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ima: change how MODULE_SIG_FORCE is checked on modules checking policy

PATCH Superseded Bruno E. O. Meneguele 2 participants 6 messages Oct 20, 2017 – Oct 23, 2017

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v1 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

cover ima: change how MODULE_SIG_FORCE is checked on modules checking policy

This patchset ensure that IMA's modules checking policy:

measure func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0

rely on the correct value of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE, since the way it is today the code completely ignores the module.sig_enforce cmdline param, which behaves in a OR logic with the CONFIG value (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE || module.sig_enforce). That said, everytime a module would load, in the current checking code, when the kernel was not compiled with the CONFIG set the call to init_module syscall fails with -EACCES:

# strace -f -v modprobe <any-module> | grep init_module
init_module(0x55b9bcc9bba0, 17763, "") = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)

With this patchset the result would rely on the module.sig_enforce cmdline as well. Once the CONFIG is not set, but the param is, the result would be 'success', as it should be:

# strace -f -v modprobe <any-module> | grep init_module
init_module(0x7f9602d6e010, 386646, "") = 0

The patchset was tested in two different kernels: 4.13.6 (Fedora 27) and 4.14.0-rc4 (integrity-next tree)

Bruno E. O. Meneguele (2):
module: export module signature enforcement status
ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of
CONFIG

 include/linux/module.h            | 2 ++
 kernel/module.c                   | 8 ++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 +++---
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Signature · 6 lines
2.13.6

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#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 module: export module signature enforcement status

A static variable sig_enforce is used as status var to indicate the real value of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE, once this one is set the var will hold true, but if the CONFIG is not set the status var will hold whatever value is present in the module.sig_enforce kernel cmdline param: true when =1 and false when =0 or not present.

Considering this cmdline param take place over the CONFIG value when it's not set, other places in the kernel could missbehave since they would have only the CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE value to rely on. Exporting this status var allows the kernel to rely in the effective value of module signature enforcement, being it from CONFIG value or cmdline param.

---
 include/linux/module.h | 2 ++
 kernel/module.c        | 8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
include/linux/module.h +2 -0
index fe5aa3736707..ddfe17e3a85c 100644
@@ -806,4 +806,6 @@ static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module)
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
 
+bool is_module_sig_enforced(void);
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_H */
kernel/module.c +8 -0
index de66ec825992..b93c7ff44066 100644
@@ -278,6 +278,14 @@ static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE);
 module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644);
 #endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE */
 
+/* Export sig_enforce kernel cmdline parameter to allow other subsystems rely
+ * on that instead of directly to CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE config. */
+bool is_module_sig_enforced(void)
+{
+	return sig_enforce;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_module_sig_enforced);
+
 /* Block module loading/unloading? */
 int modules_disabled = 0;
 core_param(nomodule, modules_disabled, bint, 0);
Signature · 6 lines
2.13.6

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#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG

In reply to Bruno E. O. Meneguele

When the user requests MODULE_CHECK policy and its kernel is compiled with CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE not set, all modules would not load, just those loaded in initram time. One option the user would have would be set a kernel cmdline param (module.sig_enforce) to true, but the IMA module check code doesn't rely on this value, it checks just CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE.

This patch solves this problem checking for the exported value of module.sig_enforce cmdline param intead of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE, which holds the effective value (CONFIG || param).

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +3 -3
index e4ab8ef8016e..d11a7fcc5c8b 100644
@@ -356,12 +356,12 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
  */
 int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
+	bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
+
 	if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
-#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
-		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
+		if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
 		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
 			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
-#endif
 		return 0;	/* We rely on module signature checking */
 	}
 	return 0;
Signature · 6 lines
2.13.6

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#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/2] module: export module signature enforcement status

In reply to Bruno E. O. Meneguele
Quoted 8 lines · Bruno E. O. Meneguele

A static variable sig_enforce is used as status var to indicate the real value of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE, once this one is set the var will hold true, but if the CONFIG is not set the status var will hold whatever value is present in the module.sig_enforce kernel cmdline param: true when =1 and false when =0 or not present.

Considering this cmdline param take place over the CONFIG value when it's not set, other places in the kernel could missbehave since they

^misbehave

Quoted 4 lines

would have only the CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE value to rely on. Exporting this status var allows the kernel to rely in the effective value of module signature enforcement, being it from CONFIG value or cmdline param.

