audit: avoid umount hangs on missing mount
cover audit: avoid umount hangs on missing mount
On user and remote filesystems, a forced umount can still hang due to attemting to fetch the fcaps of a mounted filesystem that is no longer available.
These two patches take different approaches to address this, one by avoiding the lookup when the MNT_FORCE flag is included, the other by providing a method to filter out auditing specified types of filesystems.
This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.
Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable auditing processes that touch removable filesystems.
Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100
Richard Guy Briggs (2):
audit: avoid fcaps on MNT_FORCE
audit: moar filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
fs/namei.c | 2 +- fs/namespace.c | 3 +++ include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++-- kernel/audit.c | 5 +++-- kernel/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
RFC PATCH 1/2 audit: avoid fcaps on MNT_FORCE
Don't fetch fcaps when umount2 is called with MNT_FORCE to avoid a process hang while it waits for the missing resource to (possibly never) re-appear.
Note the comment above user_path_mountpoint_at():
* A umount is a special case for path walking. We're not actually interested
* in the inode in this situation, and ESTALE errors can be a problem. We
* simply want track down the dentry and vfsmount attached at the mountpoint
* and avoid revalidating the last component.
This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.
Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100
--- fs/namei.c | 2 +- fs/namespace.c | 3 +++ include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++-- kernel/audit.c | 5 +++-- kernel/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++--- 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +1 -1
@@ -2720,7 +2720,7 @@ int user_path_at_empty(int dfd, const char __user *name, unsigned flags,if (unlikely (error == -ESTALE )) error =path_mountpoint (&nd, flags |LOOKUP_REVAL , path);if (likely (!error)) -audit_inode (name, path->dentry,0 ); +audit_inode (name, path->dentry, flags &LOOKUP_NO_REVAL );restore_nameidata ();putname (name);return error;
fs/namespace.c +3 -0
@@ -1636,6 +1636,9 @@ int ksys_umount(char __user *name, int flags)if (!(flags &UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW )) lookup_flags |=LOOKUP_FOLLOW ; +if (!(flags &MNT_FORCE )) + lookup_flags |=LOOKUP_NO_REVAL ; + retval =user_path_mountpoint_at (AT_FDCWD , name, lookup_flags, &path);if (retval) goto out;
include/linux/audit.h +6 -2
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/namei.h> /* LOOKUP_* */ #include <uapi/linux/audit.h> #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
@@ -229,6 +230,7 @@ extern void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,#define AUDIT_INODE_PARENT 1/* dentry represents the parent */ #define AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN 2/* audit record should be hidden */ +#define AUDIT_INODE_NOREVAL 4/* audit record incomplete */ extern void __audit_inode (struct filename *name,const struct dentry *dentry,unsigned int flags);extern void __audit_file (const struct file *);
@@ -289,11 +291,13 @@ static inline void audit_getname(struct filename *name) }static inline void audit_inode (struct filename *name,const struct dentry *dentry, -unsigned int parent) { +unsigned int lflags) {if (unlikely (!audit_dummy_context ())) {unsigned int flags =0 ; -if (parent) +if (lflags &LOOKUP_PARENT ) flags |=AUDIT_INODE_PARENT ; +if (lflags &LOOKUP_NO_REVAL ) + flags |=AUDIT_INODE_NOREVAL ;__audit_inode (name, dentry, flags); } }
kernel/audit.c +3 -2
@@ -2097,7 +2097,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ void audit_copy_inode (struct audit_names *name,const struct dentry *dentry, -struct inode *inode) +struct inode *inode,unsigned int flags) { name->ino = inode->i_ino; name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
@@ -2106,7 +2106,8 @@ void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, name->gid = inode->i_gid; name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;security_inode_getsecid (inode, &name->osid); -audit_copy_fcaps (name, dentry); +if (!(flags &AUDIT_INODE_NOREVAL )) +audit_copy_fcaps (name, dentry); }/**
kernel/audit.h +1 -1
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ struct audit_context {extern void audit_copy_inode (struct audit_names *name,const struct dentry *dentry, -struct inode *inode); +struct inode *inode,unsigned int flags);extern void audit_log_cap (struct audit_buffer *ab,char *prefix,kernel_cap_t *cap); extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context,
kernel/auditsc.c +3 -3
@@ -1846,7 +1846,7 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, n->type =AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL ; }handle_path (dentry); -audit_copy_inode (n, dentry, inode); +audit_copy_inode (n, dentry, inode, flags &AUDIT_INODE_NOREVAL ); }void __audit_file (const struct file *file)
@@ -1947,7 +1947,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, n =audit_alloc_name (context,AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT );if (!n)return ; -audit_copy_inode (n,NULL , parent); +audit_copy_inode (n,NULL , parent,0 ); }if (!found_child) {
@@ -1966,7 +1966,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, }if (inode) -audit_copy_inode (found_child, dentry, inode); +audit_copy_inode (found_child, dentry, inode,0 );else found_child->ino =AUDIT_INO_UNSET ; }
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak100 V1 1/2] audit: avoid fcaps on MNT_FORCE
Quoted 4 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Don't fetch fcaps when umount2 is called with
MNT_FORCEto avoid a process hang while it waits for the missing resource to (possibly never) re-appear.
