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kasan: hardware tag-based mode for production use on arm64

RFC PATCH In review Andrey Konovalov 6 participants 71 messages Oct 22, 2020 – Nov 16, 2020

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover kasan: hardware tag-based mode for production use on arm64

This patchset is not complete (hence sending as RFC), but I would like to start the discussion now and hear people's opinions regarding the questions mentioned below.

=== Overview

This patchset adopts the existing hardware tag-based KASAN mode [1] for use in production as a memory corruption mitigation. Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging. Please see [3] and [4] for detailed analysis of how MTE helps to fight memory safety problems.

The current plan is reuse CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS for production, but add a boot time switch, that allows to choose between a debugging mode, that includes all KASAN features as they are, and a production mode, that only includes the essentials like tag checking.

It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI initiative [5].

The patch titled "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters" of this series adds a few new boot parameters:

kasan.mode allows choosing one of main three modes:

- kasan.mode=off - no checks at all
- kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features
- kasan.mode=full - all features

Those mode configs provide default values for three more internal configs listed below. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing:

- kasan.stack=off/on - enable stacks collection
(default: on for mode=full, otherwise off)
- kasan.trap=async/sync - use async or sync MTE mode (default: sync for mode=full, otherwise async)
- kasan.fault=report/panic - only report MTE fault or also panic (default: report)

=== Benchmarks

For now I've only performed a few simple benchmarks such as measuring kernel boot time and slab memory usage after boot. The benchmarks were performed in QEMU and the results below exclude the slowdown caused by QEMU memory tagging emulation (as it's different from the slowdown that will be introduced by hardware and therefore irrelevant).

KASAN_HW_TAGS=y + kasan.mode=off introduces no performance or memory impact compared to KASAN_HW_TAGS=n.

kasan.mode=prod (without executing the tagging instructions) introduces 7% of both performace and memory impact compared to kasan.mode=off. Note, that 4% of performance and all 7% of memory impact are caused by the fact that enabling KASAN essentially results in CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT being disabled.

Recommended Android config has CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT disabled (I assume for security reasons), but Pixel 4 has it enabled. It's arguable, whether "disabling" CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT introduces any security benefit on top of MTE. Without MTE it makes exploiting some heap corruption harder. With MTE it will only make it harder provided that the attacker is able to predict allocation tags.

kasan.mode=full has 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection.

=== Questions

Any concerns about the boot parameters?

Should we try to deal with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT-like behavor mentioned above?

=== Notes

This patchset is available here:

https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-prod-mte-rfc2

and on Gerrit here:

https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/3707

This patchset is based on v5 of "kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64" patchset [1] (along with some fixes).

For testing in QEMU hardware tag-based KASAN requires:

1. QEMU built from master [6] (use "-machine virt,mte=on -cpu max" arguments to run).
2. GCC version 10.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
[2] https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/posts/enhancing-memory-safety
[3] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.09517.pdf
[4] https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/master/papers/2020/Security%20analysis%20of%20memory%20tagging.pdf
[5] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image
[6] https://github.com/qemu/qemu

=== History

Changes RFCv1->RFCv2:
- Rework boot parameters.
- Drop __init from empty kasan_init_tags() definition.
- Add cpu_supports_mte() helper that can be used during early boot and use it in kasan_init_tags()
- Lots of new KASAN optimization commits.

Andrey Konovalov (21):
kasan: simplify quarantine_put call site
kasan: rename get_alloc/free_info
kasan: introduce set_alloc_info
kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode
kasan: mark kasan_init_tags as __init
kasan, arm64: move initialization message
kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stack
kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes
kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS
kasan: inline kasan_poison_memory and check_invalid_free
kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory
arm64: kasan: Add cpu_supports_tags helper
kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters
kasan: check kasan_enabled in annotations
kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc
kasan: simplify kasan_poison_kfree
kasan: rename kasan_poison_kfree
kasan: don't round_up too much
kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag calls
kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_large

 arch/Kconfig                       |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h    |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h |   6 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c            |  20 +++
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S          |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c         |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S   |   2 +-
 include/linux/kasan.h              | 225 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 include/linux/mm.h                 |  27 ++-
 kernel/fork.c                      |   2 +-
 mm/kasan/common.c                  | 256 ++++++++++++++++-------------
 mm/kasan/generic.c                 |  19 ++-
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c                 | 182 +++++++++++++++++---
 mm/kasan/kasan.h                   | 102 ++++++++----
 mm/kasan/quarantine.c              |   5 +-
 mm/kasan/report.c                  |  26 ++-
 mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c          |   2 +-
 mm/kasan/shadow.c                  |   1 +
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c                 |  20 ++-
 mm/mempool.c                       |   2 +-
 mm/slab_common.c                   |   2 +-
 mm/slub.c                          |   3 +-
 22 files changed, 641 insertions(+), 269 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
#1 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 1/21 kasan: simplify quarantine_put call site

Move get_free_info() call into quarantine_put() to simplify the call site.

No functional changes.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c     | 2 +-
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      | 5 ++---
 mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -1
index 2bb0ef6da6bd..5712c66c11c1 100644
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 
 	kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
 
-	quarantine_put(get_free_info(cache, object), cache);
+	quarantine_put(cache, object);
 
 	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
 }
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -3
index 6850308c798a..5c0116c70579 100644
@@ -214,12 +214,11 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && \
 	(defined(CONFIG_SLAB) || defined(CONFIG_SLUB))
-void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info, struct kmem_cache *cache);
+void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
 void quarantine_reduce(void);
 void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache);
 #else
-static inline void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info,
-				struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
+static inline void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) { }
 static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }
 static inline void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
 #endif
mm/kasan/quarantine.c +2 -1
index 580ff5610fc1..a0792f0d6d0f 100644
@@ -161,11 +161,12 @@ static void qlist_free_all(struct qlist_head *q, struct kmem_cache *cache)
 	qlist_init(q);
 }
 
-void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info, struct kmem_cache *cache)
+void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct qlist_head *q;
 	struct qlist_head temp = QLIST_INIT;
+	struct kasan_free_meta *info = get_free_info(cache, object);
 
 	/*
 	 * Note: irq must be disabled until after we move the batch to the
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 1/21
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 01/21] kasan: simplify quarantine_put call site

Quoted 7 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Move get_free_info() call into quarantine_put() to simplify the call site.

No functional changes.

Quoted 59 lines
---
 mm/kasan/common.c     | 2 +-
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      | 5 ++---
 mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -1
index 2bb0ef6da6bd..5712c66c11c1 100644
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 
        kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
 
-       quarantine_put(get_free_info(cache, object), cache);
+       quarantine_put(cache, object);
 
        return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
 }
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -3
index 6850308c798a..5c0116c70579 100644
@@ -214,12 +214,11 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && \
        (defined(CONFIG_SLAB) || defined(CONFIG_SLUB))
-void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info, struct kmem_cache *cache);
+void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
 void quarantine_reduce(void);
 void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache);
 #else
-static inline void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info,
-                               struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
+static inline void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) { }
 static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }
 static inline void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
 #endif
mm/kasan/quarantine.c +2 -2
index 580ff5610fc1..a0792f0d6d0f 100644
@@ -161,11 +161,12 @@ static void qlist_free_all(struct qlist_head *q, struct kmem_cache *cache)
        qlist_init(q);
 }
 
-void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info, struct kmem_cache *cache)
+void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
        unsigned long flags;
        struct qlist_head *q;
        struct qlist_head temp = QLIST_INIT;
+       struct kasan_free_meta *info = get_free_info(cache, object);
 
        /*
         * Note: irq must be disabled until after we move the batch to the
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#3 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 2/21 kasan: rename get_alloc/free_info

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Rename get_alloc_info() and get_free_info() to kasan_get_alloc_meta() and kasan_get_free_meta() to better reflect what those do and avoid confusion with kasan_set_free_info().

No functional changes.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c         | 16 ++++++++--------
 mm/kasan/generic.c        | 12 ++++++------
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c        |  4 ++--
 mm/kasan/kasan.h          |  8 ++++----
 mm/kasan/quarantine.c     |  4 ++--
 mm/kasan/report.c         | 12 ++++++------
 mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c |  2 +-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c        |  4 ++--
 8 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +8 -8
index 5712c66c11c1..8fd04415d8f4 100644
@@ -175,14 +175,14 @@ size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
 		sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
 }
 
-struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-					const void *object)
+struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+					      const void *object)
 {
 	return (void *)reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset;
 }
 
-struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-				      const void *object)
+struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+					    const void *object)
 {
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) > 32);
 	return (void *)reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
@@ -259,13 +259,13 @@ static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 						const void *object)
 {
-	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info;
+	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 
 	if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
 		return (void *)object;
 
-	alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
-	__memset(alloc_info, 0, sizeof(*alloc_info));
+	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+	__memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
 		object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
 	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
-		kasan_set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
+		kasan_set_track(&kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
 
 	return set_tag(object, tag);
 }
mm/kasan/generic.c +6 -6
index e1af3b6c53b8..de6b3f03a023 100644
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr)
 {
 	struct page *page = kasan_addr_to_page(addr);
 	struct kmem_cache *cache;
-	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info;
+	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 	void *object;
 
 	if (!(page && PageSlab(page)))
@@ -339,13 +339,13 @@ void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr)
 
 	cache = page->slab_cache;
 	object = nearest_obj(cache, page, addr);
-	alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
 	/*
 	 * record the last two call_rcu() call stacks.
 	 */
-	alloc_info->aux_stack[1] = alloc_info->aux_stack[0];
-	alloc_info->aux_stack[0] = kasan_save_stack(GFP_NOWAIT);
+	alloc_meta->aux_stack[1] = alloc_meta->aux_stack[0];
+	alloc_meta->aux_stack[0] = kasan_save_stack(GFP_NOWAIT);
 }
 
 void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 {
 	struct kasan_free_meta *free_meta;
 
-	free_meta = get_free_info(cache, object);
+	free_meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
 	kasan_set_track(&free_meta->free_track, GFP_NOWAIT);
 
 	/*
@@ -367,5 +367,5 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 {
 	if (*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object) != KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK)
 		return NULL;
-	return &get_free_info(cache, object)->free_track;
+	return &kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object)->free_track;
 }
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +2 -2
index 7f0568df2a93..2a38885014e3 100644
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 {
 	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 
-	alloc_meta = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 	kasan_set_track(&alloc_meta->free_track[0], GFP_NOWAIT);
 }
 
@@ -65,6 +65,6 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 {
 	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 
-	alloc_meta = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 	return &alloc_meta->free_track[0];
 }
mm/kasan/kasan.h +4 -4
index 5c0116c70579..456b264e5124 100644
@@ -148,10 +148,10 @@ struct kasan_free_meta {
 #endif
 };
 
-struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-					const void *object);
-struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-					const void *object);
+struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+						const void *object);
+struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+						const void *object);
 
 void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
 
mm/kasan/quarantine.c +2 -2
index a0792f0d6d0f..0da3d37e1589 100644
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct qlist_head *q;
 	struct qlist_head temp = QLIST_INIT;
-	struct kasan_free_meta *info = get_free_info(cache, object);
+	struct kasan_free_meta *meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
 
 	/*
 	 * Note: irq must be disabled until after we move the batch to the
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 
 	q = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_quarantine);
-	qlist_put(q, &info->quarantine_link, cache->size);
+	qlist_put(q, &meta->quarantine_link, cache->size);
 	if (unlikely(q->bytes > QUARANTINE_PERCPU_SIZE)) {
 		qlist_move_all(q, &temp);
 
mm/kasan/report.c +6 -6
index f8817d5685a7..dee5350b459c 100644
@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 				const void *addr, u8 tag)
 {
-	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
 	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN) {
 		struct kasan_track *free_track;
 
-		print_track(&alloc_info->alloc_track, "Allocated");
+		print_track(&alloc_meta->alloc_track, "Allocated");
 		pr_err("\n");
 		free_track = kasan_get_free_track(cache, object, tag);
 		if (free_track) {
@@ -176,14 +176,14 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 		}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
-		if (alloc_info->aux_stack[0]) {
+		if (alloc_meta->aux_stack[0]) {
 			pr_err("Last call_rcu():\n");
-			print_stack(alloc_info->aux_stack[0]);
+			print_stack(alloc_meta->aux_stack[0]);
 			pr_err("\n");
 		}
-		if (alloc_info->aux_stack[1]) {
+		if (alloc_meta->aux_stack[1]) {
 			pr_err("Second to last call_rcu():\n");
-			print_stack(alloc_info->aux_stack[1]);
+			print_stack(alloc_meta->aux_stack[1]);
 			pr_err("\n");
 		}
 #endif
mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c +1 -1
index aebc44a29e83..317100fd95b9 100644
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 	if (page && PageSlab(page)) {
 		cache = page->slab_cache;
 		object = nearest_obj(cache, page, (void *)addr);
-		alloc_meta = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+		alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
 		for (i = 0; i < KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS; i++)
 			if (alloc_meta->free_pointer_tag[i] == tag)
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +2 -2
index ccc35a311179..c10863a45775 100644
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 	u8 idx = 0;
 
-	alloc_meta = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
 	idx = alloc_meta->free_track_idx;
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 	int i = 0;
 
-	alloc_meta = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
 	for (i = 0; i < KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS; i++) {
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 2/21
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 02/21] kasan: rename get_alloc/free_info

Quoted 9 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Rename get_alloc_info() and get_free_info() to kasan_get_alloc_meta() and kasan_get_free_meta() to better reflect what those do and avoid confusion with kasan_set_free_info().

No functional changes.

Quoted 244 lines
---
 mm/kasan/common.c         | 16 ++++++++--------
 mm/kasan/generic.c        | 12 ++++++------
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c        |  4 ++--
 mm/kasan/kasan.h          |  8 ++++----
 mm/kasan/quarantine.c     |  4 ++--
 mm/kasan/report.c         | 12 ++++++------
 mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c |  2 +-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c        |  4 ++--
 8 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +8 -8
index 5712c66c11c1..8fd04415d8f4 100644
@@ -175,14 +175,14 @@ size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
                sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
 }
 
-struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-                                       const void *object)
+struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                                             const void *object)
 {
        return (void *)reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset;
 }
 
-struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-                                     const void *object)
+struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                                           const void *object)
 {
        BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) > 32);
        return (void *)reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
@@ -259,13 +259,13 @@ static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                                const void *object)
 {
-       struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info;
+       struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 
        if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
                return (void *)object;
 
-       alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
-       __memset(alloc_info, 0, sizeof(*alloc_info));
+       alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+       __memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
 
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
                object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
                KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
        if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
-               kasan_set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
+               kasan_set_track(&kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
 
        return set_tag(object, tag);
 }
mm/kasan/generic.c +6 -6
index e1af3b6c53b8..de6b3f03a023 100644
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr)
 {
        struct page *page = kasan_addr_to_page(addr);
        struct kmem_cache *cache;
-       struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info;
+       struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
        void *object;
 
        if (!(page && PageSlab(page)))
@@ -339,13 +339,13 @@ void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr)
 
        cache = page->slab_cache;
        object = nearest_obj(cache, page, addr);
-       alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+       alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
        /*
         * record the last two call_rcu() call stacks.
         */
-       alloc_info->aux_stack[1] = alloc_info->aux_stack[0];
-       alloc_info->aux_stack[0] = kasan_save_stack(GFP_NOWAIT);
+       alloc_meta->aux_stack[1] = alloc_meta->aux_stack[0];
+       alloc_meta->aux_stack[0] = kasan_save_stack(GFP_NOWAIT);
 }
 
 void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 {
        struct kasan_free_meta *free_meta;
 
-       free_meta = get_free_info(cache, object);
+       free_meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
        kasan_set_track(&free_meta->free_track, GFP_NOWAIT);
 
        /*
@@ -367,5 +367,5 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 {
        if (*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object) != KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK)
                return NULL;
-       return &get_free_info(cache, object)->free_track;
+       return &kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object)->free_track;
 }
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +2 -2
index 7f0568df2a93..2a38885014e3 100644
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 {
        struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 
-       alloc_meta = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+       alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
        kasan_set_track(&alloc_meta->free_track[0], GFP_NOWAIT);
 }
 
@@ -65,6 +65,6 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 {
        struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 
-       alloc_meta = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+       alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
        return &alloc_meta->free_track[0];
 }
mm/kasan/kasan.h +4 -4
index 5c0116c70579..456b264e5124 100644
@@ -148,10 +148,10 @@ struct kasan_free_meta {
 #endif
 };
 
-struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-                                       const void *object);
-struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-                                       const void *object);
+struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                                               const void *object);
+struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                                               const void *object);
 
 void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
 
mm/kasan/quarantine.c +2 -2
index a0792f0d6d0f..0da3d37e1589 100644
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
        unsigned long flags;
        struct qlist_head *q;
        struct qlist_head temp = QLIST_INIT;
-       struct kasan_free_meta *info = get_free_info(cache, object);
+       struct kasan_free_meta *meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
 
        /*
         * Note: irq must be disabled until after we move the batch to the
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ void quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
        local_irq_save(flags);
 
        q = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_quarantine);
-       qlist_put(q, &info->quarantine_link, cache->size);
+       qlist_put(q, &meta->quarantine_link, cache->size);
        if (unlikely(q->bytes > QUARANTINE_PERCPU_SIZE)) {
                qlist_move_all(q, &temp);
 
mm/kasan/report.c +6 -6
index f8817d5685a7..dee5350b459c 100644
@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                                const void *addr, u8 tag)
 {
-       struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+       struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
        if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN) {
                struct kasan_track *free_track;
 
-               print_track(&alloc_info->alloc_track, "Allocated");
+               print_track(&alloc_meta->alloc_track, "Allocated");
                pr_err("\n");
                free_track = kasan_get_free_track(cache, object, tag);
                if (free_track) {
@@ -176,14 +176,14 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
-               if (alloc_info->aux_stack[0]) {
+               if (alloc_meta->aux_stack[0]) {
                        pr_err("Last call_rcu():\n");
-                       print_stack(alloc_info->aux_stack[0]);
+                       print_stack(alloc_meta->aux_stack[0]);
                        pr_err("\n");
                }
-               if (alloc_info->aux_stack[1]) {
+               if (alloc_meta->aux_stack[1]) {
                        pr_err("Second to last call_rcu():\n");
-                       print_stack(alloc_info->aux_stack[1]);
+                       print_stack(alloc_meta->aux_stack[1]);
                        pr_err("\n");
                }
 #endif
mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c +1 -1
index aebc44a29e83..317100fd95b9 100644
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
        if (page && PageSlab(page)) {
                cache = page->slab_cache;
                object = nearest_obj(cache, page, (void *)addr);
-               alloc_meta = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+               alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
                for (i = 0; i < KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS; i++)
                        if (alloc_meta->free_pointer_tag[i] == tag)
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +2 -3
index ccc35a311179..c10863a45775 100644
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
        struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
        u8 idx = 0;
 
-       alloc_meta = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+       alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
        idx = alloc_meta->free_track_idx;
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,
        struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
        int i = 0;
 
-       alloc_meta = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+       alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
        for (i = 0; i < KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS; i++) {
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#5 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 3/21 kasan: introduce set_alloc_info

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Add set_alloc_info() helper and move kasan_set_track() into it. This will simplify the code for one of the upcoming changes.

