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cpu/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

RFC PATCH In review Josh Poimboeuf 10 participants 33 messages Apr 4, 2019 – Apr 12, 2019

Subsystems (10)
Documentation x86 PowerPC arm64 +6 more subsystems
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#0 lore raw

cover cpu/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to it own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all CPU speculation mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing options:

- cpu_spec_mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- cpu_spec_mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- cpu_spec_mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Josh Poimboeuf (5):
cpu/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options x86/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline
options
powerpc/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline
options
s390/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline
options
arm64/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline
options

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                |  4 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                |  6 +++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                |  6 +--
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c              |  4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h              |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 32 ++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                        |  2 +
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                             |  4 +-
 include/linux/cpu.h                           |  8 ++++
 kernel/cpu.c                                  | 15 +++++++
 12 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#1 lore raw

RFC PATCH 1/5 cpu/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to their own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing options:

- cpu_spec_mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- cpu_spec_mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- cpu_spec_mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do anything. They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.

---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                           |  8 +++++++
 kernel/cpu.c                                  | 15 ++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +23 -0
index c4d830003b21..ac42e510bd6e 100644
@@ -2544,6 +2544,29 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	cpu_spec_mitigations=
+			[KNL] Control mitigations for CPU speculation
+			vulnerabilities on affected CPUs.  This is a set of
+			curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
+				but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
+				This is useful for users who don't want to be
+				surprised by SMT getting disabled across kernel
+				upgrades, or who have other ways of avoiding
+				SMT-based attacks.
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
+				disabling SMT if needed.  This is for users who
+				always want to be fully mitigated, even if it
+				means losing SMT.
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
include/linux/cpu.h +8 -0
index 5041357d0297..3a1740fda2e2 100644
@@ -187,4 +187,12 @@ static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
 
+enum cpu_spec_mitigations {
+	CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
+	CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
+	CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT,
+};
+
+extern enum cpu_spec_mitigations cpu_spec_mitigations;
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
kernel/cpu.c +15 -0
index 6c959aea0f9e..0a9d66b90a00 100644
@@ -2306,3 +2306,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 #endif
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
+
+enum cpu_spec_mitigations cpu_spec_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init cpu_spec_mitigations_setup(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		cpu_spec_mitigations = CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
+		cpu_spec_mitigations = CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt"))
+		cpu_spec_mitigations = CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("cpu_spec_mitigations", cpu_spec_mitigations_setup);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#14 lore raw

RFC PATCH 2/5 x86/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 15 +++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h              |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 32 ++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                        |  2 ++
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                             |  4 ++-
 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +15 -0
index ac42e510bd6e..29dc03971630 100644
@@ -2552,6 +2552,11 @@
 
 			off
 				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [x86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86]
+					       l1tf=off [x86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
@@ -2560,12 +2565,22 @@
 				surprised by SMT getting disabled across kernel
 				upgrades, or who have other ways of avoiding
 				SMT-based attacks.
+				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       l1tf=flush [x86]
 
 			auto,nosmt
 				Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
 				disabling SMT if needed.  This is for users who
 				always want to be fully mitigated, even if it
 				means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       l1tf=flush,nosmt [x86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +1 -0
index 2bb3a648fc12..7e95b310f869 100644
@@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ void microcode_check(void);
 
 enum l1tf_mitigations {
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT,
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN,
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH,
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +28 -4
index 2da82eff0eb4..65b95fb95ba5 100644
@@ -308,8 +308,11 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
 				  arg, sizeof(arg));
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+			return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
 		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
 		if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
@@ -444,8 +447,11 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
 		if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -677,8 +683,11 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
 					  arg, sizeof(arg));
-		if (ret < 0)
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+				return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 			return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+		}
 
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
 			if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -955,7 +964,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"L1TF: " fmt
 