The patch would be pretty good if the dependence on MNT_FORCE wasn't
added. As it is, it's buggy in more ways than one:
- It does the opposite of the above (i.e. skips fcaps *unless*MNT_FORCE is set)
- sets LOOKUP_NO_REVAL from caller of path lookup, which is invalid
(LOOKUP_NO_REVAL is used only internally by path lookup)
- the fact that *_path_mountpoint_at() shouldn't touch the mount root
is independent of MNT_FORCE
I still don't quite understand what audit is trying to do here, but apparently it's okay to skip getxattr in the MNT_FORCE case. So why is it not okay to skip it in the non-MNT_FORCE case?
Thanks,
Miklos
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak100 V1 1/2] audit: avoid fcaps on MNT_FORCE
Quoted 11 lines · Miklos Szeredi
Quoted 4 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Don't fetch fcaps when umount2 is called with
MNT_FORCEto avoid a process hang while it waits for the missing resource to (possibly never) re-appear.The patch would be pretty good if the dependence on
MNT_FORCEwasn't
added. As it is, it's buggy in more ways than one:- It does the opposite of the above (i.e. skips fcaps *unless*
MNT_FORCEis set)
I agree it looks wrong now that I look at it. It turns out my test case didn't trigger it properly since "umount -l" doesn't set MNT_FORCE while it needs "-f" to do so. This is unacceptable since "-l" needs to work in this situation too.
Quoted 2 lines
- sets
LOOKUP_NO_REVALfrom caller of path lookup, which is invalid
(LOOKUP_NO_REVALis used only internally by path lookup)
Fair enough. 949a852e46dd viro 2016-03-14 ("namei: teach lookup_slow() to skip revalidate") needs a comment update.
Maybe my patch was interacting with this one and changing the behaviour I expected.
Quoted 2 lines
- the fact that
*_path_mountpoint_at()shouldn't touch the mount root
is independent ofMNT_FORCE
We don't entirely agree here since I'm still aiming for a best effort to collect this information for the PATH record, but that may be misleading at best.
Quoted 3 lines
I still don't quite understand what audit is trying to do here, but apparently it's okay to skip getxattr in the
MNT_FORCEcase. So why is it not okay to skip it in the non-MNT_FORCE case?
The simple answer is that the audit PATH record format expects the four cap_f* fields to be there and a best effort is being attempted to fill in that information in an expected way with meaningful values. Perhaps better to accept that it is unreasonable to expect any fcaps on any umount operation and simply ignore those fields in the PATH record for umount syscall events.
This is really a problem the audit folks have backed ourselves into. This was introduced by 851f7ff56d9c ("This patch will print cap_permitted and cap_inheritable data in the PATH...")
The fcaps are only really needed for the case of an event that changes fcaps. In that case, the fcaps should have been added as a seperate audit record to accompany this event as necessary, rather than included in the PATH record that is shared by multiple event types, most of which do not change the fcaps. There has been significant and ongoing effort to normalize all audit record types so that they contain predictable fields in a predictable order without any fields that swing in and out since this makes userspace audit record parsers faster and more reliable.
My preferred solution would be to in fact remove these four cap_f* fields from the PATH record and put them in a new record that was only included when the event is relevant and the values are non-zero. This isn't an option with current upstream kernel audit devel policy.
