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cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

PATCH In review Josh Poimboeuf 8 participants 25 messages Apr 12, 2019 – May 3, 2019

Subsystems (9)
Documentation x86 PowerPC arm64 +5 more subsystems
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#0 lore raw

v2 cover cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

v2:
- docs improvements: [Randy, Michael]
- Rename to "mitigations=" [Michael]
- Add cpu_mitigations_off() function wrapper [Michael]
- x86: Simplify logic [Boris]
- powerpc: Fix no_rfi_flush checking bug (use '&&' instead of '||')
- arm64: Rebase onto Jeremy Linton's v7 patches [Will]
- arm64: "kpti command line option" [Steve P]
- arm64: Add nospectre_v2 support

-----------

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Josh Poimboeuf (5):
cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                |  6 +++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                |  8 ++++-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                |  6 ++--
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c              |  3 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 11 ++++--
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                             |  4 ++-
 include/linux/cpu.h                           | 24 +++++++++++++
 kernel/cpu.c                                  | 15 ++++++++
 10 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/5 cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do anything. They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.

---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                           | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/cpu.c                                  | 15 ++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +24 -0
index faafdc59104a..3ea92e075c64 100644
@@ -2544,6 +2544,30 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
+			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
+			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
+			options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				This is the default behavior.
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
+				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
include/linux/cpu.h +24 -0
index ae99dde02320..5350357dfbdb 100644
@@ -188,4 +188,28 @@ static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * These are used for a global "mitigations=" cmdline option for toggling
+ * optional CPU mitigations.
+ */
+enum cpu_mitigations {
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT,
+};
+
+extern enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations;
+
+/* mitigations=off */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_off(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+}
+
+/* mitigations=auto,nosmt */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+}
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
kernel/cpu.c +15 -0
index 38890f62f9a8..aed9083f8eac 100644
@@ -2320,3 +2320,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 #endif
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
+
+enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init mitigations_cmdline(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mitigations", mitigations_cmdline);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/5 x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 +++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 11 +++++++++--
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                               |  4 +++-
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +11 -5
index 3ea92e075c64..3e33bd03441a 100644
@@ -2545,15 +2545,20 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
-			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
-			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
-			options.
+			[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
 			off
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2561,12 +2566,13 @@
 				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
 				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
 				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
-				This is the default behavior.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
 
 			auto,nosmt
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
 				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
 				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +9 -2
index 2da82eff0eb4..8043a21f36be 100644
@@ -440,7 +440,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -672,7 +673,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
@@ -1008,6 +1010,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
 		return;
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
 	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
arch/x86/mm/pti.c +3 -1
index 5d27172c683f..9c2463bc158f 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
 		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
 		return;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#7 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/5 powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++----
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                  | 6 +++---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                  | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5 -4
index 3e33bd03441a..a03ab62b69af 100644
@@ -2545,7 +2545,7 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			[X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU
 			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
@@ -2554,10 +2554,11 @@
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
-				Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86]
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +3 -3
index b33bafb8fcea..70568ccbd9fd 100644
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
 	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
 		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
 
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
 }
 
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
 {
-	if (no_spectrev2)
+	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
 		do_btb_flush_fixups();
 	else
 		btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
 
 	stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
 
-	if (!no_stf_barrier)
+	if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		stf_barrier_enable(enable);
 }
 
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +1 -1
index ba404dd9ce1d..4f49e1a3594c 100644
@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
 
 	enabled_flush_types = types;
 
-	if (!no_rfi_flush)
+	if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		rfi_flush_enable(enable);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#9 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/5 s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

Configure s390 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Spectre v1 and Spectre v2.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++--
 arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c                | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -2
index a03ab62b69af..e84a01d90e92 100644
@@ -2545,7 +2545,7 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
 			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
@@ -2556,7 +2556,8 @@
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
 					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC]
+					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c +2 -1
index bdddaae96559..649135cbedd5 100644
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 static int __init nobp_setup_early(char *str)
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ early_param("nospectre_v2", nospectre_v2_setup_early);
 
 void __init nospec_auto_detect(void)
 {
-	if (test_facility(156)) {
+	if (test_facility(156) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		/*
 		 * The machine supports etokens.
 		 * Disable expolines and disable nobp.
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#11 lore raw