No functional changes.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +6 -1
index 8fd04415d8f4..a880e5a547ed 100644
@@ -318,6 +318,11 @@ bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
 	return __kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
 }
 
+static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	kasan_set_track(&kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
+}
+
 static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 				size_t size, gfp_t flags, bool keep_tag)
 {
@@ -345,7 +350,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
 	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
-		kasan_set_track(&kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
+		set_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags);
 
 	return set_tag(object, tag);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 3/21
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 03/21] kasan: introduce set_alloc_info

Quoted 8 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Add set_alloc_info() helper and move kasan_set_track() into it. This will simplify the code for one of the upcoming changes.

No functional changes.

Quoted 32 lines
---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +6 -2
index 8fd04415d8f4..a880e5a547ed 100644
@@ -318,6 +318,11 @@ bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
        return __kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
 }
 
+static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
+{
+       kasan_set_track(&kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
+}
+
 static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
                                size_t size, gfp_t flags, bool keep_tag)
 {
@@ -345,7 +350,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
                KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
        if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
-               kasan_set_track(&kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
+               set_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags);
 
        return set_tag(object, tag);
 }
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#7 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 4/21 kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.

There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S |  2 +-
 include/linux/kasan.h            | 10 ++++++----
 mm/kasan/common.c                |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
 	 */
 	bl	cpu_do_resume
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
 	mov	x0, sp
 	bl	kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1 -1
index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
 	movq	pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
 	movq	pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
 	/*
 	 * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
 	 * which we now need to unpoison.
include/linux/kasan.h +6 -4
index 3f3f541e5d5f..7be9fb9146ac 100644
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 
@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
+void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
+#else
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
 
 void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache);
mm/kasan/common.c +2 -0
index a880e5a547ed..a3e67d49b893 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
 
+#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
 static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
 {
 	void *base = task_stack_page(task);
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
 
 	kasan_unpoison_memory(base, watermark - base);
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

Quoted 67 lines · Andrey Konovalov

There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.

There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S |  2 +-
 include/linux/kasan.h            | 10 ++++++----
 mm/kasan/common.c                |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
         */
        bl      cpu_do_resume
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        mov     x0, sp
        bl      kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1 -1
index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
        movq    pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
        movq    pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        /*
         * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
         * which we now need to unpoison.
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -4
index 3f3f541e5d5f..7be9fb9146ac 100644
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 

include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166

Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -0
@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

&& defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) for consistency

Quoted 13 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +5 -0
+void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
+#else
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
 
 void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache);
mm/kasan/common.c +0 -0
index a880e5a547ed..a3e67d49b893 100644

mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_disable_current(void) · line 61

Quoted 4 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
 
+#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

#ifdef CONFIG_ is the form used toughout the kernel code

Quoted 14 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -1
 static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
 {
        void *base = task_stack_page(task);
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
 
        kasan_unpoison_memory(base, watermark - base);
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

reviewer
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

Quoted 28 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 26 lines · Andrey Konovalov

There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.

There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S |  2 +-
 include/linux/kasan.h            | 10 ++++++----
 mm/kasan/common.c                |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +0 -0
index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
         */
        bl      cpu_do_resume
 
Quoted 2 lines

arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume) · line 136

Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

And similarly here

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +0 -0
        mov     x0, sp
        bl      kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +0 -0
index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
        movq    pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
        movq    pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
 
Quoted 2 lines

arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) · line 115

Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1 -1
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

and here

Quoted 67 lines
Quoted 26 lines
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +0 -0
        /*
         * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
         * which we now need to unpoison.
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -4
index 3f3f541e5d5f..7be9fb9146ac 100644
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 

include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166

Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -0
@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

&& defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) for consistency

Quoted 13 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +5 -0
+void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
+#else
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
 
 void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache);
mm/kasan/common.c +0 -0
index a880e5a547ed..a3e67d49b893 100644

mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_disable_current(void) · line 61

Quoted 4 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
 
+#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

#ifdef CONFIG_ is the form used toughout the kernel code

Quoted 14 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -1
 static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
 {
        void *base = task_stack_page(task);
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
 
        kasan_unpoison_memory(base, watermark - base);
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

In reply to Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 68 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 66 lines · Andrey Konovalov

There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.

There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S |  2 +-
 include/linux/kasan.h            | 10 ++++++----
 mm/kasan/common.c                |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
         */
        bl      cpu_do_resume
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        mov     x0, sp
        bl      kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1 -1
index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
        movq    pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
        movq    pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        /*
         * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
         * which we now need to unpoison.
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -4
index 3f3f541e5d5f..7be9fb9146ac 100644
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 
Quoted 7 lines

include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166

Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -0
@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

&& defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) for consistency

CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.

Quoted 35 lines
Quoted 14 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +5 -0
+void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
+#else
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
 
 void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache);
mm/kasan/common.c +0 -0
index a880e5a547ed..a3e67d49b893 100644

mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_disable_current(void) · line 61

Quoted 4 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
 
+#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

#ifdef CONFIG_ is the form used toughout the kernel code

Quoted 14 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -1
 static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
 {
        void *base = task_stack_page(task);
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
 
        kasan_unpoison_memory(base, watermark - base);
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

reviewer
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

Quoted 74 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 72 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov

There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.

There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S |  2 +-
 include/linux/kasan.h            | 10 ++++++----
 mm/kasan/common.c                |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
         */
        bl      cpu_do_resume
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        mov     x0, sp
        bl      kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1 -1
index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
        movq    pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
        movq    pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        /*
         * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
         * which we now need to unpoison.
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -4
index 3f3f541e5d5f..7be9fb9146ac 100644
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 
@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166

Quoted 1 line
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -0
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

&& defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) for consistency

CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.

Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.

config KASAN_STACK

-       int
-       default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
-       default 0
+       bool
+       default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
+       default n
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

Quoted 88 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 74 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 72 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov

There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.

There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S |  2 +-
 include/linux/kasan.h            | 10 ++++++----
 mm/kasan/common.c                |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
         */
        bl      cpu_do_resume
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        mov     x0, sp
        bl      kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1 -1
index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
        movq    pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
        movq    pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        /*
         * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
         * which we now need to unpoison.
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -4
index 3f3f541e5d5f..7be9fb9146ac 100644
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 
@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166

Quoted 1 line
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -0
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

&& defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) for consistency

CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.

Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.

config KASAN_STACK

Review

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +3 -3
-       int
-       default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
-       default 0
+       bool
+       default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
+       default n

I wondered the same, but then looking at scripts/Makefile.kasan I think it's because we directly pass it to the compiler:

    ...
    $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \
    ...
maintainer
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

Quoted 94 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 86 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 73 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 72 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov

There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.

There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S |  2 +-
 include/linux/kasan.h            | 10 ++++++----
 mm/kasan/common.c                |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
         */
        bl      cpu_do_resume
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        mov     x0, sp
        bl      kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1 -1
index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
        movq    pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
        movq    pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        /*
         * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
         * which we now need to unpoison.
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -4
index 3f3f541e5d5f..7be9fb9146ac 100644
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 
@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166

Quoted 1 line
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -0
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

&& defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) for consistency

CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.

Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.

config KASAN_STACK

Review

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +3 -3
-       int
-       default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
-       default 0
+       bool
+       default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
+       default n
Quoted 5 lines

I wondered the same, but then looking at scripts/Makefile.kasan I think it's because we directly pass it to the compiler:

    ...
    $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \
    ...

Try this instead:

      $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(if $(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK),1,0)) \
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
reviewer
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

Quoted 102 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 94 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 86 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 73 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 72 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov

There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.

There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S |  2 +-
 include/linux/kasan.h            | 10 ++++++----
 mm/kasan/common.c                |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
         */
        bl      cpu_do_resume
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        mov     x0, sp
        bl      kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1 -1
index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
        movq    pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
        movq    pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        /*
         * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
         * which we now need to unpoison.
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -4
index 3f3f541e5d5f..7be9fb9146ac 100644
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 
@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166

Quoted 1 line
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -0
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

&& defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) for consistency

CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.

Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.

config KASAN_STACK

Review

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +3 -3
-       int
-       default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
-       default 0
+       bool
+       default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
+       default n
Quoted 5 lines

I wondered the same, but then looking at scripts/Makefile.kasan I think it's because we directly pass it to the compiler:

    ...
    $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \
    ...
Quoted 3 lines

Try this instead:

      $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(if $(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK),1,0)) \

We could have just 1 config instead of 2 as well.
For gcc we could do no prompt and default value y, and for clang -- prompt and default value n. I think it should do what we need.

#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

Quoted 103 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 102 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 99 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 86 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 73 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 72 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov

There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables.

There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S |  2 +-
 include/linux/kasan.h            | 10 ++++++----
 mm/kasan/common.c                |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
         */
        bl      cpu_do_resume
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        mov     x0, sp
        bl      kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +1 -1
index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
        movq    pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
        movq    pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
        /*
         * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
         * which we now need to unpoison.
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -4
index 3f3f541e5d5f..7be9fb9146ac 100644
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 
@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

include/linux/kasan.h static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } · line 166

Quoted 1 line
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -0
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

&& defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) for consistency

CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is different from other KASAN configs. It's always defined, and its value is what controls whether stack instrumentation is enabled.

Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.

config KASAN_STACK

Review

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +3 -3
-       int
-       default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
-       default 0
+       bool
+       default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
+       default n

I wondered the same, but then looking at scripts/Makefile.kasan I think it's because we directly pass it to the compiler:

    ...
    $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \
    ...
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Try this instead:

      $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(if $(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK),1,0)) \

We could have just 1 config instead of 2 as well.
For gcc we could do no prompt and default value y, and for clang -- prompt and default value n. I think it should do what we need.

I agree with Catalin's proposal since it should simplify things.

Nit: 'default n' is the default hence I do not think it should be required explicitly.

Signature · 2 lines
Regards,
Vincenzo
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

Quoted 28 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 17 lines

Review

Quoted 11 lines

Not sure why we did this instead of the following, but okay.

config KASAN_STACK

(quoted diff) +3 -3
-       int
-       default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
-       default 0
+       bool
+       default y if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
+       default n

I wondered the same, but then looking at scripts/Makefile.kasan I think it's because we directly pass it to the compiler:

    ...
    $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \
    ...
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Try this instead:

      $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(if $(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK),1,0)) \

We could have just 1 config instead of 2 as well.
For gcc we could do no prompt and default value y, and for clang -- prompt and default value n. I think it should do what we need.

Quoted 4 lines

I agree with Catalin's proposal since it should simplify things.

Nit: 'default n' is the default hence I do not think it should be required explicitly.

Fixing this sounds like a good idea, but perhaps not as a part of this series, to not overinflate it even further.

I've filed a bug for this: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221

#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

Quoted 4 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Fixing this sounds like a good idea, but perhaps not as a part of this series, to not overinflate it even further.

I've filed a bug for this: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221

Fine by me.

Signature · 2 lines
Regards,
Vincenzo
#18 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 5/21 kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Even though hardware tag-based mode currently doesn't support checking vmalloc allocations, it doesn't use shadow memory and works with VMAP_STACK as is.

---
 arch/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/Kconfig +1 -1
index af14a567b493..3caf7bcdcf93 100644
@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ config VMAP_STACK
 	default y
 	bool "Use a virtually-mapped stack"
 	depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
-	depends on !KASAN || KASAN_VMALLOC
+	depends on !(KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS) || KASAN_VMALLOC
 	help
 	  Enable this if you want the use virtually-mapped kernel stacks
 	  with guard pages.  This causes kernel stack overflows to be
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer
#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 05/21] kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode

Quoted 16 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Even though hardware tag-based mode currently doesn't support checking vmalloc allocations, it doesn't use shadow memory and works with VMAP_STACK as is.

---
 arch/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/Kconfig +0 -0
index af14a567b493..3caf7bcdcf93 100644

arch/Kconfig config VMAP_STACK · line 871

Quoted 5 lines
arch/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ config VMAP_STACK
        default y
        bool "Use a virtually-mapped stack"
        depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
-       depends on !KASAN || KASAN_VMALLOC
+       depends on !(KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS) || KASAN_VMALLOC

I find it a bit simpler to interpret:

    depends on !KASAN || KASAN_HW_TAGS || KASAN_VMALLOC

due to simpler structure. But maybe it's just me.

Quoted 6 lines
arch/Kconfig +0 -1
        help
          Enable this if you want the use virtually-mapped kernel stacks
          with guard pages.  This causes kernel stack overflows to be
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 05/21] kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode

Quoted 26 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 16 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Even though hardware tag-based mode currently doesn't support checking vmalloc allocations, it doesn't use shadow memory and works with VMAP_STACK as is.

---
 arch/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/Kconfig +0 -0
index af14a567b493..3caf7bcdcf93 100644

arch/Kconfig config VMAP_STACK · line 871

Quoted 5 lines
arch/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ config VMAP_STACK
        default y
        bool "Use a virtually-mapped stack"
        depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
-       depends on !KASAN || KASAN_VMALLOC
+       depends on !(KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS) || KASAN_VMALLOC

I find it a bit simpler to interpret:

Quoted 3 lines
    depends on !KASAN || KASAN_HW_TAGS || KASAN_VMALLOC

due to simpler structure. But maybe it's just me.

This looks better, will fix in the next version, thanks!

#21 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 6/21 kasan: mark kasan_init_tags as __init

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Similarly to kasan_init() mark kasan_init_tags() as __init.

---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 2 +-
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c    | 2 +-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c    | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -1
index 7be9fb9146ac..93d9834b7122 100644
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
 
-void kasan_init_tags(void);
+void __init kasan_init_tags(void);
 
 void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr);
 
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +1 -1
index 2a38885014e3..0128062320d5 100644
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 #include "kasan.h"
 
-void kasan_init_tags(void)
+void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
 	init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
 }
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +1 -1
index c10863a45775..bf1422282bb5 100644
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);
 
-void kasan_init_tags(void)
+void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 6/21
#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 06/21] kasan: mark kasan_init_tags as __init

Quoted 5 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev

Similarly to kasan_init() mark kasan_init_tags() as __init.

init_tags itself is not __init, but that's added in a different patch. I've commented on that patch.

Quoted 52 lines
---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 2 +-
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c    | 2 +-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c    | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -1
index 7be9fb9146ac..93d9834b7122 100644
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
 
-void kasan_init_tags(void);
+void __init kasan_init_tags(void);
 
 void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr);
 
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +1 -1
index 2a38885014e3..0128062320d5 100644
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 #include "kasan.h"
 
-void kasan_init_tags(void)
+void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
        init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
 }
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +1 -2
index c10863a45775..bf1422282bb5 100644
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);
 
-void kasan_init_tags(void)
+void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
        int cpu;
 
--

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#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 06/21] kasan: mark kasan_init_tags as __init

Quoted 6 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 3 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev

Similarly to kasan_init() mark kasan_init_tags() as __init.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

init_tags itself is not __init, but that's added in a different patch. I've commented on that patch.

Will add that change to this patch, thanks! If we combine the two patch series, we can move this into the other one later. Thanks!

Quoted 53 lines
Quoted 53 lines
---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 2 +-
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c    | 2 +-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c    | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -1
index 7be9fb9146ac..93d9834b7122 100644
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
 
-void kasan_init_tags(void);
+void __init kasan_init_tags(void);
 
 void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr);
 
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +1 -1
index 2a38885014e3..0128062320d5 100644
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 #include "kasan.h"
 
-void kasan_init_tags(void)
+void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
        init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
 }
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +1 -2
index c10863a45775..bf1422282bb5 100644
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);
 
-void kasan_init_tags(void)
+void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
        int cpu;
 
--

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#24 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 7/21 kasan, arm64: move initialization message

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Tag-based KASAN modes are fully initialized with kasan_init_tags(), while the generic mode only requireds kasan_init(). Move the initialization message for tag-based modes into kasan_init_tags().

Also fix pr_fmt() usage for KASAN code: generic mode doesn't need it, tag-based modes should use "kasan:" instead of KBUILD_MODNAME.

---
 arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 3 +++
 mm/kasan/generic.c         | 2 --
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c         | 4 ++++
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c         | 4 +++-
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +3 -0
index b6b9d55bb72e..8f17fa834b62 100644
@@ -290,5 +290,8 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 {
 	kasan_init_shadow();
 	kasan_init_depth();
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)
+	/* CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS also requires kasan_init_tags(). */
 	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
+#endif
 }
mm/kasan/generic.c +0 -2
index de6b3f03a023..d259e4c3aefd 100644
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
  *        Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
  */
 
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
-
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +4 -0
index 0128062320d5..b372421258c8 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
  * Author: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
  */
 
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
+
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/memory.h>
@@ -18,6 +20,8 @@
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
 	init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
+
+	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
 void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +3 -1
index bf1422282bb5..099af6dc8f7e 100644
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * Author: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
  */
 
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
 
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
 		per_cpu(prng_state, cpu) = (u32)get_cycles();
+
+	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer
#25 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 07/21] kasan, arm64: move initialization message

Quoted 6 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Tag-based KASAN modes are fully initialized with kasan_init_tags(), while the generic mode only requireds kasan_init(). Move the initialization message for tag-based modes into kasan_init_tags().

Also fix pr_fmt() usage for KASAN code: generic mode doesn't need it,

Why doesn't it need it? What's the difference with tag modes?

Quoted 1 line

tag-based modes should use "kasan:" instead of KBUILD_MODNAME.

With generic KASAN I currently see:

[    0.571473][    T0] kasan: KernelAddressSanitizer initialized

So KBUILD_MODNAME somehow works. Is there some difference between files?

Quoted 14 lines
---
 arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 3 +++
 mm/kasan/generic.c         | 2 --
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c         | 4 ++++
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c         | 4 +++-
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +0 -0
index b6b9d55bb72e..8f17fa834b62 100644

arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c void __init kasan_init(void) · line 294

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +2 -0
@@ -290,5 +290,8 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 {
        kasan_init_shadow();
        kasan_init_depth();
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)
+       /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS also requires kasan_init_tags(). */

A bit cleaner way may be to introduce kasan_init_early() and kasan_init_late(). Late() will do tag init and always print the message.

