zeus review request
cover zeus review request
A set of CVE fixes for zeus. Please review.
I have rebased these on top of current zeus-next and have run the entire set through autobuilder using the contrib/rpurdie/zeus helper branch.
There's one failure while compiling acl (for reproducibility test) which probably happened because of memory availability and is unrelated:
| make: *** read jobs pipe: Resource temporarily unavailable. Stop.
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/79/builds/1358/steps/8/logs/step2d
Thanks,
Anuj
The following changes since commit 1c367349b733e931369944c362b357f92621f07b:
oeqa/runtime_test: Disable test_testimage_virgl_gtk (2020-09-08 14:34:18 +0100)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://push.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib anujm/zeus
Li Wang (3):
qemu: CVE-2020-16092
qemu : fix CVE-2020-15863
qemu: CVE-2020-14364
Li Zhou (5):
xserver-xorg: Security Advisory - xserver-xorg - CVE-2020-14347
bind: Security Advisory - bind - CVE-2020-8622
bind: Security Advisory - bind - CVE-2020-8623
bind: Security Advisory - bind - CVE-2020-8624
go: Security Advisory - go - CVE-2020-24553
Stefan Ghinea (1):
qemu: CVE-2020-10756
Zhixiong Chi (2):
go: CVE-2020-16845
gnutls: CVE-2020-24659
.../bind/bind/CVE-2020-8622.patch | 60 +++ .../bind/bind/CVE-2020-8623.patch | 402 ++++++++++++++++ .../bind/bind/CVE-2020-8624.patch | 33 ++ .../recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.19.bb | 3 + meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12.inc | 3 + ...i-rename-a-test-file-to-be-less-cute.patch | 28 ++ .../go/go-1.12/CVE-2020-16845.patch | 110 +++++ .../go/go-1.12/CVE-2020-24553.patch | 429 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 4 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10756.patch | 40 ++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-14364.patch | 93 ++++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch | 64 +++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-16092.patch | 49 ++ .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14347.patch | 37 ++ .../xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.5.bb | 1 + .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2020-24659.patch | 117 +++++ meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.13.bb | 1 + 17 files changed, 1474 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2020-8622.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2020-8623.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2020-8624.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/0001-net-http-cgi-rename-a-test-file-to-be-less-cute.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/CVE-2020-16845.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/CVE-2020-24553.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10756.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-14364.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-16092.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14347.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2020-24659.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 1/11 xserver-xorg: Security Advisory - xserver-xorg - CVE-2020-14347
From: Li Zhou <[email protected]>
Backport patch from <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/
commit/aac28e162e5108510065ad4c323affd6deffd816> to solve CVE-2020-14347.
--- .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14347.patch | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ .../xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.5.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14347.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14347.patch new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From aac28e162e5108510065ad4c323affd6deffd816 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthieu Herrb <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2020 19:33:50 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fix for ZDI-11426 + +Avoid leaking un-initalized memory to clients by zeroing the +whole pixmap on initial allocation. + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-14347 +Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <[email protected]> +--- + dix/pixmap.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/dix/pixmap.c b/dix/pixmap.c +index 1186d7dbb..5a0146bbb 100644 +--- a/dix/pixmap.c ++++ b/dix/pixmap.c +@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ AllocatePixmap(ScreenPtr pScreen, int pixDataSize) + if (pScreen->totalPixmapSize > ((size_t) - 1) - pixDataSize) + return NullPixmap; + +- pPixmap = malloc(pScreen->totalPixmapSize + pixDataSize); ++ pPixmap = calloc(1, pScreen->totalPixmapSize + pixDataSize); + if (!pPixmap) + return NullPixmap; + +-- +2.17.1 +
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.5.bb +1 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.pat file://0001-test-xtest-Initialize-array-with-braces.patch \ file://0001-compiler.h-Do-not-include-sys-io.h-on-ARM-with-glibc.patch \ file://sdksyms-no-build-path.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-14347.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "c9fc7e21e11286dbedd22c00df652130" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a81d8243f37e75a03d4f8c55f96d0bc25802be6ec45c3bfa5cb614c6d01bac9d"