 /* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
-enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
 #endif
@@ -1010,8 +1019,23 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 
 	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
+	if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT) {
+		switch (cpu_spec_mitigations) {
+		case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF:
+			l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+			break;
+		case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO:
+			l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+			break;
+		case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT:
+			l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
 	case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
 	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
 	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
 		break;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +2 -0
index ab432a930ae8..83b5bdc3c777 100644
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
 			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
 			break;
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
@@ -6686,6 +6687,7 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
 			/*
 			 * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
 			 * insecure environment.
arch/x86/mm/pti.c +3 -1
index 139b28a01ce4..6d3bf680bf95 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF) {
 		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
 		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
 		return;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#21 lore raw

RFC PATCH 3/5 powerpc/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++----
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                  | 6 +++---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                  | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5 -4
index 29dc03971630..0e8eae1e8a25 100644
@@ -2552,10 +2552,11 @@
 
 			off
 				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
-				Equivalent to: nopti [x86]
+				Equivalent to: nopti [x86, powerpc]
+					       nospectre_v1 [powerpc]
 					       nospectre_v2 [x86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=off [x86]
 
 			auto (default)
@@ -2568,7 +2569,7 @@
 				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=flush [x86]
 
 			auto,nosmt
@@ -2579,7 +2580,7 @@
 				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=flush,nosmt [x86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +3 -3
index b33bafb8fcea..5aed4ad729ba 100644
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
 	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
 		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
 
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
 		enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
 }
 
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
 {
-	if (no_spectrev2)
+	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
 		do_btb_flush_fixups();
 	else
 		btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
 
 	stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
 
-	if (!no_stf_barrier)
+	if (!no_stf_barrier && cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
 		stf_barrier_enable(enable);
 }
 
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +1 -1
index ba404dd9ce1d..d9d796a66a79 100644
@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
 
 	enabled_flush_types = types;
 
-	if (!no_rfi_flush)
+	if (!no_rfi_flush || cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
 		rfi_flush_enable(enable);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#26 lore raw

RFC PATCH 4/5 s390/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

Configure s390 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Spectre v1 and Spectre v2.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 ++++---
 arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c                | 4 +++-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +4 -3
index 0e8eae1e8a25..e838af96daa4 100644
@@ -2554,8 +2554,9 @@
 				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [x86, powerpc]
 					       nospectre_v1 [powerpc]
-					       nospectre_v2 [x86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [x86, powerpc, s390]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
+					       nobp=0 [s390]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=off [x86]
 
@@ -2567,7 +2568,7 @@
 				upgrades, or who have other ways of avoiding
 				SMT-based attacks.
 				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
-					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2=auto [x86, s390]
 					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=flush [x86]
@@ -2578,7 +2579,7 @@
 				always want to be fully mitigated, even if it
 				means losing SMT.
 				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
-					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2=auto [x86, s390]
 					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=flush,nosmt [x86]
arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c +3 -1
index bdddaae96559..c40eb672b43a 100644
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 static int __init nobp_setup_early(char *str)
@@ -58,7 +59,8 @@ early_param("nospectre_v2", nospectre_v2_setup_early);
 
 void __init nospec_auto_detect(void)
 {
-	if (test_facility(156)) {
+	if (test_facility(156) ||
+	    cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF) {
 		/*
 		 * The machine supports etokens.
 		 * Disable expolines and disable nobp.
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#27 lore raw

RFC PATCH 5/5 arm64/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 4 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  | 6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -0
index e838af96daa4..0b54385ee7a8 100644
@@ -2553,11 +2553,13 @@
 			off
 				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [x86, powerpc]
+					       kpti=0 [arm64]
 					       nospectre_v1 [powerpc]
 					       nospectre_v2 [x86, powerpc, s390]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
 					       nobp=0 [s390]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86, powerpc]
+					       ssbd=force-off [arm64]
 					       l1tf=off [x86]
 
 			auto (default)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +4 -0
index 9950bb0cbd52..db8d27e3fb1c 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -385,6 +386,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
+
 	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
 	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
 		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +6 -0
index 4061de10cea6..4512b582d50f 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
@@ -978,6 +979,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		__kpti_forced = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF) {
+		str = "cpu_spec_mitigations=off";
+		__kpti_forced = -1;
+	}
+
 	/* Forced? */
 	if (__kpti_forced) {
 		pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation forced %s by %s\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#2 lore raw
In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to their own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

... tends to _have_ its own custom way ...

