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v6 more sampling fun 0

PATCH In review mark gross 3 participants 9 messages Apr 9, 2020 – Apr 12, 2020 1 message not in the archive

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PATCH 1/4 v6 more sampling fun 1

In reply to mark gross

From: mark gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] x86/cpu: Add stepping field to x86_cpu_id structure

Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the stepping must be checked to tell them apart.

On X86 there can be at most 16 steppings, add steppings bitmask to x86_cpu_id and X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro and support for matching against family/model/stepping.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c          |  7 ++++++-
 include/linux/mod_devicetable.h      |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h +23 -3
index cf3d621c6892..d8ecd0d72e04 100644
@@ -21,11 +21,12 @@
 #define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_NANO		0xf
 
 /**
- * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
  * @_vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
  *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor
  * @_family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
  * @_model:	The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @_steppings:	Bitmask for steppings, stepping constant or X86_STEPPING_ANY
  * @_feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
  * @_data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
  *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
@@ -37,15 +38,34 @@
  * into another macro at the usage site for good reasons, then please
  * start this local macro with X86_MATCH to allow easy grepping.
  */
-#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model,	\
-					   _feature, _data) {		\
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
+						    _steppings, _feature, _data) { \
 	.vendor		= X86_VENDOR_##_vendor,				\
 	.family		= _family,					\
 	.model		= _model,					\
+	.steppings	= _steppings,					\
 	.feature	= _feature,					\
 	.driver_data	= (unsigned long) _data				\
 }
 
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
+ * @_vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor
+ * @_family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @_model:	The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @_feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
+ * @_data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * The steppings arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE() is
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, feature, data) \
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, \
+						X86_STEPPING_ANY, feature, data)
+
 /**
  * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE - Macro for matching vendor, family and CPU feature
  * @vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c +6 -1
index d3482eb43ff3..ad6776081e60 100644
@@ -39,13 +39,18 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match)
 	const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
 	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
 
-	for (m = match; m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->feature; m++) {
+	for (m = match;
+	     m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
+	     m++) {
 		if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor)
 			continue;
 		if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family)
 			continue;
 		if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model)
 			continue;
+		if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY &&
+		    !(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings))
+			continue;
 		if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature))
 			continue;
 		return m;
include/linux/mod_devicetable.h +2 -0
index 4c2ddd0941a7..0754b8d71262 100644
@@ -663,6 +663,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
 	__u16 vendor;
 	__u16 family;
 	__u16 model;
+	__u16 steppings;
 	__u16 feature;	/* bit index */
 	kernel_ulong_t driver_data;
 };
@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
 #define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff
 #define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0
 #define X86_MODEL_ANY  0
+#define X86_STEPPING_ANY 0
 #define X86_FEATURE_ANY 0	/* Same as FPU, you can't test for that */
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/4 v6 more sampling fun 2

In reply to mark gross

From: mark gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] x86/cpu: clean up cpu_matches

To make cpu_matches reusable for alternitive matching tables, make cpu_matches take a x86_cpu_id table as a parameter.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +14 -11
index bed0cb83fe24..2bea1cc8dcb4 100644
@@ -1075,9 +1075,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	{}
 };
 
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which, const struct x86_cpu_id *table)
 {
-	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
 
 	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
 }
@@ -1097,31 +1097,34 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 
 	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2))
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
-		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
 	}
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
 
 	/*
@@ -1139,7 +1142,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 		return;
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1148,7 +1151,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/4 v6 more sampling fun 3

In reply to mark gross

From: mark gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] x86/speculation: Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
(SRBDS) mitigation control.

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the RNG across cores and threads. New microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using either mitigations=off or srbds=off.
* export vulnerability status via sysfs
* rename file scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

---
 .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu      |   1 +
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  20 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 116 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  |  43 +++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h                     |   2 +
 drivers/base/cpu.c                            |   8 ++
 8 files changed, 196 insertions(+)
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +1 -0
index 2e0e3b45d02a..b39531a3c5bc 100644
@@ -492,6 +492,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 Date:		January 2018
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +20 -0
index 86aae1fa099a..05817d4f2786 100644
@@ -4753,6 +4753,26 @@
 			the kernel will oops in either "warn" or "fatal"
 			mode.
 