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 2/11 qemu: CVE-2020-16092
In reply to Anuj MittalFrom: Li Wang <[email protected]>
Backport CVE patch from the upstream:
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=035e69b063835a5fd23cacabd63690a3d84532a8
--- meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-16092.patch | 49 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-16092.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +1 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2020-11869.patch \ file://CVE-2020-13765.patch \ file://CVE-2020-10702.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-16092.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-16092.patch new file +49 -0
49 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 3/11 go: CVE-2020-16845
In reply to Anuj MittalFrom: Zhixiong Chi <[email protected]>
Backport CVE patch from the upstream:
https://github.com/golang/go.git
commit 027d7241ce050d197e7fabea3d541ffbe3487258
--- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12.inc | 1 + .../go/go-1.12/CVE-2020-16845.patch | 110 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/CVE-2020-16845.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12.inc +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\ file://0001-release-branch.go1.12-security-net-textproto-don-t-n.patch \ file://0010-fix-CVE-2019-17596.patch \ file://CVE-2020-15586.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-16845.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0009-ld-replace-glibc-dynamic-linker-with-musl.patch"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/CVE-2020-16845.patch new file +110 -0
110 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 4/11 qemu: CVE-2020-10756
In reply to Anuj MittalFrom: Stefan Ghinea <[email protected]>
An out-of-bounds read vulnerability was found in the SLiRP networking implementation of the QEMU emulator. This flaw occurs in the icmp6_send_echoreply() routine while replying to an ICMP echo request, also known as ping. This flaw allows a malicious guest to leak the contents of the host memory, resulting in possible information disclosure. This flaw affects versions of libslirp before 4.3.1.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10756
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1835986
Upstream patches:
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/slirp/libslirp/-/commit/c7ede54cbd2e2b25385325600958ba0124e31cc0
--- meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10756.patch | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10756.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +1 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2020-13765.patch \ file://CVE-2020-10702.patch \ file://CVE-2020-16092.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-10756.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10756.patch new file +40 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From c7ede54cbd2e2b25385325600958ba0124e31cc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralf Haferkamp <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2020 14:51:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Drop bogus IPv6 messages + +Drop IPv6 message shorter than what's mentioned in the payload +length header (+ the size of the IPv6 header). They're invalid an could +lead to data leakage in icmp6_send_echoreply(). + +CVE: CVE-2020-10756 +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/slirp/libslirp/-/commit/c7ede54cbd2e2b25385325600958ba0124e31cc0 + +[SG: Based on libslirp commit c7ede54cbd2e2b25385325600958ba0124e31cc0 and adjusted context] +Signed-off-by: Stefan Ghinea <[email protected]> +--- + slirp/src/ip6_input.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/slirp/src/ip6_input.c b/slirp/src/ip6_input.c +index d9d2b7e9..0f2b1785 100644 +--- a/slirp/src/ip6_input.c ++++ b/slirp/src/ip6_input.c +@@ -49,6 +49,13 @@ void ip6_input(struct mbuf *m) + goto bad; + } + ++ // Check if the message size is big enough to hold what's ++ // set in the payload length header. If not this is an invalid ++ // packet ++ if (m->m_len < ntohs(ip6->ip_pl) + sizeof(struct ip6)) { ++ goto bad; ++ } ++ + /* check ip_ttl for a correct ICMP reply */ + if (ip6->ip_hl == 0) { + icmp6_send_error(m, ICMP6_TIMXCEED, ICMP6_TIMXCEED_INTRANS); +-- +2.17.1 +
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 5/11 qemu : fix CVE-2020-15863
In reply to Anuj MittalFrom: Li Wang <[email protected]>
--- meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch | 64 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +1 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2020-10702.patch \ file://CVE-2020-16092.patch \ file://CVE-2020-10756.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-15863.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch new file +64 -0
64 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 6/11 bind: Security Advisory - bind - CVE-2020-8622
In reply to Anuj MittalFrom: Li Zhou <[email protected]>
Backport patch from <https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/
commit/6ed167ad0a647dff20c8cb08c944a7967df2d415> to solve CVE-2020-8622.
