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Fix bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative for cgroup_skb/egress

PATCH Superseded YiFei Zhu 3 participants 5 messages Jun 5, 2020 – Jun 8, 2020

Subsystems (5)

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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YiFei Zhu

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#0 lore raw

cover Fix bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative for cgroup_skb/egress

When cgroup_skb/egress triggers the MAC header is not set. On the other hand, load_bytes_relative unconditionally calls skb_mac_header which, when MC not set, returns a pointer after the tail pointer, breaking the logic even if the caller requested the NET header.

Fix is to conditionally use skb_mac_header or skb_network_header depending on the requested header, -EFAULT when the header is not set. Added a test that asserts during cgroup_skb/egress request for MAC header returns -EFAULT and request for NET header succeeds.

YiFei Zhu (2):
net/filter: Permit reading NET in load_bytes_relative when MAC not set selftests/bpf: Add cgroup_skb/egress test for load_bytes_relative

 net/core/filter.c                             | 16 +++--
 .../bpf/prog_tests/load_bytes_relative.c      | 71 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/load_bytes_relative.c | 44 ++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/load_bytes_relative.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/load_bytes_relative.c

--
2.27.0

author
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 net/filter: Permit reading NET in load_bytes_relative when MAC not set

Added a check in the switch case on start_header that checks for the existence of the header, and in the case that MAC is not set and the caller requests for MAC, -EFAULT. If the caller requests for NET then MAC's existence is completely ignored.

There is no function to check NET header's existence and as far as cgroup_skb/egress is concerned it should always be set.

Removed for ptr >= the start of header, considering offset is bounded unsigned and should always be true. ptr + len <= end is overflow-unsafe and replaced with len <= end - ptr, and len <= end - mac is redundant to this condition.

Fixes 3eee1f75f2b9 ("bpf: fix bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative pkt length check")
---
 net/core/filter.c | 16 +++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +9 -7
index d01a244b5087..d3e8445b5494 100644
@@ -1755,25 +1755,27 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative, const struct sk_buff *, skb,
 	   u32, offset, void *, to, u32, len, u32, start_header)
 {
 	u8 *end = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
-	u8 *net = skb_network_header(skb);
-	u8 *mac = skb_mac_header(skb);
-	u8 *ptr;
+	u8 *start, *ptr;
 
-	if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff || len > (end - mac)))
+	if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff))
 		goto err_clear;
 
 	switch (start_header) {
 	case BPF_HDR_START_MAC:
-		ptr = mac + offset;
+		if (unlikely(!skb_mac_header_was_set(skb)))
+			goto err_clear;
+		start = skb_mac_header(skb);
 		break;
 	case BPF_HDR_START_NET:
-		ptr = net + offset;
+		start = skb_network_header(skb);
 		break;
 	default:
 		goto err_clear;
 	}
 
-	if (likely(ptr >= mac && ptr + len <= end)) {
+	ptr = start + offset;
+
+	if (likely(len <= end - ptr)) {
 		memcpy(to, ptr, len);
 		return 0;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author
#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 selftests/bpf: Add cgroup_skb/egress test for load_bytes_relative

In reply to YiFei Zhu

When cgroup_skb/egress triggers the MAC header is not set. Added a test that asserts reading MAC header is a -EFAULT but NET header succeeds. The test result from within the eBPF program is stored in an 1-element array map that the userspace then reads and asserts on.

---
 .../bpf/prog_tests/load_bytes_relative.c      | 71 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/load_bytes_relative.c | 44 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 115 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/load_bytes_relative.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/load_bytes_relative.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/load_bytes_relative.c new file +71 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c1168e4a9036
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include <network_helpers.h>
+
+void test_load_bytes_relative(void)
+{
+	int server_fd, cgroup_fd, prog_fd, map_fd, client_fd;
+	int err;
+	struct bpf_object *obj;
+	struct bpf_program *prog;
+	struct bpf_map *test_result;
+	__u32 duration = 0;
+
+	__u32 map_key = 0;
+	__u32 map_value = 0;
+
+	cgroup_fd = test__join_cgroup("/load_bytes_relative");
+	if (CHECK_FAIL(cgroup_fd < 0))
+		return;
+
+	server_fd = start_server(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM);
+	if (CHECK_FAIL(server_fd < 0))
+		goto close_cgroup_fd;
+
+	err = bpf_prog_load("./load_bytes_relative.o", BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+			    &obj, &prog_fd);
+	if (CHECK_FAIL(err))
+		goto close_server_fd;
+
+	test_result = bpf_object__find_map_by_name(obj, "test_result");
+	if (CHECK_FAIL(!test_result))
+		goto close_bpf_object;
+
+	map_fd = bpf_map__fd(test_result);
+	if (map_fd < 0)
+		goto close_bpf_object;
+
+	prog = bpf_object__find_program_by_name(obj, "load_bytes_relative");
+	if (CHECK_FAIL(!prog))
+		goto close_bpf_object;
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach(prog_fd, cgroup_fd, BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS,
+			      BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI);
+	if (CHECK_FAIL(err))
+		goto close_bpf_object;
+
+	client_fd = connect_to_fd(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, server_fd);
+	if (CHECK_FAIL(client_fd < 0))
+		goto close_bpf_object;
+	close(client_fd);
+
+	err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_fd, &map_key, &map_value);
+	if (CHECK_FAIL(err))
+		goto close_bpf_object;
+
+	CHECK(map_value != 1, "bpf", "bpf program returned failure");
+
+close_bpf_object:
+	bpf_object__close(obj);
+
+close_server_fd:
+	close(server_fd);
+
+close_cgroup_fd:
+	close(cgroup_fd);
+}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/load_bytes_relative.c new file +44 -0