+	srbds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control mitigation for the Special Register
+			Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
+			exploit which can leak bits from the random
+			number generator.
+
+			By default, this issue is mitigated by
+			microcode.  However, the microcode fix can cause
+			the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become
+			much slower.  Among other effects, this will
+			result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom.
+
+			The microcode mitigation can be disabled with
+			the following option:
+
+			off:    Disable mitigation and remove
+				performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED
+
 	srcutree.counter_wrap_check [KNL]
 			Specifies how frequently to check for
 			grace-period sequence counter wrap for the
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -0
index db189945e9b0..02dabc9e77b0 100644
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FSRM		(18*32+ 4) /* Fast Short Rep Mov */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VP2INTERSECT (18*32+ 8) /* AVX-512 Intersect for D/Q */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL		(18*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR		(18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT	(18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
@@ -407,5 +408,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS			X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
 #define X86_BUG_TAA			X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
 #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
+#define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +4 -0
index 12c9684d59ba..3efde600a674 100644
@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@
 #define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE		BIT(0)	/* Disable RTM feature */
 #define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR		BIT(1)	/* Disable TSX enumeration */
 
+/* SRBDS support */
+#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL		0x00000123
+#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS			BIT(0)
+
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS		0x00000174
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP		0x00000175
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP		0x00000176
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +116 -0

150 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +43 -0

61 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +2 -0
index 37fdefd14f28..f3e2fc44dba0 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ struct _tlb_table {
 extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[],
 			    *const __x86_cpu_dev_end[];
 
+void update_srbds_msr(void);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
 enum tsx_ctrl_states {
 	TSX_CTRL_ENABLE,
drivers/base/cpu.c +8 -0
index 9a1c00fbbaef..d2136ab9b14a 100644
@@ -562,6 +562,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev,
+			      struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -570,6 +576,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -580,6 +587,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_mds.attr,
 	&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
 	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
+	&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/4 v6 more sampling fun 4

In reply to mark gross

From: mark gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] x86/speculation: SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation
documentation

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst   |   1 +
 .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +1 -0
index 0795e3c2643f..ca4dbdd9016d 100644
@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    mds
    tsx_async_abort
    multihit.rst
+   special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst new file +148 -0

148 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.1

mark gross

author
#0 lore raw

cover v6 more sampling fun 0

From: mark gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 0/4] v6 more sampling fun

resend because I forgot the --thread option on the format-patch. sorry for the spam

This version of the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling has been updated to address feedback gotten. Including:
* is based on linus/master from this AM.
* cleanups and changes driven by review feedback from Josh and Thomas.
* addresses the case of intel fusing TSX off on lower end SKU's
* spits out some refactoring from the main patch to better isolate the SRBDS specific changes.

Thanks to all who have given me feedback on this.

---

Special Register Buffer Data Sampling is a sampling type of vulnerability that leaks data across cores sharing the HW-RNG for vulnerable processors.

This leak is fixed by a microcode update and is enabled by default.

This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND or RDSEED. It ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for reuse.

The mitigation impacts the throughput of the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions and latency of RT processing running on the socket while executing RDRAND or RDSEED. The micro benchmarks calling RDRAND many times show a slowdown.