PATCH v2 5/5 arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:

      https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 6 +++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  | 8 +++++++-
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5 -3
index e84a01d90e92..79bfc755defe 100644
@@ -2545,8 +2545,8 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
-			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
+			CPU vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
@@ -2555,11 +2555,13 @@
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       kpti=0 [ARM64]
 					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
 					       nobp=0 [S390]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +5 -1
index a1f3188c7be0..65bcd7f0cca1 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -405,6 +406,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		this_cpu_safe = true;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
+
 	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
 		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
 		if (!this_cpu_safe)
@@ -599,7 +603,7 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 	}
 
 	/* forced off */
-	if (__nospectre_v2) {
+	if (__nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
 		__hardenbp_enab = false;
 		return false;
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +7 -1
index 6b7e1556460a..d826b17f7820 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
@@ -966,7 +967,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_TSV110),
 		{ /* sentinel */ }
 	};
-	char const *str = "command line option";
+	char const *str = "kpti command line option";
 	bool meltdown_safe;
 
 	meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
@@ -988,6 +989,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		__kpti_forced = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off() && !__kpti_forced) {
+		str = "mitigations=off";
+		__kpti_forced = -1;
+	}
+
 	/* Useful for KASLR robustness */
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) && kaslr_offset() > 0) {
 		if (!__kpti_forced) {
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
reviewer
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Quoted 36 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:

      https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 6 +++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  | 8 +++++++-
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -2
index e84a01d90e92..79bfc755defe 100644
@@ -2545,8 +2545,8 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
-			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
+			CPU vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
@@ -2555,11 +2555,13 @@
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       kpti=0 [ARM64]

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 2567

Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -1
 					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
 					       nobp=0 [S390]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)

Hi,
Do we need to add "ARM64" to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst?

Signature · 1 line
~Randy
#13 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

Add ARM64 to the legend of architectures. It's already used in several places in kernel-parameters.txt.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst +1 -0
index b8d0bc07ed0a..0124980dca2d 100644
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ parameter is applicable::
 	APIC	APIC support is enabled.
 	APM	Advanced Power Management support is enabled.
 	ARM	ARM architecture is enabled.
+	ARM64	ARM64 architecture is enabled.
 	AX25	Appropriate AX.25 support is enabled.
 	CLK	Common clock infrastructure is enabled.
 	CMA	Contiguous Memory Area support is enabled.
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
reviewer
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

Quoted 15 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Add ARM64 to the legend of architectures. It's already used in several places in kernel-parameters.txt.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst +0 -0
index b8d0bc07ed0a..0124980dca2d 100644

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst parameter is applicable:: · line 94

Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst +1 -0
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ parameter is applicable::
 	APIC	APIC support is enabled.
 	APM	Advanced Power Management support is enabled.
 	ARM	ARM architecture is enabled.
+	ARM64	ARM64 architecture is enabled.
 	AX25	Appropriate AX.25 support is enabled.
 	CLK	Common clock infrastructure is enabled.
 	CMA	Contiguous Memory Area support is enabled.

Thanks.

Signature · 1 line
~Randy
Tested-by Reviewed-by on the v2 series
#24 lore raw
In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 39 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

v2:
- docs improvements: [Randy, Michael]
- Rename to "mitigations=" [Michael]
- Add cpu_mitigations_off() function wrapper [Michael]
- x86: Simplify logic [Boris]
- powerpc: Fix no_rfi_flush checking bug (use '&&' instead of '||')
- arm64: Rebase onto Jeremy Linton's v7 patches [Will]
- arm64: "kpti command line option" [Steve P]
- arm64: Add nospectre_v2 support

-----------

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Quoted 6 lines

Josh Poimboeuf (5):
cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Thanks,

Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
maintainer
#2 lore raw
In reply to Josh Poimboeuf

kernel/cpu.c void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void) · line 2326

Quoted 12 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
kernel/cpu.c +4 -0
index 38890f62f9a8..aed9083f8eac 100644
@@ -2320,3 +2320,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 #endif
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
+
+enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init mitigations_cmdline(char *arg)

Forgot the verb: "mitigations_parse_cmdline".

