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systemd: fix CVEs

PATCH New George McCollister 1 participant 9 messages Feb 25, 2019

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#0 lore raw

cover systemd: fix CVEs

Apply CVE patches to systemd. Backport changes from thud when possible otherwise use patches from:
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/237-3ubuntu10.13

The following changes since commit 31f0c5e59c7fb0ae0915de584fbfcf3d95bbb061:

testsdk: Improvements to the json logging (2018-12-07 10:56:32 +0000)

are available in the git repository at:

git://github.com/gmccollister/openembedded-core sumo-cve-fixes
https://github.com/gmccollister/openembedded-core/tree/sumo-cve-fixes

Chen Qi (2):
systemd: fix CVE-2018-15686
systemd: fix CVE-2018-15688

George McCollister (5):
systemd: fix CVE-2018-15687
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16865
systemd: fix CVE-2018-6954
systemd: fix CVE-2019-6454

Marcus Cooper (1):
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16866

 ...sive-let-s-rework-the-recursive-logic-to-.patch |  252 +++
 ...eserializing-state-always-use-read_line-L.patch |  250 +++
 ...sure-we-have-enough-space-for-the-DHCP6-o.patch |   39 +
 ...n-t-resolve-pathnames-when-traversing-rec.patch |  643 +++++++
 .../systemd/systemd/0002-Make-tmpfiles-safe.patch  | 1828 ++++++++++++++++++++
 ...-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch |  193 +++
 ...ld-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch |   60 +
 ...ote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch |   79 +
 ...nal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch |   49 +
 .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2019-6454.patch            |  210 +++
 ...e-receive-an-invalid-dbus-message-ignore-.patch |   61 +
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb           |   11 +
 12 files changed, 3675 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-chown-recursive-let-s-rework-the-recursive-logic-to-.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-core-when-deserializing-state-always-use-read_line-L.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-dhcp6-make-sure-we-have-enough-space-for-the-DHCP6-o.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-tmpfiles-don-t-resolve-pathnames-when-traversing-rec.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0002-Make-tmpfiles-safe.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2019-6454.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/sd-bus-if-we-receive-an-invalid-dbus-message-ignore-.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/8 systemd: fix CVE-2018-15686

From: Chen Qi <[email protected]>

Backport patch to fix the following CVE.

CVE: CVE-2018-15686

Cherry-picked from thud 0ef70603bc983315eb0e8a97958d995a31198c35

---
 ...eserializing-state-always-use-read_line-L.patch | 250 +++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb           |   1 +
 2 files changed, 251 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-core-when-deserializing-state-always-use-read_line-L.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-core-when-deserializing-state-always-use-read_line-L.patch new file +250 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..405300148a
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+From 56f77f7fcceea2fbb3b4efb8e307dd7784c63115 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 18:36:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?=3D=3FUTF-8=3Fq=3Fcore:=3D20when=3D20deserializ?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?ing=3D20state=3D20always=3F=3D?=
+
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20use=20read=5Fline(=E2=80=A6,=20LONG=5FLINE=5FMAX,=20?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=E2=80=A6)?=
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This should be much better than fgets(), as we can read substantially
+longer lines and overly long lines result in proper errors.
+
+Fixes a vulnerability discovered by Jann Horn at Google.
+
+CVE-2018-15686
+LP: #1796402
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1639071
+
+(cherry picked from commit 8948b3415d762245ebf5e19d80b97d4d8cc208c1)
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-15686
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <[email protected]>
+
+---
+ src/core/job.c     | 19 +++++++++++--------
+ src/core/manager.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
+ src/core/unit.c    | 34 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ src/core/unit.h    |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/core/job.c b/src/core/job.c
+index c6de8d27e..e0f9cee2f 100644
+--- a/src/core/job.c
++++ b/src/core/job.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include "dbus-job.h"
+ #include "dbus.h"
+ #include "escape.h"
++#include "fileio.h"
+ #include "job.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "macro.h"
+@@ -1067,24 +1068,26 @@ int job_serialize(Job *j, FILE *f) {
+ }
+ 
+ int job_deserialize(Job *j, FILE *f) {
++        int r;
++
+         assert(j);
+         assert(f);
+ 
+         for (;;) {
+-                char line[LINE_MAX], *l, *v;
++                _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
++                char *l, *v;
+                 size_t k;
+ 
+-                if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+-                        if (feof(f))
+-                                return 0;
+-                        return -errno;
+-                }
++                r = read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line);
++                if (r < 0)
++                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read serialization line: %m");
++                if (r == 0)
++                        return 0;
+ 
+-                char_array_0(line);
+                 l = strstrip(line);
+ 
+                 /* End marker */
+-                if (l[0] == 0)
++                if (isempty(l))
+                         return 0;
+ 
+                 k = strcspn(l, "=");
+diff --git a/src/core/manager.c b/src/core/manager.c
+index e837a46f5..423f82c94 100644
+--- a/src/core/manager.c
++++ b/src/core/manager.c
+@@ -2841,22 +2841,19 @@ int manager_deserialize(Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) {
+         m->n_reloading++;
+ 
+         for (;;) {
+-                char line[LINE_MAX];
++                _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
+                 const char *val, *l;
+ 
+-                if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+-                        if (feof(f))
+-                                r = 0;
+-                        else
+-                                r = -errno;
+-
++                r = read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line);
++                if (r < 0) {
++                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read serialization line: %m");
+                         goto finish;
+                 }
++                if (r == 0)
++                        break;
+ 
+-                char_array_0(line);
+                 l = strstrip(line);
+-
+-                if (l[0] == 0)
++                if (isempty(l)) /* end marker */
+                         break;
+ 
+                 if ((val = startswith(l, "current-job-id="))) {
+@@ -3003,29 +3000,31 @@ int manager_deserialize(Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) {
+         }
+ 
+         for (;;) {
+-                Unit *u;
+-                char name[UNIT_NAME_MAX+2];
++                _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
+                 const char* unit_name;
++                Unit *u;
+ 
+                 /* Start marker */
+-                if (!fgets(name, sizeof(name), f)) {
+-                        if (feof(f))
+-                                r = 0;
+-                        else
+-                                r = -errno;
+-
++                r = read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line);
++                if (r < 0) {
++                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read serialization line: %m");
+                         goto finish;
+                 }
++                if (r == 0)
++                        break;
+ 
+-                char_array_0(name);
+-                unit_name = strstrip(name);
++                unit_name = strstrip(line);
+ 
+                 r = manager_load_unit(m, unit_name, NULL, NULL, &u);
+                 if (r < 0) {
+                         log_notice_errno(r, "Failed to load unit \"%s\", skipping deserialization: %m", unit_name);
+                         if (r == -ENOMEM)
+                                 goto finish;
+-                        unit_deserialize_skip(f);
++
++                        r = unit_deserialize_skip(f);
++                        if (r < 0)
++                                goto finish;
++
+                         continue;
+                 }
+ 
+@@ -3038,9 +3037,6 @@ int manager_deserialize(Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) {
+         }
+ 
+ finish:
+-        if (ferror(f))
+-                r = -EIO;
+-
+         assert(m->n_reloading > 0);
+         m->n_reloading--;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/core/unit.c b/src/core/unit.c
+index 932f05baa..4c3aa8e96 100644
+--- a/src/core/unit.c
++++ b/src/core/unit.c
+@@ -3346,21 +3346,19 @@ int unit_deserialize(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) {
+                 rt = (ExecRuntime**) ((uint8_t*) u + offset);
+ 
+         for (;;) {
+-                char line[LINE_MAX], *l, *v;
++                _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
+                 CGroupIPAccountingMetric m;
++                char *l, *v;
+                 size_t k;
+ 
+-                if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+-                        if (feof(f))
+-                                return 0;
+-                        return -errno;
+-                }
++                r = read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line);
++                if (r < 0)
++                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read serialization line: %m");
++                if (r == 0) /* eof */
++                        break;
+ 
+-                char_array_0(line);
+                 l = strstrip(line);
+-
+-                /* End marker */
+-                if (isempty(l))
++                if (isempty(l)) /* End marker */
+                         break;
+ 
+                 k = strcspn(l, "=");
+@@ -3637,23 +3635,27 @@ int unit_deserialize(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) {
+         return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-void unit_deserialize_skip(FILE *f) {
++int unit_deserialize_skip(FILE *f) {
++        int r;
+         assert(f);
+ 
+         /* Skip serialized data for this unit. We don't know what it is. */
+ 
+         for (;;) {
+-                char line[LINE_MAX], *l;
++                _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
++                char *l;
+ 
+-                if (!fgets(line, sizeof line, f))
+-                        return;
++                r = read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line);
++                if (r < 0)
++                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read serialization line: %m");
++                if (r == 0)
++                        return 0;
+ 
+-                char_array_0(line);
+                 l = strstrip(line);
+ 
+                 /* End marker */
+                 if (isempty(l))
+-                        return;
++                        return 1;
+         }
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/core/unit.h b/src/core/unit.h
+index 8c79d4ed2..08ad1c652 100644
+--- a/src/core/unit.h
++++ b/src/core/unit.h
+@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ bool unit_can_serialize(Unit *u) _pure_;
+ 
+ int unit_serialize(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds, bool serialize_jobs);
+ int unit_deserialize(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds);
+-void unit_deserialize_skip(FILE *f);
++int unit_deserialize_skip(FILE *f);
+ 
+ int unit_serialize_item(Unit *u, FILE *f, const char *key, const char *value);
+ int unit_serialize_item_escaped(Unit *u, FILE *f, const char *key, const char *value);
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb +1 -0
index a409b18297..28f3dafbb5 100644
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://libmount.patch \
            file://0034-Fix-format-truncation-compile-failure-by-typecasting.patch \
            file://0035-Define-glibc-compatible-basename-for-non-glibc-syste.patch \
+           file://0001-core-when-deserializing-state-always-use-read_line-L.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_qemuall = " file://0001-core-device.c-Change-the-default-device-timeout-to-2.patch"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/8 systemd: fix CVE-2018-15687