44 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
maintainer
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf 1/2] net/filter: Permit reading NET in load_bytes_relative when MAC not set

In reply to YiFei Zhu
Quoted 46 lines · YiFei Zhu

Added a check in the switch case on start_header that checks for the existence of the header, and in the case that MAC is not set and the caller requests for MAC, -EFAULT. If the caller requests for NET then MAC's existence is completely ignored.

There is no function to check NET header's existence and as far as cgroup_skb/egress is concerned it should always be set.

Removed for ptr >= the start of header, considering offset is bounded unsigned and should always be true. ptr + len <= end is overflow-unsafe and replaced with len <= end - ptr, and len <= end - mac is redundant to this condition.

Fixes 3eee1f75f2b9 ("bpf: fix bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative pkt length check")
---
  net/core/filter.c | 16 +++++++++-------
  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +5 -6
index d01a244b5087..d3e8445b5494 100644
@@ -1755,25 +1755,27 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative, const struct sk_buff *, skb,
  	   u32, offset, void *, to, u32, len, u32, start_header)
  {
  	u8 *end = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
-	u8 *net = skb_network_header(skb);
-	u8 *mac = skb_mac_header(skb);
-	u8 *ptr;
+	u8 *start, *ptr;
 
-	if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff || len > (end - mac)))
+	if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff))
  		goto err_clear;
 
  	switch (start_header) {
  	case BPF_HDR_START_MAC:
-		ptr = mac + offset;
+		if (unlikely(!skb_mac_header_was_set(skb)))
+			goto err_clear;
+		start = skb_mac_header(skb);
  		break;
  	case BPF_HDR_START_NET:
-		ptr = net + offset;

net/core/filter.c BPF_CALL_5(bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative, const struct sk_buff *, skb, · line 1778

Quoted 10 lines
net/core/filter.c +4 -1
+		start = skb_network_header(skb);
  		break;
  	default:
  		goto err_clear;
  	}
 
-	if (likely(ptr >= mac && ptr + len <= end)) {
+	ptr = start + offset;
+
+	if (likely(len <= end - ptr)) {

Couldn't you run into the case above where the passed offset is large enough that start + offset goes beyond end pointer [and then above comparison is performed as unsigned ..]? (At least on x86-64, the 'ptr + len <= end' should never have an issue [0].) Either way, maybe lets add a test in 2/2 to assert correct behavior there.

[0] https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt

Quoted 4 lines
net/core/filter.c +0 -0
  		memcpy(to, ptr, len);
  		return 0;
  	}
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf 1/2] net/filter: Permit reading NET in load_bytes_relative when MAC not set

Quoted 3 lines · Daniel Borkmann

Couldn't you run into the case above where the passed offset is large enough that start + offset goes beyond end pointer [and then above comparison is performed as unsigned ..]?

You are right. I missed that offset would be large and make start + offset > end,
when I was trying to reason the offsets and overflows. I just checked that on x86_64
it emits a 'jg' instruction on x86_64, and the test I tried with offset = 0xffff does
return -EFAULT. However, I searched around and saw that this is due to integer promotion of len and the test would fail (i.e. not returning -EFAULT) on x86_32 (I have not tested this).

Quoted 2 lines

(At least on x86-64, the 'ptr + len <= end' should never have an issue [0].)

Alright, I see that len is an ARG_CONST_SIZE, which would be checked by check_helper_mem_access, so it is bound by the stack size. So the argument against ptr >= start also applies here, correct?

YiFei Zhu