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PATCH New Armin Kuster 1 participant 11 messages Oct 8, 2019 Arm/Amlogic Meson SoC support

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#0 lore raw

cover Pull request

Please merge these into warrior mainline

Included 2 additional backport requests.

The following changes since commit acc0f4a6a99fe9367e57a5c2a4f995b6f4db4a9f:

runqemu: Add support for kvm on aarch64 (2019-10-01 10:48:46 +0100)

are available in the git repository at:

git://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/warrior-next
http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/warrior-next

Adrian Bunk (1):
json-c: Don't --enable-rdrand

Alexander Kanavin (1):
python: update to 3.7.3

Andrii Bordunov via Openembedded-core (1):
classes/image-live.bbclass: Don't hardcode cpio.gz

Anuj Mittal (1):
python3: upgrade 3.7.3 -> 3.7.4

Armin Kuster (1):
qemu: fix build issue on new hosts with glibc 2.30

Dan Tran (2):
qemu: Fix CVE-2019-8934
unzip: Fix CVE-2019-13232

Jan Klare (1):
systemd: update SRCREV for systemd v241-stable

Michael Halstead (1):
uninative: Update to 2.7 release

Ricardo Ribalda Delgado (1):
meson: Fix native patch to python3

 meta/classes/image-live.bbclass                    |   2 +-
 meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc       |  10 +-
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd.inc              |   2 +-
 meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.13.1.bb      |   2 -
 .../meson/meson/0003-native_bindir.patch           |   2 +-
 ...ysconfig-append-STAGING_LIBDIR-python-sys.patch |   2 +-
 ...2-distutils-prefix-is-inside-staging-area.patch |   2 +-
 .../python/python3/CVE-2018-20852.patch            | 124 -------
 .../python/python3/CVE-2019-9636.patch             | 154 ---------
 .../python/python3/CVE-2019-9740.patch             | 151 ---------
 .../python/{python3_3.7.2.bb => python3_3.7.4.bb}  |   9 +-
 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc                |   3 +
 ...nux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch |  49 +++
 ...rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch |  95 ++++++
 .../recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch | 215 +++++++++++++
 .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch            |  33 ++
 .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch            | 356 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch            | 121 +++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb           |   3 +
 19 files changed, 888 insertions(+), 447 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2018-20852.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2019-9636.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2019-9740.patch
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/python/{python3_3.7.2.bb => python3_3.7.4.bb} (97%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/10 python: update to 3.7.3

From: Alexander Kanavin <[email protected]>

License-update: copyright years

[ Backported patches removed. ]
[Bug fix only update]
---
 ...ysconfig-append-STAGING_LIBDIR-python-sys.patch |   2 +-
 ...2-distutils-prefix-is-inside-staging-area.patch |   2 +-
 .../python/python3/CVE-2018-20852.patch            | 124 -----------------
 .../python/python3/CVE-2019-9636.patch             | 154 ---------------------
 .../python/{python3_3.7.2.bb => python3_3.7.3.bb}  |   8 +-
 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 285 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2018-20852.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2019-9636.patch
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/python/{python3_3.7.2.bb => python3_3.7.3.bb} (97%)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/0001-distutils-sysconfig-append-STAGING_LIBDIR-python-sys.patch +1 -1
index 8083345..1741f57 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 4865615a2bc2b78c739e4c33f536712c7f9af061 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 17796e353acf08acd604610f34840a4a9d2f4b54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Alexander Kanavin <[email protected]>
 Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 16:46:30 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] distutils/sysconfig: append
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/12-distutils-prefix-is-inside-staging-area.patch +1 -1
index dcc0932..3521317 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 1397979ee445ff6826aa5469511e003539f77bb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 12900d498bb77bcc990868a80eaf0ab257b88fff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
 Date: Tue, 14 May 2013 15:00:26 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH] python3: Add target and native recipes
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2018-20852.patch deleted +0 -124

124 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2019-9636.patch deleted +0 -154

154 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.7.3.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.7.2.bb +3 -5
similarity index 97%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.7.2.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.7.3.bb
index 6da806b..1f1441f 100644
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ HOMEPAGE = "http://www.python.org"
 LICENSE = "PSFv2"
 SECTION = "devel/python"
 
-LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=f257cc14f81685691652a3d3e1b5d754"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=e466242989bd33c1bd2b6a526a742498"
 
 SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://run-ptest \
@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://0002-Don-t-do-runtime-test-to-get-float-byte-order.patch \
            file://0003-setup.py-pass-missing-libraries-to-Extension-for-mul.patch \
            file://0001-Lib-sysconfig.py-fix-another-place-where-lib-is-hard.patch \
-           file://CVE-2018-20852.patch \
-           file://CVE-2019-9636.patch \
            file://CVE-2019-9740.patch \
            "
 
@@ -35,8 +33,8 @@ SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
            file://0001-main.c-if-OEPYTHON3HOME-is-set-use-instead-of-PYTHON.patch \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "df6ec36011808205beda239c72f947cb"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d83fe8ce51b1bb48bbcf0550fd265b9a75cdfdfa93f916f9e700aef8444bf1bb"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "93df27aec0cd18d6d42173e601ffbbfd"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "da60b54064d4cfcd9c26576f6df2690e62085123826cff2e667e72a91952d318"
 
 # exclude pre-releases for both python 2.x and 3.x
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "[Pp]ython-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+).tar"
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/10 python3: upgrade 3.7.3 -> 3.7.4

In reply to Armin Kuster

From: Anuj Mittal <[email protected]>

Also fixes CVE-2019-9740, CVE-2019-9948. For details, see:

https://docs.python.org/3.7/whatsnew/changelog.html#python-3-7-4-final

[ Backported patch removed. ]
[Bug fix only update]
---
 .../python/python3/CVE-2019-9740.patch             | 151 ---------------------
 .../python/{python3_3.7.3.bb => python3_3.7.4.bb}  |   5 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2019-9740.patch
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/python/{python3_3.7.3.bb => python3_3.7.4.bb} (98%)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2019-9740.patch deleted +0 -151
deleted file mode 100644
index 9bb336d..0000000
@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
-From 7e200e0763f5b71c199aaf98bd5588f291585619 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Miro=20Hron=C4=8Dok?= <[email protected]>
-Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 17:28:47 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] bpo-30458: Disallow control chars in http URLs. (GH-12755)
- (GH-13154)
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Disallow control chars in http URLs in urllib.urlopen.  This addresses a potential security problem for applications that do not sanity check their URLs where http request headers could be injected.
-
-Disable https related urllib tests on a build without ssl (GH-13032)
-These tests require an SSL enabled build. Skip these tests when python is built without SSL to fix test failures.
-
-Use http.client.InvalidURL instead of ValueError as the new error case's exception. (GH-13044)
-
-Backport Co-Authored-By: Miro Hrončok <[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/7e200e0763f5b71c199aaf98bd5588f291585619]
-CVE: CVE-2019-9740
-CVE: CVE-2019-9947
-Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <[email protected]>
----
- Lib/http/client.py                            | 15 ++++++
- Lib/test/test_urllib.py                       | 53 +++++++++++++++++++
- Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py                       |  7 ++-
- .../2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst  |  1 +
- 4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst
-
-diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
-index 1de151c38e92..2afd452fe30f 100644
---- a/Lib/http/client.py
-+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
-@@ -140,6 +140,16 @@
- _is_legal_header_name = re.compile(rb'[^:\s][^:\r\n]*').fullmatch
- _is_illegal_header_value = re.compile(rb'\n(?![ \t])|\r(?![ \t\n])').search
- 
-+# These characters are not allowed within HTTP URL paths.
-+#  See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.3 and the
-+#  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#appendix-A pchar definition.
-+# Prevents CVE-2019-9740.  Includes control characters such as \r\n.
-+# We don't restrict chars above \x7f as putrequest() limits us to ASCII.
-+_contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x20\x7f]')
-+# Arguably only these _should_ allowed:
-+#  _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$")
-+# We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes.
-+
- # We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some
- # servers will otherwise respond with a 411
- _METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'}
-@@ -1101,6 +1111,11 @@ def putrequest(self, method, url, skip_host=False,
-         self._method = method
-         if not url:
-             url = '/'
-+        # Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
-+        match = _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(url)
-+        if match:
-+            raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {url!r} "
-+                             f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
-         request = '%s %s %s' % (method, url, self._http_vsn_str)
- 
-         # Non-ASCII characters should have been eliminated earlier
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
-index 2ac73b58d832..7214492eca9d 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
-@@ -329,6 +329,59 @@ def test_willclose(self):
-         finally:
-             self.unfakehttp()
- 
-+    @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
-+    def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
-+        for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]:
-+            char = chr(char_no)
-+            schemeless_url = f"//localhost:7777/test{char}/"
-+            self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
-+            try:
-+                # We explicitly test urllib.request.urlopen() instead of the top
-+                # level 'def urlopen()' function defined in this... (quite ugly)
-+                # test suite.  They use different url opening codepaths.  Plain