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#32 lore raw
In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to it own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

... tends to "have its" own ... ?

-Longman

Reviewed-by on v1 3/5
#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 3/5] powerpc/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 3 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

[ ... snip ... ]

arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c void setup_barrier_nospec(void) · line 60

Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +1 -1
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)

'!no_nospec' is something that I am sure will come back to hunt me in my bad dreams.

But that's been there already, and fixing it is out of scope of this patch. Other than that, as discussed previously -- I really like this new global option. Feel free to add

for the whole set.

Thanks,

Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 3/5] powerpc/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

Will be joining in ~ 5 mins. Getting Chromium set up here.

----- Original Message -----

Quoted 38 lines

From: "Jiri Kosina" <[email protected]>
To: "Josh Poimboeuf" <[email protected]>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra" <[email protected]>, "Heiko Carstens" <[email protected]>, "Paul Mackerras" <[email protected]>, "H . Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>, "Ingo Molnar" <[email protected]>, "Andrea Arcangeli" <[email protected]>, [email protected], [email protected], "Will Deacon" <[email protected]>, "Linus Torvalds" <[email protected]>, "Catalin Marinas" <[email protected]>, "Waiman Long" <[email protected]>, [email protected], "Jon Masters" <[email protected]>, "Borislav Petkov" <[email protected]>, "Andy Lutomirski" <[email protected]>, "Thomas Gleixner" <[email protected]>, [email protected], "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <[email protected]>, [email protected], "Tyler Hicks" <[email protected]>, "Martin Schwidefsky" <[email protected]>, [email protected]
Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2019 2:49:05 PM
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 3/5] powerpc/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

Quoted 3 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

[ ... snip ... ]

arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c void setup_barrier_nospec(void) · line 60

Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +1 -1
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)

'!no_nospec' is something that I am sure will come back to hunt me in my bad dreams.

But that's been there already, and fixing it is out of scope of this patch. Other than that, as discussed previously -- I really like this new global option. Feel free to add

for the whole set.

Thanks,

--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs

maintainer
#3 lore raw
In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to their own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Yap, we definitely need something like that.

Quoted 6 lines

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if it's vulnerable; or

Uff, "reasonable" - there's the bikeshed waiting to happen.

Quoted 7 lines

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing options:

- cpu_spec_mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

"cpu_spec_mitigations" is too long, TBH.

Imagine yourself in a loud, noisy data center - you basically can't wait to leave - crouched over a keyboard in an impossible position, having to type that thing and then making a typo. Whoops, too late, already pressed Enter. Shiiiit!

Now you have to wait at least 15 mins for the damn single-threaded added value BIOS crap to noodle through all the cores just so you can try again, because you just rebooted the box.

And I know, my ideas for shorter cmdline options are crazy, like

cpu_spec_mtg=

which people would say, yuck, unreadable...

Oh, I know! How about

cpu_vulns=

?

We already have /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities so it'll be the same as that. Less things to remember.

Quoted 5 lines

- cpu_spec_mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- cpu_spec_mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Yah, the suboption choices make sense to me.

Quoted 17 lines

Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do anything. They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.

---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                           |  8 +++++++
 kernel/cpu.c                                  | 15 ++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0 -0
index c4d830003b21..ac42e510bd6e 100644
@@ -2544,6 +2544,29 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 2554

Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +8 -0
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	cpu_spec_mitigations=
+			[KNL] Control mitigations for CPU speculation
+			vulnerabilities on affected CPUs.  This is a set of
+			curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.