Quoted 63 lines
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +1 -0
        pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
+#endif
 }
mm/kasan/generic.c +0 -2
index de6b3f03a023..d259e4c3aefd 100644
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
  *        Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
  */
 
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
-
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +4 -0
index 0128062320d5..b372421258c8 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
  * Author: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
  */
 
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
+
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/memory.h>
@@ -18,6 +20,8 @@
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
        init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
+
+       pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
 void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +3 -2
index bf1422282bb5..099af6dc8f7e 100644
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * Author: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
  */
 
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
 
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 
        for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
                per_cpu(prng_state, cpu) = (u32)get_cycles();
+
+       pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
 /*
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#26 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 07/21] kasan, arm64: move initialization message

Quoted 10 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 6 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Tag-based KASAN modes are fully initialized with kasan_init_tags(), while the generic mode only requireds kasan_init(). Move the initialization message for tag-based modes into kasan_init_tags().

Also fix pr_fmt() usage for KASAN code: generic mode doesn't need it,

Why doesn't it need it? What's the difference with tag modes?

I need to reword the patch descriptions: it's not the mode that doesn't need it, it's the generic.c file, as it doesn't use any pr_*() functions.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

tag-based modes should use "kasan:" instead of KBUILD_MODNAME.

With generic KASAN I currently see:

[    0.571473][    T0] kasan: KernelAddressSanitizer initialized

So KBUILD_MODNAME somehow works. Is there some difference between files?

That code is printed from arch/xxx/mm/kasan_init*.c, which has its own pr_fmt defined.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
---
 arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 3 +++
 mm/kasan/generic.c         | 2 --
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c         | 4 ++++
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c         | 4 +++-
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 14 lines

arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c void __init kasan_init(void) · line 294

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +2 -0
index b6b9d55bb72e..8f17fa834b62 100644
@@ -290,5 +290,8 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 {
        kasan_init_shadow();
        kasan_init_depth();
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)
+       /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS also requires kasan_init_tags(). */

A bit cleaner way may be to introduce kasan_init_early() and kasan_init_late(). Late() will do tag init and always print the message.

It appears we'll also need kasan_init_even_later() for some MTE-related stuff. I'll try to figure out some sane naming scheme here and include it into the next version.

#27 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 07/21] kasan, arm64: move initialization message

Quoted 54 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 10 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 6 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Tag-based KASAN modes are fully initialized with kasan_init_tags(), while the generic mode only requireds kasan_init(). Move the initialization message for tag-based modes into kasan_init_tags().

Also fix pr_fmt() usage for KASAN code: generic mode doesn't need it,

Why doesn't it need it? What's the difference with tag modes?

I need to reword the patch descriptions: it's not the mode that doesn't need it, it's the generic.c file, as it doesn't use any pr_*() functions.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

tag-based modes should use "kasan:" instead of KBUILD_MODNAME.

With generic KASAN I currently see:

[    0.571473][    T0] kasan: KernelAddressSanitizer initialized

So KBUILD_MODNAME somehow works. Is there some difference between files?

That code is printed from arch/xxx/mm/kasan_init*.c, which has its own pr_fmt defined.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
---
 arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 3 +++
 mm/kasan/generic.c         | 2 --
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c         | 4 ++++
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c         | 4 +++-
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 14 lines

arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c void __init kasan_init(void) · line 294

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +2 -0
index b6b9d55bb72e..8f17fa834b62 100644
@@ -290,5 +290,8 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 {
        kasan_init_shadow();
        kasan_init_depth();
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)
+       /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS also requires kasan_init_tags(). */

A bit cleaner way may be to introduce kasan_init_early() and kasan_init_late(). Late() will do tag init and always print the message.

Quoted 3 lines

It appears we'll also need kasan_init_even_later() for some MTE-related stuff. I'll try to figure out some sane naming scheme here and include it into the next version.

Actually, it looks like some arches already have kasan_init_early/late() along with kasan_init(). I'd say we better keep those for generic KASAN mode, and kasan_init_tags() for tag-based modes.

#28 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 8/21 kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stack

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

There's no need for __kasan_unpoison_stack() helper, as it's only currently used in a single place. Removing it also removes undeed arithmetic.

No functional changes.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 12 +++---------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +3 -9
index a3e67d49b893..9008fc6b0810 100644
@@ -59,18 +59,12 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void)
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
 
 #if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
-static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
-{
-	void *base = task_stack_page(task);
-	size_t size = sp - base;
-
-	kasan_unpoison_memory(base, size);
-}
-
 /* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
 void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
 {
-	__kasan_unpoison_stack(task, task_stack_page(task) + THREAD_SIZE);
+	void *base = task_stack_page(task);
+
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(base, THREAD_SIZE);
 }
 
 /* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 8/21
#29 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 08/21] kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stack

Quoted 9 lines · Andrey Konovalov

There's no need for __kasan_unpoison_stack() helper, as it's only currently used in a single place. Removing it also removes undeed arithmetic.

No functional changes.

Quoted 33 lines
---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 12 +++---------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +3 -10
index a3e67d49b893..9008fc6b0810 100644
@@ -59,18 +59,12 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void)
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
 
 #if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
-static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
-{
-       void *base = task_stack_page(task);
-       size_t size = sp - base;
-
-       kasan_unpoison_memory(base, size);
-}
-
 /* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
 void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
 {
-       __kasan_unpoison_stack(task, task_stack_page(task) + THREAD_SIZE);
+       void *base = task_stack_page(task);
+
+       kasan_unpoison_memory(base, THREAD_SIZE);
 }
 
 /* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#30 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 9/21 kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Using kasan_reset_tag() currently results in a function call. As it's called quite often from the allocator code this leads to a noticeable slowdown. Move it to include/linux/kasan.h and turn it into a static inline function.

---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 5 ++++-
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c    | 5 -----
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      | 6 ++----
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c    | 5 -----
 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +4 -1
index 93d9834b7122..6377d7d3a951 100644
@@ -187,7 +187,10 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}
 
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void);
 
-void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr);
+static inline void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
+{
+	return (void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+}
 
 bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
 		bool is_write, unsigned long ip);
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -5
index b372421258c8..c3a0e83b5e7a 100644
@@ -24,11 +24,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
-void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
-{
-	return reset_tag(addr);
-}
-
 void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 {
 	set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -4
index 456b264e5124..0ccbb3c4c519 100644
@@ -246,15 +246,13 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 	return addr;
 }
 #endif
-#ifndef arch_kasan_reset_tag
-#define arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr)	((void *)(addr))
-#endif
 #ifndef arch_kasan_get_tag
 #define arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)	0
 #endif
 
+/* kasan_reset_tag() defined in include/linux/kasan.h. */
+#define reset_tag(addr)		((void *)kasan_reset_tag(addr))
 #define set_tag(addr, tag)	((void *)arch_kasan_set_tag((addr), (tag)))
-#define reset_tag(addr)		((void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr))
 #define get_tag(addr)		arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)
 
 #ifndef arch_init_tags
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +0 -5
index 099af6dc8f7e..4db41f274702 100644
@@ -67,11 +67,6 @@ u8 random_tag(void)
 	return (u8)(state % (KASAN_TAG_MAX + 1));
 }
 
-void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
-{
-	return reset_tag(addr);
-}
-
 bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
 				unsigned long ret_ip)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer
#31 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 09/21] kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes

Quoted 20 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Using kasan_reset_tag() currently results in a function call. As it's called quite often from the allocator code this leads to a noticeable slowdown. Move it to include/linux/kasan.h and turn it into a static inline function.

---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 5 ++++-
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c    | 5 -----
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      | 6 ++----
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c    | 5 -----
 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -0
index 93d9834b7122..6377d7d3a951 100644

include/linux/kasan.h static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {} · line 192

Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +3 -1
@@ -187,7 +187,10 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}
 
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void);
 
-void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr);
+static inline void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
+{
+       return (void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr);

It seems that all implementations already return (void *), so the cast is not needed.

Quoted 27 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -0
+}
 
 bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
                bool is_write, unsigned long ip);
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -5
index b372421258c8..c3a0e83b5e7a 100644
@@ -24,11 +24,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
        pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
-void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
-{
-       return reset_tag(addr);
-}
-
 void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 {
        set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
mm/kasan/kasan.h +0 -0
index 456b264e5124..0ccbb3c4c519 100644
@@ -246,15 +246,13 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
        return addr;
 }

mm/kasan/kasan.h static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) · line 254

Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -3
 #endif
-#ifndef arch_kasan_reset_tag
-#define arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr)     ((void *)(addr))
-#endif
 #ifndef arch_kasan_get_tag
 #define arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)       0
 #endif
 
+/* kasan_reset_tag() defined in include/linux/kasan.h. */
+#define reset_tag(addr)                ((void *)kasan_reset_tag(addr))

The cast is not needed.

I would also now remove reset_tag entirely by replacing it with kasan_reset_tag. Having 2 names for the same thing does not add clarity.

Quoted 24 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +0 -1
 #define set_tag(addr, tag)     ((void *)arch_kasan_set_tag((addr), (tag)))
-#define reset_tag(addr)                ((void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr))
 #define get_tag(addr)          arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)
 
 #ifndef arch_init_tags
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +0 -6
index 099af6dc8f7e..4db41f274702 100644
@@ -67,11 +67,6 @@ u8 random_tag(void)
        return (u8)(state % (KASAN_TAG_MAX + 1));
 }
 
-void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
-{
-       return reset_tag(addr);
-}
-
 bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
                                unsigned long ret_ip)
 {
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#32 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 09/21] kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes

Quoted 25 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 23 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Using kasan_reset_tag() currently results in a function call. As it's called quite often from the allocator code this leads to a noticeable slowdown. Move it to include/linux/kasan.h and turn it into a static inline function.

---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 5 ++++-
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c    | 5 -----
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      | 6 ++----
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c    | 5 -----
 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +0 -0
index 93d9834b7122..6377d7d3a951 100644
@@ -187,7 +187,10 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}
 
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void);
 
Quoted 7 lines

include/linux/kasan.h static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {} · line 192

Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +3 -1
-void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr);
+static inline void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
+{
+       return (void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr);

It seems that all implementations already return (void *), so the cast is not needed.

arch_kasan_reset_tag() (->__tag_reset() -> __untagged_addr()) preserves the type of the argument, so the cast is needed.

Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 36 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +1 -0
+}
 
 bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
                bool is_write, unsigned long ip);
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -5
index b372421258c8..c3a0e83b5e7a 100644
@@ -24,11 +24,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
        pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
-void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
-{
-       return reset_tag(addr);
-}
-
 void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 {
        set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
mm/kasan/kasan.h +0 -3
index 456b264e5124..0ccbb3c4c519 100644
@@ -246,15 +246,13 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
        return addr;
 }
 #endif
-#ifndef arch_kasan_reset_tag
-#define arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr)     ((void *)(addr))
-#endif
 #ifndef arch_kasan_get_tag
 #define arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)       0
 #endif
 
Quoted 8 lines

mm/kasan/kasan.h static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) · line 254

Quoted 2 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -0
+/* kasan_reset_tag() defined in include/linux/kasan.h. */
+#define reset_tag(addr)                ((void *)kasan_reset_tag(addr))

The cast is not needed.

I would also now remove reset_tag entirely by replacing it with kasan_reset_tag. Having 2 names for the same thing does not add clarity.

Will remove it.

#33 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 10/21 kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Using random_tag() currently results in a function call. Move its definition to mm/kasan/kasan.h and turn it into a static inline function for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function call.

---
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c |  5 -----
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -5
index c3a0e83b5e7a..4c24bfcfeff9 100644
@@ -36,11 +36,6 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
 			  round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
 }
 
-u8 random_tag(void)
-{
-	return get_random_tag();
-}
-
 bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
 {
 	u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
mm/kasan/kasan.h +20 -17
index 0ccbb3c4c519..94ba15c2f860 100644
@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ static inline bool addr_has_metadata(const void *addr)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
+#else
+static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
+#endif
+
 bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
 
 void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
@@ -223,23 +229,6 @@ static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }
 static inline void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
 #endif
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
-
-void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
-
-u8 random_tag(void);
-
-#else
-
-static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
-
-static inline u8 random_tag(void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-#endif
-
 #ifndef arch_kasan_set_tag
 static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 {
@@ -273,6 +262,20 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 #define get_mem_tag(addr)			arch_get_mem_tag(addr)
 #define set_mem_tag_range(addr, size, tag)	arch_set_mem_tag_range((addr), (size), (tag))
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
+u8 random_tag(void);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+static inline u8 random_tag(void)
+{
+	return get_random_tag();
+}
+#else
+static inline u8 random_tag(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated
  * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer
#34 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 10/21] kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS

Quoted 70 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Using random_tag() currently results in a function call. Move its definition to mm/kasan/kasan.h and turn it into a static inline function for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function call.

---
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c |  5 -----
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -5
index c3a0e83b5e7a..4c24bfcfeff9 100644
@@ -36,11 +36,6 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
                          round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
 }
 
-u8 random_tag(void)
-{
-       return get_random_tag();
-}
-
 bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
 {
        u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6 -17
index 0ccbb3c4c519..94ba15c2f860 100644
@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ static inline bool addr_has_metadata(const void *addr)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
+#else
+static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
+#endif
+
 bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
 
 void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
@@ -223,23 +229,6 @@ static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }
 static inline void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
 #endif
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
-
-void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
-
-u8 random_tag(void);
-
-#else
-
-static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
-
-static inline u8 random_tag(void)
-{
-       return 0;
-}
-
-#endif
-
 #ifndef arch_kasan_set_tag
 static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 {

mm/kasan/kasan.h static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) · line 270

Quoted 9 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6 -0
@@ -273,6 +262,20 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 #define get_mem_tag(addr)                      arch_get_mem_tag(addr)
 #define set_mem_tag_range(addr, size, tag)     arch_set_mem_tag_range((addr), (size), (tag))
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
+u8 random_tag(void);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+static inline u8 random_tag(void)
+{
+       return get_random_tag();

What's the difference between random_tag() and get_random_tag()? Do we need both?

Quoted 14 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +8 -1
+}
+#else
+static inline u8 random_tag(void)
+{
+       return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated
  * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#35 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 10/21] kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS

Quoted 75 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 73 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Using random_tag() currently results in a function call. Move its definition to mm/kasan/kasan.h and turn it into a static inline function for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function call.

---
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c |  5 -----
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -5
index c3a0e83b5e7a..4c24bfcfeff9 100644
@@ -36,11 +36,6 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
                          round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
 }
 
-u8 random_tag(void)
-{
-       return get_random_tag();
-}
-
 bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
 {
        u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6 -17
index 0ccbb3c4c519..94ba15c2f860 100644
@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ static inline bool addr_has_metadata(const void *addr)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
+#else
+static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
+#endif
+
 bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
 
 void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
@@ -223,23 +229,6 @@ static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }
 static inline void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
 #endif
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
-
-void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
-
-u8 random_tag(void);
-
-#else
-
-static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
-
-static inline u8 random_tag(void)
-{
-       return 0;
-}
-
-#endif
-
 #ifndef arch_kasan_set_tag
 static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 {
@@ -273,6 +262,20 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 #define get_mem_tag(addr)                      arch_get_mem_tag(addr)
 #define set_mem_tag_range(addr, size, tag)     arch_set_mem_tag_range((addr), (size), (tag))
 
Quoted 9 lines

mm/kasan/kasan.h static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) · line 270

Quoted 6 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6 -0
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
+u8 random_tag(void);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+static inline u8 random_tag(void)
+{
+       return get_random_tag();

What's the difference between random_tag() and get_random_tag()? Do we need both?

Not really. Will simplify this in the next version and give cleaner names.

#36 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 10/21] kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS

Quoted 87 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 75 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 73 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Using random_tag() currently results in a function call. Move its definition to mm/kasan/kasan.h and turn it into a static inline function for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function call.

---
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c |  5 -----
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -5
index c3a0e83b5e7a..4c24bfcfeff9 100644
@@ -36,11 +36,6 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
                          round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
 }
 
-u8 random_tag(void)
-{
-       return get_random_tag();
-}
-
 bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
 {
        u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6 -17
index 0ccbb3c4c519..94ba15c2f860 100644
@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ static inline bool addr_has_metadata(const void *addr)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
+#else
+static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
+#endif
+
 bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
 
 void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
@@ -223,23 +229,6 @@ static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }
 static inline void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
 #endif
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
-
-void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
-
-u8 random_tag(void);
-
-#else
-
-static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
-
-static inline u8 random_tag(void)
-{
-       return 0;
-}
-
-#endif
-
 #ifndef arch_kasan_set_tag
 static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 {
@@ -273,6 +262,20 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 #define get_mem_tag(addr)                      arch_get_mem_tag(addr)
 #define set_mem_tag_range(addr, size, tag)     arch_set_mem_tag_range((addr), (size), (tag))
 
Quoted 9 lines

mm/kasan/kasan.h static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag) · line 270

Quoted 6 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6 -0
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
+u8 random_tag(void);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+static inline u8 random_tag(void)
+{
+       return get_random_tag();

What's the difference between random_tag() and get_random_tag()? Do we need both?

Quoted 1 line

Not really. Will simplify this in the next version and give cleaner names.

Actually I think I'll keep both for the next version, but rename get_random_tag() into hw_get_random_tag() along with other hw-specific calls. The idea is to have hw_*() calls for things that are implemented by the hardware for HW_TAGS, and then define random_tag() based on that for HW_TAGS and based on a software implementation for SW_TAGS.

#37 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 11/21 kasan: inline kasan_poison_memory and check_invalid_free

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Using kasan_poison_memory() or check_invalid_free() currently results in function calls. Move their definitions to mm/kasan/kasan.h and turn them into static inline functions for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function calls.

---
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 15 ---------------
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -15
index 4c24bfcfeff9..f03161f3da19 100644
@@ -24,27 +24,12 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
-void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
-{
-	set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
-			  round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value);
-}
-
 void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
 {
 	set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
 			  round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
 }
 
-bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
-{
-	u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
-	u8 mem_tag = get_mem_tag(addr);
-
-	return (mem_tag == KASAN_TAG_INVALID) ||
-		(ptr_tag != KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && ptr_tag != mem_tag);
-}
-
 void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 				void *object, u8 tag)
 {
mm/kasan/kasan.h +24 -4
index 94ba15c2f860..8d84ae6f58f1 100644
@@ -153,8 +153,6 @@ struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 						const void *object);
 
-void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
-
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
 
 static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr)
@@ -194,8 +192,6 @@ void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
 static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
 #endif
 
-bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
-
 void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
 const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);
 void metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row);
@@ -276,6 +272,30 @@ static inline u8 random_tag(void)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+
+static inline void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
+{
+	set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
+			  round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value);
+}
+
+static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
+{
+	u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
+	u8 mem_tag = get_mem_tag(addr);
+
+	return (mem_tag == KASAN_TAG_INVALID) ||
+		(ptr_tag != KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && ptr_tag != mem_tag);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
+bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
 /*
  * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated
  * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 11/21
#38 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 11/21] kasan: inline kasan_poison_memory and check_invalid_free

Quoted 8 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev

Using kasan_poison_memory() or check_invalid_free() currently results in function calls. Move their definitions to mm/kasan/kasan.h and turn them into static inline functions for hardware tag-based mode to avoid uneeded function calls.