-+                # urlopen uses FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that
-+                # calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the
-+                # above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe.
-+                escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\')
-+                InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
-+                with self.assertRaisesRegex(
-+                    InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
-+                    urllib.request.urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
-+                with self.assertRaisesRegex(
-+                    InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
-+                    urllib.request.urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
-+                # This code path quotes the URL so there is no injection.
-+                resp = urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
-+                self.assertNotIn(char, resp.geturl())
-+            finally:
-+                self.unfakehttp()
-+
-+    @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
-+    def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
-+        self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
-+        host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123"
-+        schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
-+        try:
-+            # We explicitly test urllib.request.urlopen() instead of the top
-+            # level 'def urlopen()' function defined in this... (quite ugly)
-+            # test suite.  They use different url opening codepaths.  Plain
-+            # urlopen uses FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that
-+            # calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the
-+            # above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe.
-+            InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
-+            with self.assertRaisesRegex(
-+                InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r.*(found at least . .)"):
-+                urllib.request.urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
-+            with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"):
-+                urllib.request.urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
-+            # This code path quotes the URL so there is no injection.
-+            resp = urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
-+            self.assertNotIn(' ', resp.geturl())
-+            self.assertNotIn('\r', resp.geturl())
-+            self.assertNotIn('\n', resp.geturl())
-+        finally:
-+            self.unfakehttp()
-+
-     def test_read_0_9(self):
-         # "0.9" response accepted (but not "simple responses" without
-         # a status line)
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py b/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py
-index 32263f7f0b3b..0e002ec4ef9f 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py
-@@ -945,7 +945,12 @@ def test_unicode_host(self):
-     def test_partial_post(self):
-         # Check that a partial POST doesn't make the server loop: issue #14001.
-         conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(ADDR, PORT)
--        conn.request('POST', '/RPC2 HTTP/1.0\r\nContent-Length: 100\r\n\r\nbye')
-+        conn.send('POST /RPC2 HTTP/1.0\r\n'
-+                  'Content-Length: 100\r\n\r\n'
-+                  'bye HTTP/1.1\r\n'
-+                  f'Host: {ADDR}:{PORT}\r\n'
-+                  'Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n'
-+                  'Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n'.encode('ascii'))
-         conn.close()
- 
-     def test_context_manager(self):
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000000..ed8027fb4d64
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1 @@
-+Address CVE-2019-9740 by disallowing URL paths with embedded whitespace or control characters through into the underlying http client request.  Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause an http.client.InvalidURL exception to be raised.
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.7.4.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.7.3.bb +2 -3
similarity index 98%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.7.3.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.7.4.bb
index 1f1441f..dd16351 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://0002-Don-t-do-runtime-test-to-get-float-byte-order.patch \
            file://0003-setup.py-pass-missing-libraries-to-Extension-for-mul.patch \
            file://0001-Lib-sysconfig.py-fix-another-place-where-lib-is-hard.patch \
-           file://CVE-2019-9740.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI_append_class-native = " \
@@ -33,8 +32,8 @@ SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
            file://0001-main.c-if-OEPYTHON3HOME-is-set-use-instead-of-PYTHON.patch \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "93df27aec0cd18d6d42173e601ffbbfd"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "da60b54064d4cfcd9c26576f6df2690e62085123826cff2e667e72a91952d318"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d33e4aae66097051c2eca45ee3604803"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fb799134b868199930b75f26678f18932214042639cd52b16da7fd134cd9b13f"
 
 # exclude pre-releases for both python 2.x and 3.x
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "[Pp]ython-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+).tar"
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/10 json-c: Don't --enable-rdrand

In reply to Armin Kuster

From: Adrian Bunk <[email protected]>

In recent years AMD CPUs have had various problems with RDRAND giving either non-random data or no result at all, which is problematic if either build or target machine has a CPU with this problem.

The fallback is /dev/urandom, and I'd trust the kernel here.

--enable-rdrand was added in an upgrade to a new upstream version without mentioning any reason.