Alias to

cpu_vulns=make_linux_fast_again

:-P

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
maintainer
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 44 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 15 +++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h              |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 32 ++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                        |  2 ++
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                             |  4 ++-
 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +10 -0
index ac42e510bd6e..29dc03971630 100644
@@ -2552,6 +2552,11 @@
 
 			off
 				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [x86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86]
+					       l1tf=off [x86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
@@ -2560,12 +2565,22 @@
 				surprised by SMT getting disabled across kernel
 				upgrades, or who have other ways of avoiding
 				SMT-based attacks.
+				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       l1tf=flush [x86]
 
 			auto,nosmt
 				Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
 				disabling SMT if needed.  This is for users who

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 2586

Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5 -0
 				always want to be fully mitigated, even if it
 				means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       l1tf=flush,nosmt [x86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this

Yap, those sets look ok.

Quoted 17 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +1 -0
index 2bb3a648fc12..7e95b310f869 100644
@@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ void microcode_check(void);
 
 enum l1tf_mitigations {
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT,
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN,
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH,
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0 -0
index 2da82eff0eb4..65b95fb95ba5 100644

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) · line 313

Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +3 -1
@@ -308,8 +308,11 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
 				  arg, sizeof(arg));
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+			return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;

Instead of sprinkling that test in those three functions, just do it once above in check_bugs(), before those *_select_mitigation() functions get to run and depending on the value, you either run them or use the default settings, for the OFF case, for example.

Quoted 77 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +25 -3
 		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
 		if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
@@ -444,8 +447,11 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
 		if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -677,8 +683,11 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
 					  arg, sizeof(arg));
-		if (ret < 0)
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+				return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 			return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+		}
 
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
 			if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -955,7 +964,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"L1TF: " fmt
 
 /* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
-enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
 #endif
@@ -1010,8 +1019,23 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 
 	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
+	if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT) {
+		switch (cpu_spec_mitigations) {
+		case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF:
+			l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+			break;
+		case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO:
+			l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+			break;
+		case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT:
+			l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
 	case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
 	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
 	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
 		break;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -0
index ab432a930ae8..83b5bdc3c777 100644
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
 			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
 			break;
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) · line 6693

Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -0
@@ -6686,6 +6687,7 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
 			/*
 			 * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
 			 * insecure environment.

The L1TF bits need to be a separate patch.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#4 lore raw
In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 5 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to their own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Yap, we definitely need something like that.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if it's vulnerable; or

Uff, "reasonable" - there's the bikeshed waiting to happen.

Luckily the defaults have already been chosen. So "reasonable" just means to use the defaults.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing options:

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

- cpu_spec_mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

"cpu_spec_mitigations" is too long, TBH.

Imagine yourself in a loud, noisy data center - you basically can't wait to leave - crouched over a keyboard in an impossible position, having to type that thing and then making a typo. Whoops, too late, already pressed Enter. Shiiiit!

Sure, it's a bit long. But it's also easier to remember and more self-documenting than any shortened option I could come up with.

In your scenario, the fact that it's so easy to remember would save the day, since you wouldn't have to go look up some obscure shortened option name in the documentation :-)

Suggestions are welcome but I couldn't come up with a reasonable shorter option.

Quoted 9 lines

Now you have to wait at least 15 mins for the damn single-threaded added value BIOS crap to noodle through all the cores just so you can try again, because you just rebooted the box.

And I know, my ideas for shorter cmdline options are crazy, like

cpu_spec_mtg=

which people would say, yuck, unreadable...

I agree with those people. In my world "mtg" is short for meeting.

Quoted 5 lines

Oh, I know! How about

cpu_vulns=

?

No, because

a) We aren't enabling/disabling *vulnerabilities*, but rather mitigations;

b) We aren't enabling/disabling *all* CPU mitigations, only the speculative ones.

Quoted 2 lines

We already have /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities so it'll be the same as that. Less things to remember.

Except that it's not called "cpu_vulns"...

