kasan: hardware tag-based mode for production use on arm64
Subsystems (10)
v2 cover kasan: hardware tag-based mode for production use on arm64
This patchset is not complete (hence sending as RFC), but I would like to start the discussion now and hear people's opinions regarding the questions mentioned below.
=== Overview
This patchset adopts the existing hardware tag-based KASAN mode [1] for use in production as a memory corruption mitigation. Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging. Please see [3] and [4] for detailed analysis of how MTE helps to fight memory safety problems.
The current plan is reuse CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS for production, but add a boot time switch, that allows to choose between a debugging mode, that includes all KASAN features as they are, and a production mode, that only includes the essentials like tag checking.
It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI initiative [5].
The patch titled "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters" of this series adds a few new boot parameters:
kasan.mode allows choosing one of main three modes:
- kasan.mode=off - no checks at all
- kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features
- kasan.mode=full - all features
Those mode configs provide default values for three more internal configs listed below. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing:
- kasan.stack=off/on - enable stacks collection
(default: on for mode=full, otherwise off)
- kasan.trap=async/sync - use async or sync MTE mode (default: sync for mode=full, otherwise async)
- kasan.fault=report/panic - only report MTE fault or also panic (default: report)
=== Benchmarks
For now I've only performed a few simple benchmarks such as measuring kernel boot time and slab memory usage after boot. The benchmarks were performed in QEMU and the results below exclude the slowdown caused by QEMU memory tagging emulation (as it's different from the slowdown that will be introduced by hardware and therefore irrelevant).
KASAN_HW_TAGS=y + kasan.mode=off introduces no performance or memory impact compared to KASAN_HW_TAGS=n.
kasan.mode=prod (without executing the tagging instructions) introduces 7% of both performace and memory impact compared to kasan.mode=off. Note, that 4% of performance and all 7% of memory impact are caused by the fact that enabling KASAN essentially results in CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT being disabled.
Recommended Android config has CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT disabled (I assume for security reasons), but Pixel 4 has it enabled. It's arguable, whether "disabling" CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT introduces any security benefit on top of MTE. Without MTE it makes exploiting some heap corruption harder. With MTE it will only make it harder provided that the attacker is able to predict allocation tags.
kasan.mode=full has 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection.
=== Questions
Any concerns about the boot parameters?
Should we try to deal with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT-like behavor mentioned above?
=== Notes
This patchset is available here:
https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-prod-mte-rfc2
and on Gerrit here:
https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/3707
This patchset is based on v5 of "kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64" patchset [1] (along with some fixes).
For testing in QEMU hardware tag-based KASAN requires:
1. QEMU built from master [6] (use "-machine virt,mte=on -cpu max" arguments to run).
2. GCC version 10.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
[2] https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/posts/enhancing-memory-safety
[3] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.09517.pdf
[4] https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/master/papers/2020/Security%20analysis%20of%20memory%20tagging.pdf
[5] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image
[6] https://github.com/qemu/qemu
=== History
Changes RFCv1->RFCv2:
- Rework boot parameters.
- Drop __init from empty kasan_init_tags() definition.
- Add cpu_supports_mte() helper that can be used during early boot and use it in kasan_init_tags()
- Lots of new KASAN optimization commits.
Andrey Konovalov (21):
kasan: simplify quarantine_put call site
kasan: rename get_alloc/free_info
kasan: introduce set_alloc_info
kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode
kasan: mark kasan_init_tags as __init
kasan, arm64: move initialization message
kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stack
kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes
kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS
kasan: inline kasan_poison_memory and check_invalid_free
kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory
arm64: kasan: Add cpu_supports_tags helper
kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters
kasan: check kasan_enabled in annotations
kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc
kasan: simplify kasan_poison_kfree
kasan: rename kasan_poison_kfree
kasan: don't round_up too much
kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag calls
kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_large
arch/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h | 6 + arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 20 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 225 ++++++++++++++++++------- include/linux/mm.h | 27 ++- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/common.c | 256 ++++++++++++++++------------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 19 ++- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 182 +++++++++++++++++--- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 102 ++++++++---- mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 5 +- mm/kasan/report.c | 26 ++- mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/shadow.c | 1 + mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 20 ++- mm/mempool.c | 2 +- mm/slab_common.c | 2 +- mm/slub.c | 3 +- 22 files changed, 641 insertions(+), 269 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 1/21 kasan: simplify quarantine_put call site
Move get_free_info() call into quarantine_put() to simplify the call site.
No functional changes.
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 5 ++--- mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -1
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); -quarantine_put (get_free_info (cache, object), cache); +quarantine_put (cache, object);return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); }
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -3
@@ -214,12 +214,11 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && \ (defined(CONFIG_SLAB ) || defined(CONFIG_SLUB )) -void quarantine_put (struct kasan_free_meta *info,struct kmem_cache *cache); +void quarantine_put (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object);void quarantine_reduce (void );void quarantine_remove_cache (struct kmem_cache *cache);#else -static inline void quarantine_put (struct kasan_free_meta *info, -struct kmem_cache *cache) { } +static inline void quarantine_put (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) { }static inline void quarantine_reduce (void ) { }static inline void quarantine_remove_cache (struct kmem_cache *cache) { }#endif
mm/kasan/quarantine.c +2 -1
@@ -161,11 +161,12 @@ static void qlist_free_all(struct qlist_head *q, struct kmem_cache *cache)qlist_init (q); } -void quarantine_put (struct kasan_free_meta *info,struct kmem_cache *cache) +void quarantine_put (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) {unsigned long flags;struct qlist_head *q;struct qlist_head temp =QLIST_INIT ; +struct kasan_free_meta *info =get_free_info (cache, object);/* * Note: irq must be disabled until after we move the batch to the
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 01/21] kasan: simplify quarantine_put call site
Quoted 7 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Move
get_free_info()call intoquarantine_put()to simplify the call site.No functional changes.
Quoted 59 lines
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 5 ++--- mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +1
-1@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); -quarantine_put (get_free_info (cache, object), cache); +quarantine_put (cache, object);return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); }mm/kasan/kasan.h +2
-3@@ -214,12 +214,11 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && \ (defined(CONFIG_SLAB ) || defined(CONFIG_SLUB )) -void quarantine_put (struct kasan_free_meta *info,struct kmem_cache *cache); +void quarantine_put (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object);void quarantine_reduce (void );void quarantine_remove_cache (struct kmem_cache *cache);#else -static inline void quarantine_put (struct kasan_free_meta *info, -struct kmem_cache *cache) { } +static inline void quarantine_put (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) { }static inline void quarantine_reduce (void ) { }static inline void quarantine_remove_cache (struct kmem_cache *cache) { }#endif mm/kasan/quarantine.c +2
-2@@ -161,11 +161,12 @@ static void qlist_free_all(struct qlist_head *q, struct kmem_cache *cache)qlist_init (q); } -void quarantine_put (struct kasan_free_meta *info,struct kmem_cache *cache) +void quarantine_put (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) {unsigned long flags;struct qlist_head *q;struct qlist_head temp =QLIST_INIT ; +struct kasan_free_meta *info =get_free_info (cache, object);/* * Note: irq must be disabled until after we move the batch to the -- 2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 2/21 kasan: rename get_alloc/free_info
In reply to Andrey KonovalovRename get_alloc_info() and get_free_info() to kasan_get_alloc_meta() and kasan_get_free_meta() to better reflect what those do and avoid confusion with kasan_set_free_info().
No functional changes.
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 16 ++++++++-------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 12 ++++++------ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 4 ++-- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 8 ++++---- mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 4 ++-- mm/kasan/report.c | 12 ++++++------ mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 4 ++-- 8 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +8 -8
@@ -175,14 +175,14 @@ size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0); } -struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info (struct kmem_cache *cache, -const void *object) +struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object) {return (void *)reset_tag (object) + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset; } -struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info (struct kmem_cache *cache, -const void *object) +struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object) {BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) >32 );return (void *)reset_tag (object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
@@ -259,13 +259,13 @@ static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,void *__must_check kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object) { -struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info; +struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;if (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))return (void *)object; - alloc_info =get_alloc_info (cache, object); -__memset (alloc_info,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_info)); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); +__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta));if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false));
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);if (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ) -kasan_set_track (&get_alloc_info (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags); +kasan_set_track (&kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);return set_tag (object, tag); }
mm/kasan/generic.c +6 -6
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr) {struct page *page =kasan_addr_to_page (addr);struct kmem_cache *cache; -struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info; +struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;void *object;if (!(page &&PageSlab (page)))
@@ -339,13 +339,13 @@ void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr) cache = page->slab_cache; object =nearest_obj (cache, page, addr); - alloc_info =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);/* * record the last two call_rcu() call stacks. */ - alloc_info->aux_stack[1 ] = alloc_info->aux_stack[0 ]; - alloc_info->aux_stack[0 ] =kasan_save_stack (GFP_NOWAIT ); + alloc_meta->aux_stack[1 ] = alloc_meta->aux_stack[0 ]; + alloc_meta->aux_stack[0 ] =kasan_save_stack (GFP_NOWAIT ); } void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, {struct kasan_free_meta *free_meta; - free_meta =get_free_info (cache, object); + free_meta =kasan_get_free_meta (cache, object);kasan_set_track (&free_meta->free_track,GFP_NOWAIT );/*
@@ -367,5 +367,5 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache, {if (*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow (object) !=KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK )return NULL ; -return &get_free_info (cache, object)->free_track; +return &kasan_get_free_meta (cache, object)->free_track; }
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +2 -2
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, {struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta; - alloc_meta =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);kasan_set_track (&alloc_meta->free_track[0 ],GFP_NOWAIT ); }
@@ -65,6 +65,6 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache, {struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta; - alloc_meta =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);return &alloc_meta->free_track[0 ]; }
mm/kasan/kasan.h +4 -4
@@ -148,10 +148,10 @@ struct kasan_free_meta {#endif }; -struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info (struct kmem_cache *cache, -const void *object); -struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info (struct kmem_cache *cache, -const void *object); +struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object); +struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object);void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value);
mm/kasan/quarantine.c +2 -2
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)unsigned long flags;struct qlist_head *q;struct qlist_head temp =QLIST_INIT ; -struct kasan_free_meta *info =get_free_info (cache, object); +struct kasan_free_meta *meta =kasan_get_free_meta (cache, object);/* * Note: irq must be disabled until after we move the batch to the
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)local_irq_save (flags); q =this_cpu_ptr (&cpu_quarantine); -qlist_put (q, &info->quarantine_link, cache->size); +qlist_put (q, &meta->quarantine_link, cache->size);if (unlikely (q->bytes >QUARANTINE_PERCPU_SIZE )) {qlist_move_all (q, &temp);
mm/kasan/report.c +6 -6
@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,const void *addr,u8 tag) { -struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info =get_alloc_info (cache, object); +struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);if (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ) {struct kasan_track *free_track; -print_track (&alloc_info->alloc_track,"Allocated" ); +print_track (&alloc_meta->alloc_track,"Allocated" );pr_err ("\n" ); free_track =kasan_get_free_track (cache, object, tag);if (free_track) {
@@ -176,14 +176,14 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, }#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC -if (alloc_info->aux_stack[0 ]) { +if (alloc_meta->aux_stack[0 ]) {pr_err ("Last call_rcu():\n" ); -print_stack (alloc_info->aux_stack[0 ]); +print_stack (alloc_meta->aux_stack[0 ]);pr_err ("\n" ); } -if (alloc_info->aux_stack[1 ]) { +if (alloc_meta->aux_stack[1 ]) {pr_err ("Second to last call_rcu():\n" ); -print_stack (alloc_info->aux_stack[1 ]); +print_stack (alloc_meta->aux_stack[1 ]);pr_err ("\n" ); }#endif
mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c +1 -1
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)if (page &&PageSlab (page)) { cache = page->slab_cache; object =nearest_obj (cache, page, (void *)addr); - alloc_meta =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);for (i =0 ; i <KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS ; i++)if (alloc_meta->free_pointer_tag[i] == tag)
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +2 -2
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;u8 idx =0 ; - alloc_meta =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY idx = alloc_meta->free_track_idx;
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;int i =0 ; - alloc_meta =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY for (i =0 ; i <KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS ; i++) {
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 02/21] kasan: rename get_alloc/free_info
Quoted 9 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Rename
get_alloc_info()andget_free_info()tokasan_get_alloc_meta()andkasan_get_free_meta()to better reflect what those do and avoid confusion withkasan_set_free_info().No functional changes.
Quoted 244 lines
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 16 ++++++++-------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 12 ++++++------ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 4 ++-- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 8 ++++---- mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 4 ++-- mm/kasan/report.c | 12 ++++++------ mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 4 ++-- 8 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +8
-8@@ -175,14 +175,14 @@ size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0); } -struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info (struct kmem_cache *cache, -const void *object) +struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object) {return (void *)reset_tag (object) + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset; } -struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info (struct kmem_cache *cache, -const void *object) +struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object) {BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) >32 );return (void *)reset_tag (object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;@@ -259,13 +259,13 @@ static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,void *__must_check kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object) { -struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info; +struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;if (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))return (void *)object; - alloc_info =get_alloc_info (cache, object); -__memset (alloc_info,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_info)); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); +__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta));if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false));@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);if (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ) -kasan_set_track (&get_alloc_info (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags); +kasan_set_track (&kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);return set_tag (object, tag); }mm/kasan/generic.c +6
-6@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr) {struct page *page =kasan_addr_to_page (addr);struct kmem_cache *cache; -struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info; +struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;void *object;if (!(page &&PageSlab (page)))@@ -339,13 +339,13 @@ void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr) cache = page->slab_cache; object =nearest_obj (cache, page, addr); - alloc_info =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);/* * record the last two call_rcu() call stacks. */ - alloc_info->aux_stack[1 ] = alloc_info->aux_stack[0 ]; - alloc_info->aux_stack[0 ] =kasan_save_stack (GFP_NOWAIT ); + alloc_meta->aux_stack[1 ] = alloc_meta->aux_stack[0 ]; + alloc_meta->aux_stack[0 ] =kasan_save_stack (GFP_NOWAIT ); } void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, {struct kasan_free_meta *free_meta; - free_meta =get_free_info (cache, object); + free_meta =kasan_get_free_meta (cache, object);kasan_set_track (&free_meta->free_track,GFP_NOWAIT );/* @@ -367,5 +367,5 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache, {if (*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow (object) !=KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK )return NULL ; -return &get_free_info (cache, object)->free_track; +return &kasan_get_free_meta (cache, object)->free_track; }mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +2
-2@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, {struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta; - alloc_meta =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);kasan_set_track (&alloc_meta->free_track[0 ],GFP_NOWAIT ); }@@ -65,6 +65,6 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache, {struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta; - alloc_meta =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);return &alloc_meta->free_track[0 ]; }mm/kasan/kasan.h +4
-4@@ -148,10 +148,10 @@ struct kasan_free_meta {#endif }; -struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info (struct kmem_cache *cache, -const void *object); -struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info (struct kmem_cache *cache, -const void *object); +struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object); +struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object);void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value);mm/kasan/quarantine.c +2
-2@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)unsigned long flags;struct qlist_head *q;struct qlist_head temp =QLIST_INIT ; -struct kasan_free_meta *info =get_free_info (cache, object); +struct kasan_free_meta *meta =kasan_get_free_meta (cache, object);/* * Note: irq must be disabled until after we move the batch to the @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)local_irq_save (flags); q =this_cpu_ptr (&cpu_quarantine); -qlist_put (q, &info->quarantine_link, cache->size); +qlist_put (q, &meta->quarantine_link, cache->size);if (unlikely (q->bytes >QUARANTINE_PERCPU_SIZE )) {qlist_move_all (q, &temp);mm/kasan/report.c +6
-6@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,const void *addr,u8 tag) { -struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info =get_alloc_info (cache, object); +struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);if (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ) {struct kasan_track *free_track; -print_track (&alloc_info->alloc_track,"Allocated" ); +print_track (&alloc_meta->alloc_track,"Allocated" );pr_err ("\n" ); free_track =kasan_get_free_track (cache, object, tag);if (free_track) {@@ -176,14 +176,14 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, }#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC -if (alloc_info->aux_stack[0 ]) { +if (alloc_meta->aux_stack[0 ]) {pr_err ("Last call_rcu():\n" ); -print_stack (alloc_info->aux_stack[0 ]); +print_stack (alloc_meta->aux_stack[0 ]);pr_err ("\n" ); } -if (alloc_info->aux_stack[1 ]) { +if (alloc_meta->aux_stack[1 ]) {pr_err ("Second to last call_rcu():\n" ); -print_stack (alloc_info->aux_stack[1 ]); +print_stack (alloc_meta->aux_stack[1 ]);pr_err ("\n" ); }#endif mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c +1
-1@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)if (page &&PageSlab (page)) { cache = page->slab_cache; object =nearest_obj (cache, page, (void *)addr); - alloc_meta =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);for (i =0 ; i <KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS ; i++)if (alloc_meta->free_pointer_tag[i] == tag)mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +2
-3@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;u8 idx =0 ; - alloc_meta =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY idx = alloc_meta->free_track_idx;@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;int i =0 ; - alloc_meta =get_alloc_info (cache, object); + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY for (i =0 ; i <KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS ; i++) { --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 3/21 kasan: introduce set_alloc_info
In reply to Andrey KonovalovAdd set_alloc_info() helper and move kasan_set_track() into it. This will simplify the code for one of the upcoming changes.
No functional changes.
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +6 -1
@@ -318,6 +318,11 @@ bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)return __kasan_slab_free (cache, object, ip, true); } +static void set_alloc_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,gfp_t flags) +{ +kasan_set_track (&kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags); +} +static void *__kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object,size_t size,gfp_t flags,bool keep_tag) {
@@ -345,7 +350,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);if (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ) -kasan_set_track (&kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags); +set_alloc_info (cache, (void *)object, flags);return set_tag (object, tag); }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 03/21] kasan: introduce set_alloc_info
Quoted 8 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Add
set_alloc_info()helper and movekasan_set_track()into it. This will simplify the code for one of the upcoming changes.No functional changes.