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#3 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · Borislav Petkov

kernel/cpu.c void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void) · line 2326

Quoted 12 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
kernel/cpu.c +4 -0
index 38890f62f9a8..aed9083f8eac 100644
@@ -2320,3 +2320,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 #endif
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
+
+enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init mitigations_cmdline(char *arg)

Forgot the verb: "mitigations_parse_cmdline".

Sure.

kernel/cpu.c +2 -2
index aed9083f8eac..cf9fea42d8fc 100644
@@ -2323,7 +2323,7 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 
 enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
 
-static int __init mitigations_cmdline(char *arg)
+static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
 {
 	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
 		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
@@ -2334,4 +2334,4 @@ static int __init mitigations_cmdline(char *arg)
 
 	return 0;
 }
-early_param("mitigations", mitigations_cmdline);
+early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);
#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 10 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:

      https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te merge window.

Thanks,

tglx

#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Quoted 13 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 10 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:

      https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Quoted 4 lines

So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te merge window.

Sounds good to me (though I guess it's up to the arm64 maintainers how they want to handle the dependencies).

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

In reply to Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 13 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 10 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:

      https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Quoted 4 lines

So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te merge window.

Yes, that would work for us, cheers. I should get to Jeremy's latest version next week and I'm certainly planning to get them queued up for 5.2.

Will

#4 lore raw
In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option
Commit-ID:  98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429
Author:     Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:28 -0500
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CommitDate: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 21:37:28 +0200

cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do anything. They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc "H . Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Jon Masters <[email protected]>
Cc Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
Cc Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc Steven Price <[email protected]>
Cc Phil Auld <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                             | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/cpu.c                                    | 15 +++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +24 -0
index 858b6c0b9a15..720ffa9c4e04 100644
@@ -2513,6 +2513,30 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
+			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
+			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
+			options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				This is the default behavior.
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
+				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
include/linux/cpu.h +24 -0
index 5041357d0297..2d9c6f4b78f5 100644
@@ -187,4 +187,28 @@ static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * These are used for a global "mitigations=" cmdline option for toggling
+ * optional CPU mitigations.
+ */
+enum cpu_mitigations {
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT,
+};
+
+extern enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations;
+
+/* mitigations=off */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_off(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+}
+
+/* mitigations=auto,nosmt */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+}
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
kernel/cpu.c +15 -0
index d1c6d152da89..e70a90634b41 100644
@@ -2279,3 +2279,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 #endif
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
+
+enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);
#6 lore raw

[tip:core/speculation] x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
Commit-ID:  d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812
Author:     Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:29 -0500
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CommitDate: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 21:37:28 +0200

x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc "H . Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Jon Masters <[email protected]>
Cc Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
Cc Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc Steven Price <[email protected]>
Cc Phil Auld <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 +++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 11 +++++++++--
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                               |  4 +++-
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +11 -5
index 720ffa9c4e04..779ddeb2929c 100644
@@ -2514,15 +2514,20 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
-			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
-			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
-			options.
+			[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
 			off
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2530,12 +2535,13 @@
 				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
 				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
 				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
-				This is the default behavior.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
 
 			auto,nosmt
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
 				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
 				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +9 -2
index 01874d54f4fd..435c078c2948 100644
@@ -440,7 +440,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -672,7 +673,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
@@ -996,6 +998,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
 		return;
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
 	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
arch/x86/mm/pti.c +3 -1
index 4fee5c3003ed..5890f09bfc19 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
 		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
 		return;
#8 lore raw

[tip:core/speculation] powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
Commit-ID:  782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9
Author:     Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:30 -0500
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CommitDate: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 21:37:29 +0200

powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc "H . Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Jon Masters <[email protected]>
Cc Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
Cc Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc Steven Price <[email protected]>
Cc Phil Auld <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++----
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                  | 6 +++---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                  | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5 -4
index 779ddeb2929c..ac7150a25a7a 100644
@@ -2514,7 +2514,7 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			[X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU
 			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
@@ -2523,10 +2523,11 @@
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
-				Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86]
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +3 -3
index 9b8631533e02..cdf3e73000e9 100644
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
 	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
 		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
 