--- .../bind/bind/CVE-2020-8622.patch | 60 +++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.19.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2020-8622.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2020-8622.patch new file +60 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From ca543240380475d888d660ea3296fc880ce52f35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Andrews <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 16:07:51 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] bind: Always keep a copy of the message + +this allows it to be available even when dns_message_parse() +returns a error. + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-8622 +Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <[email protected]> +--- + lib/dns/message.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c +index ac637a2..39ed80f 100644 +--- a/lib/dns/message.c ++++ b/lib/dns/message.c +@@ -1679,6 +1679,19 @@ dns_message_parse(dns_message_t *msg, isc_buffer_t *source, + msg->header_ok = 0; + msg->question_ok = 0; + ++ if ((options & DNS_MESSAGEPARSE_CLONEBUFFER) == 0) { ++ isc_buffer_usedregion(&origsource, &msg->saved); ++ } else { ++ msg->saved.length = isc_buffer_usedlength(&origsource); ++ msg->saved.base = isc_mem_get(msg->mctx, msg->saved.length); ++ if (msg->saved.base == NULL) { ++ return (ISC_R_NOMEMORY); ++ } ++ memmove(msg->saved.base, isc_buffer_base(&origsource), ++ msg->saved.length); ++ msg->free_saved = 1; ++ } ++ + isc_buffer_remainingregion(source, &r); + if (r.length < DNS_MESSAGE_HEADERLEN) + return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND); +@@ -1754,17 +1767,6 @@ dns_message_parse(dns_message_t *msg, isc_buffer_t *source, + } + + truncated: +- if ((options & DNS_MESSAGEPARSE_CLONEBUFFER) == 0) +- isc_buffer_usedregion(&origsource, &msg->saved); +- else { +- msg->saved.length = isc_buffer_usedlength(&origsource); +- msg->saved.base = isc_mem_get(msg->mctx, msg->saved.length); +- if (msg->saved.base == NULL) +- return (ISC_R_NOMEMORY); +- memmove(msg->saved.base, isc_buffer_base(&origsource), +- msg->saved.length); +- msg->free_saved = 1; +- } + + if (ret == ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND && ignore_tc) + return (DNS_R_RECOVERABLE); +-- +1.9.1 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.19.bb +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-configure.in-remove-useless-L-use_openssl-lib.patch \ file://0001-named-lwresd-V-and-start-log-hide-build-options.patch \ file://0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-8622.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0dee554a4caa368948b32da9a0c97b516c19103bc13ff5b3762c5d8552f52329"
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 7/11 bind: Security Advisory - bind - CVE-2020-8623
In reply to Anuj MittalFrom: Li Zhou <[email protected]>
Backport patch from <https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/
commit/8d807cc21655eaa6e6a08afafeec3682c0f3f2ab> to solve CVE-2020-8623.
--- .../bind/bind/CVE-2020-8623.patch | 402 ++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.19.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 403 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2020-8623.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2020-8623.patch new file +402 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@ +From 8d807cc21655eaa6e6a08afafeec3682c0f3f2ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Ond=C5=99ej=20Sur=C3=BD?= <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 14:42:47 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix crash in pk11_numbits() when native-pkcs11 is used + +When pk11_numbits() is passed a user provided input that contains all +zeroes (via crafted DNS message), it would crash with assertion +failure. Fix that by properly handling such input. + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-8623 +Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <[email protected]> +--- + lib/dns/pkcs11dh_link.c | 15 ++++++- + lib/dns/pkcs11dsa_link.c | 8 +++- + lib/dns/pkcs11rsa_link.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + lib/isc/include/pk11/internal.h | 3 +- + lib/isc/pk11.