net: sctp: remove unused multiple cookie keys
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PATCH 1/1 net: sctp: remove unused multiple cookie keys
Vlad says: The whole multiple cookie keys code is completely unused and has been all this time. Noone uses anything other then the secret_key[0] since there is no changeover support anywhere.
Thus, for now clean up its left-over fragments.
--- include/net/sctp/constants.h | 2 +- include/net/sctp/structs.h | 5 +---- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 9 ++------- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 24 ++++++------------------ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
include/net/sctp/constants.h +1 -1
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ enum { SCTP_MAX_GABS = 16 };* to which we will raise the P-MTU. */ #define SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT 512/* MTU size ... if no mtu disc */ -#define SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS 2/* How many secrets I keep */ +#define SCTP_SECRET_SIZE 32/* Number of octets in a 256 bits. */ #define SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE 20/* size of a SLA-1 signature */
include/net/sctp/structs.h +1 -4
@@ -1236,10 +1236,7 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {* Discussion in [RFC1750] can be helpful in * selection of the key. */ -__u8 secret_key[SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS ][SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ]; -int current_key; -int last_key; -int key_changed_at; +__u8 secret_key[SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ];/* digest: This is a digest of the sctp cookie. This field is * only used on the receive path when we try to validate
net/sctp/endpointola.c +2 -7
@@ -151,9 +151,7 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, ep->rcvbuf_policy = net->sctp.rcvbuf_policy;/* Initialize the secret key used with cookie. */ -get_random_bytes (&ep->secret_key[0 ],SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ); - ep->last_key = ep->current_key =0 ; - ep->key_changed_at = jiffies; +get_random_bytes (ep->secret_key,sizeof (ep->secret_key));/* SCTP-AUTH extensions*/ INIT_LIST_HEAD (&ep->endpoint_shared_keys);
@@ -249,8 +247,6 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)/* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy (struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { -int i; -SCTP_ASSERT (ep->base.dead,"Endpoint is not dead" , return);/* Free up the HMAC transform. */
@@ -273,8 +269,7 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)sctp_inq_free (&ep->base.inqueue);sctp_bind_addr_free (&ep->base.bind_addr); -for (i =0 ; i <SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS ; ++i) -memset (&ep->secret_key[i],0 ,SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ); +memset (ep->secret_key,0 ,sizeof (ep->secret_key));/* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk (ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +6 -18
@@ -1650,8 +1650,8 @@ static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,/* Sign the message. */ sg_init_one (&sg, &cookie->c, bodysize); - keylen =SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ; - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key]; + keylen =sizeof (ep->secret_key); + key = (char *) ep->secret_key; desc.tfm =sctp_sk (ep->base.sk)->hmac; desc.flags =0 ;
@@ -1718,9 +1718,9 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( goto no_hmac;/* Check the signature. */ - keylen =SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ;sg_init_one (&sg, bear_cookie, bodysize); - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key]; + keylen =sizeof (ep->secret_key); + key = (char *) ep->secret_key; desc.tfm =sctp_sk (ep->base.sk)->hmac; desc.flags =0 ;
@@ -1732,20 +1732,8 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( }if (memcmp (digest, cookie->signature,SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE )) { -/* Try the previous key. */ - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->last_key]; -memset (digest,0x00 ,SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE ); -if (crypto_hash_setkey (desc.tfm, key, keylen) || -crypto_hash_digest (&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) { - *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM ; - goto fail; - } - -if (memcmp (digest, cookie->signature,SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE )) { -/* Yikes! Still bad signature! */ - *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG ; - goto fail; - } + *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG ; + goto fail; } no_hmac:
Signature · 1 line
1.7.11.7
Quoted 16 lines · Daniel Borkmann
Vlad says: The whole multiple cookie keys code is completely unused and has been all this time. Noone uses anything other then the secret_key[0] since there is no changeover support anywhere.
Thus, for now clean up its left-over fragments.
Cc Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>net/sctp/endpointola.c +0
-0/* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk (ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +0
-0
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, · line 1654
Quoted 7 lines
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +2
-2@@ -1650,8 +1650,8 @@ static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,/* Sign the message. */ sg_init_one (&sg, &cookie->c, bodysize); - keylen =SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ; - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key]; + keylen =sizeof (ep->secret_key); + key = (char *) ep->secret_key;
You can drop the use of they local key variable entirely here. crypto_hash_setkey takes a u8 * as a key parameter, so you can pass ep->secret_key directly.
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( · line 1723
Quoted 12 lines
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +2
-2desc.tfm =sctp_sk (ep->base.sk)->hmac; desc.flags =0 ;@@ -1718,9 +1718,9 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( goto no_hmac;/* Check the signature. */ - keylen =SCTP_SECRET_SIZE ;sg_init_one (&sg, bear_cookie, bodysize); - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key]; + keylen =sizeof (ep->secret_key); + key = (char *) ep->secret_key;
Ditto the above.
Otherwise it looks good.
Neil