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
 }
 
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
 {
-	if (no_spectrev2)
+	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
 		do_btb_flush_fixups();
 	else
 		btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
 
 	stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
 
-	if (!no_stf_barrier)
+	if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		stf_barrier_enable(enable);
 }
 
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +1 -1
index 236c1151a3a7..c7ec27ba8926 100644
@@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
 
 	enabled_flush_types = types;
 
-	if (!no_rfi_flush)
+	if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		rfi_flush_enable(enable);
 }
 
#10 lore raw

[tip:core/speculation] s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
Commit-ID:  0336e04a6520bdaefdb0769d2a70084fa52e81ed
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/0336e04a6520bdaefdb0769d2a70084fa52e81ed
Author:     Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:31 -0500
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CommitDate: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 21:37:29 +0200

s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Configure s390 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Spectre v1 and Spectre v2.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc "H . Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Jon Masters <[email protected]>
Cc Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
Cc Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc Steven Price <[email protected]>
Cc Phil Auld <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++--
 arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c                | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -2
index ac7150a25a7a..1ae93872b79f 100644
@@ -2514,7 +2514,7 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
 			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
@@ -2525,7 +2525,8 @@
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
 					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC]
+					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c +2 -1
index bdddaae96559..649135cbedd5 100644
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 static int __init nobp_setup_early(char *str)
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ early_param("nospectre_v2", nospectre_v2_setup_early);
 
 void __init nospec_auto_detect(void)
 {
-	if (test_facility(156)) {
+	if (test_facility(156) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		/*
 		 * The machine supports etokens.
 		 * Disable expolines and disable nobp.
#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

In reply to Thomas Gleixner

Hi Thomas,

Quoted 13 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 10 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:

      https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Quoted 4 lines

So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te merge window.

I'm assuming that this refers to the core/speculation branch in tip:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/log/?h=core/speculation

but please can you confirm that I'm good to pull that into arm64?

Cheers,

Will

#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Quoted 21 lines · Will Deacon

Hi Thomas,

Quoted 13 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 10 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

---
NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:

      https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Quoted 4 lines

So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te merge window.

Quoted 5 lines

I'm assuming that this refers to the core/speculation branch in tip:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/log/?h=core/speculation

but please can you confirm that I'm good to pull that into arm64?

Yes. It's all yours :)

Thanks,

tglx

maintainer
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · On Fri, 12 Apr 2019 22:56:21 -0500 Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> wrote:

Add ARM64 to the legend of architectures. It's already used in several places in kernel-parameters.txt.

It looks like nobody has picked this up...so I've applied it.

Thanks,

jon

#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

Quoted 10 lines · Jonathan Corbet
Quoted 5 lines · On Fri, 12 Apr 2019 22:56:21 -0500 Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> wrote:

Add ARM64 to the legend of architectures. It's already used in several places in kernel-parameters.txt.

It looks like nobody has picked this up...so I've applied it.

It's queued and tagged in the arm64 tree, which should also be in next!

Will

maintainer
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

Quoted 3 lines · On Fri, 3 May 2019 13:39:40 +0100 Will Deacon <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line

It looks like nobody has picked this up...so I've applied it.

It's queued and tagged in the arm64 tree, which should also be in next!

Just looked again, I still don't see it there. Josh's mitigations= change is there, but not this one. In any case, I've unapplied it, so it's all yours.

Thanks,

jon

#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

Quoted 10 lines · Jonathan Corbet
Quoted 3 lines · On Fri, 3 May 2019 13:39:40 +0100 Will Deacon <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line

It looks like nobody has picked this up...so I've applied it.

It's queued and tagged in the arm64 tree, which should also be in next!

Just looked again, I still don't see it there. Josh's mitigations= change is there, but not this one. In any case, I've unapplied it, so it's all yours.

Weird... I see it in -next as 4ad499c94264:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=4ad499c94264a2ee05aacc518b9bde658318e510

Will