In reply to George McCollister

Backport patch to fix the following CVE.

CVE: CVE-2018-15687

Based on thud commit eeb621aa19f690971caf862290a172a115578ba1 The patch in the thud commit doesn't compile against 237. Use the version of this patch, CVE-2018-15687.patch from systemd_237-3ubuntu10.13.debian.

---
 ...sive-let-s-rework-the-recursive-logic-to-.patch | 252 +++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb           |   1 +
 2 files changed, 253 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-chown-recursive-let-s-rework-the-recursive-logic-to-.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-chown-recursive-let-s-rework-the-recursive-logic-to-.patch new file +252 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a0b55f97d
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+From 2da8ba3f507345d0401ea9d7191fa16ffa560ebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2018 11:26:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] chown-recursive: let's rework the recursive logic to use
+ O_PATH
+
+That way we can pin a specific inode and analyze it and manipulate it
+without it being swapped out beneath our hands.
+
+Fixes a vulnerability originally found by Jann Horn from Google.
+
+CVE-2018-15687
+LP: #1796692
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1639076
+
+Origin: upstream, https://github.com/poettering/systemd/commit/5de6cce58b3e8b79239b6e83653459d91af6e57c
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1796692
+
+Patch for 237 from:
+systemd_237-3ubuntu10.13.debian CVE-2018-15687.patch
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-15687
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+---
+ src/core/chown-recursive.c | 146 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/core/chown-recursive.c b/src/core/chown-recursive.c
+index c479450..27c6448 100644
+--- a/src/core/chown-recursive.c
++++ b/src/core/chown-recursive.c
+@@ -18,18 +18,20 @@
+   along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ ***/
+
+-#include <sys/types.h>
+-#include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
+
+-#include "user-util.h"
+-#include "macro.h"
+-#include "fd-util.h"
+-#include "dirent-util.h"
+ #include "chown-recursive.h"
++#include "dirent-util.h"
++#include "fd-util.h"
++#include "macro.h"
++#include "stdio-util.h"
++#include "strv.h"
++#include "user-util.h"
+
+-static int chown_one(int fd, const char *name, const struct stat *st, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+-        int r;
++static int chown_one(int fd, const struct stat *st, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
++        char procfs_path[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int) + 1];
+
+         assert(fd >= 0);
+         assert(st);
+@@ -38,90 +40,82 @@
+             (!gid_is_valid(gid) || st->st_gid == gid))
+                 return 0;
+
+-        if (name)
+-                r = fchownat(fd, name, uid, gid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+-        else
+-                r = fchown(fd, uid, gid);
+-        if (r < 0)
+-                return -errno;
++        /* We change ownership through the /proc/self/fd/%i path, so that we have a stable reference that works with
++         * O_PATH. (Note: fchown() and fchmod() do not work with O_PATH, the kernel refuses that. */
++        xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
+
+-        /* The linux kernel alters the mode in some cases of chown(). Let's undo this. */
+-        if (name) {
+-                if (!S_ISLNK(st->st_mode))
+-                        r = fchmodat(fd, name, st->st_mode, 0);
+-                else /* There's currently no AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW for fchmodat() */
+-                        r = 0;
+-        } else
+-                r = fchmod(fd, st->st_mode);
+-        if (r < 0)
++        if (chown(procfs_path, uid, gid) < 0)
+                 return -errno;
+
++        /* The linux kernel alters the mode in some cases of chown(). Let's undo this. We do this only for non-symlinks
++         * however. That's because for symlinks the access mode is ignored anyway and because on some kernels/file
++         * systems trying to change the access mode will succeed but has no effect while on others it actively
++         * fails. */
++        if (!S_ISLNK(st->st_mode))
++                if (chmod(procfs_path, st->st_mode & 07777) < 0)
++                        return -errno;
++
+         return 1;
+ }
+
+ static int chown_recursive_internal(int fd, const struct stat *st, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
++        _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL;
+         bool changed = false;
++        struct dirent *de;
+         int r;
+
+         assert(fd >= 0);
+         assert(st);
+
+-        if (S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) {
+-                _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL;
+-                struct dirent *de;
+-
+-                d = fdopendir(fd);
+-                if (!d) {
+-                        r = -errno;
+-                        goto finish;
+-                }
+-                fd = -1;
+-
+-                FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, r = -errno; goto finish) {
+-                        struct stat fst;
+-
+-                        if (dot_or_dot_dot(de->d_name))
+-                                continue;
++        d = fdopendir(fd);
++        if (!d) {
++                safe_close(fd);
++                return -errno;
++        }
+
+-                        if (fstatat(dirfd(d), de->d_name, &fst, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) < 0) {
+-                                r = -errno;
+-                                goto finish;
+-                        }
+-
+-                        if (S_ISDIR(fst.st_mode)) {
+-                                int subdir_fd;
+-
+-                                subdir_fd = openat(dirfd(d), de->d_name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME);
+-                                if (subdir_fd < 0) {
+-                                        r = -errno;
+-                                        goto finish;
+-                                }
+-
+-                                r = chown_recursive_internal(subdir_fd, &fst, uid, gid);
+-                                if (r < 0)
+-                                        goto finish;
+-                                if (r > 0)
+-                                        changed = true;
+-                        } else {
+-                                r = chown_one(dirfd(d), de->d_name, &fst, uid, gid);
+-                                if (r < 0)
+-                                        goto finish;
+-                                if (r > 0)
+-                                        changed = true;
+-                        }
++        FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, return -errno) {
++                _cleanup_close_ int path_fd = -1;
++                struct stat fst;
++
++                if (dot_or_dot_dot(de->d_name))
++                        continue;
++
++                /* Let's pin the child inode we want to fix now with an O_PATH fd, so that it cannot be swapped out
++                 * while we manipulate it. */
++                path_fd = openat(dirfd(d), de->d_name, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW);
++                if (path_fd < 0)
++                        return -errno;
++
++                if (fstat(path_fd, &fst) < 0)
++                        return -errno;
++
++                if (S_ISDIR(fst.st_mode)) {
++                        int subdir_fd;
++
++                        /* Convert it to a "real" (i.e. non-O_PATH) fd now */
++                        subdir_fd = fd_reopen(path_fd, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOATIME);
++                        if (subdir_fd < 0)
++                                return subdir_fd;
++
++                        r = chown_recursive_internal(subdir_fd, &fst, uid, gid); /* takes possession of subdir_fd even on failure */
++                        if (r < 0)
++                                return r;
++                        if (r > 0)
++                                changed = true;
++                } else {
++                        r = chown_one(path_fd, &fst, uid, gid);
++                        if (r < 0)
++                                return r;
++                        if (r > 0)
++                                changed = true;
+                 }
++        }
+
+-                r = chown_one(dirfd(d), NULL, st, uid, gid);
+-        } else
+-                r = chown_one(fd, NULL, st, uid, gid);
++        r = chown_one(dirfd(d), st, uid, gid);
+         if (r < 0)
+-                goto finish;
+-
+-        r = r > 0 || changed;
++                return r;
+
+-finish:
+-        safe_close(fd);
+-        return r;
++        return r > 0 || changed;
+ }
+
+ int path_chown_recursive(const char *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+@@ -129,7 +123,7 @@
+         struct stat st;
+         int r;
+
+-        fd = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME);
++        fd = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME);
+         if (fd < 0)
+                 return -errno;
+
+--- a/src/basic/fd-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/fd-util.c
+@@ -578,3 +578,22 @@
+
+         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
++
++int fd_reopen(int fd, int flags) {
++        char procfs_path[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
++        int new_fd;
++
++        /* Reopens the specified fd with new flags. This is useful for convert an O_PATH fd into a regular one, or to
++         * turn O_RDWR fds into O_RDONLY fds.
++         *
++         * This doesn't work on sockets (since they cannot be open()ed, ever).
++         *
++         * This implicitly resets the file read index to 0. */
++
++        xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
++        new_fd = open(procfs_path, flags);
++        if (new_fd < 0)
++                return -errno;
++
++        return new_fd;
++}
+--- a/src/basic/fd-util.h
++++ b/src/basic/fd-util.h
+@@ -91,3 +91,5 @@
+ /* Hint: ENETUNREACH happens if we try to connect to "non-existing" special IP addresses, such as ::5 */
+ #define ERRNO_IS_DISCONNECT(r) \
+         IN_SET(r, ENOTCONN, ECONNRESET, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNABORTED, EPIPE, ENETUNREACH)
++
++int fd_reopen(int fd, int flags);
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb +1 -0
index 28f3dafbb5..cae9bccc60 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0034-Fix-format-truncation-compile-failure-by-typecasting.patch \
            file://0035-Define-glibc-compatible-basename-for-non-glibc-syste.patch \
            file://0001-core-when-deserializing-state-always-use-read_line-L.patch \
+           file://0001-chown-recursive-let-s-rework-the-recursive-logic-to-.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_qemuall = " file://0001-core-device.c-Change-the-default-device-timeout-to-2.patch"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/8 systemd: fix CVE-2018-15688

