes, thanks!

Thanks!

#3 lore raw
In reply to Nicolas Bouchinet

Hi Nicolas,

Quoted 2 lines

Subject: [PATCH v3] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free

With slub_debug=FUZ init_on_free=1 loglevel=7, I see error In 6.6 kernel. Should this patch be backported to 6.6?

I also had a hack together with your patch applied to 6.6

mm/slub.c +2 -1
index 96406f9813e8..ff8cdc737722 100644
@@ -1209,7 +1209,8 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab,
                        if (s->object_size > orig_size  &&
                                !check_bytes_and_report(s, slab, object,
                                        "kmalloc Redzone", p + orig_size,
-                                       val, s->object_size - orig_size)) {
+                                       slab_want_init_on_free(s) ? 0 : val,
+                                       s->object_size - orig_size)) {
                                return 0;
                        }
                }

Thanks,
Peng.

Quoted 137 lines

From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>

Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().

If init_on_free is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object. Afterward, if slub_debug=F and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED are set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().

During bulk free, slab_free_freelist_hook() isn't affected as it always sets it objects freepointer using set_freepointer() to maintain its reconstructed freelist after init_on_free.

For single free, object's freepointer thus needs to be avoided when stored outside the object if init_on_free is set. The freepointer left as is, check_object() may later detect an invalid pointer value due to objects overflow.

To reproduce, set slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7 on the command line of a kernel build with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y.

dmesg sample log:

[   10.708715]
============================================================
=================
[   10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G    B           T ):
Freepointer corrupt
[   10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[   10.712695]
[   10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4
fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80
flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
[   10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536
fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
[   10.716698]
[   10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.720703] Object   ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.720703] Object   ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.724696] Padding  ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.724696] Padding  ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00
00                                      ....
[   10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600

not freed

---
Changes since v2:
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2F
lore.kernel.org%2Fall%2FZjCxZfD1d36zfq- R%40archlinux%2F&data=05%7C02%7Cpeng.fan%40nxp.com%7C38af dff178a0422aeddc08dc690996f5%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c3 01635%7C0%7C0%7C638500737122575573%7CUnknown%7CTWFpb GZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLC JXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=Q4Vs38E%2F7HSIETGC2hYD 07gN6U8hkVZR764Yn4TFWlw%3D&reserved=0

* Reword commit message in order to clarify the patch approach as suggested by Vlastimil Babka

Changes since v1:
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2F
lore.kernel.org%2Fall%2FZij_fGjRS_rK- 65r%40archlinux%2F&data=05%7C02%7Cpeng.fan%40nxp.com%7C38 afdff178a0422aeddc08dc690996f5%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c 301635%7C0%7C0%7C638500737122594077%7CUnknown%7CTWFp bGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiL CJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=xWgnIygCHwUPjnFENutIai cMTk0HQTne8hQfOqIzbA0%3D&reserved=0

* Jump above out of object freepointer if init_on_free is set instead of initializing it with set_freepointer() as suggested by Vlastimil Babka.

* Adapt maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr() to avoid wiping out of object on alloc freepointer as suggested by Chengming Zhou.

* Reword commit message.

---
 mm/slub.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/slub.c +7 -2
index 3aa12b9b323d..173c340ec1d3 100644
@@ -2102,15 +2102,20 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache
 *s, void *x, bool init)
 	 *
 	 * The initialization memset's clear the object and the
 metadata,
 	 * but don't touch the SLAB redzone.
+	 *
+	 * The object's freepointer is also avoided if stored outside the
+	 * object.
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(init)) {
 		int rsize;
+		unsigned int inuse;
 
+		inuse = get_info_end(s);
 		if (!kasan_has_integrated_init())
 			memset(kasan_reset_tag(x), 0, s->object_size);
 		rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad :
 0;
-		memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + s->inuse, 0,
-		       s->size - s->inuse - rsize);
+		memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + inuse, 0,
+			s->size - inuse - rsize);
mm/slub.c +0 -0
 	}
 	/* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its

reuse. */

mm/slub.c +0 -0
 	return !kasan_slab_free(s, x, init);
@@ -3789,7 +3794,7 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct

kmem_cache *s, static __always_inline void
maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,

mm/slub.c +2 -1
 						   void *obj)
 {
-	if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj)
+	if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj &&
+!freeptr_outside_object(s))
 		memset((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag(obj) + s-
Quoted 1 line

offset),

0, sizeof(void *));
}
--
2.44.0

#4 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Peng Fan

Hi Nicolas,

Quoted 2 lines

Subject: [PATCH v3] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free

With slub_debug=FUZ init_on_free=1 loglevel=7, I see error In 6.6 kernel. Should this patch be backported to 6.6?

