Plans for post-quantum security?
Are there plans to make WireGuard post-quantum secure? Post-quantum cryptography is actually faster than X25519, and it is the default in browsers and many libraries now [1]. It is also the default in OpenSSH, which warns if it is not in use.
There is an academic paper [2] with a post-quantum VPN based on WireGuard, but to keep the handshake packets inside the IPv6 MTU, they had to make trade-offs:
1. The key-encapsulation mechanism used for forward secrecy is a modified version of Saber that is only secure against chosen-plaintext attack, not chosen-ciphertext attack. This is (hopefully) sufficient for the task here, but this might take careful analysis to prove. It also isn't standardized anywhere I am aware of.
2. Classic McEliece is used for long-term asymmetric keys. It has small ciphertexts, but massive public keys.
I have some thoughts of my own, but first I'd like to know if there are any plans from the developers and if suggestions would be appreciated. I'd like to not need to switch to IPsec!
Of course, one can always repeatedly update the PresharedKey field using a daemon running in userspace, but this loses some of WireGuard's advantages. It is also tricky to do without having to send traffic outside the tunnel, and it only rekeys so long as the daemon keeps running.
[1]: https://developers.cloudflare.com/ssl/post-quantum-cryptography/pqc-support/
[2]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/379.pdf
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Sincerely, Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)