This patch set enables kernel command line control of this mitigation and exports vulnerability and mitigation status.
This patch set includes 3 patches:
* The first patch adds steppings to x86_cpu_id structure and related macros
* The second patch enables the command line control of the mitigation as well as the sysfs export of vulnerability status.
* The third patch has the Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln documentation for this issue and the control over the mitigation.

mark gross (4):
x86/cpu: Add stepping field to x86_cpu_id structure x86/cpu: clean up cpu_matches
x86/speculation: Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)
mitigation control.
x86/speculation: SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation

 .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu      |   1 +
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst   |   1 +
 .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  20 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h          |  26 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 116 ++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  |  68 ++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h                     |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c                   |   7 +-
 drivers/base/cpu.c                            |   8 +
 include/linux/mod_devicetable.h               |   2 +
 13 files changed, 390 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/4] v6 more sampling fun 3

Mark,

Quoted 8 lines · speck for mark gross
(quoted diff) +8 -0
+#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(model, steppings, issues)			   \
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE(INTEL, 6,		   \
+					    INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
+					    X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
+
+#define SRBDS	BIT(0)
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {

Review

Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(HASWELL,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(HASWELL_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(HASWELL_G,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(BROADWELL_G,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(BROADWELL,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE_L,	GENMASK(0xC, 0),	SRBDS), /*06_8E steppings <=C*/
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE,		GENMASK(0xD, 0),	SRBDS), /*06_9E steppings <=D*/

Please don't use these horrible tail comments. Also the 06_NN part is of that comment is not helpful either. Please make stuff self explaining, i.e.

#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs) GENMASK(maxs, mins)

and use that in the blacklist:

	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0, 0xC),	SRBDS),
	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0, 0xD),	SRBDS),

which is pretty obvious, right?

Quoted 13 lines

static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which, const struct x86_cpu_id *table) {

(quoted diff) +6 -0
 	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
@@ -1142,6 +1163,27 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
+	if (cpu_matches(SRBDS, cpu_vuln_blacklist)) {
+		/*
+		 * Some parts on the list don't have RDRAND or RDSEED. Make sure
+		 * they show as "Not affected".
+		 */
+		if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) &&

Review static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 1181

Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+		    !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED))
+			goto srbds_not_affected;
+		/*
+		 * Parts that have TSX fused off and are not affected by MDS
+		 * are not affected by SRBDS. TSX_CTRL is only enumerated on
+		 * parts where TSX fused on.
+		 */
+		if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+		    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+			goto srbds_not_affected;

This is confusing vs. the documentation patch:

Review static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 1187

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +6 -0
+  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        0xB only if TSX is enabled
+  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        0xC only if TSX is enabled
+
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        <=B
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        0xC only if TSX is enabled
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        0xD only if TSX is enabled

IOW, this is only true for particular steppings of Kabylake[_L]

It might well be the case that exactly these steppings have MDS_NO and might have TSX fused off, but can we pretty please make this very explicit?

	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xA),	SRBDS),
	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0xB, 0xC),	SRBDS_IF_TSX),
	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xB),	SRBDS),
	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0xC, 0xD),	SRBDS_IF_TSX),

and make the check for SRBDS_IF_TSX & TSX enabled in the code? You surely figure out how to define SRBDS_IF_TSX so the SRBDS match works for both :)

Thanks,

tglx

#8 lore raw

[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 4/4] v6 more sampling fun 4

In reply to a message not in the archive

On Thu, 2020-01-30 at 11:12 -0800, speck for mark gross wrote:
[...]

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +6 -0
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable
+ Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
+ Vulnerable: no microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing

Review

Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+                                mitigation
+ Mitigated                      Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect.
+ Not affected (TSX disabled)    Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
+                                enabled while this system was booted with TSX
+                                disabled.
+ Unknown                        Running on virtual guest processor that is
+                                affected but with no way to know if host
+                                processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================

[...]

The values in this table haven't been updated along with the code.

Ben.