In reply to George McCollister

From: Chen Qi <[email protected]>

Backport patch to fix the following CVE.

CVE: CVE-2018-15688

Cherry-picked from thud 13591d7224393dc0ae529a03cdf74aceb3540ce9

---
 ...sure-we-have-enough-space-for-the-DHCP6-o.patch | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb           |  1 +
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-dhcp6-make-sure-we-have-enough-space-for-the-DHCP6-o.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-dhcp6-make-sure-we-have-enough-space-for-the-DHCP6-o.patch new file +39 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0c912f25df
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From a2622b8398ba026faf481f5eddeb53231d9de4a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2018 12:12:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] dhcp6: make sure we have enough space for the DHCP6 option
+ header
+
+Fixes a vulnerability originally discovered by Felix Wilhelm from
+Google.
+
+CVE-2018-15688
+LP: #1795921
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1639067
+
+(cherry picked from commit 4dac5eaba4e419b29c97da38a8b1f82336c2c892)
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-15688
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/libsystemd-network/dhcp6-option.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libsystemd-network/dhcp6-option.c b/src/libsystemd-network/dhcp6-option.c
+index c4b402b..dcbaad0 100644
+--- a/src/libsystemd-network/dhcp6-option.c
++++ b/src/libsystemd-network/dhcp6-option.c
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int dhcp6_option_append_ia(uint8_t **buf, size_t *buflen, DHCP6IA *ia) {
+                 return -EINVAL;
+         }
+ 
+-        if (*buflen < len)
++        if (*buflen < offsetof(DHCP6Option, data) + len)
+                 return -ENOBUFS;
+ 
+         ia_hdr = *buf;
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb +1 -0
index cae9bccc60..87793dd3af 100644
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0035-Define-glibc-compatible-basename-for-non-glibc-syste.patch \
            file://0001-core-when-deserializing-state-always-use-read_line-L.patch \
            file://0001-chown-recursive-let-s-rework-the-recursive-logic-to-.patch \
+           file://0001-dhcp6-make-sure-we-have-enough-space-for-the-DHCP6-o.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_qemuall = " file://0001-core-device.c-Change-the-default-device-timeout-to-2.patch"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/8 systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864

In reply to George McCollister

Affects < v240

Based on thud commit 403e74b07b6f3c4a2444e68c74a8434fb17aee49 The patch in the thud commit doesn't compile against 237. Use the version of this patch, CVE-2018-16864.patch from systemd_237-3ubuntu10.13.debian.