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 18 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 18 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +1 -0
index 2bb3a648fc12..7e95b310f869 100644
@@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ void microcode_check(void);
 
 enum l1tf_mitigations {
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT,
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN,
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH,
 	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0 -0
index 2da82eff0eb4..65b95fb95ba5 100644
@@ -308,8 +308,11 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 
Quoted 11 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) · line 313

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +3 -1
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
 				  arg, sizeof(arg));
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+			return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;

Instead of sprinkling that test in those three functions, just do it once above in check_bugs(), before those *_select_mitigation() functions get to run and depending on the value, you either run them or use the default settings, for the OFF case, for example.

My thinking was that the individual options could be used to override the global option. But maybe that's overkill? I dunno.

Quoted 78 lines
Quoted 78 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +25 -3
 		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
 		if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
@@ -444,8 +447,11 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
 		if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -677,8 +683,11 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
 					  arg, sizeof(arg));
-		if (ret < 0)
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+				return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 			return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+		}
 
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
 			if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -955,7 +964,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"L1TF: " fmt
 
 /* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
-enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
 #endif
@@ -1010,8 +1019,23 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 
 	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
+	if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT) {
+		switch (cpu_spec_mitigations) {
+		case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF:
+			l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+			break;
+		case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO:
+			l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+			break;
+		case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT:
+			l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
 	case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
 	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
 	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
 		break;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -0
index ab432a930ae8..83b5bdc3c777 100644
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
 			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
 			break;
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
@@ -6686,6 +6687,7 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) · line 6693

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -0
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
 		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
 			/*
 			 * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
 			 * insecure environment.

The L1TF bits need to be a separate patch.

I assume you mean just the part where L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT is added?

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#28 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 5/5] arm64/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 66 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 4 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  | 6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -0
index e838af96daa4..0b54385ee7a8 100644
@@ -2553,11 +2553,13 @@
 			off
 				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [x86, powerpc]
+					       kpti=0 [arm64]
 					       nospectre_v1 [powerpc]
 					       nospectre_v2 [x86, powerpc, s390]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
 					       nobp=0 [s390]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86, powerpc]
+					       ssbd=force-off [arm64]
 					       l1tf=off [x86]
 
 			auto (default)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +4 -0
index 9950bb0cbd52..db8d27e3fb1c 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -385,6 +386,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
+
 	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
 	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
 		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +1 -0
index 4061de10cea6..4512b582d50f 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, · line 983

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +2 -0
@@ -978,6 +979,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		__kpti_forced = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF) {
+		str = "cpu_spec_mitigations=off";

Might also be worth changing the initialisation of str, currently it is:

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, · line 984

Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0 -0
 	char const *str = "command line option";

But now we have two command line options, perhaps "kpti command line option".

Steve

Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +3 -0
+		__kpti_forced = -1;
+	}
+
 	/* Forced? */
 	if (__kpti_forced) {

pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation forced %s by %s\n",

#29 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 5/5] arm64/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

Quoted 75 lines · Steven Price
Quoted 66 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 4 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  | 6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -0
index e838af96daa4..0b54385ee7a8 100644
@@ -2553,11 +2553,13 @@
 			off
 				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [x86, powerpc]
+					       kpti=0 [arm64]
 					       nospectre_v1 [powerpc]
 					       nospectre_v2 [x86, powerpc, s390]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
 					       nobp=0 [s390]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86, powerpc]
+					       ssbd=force-off [arm64]
 					       l1tf=off [x86]
 
 			auto (default)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +4 -0
index 9950bb0cbd52..db8d27e3fb1c 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -385,6 +386,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
+
 	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
 	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
 		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +1 -0
index 4061de10cea6..4512b582d50f 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, · line 983

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +2 -0
@@ -978,6 +979,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		__kpti_forced = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF) {
+		str = "cpu_spec_mitigations=off";

Might also be worth changing the initialisation of str, currently it is:

Quoted 4 lines

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, · line 984

Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0 -0
 	char const *str = "command line option";

But now we have two command line options, perhaps "kpti command line option".