Quoted 32 lines
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)mm/kasan/common.c +6
-2@@ -318,6 +318,11 @@ bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)return __kasan_slab_free (cache, object, ip, true); } +static void set_alloc_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,gfp_t flags) +{ +kasan_set_track (&kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags); +} +static void *__kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object,size_t size,gfp_t flags,bool keep_tag) {@@ -345,7 +350,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);if (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ) -kasan_set_track (&kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags); +set_alloc_info (cache, (void *)object, flags);return set_tag (object, tag); } --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 4/21 kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThere's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.
There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++---- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK mov x0, sp bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endif
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1 -1
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14 movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15 -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK /* * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack, * which we now need to unpoison.
include/linux/kasan.h +6 -4
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);
@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {} -static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}
@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) &&CONFIG_KASAN_STACK +void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); +#else +static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC void kasan_cache_shrink (struct kmem_cache *cache);
mm/kasan/common.c +2 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void) }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK static void __kasan_unpoison_stack (struct task_struct *task,const void *sp) {void *base =task_stack_page (task);
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark) kasan_unpoison_memory(base, watermark - base); } +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */ void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
Quoted 67 lines · Andrey Konovalov
There's a config option
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKthat has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.There's no need to unpoison stack when
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() whenCONFIG_KASAN_STACKis enabled.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++---- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1
-1@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK mov x0, sp bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endifarch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1
-1@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14 movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15 -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK /* * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack, * which we now need to unpoison.include/linux/kasan.h +0
-4@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {} -static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}
include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +1
-0@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) &&CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
&& defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) for consistency
Quoted 13 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +5
-0+void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); +#else +static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC void kasan_cache_shrink (struct kmem_cache *cache);mm/kasan/common.c +0
-0
mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_disable_current(void) · line 61
Quoted 4 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-0@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void) }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
#ifdef CONFIG_ is the form used toughout the kernel code
Quoted 14 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-1static void __kasan_unpoison_stack (struct task_struct *task,const void *sp) {void *base =task_stack_page (task);@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark) kasan_unpoison_memory(base, watermark - base); } +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */ void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) { --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
Quoted 28 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 26 lines · Andrey Konovalov
There's a config option
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKthat has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.There's no need to unpoison stack when
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() whenCONFIG_KASAN_STACKis enabled.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++---- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +0
-0@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume
Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume) · line 136
Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1
-1-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
And similarly here
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +0
-0mov x0, sp bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endifarch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +0
-0@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14 movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) · line 115
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1
-1-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
and here
Quoted 67 lines
Quoted 26 lines
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +0
-0/* * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack, * which we now need to unpoison.include/linux/kasan.h +0
-4@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {} -static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +1
-0@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) &&CONFIG_KASAN_STACK &&
defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)for consistencyQuoted 13 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +5
-0+void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); +#else +static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC void kasan_cache_shrink (struct kmem_cache *cache);mm/kasan/common.c +0
-0mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_disable_current(void) · line 61
Quoted 4 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-0@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void) }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK #ifdef
CONFIG_is the form used toughout the kernel codeQuoted 14 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-1static void __kasan_unpoison_stack (struct task_struct *task,const void *sp) {void *base =task_stack_page (task);@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark) kasan_unpoison_memory(base, watermark - base); } +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */ void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) { --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
In reply to Dmitry VyukovQuoted 68 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 66 lines · Andrey Konovalov
There's a config option
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKthat has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.There's no need to unpoison stack when
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() whenCONFIG_KASAN_STACKis enabled.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++---- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1
-1@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK mov x0, sp bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endifarch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1
-1@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14 movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15 -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK /* * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack, * which we now need to unpoison.include/linux/kasan.h +0
-4@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {} -static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166
Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +1
-0@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) &&CONFIG_KASAN_STACK &&
defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)for consistency
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.
Quoted 35 lines
Quoted 14 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +5
-0+void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); +#else +static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC void kasan_cache_shrink (struct kmem_cache *cache);mm/kasan/common.c +0
-0mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_disable_current(void) · line 61
Quoted 4 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-0@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void) }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK #ifdef
CONFIG_is the form used toughout the kernel codeQuoted 14 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-1static void __kasan_unpoison_stack (struct task_struct *task,const void *sp) {void *base =task_stack_page (task);@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark) kasan_unpoison_memory(base, watermark - base); } +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */ void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) { --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
Quoted 74 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 72 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov
There's a config option
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKthat has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.There's no need to unpoison stack when
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() whenCONFIG_KASAN_STACKis enabled.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++---- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1
-1@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK mov x0, sp bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endifarch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1
-1@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14 movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15 -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK /* * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack, * which we now need to unpoison.include/linux/kasan.h +0
-4@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {} -static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166
Quoted 1 line
include/linux/kasan.h +1
-0+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) &&CONFIG_KASAN_STACK &&
defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)for consistency
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.
Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.
config KASAN_STACK
- int - default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC - default 0 + bool + default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC + default n
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
Quoted 88 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 74 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 72 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov
There's a config option
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKthat has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.There's no need to unpoison stack when
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() whenCONFIG_KASAN_STACKis enabled.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++---- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1
-1@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK mov x0, sp bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endifarch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1
-1@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14 movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15 -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK /* * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack, * which we now need to unpoison.include/linux/kasan.h +0
-4@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {} -static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166
Quoted 1 line
include/linux/kasan.h +1
-0+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) &&CONFIG_KASAN_STACK &&
defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)for consistency
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.
config
KASAN_STACK
Review
Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +3
-3- int - default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC - default 0 + bool + default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC + default n
I wondered the same, but then looking at scripts/Makefile.kasan I think it's because we directly pass it to the compiler:
...
$(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \
...Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
Quoted 94 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 86 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 73 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 72 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov
There's a config option
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKthat has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.There's no need to unpoison stack when
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() whenCONFIG_KASAN_STACKis enabled.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++---- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1
-1@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK mov x0, sp bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endifarch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1
-1@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14 movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15 -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK /* * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack, * which we now need to unpoison.include/linux/kasan.h +0
-4@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {} -static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166
Quoted 1 line
include/linux/kasan.h +1
-0+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) &&CONFIG_KASAN_STACK &&
defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)for consistency
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.
config
KASAN_STACKReview
Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +3
-3- int - default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC - default 0 + bool + default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC + default n
Quoted 5 lines
I wondered the same, but then looking at
scripts/Makefile.kasanI think it's because we directly pass it to the compiler:... $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \ ...
Try this instead:
$(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(if $(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK),1,0)) \
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
Quoted 102 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 94 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 86 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 73 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 72 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov
There's a config option
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKthat has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.There's no need to unpoison stack when
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() whenCONFIG_KASAN_STACKis enabled.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++---- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1
-1@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK mov x0, sp bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endifarch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1
-1@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14 movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15 -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK /* * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack, * which we now need to unpoison.include/linux/kasan.h +0
-4@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {} -static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166
Quoted 1 line
include/linux/kasan.h +1
-0+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) &&CONFIG_KASAN_STACK &&
defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)for consistency
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.
config
KASAN_STACKReview
Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +3
-3- int - default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC - default 0 + bool + default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC + default nQuoted 5 lines
I wondered the same, but then looking at
scripts/Makefile.kasanI think it's because we directly pass it to the compiler:... $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \ ...
Quoted 3 lines
Try this instead:
$(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(if $(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK),1,0)) \
We could have just 1 config instead of 2 as well.
For gcc we could do no prompt and default value y, and for clang -- prompt and default value n. I think it should do what we need.
Vincenzo Frascino
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
Quoted 103 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 102 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 99 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 86 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 73 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 72 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov
There's a config option
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKthat has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.There's no need to unpoison stack when
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() whenCONFIG_KASAN_STACKis enabled.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++---- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1
-1@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume) */ bl cpu_do_resume -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK mov x0, sp bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endifarch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1
-1@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14 movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15 -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK /* * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack, * which we now need to unpoison.include/linux/kasan.h +0
-4@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {} -static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166
Quoted 1 line
include/linux/kasan.h +1
-0+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) &&CONFIG_KASAN_STACK &&
defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)for consistency
CONFIG_KASAN_STACKis different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.
config
KASAN_STACKReview
Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +3
-3- int - default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC - default 0 + bool + default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC + default nI wondered the same, but then looking at
scripts/Makefile.kasanI think it's because we directly pass it to the compiler:... $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \ ...
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Try this instead:
$(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(if $(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK),1,0)) \We could have just 1 config instead of 2 as well.
For gcc we could do no prompt and default value y, and for clang -- prompt and default value n. I think it should do what we need.
I agree with Catalin's proposal since it should simplify things.
Nit: 'default n' is the default hence I do not think it should be required explicitly.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Vincenzo
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
Quoted 28 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 17 lines
Review
Quoted 11 lines
Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.
config
KASAN_STACK(quoted diff) +3
-3- int - default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC - default 0 + bool + default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC + default nI wondered the same, but then looking at
scripts/Makefile.kasanI think it's because we directly pass it to the compiler:... $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \ ...Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Try this instead:
$(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(if $(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK),1,0)) \We could have just 1 config instead of 2 as well.
For gcc we could do no prompt and default value y, and for clang -- prompt and default value n. I think it should do what we need.
Quoted 4 lines
I agree with Catalin's proposal since it should simplify things.
Nit: 'default n' is the default hence I do not think it should be required explicitly.
Fixing this sounds like a good idea, but perhaps not as a part of this series, to not overinflate it even further.
I've filed a bug for this: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221
Vincenzo Frascino
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
Quoted 4 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Fixing this sounds like a good idea, but perhaps not as a part of this series, to not overinflate it even further.
I've filed a bug for this: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221
Fine by me.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Vincenzo
RFC PATCH v2 5/21 kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode
In reply to Andrey KonovalovEven though hardware tag-based mode currently doesn't support checking vmalloc allocations, it doesn't use shadow memory and works with VMAP_STACK as is.
--- arch/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ config VMAP_STACK default y bool "Use a virtually-mapped stack" depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK - depends on !KASAN || KASAN_VMALLOC + depends on !(KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS) || KASAN_VMALLOC help Enable this if you want the use virtually-mapped kernel stacks with guard pages. This causes kernel stack overflows to be
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 05/21] kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode
Quoted 16 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Even though hardware tag-based mode currently doesn't support checking vmalloc allocations, it doesn't use shadow memory and works with
VMAP_STACKas is.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/Kconfig +0
-0
arch/Kconfig config VMAP_STACK · line 871
Quoted 5 lines
arch/Kconfig +1
-1@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ config VMAP_STACK default y bool "Use a virtually-mapped stack" depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK - depends on !KASAN || KASAN_VMALLOC + depends on !(KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS) || KASAN_VMALLOC
I find it a bit simpler to interpret:
depends on !KASAN || KASAN_HW_TAGS || KASAN_VMALLOC
due to simpler structure. But maybe it's just me.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/Kconfig +0
-1help Enable this if you want the use virtually-mapped kernel stacks with guard pages. This causes kernel stack overflows to be --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 05/21] kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode
Quoted 26 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 16 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Even though hardware tag-based mode currently doesn't support checking vmalloc allocations, it doesn't use shadow memory and works with
VMAP_STACKas is.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/Kconfig +0
-0arch/Kconfig config VMAP_STACK · line 871
Quoted 5 lines
arch/Kconfig +1
-1@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ config VMAP_STACK default y bool "Use a virtually-mapped stack" depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK - depends on !KASAN || KASAN_VMALLOC + depends on !(KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS) || KASAN_VMALLOCI find it a bit simpler to interpret:
Quoted 3 lines
depends on !KASAN || KASAN_HW_TAGS || KASAN_VMALLOCdue to simpler structure. But maybe it's just me.
This looks better, will fix in the next version, thanks!
RFC PATCH v2 6/21 kasan: mark kasan_init_tags as __init
In reply to Andrey KonovalovSimilarly to kasan_init() mark kasan_init_tags() as __init.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 2 +- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -1
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) -void kasan_init_tags (void ); +void __init kasan_init_tags (void );void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr);
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@#include "kasan.h" -void kasan_init_tags (void ) +void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) {init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX ); }
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +1 -1
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state); -void kasan_init_tags (void ) +void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) {int cpu;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 06/21] kasan: mark kasan_init_tags as __init
Quoted 5 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Similarly to
kasan_init()markkasan_init_tags()as__init.
init_tags itself is not __init, but that's added in a different patch. I've commented on that patch.
Quoted 52 lines
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 2 +- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)include/linux/kasan.h +1
-1@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) -void kasan_init_tags (void ); +void __init kasan_init_tags (void );void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr);mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +1
-1@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@#include "kasan.h" -void kasan_init_tags (void ) +void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) {init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX ); }mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +1
-2@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state); -void kasan_init_tags (void ) +void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) {int cpu; --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
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Re: [PATCH RFC v2 06/21] kasan: mark kasan_init_tags as __init
Quoted 6 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 3 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Similarly to
kasan_init()markkasan_init_tags()as__init.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Reviewed-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
init_tagsitself is not__init, but that's added in a different patch. I've commented on that patch.
Will add that change to this patch, thanks! If we combine the two patch series, we can move this into the other one later. Thanks!
Quoted 53 lines
Quoted 53 lines
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 2 +- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)include/linux/kasan.h +1
-1@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) -void kasan_init_tags (void ); +void __init kasan_init_tags (void );void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr);mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +1
-1@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@#include "kasan.h" -void kasan_init_tags (void ) +void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) {init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX ); }mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +1
-2@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state); -void kasan_init_tags (void ) +void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) {int cpu; --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
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RFC PATCH v2 7/21 kasan, arm64: move initialization message
In reply to Andrey KonovalovTag-based KASAN modes are fully initialized with kasan_init_tags(), while the generic mode only requireds kasan_init(). Move the initialization message for tag-based modes into kasan_init_tags().
Also fix pr_fmt() usage for KASAN code: generic mode doesn't need it, tag-based modes should use "kasan:" instead of KBUILD_MODNAME.
--- arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 3 +++ mm/kasan/generic.c | 2 -- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 4 ++++ mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +3 -0
@@ -290,5 +290,8 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) {kasan_init_shadow ();kasan_init_depth (); +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) +/* CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS also requires kasan_init_tags(). */ pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); +#endif }
mm/kasan/generic.c +0 -2
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@* Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> */ -#define pr_fmt (fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt -#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/init.h>
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +4 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@* Author: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> */ +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "kasan: " fmt +#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/memory.h>
@@ -18,6 +20,8 @@void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) {init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX ); + +pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); }void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr)
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +3 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@* Author: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> */ -#define pr_fmt (fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "kasan: " fmt#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h>
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)for_each_possible_cpu (cpu)per_cpu (prng_state, cpu) = (u32 )get_cycles (); + +pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 07/21] kasan, arm64: move initialization message
Quoted 6 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Tag-based KASAN modes are fully initialized with
kasan_init_tags(), while the generic mode only requiredskasan_init(). Move the initialization message for tag-based modes intokasan_init_tags().Also fix
pr_fmt()usage for KASAN code: generic mode doesn't need it,
Why doesn't it need it? What's the difference with tag modes?
Quoted 1 line
tag-based modes should use "kasan:" instead of
KBUILD_MODNAME.
With generic KASAN I currently see:
[ 0.571473][ T0] kasan: KernelAddressSanitizer initialized
So KBUILD_MODNAME somehow works. Is there some difference between files?
Quoted 14 lines
Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 3 +++ mm/kasan/generic.c | 2 -- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 4 ++++ mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +0
-0
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c void __init kasan_init(void) · line 294
Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +2
-0@@ -290,5 +290,8 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) {kasan_init_shadow ();kasan_init_depth (); +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) +/* CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS also requires kasan_init_tags(). */
A bit cleaner way may be to introduce kasan_init_early() and kasan_init_late(). Late() will do tag init and always print the message.
Quoted 63 lines
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +1
-0pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); +#endif }mm/kasan/generic.c +0
-2@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@* Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> */ -#define pr_fmt (fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt -#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/init.h> mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +4
-0@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@* Author: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> */ +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "kasan: " fmt +#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/memory.h> @@ -18,6 +20,8 @@void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) {init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX ); + +pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); }void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr)mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +3
-2@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@* Author: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> */ -#define pr_fmt (fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "kasan: " fmt#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)for_each_possible_cpu (cpu)per_cpu (prng_state, cpu) = (u32 )get_cycles (); + +pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); }/* -- 2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 07/21] kasan, arm64: move initialization message
Quoted 10 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 6 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Tag-based KASAN modes are fully initialized with
kasan_init_tags(), while the generic mode only requiredskasan_init(). Move the initialization message for tag-based modes intokasan_init_tags().Also fix
pr_fmt()usage for KASAN code: generic mode doesn't need it,Why doesn't it need it? What's the difference with tag modes?
I need to reword the patch descriptions: it's not the mode that doesn't need it, it's the generic.c file, as it doesn't use any pr_*() functions.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
tag-based modes should use "kasan:" instead of
KBUILD_MODNAME.With generic KASAN I currently see:
[ 0.571473][ T0] kasan: KernelAddressSanitizer initializedSo
KBUILD_MODNAMEsomehow works. Is there some difference between files?
That code is printed from arch/xxx/mm/kasan_init*.c, which has its own pr_fmt defined.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 3 +++ mm/kasan/generic.c | 2 -- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 4 ++++ mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 14 lines
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c void __init kasan_init(void) · line 294
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +2
-0@@ -290,5 +290,8 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) {kasan_init_shadow ();kasan_init_depth (); +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) +/* CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS also requires kasan_init_tags(). */ A bit cleaner way may be to introduce
kasan_init_early()andkasan_init_late().Late()will do tag init and always print the message.
It appears we'll also need kasan_init_even_later() for some MTE-related stuff. I'll try to figure out some sane naming scheme here and include it into the next version.
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 07/21] kasan, arm64: move initialization message
Quoted 54 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 10 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 6 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Tag-based KASAN modes are fully initialized with
kasan_init_tags(), while the generic mode only requiredskasan_init(). Move the initialization message for tag-based modes intokasan_init_tags().Also fix
pr_fmt()usage for KASAN code: generic mode doesn't need it,Why doesn't it need it? What's the difference with tag modes?