---
 ...-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch | 193 +++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb           |   1 +
 2 files changed, 194 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch new file +193 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c0b0667d85
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+From c29b44cb90e2cc521533e6169cf847553ebefd81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:38:39 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] journald: do not store the iovec entry for process
+ commandline on stack
+
+This fixes a crash where we would read the commandline, whose length is under
+control of the sending program, and then crash when trying to create a stack
+allocation for it.
+
+CVE-2018-16864
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653855
+
+The message actually doesn't get written to disk, because
+journal_file_append_entry() returns -E2BIG.
+
+Patch for 237 from:
+systemd_237-3ubuntu10.13.debian CVE-2018-16864.patch
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-16864
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+---
+ src/basic/io-util.c           | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/basic/io-util.h           |  2 ++
+ src/coredump/coredump.c       | 31 +++++++++++--------------------
+ src/journal/journald-server.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
+ 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/basic/io-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/io-util.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include "io-util.h"
++#include "string-util.h"
+ #include "time-util.h"
+ 
+ int flush_fd(int fd) {
+@@ -270,3 +271,12 @@
+ 
+         return q - (const uint8_t*) p;
+ }
++
++char* set_iovec_string_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value) {
++        char *x;
++
++        x = strappend(field, value);
++        if (x)
++                iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(x);
++        return x;
++}
+--- a/src/basic/io-util.h
++++ b/src/basic/io-util.h
+@@ -91,3 +91,5 @@
+ #define IOVEC_MAKE(base, len) (struct iovec) IOVEC_INIT(base, len)
+ #define IOVEC_INIT_STRING(string) IOVEC_INIT((char*) string, strlen(string))
+ #define IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(string) (struct iovec) IOVEC_INIT_STRING(string)
++
++char* set_iovec_string_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value);
+--- a/src/coredump/coredump.c
++++ b/src/coredump/coredump.c
+@@ -1067,19 +1067,10 @@
+         return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static char* set_iovec_field(struct iovec iovec[27], size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value) {
+-        char *x;
+-
+-        x = strappend(field, value);
+-        if (x)
+-                iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(x);
+-        return x;
+-}
+-
+ static char* set_iovec_field_free(struct iovec iovec[27], size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, char *value) {
+         char *x;
+ 
+-        x = set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, field, value);
++        x = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, field, value);
+         free(value);
+         return x;
+ }
+@@ -1129,33 +1120,33 @@
+                         disable_coredumps();
+                 }
+ 
+-                set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UNIT=", context[CONTEXT_UNIT]);
++                set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UNIT=", context[CONTEXT_UNIT]);
+         }
+ 
+         if (cg_pid_get_user_unit(pid, &t) >= 0)
+                 set_iovec_field_free(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_USER_UNIT=", t);
+ 
+         /* The next few are mandatory */
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_PID=", context[CONTEXT_PID]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_PID=", context[CONTEXT_PID]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UID=", context[CONTEXT_UID]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UID=", context[CONTEXT_UID]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_GID=", context[CONTEXT_GID]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_GID=", context[CONTEXT_GID]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL=", context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL=", context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_RLIMIT=", context[CONTEXT_RLIMIT]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_RLIMIT=", context[CONTEXT_RLIMIT]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_COMM=", context[CONTEXT_COMM]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_COMM=", context[CONTEXT_COMM]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+         if (context[CONTEXT_EXE] &&
+-            !set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_EXE=", context[CONTEXT_EXE]))
++            !set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_EXE=", context[CONTEXT_EXE]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+         if (sd_pid_get_session(pid, &t) >= 0)
+@@ -1223,7 +1214,7 @@
+                 iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(t);
+ 
+         if (safe_atoi(context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL], &signo) >= 0 && SIGNAL_VALID(signo))
+-                set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL_NAME=SIG", signal_to_string(signo));
++                set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL_NAME=SIG", signal_to_string(signo));
+ 
+         return 0; /* we successfully acquired all metadata */
+ }
+--- a/src/journal/journald-server.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-server.c
+@@ -769,6 +769,7 @@
+                 pid_t object_pid) {
+ 
+         char source_time[sizeof("_SOURCE_REALTIME_TIMESTAMP=") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(usec_t)];
++        _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline1 = NULL, *cmdline2 = NULL;
+         uid_t journal_uid;
+         ClientContext *o;
+ 
+@@ -785,20 +786,23 @@
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_UID");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->gid, gid_t, gid_is_valid, GID_FMT, "_GID");
+ 
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->comm, "_COMM");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->exe, "_EXE");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cmdline, "_CMDLINE");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->capeff, "_CAP_EFFECTIVE");
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->comm, "_COMM"); /* At most TASK_COMM_LENGTH (16 bytes) */
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->exe, "_EXE"); /* A path, so at most PATH_MAX (4096 bytes) */
+ 
+-                IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, c->label, c->label_size, "_SELINUX_CONTEXT");
++                if (c->cmdline)
++                        /* At most _SC_ARG_MAX (2MB usually), which is too much to put on stack.
++                         * Let's use a heap allocation for this one. */
++                        cmdline1 = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, &n, "_CMDLINE=", c->cmdline);
+ 
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->capeff, "_CAP_EFFECTIVE"); /* Read from /proc/.../status */
++                IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, c->label, c->label_size, "_SELINUX_CONTEXT");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->auditid, uint32_t, audit_session_is_valid, "%" PRIu32, "_AUDIT_SESSION");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->loginuid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_AUDIT_LOGINUID");
+ 
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cgroup, "_SYSTEMD_CGROUP");
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cgroup, "_SYSTEMD_CGROUP"); /* A path */
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->session, "_SYSTEMD_SESSION");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->owner_uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_SYSTEMD_OWNER_UID");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->unit, "_SYSTEMD_UNIT");
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->unit, "_SYSTEMD_UNIT"); /* Unit names are bounded by UNIT_NAME_MAX */
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->user_unit, "_SYSTEMD_USER_UNIT");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->slice, "_SYSTEMD_SLICE");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->user_slice, "_SYSTEMD_USER_SLICE");
+@@ -819,13 +823,14 @@
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "OBJECT_UID");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->gid, gid_t, gid_is_valid, GID_FMT, "OBJECT_GID");
+ 
++                /* See above for size limits, only ->cmdline may be large, so use a heap allocation for it. */
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->comm, "OBJECT_COMM");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->exe, "OBJECT_EXE");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->cmdline, "OBJECT_CMDLINE");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->capeff, "OBJECT_CAP_EFFECTIVE");
++                if (o->cmdline)
++                        cmdline2 = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, &n, "OBJECT_CMDLINE=", o->cmdline);
+ 
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->capeff, "OBJECT_CAP_EFFECTIVE");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, o->label, o->label_size, "OBJECT_SELINUX_CONTEXT");
+-
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->auditid, uint32_t, audit_session_is_valid, "%" PRIu32, "OBJECT_AUDIT_SESSION");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->loginuid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "OBJECT_AUDIT_LOGINUID");
+ 
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb +1 -0
index 87793dd3af..0cb84c002f 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0001-core-when-deserializing-state-always-use-read_line-L.patch \
            file://0001-chown-recursive-let-s-rework-the-recursive-logic-to-.patch \
            file://0001-dhcp6-make-sure-we-have-enough-space-for-the-DHCP6-o.patch \
+           file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_qemuall = " file://0001-core-device.c-Change-the-default-device-timeout-to-2.patch"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/8 systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16865

In reply to George McCollister

Affects < v240

Based on thud commit d5d2b821fc85b8cf39f683061ac2a45bddd2139f The second patch in the thud commit doesn't apply against 237. Use the version of the second patch CVE-2018-16865_2.patch from systemd_237-3ubuntu10.13.debian.

---
 ...ld-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch | 60 ++++++++++++++++
 ...ote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb           |  2 +
 3 files changed, 141 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch new file +60 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e8a6f2b986
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 4566aaf97f5b4143b930d75628f3abc905249dcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 22:45:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] journald: set a limit on the number of fields (1k)
+
+We allocate a iovec entry for each field, so with many short entries,
+our memory usage and processing time can be large, even with a relatively
+small message size. Let's refuse overly long entries.
+
+CVE-2018-16865
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861
+
+What from I can see, the problem is not from an alloca, despite what the CVE
+description says, but from the attack multiplication that comes from creating
+many very small iovecs: (void* + size_t) for each three bytes of input message.
+
+Patch backported from systemd master at
+052c57f132f04a3cf4148f87561618da1a6908b4.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-16865
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+---
+ src/basic/journal-importer.h  | 3 +++
+ src/journal/journald-native.c | 5 +++++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.h b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
+index f49ce734a1..c4ae45d32d 100644
+--- a/src/basic/journal-importer.h
++++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
+@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
+ #define DATA_SIZE_MAX (1024*1024*768u)
+ #define LINE_CHUNK 8*1024u
+ 
++/* The maximum number of fields in an entry */
++#define ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX 1024
++
+ struct iovec_wrapper {
+         struct iovec *iovec;
+         size_t size_bytes;
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-native.c b/src/journal/journald-native.c
+index 5ff22a10af..951d092053 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-native.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-native.c
+@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int server_process_entry(
+                 }
+ 
+                 /* A property follows */
++                if (n > ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) {
++                        log_debug("Received an entry that has more than " STRINGIFY(ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) " fields, ignoring entry.");
++                        r = 1;
++                        goto finish;
++                }
+ 
+                 /* n existing properties, 1 new, +1 for _TRANSPORT */
+                 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovec, m,
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch new file +79 -0

79 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb +2 -0
index 0cb84c002f..e6ef385f52 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0001-chown-recursive-let-s-rework-the-recursive-logic-to-.patch \
            file://0001-dhcp6-make-sure-we-have-enough-space-for-the-DHCP6-o.patch \
            file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \
+           file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch \
+           file://0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_qemuall = " file://0001-core-device.c-Change-the-default-device-timeout-to-2.patch"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/8 systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16866

In reply to George McCollister

From: Marcus Cooper <[email protected]>

Affects < v240

From v2 patch on [email protected] Incresed file name number from 0026 to 0027.