Signature · 2 lines
Ben Hutchings
Knowledge is power.  France is bacon.
author
#6 lore raw

[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 3/4] v6 more sampling fun 3

In reply to Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 17 lines · speck for Thomas Gleixner

Mark,

Quoted 14 lines · speck for mark gross
(quoted diff) +14 -0
+#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(model, steppings, issues)			   \
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE(INTEL, 6,		   \
+					    INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
+					    X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
+
+#define SRBDS	BIT(0)
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(HASWELL,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(HASWELL_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(HASWELL_G,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(BROADWELL_G,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(BROADWELL,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
Quoted 8 lines

Review

Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +4 -0
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE_L,	GENMASK(0xC, 0),	SRBDS), /*06_8E steppings <=C*/
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE,		GENMASK(0xD, 0),	SRBDS), /*06_9E steppings <=D*/

Please don't use these horrible tail comments. Also the 06_NN part is of that comment is not helpful either. Please make stuff self explaining, i.e.

tail comments gone.

Quoted 1 line

#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs) GENMASK(maxs, mins)

Adding this to the patch where I introduced steppings to x86_cpu_id.

Quoted 7 lines

and use that in the blacklist:

	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0, 0xC),	SRBDS),
	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0, 0xD),	SRBDS),

which is pretty obvious, right?

right!

Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines

static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which, const struct x86_cpu_id *table) {

(quoted diff) +10 -0
 	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
@@ -1142,6 +1163,27 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
+	if (cpu_matches(SRBDS, cpu_vuln_blacklist)) {
+		/*
+		 * Some parts on the list don't have RDRAND or RDSEED. Make sure
+		 * they show as "Not affected".
+		 */
+		if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) &&
+		    !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED))
+			goto srbds_not_affected;
+		/*
+		 * Parts that have TSX fused off and are not affected by MDS
Quoted 8 lines

Review static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 1181

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +6 -0
+		 * are not affected by SRBDS. TSX_CTRL is only enumerated on
+		 * parts where TSX fused on.
+		 */
+		if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+		    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+			goto srbds_not_affected;

This is confusing vs. the documentation patch:

I'll try to make it better.
attempt made. I will post it Monday.

Quoted 7 lines

Review static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 1187

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +6 -0
+  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        0xB only if TSX is enabled
+  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        0xC only if TSX is enabled
+
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        <=B
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        0xC only if TSX is enabled
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        0xD only if TSX is enabled
Quoted 5 lines

IOW, this is only true for particular steppings of Kabylake[_L]

It might well be the case that exactly these steppings have MDS_NO and might have TSX fused off, but can we pretty please make this very explicit?

I thought that might be the case to but, I was told that the choice to fuse stuff off is made by marketing per bin splits. i.e. Kabylake i3's or Celerons will get the features fused off not all kabylakes or specific steppings.

Quoted 8 lines
	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xA),	SRBDS),
	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0xB, 0xC),	SRBDS_IF_TSX),
	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xB),	SRBDS),
	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0xC, 0xD),	SRBDS_IF_TSX),

and make the check for SRBDS_IF_TSX & TSX enabled in the code? You surely figure out how to define SRBDS_IF_TSX so the SRBDS match works for both :)

In fact that was somewhat how I hand the code initialy implemented treating the "onyl if tsx" case as a separate match bit.

Added SRBDS_IF_TSX to make the code more self documenting and more closely match documentation.

done.

Quoted 4 lines

Thanks,

tglx

Thank you!
--mark

author
#9 lore raw

[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 4/4] v6 more sampling fun 4

In reply to Ben Hutchings
Quoted 20 lines · speck for Ben Hutchings

On Thu, 2020-01-30 at 11:12 -0800, speck for mark gross wrote:
[...]

Quoted 16 lines
(quoted diff) +16 -0
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable
+ Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
+ Vulnerable: no microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation
+ Mitigated                      Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect.
+ Not affected (TSX disabled)    Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
+                                enabled while this system was booted with TSX
+                                disabled.
+ Unknown                        Running on virtual guest processor that is
+                                affected but with no way to know if host
+                                processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================

[...]

Quoted 1 line

The values in this table haven't been updated along with the code.

updated Mitigated line to match exactly with code. --mark

Quoted 7 lines

Ben.

Signature · 2 lines
Ben Hutchings
Knowledge is power.  France is bacon.