But it was a fix for commit 284f17ac13fe that's from 6.8 and wasn't backported to 6.6. Are you seeing the same error happening for the same reason, or is it a different one?

Quoted 157 lines

I also had a hack together with your patch applied to 6.6

mm/slub.c +2 -1
index 96406f9813e8..ff8cdc737722 100644
@@ -1209,7 +1209,8 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab,
                        if (s->object_size > orig_size  &&
                                !check_bytes_and_report(s, slab, object,
                                        "kmalloc Redzone", p + orig_size,
-                                       val, s->object_size - orig_size)) {
+                                       slab_want_init_on_free(s) ? 0 : val,
+                                       s->object_size - orig_size)) {
                                return 0;
                        }
                }

Thanks,
Peng.

Quoted 137 lines

From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>

Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().

If init_on_free is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object. Afterward, if slub_debug=F and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED are set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().

During bulk free, slab_free_freelist_hook() isn't affected as it always sets it objects freepointer using set_freepointer() to maintain its reconstructed freelist after init_on_free.

For single free, object's freepointer thus needs to be avoided when stored outside the object if init_on_free is set. The freepointer left as is, check_object() may later detect an invalid pointer value due to objects overflow.

To reproduce, set slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7 on the command line of a kernel build with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y.

dmesg sample log:

[   10.708715]
============================================================
=================
[   10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G    B           T ):
Freepointer corrupt
[   10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[   10.712695]
[   10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4
fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80
flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
[   10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536
fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
[   10.716698]
[   10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.720703] Object   ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.720703] Object   ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.724696] Padding  ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[   10.724696] Padding  ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00
00                                      ....
[   10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600

not freed

---
Changes since v2:
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2F
lore.kernel.org%2Fall%2FZjCxZfD1d36zfq- R%40archlinux%2F&data=05%7C02%7Cpeng.fan%40nxp.com%7C38af dff178a0422aeddc08dc690996f5%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c3 01635%7C0%7C0%7C638500737122575573%7CUnknown%7CTWFpb GZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLC JXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=Q4Vs38E%2F7HSIETGC2hYD 07gN6U8hkVZR764Yn4TFWlw%3D&reserved=0

* Reword commit message in order to clarify the patch approach as suggested by Vlastimil Babka

Changes since v1:
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2F
lore.kernel.org%2Fall%2FZij_fGjRS_rK- 65r%40archlinux%2F&data=05%7C02%7Cpeng.fan%40nxp.com%7C38 afdff178a0422aeddc08dc690996f5%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c 301635%7C0%7C0%7C638500737122594077%7CUnknown%7CTWFp bGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiL CJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=xWgnIygCHwUPjnFENutIai cMTk0HQTne8hQfOqIzbA0%3D&reserved=0

* Jump above out of object freepointer if init_on_free is set instead of initializing it with set_freepointer() as suggested by Vlastimil Babka.

* Adapt maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr() to avoid wiping out of object on alloc freepointer as suggested by Chengming Zhou.

* Reword commit message.

---
 mm/slub.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/slub.c +7 -2
index 3aa12b9b323d..173c340ec1d3 100644
@@ -2102,15 +2102,20 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache
 *s, void *x, bool init)
 	 *
 	 * The initialization memset's clear the object and the
 metadata,
 	 * but don't touch the SLAB redzone.
+	 *
+	 * The object's freepointer is also avoided if stored outside the
+	 * object.
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(init)) {
 		int rsize;
+		unsigned int inuse;
 
+		inuse = get_info_end(s);
 		if (!kasan_has_integrated_init())
 			memset(kasan_reset_tag(x), 0, s->object_size);
 		rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad :
 0;
-		memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + s->inuse, 0,
-		       s->size - s->inuse - rsize);
+		memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + inuse, 0,
+			s->size - inuse - rsize);
mm/slub.c +0 -0
 	}
 	/* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its

reuse. */

mm/slub.c +0 -0
 	return !kasan_slab_free(s, x, init);
@@ -3789,7 +3794,7 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct

kmem_cache *s, static __always_inline void
maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,

mm/slub.c +2 -1
 						   void *obj)
 {
-	if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj)
+	if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj &&
+!freeptr_outside_object(s))
 		memset((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag(obj) + s-
Quoted 1 line

offset),

0, sizeof(void *));
}
--
2.44.0