I need to reword the patch descriptions: it's not the mode that doesn't need it, it's the
generic.cfile, as it doesn't use any pr_*() functions.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
tag-based modes should use "kasan:" instead of
KBUILD_MODNAME.With generic KASAN I currently see:
[ 0.571473][ T0] kasan: KernelAddressSanitizer initializedSo
KBUILD_MODNAMEsomehow works. Is there some difference between files?That code is printed from
arch/xxx/mm/kasan_init*.c, which has its ownpr_fmtdefined.Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 3 +++ mm/kasan/generic.c | 2 -- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 4 ++++ mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)Quoted 14 lines
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c void __init kasan_init(void) · line 294
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +2
-0@@ -290,5 +290,8 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) {kasan_init_shadow ();kasan_init_depth (); +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) +/* CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS also requires kasan_init_tags(). */ A bit cleaner way may be to introduce
kasan_init_early()andkasan_init_late().Late()will do tag init and always print the message.
Quoted 3 lines
It appears we'll also need
kasan_init_even_later()for some MTE-related stuff. I'll try to figure out some sane naming scheme here and include it into the next version.
Actually, it looks like some arches already have kasan_init_early/late() along with kasan_init(). I'd say we better keep those for generic KASAN mode, and kasan_init_tags() for tag-based modes.
RFC PATCH v2 8/21 kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stack
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThere's no need for __kasan_unpoison_stack() helper, as it's only currently used in a single place. Removing it also removes undeed arithmetic.
No functional changes.
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 12 +++--------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +3 -9
@@ -59,18 +59,12 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void)#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ #if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK -static void __kasan_unpoison_stack (struct task_struct *task,const void *sp) -{ -void *base =task_stack_page (task); -size_t size = sp - base; - -kasan_unpoison_memory (base, size); -} -/* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) { -__kasan_unpoison_stack (task,task_stack_page (task) +THREAD_SIZE ); +void *base =task_stack_page (task); + +kasan_unpoison_memory (base,THREAD_SIZE ); }/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 08/21] kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stack
Quoted 9 lines · Andrey Konovalov
There's no need for
__kasan_unpoison_stack()helper, as it's only currently used in a single place. Removing it also removes undeed arithmetic.No functional changes.
Quoted 33 lines
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 12 +++--------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +3
-10@@ -59,18 +59,12 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void)#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ #if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK -static void __kasan_unpoison_stack (struct task_struct *task,const void *sp) -{ -void *base =task_stack_page (task); -size_t size = sp - base; - -kasan_unpoison_memory (base, size); -} -/* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) { -__kasan_unpoison_stack (task,task_stack_page (task) +THREAD_SIZE ); +void *base =task_stack_page (task); + +kasan_unpoison_memory (base,THREAD_SIZE ); }/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */ --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 9/21 kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes
In reply to Andrey KonovalovUsing kasan_reset_tag() currently results in a function call. As it's called quite often from the allocator code this leads to a noticeable slowdown. Move it to include/linux/kasan.h and turn it into a static inline function.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 5 ++++- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 6 ++---- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 5 ----- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +4 -1
@@ -187,7 +187,10 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}void __init kasan_init_tags (void ); -void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr); +static inline void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr) +{ +return (void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag (addr); +}bool kasan_report (unsigned long addr,size_t size,bool is_write,unsigned long ip);
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -5
@@ -24,11 +24,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); } -void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr) -{ -return reset_tag (addr); -} -void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value) { set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -4
@@ -246,15 +246,13 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) return addr; }#endif -#ifndef arch_kasan_reset_tag -#define arch_kasan_reset_tag (addr) ((void *)(addr)) -#endif #ifndef arch_kasan_get_tag#define arch_kasan_get_tag (addr) 0#endif +/* kasan_reset_tag() defined in include/linux/kasan.h. */ +#define reset_tag (addr) ((void *)kasan_reset_tag(addr))#define set_tag (addr, tag) ((void *)arch_kasan_set_tag((addr), (tag))) -#define reset_tag (addr) ((void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr))#define get_tag (addr) arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)#ifndef arch_init_tags
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +0 -5
@@ -67,11 +67,6 @@ u8 random_tag(void)return (u8)(state % (KASAN_TAG_MAX +1 )); } -void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr) -{ -return reset_tag (addr); -} -bool check_memory_region (unsigned long addr,size_t size,bool write,unsigned long ret_ip) {
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 09/21] kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes
Quoted 20 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Using
kasan_reset_tag()currently results in a function call. As it's called quite often from the allocator code this leads to a noticeable slowdown. Move it toinclude/linux/kasan.hand turn it into a static inline function.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/kasan.h | 5 ++++- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 6 ++---- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 5 ----- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)include/linux/kasan.h +0
-0
include/linux/kasan.h static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {} · line 192
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +3
-1@@ -187,7 +187,10 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}void __init kasan_init_tags (void ); -void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr); +static inline void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr) +{ +return (void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag (addr);
It seems that all implementations already return (void *), so the cast is not needed.
Quoted 27 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +1
-0+}bool kasan_report (unsigned long addr,size_t size,bool is_write,unsigned long ip);mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0
-5@@ -24,11 +24,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); } -void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr) -{ -return reset_tag (addr); -} -void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value) { set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),mm/kasan/kasan.h +0
-0@@ -246,15 +246,13 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)return addr; }
mm/kasan/kasan.h static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) · line 254
Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2
-3#endif -#ifndef arch_kasan_reset_tag -#define arch_kasan_reset_tag (addr) ((void *)(addr)) -#endif #ifndef arch_kasan_get_tag#define arch_kasan_get_tag (addr) 0#endif +/* kasan_reset_tag() defined in include/linux/kasan.h. */ +#define reset_tag (addr) ((void *)kasan_reset_tag(addr))
The cast is not needed.
I would also now remove reset_tag entirely by replacing it with kasan_reset_tag. Having 2 names for the same thing does not add clarity.
Quoted 24 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +0
-1#define set_tag (addr, tag) ((void *)arch_kasan_set_tag((addr), (tag))) -#define reset_tag (addr) ((void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr))#define get_tag (addr) arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)#ifndef arch_init_tagsmm/kasan/sw_tags.c +0
-6@@ -67,11 +67,6 @@ u8 random_tag(void)return (u8)(state % (KASAN_TAG_MAX +1 )); } -void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr) -{ -return reset_tag (addr); -} -bool check_memory_region (unsigned long addr,size_t size,bool write,unsigned long ret_ip) { --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 09/21] kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes
Quoted 25 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 23 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Using
kasan_reset_tag()currently results in a function call. As it's called quite often from the allocator code this leads to a noticeable slowdown. Move it toinclude/linux/kasan.hand turn it into a static inline function.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/kasan.h | 5 ++++- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 6 ++---- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 5 ----- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)include/linux/kasan.h +0
-0@@ -187,7 +187,10 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}void __init kasan_init_tags (void );
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/kasan.h static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {} · line 192
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +3
-1-void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr); +static inline void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr) +{ +return (void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag (addr);It seems that all implementations already return (void *), so the cast is not needed.
arch_kasan_reset_tag() (->__tag_reset() -> __untagged_addr()) preserves the type of the argument, so the cast is needed.
Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 36 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +1
-0+}bool kasan_report (unsigned long addr,size_t size,bool is_write,unsigned long ip);mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0
-5@@ -24,11 +24,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); } -void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr) -{ -return reset_tag (addr); -} -void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value) { set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),mm/kasan/kasan.h +0
-3@@ -246,15 +246,13 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) return addr; }#endif -#ifndef arch_kasan_reset_tag -#define arch_kasan_reset_tag (addr) ((void *)(addr)) -#endif #ifndef arch_kasan_get_tag#define arch_kasan_get_tag (addr) 0#endif
Quoted 8 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) · line 254
Quoted 2 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2
-0+/* kasan_reset_tag() defined in include/linux/kasan.h. */ +#define reset_tag (addr) ((void *)kasan_reset_tag(addr))The cast is not needed.
I would also now remove
reset_tagentirely by replacing it withkasan_reset_tag. Having 2 names for the same thing does not add clarity.
Will remove it.
RFC PATCH v2 10/21 kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS
In reply to Andrey KonovalovUsing random_tag() currently results in a function call. Move its definition to mm/kasan/kasan.h and turn it into a static inline function for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function call.
--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -5
@@ -36,11 +36,6 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address)); } -u8 random_tag (void ) -{ -return get_random_tag (); -} -bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) {u8 ptr_tag =get_tag (addr);
mm/kasan/kasan.h +20 -17
@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ static inline bool addr_has_metadata(const void *addr)#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) +void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr); +#else +static inline void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr) { } +#endif +bool check_invalid_free (void *addr);void *find_first_bad_addr (void *addr,size_t size);
@@ -223,23 +229,6 @@ static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }static inline void quarantine_remove_cache (struct kmem_cache *cache) { }#endif -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) - -void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr); - -u8 random_tag (void ); - -#else - -static inline void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr) { } - -static inline u8 random_tag (void ) -{ -return 0 ; -} - -#endif -#ifndef arch_kasan_set_tagstatic inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag (const void *addr,u8 tag) {
@@ -273,6 +262,20 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)#define get_mem_tag (addr) arch_get_mem_tag(addr)#define set_mem_tag_range (addr, size, tag) arch_set_mem_tag_range((addr), (size), (tag)) +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS +u8 random_tag (void ); +#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) +static inline u8 random_tag (void ) +{ +return get_random_tag (); +} +#else +static inline u8 random_tag (void ) +{ +return 0 ; +} +#endif +/* * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 10/21] kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS
Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Using
random_tag()currently results in a function call. Move its definition tomm/kasan/kasan.hand turn it into a static inline function for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function call.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0
-5@@ -36,11 +36,6 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address)); } -u8 random_tag (void ) -{ -return get_random_tag (); -} -bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) {u8 ptr_tag =get_tag (addr);mm/kasan/kasan.h +6
-17@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ static inline bool addr_has_metadata(const void *addr)#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) +void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr); +#else +static inline void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr) { } +#endif +bool check_invalid_free (void *addr);void *find_first_bad_addr (void *addr,size_t size);@@ -223,23 +229,6 @@ static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }static inline void quarantine_remove_cache (struct kmem_cache *cache) { }#endif -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) - -void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr); - -u8 random_tag (void ); - -#else - -static inline void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr) { } - -static inline u8 random_tag (void ) -{ -return 0 ; -} - -#endif -#ifndef arch_kasan_set_tagstatic inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag (const void *addr,u8 tag) {
mm/kasan/kasan.h static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) · line 270
Quoted 9 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6
-0@@ -273,6 +262,20 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)#define get_mem_tag (addr) arch_get_mem_tag(addr)#define set_mem_tag_range (addr, size, tag) arch_set_mem_tag_range((addr), (size), (tag)) +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS +u8 random_tag (void ); +#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) +static inline u8 random_tag (void ) +{ +return get_random_tag ();
What's the difference between random_tag() and get_random_tag()? Do we need both?
Quoted 14 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +8
-1+} +#else +static inline u8 random_tag (void ) +{ +return 0 ; +} +#endif +/* * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations. -- 2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 10/21] kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS
Quoted 75 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 73 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Using
random_tag()currently results in a function call. Move its definition tomm/kasan/kasan.hand turn it into a static inline function for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function call.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0
-5@@ -36,11 +36,6 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address)); } -u8 random_tag (void ) -{ -return get_random_tag (); -} -bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) {u8 ptr_tag =get_tag (addr);mm/kasan/kasan.h +6
-17@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ static inline bool addr_has_metadata(const void *addr)#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) +void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr); +#else +static inline void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr) { } +#endif +bool check_invalid_free (void *addr);void *find_first_bad_addr (void *addr,size_t size);@@ -223,23 +229,6 @@ static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }static inline void quarantine_remove_cache (struct kmem_cache *cache) { }#endif -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) - -void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr); - -u8 random_tag (void ); - -#else - -static inline void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr) { } - -static inline u8 random_tag (void ) -{ -return 0 ; -} - -#endif -#ifndef arch_kasan_set_tagstatic inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag (const void *addr,u8 tag) {@@ -273,6 +262,20 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)#define get_mem_tag (addr) arch_get_mem_tag(addr)#define set_mem_tag_range (addr, size, tag) arch_set_mem_tag_range((addr), (size), (tag))
Quoted 9 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) · line 270
Quoted 6 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS +u8 random_tag (void ); +#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) +static inline u8 random_tag (void ) +{ +return get_random_tag ();What's the difference between
random_tag()andget_random_tag()? Do we need both?
Not really. Will simplify this in the next version and give cleaner names.
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 10/21] kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS
Quoted 87 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 75 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 73 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Using
random_tag()currently results in a function call. Move its definition tomm/kasan/kasan.hand turn it into a static inline function for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function call.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0
-5@@ -36,11 +36,6 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address)); } -u8 random_tag (void ) -{ -return get_random_tag (); -} -bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) {u8 ptr_tag =get_tag (addr);mm/kasan/kasan.h +6
-17@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ static inline bool addr_has_metadata(const void *addr)#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) +void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr); +#else +static inline void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr) { } +#endif +bool check_invalid_free (void *addr);void *find_first_bad_addr (void *addr,size_t size);@@ -223,23 +229,6 @@ static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }static inline void quarantine_remove_cache (struct kmem_cache *cache) { }#endif -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) - -void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr); - -u8 random_tag (void ); - -#else - -static inline void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr) { } - -static inline u8 random_tag (void ) -{ -return 0 ; -} - -#endif -#ifndef arch_kasan_set_tagstatic inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag (const void *addr,u8 tag) {@@ -273,6 +262,20 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)#define get_mem_tag (addr) arch_get_mem_tag(addr)#define set_mem_tag_range (addr, size, tag) arch_set_mem_tag_range((addr), (size), (tag))Quoted 9 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) · line 270
Quoted 6 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS +u8 random_tag (void ); +#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) +static inline u8 random_tag (void ) +{ +return get_random_tag ();What's the difference between
random_tag()andget_random_tag()? Do we need both?
Quoted 1 line
Not really. Will simplify this in the next version and give cleaner names.
Actually I think I'll keep both for the next version, but rename get_random_tag() into hw_get_random_tag() along with other hw-specific calls. The idea is to have hw_*() calls for things that are implemented by the hardware for HW_TAGS, and then define random_tag() based on that for HW_TAGS and based on a software implementation for SW_TAGS.
RFC PATCH v2 11/21 kasan: inline kasan_poison_memory and check_invalid_free
In reply to Andrey KonovalovUsing kasan_poison_memory() or check_invalid_free() currently results in function calls. Move their definitions to mm/kasan/kasan.h and turn them into static inline functions for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function calls.
--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 15 --------------- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -15
@@ -24,27 +24,12 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); } -void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value) -{ -set_mem_tag_range (reset_tag (address), -round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ), value); -} -void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {set_mem_tag_range (reset_tag (address),round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ),get_tag (address)); } -bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) -{ -u8 ptr_tag =get_tag (addr); -u8 mem_tag =get_mem_tag (addr); - -return (mem_tag ==KASAN_TAG_INVALID ) || - (ptr_tag !=KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && ptr_tag != mem_tag); -} -void kasan_set_free_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,u8 tag) {
mm/kasan/kasan.h +24 -4
@@ -153,8 +153,6 @@ struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object); -void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value); -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem (const void *shadow_addr)
@@ -194,8 +192,6 @@ void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);static inline void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr) { }#endif -bool check_invalid_free (void *addr); -void *find_first_bad_addr (void *addr,size_t size);const char *get_bug_type (struct kasan_access_info *info);void metadata_fetch_row (char *buffer,void *row);
@@ -276,6 +272,30 @@ static inline u8 random_tag(void) }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS + +static inline void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value) +{ +set_mem_tag_range (reset_tag (address), +round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ), value); +} + +static inline bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) +{ +u8 ptr_tag =get_tag (addr); +u8 mem_tag =get_mem_tag (addr); + +return (mem_tag ==KASAN_TAG_INVALID ) || + (ptr_tag !=KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && ptr_tag != mem_tag); +} + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ + +void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value); +bool check_invalid_free (void *addr); + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ +/* * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 11/21] kasan: inline kasan_poison_memory and check_invalid_free
Quoted 8 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Using
kasan_poison_memory()orcheck_invalid_free()currently results in function calls. Move their definitions tomm/kasan/kasan.hand turn them into static inline functions for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function calls.
Quoted 97 lines
--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 15 --------------- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0
-15@@ -24,27 +24,12 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); } -void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value) -{ -set_mem_tag_range (reset_tag (address), -round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ), value); -} -void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {set_mem_tag_range (reset_tag (address),round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ),get_tag (address)); } -bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) -{ -u8 ptr_tag =get_tag (addr); -u8 mem_tag =get_mem_tag (addr); - -return (mem_tag ==KASAN_TAG_INVALID ) || - (ptr_tag !=KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && ptr_tag != mem_tag); -} -void kasan_set_free_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,u8 tag) {mm/kasan/kasan.h +24
-5@@ -153,8 +153,6 @@ struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object); -void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value); -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem (const void *shadow_addr)@@ -194,8 +192,6 @@ void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);static inline void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr) { }#endif -bool check_invalid_free (void *addr); -void *find_first_bad_addr (void *addr,size_t size);const char *get_bug_type (struct kasan_access_info *info);void metadata_fetch_row (char *buffer,void *row);@@ -276,6 +272,30 @@ static inline u8 random_tag(void) }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS + +static inline void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value) +{ +set_mem_tag_range (reset_tag (address), +round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ), value); +} + +static inline bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) +{ +u8 ptr_tag =get_tag (addr); +u8 mem_tag =get_mem_tag (addr); + +return (mem_tag ==KASAN_TAG_INVALID ) || + (ptr_tag !=KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && ptr_tag != mem_tag); +} + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ + +void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value); +bool check_invalid_free (void *addr); + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ +/* * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations. -- 2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
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RFC PATCH v2 12/21 kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory
In reply to Andrey KonovalovCurrently kasan_unpoison_memory() is used as both an external annotation and as internal memory poisoning helper. Rename external annotation to kasan_unpoison_data() and inline the internal helper for for hardware tag-based mode to avoid undeeded function calls.