---
 ...nal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb           |  1 +
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch new file +49 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3925a4abbb
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From ebd06c37d4311db9851f4d3fdd023de3dd590de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Filipe Brandenburger <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 14:53:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] journal: fix out-of-bounds read CVE-2018-16866
+
+The original code didn't account for the fact that strchr() would match on the
+'\0' character, making it read past the end of the buffer if no non-whitespace
+character was present.
+
+This bug was introduced in commit ec5ff4445cca6a which was first released in
+systemd v221 and later fixed in commit 8595102d3ddde6 which was released in
+v240, so versions in the range [v221, v240) are affected.
+
+Patch backported from systemd-stable at f005e73d3723d62a39be661931fcb6347119b52b
+also includes a change from systemd master which removes a heap buffer overflow
+a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-16866
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/journal/journald-syslog.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+index 9dea116722..809b318c06 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
+         e = l;
+         l--;
+ 
+-        if (p[l-1] == ']') {
++        if (l > 0 && p[l-1] == ']') {
+                 size_t k = l-1;
+ 
+                 for (;;) {
+@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
+         if (t)
+                 *identifier = t;
+ 
+-        if (strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
++        if (p[e] != '\0' && strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
+                 e++;
+         *buf = p + e;
+         return e;
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb +1 -0
index e6ef385f52..b53221896f 100644
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \
            file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch \
            file://0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch \
+           file://0027-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_qemuall = " file://0001-core-device.c-Change-the-default-device-timeout-to-2.patch"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/8 systemd: fix CVE-2018-6954

In reply to George McCollister

Apply patches to fix CVE-2018-6954

NVD description from https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6954

systemd-tmpfiles in systemd through 237 mishandles symlinks present in non-terminal path components, which allows local users to obtain ownership of arbitrary files via vectors involving creation of a directory and a file under that directory, and later replacing that directory with a symlink. This occurs even if the fs.protected_symlinks sysctl is turned on.

Patches from systemd_237-3ubuntu10.13.debian.

These patches shouldn't be required on newer OE releases since they use systemd v239 or higher.