Yes, agreed, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#30 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 5/5] arm64/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

Hi Josh,

Quoted 4 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown and Speculative Store Bypass.

Quoted 8 lines

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 4 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  | 6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

Just wanted to make you aware that this is probably going to conflict badly with some patches we have pending to hook up the sysfs entries:

http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2019-March/640326.html

That patch series isn't quite there yet, so I'm expecting a v7, but I think it will change the shape of this patch quite a lot.

Will

reviewer
#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 53 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 52 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 15 +++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h              |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 32 ++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                        |  2 ++
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                             |  4 ++-
 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +15 -0
index ac42e510bd6e..29dc03971630 100644
@@ -2552,6 +2552,11 @@
 
 			off
 				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [x86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86]
+					       l1tf=off [x86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
@@ -2560,12 +2565,22 @@
 				surprised by SMT getting disabled across kernel
 				upgrades, or who have other ways of avoiding
 				SMT-based attacks.
+				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       l1tf=flush [x86]
 
 			auto,nosmt
 				Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
 				disabling SMT if needed.  This is for users who
 				always want to be fully mitigated, even if it
 				means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       l1tf=flush,nosmt [x86]
 
Quoted 4 lines

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 2586

Quoted 2 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0 -0
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this

Yap, those sets look ok.

nit: s/x86/X86/g
according to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst

Signature · 1 line
~Randy
maintainer
#5 lore raw
In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 3 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

In your scenario, the fact that it's so easy to remember would save the day, since you wouldn't have to go look up some obscure shortened option name in the documentation :-)

No no, the idea is for the short option to be memorable.

Quoted 2 lines

Suggestions are welcome but I couldn't come up with a reasonable shorter option.

Same here.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
maintainer
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 2 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

My thinking was that the individual options could be used to override the global option. But maybe that's overkill? I dunno.

You mean if the user deliberately types:

"cpu_spec_mitigations=off spectre_v2=auto"

on the cmdline to turn off all and then enable only one?

Hmm, yap, sounds like an overkill to me. Then I'd probably do:

	pr_err("Make up your mind already!\n");
	return;

:-))

I'd say let's do the simpler and cleaner thing now and think about supporting this overkill when it really turns out that it is needed.

Quoted 1 line

I assume you mean just the part where L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT is added?

Yap.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Randy Dunlap
Quoted 54 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 53 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 52 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 15 +++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h              |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 32 ++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                        |  2 ++
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                             |  4 ++-
 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +15 -0
index ac42e510bd6e..29dc03971630 100644
@@ -2552,6 +2552,11 @@
 
 			off
 				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [x86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86]
+					       l1tf=off [x86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
@@ -2560,12 +2565,22 @@
 				surprised by SMT getting disabled across kernel
 				upgrades, or who have other ways of avoiding
 				SMT-based attacks.
+				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       l1tf=flush [x86]
 
 			auto,nosmt
 				Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
 				disabling SMT if needed.  This is for users who
 				always want to be fully mitigated, even if it
 				means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       l1tf=flush,nosmt [x86]
 
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 2586

Quoted 2 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0 -0
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this

Yap, those sets look ok.

nit: s/x86/X86/g
according to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst

Ah, I didn't realize I was conforming to a standard. I will update the other arch strings as well. Thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Josh
maintainer
#6 lore raw
In reply to Borislav Petkov

Thinking about this more, we can shave off the first 4 chars and have it be:

spec_mitigations=

I think it is painfully clear which speculation mitigations we mean. And the other switches don't have "cpu_" prefixes too so...

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#31 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 5/5] arm64/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Will Deacon
Quoted 16 lines · Will Deacon

Hi Josh,

Quoted 4 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown and Speculative Store Bypass.

Quoted 8 lines

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 4 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  | 6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
Quoted 7 lines

Just wanted to make you aware that this is probably going to conflict badly with some patches we have pending to hook up the sysfs entries:

http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2019-March/640326.html

That patch series isn't quite there yet, so I'm expecting a v7, but I think it will change the shape of this patch quite a lot.