There's the external annotation kasan_unpoison_slab() that is currently defined as static inline and uses kasan_unpoison_memory(). With this change it's turned into a function call. Overall, this results in the same number of calls for hardware tag-based mode as kasan_unpoison_memory() is now inlined.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++---------- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/common.c | 10 ++++++++++ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 6 ------ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 7 +++++++ mm/slab_common.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +6 -10
@@ -66,14 +66,15 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN -void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size,slab_flags_t *flags); +void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size); +void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr); +void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page);void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object);void kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object);
@@ -98,11 +99,6 @@ struct kasan_cache {int free_meta_offset; }; -size_t __ksize (const void *); -static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) -{ -kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr,__ksize (ptr)); -}size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache);bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot (void );
@@ -110,8 +106,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);#else /* CONFIG_KASAN */ -static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}
@@ -119,6 +113,9 @@ static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, slab_flags_t *flags) {} +static inline void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) { } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) { } +static inline void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) {}static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) {}
@@ -158,7 +155,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, return false; } -static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) { }static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) {return 0 ; }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
kernel/fork.c +1 -1
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)continue ;/* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */ -kasan_unpoison_memory (s->addr,THREAD_SIZE ); +kasan_unpoison_data (s->addr,THREAD_SIZE );/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */ memset (s->addr,0 ,THREAD_SIZE );
mm/kasan/common.c +10 -0
@@ -184,6 +184,16 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,return (void *)reset_tag (object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset; } +void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) +{ +kasan_unpoison_memory (address, size); +} + +void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) +{ +kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr,__ksize (ptr)); +} +void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) {unsigned long i;
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -6
@@ -24,12 +24,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); } -void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) -{ -set_mem_tag_range (reset_tag (address), -round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ),get_tag (address)); -} -void kasan_set_free_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,u8 tag) {
mm/kasan/kasan.h +7 -0
@@ -280,6 +280,12 @@ static inline void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 valu round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value); } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) +{ +set_mem_tag_range (reset_tag (address), +round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ),get_tag (address)); +} +static inline bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) {u8 ptr_tag =get_tag (addr);
@@ -292,6 +298,7 @@ static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value); +void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size);bool check_invalid_free (void *addr);#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
mm/slab_common.c +1 -1
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)* We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area, * so we need to unpoison this area. */ -kasan_unpoison_memory (objp, size); +kasan_unpoison_data (objp, size);return size; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (ksize);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 12/21] kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory
Quoted 11 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Currently
kasan_unpoison_memory()is used as both an external annotation and as internal memory poisoning helper. Rename external annotation tokasan_unpoison_data()and inline the internal helper for for hardware tag-based mode to avoid undeeded function calls.There's the external annotation
kasan_unpoison_slab()that is currently defined as static inline and useskasan_unpoison_memory(). With this change it's turned into a function call. Overall, this results in the same number of calls for hardware tag-based mode askasan_unpoison_memory()is now inlined.
Can't we leave kasan_unpoison_slab as is? Or there are other reasons to uninline it?
It seems that uninling it is orthogonal to the rest of this patch.
Quoted 164 lines
Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++---------- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/common.c | 10 ++++++++++ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 6 ------ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 7 +++++++ mm/slab_common.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)include/linux/kasan.h +6
-10@@ -66,14 +66,15 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN -void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size,slab_flags_t *flags); +void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size); +void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr); +void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page);void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object);void kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object);@@ -98,11 +99,6 @@ struct kasan_cache {int free_meta_offset; }; -size_t __ksize (const void *); -static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) -{ -kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr,__ksize (ptr)); -}size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache);bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot (void );@@ -110,8 +106,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);#else /* CONFIG_KASAN */ -static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}@@ -119,6 +113,9 @@ static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, slab_flags_t *flags) {} +static inline void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) { } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) { } +static inline void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) {}static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) {}@@ -158,7 +155,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, return false; } -static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) { }static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) {return 0 ; }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ kernel/fork.c +1
-1@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)continue ;/* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */ -kasan_unpoison_memory (s->addr,THREAD_SIZE ); +kasan_unpoison_data (s->addr,THREAD_SIZE );/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */ memset (s->addr,0 ,THREAD_SIZE );mm/kasan/common.c +10
-0@@ -184,6 +184,16 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,return (void *)reset_tag (object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset; } +void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) +{ +kasan_unpoison_memory (address, size); +} + +void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) +{ +kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr,__ksize (ptr)); +} +void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) {unsigned long i;mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0
-6@@ -24,12 +24,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); } -void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) -{ -set_mem_tag_range (reset_tag (address), -round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ),get_tag (address)); -} -void kasan_set_free_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,u8 tag) {mm/kasan/kasan.h +7
-0@@ -280,6 +280,12 @@ static inline void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 valu round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value); } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size) +{ +set_mem_tag_range (reset_tag (address), +round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ),get_tag (address)); +} +static inline bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) {u8 ptr_tag =get_tag (addr);@@ -292,6 +298,7 @@ static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ void kasan_poison_memory (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value); +void kasan_unpoison_memory (const void *address,size_t size);bool check_invalid_free (void *addr);#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ mm/slab_common.c +1
-2@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)* We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area, * so we need to unpoison this area. */ -kasan_unpoison_memory (objp, size); +kasan_unpoison_data (objp, size);return size; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (ksize); --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 12/21] kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory
Quoted 8 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 6 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Currently
kasan_unpoison_memory()is used as both an external annotation and as internal memory poisoning helper. Rename external annotation tokasan_unpoison_data()and inline the internal helper for for hardware tag-based mode to avoid undeeded function calls.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
There's the external annotation
kasan_unpoison_slab()that is currently defined as static inline and useskasan_unpoison_memory(). With this change it's turned into a function call. Overall, this results in the same number of calls for hardware tag-based mode askasan_unpoison_memory()is now inlined.Can't we leave
kasan_unpoison_slabas is? Or there are other reasons to uninline it?
Just to have cleaner kasan.h callbacks definitions.
Quoted 1 line
It seems that uninling it is orthogonal to the rest of this patch.
I can split it out into a separate patch if you think this makes sense?
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 12/21] kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory
Quoted 13 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 13 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 11 lines
Currently
kasan_unpoison_memory()is used as both an external annotation and as internal memory poisoning helper. Rename external annotation tokasan_unpoison_data()and inline the internal helper for for hardware tag-based mode to avoid undeeded function calls.There's the external annotation
kasan_unpoison_slab()that is currently defined as static inline and useskasan_unpoison_memory(). With this change it's turned into a function call. Overall, this results in the same number of calls for hardware tag-based mode askasan_unpoison_memory()is now inlined.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Can't we leave
kasan_unpoison_slabas is? Or there are other reasons to uninline it?Just to have cleaner
kasan.hcallbacks definitions.Quoted 1 line
It seems that uninling it is orthogonal to the rest of this patch.
I can split it out into a separate patch if you think this makes sense?
I don't have a strong opinion either way.
RFC PATCH v2 13/21 arm64: kasan: Add cpu_supports_tags helper
In reply to Andrey KonovalovAdd an arm64 helper called cpu_supports_mte() that exposes information about whether the CPU supports memory tagging and that can be called during early boot (unlike system_supports_mte()).
Use that helper to implement a generic cpu_supports_tags() helper, that will be used by hardware tag-based KASAN.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h | 6 ++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +1 -0
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ static inline const void *__tag_set(const void *addr, u8 tag) }#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +#define arch_cpu_supports_tags () cpu_supports_mte()#define arch_init_tags (max_tag) mte_init_tags(max_tag)#define arch_get_random_tag () mte_get_random_tag()#define arch_get_mem_tag (addr) mte_get_mem_tag(addr)
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h +6 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/types.h> /*
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ u8 mte_get_random_tag(void);void *mte_set_mem_tag_range (void *addr,size_t size,u8 tag);void mte_init_tags (u64 max_tag); +bool __init cpu_supports_mte (void );#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */
@@ -54,6 +56,10 @@ static inline void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)static inline void mte_init_tags (u64 max_tag) { } +static inline bool cpu_supports_mte (void ) +{ +return false; +}#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */
arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c +20 -0
@@ -134,6 +134,26 @@ void mte_init_tags(u64 max_tag) gcr_kernel_excl = ~incl &SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK ; } +/* +* This function can be used during early boot to determine whether the CPU +* supports MTE. The alternative that must be used after boot is completed is +* system_supports_mte(), but it only works after the cpufeature framework +* learns about MTE. +*/ +bool __init cpu_supports_mte (void ) +{ +u64 pfr1; +u32 val; + +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_MTE )) +return false; + + pfr1 =read_cpuid (ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 ); + val =cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field (pfr1,ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT ); + +return val >=ID_AA64PFR1_MTE ; +} +static void update_sctlr_el1_tcf0 (u64 tcf0) {/* ISB required for the kernel uaccess routines */
mm/kasan/kasan.h +4 -0
@@ -240,6 +240,9 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)#define set_tag (addr, tag) ((void *)arch_kasan_set_tag((addr), (tag)))#define get_tag (addr) arch_kasan_get_tag(addr) +#ifndef arch_cpu_supports_tags +#define arch_cpu_supports_tags () (false) +#endif #ifndef arch_init_tags#define arch_init_tags (max_tag)#endif
@@ -253,6 +256,7 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)#define arch_set_mem_tag_range (addr, size, tag) ((void *)(addr))#endif +#define cpu_supports_tags () arch_cpu_supports_tags()#define init_tags (max_tag) arch_init_tags(max_tag)#define get_random_tag () arch_get_random_tag()#define get_mem_tag (addr) arch_get_mem_tag(addr)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 13/21] arm64: kasan: Add cpu_supports_tags helper
Quoted 10 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Add an arm64 helper called
cpu_supports_mte()that exposes information about whether the CPU supports memory tagging and that can be called during early boot (unlikesystem_supports_mte()).Use that helper to implement a generic
cpu_supports_tags()helper, that will be used by hardware tag-based KASAN.
Quoted 106 lines
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h | 6 ++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +1
-0@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ static inline const void *__tag_set(const void *addr, u8 tag) }#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +#define arch_cpu_supports_tags () cpu_supports_mte()#define arch_init_tags (max_tag) mte_init_tags(max_tag)#define arch_get_random_tag () mte_get_random_tag()#define arch_get_mem_tag (addr) mte_get_mem_tag(addr)arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h +6
-0@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/types.h> /* @@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ u8 mte_get_random_tag(void);void *mte_set_mem_tag_range (void *addr,size_t size,u8 tag);void mte_init_tags (u64 max_tag); +bool __init cpu_supports_mte (void );#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ @@ -54,6 +56,10 @@ static inline void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)static inline void mte_init_tags (u64 max_tag) { } +static inline bool cpu_supports_mte (void ) +{ +return false; +}#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c +20
-0@@ -134,6 +134,26 @@ void mte_init_tags(u64 max_tag) gcr_kernel_excl = ~incl &SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK ; } +/* +* This function can be used during early boot to determine whether the CPU +* supports MTE. The alternative that must be used after boot is completed is +* system_supports_mte(), but it only works after the cpufeature framework +* learns about MTE. +*/ +bool __init cpu_supports_mte (void ) +{ +u64 pfr1; +u32 val; + +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_MTE )) +return false; + + pfr1 =read_cpuid (ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 ); + val =cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field (pfr1,ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT ); + +return val >=ID_AA64PFR1_MTE ; +} +static void update_sctlr_el1_tcf0 (u64 tcf0) {/* ISB required for the kernel uaccess routines */ mm/kasan/kasan.h +4
-1@@ -240,6 +240,9 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)#define set_tag (addr, tag) ((void *)arch_kasan_set_tag((addr), (tag)))#define get_tag (addr) arch_kasan_get_tag(addr) +#ifndef arch_cpu_supports_tags +#define arch_cpu_supports_tags () (false) +#endif #ifndef arch_init_tags#define arch_init_tags (max_tag)#endif @@ -253,6 +256,7 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)#define arch_set_mem_tag_range (addr, size, tag) ((void *)(addr))#endif +#define cpu_supports_tags () arch_cpu_supports_tags()#define init_tags (max_tag) arch_init_tags(max_tag)#define get_random_tag () arch_get_random_tag()#define get_mem_tag (addr) arch_get_mem_tag(addr) --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 14/21 kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters
In reply to Andrey KonovalovTODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 92 +++++++++++++----------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 ++ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 9 +++ mm/kasan/report.c | 14 +++- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 5 ++ 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +51 -41
@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,unsigned int redzone_size;int redzone_adjust; -/* Add alloc meta. */ - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); - -/* Add free meta. */ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && - (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || - cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ); - } - - redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); - redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); -if (redzone_adjust >0 ) - *size += redzone_adjust; - - *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, -max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { +/* Add alloc meta. */ + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; + *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); + +/* Add free meta. */ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && + (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || + cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; + *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ); + } -/* -* If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all. -*/ -if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset || - *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) { - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset =0 ; - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset =0 ; - *size = orig_size; -return ; + redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); + redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); +if (redzone_adjust >0 ) + *size += redzone_adjust; + + *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, +max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); + +/* +* If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all. +*/ +if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset || + *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) { + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset =0 ; + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset =0 ; + *size = orig_size; +return ; + } } *flags |=SLAB_KASAN ;
@@ -165,10 +167,12 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) { -return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ? -sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ) :0 ) + - (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ? -sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) :0 ); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) +return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ? +sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ) :0 ) + + (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ? +sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) :0 ); +return 0 ; } struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
@@ -270,8 +274,10 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,if (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))return (void *)object; - alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); -__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); +__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); + }if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false));
@@ -308,15 +314,19 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, rounded_up_size =round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );kasan_poison_memory (object, rounded_up_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE ); -if ((IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && !quarantine) || -unlikely (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))) -return false; +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { +if ((IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && !quarantine) || +unlikely (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))) +return false; + +kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); -kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); +quarantine_put (cache, object); -quarantine_put (cache, object); +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); + } -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); +return false; }bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip)
@@ -355,7 +365,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,kasan_poison_memory ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE ); -if (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ) +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack) && (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))set_alloc_info (cache, (void *)object, flags);return set_tag (object, tag);
mm/kasan/generic.c +5 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@#include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" +/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_stack); +/* * All functions below always inlined so compiler could * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +168 -1
184 lines not on this page · raw message
mm/kasan/kasan.h +9 -0
@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@#ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H#define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H +#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/stackdepot.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_stack); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_stack); +#endif + +extern bool kasan_panic__ro_after_init ; +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)#else
mm/kasan/report.c +12 -2
@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags) panic_on_warn =0 ;panic ("panic_on_warn set ...\n" ); } +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +if (kasan_panic) +panic ("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n" ); +#endif kasan_enable_current (); }
@@ -159,8 +163,8 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, (void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size)); } -static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, -const void *addr,u8 tag) +static void describe_object_stacks (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +const void *addr,u8 tag) {struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);
@@ -188,7 +192,13 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, }#endif } +} +static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +const void *addr,u8 tag) +{ +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) +describe_object_stacks (cache, object, addr, tag);describe_object_addr (cache, object, addr); }
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +5 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@#include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" +/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_stack); + static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);void __init kasan_init_tags (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters
Quoted 258 lines · Andrey Konovalov
TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- mm/kasan/common.c | 92 +++++++++++++----------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 ++ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 9 +++ mm/kasan/report.c | 14 +++- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 5 ++ 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +51
-41@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,unsigned int redzone_size;int redzone_adjust; -/* Add alloc meta. */ - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); - -/* Add free meta. */ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && - (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || - cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ); - } - - redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); - redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); -if (redzone_adjust >0 ) - *size += redzone_adjust; - - *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, -max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { +/* Add alloc meta. */ + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; + *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); + +/* Add free meta. */ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && + (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || + cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; + *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ); + } -/* -* If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all. -*/ -if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset || - *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) { - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset =0 ; - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset =0 ; - *size = orig_size; -return ; + redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); + redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); +if (redzone_adjust >0 ) + *size += redzone_adjust; + + *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, +max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); + +/* +* If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all. +*/ +if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset || + *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) { + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset =0 ; + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset =0 ; + *size = orig_size; +return ; + } } *flags |=SLAB_KASAN ;@@ -165,10 +167,12 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) { -return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ? -sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ) :0 ) + - (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ? -sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) :0 ); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) +return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ? +sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ) :0 ) + + (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ? +sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) :0 ); +return 0 ; } struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,@@ -270,8 +274,10 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,if (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))return (void *)object; - alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); -__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); +__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); + }if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false));@@ -308,15 +314,19 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, rounded_up_size =round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );kasan_poison_memory (object, rounded_up_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE ); -if ((IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && !quarantine) || -unlikely (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))) -return false; +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { +if ((IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && !quarantine) || +unlikely (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))) +return false; + +kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); -kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); +quarantine_put (cache, object); -quarantine_put (cache, object); +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); + } -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); +return false; }bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip)@@ -355,7 +365,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,kasan_poison_memory ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE ); -if (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ) +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack) && (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))set_alloc_info (cache, (void *)object, flags);return set_tag (object, tag);mm/kasan/generic.c +5
-0@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@#include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" +/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_stack); +/* * All functions below always inlined so compiler could * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +77
-0@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@#define pr_fmt (fmt) "kasan: " fmt +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/memory.h> @@ -17,10 +19,175 @@#include "kasan.h" +enum kasan_arg_mode { +KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF , +KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD , +KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_stack { +KASAN_ARG_STACK_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF , +KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_trap { +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC , +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_fault { +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT , +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC , +}; + +static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_stack kasan_arg_stack__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_trap kasan_arg_trap__ro_after_init ; + +/* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); + +/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (kasan_stack); + +/* Whether to use synchronous or asynchronous tag checking. */ +static bool kasan_sync__ro_after_init ; + +/* Whether panic or disable tag checking on fault. */ +bool kasan_panic__ro_after_init ; + +/* kasan.mode=off/prod/full */ +static int __init early_kasan_mode (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"off" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"prod" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"full" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.mode" , early_kasan_mode); + +/* kasan.stack=off/on */ +static int __init early_kasan_stack (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"off" )) + kasan_arg_stack =KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"on" )) + kasan_arg_stack =KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ;
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c line 106
Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +10
-0+} +early_param ("kasan.stack" , early_kasan_stack); + +/* kasan.trap=sync/async */ +static int __init early_kasan_trap (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"ASYNC" ))
Why is this "ASYNC" and not "async"?