---
 ...n-t-resolve-pathnames-when-traversing-rec.patch |  643 +++++++
 .../systemd/systemd/0002-Make-tmpfiles-safe.patch  | 1828 ++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb           |    2 +
 3 files changed, 2473 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-tmpfiles-don-t-resolve-pathnames-when-traversing-rec.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0002-Make-tmpfiles-safe.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-tmpfiles-don-t-resolve-pathnames-when-traversing-rec.patch new file +643 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..108e4ad8b8
@@ -0,0 +1,643 @@
+From 33dc9a280f952f503e5493ee29f6815bef29d551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Franck Bui <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 17:19:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] tmpfiles: don't resolve pathnames when traversing recursively
+ through directory trees
+
+Otherwise we can be fooled if one path component is replaced underneath us.
+
+The patch achieves that by always operating at file descriptor level (by using
+*at() helpers) and by making sure we do not any path resolution when traversing
+direcotry trees.
+
+However this is not always possible, for instance when listing the content of a
+directory or some operations don't provide the *at() helpers or others (such as
+fchmodat()) don't have the AT_EMPTY_PATH flag. In such cases we operate on
+/proc/self/fd/%i pseudo-symlink instead, which works the same for all kinds of
+objects and requires no checking of type beforehand.
+
+Also O_PATH flag is used when opening file objects in order to prevent
+undesired behaviors: device nodes from reacting, automounts from
+triggering, etc...
+
+Fixes: CVE-2018-6954
+
+Origin: upstream, https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/936f6bdb803c432578e2cdcc5f93f3bfff93aff0
+Bug: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/7986
+
+Patch from:
+systemd_237-3ubuntu10.13.debian CVE-2018-6954.patch
+
+https://usn.ubuntu.com/3816-1/ states that CVE-2018-6954 doesn't
+affect Ubuntu 18.10 which uses the same version of systemd as thud
+(239).
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-6954
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: George McCollister <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c | 363 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 239 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c b/src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c
+index 88cc543f09..613d418eb3 100644
+--- a/src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c
++++ b/src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c
+@@ -792,94 +792,105 @@ static bool hardlink_vulnerable(struct stat *st) {
+         return !S_ISDIR(st->st_mode) && st->st_nlink > 1 && dangerous_hardlinks();
+ }
+ 
+-static int path_set_perms(Item *i, const char *path) {
+-        char fn[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
+-        _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
+-        struct stat st;
++static int fd_set_perms(Item *i, int fd, const struct stat *st) {
++        _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
++        int r;
+ 
+         assert(i);
+-        assert(path);
+-
+-        if (!i->mode_set && !i->uid_set && !i->gid_set)
+-                goto shortcut;
+-
+-        /* We open the file with O_PATH here, to make the operation
+-         * somewhat atomic. Also there's unfortunately no fchmodat()
+-         * with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, hence we emulate it here via
+-         * O_PATH. */
+-
+-        fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH);
+-        if (fd < 0) {
+-                int level = LOG_ERR, r = -errno;
++        assert(fd);
+ 
+-                /* Option "e" operates only on existing objects. Do not
+-                 * print errors about non-existent files or directories */
+-                if (i->type == EMPTY_DIRECTORY && errno == ENOENT) {
+-                        level = LOG_DEBUG;
+-                        r = 0;
+-                }
+-
+-                log_full_errno(level, errno, "Adjusting owner and mode for %s failed: %m", path);
++        r = fd_get_path(fd, &path);
++        if (r < 0)
+                 return r;
+-        }
+ 
+-        if (fstatat(fd, "", &st, AT_EMPTY_PATH) < 0)
+-                return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat() file %s: %m", path);
++        if (!i->mode_set && !i->uid_set && !i->gid_set)
++                goto shortcut;
+ 
+-        if (hardlink_vulnerable(&st)) {
++        if (hardlink_vulnerable(st)) {
+                 log_error("Refusing to set permissions on hardlinked file %s while the fs.protected_hardlinks sysctl is turned off.", path);
+                 return -EPERM;
+         }
+ 
+-        xsprintf(fn, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
+-
+         if (i->mode_set) {
+-                if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))
++                if (S_ISLNK(st->st_mode))
+                         log_debug("Skipping mode fix for symlink %s.", path);
+                 else {
+                         mode_t m = i->mode;
+ 
+                         if (i->mask_perms) {
+-                                if (!(st.st_mode & 0111))
++                                if (!(st->st_mode & 0111))
+                                         m &= ~0111;
+-                                if (!(st.st_mode & 0222))
++                                if (!(st->st_mode & 0222))
+                                         m &= ~0222;
+-                                if (!(st.st_mode & 0444))
++                                if (!(st->st_mode & 0444))
+                                         m &= ~0444;
+-                                if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
++                                if (!S_ISDIR(st->st_mode))
+                                         m &= ~07000; /* remove sticky/sgid/suid bit, unless directory */
+                         }
+ 
+-                        if (m == (st.st_mode & 07777))
+-                                log_debug("\"%s\" has correct mode %o already.", path, st.st_mode);
++                        if (m == (st->st_mode & 07777))
++                                log_debug("\"%s\" has correct mode %o already.", path, st->st_mode);
+                         else {
++                                char procfs_path[strlen("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
++
+                                 log_debug("Changing \"%s\" to mode %o.", path, m);
+ 
+-                                if (chmod(fn, m) < 0)
+-                                        return log_error_errno(errno, "chmod() of %s via %s failed: %m", path, fn);
++                                /* fchmodat() still doesn't have AT_EMPTY_PATH flag. */
++                                xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
++
++                                if (chmod(procfs_path, m) < 0)
++                                        return log_error_errno(errno, "chmod() of %s via %s failed: %m", path, procfs_path);
+                         }
+                 }
+         }
+ 
+-        if ((i->uid_set && i->uid != st.st_uid) ||
+-            (i->gid_set && i->gid != st.st_gid)) {
++        if ((i->uid_set && i->uid != st->st_uid) ||
++            (i->gid_set && i->gid != st->st_gid)) {
+                 log_debug("Changing \"%s\" to owner "UID_FMT":"GID_FMT,
+                           path,
+                           i->uid_set ? i->uid : UID_INVALID,
+                           i->gid_set ? i->gid : GID_INVALID);
+ 
+-                if (chown(fn,
+-                          i->uid_set ? i->uid : UID_INVALID,
+-                          i->gid_set ? i->gid : GID_INVALID) < 0)
+-                        return log_error_errno(errno, "chown() of %s via %s failed: %m", path, fn);
++                if (fchownat(fd,
++                             "",
++                             i->uid_set ? i->uid : UID_INVALID,
++                             i->gid_set ? i->gid : GID_INVALID,
++                             AT_EMPTY_PATH) < 0)
++                        return log_error_errno(errno, "fchownat() of %s failed: %m", path);
+         }
+ 
+-        fd = safe_close(fd);
+-
+ shortcut:
+         return label_fix(path, false, false);
+ }
+ 
++static int path_set_perms(Item *i, const char *path) {
++        _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
++        struct stat st;
++
++        assert(i);
++        assert(path);
++
++        fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH);
++        if (fd < 0) {
++                int level = LOG_ERR, r = -errno;
++
++                /* Option "e" operates only on existing objects. Do not
++                 * print errors about non-existent files or directories */
++                if (i->type == EMPTY_DIRECTORY && errno == ENOENT) {
++                        level = LOG_DEBUG;
++                        r = 0;
++                }
++
++                log_full_errno(level, errno, "Adjusting owner and mode for %s failed: %m", path);
++                return r;
++        }
++
++        if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
++                return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat() file %s: %m", path);
++
++        return fd_set_perms(i, fd, &st);
++}
++
+ static int parse_xattrs_from_arg(Item *i) {
+         const char *p;
+         int r;
+@@ -918,21 +929,43 @@ static int parse_xattrs_from_arg(Item *i) {
+         return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static int path_set_xattrs(Item *i, const char *path) {
++static int fd_set_xattrs(Item *i, int fd, const struct stat *st) {
++        char procfs_path[strlen("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
++        _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
+         char **name, **value;
++        int r;
+ 
+         assert(i);
+-        assert(path);
++        assert(fd);
++
++        r = fd_get_path(fd, &path);
++        if (r < 0)
++                return r;
++
++        xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
+ 
+         STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(name, value, i->xattrs) {
+                 log_debug("Setting extended attribute '%s=%s' on %s.", *name, *value, path);
+-                if (lsetxattr(path, *name, *value, strlen(*value), 0) < 0)
++                if (setxattr(procfs_path, *name, *value, strlen(*value), 0) < 0)
+                         return log_error_errno(errno, "Setting extended attribute %s=%s on %s failed: %m",
+                                                *name, *value, path);
+         }
+         return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static int path_set_xattrs(Item *i, const char *path) {
++        _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
++
++        assert(i);
++        assert(path);
++
++        fd = open(path, O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_PATH);
++        if (fd < 0)
++                return log_error_errno(errno, "Cannot open '%s': %m", path);
++
++        return fd_set_xattrs(i, fd, NULL);
++}
++
+ static int parse_acls_from_arg(Item *item) {
+ #if HAVE_ACL
+         int r;
+@@ -998,52 +1031,71 @@ static int path_set_acl(const char *path, const char *pretty, acl_type_t type, a
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-static int path_set_acls(Item *item, const char *path) {
++static int fd_set_acls(Item *item, int fd, const struct stat *st) {
+         int r = 0;
+ #if HAVE_ACL
+-        char fn[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
+-        _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
+-        struct stat st;
++        char procfs_path[strlen("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
++        _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
+ 
+         assert(item);
+-        assert(path);
+-
+-        fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH);
+-        if (fd < 0)
+-                return log_error_errno(errno, "Adjusting ACL of %s failed: %m", path);
++        assert(fd);
++        assert(st);
+ 
+-        if (fstatat(fd, "", &st, AT_EMPTY_PATH) < 0)
+-                return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat() file %s: %m", path);
++        r = fd_get_path(fd, &path);
++        if (r < 0)
++                return r;
+ 
+-        if (hardlink_vulnerable(&st)) {
++        if (hardlink_vulnerable(st)) {
+                 log_error("Refusing to set ACLs on hardlinked file %s while the fs.protected_hardlinks sysctl is turned off.", path);
+                 return -EPERM;
+         }
+ 
+-        if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
++        if (S_ISLNK(st->st_mode)) {
+                 log_debug("Skipping ACL fix for symlink %s.", path);
+                 return 0;
+         }
+ 
+-        xsprintf(fn, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
++        xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
+ 
+         if (item->acl_access)
+-                r = path_set_acl(fn, path, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, item->acl_access, item->force);
++                r = path_set_acl(procfs_path, path, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, item->acl_access, item->force);
+ 
+         if (r == 0 && item->acl_default)
+-                r = path_set_acl(fn, path, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, item->acl_default, item->force);