Thanks for the heads up Will. I will drop the arm64 patch for now then.

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 12 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

My thinking was that the individual options could be used to override the global option. But maybe that's overkill? I dunno.

You mean if the user deliberately types:

"cpu_spec_mitigations=off spectre_v2=auto"

on the cmdline to turn off all and then enable only one?

Hmm, yap, sounds like an overkill to me. Then I'd probably do:

Quoted 7 lines
	pr_err("Make up your mind already!\n");
	return;

:-))

I'd say let's do the simpler and cleaner thing now and think about supporting this overkill when it really turns out that it is needed.

Fair enough.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

I assume you mean just the part where L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT is added?

Yap.

Ok.

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#7 lore raw
In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov

Thinking about this more, we can shave off the first 4 chars and have it be:

spec_mitigations=

I think it is painfully clear which speculation mitigations we mean. And the other switches don't have "cpu_" prefixes too so...

Sure, I'm ok with renaming it to that, if there are no objections.

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#8 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov

Thinking about this more, we can shave off the first 4 chars and have it be:

spec_mitigations=

I think it is painfully clear which speculation mitigations we mean. And the other switches don't have "cpu_" prefixes too so...

Sure, I'm ok with renaming it to that, if there are no objections.

What about when we have a mitigation for a non-speculation related bug :)

mitigations=xxx

?

cheers

reviewer Acked-by on v1 3/5
#24 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 3/5] powerpc/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 18 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++----
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                  | 6 +++---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                  | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0 -0
index 29dc03971630..0e8eae1e8a25 100644

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 2557

Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -1
@@ -2552,10 +2552,11 @@
 
 			off
 				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
-				Equivalent to: nopti [x86]
+				Equivalent to: nopti [x86, powerpc]
+					       nospectre_v1 [powerpc]
 					       nospectre_v2 [x86]

Not sure if you meant to omit powerpc from nospectre_v2?

You have patched it in the code below.

Quoted 29 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -3
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=off [x86]
 
 			auto (default)
@@ -2568,7 +2569,7 @@
 				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=flush [x86]
 
 			auto,nosmt
@@ -2579,7 +2580,7 @@
 				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=flush,nosmt [x86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +0 -0
index b33bafb8fcea..5aed4ad729ba 100644

arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c void setup_barrier_nospec(void) · line 61

Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +1 -1
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
 	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
 		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
 
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
 		enable_barrier_nospec(enable);

Adding a wrapper func that checks for CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF would make these a little less verbose, eg:

	if (!no_nospec && !cpu_spec_mitigations_off())

enable_barrier_nospec(enable);

But that's a nitpick.

Quoted 23 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +2 -2
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
 {
-	if (no_spectrev2)
+	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
 		do_btb_flush_fixups();
 	else
 		btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
 
 	stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
 
-	if (!no_stf_barrier)
+	if (!no_stf_barrier && cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
 		stf_barrier_enable(enable);
 }
 
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +0 -0
index ba404dd9ce1d..d9d796a66a79 100644

arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable) · line 937

Quoted 7 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +1 -1
@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
 
 	enabled_flush_types = types;
 
-	if (!no_rfi_flush)
+	if (!no_rfi_flush || cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
 		rfi_flush_enable(enable);
 }

LGTM.

cheers

maintainer
#9 lore raw
In reply to Michael Ellerman
Quoted 1 line · Michael Ellerman

What about when we have a mitigation for a non-speculation related bug :)

Like that is *ever* going to happen... :-P

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#10 lore raw
In reply to Michael Ellerman
Quoted 6 lines · Michael Ellerman
Quoted 4 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 3 lines · Borislav Petkov

Thinking about this more, we can shave off the first 4 chars and have it be:

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

spec_mitigations=

I think it is painfully clear which speculation mitigations we mean. And the other switches don't have "cpu_" prefixes too so...