Quoted 170 lines
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +81
-1+ kasan_arg_trap =KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC ; + else if (!strcmp(arg, "sync")) + kasan_arg_trap =KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC ; + else + return -EINVAL; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.trap" , early_kasan_trap); + +/* kasan.fault=report/panic */ +static int __init early_kasan_fault (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"report" )) + kasan_arg_fault =KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"panic" )) + kasan_arg_fault =KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.fault" , early_kasan_fault); +void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) { -init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX ); +if (!cpu_supports_tags ()) +return ; + +/* First, preset values based on the mode. */ + +switch (kasan_arg_mode) { +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF : +return ; +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_enabled); +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_enabled); +static_branch_enable (&kasan_stack); + kasan_sync = true; +break ; + } + +/* Now, optionally override the presets. */ +switch (kasan_arg_stack) { +case KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF : +static_branch_disable (&kasan_stack); +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_stack); +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +switch (kasan_arg_trap) { +case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC : + kasan_sync = false; +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC : + kasan_sync = true; +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +switch (kasan_arg_fault) { +case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT : + kasan_panic = false; +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC : + kasan_panic = true; +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +/* TODO: choose between sync and async based on kasan_sync. */ +init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX );pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); }mm/kasan/kasan.h +9
-0@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@#ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H#define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H +#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/stackdepot.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_stack); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_stack); +#endif + +extern bool kasan_panic__ro_after_init ; +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)#else mm/kasan/report.c +12
-2@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags) panic_on_warn =0 ;panic ("panic_on_warn set ...\n" ); } +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +if (kasan_panic) +panic ("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n" ); +#endif kasan_enable_current (); }@@ -159,8 +163,8 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, (void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size)); } -static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, -const void *addr,u8 tag) +static void describe_object_stacks (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +const void *addr,u8 tag) {struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);@@ -188,7 +192,13 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, }#endif } +} +static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +const void *addr,u8 tag) +{ +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) +describe_object_stacks (cache, object, addr, tag);describe_object_addr (cache, object, addr); }mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +5
-1@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@#include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" +/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_stack); + static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters
Quoted 264 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 262 lines · Andrey Konovalov
TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- mm/kasan/common.c | 92 +++++++++++++----------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 ++ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 9 +++ mm/kasan/report.c | 14 +++- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 5 ++ 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +51
-41@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,unsigned int redzone_size;int redzone_adjust; -/* Add alloc meta. */ - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); - -/* Add free meta. */ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && - (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || - cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ); - } - - redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); - redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); -if (redzone_adjust >0 ) - *size += redzone_adjust; - - *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, -max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { +/* Add alloc meta. */ + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; + *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); + +/* Add free meta. */ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && + (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || + cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; + *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ); + } -/* -* If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all. -*/ -if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset || - *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) { - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset =0 ; - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset =0 ; - *size = orig_size; -return ; + redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); + redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); +if (redzone_adjust >0 ) + *size += redzone_adjust; + + *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, +max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); + +/* +* If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all. +*/ +if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset || + *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) { + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset =0 ; + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset =0 ; + *size = orig_size; +return ; + } } *flags |=SLAB_KASAN ;@@ -165,10 +167,12 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) { -return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ? -sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ) :0 ) + - (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ? -sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) :0 ); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) +return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ? +sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ) :0 ) + + (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ? +sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) :0 ); +return 0 ; } struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,@@ -270,8 +274,10 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,if (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))return (void *)object; - alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); -__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { + alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); +__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); + }if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false));@@ -308,15 +314,19 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, rounded_up_size =round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );kasan_poison_memory (object, rounded_up_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE ); -if ((IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && !quarantine) || -unlikely (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))) -return false; +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { +if ((IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && !quarantine) || +unlikely (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))) +return false; + +kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); -kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); +quarantine_put (cache, object); -quarantine_put (cache, object); +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); + } -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); +return false; }bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip)@@ -355,7 +365,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,kasan_poison_memory ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE ); -if (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ) +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack) && (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))set_alloc_info (cache, (void *)object, flags);return set_tag (object, tag);mm/kasan/generic.c +5
-0@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@#include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" +/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_stack); +/* * All functions below always inlined so compiler could * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +81
-0@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@#define pr_fmt (fmt) "kasan: " fmt +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/memory.h> @@ -17,10 +19,175 @@#include "kasan.h" +enum kasan_arg_mode { +KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF , +KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD , +KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_stack { +KASAN_ARG_STACK_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF , +KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_trap { +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC , +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_fault { +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT , +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC , +}; + +static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_stack kasan_arg_stack__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_trap kasan_arg_trap__ro_after_init ; + +/* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); + +/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (kasan_stack); + +/* Whether to use synchronous or asynchronous tag checking. */ +static bool kasan_sync__ro_after_init ; + +/* Whether panic or disable tag checking on fault. */ +bool kasan_panic__ro_after_init ; + +/* kasan.mode=off/prod/full */ +static int __init early_kasan_mode (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"off" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"prod" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"full" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.mode" , early_kasan_mode); + +/* kasan.stack=off/on */ +static int __init early_kasan_stack (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"off" )) + kasan_arg_stack =KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"on" )) + kasan_arg_stack =KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.stack" , early_kasan_stack); + +/* kasan.trap=sync/async */
Quoted 8 lines
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c line 106
Quoted 6 lines
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +6
-0+static int __init early_kasan_trap (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"ASYNC" ))Why is this "ASYNC" and not "async"?
Typo, will fix in the next version. Thanks!
Quoted 171 lines
Quoted 171 lines
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +81
-1+ kasan_arg_trap =KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC ; + else if (!strcmp(arg, "sync")) + kasan_arg_trap =KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC ; + else + return -EINVAL; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.trap" , early_kasan_trap); + +/* kasan.fault=report/panic */ +static int __init early_kasan_fault (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"report" )) + kasan_arg_fault =KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"panic" )) + kasan_arg_fault =KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.fault" , early_kasan_fault); +void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) { -init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX ); +if (!cpu_supports_tags ()) +return ; + +/* First, preset values based on the mode. */ + +switch (kasan_arg_mode) { +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF : +return ; +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_enabled); +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_enabled); +static_branch_enable (&kasan_stack); + kasan_sync = true; +break ; + } + +/* Now, optionally override the presets. */ +switch (kasan_arg_stack) { +case KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF : +static_branch_disable (&kasan_stack); +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_stack); +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +switch (kasan_arg_trap) { +case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC : + kasan_sync = false; +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC : + kasan_sync = true; +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +switch (kasan_arg_fault) { +case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT : + kasan_panic = false; +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC : + kasan_panic = true; +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +/* TODO: choose between sync and async based on kasan_sync. */ +init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX );pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); }mm/kasan/kasan.h +9
-0@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@#ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H#define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H +#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/stackdepot.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_stack); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_stack); +#endif + +extern bool kasan_panic__ro_after_init ; +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)#else mm/kasan/report.c +12
-2@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags) panic_on_warn =0 ;panic ("panic_on_warn set ...\n" ); } +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +if (kasan_panic) +panic ("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n" ); +#endif kasan_enable_current (); }@@ -159,8 +163,8 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, (void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size)); } -static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, -const void *addr,u8 tag) +static void describe_object_stacks (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +const void *addr,u8 tag) {struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);@@ -188,7 +192,13 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, }#endif } +} +static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +const void *addr,u8 tag) +{ +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) +describe_object_stacks (cache, object, addr, tag);describe_object_addr (cache, object, addr); }mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +5
-1@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@#include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" +/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_stack); + static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters
In reply to Andrey KonovalovQuoted 33 lines · Andrey Konovalov
TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- mm/kasan/common.c | 92 +++++++++++++----------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 ++ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 9 +++ mm/kasan/report.c | 14 +++- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 5 ++ 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +0
-10@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,unsigned int redzone_size;int redzone_adjust; -/* Add alloc meta. */ - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); - -/* Add free meta. */ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && - (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || - cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta );
mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, · line 132
Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-9- } - - redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); - redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); -if (redzone_adjust >0 ) - *size += redzone_adjust; - - *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, -max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) {
Initially I thought kasan_stack is related to stack instrumentation. And then wondered why we check it during slab creation.
I suggest giving it a slightly longer and more descriptive name.
... reading code further, it also disables quarantine, right? Something to mention somewhere.
Quoted 60 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +35
-13+/* Add alloc meta. */ + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; + *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); + +/* Add free meta. */ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && + (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || + cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; + *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ); + } -/* -* If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all. -*/ -if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset || - *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) { - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset =0 ; - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset =0 ; - *size = orig_size; -return ; + redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); + redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); +if (redzone_adjust >0 ) + *size += redzone_adjust; + + *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, +max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); + +/* +* If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all. +*/ +if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset || + *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) { + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset =0 ; + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset =0 ; + *size = orig_size; +return ; + } } *flags |=SLAB_KASAN ;@@ -165,10 +167,12 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) { -return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ? -sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ) :0 ) + - (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ? -sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) :0 ); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) +return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ? +sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ) :0 ) + + (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ? +sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) :0 ); +return 0 ; } struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
mm/kasan/common.c void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, · line 277
Quoted 6 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-2@@ -270,8 +274,10 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,if (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))return (void *)object; - alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); -__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) {
Interestingly, now SLAB_KASAN is always set when kasan_stack is not enabled. So it seems to me we can move the SLAB_KASAN check into this unlikely branch now.
Quoted 254 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +14
-7+ alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); +__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); + }if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false));@@ -308,15 +314,19 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, rounded_up_size =round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );kasan_poison_memory (object, rounded_up_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE ); -if ((IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && !quarantine) || -unlikely (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))) -return false; +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { +if ((IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && !quarantine) || +unlikely (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))) +return false; + +kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); -kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); +quarantine_put (cache, object); -quarantine_put (cache, object); +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); + } -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); +return false; }bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip)@@ -355,7 +365,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,kasan_poison_memory ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE ); -if (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ) +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack) && (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))set_alloc_info (cache, (void *)object, flags);return set_tag (object, tag);mm/kasan/generic.c +5
-0@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@#include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" +/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_stack); +/* * All functions below always inlined so compiler could * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +168
-1@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@#define pr_fmt (fmt) "kasan: " fmt +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/memory.h> @@ -17,10 +19,175 @@#include "kasan.h" +enum kasan_arg_mode { +KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF , +KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD , +KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_stack { +KASAN_ARG_STACK_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF , +KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_trap { +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC , +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_fault { +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT , +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC , +}; + +static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_stack kasan_arg_stack__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_trap kasan_arg_trap__ro_after_init ; + +/* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); + +/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (kasan_stack); + +/* Whether to use synchronous or asynchronous tag checking. */ +static bool kasan_sync__ro_after_init ; + +/* Whether panic or disable tag checking on fault. */ +bool kasan_panic__ro_after_init ; + +/* kasan.mode=off/prod/full */ +static int __init early_kasan_mode (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"off" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"prod" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"full" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.mode" , early_kasan_mode); + +/* kasan.stack=off/on */ +static int __init early_kasan_stack (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"off" )) + kasan_arg_stack =KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"on" )) + kasan_arg_stack =KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.stack" , early_kasan_stack); + +/* kasan.trap=sync/async */ +static int __init early_kasan_trap (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"ASYNC" )) + kasan_arg_trap =KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"sync" )) + kasan_arg_trap =KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.trap" , early_kasan_trap); + +/* kasan.fault=report/panic */ +static int __init early_kasan_fault (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"report" )) + kasan_arg_fault =KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"panic" )) + kasan_arg_fault =KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.fault" , early_kasan_fault); +void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) { -init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX ); +if (!cpu_supports_tags ()) +return ; + +/* First, preset values based on the mode. */ + +switch (kasan_arg_mode) { +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF : +return ; +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_enabled); +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_enabled); +static_branch_enable (&kasan_stack); + kasan_sync = true; +break ; + } + +/* Now, optionally override the presets. */ +switch (kasan_arg_stack) { +case KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF : +static_branch_disable (&kasan_stack); +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_stack); +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +switch (kasan_arg_trap) { +case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC : + kasan_sync = false; +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC : + kasan_sync = true; +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +switch (kasan_arg_fault) { +case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT : + kasan_panic = false; +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC : + kasan_panic = true; +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +/* TODO: choose between sync and async based on kasan_sync. */ +init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX );pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); }mm/kasan/kasan.h +0
-0@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@#ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H#define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
mm/kasan/kasan.h line 13
Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6
-0+#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/stackdepot.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_stack); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_stack); +#endif
kasan_stack and kasan_enabled make sense and changed only in hw_tags mode. It would be cleaner (and faster for other modes) to abstract static keys as:
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
#include <linux/jump_label.h> DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_stack);
static inline bool kasan_stack_collection_enabled()
{
return static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack);
}
#else
static inline bool kasan_stack_collection_enabled() { return true; } #endif
This way we don't need to include and define static keys for other modes.
Quoted 64 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2
-0+extern bool kasan_panic__ro_after_init ; +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)#else mm/kasan/report.c +12
-2@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags) panic_on_warn =0 ;panic ("panic_on_warn set ...\n" ); } +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +if (kasan_panic) +panic ("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n" ); +#endif kasan_enable_current (); }@@ -159,8 +163,8 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, (void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size)); } -static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, -const void *addr,u8 tag) +static void describe_object_stacks (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +const void *addr,u8 tag) {struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);@@ -188,7 +192,13 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, }#endif } +} +static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +const void *addr,u8 tag) +{ +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) +describe_object_stacks (cache, object, addr, tag);describe_object_addr (cache, object, addr); }mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +5
-1@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@#include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" +/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_stack); + static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters
Quoted 41 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 39 lines · Andrey Konovalov
TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- mm/kasan/common.c | 92 +++++++++++++----------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 ++ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 9 +++ mm/kasan/report.c | 14 +++- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 5 ++ 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +0
-16@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,unsigned int redzone_size;int redzone_adjust; -/* Add alloc meta. */ - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); - -/* Add free meta. */ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && - (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || - cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ); - } - - redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); - redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); -if (redzone_adjust >0 ) - *size += redzone_adjust;
Quoted 8 lines
mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, · line 132
Quoted 4 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-3- - *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, -max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) {Initially I thought
kasan_stackis related to stack instrumentation. And then wondered why we check it during slab creation.
I suggest giving it a slightly longer and more descriptive name.
Will do.
Quoted 2 lines
... reading code further, it also disables quarantine, right? Something to mention somewhere.
Quarantine is not supported for anything but generic KASAN. Maybe it makes sense to put this into documentation...
Quoted 63 lines
Quoted 63 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +35
-13+/* Add alloc meta. */ + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; + *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); + +/* Add free meta. */ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && + (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || + cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; + *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ); + } -/* -* If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all. -*/ -if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset || - *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) { - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset =0 ; - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset =0 ; - *size = orig_size; -return ; + redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); + redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); +if (redzone_adjust >0 ) + *size += redzone_adjust; + + *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, +max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); + +/* +* If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all. +*/ +if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset || + *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) { + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset =0 ; + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset =0 ; + *size = orig_size; +return ; + } } *flags |=SLAB_KASAN ;@@ -165,10 +167,12 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) { -return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ? -sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ) :0 ) + - (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ? -sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) :0 ); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) +return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ? +sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ) :0 ) + + (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ? +sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) :0 ); +return 0 ; } struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,@@ -270,8 +274,10 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,if (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))return (void *)object;
Quoted 7 lines
mm/kasan/common.c void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, · line 277
Quoted 3 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-2- alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); -__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) {Interestingly, now
SLAB_KASANis always set whenkasan_stackis not enabled. So it seems to me we can move theSLAB_KASANcheck into this unlikely branch now.
Yes, will fix. I'll also include a complete rework of SLAB_KASAN into the next version.
Quoted 280 lines
Quoted 255 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +14
-7+ alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object); +__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); + }if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false));@@ -308,15 +314,19 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, rounded_up_size =round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );kasan_poison_memory (object, rounded_up_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE ); -if ((IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && !quarantine) || -unlikely (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))) -return false; +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { +if ((IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && !quarantine) || +unlikely (!(cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))) +return false; + +kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); -kasan_set_free_info (cache, object, tag); +quarantine_put (cache, object); -quarantine_put (cache, object); +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); + } -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ); +return false; }bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip)@@ -355,7 +365,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,kasan_poison_memory ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE ); -if (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ) +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack) && (cache->flags &SLAB_KASAN ))set_alloc_info (cache, (void *)object, flags);return set_tag (object, tag);mm/kasan/generic.c +5
-0@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@#include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" +/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_stack); +/* * All functions below always inlined so compiler could * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +168
-1@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@#define pr_fmt (fmt) "kasan: " fmt +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/memory.h> @@ -17,10 +19,175 @@#include "kasan.h" +enum kasan_arg_mode { +KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF , +KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD , +KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_stack { +KASAN_ARG_STACK_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF , +KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_trap { +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC , +KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC , +}; + +enum kasan_arg_fault { +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT , +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT , +KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC , +}; + +static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_stack kasan_arg_stack__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault__ro_after_init ; +static enum kasan_arg_trap kasan_arg_trap__ro_after_init ; + +/* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); + +/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (kasan_stack); + +/* Whether to use synchronous or asynchronous tag checking. */ +static bool kasan_sync__ro_after_init ; + +/* Whether panic or disable tag checking on fault. */ +bool kasan_panic__ro_after_init ; + +/* kasan.mode=off/prod/full */ +static int __init early_kasan_mode (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"off" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"prod" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"full" )) + kasan_arg_mode =KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.mode" , early_kasan_mode); + +/* kasan.stack=off/on */ +static int __init early_kasan_stack (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"off" )) + kasan_arg_stack =KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"on" )) + kasan_arg_stack =KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.stack" , early_kasan_stack); + +/* kasan.trap=sync/async */ +static int __init early_kasan_trap (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"ASYNC" )) + kasan_arg_trap =KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"sync" )) + kasan_arg_trap =KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.trap" , early_kasan_trap); + +/* kasan.fault=report/panic */ +static int __init early_kasan_fault (char *arg) +{ +if (!arg) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!strcmp (arg,"report" )) + kasan_arg_fault =KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"panic" )) + kasan_arg_fault =KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC ; +else +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("kasan.fault" , early_kasan_fault); +void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) { -init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX ); +if (!cpu_supports_tags ()) +return ; + +/* First, preset values based on the mode. */ + +switch (kasan_arg_mode) { +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF : +return ; +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_enabled); +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_enabled); +static_branch_enable (&kasan_stack); + kasan_sync = true; +break ; + } + +/* Now, optionally override the presets. */ +switch (kasan_arg_stack) { +case KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF : +static_branch_disable (&kasan_stack); +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON : +static_branch_enable (&kasan_stack); +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +switch (kasan_arg_trap) { +case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC : + kasan_sync = false; +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC : + kasan_sync = true; +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +switch (kasan_arg_fault) { +case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT : + kasan_panic = false; +break ; +case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC : + kasan_panic = true; +break ; +default : +break ; + } + +/* TODO: choose between sync and async based on kasan_sync. */ +init_tags (KASAN_TAG_MAX );pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); }mm/kasan/kasan.h +0
-0@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@#ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H#define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_Hmm/kasan/kasan.h line 13
Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6
-0+#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/stackdepot.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_stack); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_stack); +#endif
kasan_stackandkasan_enabledmake sense and changed only inhw_tagsmode. It would be cleaner (and faster for other modes) to abstract static keys as:#ifdef
CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
#include <linux/jump_label.h>DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_stack);
static inline boolkasan_stack_collection_enabled()
{
returnstatic_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack);
}
#else
static inline boolkasan_stack_collection_enabled(){ return true; } #endif
Quoted 1 line
This way we don't need to include and define static keys for other modes.
