Security
I'd like to propose a security discussion topic again this year, as folk may have security-related development issues (e.g. cross-subsystem merges, points of conflict) to discuss with the broader kernel group.
For reference, here is last year's agenda:
http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Linux_Kernel_Summit_2017,_Security_Session
The agenda for 2018 would be finalized closer to November.
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Sort of related to this. I think we should have a public email list to discuss potential security problems. We've actually talked about making the [email protected] list public at some point when people started flooding it with static checker warnings about potential SELinux missing checks.
The downsides are 1) Maintainers will be annoyed. They don't want me or anyone to forward them static checker output (they are polite about this). But they also want to be the first to know about real bugs found by static analysis. These are conflicting and impossible desires... 2) Script kiddies will follow the list and learn about bugs earlier. I don't see this as a huge issue if we restricted it to driver specific bugs.
Security work is lonely. Everyone expects *all* the bugs to be fixed perfectly and in absolute secrecy.
Every other special interest group has a mailing list linux in automotive or small kernels. Security would be the same. Also I sometimes see obviously bad security fixes. There is one integer overflow fixes which I have re-fixed three times. Older me is able to review other people's integer overflow fixes and spot bugs. It would be good to have a way to share that knowledge.
Most maintainers do not want to deal with more than a 5% false positive rate in static checker warnings. I, on the other hand, regularly deal with a 95% false positive checks and there are probably other people like me who can spend a whole day looking and feel happy to find one bug.
regards,
dan carpenter
Quoted 24 lines · Dan Carpenter
Sort of related to this. I think we should have a public email list to discuss potential security problems. We've actually talked about making the [email protected] list public at some point when people started flooding it with static checker warnings about potential SELinux missing checks.
The downsides are 1) Maintainers will be annoyed. They don't want me or anyone to forward them static checker output (they are polite about this). But they also want to be the first to know about real bugs found by static analysis. These are conflicting and impossible desires... 2) Script kiddies will follow the list and learn about bugs earlier. I don't see this as a huge issue if we restricted it to driver specific bugs.
Security work is lonely. Everyone expects *all* the bugs to be fixed perfectly and in absolute secrecy.
Every other special interest group has a mailing list linux in automotive or small kernels. Security would be the same. Also I sometimes see obviously bad security fixes. There is one integer overflow fixes which I have re-fixed three times. Older me is able to review other people's integer overflow fixes and spot bugs. It would be good to have a way to share that knowledge.
Quoted 6 lines
Most maintainers do not want to deal with more than a 5% false positive rate in static checker warnings. I, on the other hand, regularly deal with a 95% false positive checks and there are probably other people like me who can spend a whole day looking and feel happy to find one bug.
I think there's two different categories here: there's a general security interest group and security response. [email protected] is supposed to be security response for coordination. kernel-hardening kind of fills the security interest list but maybe it's still separate. I do support having more discussion of security bugs publicly while also having a discussion about security response since we get a non-zero number of reports that requires more careful handling.
Thanks,
Laura
Quoted 6 lines · Dan Carpenter
Sort of related to this. I think we should have a public email list to discuss potential security problems. We've actually talked about making the [email protected] list public at some point when people started flooding it with static checker warnings about potential SELinux missing checks.
Quoted 7 lines
The downsides are 1) Maintainers will be annoyed. They don't want me or anyone to forward them static checker output (they are polite about this). But they also want to be the first to know about real bugs found by static analysis. These are conflicting and impossible desires... 2) Script kiddies will follow the list and learn about bugs earlier. I don't see this as a huge issue if we restricted it to driver specific bugs.
3) there simply is a need for CRD process for the kernel (which pretty much by definition is not happening publicly). Currently, security@ serves that purpose, so if you make that public, you have to instantiate some other process to deal with CRDs.
Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
Quoted 4 lines · Jiri Kosina
3) there simply is a need for CRD process for the kernel (which pretty much by definition is not happening publicly). Currently, security@ serves that purpose, so if you make that public, you have to instantiate some other process to deal with CRDs.
Can you expand the acronym "CRD".
- Ted
Quoted 6 lines · Theodore Y. Ts'o
Quoted 4 lines
3) there simply is a need for CRD process for the kernel (which pretty much by definition is not happening publicly). Currently, security@ serves that purpose, so if you make that public, you have to instantiate some other process to deal with CRDs.
Can you expand the acronym "CRD".
"Coordinated release date" across the various affected vendors.
Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
Quoted 16 lines · Jiri Kosina
Quoted 6 lines · Dan Carpenter
Sort of related to this. I think we should have a public email list to discuss potential security problems. We've actually talked about making the [email protected] list public at some point when people started flooding it with static checker warnings about potential SELinux missing checks.
Quoted 7 lines
The downsides are 1) Maintainers will be annoyed. They don't want me or anyone to forward them static checker output (they are polite about this). But they also want to be the first to know about real bugs found by static analysis. These are conflicting and impossible desires... 2) Script kiddies will follow the list and learn about bugs earlier. I don't see this as a huge issue if we restricted it to driver specific bugs.
Quoted 4 lines
3) there simply is a need for CRD process for the kernel (which pretty much by definition is not happening publicly). Currently, security@ serves that purpose, so if you make that public, you have to instantiate some other process to deal with CRDs.
I'm not saying we would eliminate [email protected]. We would keep that. [email protected] also does not want to answer questions about every "suspicious code" that people find.
For coordinated responses you need linux-distros. [email protected] does not do it.
[email protected] is there for two reasons. First we need a contact to deal with security issues. About half the time when people send us security reports to [email protected] then we just forward it to the appropriate maintainer. Second, it's has a bunch of core developers for serious bugs in ptrace or similar which affect everyone. Those kinds of fixes are risky and complicated. But after a fix is found then distros are expected to handle the release and getting the CVE etc.
regards,
dan carpenter