Quoted 97 lines
---
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 15 ---------------
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -15
index 4c24bfcfeff9..f03161f3da19 100644
@@ -24,27 +24,12 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
        pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
-void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
-{
-       set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
-                         round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value);
-}
-
 void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
 {
        set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
                          round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
 }
 
-bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
-{
-       u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
-       u8 mem_tag = get_mem_tag(addr);
-
-       return (mem_tag == KASAN_TAG_INVALID) ||
-               (ptr_tag != KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && ptr_tag != mem_tag);
-}
-
 void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                void *object, u8 tag)
 {
mm/kasan/kasan.h +24 -5
index 94ba15c2f860..8d84ae6f58f1 100644
@@ -153,8 +153,6 @@ struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                                const void *object);
 
-void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
-
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
 
 static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr)
@@ -194,8 +192,6 @@ void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
 static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
 #endif
 
-bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
-
 void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
 const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);
 void metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row);
@@ -276,6 +272,30 @@ static inline u8 random_tag(void)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+
+static inline void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
+{
+       set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
+                         round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value);
+}
+
+static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
+{
+       u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
+       u8 mem_tag = get_mem_tag(addr);
+
+       return (mem_tag == KASAN_TAG_INVALID) ||
+               (ptr_tag != KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && ptr_tag != mem_tag);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
+bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
 /*
  * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated
  * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

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#39 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 12/21 kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Currently kasan_unpoison_memory() is used as both an external annotation and as internal memory poisoning helper. Rename external annotation to kasan_unpoison_data() and inline the internal helper for for hardware tag-based mode to avoid undeeded function calls.

There's the external annotation kasan_unpoison_slab() that is currently defined as static inline and uses kasan_unpoison_memory(). With this change it's turned into a function call. Overall, this results in the same number of calls for hardware tag-based mode as kasan_unpoison_memory() is now inlined.

---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++----------
 kernel/fork.c         |  2 +-
 mm/kasan/common.c     | 10 ++++++++++
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c    |  6 ------
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      |  7 +++++++
 mm/slab_common.c      |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +6 -10
index 6377d7d3a951..2b9023224474 100644
@@ -66,14 +66,15 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
 
-void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
 void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 			slab_flags_t *flags);
 
+void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size);
+void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr);
+
 void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page);
 void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
 void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
@@ -98,11 +99,6 @@ struct kasan_cache {
 	int free_meta_offset;
 };
 
-size_t __ksize(const void *);
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
-{
-	kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
-}
 size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
 
 bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void);
@@ -110,8 +106,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 
@@ -119,6 +113,9 @@ static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 				      unsigned int *size,
 				      slab_flags_t *flags) {}
 
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) { }
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { }
+
 static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) {}
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 					void *object) {}
@@ -158,7 +155,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
 	return false;
 }
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { }
 static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
kernel/fork.c +1 -1
index b41fecca59d7..858d78eee6ec 100644
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
 			continue;
 
 		/* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */
-		kasan_unpoison_memory(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
+		kasan_unpoison_data(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
 
 		/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */
 		memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE);
mm/kasan/common.c +10 -0
index 9008fc6b0810..1a5e6c279a72 100644
@@ -184,6 +184,16 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 	return (void *)reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
 }
 
+void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(address, size);
+}
+
+void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
+{
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
+}
+
 void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
 {
 	unsigned long i;
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -6
index f03161f3da19..915142da6b57 100644
@@ -24,12 +24,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
-void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
-{
-	set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
-			  round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
-}
-
 void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 				void *object, u8 tag)
 {
mm/kasan/kasan.h +7 -0
index 8d84ae6f58f1..da08b2533d73 100644
@@ -280,6 +280,12 @@ static inline void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 valu
 			  round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value);
 }
 
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+	set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
+			  round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
+}
+
 static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
 {
 	u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
@@ -292,6 +298,7 @@ static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
 #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
 
 void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
+void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
mm/slab_common.c +1 -1
index 53d0f8bb57ea..f1b0c4a22f08 100644
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 	 * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
 	 * so we need to unpoison this area.
 	 */
-	kasan_unpoison_memory(objp, size);
+	kasan_unpoison_data(objp, size);
 	return size;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer
#40 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 12/21] kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory

Quoted 11 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Currently kasan_unpoison_memory() is used as both an external annotation and as internal memory poisoning helper. Rename external annotation to kasan_unpoison_data() and inline the internal helper for for hardware tag-based mode to avoid undeeded function calls.

There's the external annotation kasan_unpoison_slab() that is currently defined as static inline and uses kasan_unpoison_memory(). With this change it's turned into a function call. Overall, this results in the same number of calls for hardware tag-based mode as kasan_unpoison_memory() is now inlined.

Can't we leave kasan_unpoison_slab as is? Or there are other reasons to uninline it?
It seems that uninling it is orthogonal to the rest of this patch.

Quoted 164 lines
---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++----------
 kernel/fork.c         |  2 +-
 mm/kasan/common.c     | 10 ++++++++++
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c    |  6 ------
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      |  7 +++++++
 mm/slab_common.c      |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +6 -10
index 6377d7d3a951..2b9023224474 100644
@@ -66,14 +66,15 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
 
-void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
 void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
                        slab_flags_t *flags);
 
+void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size);
+void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr);
+
 void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page);
 void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
 void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
@@ -98,11 +99,6 @@ struct kasan_cache {
        int free_meta_offset;
 };
 
-size_t __ksize(const void *);
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
-{
-       kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
-}
 size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
 
 bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void);
@@ -110,8 +106,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 
@@ -119,6 +113,9 @@ static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                      unsigned int *size,
                                      slab_flags_t *flags) {}
 
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) { }
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { }
+
 static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) {}
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                        void *object) {}
@@ -158,7 +155,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
        return false;
 }
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { }
 static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
kernel/fork.c +1 -1
index b41fecca59d7..858d78eee6ec 100644
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
                        continue;
 
                /* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */
-               kasan_unpoison_memory(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
+               kasan_unpoison_data(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
 
                /* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */
                memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE);
mm/kasan/common.c +10 -0
index 9008fc6b0810..1a5e6c279a72 100644
@@ -184,6 +184,16 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
        return (void *)reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
 }
 
+void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+       kasan_unpoison_memory(address, size);
+}
+
+void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
+{
+       kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
+}
+
 void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
 {
        unsigned long i;
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +0 -6
index f03161f3da19..915142da6b57 100644
@@ -24,12 +24,6 @@ void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
        pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
-void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
-{
-       set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
-                         round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
-}
-
 void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                void *object, u8 tag)
 {
mm/kasan/kasan.h +7 -0
index 8d84ae6f58f1..da08b2533d73 100644
@@ -280,6 +280,12 @@ static inline void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 valu
                          round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value);
 }
 
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+       set_mem_tag_range(reset_tag(address),
+                         round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
+}
+
 static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
 {
        u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
@@ -292,6 +298,7 @@ static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
 #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
 
 void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
+void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
mm/slab_common.c +1 -2
index 53d0f8bb57ea..f1b0c4a22f08 100644
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
         * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
         * so we need to unpoison this area.
         */
-       kasan_unpoison_memory(objp, size);
+       kasan_unpoison_data(objp, size);
        return size;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#41 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 12/21] kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory

Quoted 8 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 6 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Currently kasan_unpoison_memory() is used as both an external annotation and as internal memory poisoning helper. Rename external annotation to kasan_unpoison_data() and inline the internal helper for for hardware tag-based mode to avoid undeeded function calls.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

There's the external annotation kasan_unpoison_slab() that is currently defined as static inline and uses kasan_unpoison_memory(). With this change it's turned into a function call. Overall, this results in the same number of calls for hardware tag-based mode as kasan_unpoison_memory() is now inlined.

Can't we leave kasan_unpoison_slab as is? Or there are other reasons to uninline it?

Just to have cleaner kasan.h callbacks definitions.

Quoted 1 line

It seems that uninling it is orthogonal to the rest of this patch.

I can split it out into a separate patch if you think this makes sense?

reviewer
#42 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 12/21] kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory

Quoted 13 lines · Andrey Konovalov' via kasan-dev
Quoted 13 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 11 lines

Currently kasan_unpoison_memory() is used as both an external annotation and as internal memory poisoning helper. Rename external annotation to kasan_unpoison_data() and inline the internal helper for for hardware tag-based mode to avoid undeeded function calls.

There's the external annotation kasan_unpoison_slab() that is currently defined as static inline and uses kasan_unpoison_memory(). With this change it's turned into a function call. Overall, this results in the same number of calls for hardware tag-based mode as kasan_unpoison_memory() is now inlined.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Can't we leave kasan_unpoison_slab as is? Or there are other reasons to uninline it?

Just to have cleaner kasan.h callbacks definitions.

Quoted 1 line

It seems that uninling it is orthogonal to the rest of this patch.

I can split it out into a separate patch if you think this makes sense?

I don't have a strong opinion either way.

#43 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 13/21 arm64: kasan: Add cpu_supports_tags helper

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Add an arm64 helper called cpu_supports_mte() that exposes information about whether the CPU supports memory tagging and that can be called during early boot (unlike system_supports_mte()).

Use that helper to implement a generic cpu_supports_tags() helper, that will be used by hardware tag-based KASAN.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h    |  1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h |  6 ++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c            | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/kasan/kasan.h                   |  4 ++++
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +1 -0
index b5d6b824c21c..f496abfcf7f5 100644
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ static inline const void *__tag_set(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+#define arch_cpu_supports_tags()		cpu_supports_mte()
 #define arch_init_tags(max_tag)			mte_init_tags(max_tag)
 #define arch_get_random_tag()			mte_get_random_tag()
 #define arch_get_mem_tag(addr)			mte_get_mem_tag(addr)
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h +6 -0
index a4c61b926d4a..4c3f2c6b4fe6 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
+#include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 /*
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ u8 mte_get_random_tag(void);
 void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag);
 
 void mte_init_tags(u64 max_tag);
+bool __init cpu_supports_mte(void);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */
 
@@ -54,6 +56,10 @@ static inline void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)
 static inline void mte_init_tags(u64 max_tag)
 {
 }
+static inline bool cpu_supports_mte(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */
 
arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c +20 -0
index ca8206b7f9a6..8fcd17408515 100644
@@ -134,6 +134,26 @@ void mte_init_tags(u64 max_tag)
 	gcr_kernel_excl = ~incl & SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK;
 }
 
+/*
+ * This function can be used during early boot to determine whether the CPU
+ * supports MTE. The alternative that must be used after boot is completed is
+ * system_supports_mte(), but it only works after the cpufeature framework
+ * learns about MTE.
+ */
+bool __init cpu_supports_mte(void)
+{
+	u64 pfr1;
+	u32 val;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_MTE))
+		return false;
+
+	pfr1 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1);
+	val = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr1, ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT);
+
+	return val >= ID_AA64PFR1_MTE;
+}
+
 static void update_sctlr_el1_tcf0(u64 tcf0)
 {
 	/* ISB required for the kernel uaccess routines */
mm/kasan/kasan.h +4 -0
index da08b2533d73..f7ae0c23f023 100644
@@ -240,6 +240,9 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 #define set_tag(addr, tag)	((void *)arch_kasan_set_tag((addr), (tag)))
 #define get_tag(addr)		arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)
 
+#ifndef arch_cpu_supports_tags
+#define arch_cpu_supports_tags() (false)
+#endif
 #ifndef arch_init_tags
 #define arch_init_tags(max_tag)
 #endif
@@ -253,6 +256,7 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 #define arch_set_mem_tag_range(addr, size, tag) ((void *)(addr))
 #endif
 
+#define cpu_supports_tags()			arch_cpu_supports_tags()
 #define init_tags(max_tag)			arch_init_tags(max_tag)
 #define get_random_tag()			arch_get_random_tag()
 #define get_mem_tag(addr)			arch_get_mem_tag(addr)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 13/21
#44 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 13/21] arm64: kasan: Add cpu_supports_tags helper

Quoted 10 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Add an arm64 helper called cpu_supports_mte() that exposes information about whether the CPU supports memory tagging and that can be called during early boot (unlike system_supports_mte()).

Use that helper to implement a generic cpu_supports_tags() helper, that will be used by hardware tag-based KASAN.

Quoted 106 lines
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h    |  1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h |  6 ++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c            | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/kasan/kasan.h                   |  4 ++++
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +1 -0
index b5d6b824c21c..f496abfcf7f5 100644
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ static inline const void *__tag_set(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+#define arch_cpu_supports_tags()               cpu_supports_mte()
 #define arch_init_tags(max_tag)                        mte_init_tags(max_tag)
 #define arch_get_random_tag()                  mte_get_random_tag()
 #define arch_get_mem_tag(addr)                 mte_get_mem_tag(addr)
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h +6 -0
index a4c61b926d4a..4c3f2c6b4fe6 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
+#include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 /*
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ u8 mte_get_random_tag(void);
 void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag);
 
 void mte_init_tags(u64 max_tag);
+bool __init cpu_supports_mte(void);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */
 
@@ -54,6 +56,10 @@ static inline void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)
 static inline void mte_init_tags(u64 max_tag)
 {
 }
+static inline bool cpu_supports_mte(void)
+{
+       return false;
+}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */
 
arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c +20 -0
index ca8206b7f9a6..8fcd17408515 100644
@@ -134,6 +134,26 @@ void mte_init_tags(u64 max_tag)
        gcr_kernel_excl = ~incl & SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK;
 }
 
+/*
+ * This function can be used during early boot to determine whether the CPU
+ * supports MTE. The alternative that must be used after boot is completed is
+ * system_supports_mte(), but it only works after the cpufeature framework
+ * learns about MTE.
+ */
+bool __init cpu_supports_mte(void)
+{
+       u64 pfr1;
+       u32 val;
+
+       if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_MTE))
+               return false;
+
+       pfr1 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1);
+       val = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr1, ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT);
+
+       return val >= ID_AA64PFR1_MTE;
+}
+
 static void update_sctlr_el1_tcf0(u64 tcf0)
 {
        /* ISB required for the kernel uaccess routines */
mm/kasan/kasan.h +4 -1
index da08b2533d73..f7ae0c23f023 100644
@@ -240,6 +240,9 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 #define set_tag(addr, tag)     ((void *)arch_kasan_set_tag((addr), (tag)))
 #define get_tag(addr)          arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)
 
+#ifndef arch_cpu_supports_tags
+#define arch_cpu_supports_tags() (false)
+#endif
 #ifndef arch_init_tags
 #define arch_init_tags(max_tag)
 #endif
@@ -253,6 +256,7 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
 #define arch_set_mem_tag_range(addr, size, tag) ((void *)(addr))
 #endif
 
+#define cpu_supports_tags()                    arch_cpu_supports_tags()
 #define init_tags(max_tag)                     arch_init_tags(max_tag)
 #define get_random_tag()                       arch_get_random_tag()
 #define get_mem_tag(addr)                      arch_get_mem_tag(addr)
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#45 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 14/21 kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c  |  92 +++++++++++++-----------
 mm/kasan/generic.c |   5 ++
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   |   9 +++
 mm/kasan/report.c  |  14 +++-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c |   5 ++
 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +51 -41
index 1a5e6c279a72..cc129ef62ab1 100644
@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 	unsigned int redzone_size;
 	int redzone_adjust;
 
-	/* Add alloc meta. */
-	cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
-	*size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
-
-	/* Add free meta. */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
-	    (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
-	     cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
-		cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
-		*size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
-	}
-
-	redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
-	redzone_adjust = redzone_size -	(*size - cache->object_size);
-	if (redzone_adjust > 0)
-		*size += redzone_adjust;
-
-	*size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
-			max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
+		/* Add alloc meta. */
+		cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
+		*size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
+
+		/* Add free meta. */
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
+		    (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
+		     cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
+			cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
+			*size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
+		}
 
-	/*
-	 * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
-	 */
-	if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
-			*size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
-		cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
-		cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
-		*size = orig_size;
-		return;
+		redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
+		redzone_adjust = redzone_size -	(*size - cache->object_size);
+		if (redzone_adjust > 0)
+			*size += redzone_adjust;
+
+		*size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
+				max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+
+		/*
+		 * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
+		 */
+		if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
+				*size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
+			cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
+			cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
+			*size = orig_size;
+			return;
+		}
 	}
 
 	*flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
@@ -165,10 +167,12 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 
 size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
 {
-	return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
-		sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
-		(cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
-		sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
+		return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
+			sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
+			(cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
+			sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
@@ -270,8 +274,10 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 	if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
 		return (void *)object;
 
-	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
-	__memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
+		alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+		__memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
+	}
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
 		object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
@@ -308,15 +314,19 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 	kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
-	if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
-			unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
-		return false;
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
+		if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
+				unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
+			return false;
+
+		kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
 
-	kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
+		quarantine_put(cache, object);
 
-	quarantine_put(cache, object);
+		return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+	}
 
-	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+	return false;
 }
 
 bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
@@ -355,7 +365,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 	kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
 		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
-	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack) && (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
 		set_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags);
 
 	return set_tag(object, tag);
mm/kasan/generic.c +5 -0
index d259e4c3aefd..20a1e753e0c5 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
+/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
 /*
  * All functions below always inlined so compiler could
  * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +168 -1

184 lines not on this page · raw message

mm/kasan/kasan.h +9 -0
index f7ae0c23f023..00b47bc753aa 100644
@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@
 #ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
 #define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
 
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_stack);
+#else
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_stack);
+#endif
+
+extern bool kasan_panic __ro_after_init;
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
 #define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE	(1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
 #else
mm/kasan/report.c +12 -2
index dee5350b459c..426dd1962d3c 100644
@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
 		panic_on_warn = 0;
 		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
 	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+	if (kasan_panic)
+		panic("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n");
+#endif
 	kasan_enable_current();
 }
 
@@ -159,8 +163,8 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 		(void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size));
 }
 