Sounds good, will do.
Quoted 65 lines
Quoted 65 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2
-0+extern bool kasan_panic__ro_after_init ; +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)#else mm/kasan/report.c +12
-2@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags) panic_on_warn =0 ;panic ("panic_on_warn set ...\n" ); } +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +if (kasan_panic) +panic ("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n" ); +#endif kasan_enable_current (); }@@ -159,8 +163,8 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, (void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size)); } -static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, -const void *addr,u8 tag) +static void describe_object_stacks (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +const void *addr,u8 tag) {struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta =kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object);@@ -188,7 +192,13 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, }#endif } +} +static void describe_object (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +const void *addr,u8 tag) +{ +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) +describe_object_stacks (cache, object, addr, tag);describe_object_addr (cache, object, addr); }mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +5
-1@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@#include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" +/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_enabled); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_enabled); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO (kasan_stack); + static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);void __init kasan_init_tags (void ) --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters
In reply to Andrey KonovalovQuoted 33 lines · Andrey Konovalov
TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- mm/kasan/common.c | 92 +++++++++++++----------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 ++ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 9 +++ mm/kasan/report.c | 14 +++- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 5 ++ 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +0
-10@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,unsigned int redzone_size;int redzone_adjust; -/* Add alloc meta. */ - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); - -/* Add free meta. */ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && - (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || - cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta );
mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, · line 132
Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-9- } - - redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); - redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); -if (redzone_adjust >0 ) - *size += redzone_adjust; - - *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, -max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) {
I just looked at this file in your Github repo, and noticed that this could just be
if (!static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
return;
since the if-block ends at the function. That might hopefully make the diff a bit smaller.
Thanks,
-- Marco
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters
Quoted 49 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 33 lines · Andrey Konovalov
TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- mm/kasan/common.c | 92 +++++++++++++----------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 ++ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 9 +++ mm/kasan/report.c | 14 +++- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 5 ++ 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +0
-10@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,unsigned int redzone_size;int redzone_adjust; -/* Add alloc meta. */ - cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_alloc_meta ); - -/* Add free meta. */ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && - (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor || - cache->object_size <sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ))) { - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size; - *size +=sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta );mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, · line 132
Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1
-9- } - - redzone_size =optimal_redzone (cache->object_size); - redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size); -if (redzone_adjust >0 ) - *size += redzone_adjust; - - *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, -max (*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size)); +if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) {I just looked at this file in your Github repo, and noticed that this could just be
Quoted 5 lines
if (!static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
return;since the if-block ends at the function. That might hopefully make the diff a bit smaller.
Will do, thanks!
RFC PATCH v2 15/21 kasan: check kasan_enabled in annotations
In reply to Andrey KonovalovDeclare the kasan_enabled static key in include/linux/kasan.h and in include/linux/mm.h and check it in all kasan annotations. This allows to avoid any slowdown caused by function calls when kasan_enabled is disabled.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 210 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- include/linux/mm.h | 27 ++++-- mm/kasan/common.c | 60 ++++++------ 3 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +160 -50
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@#ifndef _LINUX_KASAN_H#define _LINUX_KASAN_H +#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/types.h> struct kmem_cache ;
@@ -66,40 +67,154 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); -void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); +struct kasan_cache { +int alloc_meta_offset; +int free_meta_offset; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_enabled); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_enabled); +#endif -void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size, -slab_flags_t *flags); +void __kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); +static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_alloc_pages (page, order); +} -void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr); +void __kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); +static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_free_pages (page, order); +} -void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page); -void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); -void kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); -void *__must_check kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache, -const void *object); +void __kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size, +slab_flags_t *flags); +static inline void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache, +unsigned int *size,slab_flags_t *flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_cache_create (cache, size, flags); +} -void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size, -gfp_t flags); -void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); -void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); -void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, -size_t size,gfp_t flags); -void *__must_check kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t new_size, -gfp_t flags); +size_t __kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache); +static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_metadata_size (cache); +return 0 ; +} -void *__must_check kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, -gfp_t flags); -bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,unsigned long ip); +void __kasan_unpoison_data (const void *addr,size_t size); +static inline void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *addr,size_t size) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_unpoison_data (addr, size); +} -struct kasan_cache { -int alloc_meta_offset; -int free_meta_offset; -}; +void __kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr); +static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_unpoison_slab (ptr); +} + +void __kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page); +static inline void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_poison_slab (page); +} + +void __kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); +static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_unpoison_object_data (cache, object); +} + +void __kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); +static inline void kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_poison_object_data (cache, object); +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_init_slab_obj (cache, object); +return (void *)object; +} + +bool __kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,unsigned long ip); +static inline bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,unsigned long ip) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_slab_free (s, object, ip); +return false; +} -size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache); +void *__must_check __kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s, +void *object,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s, +void *object,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_slab_alloc (s, object, flags); +return object; +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, +size_t size,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, +size_t size,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_kmalloc (s, object, size, flags); +return (void *)object; +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr, +size_t size,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr, +size_t size,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_kmalloc_large (ptr, size, flags); +return (void *)ptr; +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_krealloc (const void *object, +size_t new_size,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_krealloc (const void *object, +size_t new_size,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_krealloc (object, new_size, flags); +return (void *)object; +} + +void __kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); +static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_poison_kfree (ptr, ip); +} + +void __kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); +static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_kfree_large (ptr, ip); +}bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot (void );void kasan_restore_multi_shot (bool enabled);
@@ -108,14 +223,12 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {} -static inline void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size,slab_flags_t *flags) {} - -static inline void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) { } -static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) { } - +static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) {return 0 ; } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) {} +static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) {}static inline void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) {}static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) {}
@@ -126,36 +239,33 @@ static inline void *kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, {return (void *)object; } - -static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large (void *ptr,size_t size,gfp_t flags) +static inline bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, +unsigned long ip) { -return ptr; +return false; } -static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {} -static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {} -static inline void *kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, -size_t size,gfp_t flags) +static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, +gfp_t flags) { -return (void *)object; +return object; } -static inline void *kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t new_size, -gfp_t flags) +static inline void *kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, +size_t size,gfp_t flags) {return (void *)object; } -static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, -gfp_t flags) +static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size,gfp_t flags) { -return object; +return (void *)ptr; } -static inline bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, -unsigned long ip) +static inline void *kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t new_size, +gfp_t flags) { -return false; +return (void *)object; } - -static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) {return 0 ; } +static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {} +static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {}#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
include/linux/mm.h +21 -6
@@ -1412,22 +1412,36 @@ static inline bool cpupid_match_pid(struct task_struct *task, int cpupid)#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */ #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_enabled); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_enabled); +#endif +static inline u8 page_kasan_tag (const struct page *page) { -return (page->flags >>KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ) &KASAN_TAG_MASK ; +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return (page->flags >>KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ) &KASAN_TAG_MASK ; +return 0xff ; }static inline void page_kasan_tag_set (struct page *page,u8 tag) { - page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ); - page->flags |= (tag &KASAN_TAG_MASK ) <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ; +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) { + page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ); + page->flags |= (tag &KASAN_TAG_MASK ) <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ; + } }static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset (struct page *page) { -page_kasan_tag_set (page,0xff ); +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +page_kasan_tag_set (page,0xff ); } -#else + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ +static inline u8 page_kasan_tag (const struct page *page) {return 0xff ;
@@ -1435,7 +1449,8 @@ static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)static inline void page_kasan_tag_set (struct page *page,u8 tag) { }static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset (struct page *page) { } -#endif + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ static inline struct zone *page_zone (const struct page *page) {
mm/kasan/common.c +30 -30
169 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 15/21] kasan: check kasan_enabled in annotations
Quoted 40 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Declare the
kasan_enabledstatic key ininclude/linux/kasan.hand ininclude/linux/mm.hand check it in all kasan annotations. This allows to avoid any slowdown caused by function calls whenkasan_enabledis disabled.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/kasan.h | 210 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- include/linux/mm.h | 27 ++++-- mm/kasan/common.c | 60 ++++++------ 3 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)include/linux/kasan.h +9
-2@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@#ifndef _LINUX_KASAN_H#define _LINUX_KASAN_H +#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/types.h> struct kmem_cache ;@@ -66,40 +67,154 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); -void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); +struct kasan_cache { +int alloc_meta_offset; +int free_meta_offset; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_enabled); +#else
include/linux/kasan.h static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {} · line 85
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +7
-2+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_enabled); +#endif -void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size, -slab_flags_t *flags); +void __kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); +static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_alloc_pages (page, order);
The patch looks fine per se, but I think with the suggestion in the previous patch, this should be:
if (kasan_is_enabled())
__kasan_alloc_pages(page, order);No overhead for other modes and less logic duplication.
Quoted 474 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +144
-46+} -void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr); +void __kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); +static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_free_pages (page, order); +} -void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page); -void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); -void kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); -void *__must_check kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache, -const void *object); +void __kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size, +slab_flags_t *flags); +static inline void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache, +unsigned int *size,slab_flags_t *flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_cache_create (cache, size, flags); +} -void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size, -gfp_t flags); -void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); -void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); -void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, -size_t size,gfp_t flags); -void *__must_check kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t new_size, -gfp_t flags); +size_t __kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache); +static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_metadata_size (cache); +return 0 ; +} -void *__must_check kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, -gfp_t flags); -bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,unsigned long ip); +void __kasan_unpoison_data (const void *addr,size_t size); +static inline void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *addr,size_t size) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_unpoison_data (addr, size); +} -struct kasan_cache { -int alloc_meta_offset; -int free_meta_offset; -}; +void __kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr); +static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_unpoison_slab (ptr); +} + +void __kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page); +static inline void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_poison_slab (page); +} + +void __kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); +static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_unpoison_object_data (cache, object); +} + +void __kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); +static inline void kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_poison_object_data (cache, object); +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_init_slab_obj (cache, object); +return (void *)object; +} + +bool __kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,unsigned long ip); +static inline bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,unsigned long ip) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_slab_free (s, object, ip); +return false; +} -size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache); +void *__must_check __kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s, +void *object,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s, +void *object,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_slab_alloc (s, object, flags); +return object; +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, +size_t size,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, +size_t size,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_kmalloc (s, object, size, flags); +return (void *)object; +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr, +size_t size,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr, +size_t size,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_kmalloc_large (ptr, size, flags); +return (void *)ptr; +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_krealloc (const void *object, +size_t new_size,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_krealloc (const void *object, +size_t new_size,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_krealloc (object, new_size, flags); +return (void *)object; +} + +void __kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); +static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_poison_kfree (ptr, ip); +} + +void __kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); +static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_kfree_large (ptr, ip); +}bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot (void );void kasan_restore_multi_shot (bool enabled);@@ -108,14 +223,12 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {} -static inline void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size,slab_flags_t *flags) {} - -static inline void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) { } -static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) { } - +static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) {return 0 ; } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) {} +static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) {}static inline void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) {}static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) {}@@ -126,36 +239,33 @@ static inline void *kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, {return (void *)object; } - -static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large (void *ptr,size_t size,gfp_t flags) +static inline bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, +unsigned long ip) { -return ptr; +return false; } -static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {} -static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {} -static inline void *kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, -size_t size,gfp_t flags) +static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, +gfp_t flags) { -return (void *)object; +return object; } -static inline void *kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t new_size, -gfp_t flags) +static inline void *kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, +size_t size,gfp_t flags) {return (void *)object; } -static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, -gfp_t flags) +static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size,gfp_t flags) { -return object; +return (void *)ptr; } -static inline bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, -unsigned long ip) +static inline void *kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t new_size, +gfp_t flags) { -return false; +return (void *)object; } - -static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) {return 0 ; } +static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {} +static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {}#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ include/linux/mm.h +21
-6@@ -1412,22 +1412,36 @@ static inline bool cpupid_match_pid(struct task_struct *task, int cpupid)#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */ #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_enabled); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_enabled); +#endif +static inline u8 page_kasan_tag (const struct page *page) { -return (page->flags >>KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ) &KASAN_TAG_MASK ; +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return (page->flags >>KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ) &KASAN_TAG_MASK ; +return 0xff ; }static inline void page_kasan_tag_set (struct page *page,u8 tag) { - page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ); - page->flags |= (tag &KASAN_TAG_MASK ) <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ; +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) { + page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ); + page->flags |= (tag &KASAN_TAG_MASK ) <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ; + } }static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset (struct page *page) { -page_kasan_tag_set (page,0xff ); +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +page_kasan_tag_set (page,0xff ); } -#else + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ +static inline u8 page_kasan_tag (const struct page *page) {return 0xff ;@@ -1435,7 +1449,8 @@ static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)static inline void page_kasan_tag_set (struct page *page,u8 tag) { }static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset (struct page *page) { } -#endif + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ static inline struct zone *page_zone (const struct page *page) {mm/kasan/common.c +30
-31@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark) }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */ -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) +void __kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {u8 tag;unsigned long i;@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)kasan_unpoison_memory (page_address (page),PAGE_SIZE << order); } -void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) +void __kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {if (likely (!PageHighMem (page))) kasan_poison_memory(page_address(page),@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ static inline unsigned int optimal_redzone(unsigned int object_size) object_size <= (1 <<16 ) -1024 ?1024 :2048 ; } -void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size, -slab_flags_t *flags) +void __kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size, +slab_flags_t *flags) {unsigned int orig_size = *size;unsigned int redzone_size;@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, *flags |=SLAB_KASAN ; } -size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) +size_t __kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) {if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?@@ -188,17 +188,17 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,return (void *)reset_tag (object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset; } -void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) +void __kasan_unpoison_data (const void *addr,size_t size) { -kasan_unpoison_memory (address, size); +kasan_unpoison_memory (addr, size); } -void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) +void __kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) {kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr,__ksize (ptr)); } -void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) +void __kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) {unsigned long i;@@ -208,12 +208,12 @@ void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); } -void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) +void __kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) {kasan_unpoison_memory (object, cache->object_size); } -void kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) +void __kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) { kasan_poison_memory(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,#endif } -void *__must_check kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache, +void *__must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object) {struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,return (void *)object; } -static bool __kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +static bool ____kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip,bool quarantine) {u8 tag;@@ -329,9 +329,9 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,return false; } -bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip) +bool __kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip) { -return __kasan_slab_free (cache, object, ip, true); +return ____kasan_slab_free (cache, object, ip, true); }static void set_alloc_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,gfp_t flags)@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)kasan_set_track (&kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags); } -static void *__kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object, +static void *____kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object,size_t size,gfp_t flags,bool keep_tag) {unsigned long redzone_start;@@ -371,20 +371,20 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,return set_tag (object, tag); } -void *__must_check kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, -gfp_t flags) +void *__must_check __kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *cache, +void *object,gfp_t flags) { -return __kasan_kmalloc (cache, object, cache->object_size, flags, false); +return ____kasan_kmalloc (cache, object, cache->object_size, flags, false); } -void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object, -size_t size,gfp_t flags) +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object, +size_t size,gfp_t flags) { -return __kasan_kmalloc (cache, object, size, flags, true); +return ____kasan_kmalloc (cache, object, size, flags, true); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_kmalloc); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kasan_kmalloc); -void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size, +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size,gfp_t flags) {struct page *page;@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,return (void *)ptr; } -void *__must_check kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t size,gfp_t flags) +void *__must_check __kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t size,gfp_t flags) {struct page *page;@@ -419,13 +419,13 @@ void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags) page =virt_to_head_page (object);if (unlikely (!PageSlab (page))) -return kasan_kmalloc_large (object, size, flags); +return __kasan_kmalloc_large (object, size, flags);else -return __kasan_kmalloc (page->slab_cache, object, size, +return ____kasan_kmalloc (page->slab_cache, object, size, flags, true); } -void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +void __kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {struct page *page;@@ -438,11 +438,11 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) }kasan_poison_memory (ptr,page_size (page),KASAN_FREE_PAGE ); }else { -__kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); +____kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); } } -void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +void __kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {if (ptr !=page_address (virt_to_head_page (ptr)))kasan_report_invalid_free (ptr, ip); --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 15/21] kasan: check kasan_enabled in annotations
Quoted 56 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 40 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Declare the
kasan_enabledstatic key ininclude/linux/kasan.hand ininclude/linux/mm.hand check it in all kasan annotations. This allows to avoid any slowdown caused by function calls whenkasan_enabledis disabled.Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/kasan.h | 210 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- include/linux/mm.h | 27 ++++-- mm/kasan/common.c | 60 ++++++------ 3 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)include/linux/kasan.h +9
-2@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@#ifndef _LINUX_KASAN_H#define _LINUX_KASAN_H +#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/types.h> struct kmem_cache ;@@ -66,40 +67,154 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); -void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); +struct kasan_cache { +int alloc_meta_offset; +int free_meta_offset; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_enabled); +#else include/linux/kasan.h static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {} · line 85
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +7
-2+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_enabled); +#endif -void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size, -slab_flags_t *flags); +void __kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); +static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_alloc_pages (page, order);The patch looks fine per se, but I think with the suggestion in the previous patch, this should be:
Quoted 4 lines
if (kasan_is_enabled()) __kasan_alloc_pages(page, order);No overhead for other modes and less logic duplication.
Will do, thanks!
