SUPPORT.md: split XSM from Flask
PATCH v3 1/1 SUPPORT.md: split XSM from Flask
XSM is a generic framework, which in particular is also used by SILO. With this it can't really be experimental: Arm mandates SILO for having a security supported configuration.
---
v3: Add explanations. Another terminology adjustment.
v2: Terminology adjustments. Stronger description.
SUPPORT.md +17 -2
@@ -769,13 +769,21 @@ Compile time disabled for ARM by default Status, x86: Supported, not security supported -### XSM & FLASK +### XSM (Xen Security Module) Framework + +XSM is a security policy framework. The dummy implementation is covered by this +statement, and implements a policy whereby dom0 is all powerful. See below for +alternative modules (FLASK, SILO). + + Status: Supported + +### FLASK XSM Module Status: Experimental Compile time disabled by default. -Also note that using XSM +Also note that using FLASK to delegate various domain control hypercalls to particular other domains, rather than only permitting use by dom0, is also specifically excluded from security support for many hypercalls.
@@ -788,6 +796,13 @@ Please see XSA-77 for more details. The default policy includes FLASK labels and roles for a "typical" Xen-based system with dom0, driver domains, stub domains, domUs, and so on. +### SILO XSM Module + +SILO implements a policy whereby DomU-s can only communicate with Dom0, yet not +with each other. + + Status: Supported + ## Virtual Hardware, Hypervisor ### x86/Nested PV
Ping: [PATCH v3] SUPPORT.md: split XSM from Flask
Quoted 8 lines · Jan Beulich
XSM is a generic framework, which in particular is also used by SILO. With this it can't really be experimental: Arm mandates SILO for having a security supported configuration.
Signed-off-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>---
v3: Add explanations. Another terminology adjustment.
v2: Terminology adjustments. Stronger description.
Are yet further adjustments needed?
Jan
Quoted 40 lines
SUPPORT.md +17
-2@@ -769,13 +769,21 @@ Compile time disabled for ARM by default Status, x86: Supported, not security supported -### XSM & FLASK +### XSM (Xen Security Module) Framework + +XSM is a security policy framework. The dummy implementation is covered by this +statement, and implements a policy whereby dom0 is all powerful. See below for +alternative modules (FLASK, SILO). + + Status: Supported + +### FLASK XSM Module Status: Experimental Compile time disabled by default. -Also note that using XSM +Also note that using FLASK to delegate various domain control hypercalls to particular other domains, rather than only permitting use by dom0, is also specifically excluded from security support for many hypercalls.@@ -788,6 +796,13 @@ Please see XSA-77 for more details. The default policy includes FLASK labels and roles for a "typical" Xen-based system with dom0, driver domains, stub domains, domUs, and so on. +### SILO XSM Module + +SILO implements a policy whereby DomU-s can only communicate with Dom0, yet not +with each other. + + Status: Supported + ## Virtual Hardware, Hypervisor ### x86/Nested PV
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
XSM is a generic framework, which in particular is also used by SILO. With this it can't really be experimental: Arm mandates SILO for having a security supported configuration.
Signed-off-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Quoted 31 lines
---
v3: Add explanations. Another terminology adjustment.
v2: Terminology adjustments. Stronger description.SUPPORT.md +10
-2@@ -769,13 +769,21 @@ Compile time disabled for ARM by default Status, x86: Supported, not security supported -### XSM & FLASK +### XSM (Xen Security Module) Framework + +XSM is a security policy framework. The dummy implementation is covered by this +statement, and implements a policy whereby dom0 is all powerful. See below for +alternative modules (FLASK, SILO). + + Status: Supported + +### FLASK XSM Module Status: Experimental Compile time disabled by default. -Also note that using XSM +Also note that using FLASK to delegate various domain control hypercalls to particular other domains, rather than only permitting use by dom0, is also specifically excluded from security support for many hypercalls.
SUPPORT.md Please see XSA-77 for more details. · line 802
Quoted 7 lines
SUPPORT.md +4
-0@@ -788,6 +796,13 @@ Please see XSA-77 for more details. The default policy includes FLASK labels and roles for a "typical" Xen-based system with dom0, driver domains, stub domains, domUs, and so on. +### SILO XSM Module + +SILO implements a policy whereby DomU-s can only communicate with Dom0, yet not +with each other.
Might be good to clarify SILO is just like the dummy XSM implementation without allowing inter-domain communication, ie:
"SILO extends the dummy XSM policy by enforcing that DomU-s can only communicate with Dom0, yet not with each other."
Or similar.
Thanks, Roger.
Quoted 8 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
XSM is a generic framework, which in particular is also used by SILO. With this it can't really be experimental: Arm mandates SILO for having a security supported configuration.
Signed-off-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
Thanks.
Quoted 12 lines
SUPPORT.md Please see XSA-77 for more details. · line 802
Quoted 8 lines
SUPPORT.md +4
-0@@ -788,6 +796,13 @@ Please see XSA-77 for more details. The default policy includes FLASK labels and roles for a "typical" Xen-based system with dom0, driver domains, stub domains, domUs, and so on. +### SILO XSM Module + +SILO implements a policy whereby DomU-s can only communicate with Dom0, yet not +with each other.Might be good to clarify SILO is just like the dummy XSM implementation without allowing inter-domain communication, ie:
Quoted 4 lines
"SILO extends the dummy XSM policy by enforcing that DomU-s can only communicate with Dom0, yet not with each other."
Or similar.
Fine with me - adjusted.
Jan
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
XSM is a generic framework, which in particular is also used by SILO. With this it can't really be experimental: Arm mandates SILO for having a security supported configuration.
Signed-off-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>