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++--------- + 5 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/dns/pkcs11dh_link.c b/lib/dns/pkcs11dh_link.c +index e2b60ea7c5..4cd8e32d60 100644 +--- a/lib/dns/pkcs11dh_link.c ++++ b/lib/dns/pkcs11dh_link.c +@@ -748,6 +748,7 @@ pkcs11dh_fromdns(dst_key_t *key, isc_buffer_t *data) { + CK_BYTE *prime = NULL, *base = NULL, *pub = NULL; + CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr; + int special = 0; ++ unsigned int bits; + isc_result_t result; + + isc_buffer_remainingregion(data, &r); +@@ -852,7 +853,11 @@ pkcs11dh_fromdns(dst_key_t *key, isc_buffer_t *data) { + pub = r.base; + isc_region_consume(&r, publen); + +- key->key_size = pk11_numbits(prime, plen_); ++ result = pk11_numbits(prime, plen_, &bits); ++ if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ key->key_size = bits; + + dh->repr = (CK_ATTRIBUTE *) isc_mem_get(key->mctx, sizeof(*attr) * 3); + if (dh->repr == NULL) +@@ -1012,6 +1017,7 @@ pkcs11dh_parse(dst_key_t *key, isc_lex_t *lexer, dst_key_t *pub) { + dst_private_t priv; + isc_result_t ret; + int i; ++ unsigned int bits; + pk11_object_t *dh = NULL; + CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr; + isc_mem_t *mctx; +@@ -1082,7 +1088,12 @@ pkcs11dh_parse(dst_key_t *key, isc_lex_t *lexer, dst_key_t *pub) { + + attr = pk11_attribute_bytype(dh, CKA_PRIME); + INSIST(attr != NULL); +- key->key_size = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen); ++ ++ ret = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen, &bits); ++ if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { ++ goto err; ++ } ++ key->key_size = bits; + + return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); + +diff --git a/lib/dns/pkcs11dsa_link.c b/lib/dns/pkcs11dsa_link.c +index 12d707a112..24d4c149ff 100644 +--- a/lib/dns/pkcs11dsa_link.c ++++ b/lib/dns/pkcs11dsa_link.c +@@ -983,6 +983,7 @@ pkcs11dsa_parse(dst_key_t *key, isc_lex_t *lexer, dst_key_t *pub) { + dst_private_t priv; + isc_result_t ret; + int i; ++ unsigned int bits; + pk11_object_t *dsa = NULL; + CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr; + isc_mem_t *mctx = key->mctx; +@@ -1072,7 +1073,12 @@ pkcs11dsa_parse(dst_key_t *key, isc_lex_t *lexer, dst_key_t *pub) { + + attr = pk11_attribute_bytype(dsa, CKA_PRIME); + INSIST(attr != NULL); +- key->key_size = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen); ++ ++ ret = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen, &bits); ++ if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { ++ goto err; ++ } ++ key->key_size = bits; + + return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); + +diff --git a/lib/dns/pkcs11rsa_link.c b/lib/dns/pkcs11rsa_link.c +index 096c1a8e91..1d10d26564 100644 +--- a/lib/dns/pkcs11rsa_link.c ++++ b/lib/dns/pkcs11rsa_link.c +@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ pkcs11rsa_createctx_verify(dst_key_t *key, unsigned int maxbits, + key->key_alg == DST_ALG_RSASHA256 || + key->key_alg == DST_ALG_RSASHA512); + #endif ++ REQUIRE(maxbits <= RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS); + + /* + * Reject incorrect RSA key lengths. +@@ -376,6 +377,7 @@ pkcs11rsa_createctx_verify(dst_key_t *key, unsigned int maxbits, + for (attr = pk11_attribute_first(rsa); + attr != NULL; + attr = pk11_attribute_next(rsa, attr)) ++ { + switch (attr->type) { + case CKA_MODULUS: + INSIST(keyTemplate[5].type == attr->type); +@@ -396,12 +398,16 @@ pkcs11rsa_createctx_verify(dst_key_t *key, unsigned int maxbits, + memmove(keyTemplate[6].pValue, attr->pValue, + attr->ulValueLen); + keyTemplate[6].ulValueLen = attr->ulValueLen; +- if (pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, +- attr->ulValueLen) > maxbits && +- maxbits != 0) ++ unsigned int bits; ++ ret = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen, ++ &bits); ++ if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS || ++ (bits > maxbits && maxbits != 0)) { + DST_RET(DST_R_VERIFYFAILURE); ++ } + break; + } ++ } + pk11_ctx->object = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + pk11_ctx->ontoken = false; + PK11_RET(pkcs_C_CreateObject, +@@ -1072,6 +1078,7 @@ pkcs11rsa_verify(dst_context_t *dctx, const isc_region_t *sig) { + keyTemplate[5].ulValueLen = attr->ulValueLen; + break; + case CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT: ++ unsigned int bits; + INSIST(keyTemplate[6].type == attr->type); + keyTemplate[6].pValue = isc_mem_get(dctx->mctx, + attr->ulValueLen); +@@ -1080,10 +1087,12 @@ pkcs11rsa_verify(dst_context_t *dctx, const isc_region_t *sig) { + memmove(keyTemplate[6].pValue, attr->pValue, + attr->ulValueLen); + keyTemplate[6].ulValueLen = attr->ulValueLen; +- if (pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, +- attr->ulValueLen) +- > RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) ++ ret = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen, ++ &bits); ++ if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS || bits > RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) ++ { + DST_RET(DST_R_VERIFYFAILURE); ++ } + break; + } + pk11_ctx->object = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; +@@ -1461,6 +1470,8 @@ pkcs11rsa_fromdns(dst_key_t *key, isc_buffer_t *data) { + CK_BYTE *exponent = NULL, *modulus = NULL; + CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr; + unsigned int length; ++ unsigned int bits; ++ isc_result_t ret = ISC_R_SUCCESS; + + isc_buffer_remainingregion(data, &r); + if (r.length == 0) +@@ -1478,9 +1489,7 @@ pkcs11rsa_fromdns(dst_key_t *key, isc_buffer_t *data) { + + if (e_bytes == 0) { + if (r.length < 2) { +- isc_safe_memwipe(rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); +- isc_mem_put(key->mctx, rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); +- return (DST_R_INVALIDPUBLICKEY); ++ DST_RET(DST_R_INVALIDPUBLICKEY); + } + e_bytes = (*r.base) << 8; + isc_region_consume(&r, 1); +@@ -1489,16 +1498,18 @@ pkcs11rsa_fromdns(dst_key_t *key, isc_buffer_t *data) { + } + + if (r.length < e_bytes) { +- isc_safe_memwipe(rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); +- isc_mem_put(key->mctx, rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); +- return (DST_R_INVALIDPUBLICKEY); ++ DST_RET(DST_R_INVALIDPUBLICKEY); + } + exponent = r.base; + isc_region_consume(&r, e_bytes); + modulus = r.base; + mod_bytes = r.length; + +- key->key_size = pk11_numbits(modulus, mod_bytes); ++ ret = pk11_numbits(modulus, mod_bytes, &bits); ++ if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { ++ goto err; ++ } ++ key->key_size = bits; + + isc_buffer_forward(data, length); + +@@ -1548,9 +1559,12 @@ pkcs11rsa_fromdns(dst_key_t *key, isc_buffer_t *data) { + rsa->repr, + rsa->attrcnt * sizeof(*attr)); + } ++ ret = ISC_R_NOMEMORY; ++ ++ err: + isc_safe_memwipe(rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); + isc_mem_put(key->mctx, rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); +- return (ISC_R_NOMEMORY); ++ return (ret); + } + + static isc_result_t +@@ -1729,6 +1743,7 @@ pkcs11rsa_fetch(dst_key_t *key, const char *engine, const char *label, + pk11_object_t *pubrsa; + pk11_context_t *pk11_ctx = NULL; + isc_result_t ret; ++ unsigned int bits; + + if (label == NULL) + return (DST_R_NOENGINE); +@@ -1815,7 +1830,11 @@ pkcs11rsa_fetch(dst_key_t *key, const char *engine, const char *label, + + attr = pk11_attribute_bytype(rsa, CKA_MODULUS); + INSIST(attr != NULL); +- key->key_size = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen); ++ ret = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen, &bits); ++ if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { ++ goto err; ++ } ++ key->key_size = bits; + + return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); + +@@ -1901,6 +1920,7 @@ pkcs11rsa_parse(dst_key_t *key, isc_lex_t *lexer, dst_key_t *pub) { + CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr; + isc_mem_t *mctx = key->mctx; + const char *engine = NULL, *label = NULL; ++ unsigned int bits; + + /* read private key file */ + ret = dst__privstruct_parse(key, DST_ALG_RSA, lexer, mctx, &priv); +@@ -2044,12 +2064,22 @@ pkcs11rsa_parse(dst_key_t *key, isc_lex_t *lexer, dst_key_t *pub) { + + attr = pk11_attribute_bytype(rsa, CKA_MODULUS); + INSIST(attr != NULL); +- key->key_size = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen); ++ ret = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen, &bits); ++ if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { ++ goto err; ++ } ++ key->key_size = bits; + + attr = pk11_attribute_bytype(rsa, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); + INSIST(attr != NULL); +- if (pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen) > RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) ++ ++ ret = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen, &bits); ++ if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (bits > RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { + DST_RET(ISC_R_RANGE); ++ } + + dst__privstruct_free(&priv, mctx); + isc_safe_memwipe(&priv, sizeof(priv)); +@@ -2084,6 +2114,7 @@ pkcs11rsa_fromlabel(dst_key_t *key, const char *engine, const char *label, + pk11_context_t *pk11_ctx = NULL; + isc_result_t