Quoted 475 lines
Quoted 475 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +144
-46+} -void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size); -void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr); +void __kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order); +static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_free_pages (page, order); +} -void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page); -void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); -void kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); -void *__must_check kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache, -const void *object); +void __kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size, +slab_flags_t *flags); +static inline void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache, +unsigned int *size,slab_flags_t *flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_cache_create (cache, size, flags); +} -void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size, -gfp_t flags); -void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); -void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); -void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, -size_t size,gfp_t flags); -void *__must_check kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t new_size, -gfp_t flags); +size_t __kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache); +static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_metadata_size (cache); +return 0 ; +} -void *__must_check kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, -gfp_t flags); -bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,unsigned long ip); +void __kasan_unpoison_data (const void *addr,size_t size); +static inline void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *addr,size_t size) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_unpoison_data (addr, size); +} -struct kasan_cache { -int alloc_meta_offset; -int free_meta_offset; -}; +void __kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr); +static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_unpoison_slab (ptr); +} + +void __kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page); +static inline void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_poison_slab (page); +} + +void __kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); +static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_unpoison_object_data (cache, object); +} + +void __kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object); +static inline void kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_poison_object_data (cache, object); +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache, +const void *object) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_init_slab_obj (cache, object); +return (void *)object; +} + +bool __kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,unsigned long ip); +static inline bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,unsigned long ip) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_slab_free (s, object, ip); +return false; +} -size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache); +void *__must_check __kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s, +void *object,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s, +void *object,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_slab_alloc (s, object, flags); +return object; +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, +size_t size,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, +size_t size,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_kmalloc (s, object, size, flags); +return (void *)object; +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr, +size_t size,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr, +size_t size,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_kmalloc_large (ptr, size, flags); +return (void *)ptr; +} + +void *__must_check __kasan_krealloc (const void *object, +size_t new_size,gfp_t flags); +static inline void *__must_check kasan_krealloc (const void *object, +size_t new_size,gfp_t flags) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return __kasan_krealloc (object, new_size, flags); +return (void *)object; +} + +void __kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); +static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_poison_kfree (ptr, ip); +} + +void __kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); +static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_kfree_large (ptr, ip); +}bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot (void );void kasan_restore_multi_shot (bool enabled);@@ -108,14 +223,12 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {} -static inline void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size,slab_flags_t *flags) {} - -static inline void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) { } -static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) { } - +static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) {return 0 ; } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) {} +static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) {}static inline void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) {}static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) {}@@ -126,36 +239,33 @@ static inline void *kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, {return (void *)object; } - -static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large (void *ptr,size_t size,gfp_t flags) +static inline bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, +unsigned long ip) { -return ptr; +return false; } -static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {} -static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {} -static inline void *kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, -size_t size,gfp_t flags) +static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, +gfp_t flags) { -return (void *)object; +return object; } -static inline void *kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t new_size, -gfp_t flags) +static inline void *kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *s,const void *object, +size_t size,gfp_t flags) {return (void *)object; } -static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, -gfp_t flags) +static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size,gfp_t flags) { -return object; +return (void *)ptr; } -static inline bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object, -unsigned long ip) +static inline void *kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t new_size, +gfp_t flags) { -return false; +return (void *)object; } - -static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) {return 0 ; } +static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {} +static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {}#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ include/linux/mm.h +21
-6@@ -1412,22 +1412,36 @@ static inline bool cpupid_match_pid(struct task_struct *task, int cpupid)#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */ #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kasan_enabled); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (kasan_enabled); +#endif +static inline u8 page_kasan_tag (const struct page *page) { -return (page->flags >>KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ) &KASAN_TAG_MASK ; +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +return (page->flags >>KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ) &KASAN_TAG_MASK ; +return 0xff ; }static inline void page_kasan_tag_set (struct page *page,u8 tag) { - page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ); - page->flags |= (tag &KASAN_TAG_MASK ) <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ; +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) { + page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ); + page->flags |= (tag &KASAN_TAG_MASK ) <<KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ; + } }static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset (struct page *page) { -page_kasan_tag_set (page,0xff ); +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +page_kasan_tag_set (page,0xff ); } -#else + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ +static inline u8 page_kasan_tag (const struct page *page) {return 0xff ;@@ -1435,7 +1449,8 @@ static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)static inline void page_kasan_tag_set (struct page *page,u8 tag) { }static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset (struct page *page) { } -#endif + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ static inline struct zone *page_zone (const struct page *page) {mm/kasan/common.c +30
-31@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark) }#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */ -void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) +void __kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {u8 tag;unsigned long i;@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)kasan_unpoison_memory (page_address (page),PAGE_SIZE << order); } -void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) +void __kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {if (likely (!PageHighMem (page))) kasan_poison_memory(page_address(page),@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ static inline unsigned int optimal_redzone(unsigned int object_size) object_size <= (1 <<16 ) -1024 ?1024 :2048 ; } -void kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size, -slab_flags_t *flags) +void __kasan_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cache,unsigned int *size, +slab_flags_t *flags) {unsigned int orig_size = *size;unsigned int redzone_size;@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, *flags |=SLAB_KASAN ; } -size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) +size_t __kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) {if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?@@ -188,17 +188,17 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,return (void *)reset_tag (object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset; } -void kasan_unpoison_data (const void *address,size_t size) +void __kasan_unpoison_data (const void *addr,size_t size) { -kasan_unpoison_memory (address, size); +kasan_unpoison_memory (addr, size); } -void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) +void __kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) {kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr,__ksize (ptr)); } -void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) +void __kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page) {unsigned long i;@@ -208,12 +208,12 @@ void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); } -void kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) +void __kasan_unpoison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) {kasan_unpoison_memory (object, cache->object_size); } -void kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) +void __kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) { kasan_poison_memory(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,#endif } -void *__must_check kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache, +void *__must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object) {struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,return (void *)object; } -static bool __kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, +static bool ____kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip,bool quarantine) {u8 tag;@@ -329,9 +329,9 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,return false; } -bool kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip) +bool __kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip) { -return __kasan_slab_free (cache, object, ip, true); +return ____kasan_slab_free (cache, object, ip, true); }static void set_alloc_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,gfp_t flags)@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)kasan_set_track (&kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags); } -static void *__kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object, +static void *____kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object,size_t size,gfp_t flags,bool keep_tag) {unsigned long redzone_start;@@ -371,20 +371,20 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,return set_tag (object, tag); } -void *__must_check kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object, -gfp_t flags) +void *__must_check __kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *cache, +void *object,gfp_t flags) { -return __kasan_kmalloc (cache, object, cache->object_size, flags, false); +return ____kasan_kmalloc (cache, object, cache->object_size, flags, false); } -void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object, -size_t size,gfp_t flags) +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object, +size_t size,gfp_t flags) { -return __kasan_kmalloc (cache, object, size, flags, true); +return ____kasan_kmalloc (cache, object, size, flags, true); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (kasan_kmalloc); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kasan_kmalloc); -void *__must_check kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size, +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size,gfp_t flags) {struct page *page;@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,return (void *)ptr; } -void *__must_check kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t size,gfp_t flags) +void *__must_check __kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t size,gfp_t flags) {struct page *page;@@ -419,13 +419,13 @@ void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags) page =virt_to_head_page (object);if (unlikely (!PageSlab (page))) -return kasan_kmalloc_large (object, size, flags); +return __kasan_kmalloc_large (object, size, flags);else -return __kasan_kmalloc (page->slab_cache, object, size, +return ____kasan_kmalloc (page->slab_cache, object, size, flags, true); } -void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +void __kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {struct page *page;@@ -438,11 +438,11 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) }kasan_poison_memory (ptr,page_size (page),KASAN_FREE_PAGE ); }else { -__kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); +____kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); } } -void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +void __kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {if (ptr !=page_address (virt_to_head_page (ptr)))kasan_report_invalid_free (ptr, ip); --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 16/21 kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc
In reply to Andrey KonovalovSince kasan_kmalloc() always follows kasan_slab_alloc(), there's no need to reunpoison the object data, only to poison the redzone.
This requires changing kasan annotation for early SLUB cache to kasan_slab_alloc(). Otherwise kasan_kmalloc() doesn't untag the object. This doesn't do any functional changes, as kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
Similarly for kasan_krealloc(), as it's called after ksize(), which already unpoisoned the object, there's no need to do it again.
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++---------- mm/slub.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +21 -10
@@ -360,8 +360,14 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) tag =assign_tag (cache, object, false, keep_tag); -/* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */ -kasan_unpoison_memory (set_tag (object, tag), size); +/* +* Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for: +* 1. krealloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned via ksize(); +* 2. kmalloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned by kasan_kmalloc(). +* Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS. +*/ +if (!keep_tag) +kasan_unpoison_memory (set_tag (object, tag), size);kasan_poison_memory ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE );
@@ -384,10 +390,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kasan_kmalloc); -void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size, -gfp_t flags) +static void *__must_check ____kasan_kmalloc_large (struct page *page,const void *ptr, +size_t size,gfp_t flags,bool realloc) { -struct page *page;unsigned long redzone_start;unsigned long redzone_end;
@@ -397,18 +402,24 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,if (unlikely (ptr ==NULL ))return NULL ; - page =virt_to_page (ptr); - redzone_start =round_up ((unsigned long )(ptr + size), -KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); + redzone_start =round_up ((unsigned long )(ptr + size),KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); redzone_end = (unsigned long )ptr +page_size (page); -kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr, size); +/* ksize() in __do_krealloc() already unpoisoned the memory. */ +if (!realloc) +kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr, size);kasan_poison_memory ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE );return (void *)ptr; } +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size, +gfp_t flags) +{ +return ____kasan_kmalloc_large (virt_to_page (ptr), ptr, size, flags, false); +} +void *__must_check __kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t size,gfp_t flags) {struct page *page;
@@ -419,7 +430,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag page =virt_to_head_page (object);if (unlikely (!PageSlab (page))) -return __kasan_kmalloc_large (object, size, flags); +return ____kasan_kmalloc_large (page, object, size, flags, true);else return ____kasan_kmalloc (page->slab_cache, object, size, flags, true);
mm/slub.c +1 -2
@@ -3535,8 +3535,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)init_object (kmem_cache_node, n,SLUB_RED_ACTIVE );init_tracking (kmem_cache_node, n);#endif - n =kasan_kmalloc (kmem_cache_node, n,sizeof (struct kmem_cache_node ), -GFP_KERNEL ); + n =kasan_slab_alloc (kmem_cache_node, n,GFP_KERNEL ); page->freelist =get_freepointer (kmem_cache_node, n); page->inuse =1 ; page->frozen =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerRe: [PATCH RFC v2 16/21] kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc
Quoted 11 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Since
kasan_kmalloc()always followskasan_slab_alloc(), there's no need to reunpoison the object data, only to poison the redzone.This requires changing kasan annotation for early SLUB cache to
kasan_slab_alloc(). Otherwisekasan_kmalloc()doesn't untag the object. This doesn't do any functional changes, askmem_cache_node->object_sizeis equal tosizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).Similarly for
kasan_krealloc(), as it's called afterksize(), which already unpoisoned the object, there's no need to do it again.
Have you considered doing this the other way around: make krealloc call __ksize and unpoison in kasan_krealloc?
This has the advantage of more precise poisoning as ksize will unpoison the whole underlying object.
But then maybe we will need to move first checks in ksize into __ksize as we may need them in krealloc as well.
Quoted 96 lines
Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- mm/kasan/common.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++---------- mm/slub.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +21
-10@@ -360,8 +360,14 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) tag =assign_tag (cache, object, false, keep_tag); -/* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */ -kasan_unpoison_memory (set_tag (object, tag), size); +/* +* Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for: +* 1. krealloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned via ksize(); +* 2. kmalloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned by kasan_kmalloc(). +* Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS. +*/ +if (!keep_tag) +kasan_unpoison_memory (set_tag (object, tag), size);kasan_poison_memory ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE );@@ -384,10 +390,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kasan_kmalloc); -void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size, -gfp_t flags) +static void *__must_check ____kasan_kmalloc_large (struct page *page,const void *ptr, +size_t size,gfp_t flags,bool realloc) { -struct page *page;unsigned long redzone_start;unsigned long redzone_end;@@ -397,18 +402,24 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,if (unlikely (ptr ==NULL ))return NULL ; - page =virt_to_page (ptr); - redzone_start =round_up ((unsigned long )(ptr + size), -KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); + redzone_start =round_up ((unsigned long )(ptr + size),KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); redzone_end = (unsigned long )ptr +page_size (page); -kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr, size); +/* ksize() in __do_krealloc() already unpoisoned the memory. */ +if (!realloc) +kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr, size);kasan_poison_memory ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE );return (void *)ptr; } +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size, +gfp_t flags) +{ +return ____kasan_kmalloc_large (virt_to_page (ptr), ptr, size, flags, false); +} +void *__must_check __kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t size,gfp_t flags) {struct page *page;@@ -419,7 +430,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag page =virt_to_head_page (object);if (unlikely (!PageSlab (page))) -return __kasan_kmalloc_large (object, size, flags); +return ____kasan_kmalloc_large (page, object, size, flags, true);else return ____kasan_kmalloc (page->slab_cache, object, size, flags, true);mm/slub.c +1
-3@@ -3535,8 +3535,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)init_object (kmem_cache_node, n,SLUB_RED_ACTIVE );init_tracking (kmem_cache_node, n);#endif - n =kasan_kmalloc (kmem_cache_node, n,sizeof (struct kmem_cache_node ), -GFP_KERNEL ); + n =kasan_slab_alloc (kmem_cache_node, n,GFP_KERNEL ); page->freelist =get_freepointer (kmem_cache_node, n); page->inuse =1 ; page->frozen =0 ; --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 16/21] kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc
Quoted 14 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 11 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Since
kasan_kmalloc()always followskasan_slab_alloc(), there's no need to reunpoison the object data, only to poison the redzone.This requires changing kasan annotation for early SLUB cache to
kasan_slab_alloc(). Otherwisekasan_kmalloc()doesn't untag the object. This doesn't do any functional changes, askmem_cache_node->object_sizeis equal tosizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).Similarly for
kasan_krealloc(), as it's called afterksize(), which already unpoisoned the object, there's no need to do it again.
Quoted 7 lines
Have you considered doing this the other way around: make krealloc call
__ksizeand unpoison inkasan_krealloc?
This has the advantage of more precise poisoning as ksize will unpoison the whole underlying object.But then maybe we will need to move first checks in ksize into
__ksizeas we may need them in krealloc as well.
This might be a good idea. I won't implement this for the next version, but will look into this after that. Thanks!
Quoted 101 lines
Quoted 101 lines
Signed-off-by Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>--- mm/kasan/common.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++---------- mm/slub.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +21
-10@@ -360,8 +360,14 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) tag =assign_tag (cache, object, false, keep_tag); -/* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */ -kasan_unpoison_memory (set_tag (object, tag), size); +/* +* Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for: +* 1. krealloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned via ksize(); +* 2. kmalloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned by kasan_kmalloc(). +* Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS. +*/ +if (!keep_tag) +kasan_unpoison_memory (set_tag (object, tag), size);kasan_poison_memory ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE );@@ -384,10 +390,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kasan_kmalloc); -void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size, -gfp_t flags) +static void *__must_check ____kasan_kmalloc_large (struct page *page,const void *ptr, +size_t size,gfp_t flags,bool realloc) { -struct page *page;unsigned long redzone_start;unsigned long redzone_end;@@ -397,18 +402,24 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,if (unlikely (ptr ==NULL ))return NULL ; - page =virt_to_page (ptr); - redzone_start =round_up ((unsigned long )(ptr + size), -KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); + redzone_start =round_up ((unsigned long )(ptr + size),KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); redzone_end = (unsigned long )ptr +page_size (page); -kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr, size); +/* ksize() in __do_krealloc() already unpoisoned the memory. */ +if (!realloc) +kasan_unpoison_memory (ptr, size);kasan_poison_memory ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE );return (void *)ptr; } +void *__must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large (const void *ptr,size_t size, +gfp_t flags) +{ +return ____kasan_kmalloc_large (virt_to_page (ptr), ptr, size, flags, false); +} +void *__must_check __kasan_krealloc (const void *object,size_t size,gfp_t flags) {struct page *page;@@ -419,7 +430,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag page =virt_to_head_page (object);if (unlikely (!PageSlab (page))) -return __kasan_kmalloc_large (object, size, flags); +return ____kasan_kmalloc_large (page, object, size, flags, true);else return ____kasan_kmalloc (page->slab_cache, object, size, flags, true);mm/slub.c +1
-3@@ -3535,8 +3535,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)init_object (kmem_cache_node, n,SLUB_RED_ACTIVE );init_tracking (kmem_cache_node, n);#endif - n =kasan_kmalloc (kmem_cache_node, n,sizeof (struct kmem_cache_node ), -GFP_KERNEL ); + n =kasan_slab_alloc (kmem_cache_node, n,GFP_KERNEL ); page->freelist =get_freepointer (kmem_cache_node, n); page->inuse =1 ; page->frozen =0 ; --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 17/21 kasan: simplify kasan_poison_kfree
In reply to Andrey Konovalovkasan_poison_kfree() is currently only called for mempool allocations that are backed by either kmem_cache_alloc() or kmalloc(). Therefore, the page passed to kasan_poison_kfree() is always PageSlab() and there's no need to do the check.
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 11 +---------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -10
@@ -441,16 +441,7 @@ void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)struct page *page; page =virt_to_head_page (ptr); - -if (unlikely (!PageSlab (page))) { -if (ptr !=page_address (page)) { -kasan_report_invalid_free (ptr, ip); -return ; - } -kasan_poison_memory (ptr,page_size (page),KASAN_FREE_PAGE ); - }else { -____kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); - } +____kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); }void __kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 17/21] kasan: simplify kasan_poison_kfree
Quoted 8 lines · Andrey Konovalov
kasan_poison_kfree()is currently only called for mempool allocations that are backed by eitherkmem_cache_alloc()orkmalloc(). Therefore, the page passed tokasan_poison_kfree()is alwaysPageSlab()and there's no need to do the check.
Quoted 29 lines
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 11 +---------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +1
-11@@ -441,16 +441,7 @@ void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)struct page *page; page =virt_to_head_page (ptr); - -if (unlikely (!PageSlab (page))) { -if (ptr !=page_address (page)) { -kasan_report_invalid_free (ptr, ip); -return ; - } -kasan_poison_memory (ptr,page_size (page),KASAN_FREE_PAGE ); - }else { -____kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); - } +____kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); }void __kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 18/21 kasan: rename kasan_poison_kfree
In reply to Andrey KonovalovRename kasan_poison_kfree() into kasan_slab_free_mempool() as it better reflects what this annotation does.