-static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
-				const void *addr, u8 tag)
+static void describe_object_stacks(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+					const void *addr, u8 tag)
 {
 	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
@@ -188,7 +192,13 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 		}
 #endif
 	}
+}
 
+static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+				const void *addr, u8 tag)
+{
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
+		describe_object_stacks(cache, object, addr, tag);
 	describe_object_addr(cache, object, addr);
 }
 
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +5 -0
index 4db41f274702..b6d185adf2c5 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
+/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);
 
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
#46 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters

Quoted 258 lines · Andrey Konovalov

TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c  |  92 +++++++++++++-----------
 mm/kasan/generic.c |   5 ++
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   |   9 +++
 mm/kasan/report.c  |  14 +++-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c |   5 ++
 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +51 -41
index 1a5e6c279a72..cc129ef62ab1 100644
@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
        unsigned int redzone_size;
        int redzone_adjust;
 
-       /* Add alloc meta. */
-       cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
-       *size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
-
-       /* Add free meta. */
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
-           (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
-            cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
-               cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
-               *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
-       }
-
-       redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
-       redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size);
-       if (redzone_adjust > 0)
-               *size += redzone_adjust;
-
-       *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
-                       max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
+               /* Add alloc meta. */
+               cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
+               *size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
+
+               /* Add free meta. */
+               if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
+                   (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
+                    cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
+                       cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
+                       *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
+               }
 
-       /*
-        * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
-        */
-       if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
-                       *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
-               cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
-               cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
-               *size = orig_size;
-               return;
+               redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
+               redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size);
+               if (redzone_adjust > 0)
+                       *size += redzone_adjust;
+
+               *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
+                               max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+
+               /*
+                * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
+                */
+               if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
+                               *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
+                       cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
+                       cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
+                       *size = orig_size;
+                       return;
+               }
        }
 
        *flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
@@ -165,10 +167,12 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 
 size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
 {
-       return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
-               sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
-               (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
-               sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
+               return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
+                       sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
+                       (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
+                       sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+       return 0;
 }
 
 struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
@@ -270,8 +274,10 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
        if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
                return (void *)object;
 
-       alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
-       __memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
+               alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+               __memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
+       }
 
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
                object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
@@ -308,15 +314,19 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
        rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
        kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
-       if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
-                       unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
-               return false;
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
+               if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
+                               unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
+                       return false;
+
+               kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
 
-       kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
+               quarantine_put(cache, object);
 
-       quarantine_put(cache, object);
+               return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+       }
 
-       return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+       return false;
 }
 
 bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
@@ -355,7 +365,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
        kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
                KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
-       if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack) && (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
                set_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags);
 
        return set_tag(object, tag);
mm/kasan/generic.c +5 -0
index d259e4c3aefd..20a1e753e0c5 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
+/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
 /*
  * All functions below always inlined so compiler could
  * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +77 -0
index 915142da6b57..bccd781011ad 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
 
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/memory.h>
@@ -17,10 +19,175 @@
 
 #include "kasan.h"
 
+enum kasan_arg_mode {
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF,
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD,
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_stack {
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF,
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_trap {
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC,
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_fault {
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT,
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC,
+};
+
+static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_stack kasan_arg_stack __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_trap kasan_arg_trap __ro_after_init;
+
+/* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+
+/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
+/* Whether to use synchronous or asynchronous tag checking. */
+static bool kasan_sync __ro_after_init;
+
+/* Whether panic or disable tag checking on fault. */
+bool kasan_panic __ro_after_init;
+
+/* kasan.mode=off/prod/full */
+static int __init early_kasan_mode(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "prod"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "full"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.mode", early_kasan_mode);
+
+/* kasan.stack=off/on */
+static int __init early_kasan_stack(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+               kasan_arg_stack = KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "on"))
+               kasan_arg_stack = KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;

mm/kasan/hw_tags.c line 106

Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +10 -0
+}
+early_param("kasan.stack", early_kasan_stack);
+
+/* kasan.trap=sync/async */
+static int __init early_kasan_trap(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "ASYNC"))

Why is this "ASYNC" and not "async"?

Quoted 170 lines
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +81 -1
+               kasan_arg_trap = KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "sync"))
+               kasan_arg_trap = KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.trap", early_kasan_trap);
+
+/* kasan.fault=report/panic */
+static int __init early_kasan_fault(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "report"))
+               kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "panic"))
+               kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.fault", early_kasan_fault);
+
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
-       init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
+       if (!cpu_supports_tags())
+               return;
+
+       /* First, preset values based on the mode. */
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_mode) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF:
+               return;
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_enabled);
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_enabled);
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_stack);
+               kasan_sync = true;
+               break;
+       }
+
+       /* Now, optionally override the presets. */
 
+       switch (kasan_arg_stack) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF:
+               static_branch_disable(&kasan_stack);
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_stack);
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_trap) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC:
+               kasan_sync = false;
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC:
+               kasan_sync = true;
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_fault) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT:
+               kasan_panic = false;
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC:
+               kasan_panic = true;
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       /* TODO: choose between sync and async based on kasan_sync. */
+       init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
        pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
mm/kasan/kasan.h +9 -0
index f7ae0c23f023..00b47bc753aa 100644
@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@
 #ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
 #define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
 
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_stack);
+#else
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_stack);
+#endif
+
+extern bool kasan_panic __ro_after_init;
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
 #define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE     (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
 #else
mm/kasan/report.c +12 -2
index dee5350b459c..426dd1962d3c 100644
@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
                panic_on_warn = 0;
                panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
        }
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+       if (kasan_panic)
+               panic("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n");
+#endif
        kasan_enable_current();
 }
 
@@ -159,8 +163,8 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                (void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size));
 }
 
-static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
-                               const void *addr, u8 tag)
+static void describe_object_stacks(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+                                       const void *addr, u8 tag)
 {
        struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
@@ -188,7 +192,13 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                }
 #endif
        }
+}
 
+static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+                               const void *addr, u8 tag)
+{
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
+               describe_object_stacks(cache, object, addr, tag);
        describe_object_addr(cache, object, addr);
 }
 
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +5 -1
index 4db41f274702..b6d185adf2c5 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
+/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);
 
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#47 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters

Quoted 264 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 262 lines · Andrey Konovalov

TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c  |  92 +++++++++++++-----------
 mm/kasan/generic.c |   5 ++
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   |   9 +++
 mm/kasan/report.c  |  14 +++-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c |   5 ++
 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +51 -41
index 1a5e6c279a72..cc129ef62ab1 100644
@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
        unsigned int redzone_size;
        int redzone_adjust;
 
-       /* Add alloc meta. */
-       cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
-       *size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
-
-       /* Add free meta. */
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
-           (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
-            cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
-               cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
-               *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
-       }
-
-       redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
-       redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size);
-       if (redzone_adjust > 0)
-               *size += redzone_adjust;
-
-       *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
-                       max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
+               /* Add alloc meta. */
+               cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
+               *size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
+
+               /* Add free meta. */
+               if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
+                   (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
+                    cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
+                       cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
+                       *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
+               }
 
-       /*
-        * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
-        */
-       if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
-                       *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
-               cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
-               cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
-               *size = orig_size;
-               return;
+               redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
+               redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size);
+               if (redzone_adjust > 0)
+                       *size += redzone_adjust;
+
+               *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
+                               max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+
+               /*
+                * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
+                */
+               if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
+                               *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
+                       cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
+                       cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
+                       *size = orig_size;
+                       return;
+               }
        }
 
        *flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
@@ -165,10 +167,12 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 
 size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
 {
-       return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
-               sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
-               (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
-               sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
+               return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
+                       sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
+                       (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
+                       sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+       return 0;
 }
 
 struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
@@ -270,8 +274,10 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
        if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
                return (void *)object;
 
-       alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
-       __memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
+               alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+               __memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
+       }
 
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
                object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
@@ -308,15 +314,19 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
        rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
        kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
-       if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
-                       unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
-               return false;
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
+               if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
+                               unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
+                       return false;
+
+               kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
 
-       kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
+               quarantine_put(cache, object);
 
-       quarantine_put(cache, object);
+               return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+       }
 
-       return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+       return false;
 }
 
 bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
@@ -355,7 +365,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
        kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
                KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
-       if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack) && (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
                set_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags);
 
        return set_tag(object, tag);
mm/kasan/generic.c +5 -0
index d259e4c3aefd..20a1e753e0c5 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
+/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
 /*
  * All functions below always inlined so compiler could
  * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +81 -0
index 915142da6b57..bccd781011ad 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
 
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/memory.h>
@@ -17,10 +19,175 @@
 
 #include "kasan.h"
 
+enum kasan_arg_mode {
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF,
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD,
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_stack {
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF,
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_trap {
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC,
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_fault {
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT,
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC,
+};
+
+static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_stack kasan_arg_stack __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_trap kasan_arg_trap __ro_after_init;
+
+/* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+
+/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
+/* Whether to use synchronous or asynchronous tag checking. */
+static bool kasan_sync __ro_after_init;
+
+/* Whether panic or disable tag checking on fault. */
+bool kasan_panic __ro_after_init;
+
+/* kasan.mode=off/prod/full */
+static int __init early_kasan_mode(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "prod"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "full"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.mode", early_kasan_mode);
+
+/* kasan.stack=off/on */
+static int __init early_kasan_stack(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+               kasan_arg_stack = KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "on"))
+               kasan_arg_stack = KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.stack", early_kasan_stack);
+
+/* kasan.trap=sync/async */
Quoted 8 lines

mm/kasan/hw_tags.c line 106

Quoted 6 lines
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +6 -0
+static int __init early_kasan_trap(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "ASYNC"))

Why is this "ASYNC" and not "async"?

Typo, will fix in the next version. Thanks!

Quoted 171 lines
Quoted 171 lines
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +81 -1
+               kasan_arg_trap = KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "sync"))
+               kasan_arg_trap = KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.trap", early_kasan_trap);
+
+/* kasan.fault=report/panic */
+static int __init early_kasan_fault(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "report"))
+               kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "panic"))
+               kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.fault", early_kasan_fault);
+
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
-       init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
+       if (!cpu_supports_tags())
+               return;
+
+       /* First, preset values based on the mode. */
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_mode) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF:
+               return;
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_enabled);
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_enabled);
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_stack);
+               kasan_sync = true;
+               break;
+       }
+
+       /* Now, optionally override the presets. */
 
+       switch (kasan_arg_stack) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF:
+               static_branch_disable(&kasan_stack);
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_stack);
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_trap) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC:
+               kasan_sync = false;
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC:
+               kasan_sync = true;
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_fault) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT:
+               kasan_panic = false;
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC:
+               kasan_panic = true;
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       /* TODO: choose between sync and async based on kasan_sync. */
+       init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
        pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
mm/kasan/kasan.h +9 -0
index f7ae0c23f023..00b47bc753aa 100644
@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@
 #ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
 #define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
 
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_stack);
+#else
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_stack);
+#endif
+
+extern bool kasan_panic __ro_after_init;
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
 #define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE     (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
 #else
mm/kasan/report.c +12 -2
index dee5350b459c..426dd1962d3c 100644
@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
                panic_on_warn = 0;
                panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
        }
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+       if (kasan_panic)
+               panic("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n");
+#endif
        kasan_enable_current();
 }
 
@@ -159,8 +163,8 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                (void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size));
 }
 
-static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
-                               const void *addr, u8 tag)
+static void describe_object_stacks(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+                                       const void *addr, u8 tag)
 {
        struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
@@ -188,7 +192,13 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                }
 #endif
        }
+}
 
+static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+                               const void *addr, u8 tag)
+{
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
+               describe_object_stacks(cache, object, addr, tag);
        describe_object_addr(cache, object, addr);
 }
 
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +5 -1
index 4db41f274702..b6d185adf2c5 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
+/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);
 
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

reviewer
#48 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters

In reply to Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 33 lines · Andrey Konovalov

TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c  |  92 +++++++++++++-----------
 mm/kasan/generic.c |   5 ++
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   |   9 +++
 mm/kasan/report.c  |  14 +++-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c |   5 ++
 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +0 -10
index 1a5e6c279a72..cc129ef62ab1 100644
@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
        unsigned int redzone_size;
        int redzone_adjust;
 
-       /* Add alloc meta. */
-       cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
-       *size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
-
-       /* Add free meta. */
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
-           (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
-            cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
-               cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
-               *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);

mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, · line 132

Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -9
-       }
-
-       redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
-       redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size);
-       if (redzone_adjust > 0)
-               *size += redzone_adjust;
-
-       *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
-                       max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {

Initially I thought kasan_stack is related to stack instrumentation. And then wondered why we check it during slab creation.
I suggest giving it a slightly longer and more descriptive name.

... reading code further, it also disables quarantine, right? Something to mention somewhere.

Quoted 60 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +35 -13
+               /* Add alloc meta. */
+               cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
+               *size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
+
+               /* Add free meta. */
+               if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
+                   (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
+                    cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
+                       cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
+                       *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
+               }
 
-       /*
-        * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
-        */
-       if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
-                       *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
-               cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
-               cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
-               *size = orig_size;
-               return;
+               redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
+               redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size);
+               if (redzone_adjust > 0)
+                       *size += redzone_adjust;
+
+               *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
+                               max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+
+               /*
+                * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
+                */
+               if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
+                               *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
+                       cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
+                       cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
+                       *size = orig_size;
+                       return;
+               }
        }
 
        *flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
@@ -165,10 +167,12 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 
 size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
 {
-       return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
-               sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
-               (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
-               sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
+               return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
+                       sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
+                       (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
+                       sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+       return 0;
 }
 
 struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,

mm/kasan/common.c void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, · line 277

Quoted 6 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -2
@@ -270,8 +274,10 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
        if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
                return (void *)object;
 
-       alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
-       __memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {

Interestingly, now SLAB_KASAN is always set when kasan_stack is not enabled. So it seems to me we can move the SLAB_KASAN check into this unlikely branch now.

Quoted 254 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +14 -7
+               alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+               __memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
+       }
 
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
                object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
@@ -308,15 +314,19 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
        rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
        kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
-       if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
-                       unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
-               return false;
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
+               if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
+                               unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
+                       return false;
+
+               kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
 
-       kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
+               quarantine_put(cache, object);
 
-       quarantine_put(cache, object);
+               return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+       }
 
-       return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+       return false;
 }
 
 bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
@@ -355,7 +365,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
        kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
                KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
-       if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack) && (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
                set_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags);
 
        return set_tag(object, tag);
mm/kasan/generic.c +5 -0
index d259e4c3aefd..20a1e753e0c5 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
+/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
 /*
  * All functions below always inlined so compiler could
  * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +168 -1
index 915142da6b57..bccd781011ad 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
 
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/memory.h>
@@ -17,10 +19,175 @@
 
 #include "kasan.h"
 
+enum kasan_arg_mode {
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF,
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD,
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_stack {
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF,
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_trap {
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC,
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_fault {
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT,
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC,
+};
+
+static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_stack kasan_arg_stack __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_trap kasan_arg_trap __ro_after_init;
+
+/* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+
+/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
+/* Whether to use synchronous or asynchronous tag checking. */
+static bool kasan_sync __ro_after_init;
+
+/* Whether panic or disable tag checking on fault. */
+bool kasan_panic __ro_after_init;
+
+/* kasan.mode=off/prod/full */
+static int __init early_kasan_mode(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "prod"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "full"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.mode", early_kasan_mode);
+
+/* kasan.stack=off/on */
+static int __init early_kasan_stack(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+               kasan_arg_stack = KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "on"))
+               kasan_arg_stack = KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.stack", early_kasan_stack);
+
+/* kasan.trap=sync/async */
+static int __init early_kasan_trap(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "ASYNC"))
+               kasan_arg_trap = KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "sync"))
+               kasan_arg_trap = KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.trap", early_kasan_trap);
+
+/* kasan.fault=report/panic */
+static int __init early_kasan_fault(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "report"))
+               kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "panic"))
+               kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.fault", early_kasan_fault);
+
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
-       init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
+       if (!cpu_supports_tags())
+               return;
+
+       /* First, preset values based on the mode. */
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_mode) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF:
+               return;
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_enabled);
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_enabled);
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_stack);
+               kasan_sync = true;
+               break;
+       }
+
+       /* Now, optionally override the presets. */
 
+       switch (kasan_arg_stack) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF:
+               static_branch_disable(&kasan_stack);
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_stack);
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_trap) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC:
+               kasan_sync = false;
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC:
+               kasan_sync = true;
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_fault) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT:
+               kasan_panic = false;
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC:
+               kasan_panic = true;
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       /* TODO: choose between sync and async based on kasan_sync. */
+       init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
        pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
mm/kasan/kasan.h +0 -0
index f7ae0c23f023..00b47bc753aa 100644
@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@
 #ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
 #define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H

mm/kasan/kasan.h line 13

Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6 -0
 
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_stack);
+#else
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_stack);
+#endif

kasan_stack and kasan_enabled make sense and changed only in hw_tags mode. It would be cleaner (and faster for other modes) to abstract static keys as:

#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
#include <linux/jump_label.h> DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_stack);
static inline bool kasan_stack_collection_enabled()
{
return static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack);
}
#else
static inline bool kasan_stack_collection_enabled() { return true; } #endif

This way we don't need to include and define static keys for other modes.

Quoted 64 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -0
+extern bool kasan_panic __ro_after_init;
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
 #define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE     (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
 #else
mm/kasan/report.c +12 -2
index dee5350b459c..426dd1962d3c 100644
@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
                panic_on_warn = 0;
                panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
        }
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+       if (kasan_panic)
+               panic("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n");
+#endif
        kasan_enable_current();
 }
 
@@ -159,8 +163,8 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                (void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size));
 }
 
-static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
-                               const void *addr, u8 tag)
+static void describe_object_stacks(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+                                       const void *addr, u8 tag)
 {
        struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
@@ -188,7 +192,13 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                }
 #endif
        }
+}
 
+static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+                               const void *addr, u8 tag)
+{
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
+               describe_object_stacks(cache, object, addr, tag);
        describe_object_addr(cache, object, addr);
 }
 
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +5 -1
index 4db41f274702..b6d185adf2c5 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
+/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);
 
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#49 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters

Quoted 41 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 39 lines · Andrey Konovalov

TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c  |  92 +++++++++++++-----------
 mm/kasan/generic.c |   5 ++
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   |   9 +++
 mm/kasan/report.c  |  14 +++-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c |   5 ++
 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +0 -16
index 1a5e6c279a72..cc129ef62ab1 100644
@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
        unsigned int redzone_size;
        int redzone_adjust;
 
-       /* Add alloc meta. */
-       cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
-       *size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
-
-       /* Add free meta. */
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
-           (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
-            cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
-               cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
-               *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
-       }
-
-       redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
-       redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size);
-       if (redzone_adjust > 0)
-               *size += redzone_adjust;
Quoted 8 lines

mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, · line 132

Quoted 4 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -3
-
-       *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
-                       max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {

Initially I thought kasan_stack is related to stack instrumentation. And then wondered why we check it during slab creation.
I suggest giving it a slightly longer and more descriptive name.