Sure, I'm ok with renaming it to that, if there are no objections.

What about when we have a mitigation for a non-speculation related bug :)

Those kind of silicon bugs are usually mitigated unconditionally.

Thanks,

tglx

#25 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 3/5] powerpc/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

In reply to Michael Ellerman
Quoted 29 lines · Michael Ellerman
Quoted 18 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++----
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                  | 6 +++---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                  | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0 -0
index 29dc03971630..0e8eae1e8a25 100644

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 2557

Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -1
@@ -2552,10 +2552,11 @@
 
 			off
 				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
-				Equivalent to: nopti [x86]
+				Equivalent to: nopti [x86, powerpc]
+					       nospectre_v1 [powerpc]
 					       nospectre_v2 [x86]

Not sure if you meant to omit powerpc from nospectre_v2?

Quoted 1 line

You have patched it in the code below.

Oops. I'll update the documentation.

Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 29 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -3
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=off [x86]
 
 			auto (default)
@@ -2568,7 +2569,7 @@
 				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=flush [x86]
 
 			auto,nosmt
@@ -2579,7 +2580,7 @@
 				Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2=auto [x86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86, powerpc]
 					       l1tf=flush,nosmt [x86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +0 -0
index b33bafb8fcea..5aed4ad729ba 100644

arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c void setup_barrier_nospec(void) · line 61

Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +1 -1
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
 	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
 		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
 
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
 		enable_barrier_nospec(enable);

Adding a wrapper func that checks for CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF would make these a little less verbose, eg:

Quoted 4 lines
	if (!no_nospec && !cpu_spec_mitigations_off())

enable_barrier_nospec(enable);

But that's a nitpick.

Yes, that would be much nicer. I'll probably do something like that in the next version. Thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#11 lore raw
In reply to Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 9 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 8 lines · Michael Ellerman
Quoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov

Thinking about this more, we can shave off the first 4 chars and have it be:

spec_mitigations=

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I think it is painfully clear which speculation mitigations we mean. And the other switches don't have "cpu_" prefixes too so...

Sure, I'm ok with renaming it to that, if there are no objections.

What about when we have a mitigation for a non-speculation related bug :)

Those kind of silicon bugs are usually mitigated unconditionally.

Right.

But at least "mitigations=" is nice and short. We could clarify in the documentation that it doesn't apply to *all* mitigations, only the ones which are optional and which can affect performance.

And it would give us the freedom to include any future "optional" mitigations, spec or not.

I kind of like it. But I could go either way.

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#13 lore raw
In reply to Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 9 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 8 lines · Michael Ellerman
Quoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov

Thinking about this more, we can shave off the first 4 chars and have it be:

spec_mitigations=

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I think it is painfully clear which speculation mitigations we mean. And the other switches don't have "cpu_" prefixes too so...

Sure, I'm ok with renaming it to that, if there are no objections.

What about when we have a mitigation for a non-speculation related bug :)

Those kind of silicon bugs are usually mitigated unconditionally.

I guess that's true, usually :)

cheers

#12 lore raw
In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 21 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 9 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 8 lines · Michael Ellerman
Quoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov

Thinking about this more, we can shave off the first 4 chars and have it be:

spec_mitigations=

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I think it is painfully clear which speculation mitigations we mean. And the other switches don't have "cpu_" prefixes too so...

Sure, I'm ok with renaming it to that, if there are no objections.

What about when we have a mitigation for a non-speculation related bug :)

Those kind of silicon bugs are usually mitigated unconditionally.

Right.

Quoted 8 lines

But at least "mitigations=" is nice and short. We could clarify in the documentation that it doesn't apply to *all* mitigations, only the ones which are optional and which can affect performance.

And it would give us the freedom to include any future "optional" mitigations, spec or not.

I kind of like it. But I could go either way.

Some of the published SMT attacks are not speculation based.

And arguably we already have an optional mitigation for those, ie. nosmt.

cheers