[YOCTO #13534]

---
 meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.13.1.bb | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.13.1.bb +0 -2
index 5b10e68..e6a3899 100644
@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ RPROVIDES_${PN} = "libjson"
 
 inherit autotools
 
-EXTRA_OECONF = "--enable-rdrand"
-
 do_configure_prepend() {
     # Clean up autoconf cruft that should not be in the tarball
     rm -f ${S}/config.status
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/10 qemu: Fix CVE-2019-8934

In reply to Armin Kuster

From: Dan Tran <[email protected]>

[Fix up against lastest warrior]
---
 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc                |   1 +
 .../recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 216 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +1 -0
index 3de87d3..e720ddf 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2019-3812.patch \
            file://0014-linux-user-fix-to-handle-variably-sized-SIOCGSTAMP-w.patch \
            file://CVE-2018-20815.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-8934.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
 
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch new file +215 -0

215 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/10 unzip: Fix CVE-2019-13232

In reply to Armin Kuster

From: Dan Tran <[email protected]>

---
 .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch            |  33 ++
 .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch            | 356 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch            | 121 +++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb           |   3 +
 4 files changed, 513 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch new file +33 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d485a1b
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 080d52c3c9416c731f637f9c6e003961ef43f079 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 08:20:32 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Fix bug in undefer_input() that misplaced the input
+ state.
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-13232
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/41beb477c5744bc396fa1162ee0c14218ec12213]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <[email protected]>
+---
+ fileio.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c
+index 7605a29..14460f3 100644
+--- a/fileio.c
++++ b/fileio.c
+@@ -532,8 +532,10 @@ void undefer_input(__G)
+          * This condition was checked when G.incnt_leftover was set > 0 in
+          * defer_leftover_input(), and it is NOT allowed to touch G.csize
+          * before calling undefer_input() when (G.incnt_leftover > 0)
+-         * (single exception: see read_byte()'s  "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
++         * (single exception: see readbyte()'s  "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
+          */
++        if (G.csize < 0L)
++            G.csize = 0L;
+         G.incnt = G.incnt_leftover + (int)G.csize;
+         G.inptr = G.inptr_leftover - (int)G.csize;
+         G.incnt_leftover = 0;
+-- 
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +356 -0

356 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +121 -0

121 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb +3 -0
index daba722..c1ea0a9 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/infozip/UnZip%206.x%20%28latest%29/UnZip%206.0/
 	file://symlink.patch \
 	file://0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch \
 	file://CVE-2018-18384.patch \
+	file://CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch \
+	file://CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch \
+	file://CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch \
 "
 UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/10 classes/image-live.bbclass: Don't hardcode cpio.gz

In reply to Armin Kuster

From: Andrii Bordunov via Openembedded-core <[email protected]>

There's INITRAMFS_FSTYPES that can be set differently.

---
 meta/classes/image-live.bbclass | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/classes/image-live.bbclass +1 -1
index af71be5..54058b3 100644
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ do_bootimg[depends] += "dosfstools-native:do_populate_sysroot \
 LABELS_LIVE ?= "boot install"
 ROOT_LIVE ?= "root=/dev/ram0"
 INITRD_IMAGE_LIVE ?= "${MLPREFIX}core-image-minimal-initramfs"
-INITRD_LIVE ?= "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${INITRD_IMAGE_LIVE}-${MACHINE}.cpio.gz"
+INITRD_LIVE ?= "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${INITRD_IMAGE_LIVE}-${MACHINE}.${INITRAMFS_FSTYPES}"
 
 LIVE_ROOTFS_TYPE ?= "ext4"
 ROOTFS ?= "${IMGDEPLOYDIR}/${IMAGE_LINK_NAME}.${LIVE_ROOTFS_TYPE}"
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/10 systemd: update SRCREV for systemd v241-stable

In reply to Armin Kuster

From: Jan Klare <[email protected]>

Currently systemd 241 does break for kernels 5.2+ with the error described here:
* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/12784

The issue has been fixed in master and will be fixed in the release 243. The necessary patches have been backported to systemd/systemd-stable in the branch v241-stable, but currently in warrior an old version of that branch is pulled in.

This patch updates the SRCREV to the latest commit from that branch and therefore pulls in the needed fix to run systemd 241 on 5.2+ kernels.