Will do.

Quoted 2 lines

... reading code further, it also disables quarantine, right? Something to mention somewhere.

Quarantine is not supported for anything but generic KASAN. Maybe it makes sense to put this into documentation...

Quoted 63 lines
Quoted 63 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +35 -13
+               /* Add alloc meta. */
+               cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
+               *size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
+
+               /* Add free meta. */
+               if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
+                   (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
+                    cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
+                       cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
+                       *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
+               }
 
-       /*
-        * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
-        */
-       if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
-                       *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
-               cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
-               cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
-               *size = orig_size;
-               return;
+               redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
+               redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size);
+               if (redzone_adjust > 0)
+                       *size += redzone_adjust;
+
+               *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
+                               max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+
+               /*
+                * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
+                */
+               if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
+                               *size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
+                       cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
+                       cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
+                       *size = orig_size;
+                       return;
+               }
        }
 
        *flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
@@ -165,10 +167,12 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 
 size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
 {
-       return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
-               sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
-               (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
-               sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
+               return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
+                       sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
+                       (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
+                       sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+       return 0;
 }
 
 struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
@@ -270,8 +274,10 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
        if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
                return (void *)object;
 
Quoted 7 lines

mm/kasan/common.c void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, · line 277

Quoted 3 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -2
-       alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
-       __memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {

Interestingly, now SLAB_KASAN is always set when kasan_stack is not enabled. So it seems to me we can move the SLAB_KASAN check into this unlikely branch now.

Yes, will fix. I'll also include a complete rework of SLAB_KASAN into the next version.

Quoted 280 lines
Quoted 255 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +14 -7
+               alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+               __memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
+       }
 
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
                object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
@@ -308,15 +314,19 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
        rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
        kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
-       if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
-                       unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
-               return false;
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
+               if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
+                               unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
+                       return false;
+
+               kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
 
-       kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
+               quarantine_put(cache, object);
 
-       quarantine_put(cache, object);
+               return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+       }
 
-       return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+       return false;
 }
 
 bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
@@ -355,7 +365,7 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
        kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
                KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
-       if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack) && (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
                set_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags);
 
        return set_tag(object, tag);
mm/kasan/generic.c +5 -0
index d259e4c3aefd..20a1e753e0c5 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
+/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
 /*
  * All functions below always inlined so compiler could
  * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +168 -1
index 915142da6b57..bccd781011ad 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
 
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/memory.h>
@@ -17,10 +19,175 @@
 
 #include "kasan.h"
 
+enum kasan_arg_mode {
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF,
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD,
+       KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_stack {
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF,
+       KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_trap {
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC,
+       KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_fault {
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT,
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT,
+       KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC,
+};
+
+static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_stack kasan_arg_stack __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_trap kasan_arg_trap __ro_after_init;
+
+/* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+
+/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
+/* Whether to use synchronous or asynchronous tag checking. */
+static bool kasan_sync __ro_after_init;
+
+/* Whether panic or disable tag checking on fault. */
+bool kasan_panic __ro_after_init;
+
+/* kasan.mode=off/prod/full */
+static int __init early_kasan_mode(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "prod"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "full"))
+               kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.mode", early_kasan_mode);
+
+/* kasan.stack=off/on */
+static int __init early_kasan_stack(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+               kasan_arg_stack = KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "on"))
+               kasan_arg_stack = KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.stack", early_kasan_stack);
+
+/* kasan.trap=sync/async */
+static int __init early_kasan_trap(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "ASYNC"))
+               kasan_arg_trap = KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "sync"))
+               kasan_arg_trap = KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.trap", early_kasan_trap);
+
+/* kasan.fault=report/panic */
+static int __init early_kasan_fault(char *arg)
+{
+       if (!arg)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!strcmp(arg, "report"))
+               kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT;
+       else if (!strcmp(arg, "panic"))
+               kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.fault", early_kasan_fault);
+
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
 {
-       init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
+       if (!cpu_supports_tags())
+               return;
+
+       /* First, preset values based on the mode. */
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_mode) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_OFF:
+               return;
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_PROD:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_enabled);
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_MODE_FULL:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_enabled);
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_stack);
+               kasan_sync = true;
+               break;
+       }
+
+       /* Now, optionally override the presets. */
 
+       switch (kasan_arg_stack) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_STACK_OFF:
+               static_branch_disable(&kasan_stack);
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_STACK_ON:
+               static_branch_enable(&kasan_stack);
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_trap) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_ASYNC:
+               kasan_sync = false;
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_TRAP_SYNC:
+               kasan_sync = true;
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       switch (kasan_arg_fault) {
+       case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT:
+               kasan_panic = false;
+               break;
+       case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC:
+               kasan_panic = true;
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       /* TODO: choose between sync and async based on kasan_sync. */
+       init_tags(KASAN_TAG_MAX);
        pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
 }
 
mm/kasan/kasan.h +0 -0
index f7ae0c23f023..00b47bc753aa 100644
@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@
 #ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
 #define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H

mm/kasan/kasan.h line 13

Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6 -0
 
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_stack);
+#else
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_stack);
+#endif

kasan_stack and kasan_enabled make sense and changed only in hw_tags mode. It would be cleaner (and faster for other modes) to abstract static keys as:

#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
#include <linux/jump_label.h> DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_stack);
static inline bool kasan_stack_collection_enabled()
{
return static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack);
}
#else
static inline bool kasan_stack_collection_enabled() { return true; } #endif

Quoted 1 line

This way we don't need to include and define static keys for other modes.

Sounds good, will do.

Quoted 65 lines
Quoted 65 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -0
+extern bool kasan_panic __ro_after_init;
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
 #define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE     (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
 #else
mm/kasan/report.c +12 -2
index dee5350b459c..426dd1962d3c 100644
@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
                panic_on_warn = 0;
                panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
        }
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+       if (kasan_panic)
+               panic("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n");
+#endif
        kasan_enable_current();
 }
 
@@ -159,8 +163,8 @@ static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                (void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size));
 }
 
-static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
-                               const void *addr, u8 tag)
+static void describe_object_stacks(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+                                       const void *addr, u8 tag)
 {
        struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
 
@@ -188,7 +192,13 @@ static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                }
 #endif
        }
+}
 
+static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+                               const void *addr, u8 tag)
+{
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
+               describe_object_stacks(cache, object, addr, tag);
        describe_object_addr(cache, object, addr);
 }
 
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +5 -1
index 4db41f274702..b6d185adf2c5 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
+/* See the comments in hw_tags.c */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enabled);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(kasan_stack);
+
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);
 
 void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#50 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters

In reply to Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 33 lines · Andrey Konovalov

TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c  |  92 +++++++++++++-----------
 mm/kasan/generic.c |   5 ++
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   |   9 +++
 mm/kasan/report.c  |  14 +++-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c |   5 ++
 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +0 -10
index 1a5e6c279a72..cc129ef62ab1 100644
@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
        unsigned int redzone_size;
        int redzone_adjust;
 
-       /* Add alloc meta. */
-       cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
-       *size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
-
-       /* Add free meta. */
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
-           (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
-            cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
-               cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
-               *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);

mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, · line 132

Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -9
-       }
-
-       redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
-       redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size);
-       if (redzone_adjust > 0)
-               *size += redzone_adjust;
-
-       *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
-                       max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {

I just looked at this file in your Github repo, and noticed that this could just be

if (!static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))

    return;

since the if-block ends at the function. That might hopefully make the diff a bit smaller.

Thanks,
-- Marco

#51 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters

Quoted 49 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 33 lines · Andrey Konovalov

TODO: no meaningful description here yet, please see the cover letter
for this RFC series.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c  |  92 +++++++++++++-----------
 mm/kasan/generic.c |   5 ++
 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   |   9 +++
 mm/kasan/report.c  |  14 +++-
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c |   5 ++
 6 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +0 -10
index 1a5e6c279a72..cc129ef62ab1 100644
@@ -129,35 +129,37 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
        unsigned int redzone_size;
        int redzone_adjust;
 
-       /* Add alloc meta. */
-       cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
-       *size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
-
-       /* Add free meta. */
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
-           (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
-            cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
-               cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
-               *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);

mm/kasan/common.c void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, · line 132

Quoted 10 lines
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -9
-       }
-
-       redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
-       redzone_adjust = redzone_size - (*size - cache->object_size);
-       if (redzone_adjust > 0)
-               *size += redzone_adjust;
-
-       *size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
-                       max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {

I just looked at this file in your Github repo, and noticed that this could just be

Quoted 5 lines

if (!static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))

    return;

since the if-block ends at the function. That might hopefully make the diff a bit smaller.

Will do, thanks!

#52 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 15/21 kasan: check kasan_enabled in annotations

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Declare the kasan_enabled static key in include/linux/kasan.h and in include/linux/mm.h and check it in all kasan annotations. This allows to avoid any slowdown caused by function calls when kasan_enabled is disabled.

---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 210 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 include/linux/mm.h    |  27 ++++--
 mm/kasan/common.c     |  60 ++++++------
 3 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +160 -50
index 2b9023224474..8654275aa62e 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_KASAN_H
 #define _LINUX_KASAN_H
 
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 struct kmem_cache;
@@ -66,40 +67,154 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
 
-void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
-void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
+struct kasan_cache {
+	int alloc_meta_offset;
+	int free_meta_offset;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_enabled);
+#else
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_enabled);
+#endif
 
-void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
-			slab_flags_t *flags);
+void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
+static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		__kasan_alloc_pages(page, order);
+}
 
-void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size);
-void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr);
+void __kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
+static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		__kasan_free_pages(page, order);
+}
 
-void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page);
-void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
-void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
-void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-					const void *object);
+void __kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
+				slab_flags_t *flags);
+static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+			unsigned int *size, slab_flags_t *flags)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		__kasan_cache_create(cache, size, flags);
+}
 
-void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
-						gfp_t flags);
-void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
-void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
-void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
-					size_t size, gfp_t flags);
-void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
-					gfp_t flags);
+size_t __kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
+static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		return __kasan_metadata_size(cache);
+	return 0;
+}
 
-void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
-					gfp_t flags);
-bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long ip);
+void __kasan_unpoison_data(const void *addr, size_t size);
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		__kasan_unpoison_data(addr, size);
+}
 
-struct kasan_cache {
-	int alloc_meta_offset;
-	int free_meta_offset;
-};
+void __kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr);
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		__kasan_unpoison_slab(ptr);
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page);
+static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		return __kasan_poison_slab(page);
+}
+
+void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		return __kasan_unpoison_object_data(cache, object);
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
+static inline void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		__kasan_poison_object_data(cache, object);
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+					  const void *object);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+						      const void *object)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		return __kasan_init_slab_obj(cache, object);
+	return (void *)object;
+}
+
+bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long ip);
+static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		return __kasan_slab_free(s, object, ip);
+	return false;
+}
 
-size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
+void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
+				       void *object, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
+						   void *object, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		return __kasan_slab_alloc(s, object, flags);
+	return object;
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
+				    size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
+						size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		return __kasan_kmalloc(s, object, size, flags);
+	return (void *)object;
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr,
+					  size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr,
+						      size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		return __kasan_kmalloc_large(ptr, size, flags);
+	return (void *)ptr;
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object,
+				     size_t new_size, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object,
+						 size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		return __kasan_krealloc(object, new_size, flags);
+	return (void *)object;
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
+static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		__kasan_poison_kfree(ptr, ip);
+}
+
+void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
+static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		__kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip);
+}
 
 bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void);
 void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
@@ -108,14 +223,12 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 				      unsigned int *size,
 				      slab_flags_t *flags) {}
-
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) { }
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { }
-
+static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) {}
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) {}
 static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) {}
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 					void *object) {}
@@ -126,36 +239,33 @@ static inline void *kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 {
 	return (void *)object;
 }
-
-static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large(void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
+				   unsigned long ip)
 {
-	return ptr;
+	return false;
 }
-static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
-static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
-static inline void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
-				size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
+				   gfp_t flags)
 {
-	return (void *)object;
+	return object;
 }
-static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
-				 gfp_t flags)
+static inline void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
+				size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
 	return (void *)object;
 }
 
-static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
-				   gfp_t flags)
+static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
-	return object;
+	return (void *)ptr;
 }
-static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
-				   unsigned long ip)
+static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
+				 gfp_t flags)
 {
-	return false;
+	return (void *)object;
 }
-
-static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
+static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
+static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
include/linux/mm.h +21 -6
index a3cac68c737c..701e9d7666d6 100644
@@ -1412,22 +1412,36 @@ static inline bool cpupid_match_pid(struct task_struct *task, int cpupid)
 #endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_enabled);
+#else
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_enabled);
+#endif
+
 static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)
 {
-	return (page->flags >> KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT) & KASAN_TAG_MASK;
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		return (page->flags >> KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT) & KASAN_TAG_MASK;
+	return 0xff;
 }
 
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_set(struct page *page, u8 tag)
 {
-	page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT);
-	page->flags |= (tag & KASAN_TAG_MASK) << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT;
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled)) {
+		page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT);
+		page->flags |= (tag & KASAN_TAG_MASK) << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT;
+	}
 }
 
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset(struct page *page)
 {
-	page_kasan_tag_set(page, 0xff);
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		page_kasan_tag_set(page, 0xff);
 }
-#else
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
 static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)
 {
 	return 0xff;
@@ -1435,7 +1449,8 @@ static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)
 
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_set(struct page *page, u8 tag) { }
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset(struct page *page) { }
-#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
 
 static inline struct zone *page_zone(const struct page *page)
 {
mm/kasan/common.c +30 -30

169 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer
#53 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 15/21] kasan: check kasan_enabled in annotations

Quoted 40 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Declare the kasan_enabled static key in include/linux/kasan.h and in include/linux/mm.h and check it in all kasan annotations. This allows to avoid any slowdown caused by function calls when kasan_enabled is disabled.

---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 210 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 include/linux/mm.h    |  27 ++++--
 mm/kasan/common.c     |  60 ++++++------
 3 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +9 -2
index 2b9023224474..8654275aa62e 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_KASAN_H
 #define _LINUX_KASAN_H
 
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 struct kmem_cache;
@@ -66,40 +67,154 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
 
-void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
-void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
+struct kasan_cache {
+       int alloc_meta_offset;
+       int free_meta_offset;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_enabled);
+#else

include/linux/kasan.h static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {} · line 85

Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +7 -2
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_enabled);
+#endif
 
-void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
-                       slab_flags_t *flags);
+void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
+static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_alloc_pages(page, order);

The patch looks fine per se, but I think with the suggestion in the previous patch, this should be:

      if (kasan_is_enabled())
             __kasan_alloc_pages(page, order);

No overhead for other modes and less logic duplication.

Quoted 474 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +144 -46
+}
 
-void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size);
-void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr);
+void __kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
+static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_free_pages(page, order);
+}
 
-void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page);
-void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
-void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
-void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-                                       const void *object);
+void __kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
+                               slab_flags_t *flags);
+static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                       unsigned int *size, slab_flags_t *flags)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_cache_create(cache, size, flags);
+}
 
-void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
-                                               gfp_t flags);
-void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
-void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
-void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
-                                       size_t size, gfp_t flags);
-void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
-                                       gfp_t flags);
+size_t __kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
+static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_metadata_size(cache);
+       return 0;
+}
 
-void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
-                                       gfp_t flags);
-bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long ip);
+void __kasan_unpoison_data(const void *addr, size_t size);
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_unpoison_data(addr, size);
+}
 
-struct kasan_cache {
-       int alloc_meta_offset;
-       int free_meta_offset;
-};
+void __kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr);
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_unpoison_slab(ptr);
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page);
+static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_poison_slab(page);
+}
+
+void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_unpoison_object_data(cache, object);
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
+static inline void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_poison_object_data(cache, object);
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                                         const void *object);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                                                     const void *object)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_init_slab_obj(cache, object);
+       return (void *)object;
+}
+
+bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long ip);
+static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long ip)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_slab_free(s, object, ip);
+       return false;
+}
 
-size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
+void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
+                                      void *object, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
+                                                  void *object, gfp_t flags)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_slab_alloc(s, object, flags);
+       return object;
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
+                                   size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
+                                               size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_kmalloc(s, object, size, flags);
+       return (void *)object;
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr,
+                                         size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr,
+                                                     size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_kmalloc_large(ptr, size, flags);
+       return (void *)ptr;
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object,
+                                    size_t new_size, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object,
+                                                size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_krealloc(object, new_size, flags);
+       return (void *)object;
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
+static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_poison_kfree(ptr, ip);
+}
+
+void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
+static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip);
+}
 
 bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void);
 void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
@@ -108,14 +223,12 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                      unsigned int *size,
                                      slab_flags_t *flags) {}
-
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) { }
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { }
-
+static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) {}
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) {}
 static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) {}
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                        void *object) {}
@@ -126,36 +239,33 @@ static inline void *kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 {
        return (void *)object;
 }
-
-static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large(void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
+                                  unsigned long ip)
 {
-       return ptr;
+       return false;
 }
-static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
-static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
-static inline void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
-                               size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
+                                  gfp_t flags)
 {
-       return (void *)object;
+       return object;
 }
-static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
-                                gfp_t flags)
+static inline void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
+                               size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
        return (void *)object;
 }
 
-static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
-                                  gfp_t flags)
+static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
-       return object;
+       return (void *)ptr;
 }
-static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
-                                  unsigned long ip)
+static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
+                                gfp_t flags)
 {
-       return false;
+       return (void *)object;
 }
-
-static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
+static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
+static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
include/linux/mm.h +21 -6
index a3cac68c737c..701e9d7666d6 100644
@@ -1412,22 +1412,36 @@ static inline bool cpupid_match_pid(struct task_struct *task, int cpupid)
 #endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_enabled);
+#else
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_enabled);
+#endif
+
 static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)
 {
-       return (page->flags >> KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT) & KASAN_TAG_MASK;
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return (page->flags >> KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT) & KASAN_TAG_MASK;
+       return 0xff;
 }
 
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_set(struct page *page, u8 tag)
 {
-       page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT);
-       page->flags |= (tag & KASAN_TAG_MASK) << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT;
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled)) {
+               page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT);
+               page->flags |= (tag & KASAN_TAG_MASK) << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT;
+       }
 }
 
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset(struct page *page)
 {
-       page_kasan_tag_set(page, 0xff);
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               page_kasan_tag_set(page, 0xff);
 }
-#else
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
 static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)
 {
        return 0xff;
@@ -1435,7 +1449,8 @@ static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)
 