Thanks! There's a minor checkpatch warning below.

Quoted 22 lines
---
 include/linux/module.h | 2 ++
 kernel/module.c        | 8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
include/linux/module.h +2 -0
index fe5aa3736707..ddfe17e3a85c 100644
@@ -806,4 +806,6 @@ static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module)
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
 
+bool is_module_sig_enforced(void);
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_H */
kernel/module.c +0 -0
index de66ec825992..b93c7ff44066 100644

kernel/module.c static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE); · line 282

Quoted 5 lines
kernel/module.c +2 -0
@@ -278,6 +278,14 @@ static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE);
 module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644);
 #endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE */
 
+/* Export sig_enforce kernel cmdline parameter to allow other subsystems rely
+ * on that instead of directly to CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE config. */

Checkpatch complains. ?Please use the normal format:
/*
?*
?*/

kernel/module.c static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE); · line 291

Quoted 9 lines
kernel/module.c +6 -0
+bool is_module_sig_enforced(void)
+{
+	return sig_enforce;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_module_sig_enforced);
+
 /* Block module loading/unloading? */
 int modules_disabled = 0;
 core_param(nomodule, modules_disabled, bint, 0);

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#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/2] ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG

In reply to Bruno E. O. Meneguele
Quoted 7 lines · Bruno E. O. Meneguele

When the user requests MODULE_CHECK policy and its kernel is compiled with CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE not set, all modules would not load, just those loaded in initram time. One option the user would have would be set a kernel cmdline param (module.sig_enforce) to true, but the IMA module check code doesn't rely on this value, it checks just CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE.

Quoted 5 lines

This patch solves this problem checking for the exported value of module.sig_enforce cmdline param intead of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE, which holds the effective value (CONFIG || param).

Thanks!

Quoted 14 lines
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +2 -0
index e4ab8ef8016e..d11a7fcc5c8b 100644
@@ -356,12 +356,12 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
  */
 int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
+	bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
+

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) · line 367

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1 -3
 	if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
-#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
-		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
+		if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
 		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
 			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
-#endif
 		return 0;	/* We rely on module signature checking */
 	}
 	return 0;

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#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/2] module: export module signature enforcement status

In reply to Mimi Zohar
Quoted 7 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 6 lines · Bruno E. O. Meneguele

A static variable sig_enforce is used as status var to indicate the real value of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE, once this one is set the var will hold true, but if the CONFIG is not set the status var will hold whatever value is present in the module.sig_enforce kernel cmdline param: true when =1 and false when =0 or not present.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Considering this cmdline param take place over the CONFIG value when it's not set, other places in the kernel could missbehave since they

^misbehave

right.

Quoted 32 lines
Quoted 4 lines

would have only the CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE value to rely on. Exporting this status var allows the kernel to rely in the effective value of module signature enforcement, being it from CONFIG value or cmdline param.

Thanks! There's a minor checkpatch warning below.

Quoted 25 lines
---
 include/linux/module.h | 2 ++
 kernel/module.c        | 8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
include/linux/module.h +2 -0
index fe5aa3736707..ddfe17e3a85c 100644
@@ -806,4 +806,6 @@ static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module)
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
 
+bool is_module_sig_enforced(void);
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_H */
kernel/module.c +0 -0
index de66ec825992..b93c7ff44066 100644
@@ -278,6 +278,14 @@ static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE);
 module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644);
 #endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE */
 
Quoted 8 lines

kernel/module.c static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE); · line 282

Quoted 2 lines
kernel/module.c +2 -0
+/* Export sig_enforce kernel cmdline parameter to allow other subsystems rely
+ * on that instead of directly to CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE config. */

Checkpatch complains. Please use the normal format:
/*
*
*/

Oh, sure, sorry for that! I'll resend a v2 of the patchset in a minute.

Thanks.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/module.c +6 -0
+bool is_module_sig_enforced(void)
+{
+	return sig_enforce;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_module_sig_enforced);
+
 /* Block module loading/unloading? */
 int modules_disabled = 0;
 core_param(nomodule, modules_disabled, bint, 0);
Signature · 6 lines
bmeneg 
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