ret; + unsigned int i; ++ unsigned int bits; + + UNUSED(pin); + +@@ -2178,12 +2209,22 @@ pkcs11rsa_fromlabel(dst_key_t *key, const char *engine, const char *label, + + attr = pk11_attribute_bytype(rsa, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); + INSIST(attr != NULL); +- if (pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen) > RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) ++ ++ ret = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen, &bits); ++ if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (bits > RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { + DST_RET(ISC_R_RANGE); ++ } + + attr = pk11_attribute_bytype(rsa, CKA_MODULUS); + INSIST(attr != NULL); +- key->key_size = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen); ++ ret = pk11_numbits(attr->pValue, attr->ulValueLen, &bits); ++ if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { ++ goto err; ++ } ++ key->key_size = bits; + + pk11_return_session(pk11_ctx); + isc_safe_memwipe(pk11_ctx, sizeof(*pk11_ctx)); +diff --git a/lib/isc/include/pk11/internal.h b/lib/isc/include/pk11/internal.h +index aa8907ab08..7cc8ec812b 100644 +--- a/lib/isc/include/pk11/internal.h ++++ b/lib/isc/include/pk11/internal.h +@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ void pk11_mem_put(void *ptr, size_t size); + + CK_SLOT_ID pk11_get_best_token(pk11_optype_t optype); + +-unsigned int pk11_numbits(CK_BYTE_PTR data, unsigned int bytecnt); ++isc_result_t ++pk11_numbits(CK_BYTE_PTR data, unsigned int bytecnt, unsigned int *bits); + + CK_ATTRIBUTE *pk11_attribute_first(const pk11_object_t *obj); + +diff --git a/lib/isc/pk11.c b/lib/isc/pk11.c +index 012afd968a..4e4052044b 100644 +--- a/lib/isc/pk11.c ++++ b/lib/isc/pk11.c +@@ -962,13 +962,15 @@ pk11_get_best_token(pk11_optype_t optype) { + return (token->slotid); + } + +-unsigned int +-pk11_numbits(CK_BYTE_PTR data, unsigned int bytecnt) { ++isc_result_t ++pk11_numbits(CK_BYTE_PTR data, unsigned int bytecnt, unsigned int *bits) { + unsigned int bitcnt, i; + CK_BYTE top; + +- if (bytecnt == 0) +- return (0); ++ if (bytecnt == 0) { ++ *bits = 0; ++ return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); ++ } + bitcnt = bytecnt * 8; + for (i = 0; i < bytecnt; i++) { + top = data[i]; +@@ -976,26 +978,41 @@ pk11_numbits(CK_BYTE_PTR data, unsigned int bytecnt) { + bitcnt -= 8; + continue; + } +- if (top & 0x80) +- return (bitcnt); +- if (top & 0x40) +- return (bitcnt - 1); +- if (top & 0x20) +- return (bitcnt - 2); +- if (top & 0x10) +- return (bitcnt - 3); +- if (top & 0x08) +- return (bitcnt - 4); +- if (top & 0x04) +- return (bitcnt - 5); +- if (top & 0x02) +- return (bitcnt - 6); +- if (top & 0x01) +- return (bitcnt - 7); ++ if (top & 0x80) { ++ *bits = bitcnt; ++ return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); ++ } ++ if (top & 0x40) { ++ *bits = bitcnt - 1; ++ return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); ++ } ++ if (top & 0x20) { ++ *bits = bitcnt - 2; ++ return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); ++ } ++ if (top & 0x10) { ++ *bits = bitcnt - 3; ++ return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); ++ } ++ if (top & 0x08) { ++ *bits = bitcnt - 4; ++ return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); ++ } ++ if (top & 0x04) { ++ *bits = bitcnt - 5; ++ return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); ++ } ++ if (top & 0x02) { ++ *bits = bitcnt - 6; ++ return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); ++ } ++ if (top & 0x01) { ++ *bits = bitcnt - 7; ++ return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); ++ } + break; + } +- INSIST(0); +- ISC_UNREACHABLE(); ++ return (ISC_R_RANGE); + } + + CK_ATTRIBUTE * +-- +2.17.1 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.19.bb +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-named-lwresd-V-and-start-log-hide-build-options.patch \ file://0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch \ file://CVE-2020-8622.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-8623.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0dee554a4caa368948b32da9a0c97b516c19103bc13ff5b3762c5d8552f52329"
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 8/11 bind: Security Advisory - bind - CVE-2020-8624
In reply to Anuj MittalFrom: Li Zhou <[email protected]>
Backport patch from <https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/
commit/e4cccf9668c7adee4724a7649ec64685f82c8677> to solve CVE-2020-8624.