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_set(struct page *page, u8 tag) { }
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset(struct page *page) { }
-#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
 
 static inline struct zone *page_zone(const struct page *page)
 {
mm/kasan/common.c +30 -31
index cc129ef62ab1..c5ec60e1a4d2 100644
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
 
-void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
        u8 tag;
        unsigned long i;
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
        kasan_unpoison_memory(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
 }
 
-void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+void __kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
        if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
                kasan_poison_memory(page_address(page),
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ static inline unsigned int optimal_redzone(unsigned int object_size)
                object_size <= (1 << 16) - 1024 ? 1024 : 2048;
 }
 
-void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
-                       slab_flags_t *flags)
+void __kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
+                         slab_flags_t *flags)
 {
        unsigned int orig_size = *size;
        unsigned int redzone_size;
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
        *flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
 }
 
-size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
+size_t __kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
 {
        if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
                return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
@@ -188,17 +188,17 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
        return (void *)reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
 }
 
-void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size)
+void __kasan_unpoison_data(const void *addr, size_t size)
 {
-       kasan_unpoison_memory(address, size);
+       kasan_unpoison_memory(addr, size);
 }
 
-void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
+void __kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
 {
        kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
 }
 
-void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
+void __kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
 {
        unsigned long i;
 
@@ -208,12 +208,12 @@ void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
                        KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 }
 
-void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
        kasan_unpoison_memory(object, cache->object_size);
 }
 
-void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
        kasan_poison_memory(object,
                        round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 #endif
 }
 
-void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                                const void *object)
 {
        struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
        return (void *)object;
 }
 
-static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                              unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
 {
        u8 tag;
@@ -329,9 +329,9 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
        return false;
 }
 
-bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
+bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
 {
-       return __kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
+       return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
 }
 
 static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
        kasan_set_track(&kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
 }
 
-static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
+static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
                                size_t size, gfp_t flags, bool keep_tag)
 {
        unsigned long redzone_start;
@@ -371,20 +371,20 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
        return set_tag(object, tag);
 }
 
-void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
-                                       gfp_t flags)
+void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                                       void *object, gfp_t flags)
 {
-       return __kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags, false);
+       return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags, false);
 }
 
-void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
-                               size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
+                                       size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
-       return __kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, size, flags, true);
+       return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, size, flags, true);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
 
-void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
                                                gfp_t flags)
 {
        struct page *page;
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
        return (void *)ptr;
 }
 
-void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
        struct page *page;
 
@@ -419,13 +419,13 @@ void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
        page = virt_to_head_page(object);
 
        if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
-               return kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
+               return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
        else
-               return __kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size,
+               return ____kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size,
                                                flags, true);
 }
 
-void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
        struct page *page;
 
@@ -438,11 +438,11 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
                }
                kasan_poison_memory(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
        } else {
-               __kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
+               ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
        }
 }
 
-void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
        if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
                kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#54 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 15/21] kasan: check kasan_enabled in annotations

Quoted 56 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 40 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Declare the kasan_enabled static key in include/linux/kasan.h and in include/linux/mm.h and check it in all kasan annotations. This allows to avoid any slowdown caused by function calls when kasan_enabled is disabled.

---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 210 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 include/linux/mm.h    |  27 ++++--
 mm/kasan/common.c     |  60 ++++++------
 3 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +9 -2
index 2b9023224474..8654275aa62e 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_KASAN_H
 #define _LINUX_KASAN_H
 
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 struct kmem_cache;
@@ -66,40 +67,154 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
 
-void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
-void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
+struct kasan_cache {
+       int alloc_meta_offset;
+       int free_meta_offset;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_enabled);
+#else

include/linux/kasan.h static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {} · line 85

Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +7 -2
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_enabled);
+#endif
 
-void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
-                       slab_flags_t *flags);
+void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
+static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_alloc_pages(page, order);

The patch looks fine per se, but I think with the suggestion in the previous patch, this should be:

Quoted 4 lines
      if (kasan_is_enabled())
             __kasan_alloc_pages(page, order);

No overhead for other modes and less logic duplication.

Will do, thanks!

Quoted 475 lines
Quoted 475 lines
include/linux/kasan.h +144 -46
+}
 
-void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size);
-void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr);
+void __kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
+static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_free_pages(page, order);
+}
 
-void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page);
-void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
-void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
-void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-                                       const void *object);
+void __kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
+                               slab_flags_t *flags);
+static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                       unsigned int *size, slab_flags_t *flags)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_cache_create(cache, size, flags);
+}
 
-void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
-                                               gfp_t flags);
-void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
-void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
-void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
-                                       size_t size, gfp_t flags);
-void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
-                                       gfp_t flags);
+size_t __kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
+static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_metadata_size(cache);
+       return 0;
+}
 
-void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
-                                       gfp_t flags);
-bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long ip);
+void __kasan_unpoison_data(const void *addr, size_t size);
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_unpoison_data(addr, size);
+}
 
-struct kasan_cache {
-       int alloc_meta_offset;
-       int free_meta_offset;
-};
+void __kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr);
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_unpoison_slab(ptr);
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page);
+static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_poison_slab(page);
+}
+
+void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_unpoison_object_data(cache, object);
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
+static inline void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_poison_object_data(cache, object);
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                                         const void *object);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                                                     const void *object)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_init_slab_obj(cache, object);
+       return (void *)object;
+}
+
+bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long ip);
+static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long ip)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_slab_free(s, object, ip);
+       return false;
+}
 
-size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
+void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
+                                      void *object, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
+                                                  void *object, gfp_t flags)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_slab_alloc(s, object, flags);
+       return object;
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
+                                   size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
+                                               size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_kmalloc(s, object, size, flags);
+       return (void *)object;
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr,
+                                         size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr,
+                                                     size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_kmalloc_large(ptr, size, flags);
+       return (void *)ptr;
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object,
+                                    size_t new_size, gfp_t flags);
+static inline void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object,
+                                                size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return __kasan_krealloc(object, new_size, flags);
+       return (void *)object;
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
+static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_poison_kfree(ptr, ip);
+}
+
+void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
+static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip);
+}
 
 bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void);
 void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
@@ -108,14 +223,12 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                      unsigned int *size,
                                      slab_flags_t *flags) {}
-
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) { }
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { }
-
+static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) {}
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) {}
 static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) {}
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                        void *object) {}
@@ -126,36 +239,33 @@ static inline void *kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 {
        return (void *)object;
 }
-
-static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large(void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
+                                  unsigned long ip)
 {
-       return ptr;
+       return false;
 }
-static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
-static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
-static inline void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
-                               size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
+                                  gfp_t flags)
 {
-       return (void *)object;
+       return object;
 }
-static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
-                                gfp_t flags)
+static inline void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
+                               size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
        return (void *)object;
 }
 
-static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
-                                  gfp_t flags)
+static inline void *kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
-       return object;
+       return (void *)ptr;
 }
-static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
-                                  unsigned long ip)
+static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
+                                gfp_t flags)
 {
-       return false;
+       return (void *)object;
 }
-
-static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
+static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
+static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
include/linux/mm.h +21 -6
index a3cac68c737c..701e9d7666d6 100644
@@ -1412,22 +1412,36 @@ static inline bool cpupid_match_pid(struct task_struct *task, int cpupid)
 #endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_enabled);
+#else
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_enabled);
+#endif
+
 static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)
 {
-       return (page->flags >> KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT) & KASAN_TAG_MASK;
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               return (page->flags >> KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT) & KASAN_TAG_MASK;
+       return 0xff;
 }
 
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_set(struct page *page, u8 tag)
 {
-       page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT);
-       page->flags |= (tag & KASAN_TAG_MASK) << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT;
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled)) {
+               page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT);
+               page->flags |= (tag & KASAN_TAG_MASK) << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT;
+       }
 }
 
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset(struct page *page)
 {
-       page_kasan_tag_set(page, 0xff);
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               page_kasan_tag_set(page, 0xff);
 }
-#else
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
 static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)
 {
        return 0xff;
@@ -1435,7 +1449,8 @@ static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page)
 
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_set(struct page *page, u8 tag) { }
 static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset(struct page *page) { }
-#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
 
 static inline struct zone *page_zone(const struct page *page)
 {
mm/kasan/common.c +30 -31
index cc129ef62ab1..c5ec60e1a4d2 100644
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
 
-void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
        u8 tag;
        unsigned long i;
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
        kasan_unpoison_memory(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
 }
 
-void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+void __kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
        if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
                kasan_poison_memory(page_address(page),
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ static inline unsigned int optimal_redzone(unsigned int object_size)
                object_size <= (1 << 16) - 1024 ? 1024 : 2048;
 }
 
-void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
-                       slab_flags_t *flags)
+void __kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
+                         slab_flags_t *flags)
 {
        unsigned int orig_size = *size;
        unsigned int redzone_size;
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
        *flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
 }
 
-size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
+size_t __kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
 {
        if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack))
                return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
@@ -188,17 +188,17 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
        return (void *)reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
 }
 
-void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size)
+void __kasan_unpoison_data(const void *addr, size_t size)
 {
-       kasan_unpoison_memory(address, size);
+       kasan_unpoison_memory(addr, size);
 }
 
-void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
+void __kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
 {
        kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
 }
 
-void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
+void __kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
 {
        unsigned long i;
 
@@ -208,12 +208,12 @@ void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
                        KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 }
 
-void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
        kasan_unpoison_memory(object, cache->object_size);
 }
 
-void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
        kasan_poison_memory(object,
                        round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 #endif
 }
 
-void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                                                const void *object)
 {
        struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
        return (void *)object;
 }
 
-static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                              unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
 {
        u8 tag;
@@ -329,9 +329,9 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
        return false;
 }
 
-bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
+bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
 {
-       return __kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
+       return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
 }
 
 static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
        kasan_set_track(&kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
 }
 
-static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
+static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
                                size_t size, gfp_t flags, bool keep_tag)
 {
        unsigned long redzone_start;
@@ -371,20 +371,20 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
        return set_tag(object, tag);
 }
 
-void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
-                                       gfp_t flags)
+void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+                                       void *object, gfp_t flags)
 {
-       return __kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags, false);
+       return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags, false);
 }
 
-void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
-                               size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
+                                       size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
-       return __kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, size, flags, true);
+       return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, size, flags, true);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
 
-void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
                                                gfp_t flags)
 {
        struct page *page;
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
        return (void *)ptr;
 }
 
-void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
        struct page *page;
 
@@ -419,13 +419,13 @@ void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
        page = virt_to_head_page(object);
 
        if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
-               return kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
+               return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
        else
-               return __kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size,
+               return ____kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size,
                                                flags, true);
 }
 
-void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
        struct page *page;
 
@@ -438,11 +438,11 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
                }
                kasan_poison_memory(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
        } else {
-               __kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
+               ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
        }
 }
 
-void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
        if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
                kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#55 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 16/21 kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Since kasan_kmalloc() always follows kasan_slab_alloc(), there's no need to reunpoison the object data, only to poison the redzone.

This requires changing kasan annotation for early SLUB cache to kasan_slab_alloc(). Otherwise kasan_kmalloc() doesn't untag the object. This doesn't do any functional changes, as kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).

Similarly for kasan_krealloc(), as it's called after ksize(), which already unpoisoned the object, there's no need to do it again.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
 mm/slub.c         |  3 +--
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +21 -10
index c5ec60e1a4d2..a581937c2a44 100644
@@ -360,8 +360,14 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
 		tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
 
-	/* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
-	kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
+	/*
+	 * Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for:
+	 * 1. krealloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned via ksize();
+	 * 2. kmalloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned by kasan_kmalloc().
+	 * Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS.
+	 */
+	if (!keep_tag)
+		kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
 	kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
 		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
@@ -384,10 +390,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
 
-void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
-						gfp_t flags)
+static void * __must_check ____kasan_kmalloc_large(struct page *page, const void *ptr,
+						size_t size, gfp_t flags, bool realloc)
 {
-	struct page *page;
 	unsigned long redzone_start;
 	unsigned long redzone_end;
 
@@ -397,18 +402,24 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
 	if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
 		return NULL;
 
-	page = virt_to_page(ptr);
-	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
-				KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size), KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 	redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
 
-	kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
+	/* ksize() in __do_krealloc() already unpoisoned the memory. */
+	if (!realloc)
+		kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
 	kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
 		KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
 
 	return (void *)ptr;
 }
 
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
+						gfp_t flags)
+{
+	return ____kasan_kmalloc_large(virt_to_page(ptr), ptr, size, flags, false);
+}
+
 void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
 	struct page *page;
@@ -419,7 +430,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
 	page = virt_to_head_page(object);
 
 	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
-		return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
+		return ____kasan_kmalloc_large(page, object, size, flags, true);
 	else
 		return ____kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size,
 						flags, true);
mm/slub.c +1 -2
index 1d3f2355df3b..afb035b0bf2d 100644
@@ -3535,8 +3535,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
 	init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
 	init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
 #endif
-	n = kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node),
-		      GFP_KERNEL);
+	n = kasan_slab_alloc(kmem_cache_node, n, GFP_KERNEL);
 	page->freelist = get_freepointer(kmem_cache_node, n);
 	page->inuse = 1;
 	page->frozen = 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer
#56 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 16/21] kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc

Quoted 11 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Since kasan_kmalloc() always follows kasan_slab_alloc(), there's no need to reunpoison the object data, only to poison the redzone.

This requires changing kasan annotation for early SLUB cache to kasan_slab_alloc(). Otherwise kasan_kmalloc() doesn't untag the object. This doesn't do any functional changes, as kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).

Similarly for kasan_krealloc(), as it's called after ksize(), which already unpoisoned the object, there's no need to do it again.

Have you considered doing this the other way around: make krealloc call __ksize and unpoison in kasan_krealloc?
This has the advantage of more precise poisoning as ksize will unpoison the whole underlying object.

But then maybe we will need to move first checks in ksize into __ksize as we may need them in krealloc as well.

Quoted 96 lines
---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
 mm/slub.c         |  3 +--
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +21 -10
index c5ec60e1a4d2..a581937c2a44 100644
@@ -360,8 +360,14 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
                tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
 
-       /* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
-       kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
+       /*
+        * Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for:
+        * 1. krealloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned via ksize();
+        * 2. kmalloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned by kasan_kmalloc().
+        * Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS.
+        */
+       if (!keep_tag)
+               kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
        kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
                KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
@@ -384,10 +390,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
 
-void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
-                                               gfp_t flags)
+static void * __must_check ____kasan_kmalloc_large(struct page *page, const void *ptr,
+                                               size_t size, gfp_t flags, bool realloc)
 {
-       struct page *page;
        unsigned long redzone_start;
        unsigned long redzone_end;
 
@@ -397,18 +402,24 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
        if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
                return NULL;
 
-       page = virt_to_page(ptr);
-       redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
-                               KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+       redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size), KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
        redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
 
-       kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
+       /* ksize() in __do_krealloc() already unpoisoned the memory. */
+       if (!realloc)
+               kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
        kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
                KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
 
        return (void *)ptr;
 }
 
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
+                                               gfp_t flags)
+{
+       return ____kasan_kmalloc_large(virt_to_page(ptr), ptr, size, flags, false);
+}
+
 void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
        struct page *page;
@@ -419,7 +430,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
        page = virt_to_head_page(object);
 
        if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
-               return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
+               return ____kasan_kmalloc_large(page, object, size, flags, true);
        else
                return ____kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size,
                                                flags, true);
mm/slub.c +1 -3
index 1d3f2355df3b..afb035b0bf2d 100644
@@ -3535,8 +3535,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
        init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
        init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
 #endif
-       n = kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node),
-                     GFP_KERNEL);
+       n = kasan_slab_alloc(kmem_cache_node, n, GFP_KERNEL);
        page->freelist = get_freepointer(kmem_cache_node, n);
        page->inuse = 1;
        page->frozen = 0;
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#57 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 16/21] kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc

Quoted 14 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 11 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Since kasan_kmalloc() always follows kasan_slab_alloc(), there's no need to reunpoison the object data, only to poison the redzone.

This requires changing kasan annotation for early SLUB cache to kasan_slab_alloc(). Otherwise kasan_kmalloc() doesn't untag the object. This doesn't do any functional changes, as kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).

Similarly for kasan_krealloc(), as it's called after ksize(), which already unpoisoned the object, there's no need to do it again.

Quoted 7 lines

Have you considered doing this the other way around: make krealloc call __ksize and unpoison in kasan_krealloc?
This has the advantage of more precise poisoning as ksize will unpoison the whole underlying object.

But then maybe we will need to move first checks in ksize into __ksize as we may need them in krealloc as well.

This might be a good idea. I won't implement this for the next version, but will look into this after that. Thanks!

Quoted 101 lines
Quoted 101 lines
---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
 mm/slub.c         |  3 +--
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +21 -10
index c5ec60e1a4d2..a581937c2a44 100644
@@ -360,8 +360,14 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
                tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
 
-       /* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
-       kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
+       /*
+        * Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for:
+        * 1. krealloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned via ksize();
+        * 2. kmalloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned by kasan_kmalloc().
+        * Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS.
+        */
+       if (!keep_tag)
+               kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
        kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
                KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
@@ -384,10 +390,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
 
-void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
-                                               gfp_t flags)
+static void * __must_check ____kasan_kmalloc_large(struct page *page, const void *ptr,
+                                               size_t size, gfp_t flags, bool realloc)
 {
-       struct page *page;
        unsigned long redzone_start;
        unsigned long redzone_end;
 
@@ -397,18 +402,24 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
        if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
                return NULL;
 
-       page = virt_to_page(ptr);
-       redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
-                               KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+       redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size), KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
        redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
 
-       kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
+       /* ksize() in __do_krealloc() already unpoisoned the memory. */
+       if (!realloc)
+               kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
        kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
                KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
 
        return (void *)ptr;
 }
 
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
+                                               gfp_t flags)
+{
+       return ____kasan_kmalloc_large(virt_to_page(ptr), ptr, size, flags, false);
+}
+
 void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
        struct page *page;
@@ -419,7 +430,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
        page = virt_to_head_page(object);
 
        if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
-               return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
+               return ____kasan_kmalloc_large(page, object, size, flags, true);
        else
                return ____kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size,
                                                flags, true);
mm/slub.c +1 -3
index 1d3f2355df3b..afb035b0bf2d 100644
@@ -3535,8 +3535,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
        init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
        init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
 #endif
-       n = kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node),
-                     GFP_KERNEL);
+       n = kasan_slab_alloc(kmem_cache_node, n, GFP_KERNEL);
        page->freelist = get_freepointer(kmem_cache_node, n);
        page->inuse = 1;
        page->frozen = 0;
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#58 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 17/21 kasan: simplify kasan_poison_kfree

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

kasan_poison_kfree() is currently only called for mempool allocations that are backed by either kmem_cache_alloc() or kmalloc(). Therefore, the page passed to kasan_poison_kfree() is always PageSlab() and there's no need to do the check.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 11 +----------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -10
index a581937c2a44..b82dbae0c5d6 100644
@@ -441,16 +441,7 @@ void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 	struct page *page;
 
 	page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
-
-	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
-		if (ptr != page_address(page)) {
-			kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
-			return;
-		}
-		kasan_poison_memory(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
-	} else {
-		____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
-	}
+	____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
 }
 
 void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 17/21
#59 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 17/21] kasan: simplify kasan_poison_kfree

Quoted 8 lines · Andrey Konovalov

kasan_poison_kfree() is currently only called for mempool allocations that are backed by either kmem_cache_alloc() or kmalloc(). Therefore, the page passed to kasan_poison_kfree() is always PageSlab() and there's no need to do the check.