++                r = path_set_acl(procfs_path, path, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, item->acl_default, item->force);
+ 
+         if (r > 0)
+                 return -r; /* already warned */
+-        else if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
++        if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+                 log_debug_errno(r, "ACLs not supported by file system at %s", path);
+                 return 0;
+-        } else if (r < 0)
+-                log_error_errno(r, "ACL operation on \"%s\" failed: %m", path);
++        }
++        if (r < 0)
++                return log_error_errno(r, "ACL operation on \"%s\" failed: %m", path);
+ #endif
+         return r;
+ }
+ 
++static int path_set_acls(Item *item, const char *path) {
++        int r = 0;
++#ifdef HAVE_ACL
++        _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
++        struct stat st;
++
++        assert(item);
++        assert(path);
++
++        fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH);
++        if (fd < 0)
++                return log_error_errno(errno, "Adjusting ACL of %s failed: %m", path);
++
++        if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
++                return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat() file %s: %m", path);
++
++        r = fd_set_acls(item, fd, &st);
++ #endif
++         return r;
++ }
++
+ #define ATTRIBUTES_ALL                          \
+         (FS_NOATIME_FL      |                   \
+          FS_SYNC_FL         |                   \
+@@ -1143,30 +1195,24 @@ static int parse_attribute_from_arg(Item *item) {
+         return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static int path_set_attribute(Item *item, const char *path) {
+-        _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
+-        struct stat st;
++static int fd_set_attribute(Item *item, int fd, const struct stat *st) {
++        char procfs_path[strlen("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
++        _cleanup_close_ int procfs_fd = -1;
++        _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
+         unsigned f;
+         int r;
+ 
+         if (!item->attribute_set || item->attribute_mask == 0)
+                 return 0;
+ 
+-        fd = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOATIME|O_NOFOLLOW);
+-        if (fd < 0) {
+-                if (errno == ELOOP)
+-                        return log_error_errno(errno, "Skipping file attributes adjustment on symlink %s.", path);
+-
+-                return log_error_errno(errno, "Cannot open '%s': %m", path);
+-        }
+-
+-        if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+-                return log_error_errno(errno, "Cannot stat '%s': %m", path);
++        r = fd_get_path(fd, &path);
++        if (r < 0)
++                return r;
+ 
+         /* Issuing the file attribute ioctls on device nodes is not
+          * safe, as that will be delivered to the drivers, not the
+          * file system containing the device node. */
+-        if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
++        if (!S_ISREG(st->st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) {
+                 log_error("Setting file flags is only supported on regular files and directories, cannot set on '%s'.", path);
+                 return -EINVAL;
+         }
+@@ -1174,10 +1220,16 @@ static int path_set_attribute(Item *item, const char *path) {
+         f = item->attribute_value & item->attribute_mask;
+ 
+         /* Mask away directory-specific flags */
+-        if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
++        if (!S_ISDIR(st->st_mode))
+                 f &= ~FS_DIRSYNC_FL;
+ 
+-        r = chattr_fd(fd, f, item->attribute_mask);
++        xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
++
++        procfs_fd = open(procfs_path, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOATIME);
++        if (procfs_fd < 0)
++                return -errno;
++
++        r = chattr_fd(procfs_fd, f, item->attribute_mask);
+         if (r < 0)
+                 log_full_errno(IN_SET(r, -ENOTTY, -EOPNOTSUPP) ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING,
+                                r,
+@@ -1187,6 +1239,23 @@ static int path_set_attribute(Item *item, const char *path) {
+         return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static int path_set_attribute(Item *item, const char *path) {
++        _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
++        struct stat st;
++
++        if (!item->attribute_set || item->attribute_mask == 0)
++                return 0;
++
++        fd = open(path, O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_PATH);
++        if (fd < 0)
++                return log_error_errno(errno, "Cannot open '%s': %m", path);
++
++        if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
++                return log_error_errno(errno, "Cannot stat '%s': %m", path);
++
++        return fd_set_attribute(item, fd, &st);
++}
++
+ static int write_one_file(Item *i, const char *path) {
+         _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
+         int flags, r = 0;
+@@ -1251,48 +1320,58 @@ done:
+ }
+ 
+ typedef int (*action_t)(Item *, const char *);
++typedef int (*fdaction_t)(Item *, int fd, const struct stat *st);
+ 
+-static int item_do_children(Item *i, const char *path, action_t action) {
+-        _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d;
+-        struct dirent *de;
+-        int r = 0;
++static int item_do(Item *i, int fd, const struct stat *st, fdaction_t action) {
++        int r = 0, q;
+ 
+         assert(i);
+-        assert(path);
++        assert(fd >= 0);
++        assert(st);
+ 
+         /* This returns the first error we run into, but nevertheless
+          * tries to go on */
++        r = action(i, fd, st);
+ 
+-        d = opendir_nomod(path);
+-        if (!d)
+-                return IN_SET(errno, ENOENT, ENOTDIR, ELOOP) ? 0 : -errno;
++        if (S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) {
++                char procfs_path[strlen("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
++                _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL;
++                struct dirent *de;
+ 
+-        FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, r = -errno) {
+-                _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
+-                int q;
++                /* The passed 'fd' was opened with O_PATH. We need to convert
++                 * it into a 'regular' fd before reading the directory content. */
++                xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
+ 
+-                if (dot_or_dot_dot(de->d_name))
+-                        continue;
++                d = opendir(procfs_path);
++                if (!d) {
++                        r = r ?: -errno;
++                        goto finish;
++                }
+ 
+-                p = strjoin(path, "/", de->d_name);
+-                if (!p)
+-                        return -ENOMEM;
++                FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, q = -errno; goto finish) {
++                        struct stat de_st;
++                        int de_fd;
++
++                        if (dot_or_dot_dot(de->d_name))
++                                continue;
+ 
+-                q = action(i, p);
+-                if (q < 0 && q != -ENOENT && r == 0)
+-                        r = q;
++                        de_fd = openat(fd, de->d_name, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH);
++                        if (de_fd >= 0 && fstat(de_fd, &de_st) >= 0)
++                                /* pass ownership of dirent fd over  */
++                                q = item_do(i, de_fd, &de_st, action);
++                        else
++                                q = -errno;
+ 
+-                if (IN_SET(de->d_type, DT_UNKNOWN, DT_DIR)) {
+-                        q = item_do_children(i, p, action);
+                         if (q < 0 && r == 0)
+                                 r = q;
+                 }
+         }
+-
++finish:
++        safe_close(fd);
+         return r;
+ }
+ 
+-static int glob_item(Item *i, action_t action, bool recursive) {
++static int glob_item(Item *i, action_t action) {
+         _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t g = {
+ #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
+                 .gl_opendir = (void *(*)(const char *)) opendir_nomod,
+@@ -1309,12 +1388,48 @@ static int glob_item(Item *i, action_t action, bool recursive) {
+                 k = action(i, *fn);
+                 if (k < 0 && r == 0)
+                         r = k;
++        }
+ 
+-                if (recursive) {
+-                        k = item_do_children(i, *fn, action);
+-                        if (k < 0 && r == 0)
+-                                r = k;
++        return r;
++}
++
++static int glob_item_recursively(Item *i, fdaction_t action) {
++        _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t g = {
++                .gl_opendir = (void *(*)(const char *)) opendir_nomod,
++        };
++        int r = 0, k;
++        char **fn;
++
++        k = safe_glob(i->path, GLOB_NOSORT|GLOB_BRACE, &g);
++        if (k < 0 && k != -ENOENT)
++                return log_error_errno(k, "glob(%s) failed: %m", i->path);
++
++        STRV_FOREACH(fn, g.gl_pathv) {
++                _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
++                struct stat st;
++
++                /* Make sure we won't trigger/follow file object (such as
++                 * device nodes, automounts, ...) pointed out by 'fn' with
++                 * O_PATH. Note, when O_PATH is used, flags other than
++                 * O_CLOEXEC, O_DIRECTORY, and O_NOFOLLOW are ignored. */
++
++                fd = open(*fn, O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_PATH);
++                if (fd < 0) {
++                        r = r ?: -errno;
++                        continue;
++                }
++
++                if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
++                        r = r ?: -errno;
++                        continue;
+                 }
++
++                k = item_do(i, fd, &st, action);
++                if (k < 0 && r == 0)
++                        r = k;
++
++                /* we passed fd ownership to the previous call */
++                fd = -1;
+         }
+ 
+         return r;
+@@ -1403,7 +1518,7 @@ static int create_item(Item *i) {
+                 break;
+ 
+         case WRITE_FILE:
+-                r = glob_item(i, write_one_file, false);
++                r = glob_item(i, write_one_file);
+                 if (r < 0)
+                         return r;
+ 
+@@ -1662,49 +1777,49 @@ static int create_item(Item *i) {
+ 
+         case ADJUST_MODE:
+         case RELABEL_PATH:
+-                r = glob_item(i, path_set_perms, false);
++                r = glob_item(i, path_set_perms);
+                 if (r < 0)
+                         return r;
+                 break;
+ 
+         case RECURSIVE_RELABEL_PATH:
+-                r = glob_item(i, path_set_perms, true);
++                r = glob_item_recursively(i, fd_set_perms);
+                 if (r < 0)
+                         return r;
+                 break;
+ 
+         case SET_XATTR:
+-                r = glob_item(i, path_set_xattrs, false);
++                r = glob_item(i, path_set_xattrs);
+                 if (r < 0)
+                         return r;
+                 break;
+ 
+         case RECURSIVE_SET_XATTR:
+-                r = glob_item(i, path_set_xattrs, true);
++                r = glob_item_recursively(i, fd_set_xattrs);
+                 if (r < 0)
+                         return r;
+                 break;
+ 
+         case SET_ACL:
+-                r = glob_item(i, path_set_acls, false);
++                r = glob_item(i, path_set_acls);
+                 if (r < 0)
+                         return r;
+                 break;
+ 
+         case RECURSIVE_SET_ACL:
+-                r = glob_item(i, path_set_acls, true);
++                r = glob_item_recursively(i, fd_set_acls);
+                 if (r < 0)
+                         return r;
+                 break;
+ 
+         case SET_ATTRIBUTE:
+-                r = glob_item(i, path_set_attribute, false);
++                r = glob_item(i, path_set_attribute);
+                 if (r < 0)
+                         return r;
+                 break;
+ 
+         case RECURSIVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE:
+-                r = glob_item(i, path_set_attribute, true);
++                r = glob_item_recursively(i, fd_set_attribute);
+                 if (r < 0)
+                         return r;
+                 break;
+@@ -1754,7 +1869,7 @@ static int remove_item(Item *i) {
+         case REMOVE_PATH:
+         case TRUNCATE_DIRECTORY:
+         case RECURSIVE_REMOVE_PATH:
+-                return glob_item(i, remove_item_instance, false);
++                return glob_item(i, remove_item_instance);
+ 
+         default:
+                 return 0;
+@@ -1828,7 +1943,7 @@ static int clean_item(Item *i) {
+                 return 0;
+         case EMPTY_DIRECTORY:
+         case IGNORE_DIRECTORY_PATH:
+-                return glob_item(i, clean_item_instance, false);
++                return glob_item(i, clean_item_instance);
+         default:
+                 return 0;
+         }
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0002-Make-tmpfiles-safe.patch new file +1828 -0