--- .../bind/bind/CVE-2020-8624.patch | 33 +++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.19.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2020-8624.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2020-8624.patch new file +33 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From a73c3d30de7fe98af9e4dc0e490f732a48412380 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Andrews <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 23:36:03 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] bind: Update-policy 'subdomain' was incorrectly treated as + 'zonesub' + +resulting in names outside the specified subdomain having the wrong +restrictions for the given key. + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-8624 +Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <[email protected]> +--- + bin/named/zoneconf.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/bin/named/zoneconf.c b/bin/named/zoneconf.c +index e237bdb..4898447 100644 +--- a/bin/named/zoneconf.c ++++ b/bin/named/zoneconf.c +@@ -237,7 +237,8 @@ configure_zone_ssutable(const cfg_obj_t *zconfig, dns_zone_t *zone, + + str = cfg_obj_asstring(matchtype); + CHECK(dns_ssu_mtypefromstring(str, &mtype)); +- if (mtype == dns_ssumatchtype_subdomain) { ++ if (mtype == dns_ssumatchtype_subdomain && ++ strcasecmp(str, "zonesub") == 0) { + usezone = true; + } + +-- +1.9.1 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.19.bb +1 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch \ file://CVE-2020-8622.patch \ file://CVE-2020-8623.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-8624.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0dee554a4caa368948b32da9a0c97b516c19103bc13ff5b3762c5d8552f52329"
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 9/11 qemu: CVE-2020-14364
In reply to Anuj MittalFrom: Li Wang <[email protected]>
Backport patch from:
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=b946434f2659a182afc17e155be6791ebfb302eb
--- meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-14364.patch | 93 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-14364.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +1 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2020-16092.patch \ file://CVE-2020-10756.patch \ file://CVE-2020-15863.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-14364.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-14364.patch new file +93 -0
93 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 10/11 go: Security Advisory - go - CVE-2020-24553
In reply to Anuj MittalFrom: Li Zhou <[email protected]>
Backport the patch from <https://github.com/golang/go/commit/eb07103a083237414145a45f029c873d57037e06> to solve CVE-2020-24553.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12.inc | 2 + ...i-rename-a-test-file-to-be-less-cute.patch | 28 ++ .../go/go-1.12/CVE-2020-24553.patch | 429 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 459 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/0001-net-http-cgi-rename-a-test-file-to-be-less-cute.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/CVE-2020-24553.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12.inc +2 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ SRC_URI += "\ file://0010-fix-CVE-2019-17596.patch \ file://CVE-2020-15586.patch \ file://CVE-2020-16845.patch \ + file://0001-net-http-cgi-rename-a-test-file-to-be-less-cute.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-24553.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0009-ld-replace-glibc-dynamic-linker-with-musl.patch"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/0001-net-http-cgi-rename-a-test-file-to-be-less-cute.patch new file +28 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 8390c478600b852392cb116741b3cb239c94d123 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Brad Fitzpatrick <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2020 18:08:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] net/http/cgi: rename a test file to be less cute + +My fault (from CL 4245070), sorry. + +Change-Id: Ib95d3170dc326e74aa74c22421c4e44a8b00f577 +Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/214920 +Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <[email protected]> +TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport +[lz: Add this patch for merging the patch for CVE-2020-24553] +Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <[email protected]> +--- + src/net/http/cgi/{matryoshka_test.go => integration_test.go} | 0 + 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) + rename src/net/http/cgi/{matryoshka_test.go => integration_test.go} (100%) + +diff --git a/src/net/http/cgi/matryoshka_test.go b/src/net/http/cgi/integration_test.go +similarity index 100% +rename from src/net/http/cgi/matryoshka_test.go +rename to src/net/http/cgi/integration_test.go +-- +2.17.1 +
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/CVE-2020-24553.patch new file +429 -0
429 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 11/11 gnutls: CVE-2020-24659
In reply to Anuj MittalFrom: Zhixiong Chi <[email protected]>
Backport the CVE patch from the usptream:
https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls.git
commit 29ee67c205855e848a0a26e6d0e4f65b6b943e0a