---
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd.inc | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd.inc +1 -1
index 5bd88ed..2b9c291 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ LICENSE = "GPLv2 & LGPLv2.1"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE.GPL2;md5=751419260aa954499f7abaabaa882bbe \
                     file://LICENSE.LGPL2.1;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c"
 
-SRCREV = "c1f8ff8d0de7e303b8004b02a0a47d4cc103a7f8"
+SRCREV = "511646b8ac5c82f210b16920044465756913d238"
 SRCBRANCH = "v241-stable"
 SRC_URI = "git://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable.git;protocol=git;branch=${SRCBRANCH}"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/10 qemu: fix build issue on new hosts with glibc 2.30

In reply to Armin Kuster

This fixes the following error:

TOPDIR/tmp/work/x86_64-linux/qemu-native/3.1.0-r0/qemu-3.1.0/linux-user/syscall.c:254:16: error: static declaration of ‘gettid’ follows non-static declaration
254 | _syscall0(int, gettid)
| ^~~~~~
TOPDIR/tmp/work/x86_64-linux/qemu-native/3.1.0-r0/qemu-3.1.0/linux-user/syscall.c:185:13: note: in definition of macro ‘_syscall0’
185 | static type name (void) \
| ^~~~
In file included from /usr/include/unistd.h:1170,
from TOPDIR/tmp/work/x86_64-linux/qemu-native/3.1.0-r0/qemu-3.1.0/include/qemu/osdep.h:90,
from TOPDIR/tmp/work/x86_64-linux/qemu-native/3.1.0-r0/qemu-3.1.0/linux-user/syscall.c:20:
/usr/include/bits/unistd_ext.h:34:16: note: previous declaration of ‘gettid’ was here
34 | extern __pid_t gettid (void) __THROW;
| ^~~~~~

---
 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc                |  2 +
 ...nux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch | 49 +++++++++++
 ...rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 146 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +2 -0
index e720ddf..40c3174 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://0014-linux-user-fix-to-handle-variably-sized-SIOCGSTAMP-w.patch \
            file://CVE-2018-20815.patch \
            file://CVE-2019-8934.patch \
+           file://0001-linux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch \
+           file://0001-linux-user-rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
 
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch new file +49 -0

49 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch new file +95 -0

95 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/10 meson: Fix native patch to python3

In reply to Armin Kuster

From: Ricardo Ribalda Delgado <[email protected]>

Fixes:

File "/workdir/build/tmp/work/dbfp4-poky-linux/qv4l2/1.17.0+gitAUTOINC+95f39aae48-r0/recipe-sysroot-native/usr/lib/python3.7/site-packages/mesonbuild/dependencies/base.py", line 574, in _call_pkgbin
cache[(self.pkgbin, targs, fenv)] = self._call_pkgbin_real(args, env, use_native)
File "/workdir/build/tmp/work/dbfp4-poky-linux/qv4l2/1.17.0+gitAUTOINC+95f39aae48-r0/recipe-sysroot-native/usr/lib/python3.7/site-packages/mesonbuild/dependencies/base.py", line 556, in _call_pkgbin_real
cmd = self.pkgbin.get_command() + "-native" + args
TypeError: can only concatenate list (not "str") to list

---
 meta/recipes-devtools/meson/meson/0003-native_bindir.patch | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-devtools/meson/meson/0003-native_bindir.patch +1 -1
index da47745..2b22531 100644
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ index 6d3678f..90fdb80 100644
 -        cmd = self.pkgbin.get_command() + args
 +    def _call_pkgbin_real(self, args, env, use_native=False):
 +        if use_native:
-+            cmd = self.pkgbin.get_command() + "-native" + args
++            cmd = [self.pkgbin.get_command()[0] + "-native"] + args
 +        else:
 +            cmd = self.pkgbin.get_command() + args
          p, out = Popen_safe(cmd, env=env)[0:2]
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/10 uninative: Update to 2.7 release

In reply to Armin Kuster

From: Michael Halstead <[email protected]>

The 2.7 release updates glibc to version 2.30. Recently added to openSUSE Tumbleweed and needed for Fedora Core 31.

---
 meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc +5 -5
index df24346..ad75d3e 100644
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
 # to the distro running on the build machine.
 #
 
-UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.29"
+UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.30"
 
-UNINATIVE_URL ?= "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/uninative/2.6/"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "a37118fc8b423f48146120707b81dd15017512c3e8ef9e6ca2cb3a033f4f4046"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "3234fc3ded810225071f23a0e9a99f4f8c2480059945a848eff076ce78122ade"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "133387753a9acf3e1b788103c59fac91e968e2ee331d7a4b9498e926ada7be57"
+UNINATIVE_URL ?= "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/uninative/2.7/"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "e76a45886ee8a0b3904b761c17ac8ff91edf9811ee455f1832d10763ba794dfc"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "810d027dfb1c7675226afbcec07808770516c969ee7378f6d8240281083f8924"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "9498d8bba047499999a7310ac2576d0796461184965351a56f6d32c888a1f216"
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4