1,828 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb +2 -0
index b53221896f..1d9fcf0bd7 100644
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch \
            file://0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch \
            file://0027-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch \
+           file://0001-tmpfiles-don-t-resolve-pathnames-when-traversing-rec.patch \
+           file://0002-Make-tmpfiles-safe.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_qemuall = " file://0001-core-device.c-Change-the-default-device-timeout-to-2.patch"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/8 systemd: fix CVE-2019-6454

In reply to George McCollister

Apply patches from systemd_237-3ubuntu10.13 to fix CVE-2019-6454. CVE-2019-6454 is an issue in which systemd (PID1) can be crashed with a specially formed D-Bus message.

For information see:
https://usn.ubuntu.com/3891-1/
https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/commit/?h=applied/ubuntu/bionic-updates&id=d7584b894afcaa8a4a1abb69db2a9c81a6276e80

---
 .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2019-6454.patch            | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++
 ...e-receive-an-invalid-dbus-message-ignore-.patch |  61 ++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb           |   2 +
 3 files changed, 273 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2019-6454.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/sd-bus-if-we-receive-an-invalid-dbus-message-ignore-.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2019-6454.patch new file +210 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e3c67c166c
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+Description: sd-bus: enforce a size limit for dbus paths, and don't allocate
+ them on the stacka
+Forwarded: no
+
+Patch from: systemd_237-3ubuntu10.13
+
+For information see:
+https://usn.ubuntu.com/3891-1/
+https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/commit/?h=applied/ubuntu/bionic-updates&id=d7584b894afcaa8a4a1abb69db2a9c81a6276e80
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-6454
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: George McCollister <[email protected]>
+
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
+@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
+         if (slash)
+                 return false;
+ 
+-        return true;
++        return (q - p) <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX;
+ }
+ 
+ char* object_path_startswith(const char *a, const char *b) {
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
+@@ -339,6 +339,10 @@
+ 
+ #define BUS_MESSAGE_SIZE_MAX (64*1024*1024)
+ #define BUS_AUTH_SIZE_MAX (64*1024)
++/* Note that the D-Bus specification states that bus paths shall have no size limit. We enforce here one
++ * anyway, since truly unbounded strings are a security problem. The limit we pick is relatively large however,
++ * to not clash unnecessarily with real-life applications. */
++#define BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX (64*1024)
+ 
+ #define BUS_CONTAINER_DEPTH 128
+ 
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
+@@ -1150,7 +1150,8 @@
+                 const char *path,
+                 sd_bus_error *error) {
+ 
+-        char *prefix;
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
++        size_t pl;
+         int r;
+ 
+         assert(bus);
+@@ -1166,7 +1167,12 @@
+                 return 0;
+ 
+         /* Second, add fallback vtables registered for any of the prefixes */
+-        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
++        pl = strlen(path);
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
++
+         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                 r = object_manager_serialize_path(bus, reply, prefix, path, true, error);
+                 if (r < 0)
+@@ -1362,6 +1368,7 @@
+ }
+ 
+ int bus_process_object(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m) {
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
+         int r;
+         size_t pl;
+         bool found_object = false;
+@@ -1386,9 +1393,12 @@
+         assert(m->member);
+ 
+         pl = strlen(m->path);
+-        do {
+-                char prefix[pl+1];
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
+ 
++        do {
+                 bus->nodes_modified = false;
+ 
+                 r = object_find_and_run(bus, m, m->path, false, &found_object);
+@@ -1516,9 +1526,15 @@
+ 
+         n = hashmap_get(bus->nodes, path);
+         if (!n) {
+-                char *prefix;
++                _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
++                size_t pl;
++
++                pl = strlen(path);
++                assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++                prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++                if (!prefix)
++                        return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+-                prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
+                 OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                         n = hashmap_get(bus->nodes, prefix);
+                         if (n)
+@@ -2108,8 +2124,9 @@
+                 char **names) {
+ 
+         BUS_DONT_DESTROY(bus);
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
+         bool found_interface = false;
+-        char *prefix;
++        size_t pl;
+         int r;
+ 
+         assert_return(bus, -EINVAL);
+@@ -2128,6 +2145,12 @@
+         if (names && names[0] == NULL)
+                 return 0;
+ 
++        pl = strlen(path);
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
++
+         do {
+                 bus->nodes_modified = false;
+ 
+@@ -2137,7 +2160,6 @@
+                 if (bus->nodes_modified)
+                         continue;
+ 
+-                prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
+                 OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                         r = emit_properties_changed_on_interface(bus, prefix, path, interface, true, &found_interface, names);
+                         if (r != 0)
+@@ -2269,7 +2291,8 @@
+ 
+ static int object_added_append_all(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m, const char *path) {
+         _cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL;
+-        char *prefix;
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
++        size_t pl;
+         int r;
+ 
+         assert(bus);
+@@ -2314,7 +2337,12 @@
+         if (bus->nodes_modified)
+                 return 0;
+ 
+-        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
++        pl = strlen(path);
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
++
+         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                 r = object_added_append_all_prefix(bus, m, s, prefix, path, true);
+                 if (r < 0)
+@@ -2453,7 +2481,8 @@
+ 
+ static int object_removed_append_all(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m, const char *path) {
+         _cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL;
+-        char *prefix;
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
++        size_t pl;
+         int r;
+ 
+         assert(bus);
+@@ -2485,7 +2514,12 @@
+         if (bus->nodes_modified)
+                 return 0;
+ 
+-        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
++        pl = strlen(path);
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
++
+         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                 r = object_removed_append_all_prefix(bus, m, s, prefix, path, true);
+                 if (r < 0)
+@@ -2635,7 +2669,8 @@
+                 const char *path,
+                 const char *interface) {
+ 
+-        char *prefix;
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
++        size_t pl;
+         int r;
+ 
+         assert(bus);
+@@ -2649,7 +2684,12 @@
+         if (bus->nodes_modified)
+                 return 0;
+ 
+-        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
++        pl = strlen(path);
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
++
+         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                 r = interfaces_added_append_one_prefix(bus, m, prefix, path, interface, true);
+                 if (r != 0)
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/sd-bus-if-we-receive-an-invalid-dbus-message-ignore-.patch new file +61 -0

61 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_237.bb +2 -0
index 1d9fcf0bd7..3b9c4026ce 100644
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0027-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch \
            file://0001-tmpfiles-don-t-resolve-pathnames-when-traversing-rec.patch \
            file://0002-Make-tmpfiles-safe.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-6454.patch \
+           file://sd-bus-if-we-receive-an-invalid-dbus-message-ignore-.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_qemuall = " file://0001-core-device.c-Change-the-default-device-timeout-to-2.patch"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0