Thanks Miklos for taking the time to provide feedback on this patch.
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks,
Miklos
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak100 V1 1/2] audit: avoid fcaps on MNT_FORCE
Quoted 6 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
The simple answer is that the audit PATH record format expects the four cap_f* fields to be there and a best effort is being attempted to fill in that information in an expected way with meaningful values. Perhaps better to accept that it is unreasonable to expect any fcaps on any umount operation and simply ignore those fields in the PATH record for umount syscall events.
When there's a mount there are in fact two objects belonging to the exact same path, each having completely independent metadata: the mount point and the root of the mount. For example:
stat /mnt
umount /mnt
stat /mnt
The first stat will show the root of the mount, the second one will show the mount point.
Which one is the relevant for audit?
Not saying audit should be doing getxattr on any of them, just trying to see more clearly.
Thanks,
Miklos
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak100 V1 1/2] audit: avoid fcaps on MNT_FORCE
Quoted 13 lines · Miklos Szeredi
Quoted 6 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
The simple answer is that the audit PATH record format expects the four cap_f* fields to be there and a best effort is being attempted to fill in that information in an expected way with meaningful values. Perhaps better to accept that it is unreasonable to expect any fcaps on any umount operation and simply ignore those fields in the PATH record for umount syscall events.
When there's a mount there are in fact two objects belonging to the exact same path, each having completely independent metadata: the mount point and the root of the mount. For example:
Quoted 7 lines
stat /mnt
umount /mnt
stat /mntThe first stat will show the root of the mount, the second one will show the mount point.
Which one is the relevant for audit?
It would be the root of the mount, the one that is visible to processes in that mount namespace.
Obviously, once that mount has been unmounted, it would be the mount point (no longer in use as such at that point) that is of interest.
On mounting, I'm guessing both would be of interest if the fcaps changed for that process-visible path in that mount namespace, so this provides an additional operation that would need recording aside from the case of a simple attribute change.
Quoted 5 lines
Not saying audit should be doing getxattr on any of them, just trying to see more clearly.
Thanks,
Miklos
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak100 V1 1/2] audit: avoid fcaps on MNT_FORCE
Quoted 2 lines · EST Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 1 line · Miklos Szeredi
On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 11:59 PM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Quoted 22 lines · wrote:
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The simple answer is that the audit PATH record format expects the four cap_f* fields to be there and a best effort is being attempted to fill in that information in an expected way with meaningful values. Perhaps better to accept that it is unreasonable to expect any fcaps on any umount operation and simply ignore those fields in the PATH record for umount syscall events.
When there's a mount there are in fact two objects belonging to the exact same path, each having completely independent metadata: the mount point and the root of the mount. For example:
Quoted 7 lines
stat /mnt
umount /mnt
stat /mntThe first stat will show the root of the mount, the second one will show the mount point.
Which one is the relevant for audit?It would be the root of the mount, the one that is visible to processes in that mount namespace.
Quoted 7 lines
Obviously, once that mount has been unmounted, it would be the mount point (no longer in use as such at that point) that is of interest.
On mounting, I'm guessing both would be of interest if the fcaps changed for that process-visible path in that mount namespace, so this provides an additional operation that would need recording aside from the case of a simple attribute change.
fcaps are on files. Mountpoints are directories. Would fcaps changes be possible?
-Steve
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Not saying audit should be doing getxattr on any of them, just trying to see more clearly.
Thanks,
Miklos- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
RFC PATCH 2/2 audit: moar filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsLike 42d5e37654e4 ("audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic")
Any user or remote filesystem could become unavailable and effectively block on a forced unmount.
-a always,exit -S umount2 -F key=umount2
Provide a method to ignore these user and remote filesystems to prevent them from being impossible to unmount.
Extend the "AUDIT_FILTER_FS" filter that uses the field type AUDIT_FSTYPE keying off the filesystem 4-octet hexadecimal magic identifier to filter specific filesystems to cover audit_inode() to address this blockage.
An example rule would look like:
-a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x517B -F key=ignore_smb
-a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x6969 -F key=ignore_nfsArguably the better way to address this issue is to disable auditing processes that touch removable filesystems.
Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100
--- kernel/auditsc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
kernel/auditsc.c +23 -0
@@ -1777,10 +1777,33 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode =d_backing_inode (dentry);struct audit_names *n;bool parent = flags &AUDIT_INODE_PARENT ; +struct audit_entry *e; +struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS ]; +int i;if (!context->in_syscall)return ; +rcu_read_lock (); +if (!list_empty (list)) { +list_for_each_entry_rcu (e, list, list) { +for (i =0 ; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { +struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; + +if (f->type ==AUDIT_FSTYPE ) { +if (audit_comparator (inode->i_sb->s_magic, + f->op, f->val)) { +if (e->rule.action ==AUDIT_NEVER ) { +rcu_read_unlock (); +return ; + } + } + } + } + } + } +rcu_read_unlock (); +if (!name) goto out_alloc;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 19 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
On user and remote filesystems, a forced umount can still hang due to attemting to fetch the fcaps of a mounted filesystem that is no longer available.
These two patches take different approaches to address this, one by avoiding the lookup when the
MNT_FORCEflag is included, the other by providing a method to filter out auditing specified types of filesystems.This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.
Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable auditing processes that touch removable filesystems.
Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100Richard Guy Briggs (2):
audit: avoid fcaps onMNT_FORCE
audit: moar filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
Quoted 7 lines
fs/namei.c | 2 +- fs/namespace.c | 3 +++ include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++-- kernel/audit.c | 5 +++-- kernel/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Just to get this out of the way, don't use "moar", spell it properly.
Beyond that, it's not clear to me from your cover letter if you are proposing these patches as an "or" or as an "and"; assuming the patch(es) are reasonable, do you want us to merge both of these patches, or only the one we like the most?
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Quoted 28 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 19 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
On user and remote filesystems, a forced umount can still hang due to attemting to fetch the fcaps of a mounted filesystem that is no longer available.
These two patches take different approaches to address this, one by avoiding the lookup when the
MNT_FORCEflag is included, the other by providing a method to filter out auditing specified types of filesystems.This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.
Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable auditing processes that touch removable filesystems.
Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100Richard Guy Briggs (2):
audit: avoid fcaps onMNT_FORCE
audit: moar filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magicQuoted 7 lines
fs/namei.c | 2 +- fs/namespace.c | 3 +++ include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++-- kernel/audit.c | 5 +++-- kernel/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Quoted 6 lines
Just to get this out of the way, don't use "moar", spell it properly.
Beyond that, it's not clear to me from your cover letter if you are proposing these patches as an "or" or as an "and"; assuming the patch(es) are reasonable, do you want us to merge both of these patches, or only the one we like the most?
I would like each one to be considered on its own merits.
The second was discussed back when the logs were flooded with "(null)" PATH records due to debugfs and tracefs noise. Do you agree with the general concept or not?
The first is being picked apart (rightfully) due to assumptions and choices made long ago in the audit system. So while it is still in far more flux than the second patch, I think it has the potential to fix the problem more correctly and permanently but in the process may challenge our rules about the format and invariability of audit records. The basic premise is to prevent audit from trying to get information (fcaps) from a filesystem that is likely to be far more ephemeral than local on-disk kernel filesystems or to fail to do so more gracefully.
Quoted 1 line
paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 36 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 28 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 19 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
On user and remote filesystems, a forced umount can still hang due to attemting to fetch the fcaps of a mounted filesystem that is no longer available.
These two patches take different approaches to address this, one by avoiding the lookup when the
MNT_FORCEflag is included, the other by providing a method to filter out auditing specified types of filesystems.This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.
Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable auditing processes that touch removable filesystems.
Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100Richard Guy Briggs (2):
audit: avoid fcaps onMNT_FORCE
audit: moar filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magicQuoted 7 lines
fs/namei.c | 2 +- fs/namespace.c | 3 +++ include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++-- kernel/audit.c | 5 +++-- kernel/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)Quoted 6 lines
Just to get this out of the way, don't use "moar", spell it properly.
Beyond that, it's not clear to me from your cover letter if you are proposing these patches as an "or" or as an "and"; assuming the patch(es) are reasonable, do you want us to merge both of these patches, or only the one we like the most?
