Security: Handle hidepid option correctly
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 Security: Handle hidepid option correctly
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Cheng Yang <[email protected]>
The proc_parse_options() call from proc_mount() runs only once at boot time. So on any later mount attempt, any mount options are ignored because ->s_root is already initialized.
As a consequence, "mount -o <options>" will ignore the options. The only way to change mount options is "mount -o remount,<options>". To fix this, parse the mount options unconditionally.
--- fs/proc/inode.c | 4 ---- fs/proc/root.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/proc/inode.c +0 -4
@@ -493,13 +493,9 @@ struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct proc_dir_entry *de)int proc_fill_super (struct super_block *s,void *data,int silent) { -struct pid_namespace *ns =get_pid_ns (s->s_fs_info);struct inode *root_inode;int ret; -if (!proc_parse_options (data, ns)) -return -EINVAL ; -/* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */ s->s_iflags |=SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE |SB_I_NOEXEC |SB_I_NODEV ; s->s_flags |=SB_NODIRATIME |SB_NOSUID |SB_NOEXEC ;
fs/proc/root.c +3 -0
@@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, ns =task_active_pid_ns (current); } +if (!proc_parse_options (data, ns)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return mount_ns (fs_type, flags, data, ns, ns->user_ns, proc_fill_super); }
Signature · 1 line
1.9.1
Quoted 2 lines
[PATCH] Security: Handle hidepid option correctly
Why is this considered to be security sensitive? I can guess, but I'd like to know your reasoning.
Quoted 30 lines · On Thu, 29 Nov 2018 19:08:21 +0800 [email protected] wrote:
From: Cheng Yang <[email protected]>
The
proc_parse_options()call fromproc_mount()runs only once at boot time. So on any later mount attempt, any mount options are ignored because ->s_root is already initialized.
As a consequence, "mount -o <options>" will ignore the options. The only way to change mount options is "mount -o remount,<options>". To fix this, parse the mount options unconditionally.fs/proc/inode.c +0
-4@@ -493,13 +493,9 @@ struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct proc_dir_entry *de)int proc_fill_super (struct super_block *s,void *data,int silent) { -struct pid_namespace *ns =get_pid_ns (s->s_fs_info);struct inode *root_inode;int ret; -if (!proc_parse_options (data, ns)) -return -EINVAL ; -/* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */ s->s_iflags |=SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE |SB_I_NOEXEC |SB_I_NODEV ; s->s_flags |=SB_NODIRATIME |SB_NOSUID |SB_NOEXEC ;fs/proc/root.c +0
-0
fs/proc/root.c static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, · line 105
Quoted 8 lines
fs/proc/root.c +3
-0@@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, ns =task_active_pid_ns (current); } +if (!proc_parse_options (data, ns)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return mount_ns (fs_type, flags, data, ns, ns->user_ns, proc_fill_super); }
Other filesystems parse the options from fill_super(). Is proc special in some fashion?