No functional changes.
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++++-------- mm/kasan/common.c | 16 ++++++++-------- mm/mempool.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +8 -8
@@ -162,6 +162,13 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsignedreturn false; } +void __kasan_slab_free_mempool (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); +static inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_slab_free_mempool (ptr, ip); +} +void *__must_check __kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,gfp_t flags); static inline void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
@@ -202,13 +209,6 @@ static inline void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object,return (void *)object; } -void __kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); -static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) -{ -if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) -__kasan_poison_kfree (ptr, ip); -} -void __kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip);static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, {return false; } +static inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {}static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,gfp_t flags) {
@@ -264,7 +265,6 @@ static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size, {return (void *)object; } -static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {}static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {}#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
mm/kasan/common.c +8 -8
@@ -334,6 +334,14 @@ bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)return ____kasan_slab_free (cache, object, ip, true); } +void __kasan_slab_free_mempool (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +{ +struct page *page; + + page =virt_to_head_page (ptr); +____kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); +} +static void set_alloc_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,gfp_t flags) {kasan_set_track (&kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
@@ -436,14 +444,6 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag flags, true); } -void __kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) -{ -struct page *page; - - page =virt_to_head_page (ptr); -____kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); -} -void __kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {if (ptr !=page_address (virt_to_head_page (ptr)))
mm/mempool.c +1 -1
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static inline void poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element) static __always_inline void kasan_poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element) {if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_slab || pool->alloc == mempool_kmalloc) -kasan_poison_kfree (element, _RET_IP_); +kasan_slab_free_mempool (element, _RET_IP_);if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_pages)kasan_free_pages (element, (unsigned long )pool->pool_data); }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 18/21] kasan: rename kasan_poison_kfree
Quoted 8 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Rename
kasan_poison_kfree()intokasan_slab_free_mempool()as it better reflects what this annotation does.No functional changes.
Quoted 104 lines
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++++-------- mm/kasan/common.c | 16 ++++++++-------- mm/mempool.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)include/linux/kasan.h +8
-8@@ -162,6 +162,13 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsignedreturn false; } +void __kasan_slab_free_mempool (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); +static inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) +__kasan_slab_free_mempool (ptr, ip); +} +void *__must_check __kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,gfp_t flags); static inline void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,@@ -202,13 +209,6 @@ static inline void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object,return (void *)object; } -void __kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip); -static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) -{ -if (static_branch_likely (&kasan_enabled)) -__kasan_poison_kfree (ptr, ip); -} -void __kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip);static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, {return false; } +static inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {}static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,gfp_t flags) {@@ -264,7 +265,6 @@ static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size, {return (void *)object; } -static inline void kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {}static inline void kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {}#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ mm/kasan/common.c +8
-8@@ -334,6 +334,14 @@ bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)return ____kasan_slab_free (cache, object, ip, true); } +void __kasan_slab_free_mempool (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) +{ +struct page *page; + + page =virt_to_head_page (ptr); +____kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); +} +static void set_alloc_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,gfp_t flags) {kasan_set_track (&kasan_get_alloc_meta (cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);@@ -436,14 +444,6 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag flags, true); } -void __kasan_poison_kfree (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) -{ -struct page *page; - - page =virt_to_head_page (ptr); -____kasan_slab_free (page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); -} -void __kasan_kfree_large (void *ptr,unsigned long ip) {if (ptr !=page_address (virt_to_head_page (ptr)))mm/mempool.c +1
-2@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static inline void poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element) static __always_inline void kasan_poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element) {if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_slab || pool->alloc == mempool_kmalloc) -kasan_poison_kfree (element, _RET_IP_); +kasan_slab_free_mempool (element, _RET_IP_);if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_pages)kasan_free_pages (element, (unsigned long )pool->pool_data); } --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 19/21 kasan: don't round_up too much
In reply to Andrey KonovalovFor tag-based mode kasan_poison_memory() already rounds up the size. Do the same for software modes and remove round_up() from common code.
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 8 ++------ mm/kasan/shadow.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +2 -6
@@ -215,9 +215,7 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)void __kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) { -kasan_poison_memory (object, -round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ), -KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE ); +kasan_poison_memory (object, cache->object_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE ); }/*
@@ -290,7 +288,6 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, {u8 tag;void *tagged_object; -unsigned long rounded_up_size; tag =get_tag (object); tagged_object = object;
@@ -311,8 +308,7 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,return true; } - rounded_up_size =round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); -kasan_poison_memory (object, rounded_up_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE ); +kasan_poison_memory (object, cache->object_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE );if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
mm/kasan/shadow.c +1 -0
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)* addresses to this function. */ address =reset_tag (address); + size =round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); shadow_start =kasan_mem_to_shadow (address); shadow_end =kasan_mem_to_shadow (address + size);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 19/21] kasan: don't round_up too much
Quoted 6 lines · Andrey Konovalov
For tag-based mode
kasan_poison_memory()already rounds up the size. Do the same for software modes and removeround_up()from common code.
Quoted 53 lines
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 8 ++------ mm/kasan/shadow.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +2
-6@@ -215,9 +215,7 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)void __kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) { -kasan_poison_memory (object, -round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ), -KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE ); +kasan_poison_memory (object, cache->object_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE ); }/* @@ -290,7 +288,6 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, {u8 tag;void *tagged_object; -unsigned long rounded_up_size; tag =get_tag (object); tagged_object = object;@@ -311,8 +308,7 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,return true; } - rounded_up_size =round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); -kasan_poison_memory (object, rounded_up_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE ); +kasan_poison_memory (object, cache->object_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE );if (static_branch_unlikely (&kasan_stack)) { if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||mm/kasan/shadow.c +1
-1@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)* addresses to this function. */ address =reset_tag (address); + size =round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); shadow_start =kasan_mem_to_shadow (address); shadow_end =kasan_mem_to_shadow (address + size); --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 20/21 kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag calls
In reply to Andrey Konovalovset_tag() already ignores the tag for the generic mode, so just call it as is. Add a check for the generic mode to assign_tag(), and simplify its call in ____kasan_kmalloc().
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +6 -5
@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)static u8 assign_tag (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object,bool init,bool keep_tag) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC )) +return 0xff ; +/* * 1. When an object is kmalloc()'ed, two hooks are called: * kasan_slab_alloc() and kasan_kmalloc(). We assign the
@@ -277,8 +280,8 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); } -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) - object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false)); +/* Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */ + object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false));return (void *)object; }
@@ -360,9 +363,7 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); redzone_end =round_up ((unsigned long )object + cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); - -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) - tag =assign_tag (cache, object, false, keep_tag); + tag =assign_tag (cache, object, false, keep_tag);/* * Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for:
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 20/21] kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag calls
Quoted 7 lines · Andrey Konovalov
set_tag()already ignores the tag for the generic mode, so just call it as is. Add a check for the generic mode toassign_tag(), and simplify its call in____kasan_kmalloc().
Quoted 43 lines
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)mm/kasan/common.c +6
-6@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)static u8 assign_tag (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object,bool init,bool keep_tag) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC )) +return 0xff ; +/* * 1. When an object is kmalloc()'ed, two hooks are called: * kasan_slab_alloc() and kasan_kmalloc(). We assign the @@ -277,8 +280,8 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,__memset (alloc_meta,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_meta)); } -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) - object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false)); +/* Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */ + object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false));return (void *)object; }@@ -360,9 +363,7 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); redzone_end =round_up ((unsigned long )object + cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); - -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) - tag =assign_tag (cache, object, false, keep_tag); + tag =assign_tag (cache, object, false, keep_tag);/* * Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for: -- 2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 21/21 kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_large
In reply to Andrey KonovalovCurrently it says that the memory gets poisoned by page_alloc code. Clarify this by mentioning the specific callback that poisons the memory.
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -1
@@ -445,5 +445,5 @@ void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {if (ptr !=page_address (virt_to_head_page (ptr)))kasan_report_invalid_free (ptr, ip); -/* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */ +/* The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages(). */ }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 21/21] kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_large
Quoted 7 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Currently it says that the memory gets poisoned by
page_alloccode. Clarify this by mentioning the specific callback that poisons the memory.
Quoted 18 lines
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)mm/kasan/common.c +1
-2@@ -445,5 +445,5 @@ void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {if (ptr !=page_address (virt_to_head_page (ptr)))kasan_report_invalid_free (ptr, ip); -/* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */ +/* The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages(). */ } --2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerQuoted 66 lines · Andrey Konovalov
This patchset is not complete (hence sending as RFC), but I would like to start the discussion now and hear people's opinions regarding the questions mentioned below.
=== Overview
This patchset adopts the existing hardware tag-based KASAN mode [1] for use in production as a memory corruption mitigation. Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging. Please see [3] and [4] for detailed analysis of how MTE helps to fight memory safety problems.
The current plan is reuse
CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGSfor production, but add a boot time switch, that allows to choose between a debugging mode, that includes all KASAN features as they are, and a production mode, that only includes the essentials like tag checking.It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI initiative [5].
The patch titled "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters" of this series adds a few new boot parameters:
kasan.mode allows choosing one of main three modes:
- kasan.mode=off - no checks at all
- kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features
- kasan.mode=full - all featuresThose mode configs provide default values for three more internal configs listed below. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing:
- kasan.stack=off/on - enable stacks collection
(default: on for mode=full, otherwise off)
- kasan.trap=async/sync - use async or sync MTE mode (default: sync for mode=full, otherwise async)
- kasan.fault=report/panic - only report MTE fault or also panic (default: report)=== Benchmarks
For now I've only performed a few simple benchmarks such as measuring kernel boot time and slab memory usage after boot. The benchmarks were performed in QEMU and the results below exclude the slowdown caused by QEMU memory tagging emulation (as it's different from the slowdown that will be introduced by hardware and therefore irrelevant).
KASAN_HW_TAGS=y + kasan.mode=off introduces no performance or memory impact compared to KASAN_HW_TAGS=n.
kasan.mode=prod (without executing the tagging instructions) introduces 7% of both performace and memory impact compared to kasan.mode=off. Note, that 4% of performance and all 7% of memory impact are caused by the fact that enabling KASAN essentially results in
CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULTbeing disabled.Recommended Android config has
CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULTdisabled (I assume for security reasons), but Pixel 4 has it enabled. It's arguable, whether "disabling"CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULTintroduces any security benefit on top of MTE. Without MTE it makes exploiting some heap corruption harder. With MTE it will only make it harder provided that the attacker is able to predict allocation tags.
Quoted 6 lines
kasan.mode=full has 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection.
=== Questions
Any concerns about the boot parameters?
For boot parameters I think we are now "safe" in the sense that we provide maximum possible flexibility and can defer any actual decisions.
Quoted 2 lines
Should we try to deal with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT-like behavor mentioned above?
How hard it is to allow KASAN with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT? Are there any principal conflicts?
The numbers you provided look quite substantial (on a par of what MTE itself may introduce). So I would assume if a vendor does not have CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT disabled, it may not want to disable it because of MTE (effectively doubles overhead).
Quoted 68 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 66 lines · Andrey Konovalov
This patchset is not complete (hence sending as RFC), but I would like to start the discussion now and hear people's opinions regarding the questions mentioned below.
=== Overview
This patchset adopts the existing hardware tag-based KASAN mode [1] for use in production as a memory corruption mitigation. Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging. Please see [3] and [4] for detailed analysis of how MTE helps to fight memory safety problems.
The current plan is reuse
CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGSfor production, but add a boot time switch, that allows to choose between a debugging mode, that includes all KASAN features as they are, and a production mode, that only includes the essentials like tag checking.It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI initiative [5].
The patch titled "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters" of this series adds a few new boot parameters:
kasan.mode allows choosing one of main three modes:
- kasan.mode=off - no checks at all
- kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features
- kasan.mode=full - all featuresThose mode configs provide default values for three more internal configs listed below. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing:
- kasan.stack=off/on - enable stacks collection
(default: on for mode=full, otherwise off)
- kasan.trap=async/sync - use async or sync MTE mode (default: sync for mode=full, otherwise async)
- kasan.fault=report/panic - only report MTE fault or also panic (default: report)=== Benchmarks
For now I've only performed a few simple benchmarks such as measuring kernel boot time and slab memory usage after boot. The benchmarks were performed in QEMU and the results below exclude the slowdown caused by QEMU memory tagging emulation (as it's different from the slowdown that will be introduced by hardware and therefore irrelevant).
KASAN_HW_TAGS=y + kasan.mode=off introduces no performance or memory impact compared to KASAN_HW_TAGS=n.
kasan.mode=prod (without executing the tagging instructions) introduces 7% of both performace and memory impact compared to kasan.mode=off. Note, that 4% of performance and all 7% of memory impact are caused by the fact that enabling KASAN essentially results in
CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULTbeing disabled.Recommended Android config has
CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULTdisabled (I assume for security reasons), but Pixel 4 has it enabled. It's arguable, whether "disabling"CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULTintroduces any security benefit on top of MTE. Without MTE it makes exploiting some heap corruption harder. With MTE it will only make it harder provided that the attacker is able to predict allocation tags.
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
kasan.mode=full has 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection.
FTR, this only accounts for slab memory overhead that comes from redzones that store stack ids. There's also page_alloc overhead from the stacks themselves, which I didn't measure yet.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
=== Questions
Any concerns about the boot parameters?
For boot parameters I think we are now "safe" in the sense that we provide maximum possible flexibility and can defer any actual decisions.
Perfect!
I realized that I actually forgot to think about the default values when no boot params are specified, I'll fix this in the next version.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Should we try to deal with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT-like behavor mentioned above?
How hard it is to allow KASAN with
CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT? Are there any principal conflicts?
I'll explore this.
Quoted 4 lines
The numbers you provided look quite substantial (on a par of what MTE itself may introduce). So I would assume if a vendor does not have
CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULTdisabled, it may not want to disable it because of MTE (effectively doubles overhead).
Sounds reasonable.
Thanks!
The boot parameters look great!
Do we use redzones in kasan.mode=prod?
(I think we should not)
Please separate the work on improving the stack trace collection form the work on enabling kasan.mode=prod, the latter is more important IMHO.
Still some notes on stack traces:
Quoted 2 lines
kasan.mode=full has 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection.
This is a lot. Right?
Please provide a more detailed breakdown:
* CPU overhead of collecting stack traces vs overhead of putting them in a container/depot
* RAM overhead depending on the number of frames stored
* RAM overhead of the storage container (or redones?)
* How much is 30% in absolute numbers?
Do we perform any stack trace compressions?
Can we collect stack traces from the shadow call stack, when it's available (default on Android)?
As we discussed offline, I think we have a way to compress reasonably long stack traces into 8 bytes,
but it will take some effort and time to implement:
* collect the stack trace as usual (with shadow stack, when available)
* compute a hash of the top N frames
* store the hash, discard the stack trace. On trap, report the hashes for allocation/deallocation
* Offline, analyze the binary to reconstruct the call graph, including the indirect calls
* Perform DFS search from kmalloc/kfree up the call graph to depth N, compute hashes for all paths,
report paths with the hash that matches the hash in the report. My preliminary investigation shows that we can do it easily for N <= 10. The trickiest bit here is to build the call graph for indirect calls, but we should be able to do it.
Quoted 107 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 68 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 66 lines · Andrey Konovalov
This patchset is not complete (hence sending as RFC), but I would like to start the discussion now and hear people's opinions regarding the questions mentioned below.
=== Overview
This patchset adopts the existing hardware tag-based KASAN mode [1] for use in production as a memory corruption mitigation. Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging. Please see [3] and [4] for detailed analysis of how MTE helps to fight memory safety problems.
The current plan is reuse
CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGSfor production, but add a boot time switch, that allows to choose between a debugging mode, that includes all KASAN features as they are, and a production mode, that only includes the essentials like tag checking.It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI initiative [5].
The patch titled "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters" of this series adds a few new boot parameters:
kasan.mode allows choosing one of main three modes:
- kasan.mode=off - no checks at all
- kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features
- kasan.mode=full - all featuresThose mode configs provide default values for three more internal configs listed below. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing:
- kasan.stack=off/on - enable stacks collection
(default: on for mode=full, otherwise off)
- kasan.trap=async/sync - use async or sync MTE mode (default: sync for mode=full, otherwise async)
- kasan.fault=report/panic - only report MTE fault or also panic (default: report)=== Benchmarks
For now I've only performed a few simple benchmarks such as measuring kernel boot time and slab memory usage after boot. The benchmarks were performed in QEMU and the results below exclude the slowdown caused by QEMU memory tagging emulation (as it's different from the slowdown that will be introduced by hardware and therefore irrelevant).
KASAN_HW_TAGS=y + kasan.mode=off introduces no performance or memory impact compared to KASAN_HW_TAGS=n.
kasan.mode=prod (without executing the tagging instructions) introduces 7% of both performace and memory impact compared to kasan.mode=off. Note, that 4% of performance and all 7% of memory impact are caused by the fact that enabling KASAN essentially results in
CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULTbeing disabled.Recommended Android config has
CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULTdisabled (I assume for security reasons), but Pixel 4 has it enabled. It's arguable, whether "disabling"CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULTintroduces any security benefit on top of MTE. Without MTE it makes exploiting some heap corruption harder. With MTE it will only make it harder provided that the attacker is able to predict allocation tags.Quoted 2 lines
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kasan.mode=full has 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection.
FTR, this only accounts for slab memory overhead that comes from redzones that store stack ids. There's also
page_allocoverhead from the stacks themselves, which I didn't measure yet.Quoted 8 lines
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=== Questions
Any concerns about the boot parameters?
For boot parameters I think we are now "safe" in the sense that we provide maximum possible flexibility and can defer any actual decisions.
Perfect!
I realized that I actually forgot to think about the default values when no boot params are specified, I'll fix this in the next version.
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Should we try to deal with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT-like behavor mentioned above?
How hard it is to allow KASAN with
CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT? Are there any principal conflicts?I'll explore this.
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The numbers you provided look quite substantial (on a par of what MTE itself may introduce). So I would assume if a vendor does not have
CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULTdisabled, it may not want to disable it because of MTE (effectively doubles overhead).Sounds reasonable.
Thanks!