Quoted 5 lines
I would like each one to be considered on its own merits.
The second was discussed back when the logs were flooded with "(null)" PATH records due to debugfs and tracefs noise. Do you agree with the general concept or not?
I believe I was in favor of this back then, and I think it is still a reasonable feature to add independent of the umount hang problem.
One possible enhancement might be to also support filesystem names and not just magic numbers. This could either be done in userspace or the kernel via AUDIT_FSNAME, or similar. If you do take the _FSNAME approach you should have the kernel convert that to a magic number when it translates the rule (performance reasons).
Quoted 8 lines
The first is being picked apart (rightfully) due to assumptions and choices made long ago in the audit system. So while it is still in far more flux than the second patch, I think it has the potential to fix the problem more correctly and permanently but in the process may challenge our rules about the format and invariability of audit records. The basic premise is to prevent audit from trying to get information (fcaps) from a filesystem that is likely to be far more ephemeral than local on-disk kernel filesystems or to fail to do so more gracefully.
There is one minor nit: use "flags" instead of "lflags" in the audit_inode parameter list, the local "flags" variable can be changed to something else; the parameters are what callers see, make them simple and familiar.
However, beyond that I think the general approach of not recording fcaps is reasonable if we can't reliably do it. What do the fcaps entries look like in this particular case, are they "0" or "?"? I would suggest "?" is the correct answer here.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Quoted 37 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 36 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 34 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 19 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
On user and remote filesystems, a forced umount can still hang due to attemting to fetch the fcaps of a mounted filesystem that is no longer available.
These two patches take different approaches to address this, one by avoiding the lookup when the
MNT_FORCEflag is included, the other by providing a method to filter out auditing specified types of filesystems.This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.
Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable auditing processes that touch removable filesystems.
Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100Richard Guy Briggs (2):
audit: avoid fcaps onMNT_FORCE
audit: moar filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magicQuoted 7 lines
fs/namei.c | 2 +- fs/namespace.c | 3 +++ include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++-- kernel/audit.c | 5 +++-- kernel/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)Just to get this out of the way, don't use "moar", spell it properly.
Beyond that, it's not clear to me from your cover letter if you are proposing these patches as an "or" or as an "and"; assuming the patch(es) are reasonable, do you want us to merge both of these patches, or only the one we like the most?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I would like each one to be considered on its own merits.
The second was discussed back when the logs were flooded with "(null)" PATH records due to debugfs and tracefs noise. Do you agree with the general concept or not?
I believe I was in favor of this back then, and I think it is still a reasonable feature to add independent of the umount hang problem.
I wasn't so keen then, but see more use for it now.
Quoted 5 lines
One possible enhancement might be to also support filesystem names and not just magic numbers. This could either be done in userspace or the kernel via
AUDIT_FSNAME, or similar. If you do take the_FSNAMEapproach you should have the kernel convert that to a magic number when it translates the rule (performance reasons).
I had looked at filesystem names previously with Steve and I seem to recall that was much better left to userspace to convert. The biggest challenge I see here is that in-kernel filsystems have all their magic numbers listed in the kernel, whereas discovering the magic numbers for fuse and other remote filesystems is a bit harder. This was one of the reasons I wanted to include the magic number in the name= field in patch #1 for ghak8 so it was easy to figure out what type of filesystem was involved.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
The first is being picked apart (rightfully) due to assumptions and choices made long ago in the audit system. So while it is still in far more flux than the second patch, I think it has the potential to fix the problem more correctly and permanently but in the process may challenge our rules about the format and invariability of audit records. The basic premise is to prevent audit from trying to get information (fcaps) from a filesystem that is likely to be far more ephemeral than local on-disk kernel filesystems or to fail to do so more gracefully.
Quoted 4 lines
There is one minor nit: use "flags" instead of "lflags" in the
audit_inodeparameter list, the local "flags" variable can be changed to something else; the parameters are what callers see, make them simple and familiar.
Noted.
Quoted 4 lines
However, beyond that I think the general approach of not recording fcaps is reasonable if we can't reliably do it. What do the fcaps entries look like in this particular case, are they "0" or "?"? I would suggest "?" is the correct answer here.
I'd agree "?" would be the best option to make it clear it is not available rather than just zero.
Quoted 1 line
paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635