--- .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2020-24659.patch | 117 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.13.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 118 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2020-24659.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2020-24659.patch new file +117 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +From 29ee67c205855e848a0a26e6d0e4f65b6b943e0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 22 Aug 2020 17:19:39 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] handshake: reject no_renegotiation alert if handshake is + incomplete + +If the initial handshake is incomplete and the server sends a +no_renegotiation alert, the client should treat it as a fatal error +even if its level is warning. Otherwise the same handshake +state (e.g., DHE parameters) are reused in the next gnutls_handshake +call, if it is called in the loop idiom: + + do { + ret = gnutls_handshake(session); + } while (ret < 0 && gnutls_error_is_fatal(ret) == 0); + +Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]> +CVE: CVE-2020-24659 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls.git] +Signed-off-by: Zhixiong Chi <[email protected]> +--- + lib/gnutls_int.h | 1 + + lib/handshake.c | 48 +++++++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/gnutls_int.h b/lib/gnutls_int.h +index bb6c19713..31cec5c0c 100644 +--- a/lib/gnutls_int.h ++++ b/lib/gnutls_int.h +@@ -1370,6 +1370,7 @@ typedef struct { + #define HSK_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_RECEIVED (1<<26) /* server: record_size_limit extension was seen but not accepted yet */ + #define HSK_OCSP_REQUESTED (1<<27) /* server: client requested OCSP stapling */ + #define HSK_CLIENT_OCSP_REQUESTED (1<<28) /* client: server requested OCSP stapling */ ++#define HSK_SERVER_HELLO_RECEIVED (1<<29) /* client: Server Hello message has been received */ + + /* The hsk_flags are for use within the ongoing handshake; + * they are reset to zero prior to handshake start by gnutls_handshake. */ +diff --git a/lib/handshake.c b/lib/handshake.c +index b40f84b3d..ce2d160e2 100644 +--- a/lib/handshake.c ++++ b/lib/handshake.c +@@ -2051,6 +2051,8 @@ read_server_hello(gnutls_session_t session, + if (ret < 0) + return gnutls_assert_val(ret); + ++ session->internals.hsk_flags |= HSK_SERVER_HELLO_RECEIVED; ++ + return 0; + } + +@@ -2575,16 +2577,42 @@ int gnutls_rehandshake(gnutls_session_t session) + return 0; + } + ++/* This function checks whether the error code should be treated fatal ++ * or not, and also does the necessary state transition. In ++ * particular, in the case of a rehandshake abort it resets the ++ * handshake's internal state. ++ */ + inline static int + _gnutls_abort_handshake(gnutls_session_t session, int ret) + { +- if (((ret == GNUTLS_E_WARNING_ALERT_RECEIVED) && +- (gnutls_alert_get(session) == GNUTLS_A_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) +- || ret == GNUTLS_E_GOT_APPLICATION_DATA) +- return 0; ++ switch (ret) { ++ case GNUTLS_E_WARNING_ALERT_RECEIVED: ++ if (gnutls_alert_get(session) == GNUTLS_A_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { ++ /* The server always toleretes a "no_renegotiation" alert. */ ++ if (session->security_parameters.entity == GNUTLS_SERVER) { ++ STATE = STATE0; ++ return ret; ++ } ++ ++ /* The client should tolerete a "no_renegotiation" alert only if: ++ * - the initial handshake has completed, or ++ * - a Server Hello is not yet received ++ */ ++ if (session->internals.initial_negotiation_completed || ++ !(session->internals.hsk_flags & HSK_SERVER_HELLO_RECEIVED)) { ++ STATE = STATE0; ++ return ret; ++ } + +- /* this doesn't matter */ +- return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET); ++ } ++ return ret; ++ case GNUTLS_E_GOT_APPLICATION_DATA: ++ STATE = STATE0; ++ return ret; ++ default: ++ return ret; ++ } + } + + +@@ -2747,13 +2774,7 @@ int gnutls_handshake(gnutls_session_t session) + } + + if (ret < 0) { +- /* In the case of a rehandshake abort +- * we should reset the handshake's internal state. +- */ +- if (_gnutls_abort_handshake(session, ret) == 0) +- STATE = STATE0; +- +- return ret; ++ return _gnutls_abort_handshake(session, ret); + } + + /* clear handshake buffer */ +-- +2.17.0 +
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.13.bb +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar file://CVE-2020-13777-a.patch \ file://CVE-2020-13777-b.patch \ file://CVE-2020-13777-c.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-24659.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "bb1fe696a11543433785b4fc70ca225f"
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Quoted 7 lines · Anuj Mittal
A set of CVE fixes for zeus. Please review.
I have rebased these on top of current zeus-next and have run the entire
set through autobuilder using the contrib/rpurdie/zeus helper branch.
Quoted 7 lines
There's one failure while compiling acl (for reproducibility test) which probably happened because of memory availability and is unrelated:
Quoted 1 line
make: *** read jobs pipe: Resource temporarily unavailable. Stop.
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/79/builds/1358/steps/8/logs/step2d
Thanks Anuj!
One of the selftest failures wasn't this but was failures in bitbake- selftest due to fetcher url stability issues. I've backported the bitbake change which fixes that to 1.44.
The issue above isn't resource but is related to the attr fix I made in thud-next. Its caused by issues with newer versions of make and the rather weird makefile attr/acl has. The fix is to do what I did for attr, disable parallel make during install. Newer verisons of acl/attr don't have the problem so this is zeus specific.
Cheers,
Richard