Quoted 29 lines
---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 11 +----------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -11
index a581937c2a44..b82dbae0c5d6 100644
@@ -441,16 +441,7 @@ void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
        struct page *page;
 
        page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
-
-       if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
-               if (ptr != page_address(page)) {
-                       kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
-                       return;
-               }
-               kasan_poison_memory(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
-       } else {
-               ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
-       }
+       ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
 }
 
 void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#60 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 18/21 kasan: rename kasan_poison_kfree

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Rename kasan_poison_kfree() into kasan_slab_free_mempool() as it better reflects what this annotation does.

No functional changes.

---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++++--------
 mm/kasan/common.c     | 16 ++++++++--------
 mm/mempool.c          |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +8 -8
index 8654275aa62e..2ae92f295f76 100644
@@ -162,6 +162,13 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned
 	return false;
 }
 
+void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
+static inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+		__kasan_slab_free_mempool(ptr, ip);
+}
+
 void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
 				       void *object, gfp_t flags);
 static inline void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
@@ -202,13 +209,6 @@ static inline void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object,
 	return (void *)object;
 }
 
-void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
-static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
-{
-	if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
-		__kasan_poison_kfree(ptr, ip);
-}
-
 void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
 static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
 {
 	return false;
 }
+static inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
 static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
 				   gfp_t flags)
 {
@@ -264,7 +265,6 @@ static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
 {
 	return (void *)object;
 }
-static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
 static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
mm/kasan/common.c +8 -8
index b82dbae0c5d6..5622b0ec0907 100644
@@ -334,6 +334,14 @@ bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
 	return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
 }
 
+void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+
+	page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
+	____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
+}
+
 static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
 {
 	kasan_set_track(&kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
@@ -436,14 +444,6 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
 						flags, true);
 }
 
-void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
-{
-	struct page *page;
-
-	page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
-	____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
-}
-
 void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
 	if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
mm/mempool.c +1 -1
index 79bff63ecf27..0e8d877fbbc6 100644
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static inline void poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element)
 static __always_inline void kasan_poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element)
 {
 	if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_slab || pool->alloc == mempool_kmalloc)
-		kasan_poison_kfree(element, _RET_IP_);
+		kasan_slab_free_mempool(element, _RET_IP_);
 	if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_pages)
 		kasan_free_pages(element, (unsigned long)pool->pool_data);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 18/21
#61 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 18/21] kasan: rename kasan_poison_kfree

Quoted 8 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Rename kasan_poison_kfree() into kasan_slab_free_mempool() as it better reflects what this annotation does.

No functional changes.

Quoted 104 lines
---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++++--------
 mm/kasan/common.c     | 16 ++++++++--------
 mm/mempool.c          |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +8 -8
index 8654275aa62e..2ae92f295f76 100644
@@ -162,6 +162,13 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned
        return false;
 }
 
+void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
+static inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
+               __kasan_slab_free_mempool(ptr, ip);
+}
+
 void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
                                       void *object, gfp_t flags);
 static inline void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
@@ -202,13 +209,6 @@ static inline void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object,
        return (void *)object;
 }
 
-void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
-static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
-{
-       if (static_branch_likely(&kasan_enabled))
-               __kasan_poison_kfree(ptr, ip);
-}
-
 void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
 static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
 {
        return false;
 }
+static inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
 static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
                                   gfp_t flags)
 {
@@ -264,7 +265,6 @@ static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
 {
        return (void *)object;
 }
-static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
 static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
mm/kasan/common.c +8 -8
index b82dbae0c5d6..5622b0ec0907 100644
@@ -334,6 +334,14 @@ bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
        return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
 }
 
+void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+       struct page *page;
+
+       page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
+       ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
+}
+
 static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
 {
        kasan_set_track(&kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
@@ -436,14 +444,6 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
                                                flags, true);
 }
 
-void __kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
-{
-       struct page *page;
-
-       page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
-       ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
-}
-
 void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
        if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
mm/mempool.c +1 -2
index 79bff63ecf27..0e8d877fbbc6 100644
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static inline void poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element)
 static __always_inline void kasan_poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element)
 {
        if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_slab || pool->alloc == mempool_kmalloc)
-               kasan_poison_kfree(element, _RET_IP_);
+               kasan_slab_free_mempool(element, _RET_IP_);
        if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_pages)
                kasan_free_pages(element, (unsigned long)pool->pool_data);
 }
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#62 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 19/21 kasan: don't round_up too much

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

For tag-based mode kasan_poison_memory() already rounds up the size. Do the same for software modes and remove round_up() from common code.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 8 ++------
 mm/kasan/shadow.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +2 -6
index 5622b0ec0907..983383ebe32a 100644
@@ -215,9 +215,7 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 
 void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
-	kasan_poison_memory(object,
-			round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
-			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
+	kasan_poison_memory(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -290,7 +288,6 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 {
 	u8 tag;
 	void *tagged_object;
-	unsigned long rounded_up_size;
 
 	tag = get_tag(object);
 	tagged_object = object;
@@ -311,8 +308,7 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 		return true;
 	}
 
-	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
-	kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
+	kasan_poison_memory(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
 		if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
mm/kasan/shadow.c +1 -0
index 616ac64c4a21..ab1d39c566b9 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 	 * addresses to this function.
 	 */
 	address = reset_tag(address);
+	size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 
 	shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address);
 	shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 19/21
#63 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 19/21] kasan: don't round_up too much

Quoted 6 lines · Andrey Konovalov

For tag-based mode kasan_poison_memory() already rounds up the size. Do the same for software modes and remove round_up() from common code.

Quoted 53 lines
---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 8 ++------
 mm/kasan/shadow.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +2 -6
index 5622b0ec0907..983383ebe32a 100644
@@ -215,9 +215,7 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 
 void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
-       kasan_poison_memory(object,
-                       round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
-                       KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
+       kasan_poison_memory(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -290,7 +288,6 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 {
        u8 tag;
        void *tagged_object;
-       unsigned long rounded_up_size;
 
        tag = get_tag(object);
        tagged_object = object;
@@ -311,8 +308,7 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
                return true;
        }
 
-       rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
-       kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
+       kasan_poison_memory(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
        if (static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_stack)) {
                if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
mm/kasan/shadow.c +1 -1
index 616ac64c4a21..ab1d39c566b9 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
         * addresses to this function.
         */
        address = reset_tag(address);
+       size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 
        shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address);
        shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#64 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 20/21 kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag calls

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

set_tag() already ignores the tag for the generic mode, so just call it as is. Add a check for the generic mode to assign_tag(), and simplify its call in ____kasan_kmalloc().

---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +6 -5
index 983383ebe32a..3cd56861eb11 100644
@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 			bool init, bool keep_tag)
 {
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		return 0xff;
+
 	/*
 	 * 1. When an object is kmalloc()'ed, two hooks are called:
 	 *    kasan_slab_alloc() and kasan_kmalloc(). We assign the
@@ -277,8 +280,8 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
 		__memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
 	}
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
-		object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
+	/* Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
+	object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
 
 	return (void *)object;
 }
@@ -360,9 +363,7 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 				KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 	redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
 				KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
-
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
-		tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
+	tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
 
 	/*
 	 * Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for:
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 20/21
#65 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 20/21] kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag calls

Quoted 7 lines · Andrey Konovalov

set_tag() already ignores the tag for the generic mode, so just call it as is. Add a check for the generic mode to assign_tag(), and simplify its call in ____kasan_kmalloc().

Quoted 43 lines
---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +6 -6
index 983383ebe32a..3cd56861eb11 100644
@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
                        bool init, bool keep_tag)
 {
+       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+               return 0xff;
+
        /*
         * 1. When an object is kmalloc()'ed, two hooks are called:
         *    kasan_slab_alloc() and kasan_kmalloc(). We assign the
@@ -277,8 +280,8 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
                __memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
        }
 
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
-               object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
+       /* Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
+       object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
 
        return (void *)object;
 }
@@ -360,9 +363,7 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
                                KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
        redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
                                KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
-
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
-               tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
+       tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
 
        /*
         * Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for:
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

#66 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 21/21 kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_large

In reply to Andrey Konovalov

Currently it says that the memory gets poisoned by page_alloc code. Clarify this by mentioning the specific callback that poisons the memory.

---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -1
index 3cd56861eb11..54af79aa8d3f 100644
@@ -445,5 +445,5 @@ void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
 	if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
 		kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
-	/* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */
+	/* The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages(). */
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
reviewer Reviewed-by on v2 21/21
#67 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC v2 21/21] kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_large

Quoted 7 lines · Andrey Konovalov

Currently it says that the memory gets poisoned by page_alloc code. Clarify this by mentioning the specific callback that poisons the memory.

Quoted 18 lines
---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -2
index 3cd56861eb11..54af79aa8d3f 100644
@@ -445,5 +445,5 @@ void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
        if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
                kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
-       /* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */
+       /* The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages(). */
 }
--

2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog

reviewer
#68 lore raw
In reply to Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 66 lines · Andrey Konovalov

This patchset is not complete (hence sending as RFC), but I would like to start the discussion now and hear people's opinions regarding the questions mentioned below.

=== Overview

This patchset adopts the existing hardware tag-based KASAN mode [1] for use in production as a memory corruption mitigation. Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging. Please see [3] and [4] for detailed analysis of how MTE helps to fight memory safety problems.

The current plan is reuse CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS for production, but add a boot time switch, that allows to choose between a debugging mode, that includes all KASAN features as they are, and a production mode, that only includes the essentials like tag checking.

It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI initiative [5].

The patch titled "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters" of this series adds a few new boot parameters:

kasan.mode allows choosing one of main three modes:

- kasan.mode=off - no checks at all
- kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features
- kasan.mode=full - all features

Those mode configs provide default values for three more internal configs listed below. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing:

- kasan.stack=off/on - enable stacks collection
(default: on for mode=full, otherwise off)
- kasan.trap=async/sync - use async or sync MTE mode (default: sync for mode=full, otherwise async)
- kasan.fault=report/panic - only report MTE fault or also panic (default: report)

=== Benchmarks

For now I've only performed a few simple benchmarks such as measuring kernel boot time and slab memory usage after boot. The benchmarks were performed in QEMU and the results below exclude the slowdown caused by QEMU memory tagging emulation (as it's different from the slowdown that will be introduced by hardware and therefore irrelevant).

KASAN_HW_TAGS=y + kasan.mode=off introduces no performance or memory impact compared to KASAN_HW_TAGS=n.

kasan.mode=prod (without executing the tagging instructions) introduces 7% of both performace and memory impact compared to kasan.mode=off. Note, that 4% of performance and all 7% of memory impact are caused by the fact that enabling KASAN essentially results in CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT being disabled.

Recommended Android config has CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT disabled (I assume for security reasons), but Pixel 4 has it enabled. It's arguable, whether "disabling" CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT introduces any security benefit on top of MTE. Without MTE it makes exploiting some heap corruption harder. With MTE it will only make it harder provided that the attacker is able to predict allocation tags.

Quoted 6 lines

kasan.mode=full has 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection.

=== Questions

Any concerns about the boot parameters?

For boot parameters I think we are now "safe" in the sense that we provide maximum possible flexibility and can defer any actual decisions.

Quoted 2 lines

Should we try to deal with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT-like behavor mentioned above?

How hard it is to allow KASAN with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT? Are there any principal conflicts?
The numbers you provided look quite substantial (on a par of what MTE itself may introduce). So I would assume if a vendor does not have CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT disabled, it may not want to disable it because of MTE (effectively doubles overhead).

#69 lore raw
Quoted 68 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 66 lines · Andrey Konovalov

This patchset is not complete (hence sending as RFC), but I would like to start the discussion now and hear people's opinions regarding the questions mentioned below.

=== Overview

This patchset adopts the existing hardware tag-based KASAN mode [1] for use in production as a memory corruption mitigation. Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging. Please see [3] and [4] for detailed analysis of how MTE helps to fight memory safety problems.

The current plan is reuse CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS for production, but add a boot time switch, that allows to choose between a debugging mode, that includes all KASAN features as they are, and a production mode, that only includes the essentials like tag checking.

It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI initiative [5].

The patch titled "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters" of this series adds a few new boot parameters:

kasan.mode allows choosing one of main three modes:

- kasan.mode=off - no checks at all
- kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features
- kasan.mode=full - all features

Those mode configs provide default values for three more internal configs listed below. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing:

- kasan.stack=off/on - enable stacks collection
(default: on for mode=full, otherwise off)
- kasan.trap=async/sync - use async or sync MTE mode (default: sync for mode=full, otherwise async)
- kasan.fault=report/panic - only report MTE fault or also panic (default: report)

=== Benchmarks

For now I've only performed a few simple benchmarks such as measuring kernel boot time and slab memory usage after boot. The benchmarks were performed in QEMU and the results below exclude the slowdown caused by QEMU memory tagging emulation (as it's different from the slowdown that will be introduced by hardware and therefore irrelevant).

KASAN_HW_TAGS=y + kasan.mode=off introduces no performance or memory impact compared to KASAN_HW_TAGS=n.

kasan.mode=prod (without executing the tagging instructions) introduces 7% of both performace and memory impact compared to kasan.mode=off. Note, that 4% of performance and all 7% of memory impact are caused by the fact that enabling KASAN essentially results in CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT being disabled.

Recommended Android config has CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT disabled (I assume for security reasons), but Pixel 4 has it enabled. It's arguable, whether "disabling" CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT introduces any security benefit on top of MTE. Without MTE it makes exploiting some heap corruption harder. With MTE it will only make it harder provided that the attacker is able to predict allocation tags.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

kasan.mode=full has 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection.

FTR, this only accounts for slab memory overhead that comes from redzones that store stack ids. There's also page_alloc overhead from the stacks themselves, which I didn't measure yet.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

=== Questions

Any concerns about the boot parameters?

For boot parameters I think we are now "safe" in the sense that we provide maximum possible flexibility and can defer any actual decisions.

Perfect!

I realized that I actually forgot to think about the default values when no boot params are specified, I'll fix this in the next version.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Should we try to deal with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT-like behavor mentioned above?

How hard it is to allow KASAN with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT? Are there any principal conflicts?

I'll explore this.

Quoted 4 lines

The numbers you provided look quite substantial (on a par of what MTE itself may introduce). So I would assume if a vendor does not have CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT disabled, it may not want to disable it because of MTE (effectively doubles overhead).

Sounds reasonable.

Thanks!

#70 lore raw

The boot parameters look great!

Do we use redzones in kasan.mode=prod?
(I think we should not)

Please separate the work on improving the stack trace collection form the work on enabling kasan.mode=prod, the latter is more important IMHO.

Still some notes on stack traces:

Quoted 2 lines

kasan.mode=full has 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection.

This is a lot. Right?
Please provide a more detailed breakdown:
* CPU overhead of collecting stack traces vs overhead of putting them in a container/depot
* RAM overhead depending on the number of frames stored
* RAM overhead of the storage container (or redones?)
* How much is 30% in absolute numbers?

Do we perform any stack trace compressions?

Can we collect stack traces from the shadow call stack, when it's available (default on Android)?

As we discussed offline, I think we have a way to compress reasonably long stack traces into 8 bytes,
but it will take some effort and time to implement:
* collect the stack trace as usual (with shadow stack, when available)
* compute a hash of the top N frames
* store the hash, discard the stack trace. On trap, report the hashes for allocation/deallocation
* Offline, analyze the binary to reconstruct the call graph, including the indirect calls
* Perform DFS search from kmalloc/kfree up the call graph to depth N, compute hashes for all paths,
report paths with the hash that matches the hash in the report. My preliminary investigation shows that we can do it easily for N <= 10. The trickiest bit here is to build the call graph for indirect calls, but we should be able to do it.

Quoted 107 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 68 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 66 lines · Andrey Konovalov

This patchset is not complete (hence sending as RFC), but I would like to start the discussion now and hear people's opinions regarding the questions mentioned below.

=== Overview

This patchset adopts the existing hardware tag-based KASAN mode [1] for use in production as a memory corruption mitigation. Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging. Please see [3] and [4] for detailed analysis of how MTE helps to fight memory safety problems.

The current plan is reuse CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS for production, but add a boot time switch, that allows to choose between a debugging mode, that includes all KASAN features as they are, and a production mode, that only includes the essentials like tag checking.

It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI initiative [5].

The patch titled "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters" of this series adds a few new boot parameters:

kasan.mode allows choosing one of main three modes:

- kasan.mode=off - no checks at all
- kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features
- kasan.mode=full - all features

Those mode configs provide default values for three more internal configs listed below. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing:

- kasan.stack=off/on - enable stacks collection
(default: on for mode=full, otherwise off)
- kasan.trap=async/sync - use async or sync MTE mode (default: sync for mode=full, otherwise async)
- kasan.fault=report/panic - only report MTE fault or also panic (default: report)

=== Benchmarks

For now I've only performed a few simple benchmarks such as measuring kernel boot time and slab memory usage after boot. The benchmarks were performed in QEMU and the results below exclude the slowdown caused by QEMU memory tagging emulation (as it's different from the slowdown that will be introduced by hardware and therefore irrelevant).

KASAN_HW_TAGS=y + kasan.mode=off introduces no performance or memory impact compared to KASAN_HW_TAGS=n.

kasan.mode=prod (without executing the tagging instructions) introduces 7% of both performace and memory impact compared to kasan.mode=off. Note, that 4% of performance and all 7% of memory impact are caused by the fact that enabling KASAN essentially results in CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT being disabled.

Recommended Android config has CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT disabled (I assume for security reasons), but Pixel 4 has it enabled. It's arguable, whether "disabling" CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT introduces any security benefit on top of MTE. Without MTE it makes exploiting some heap corruption harder. With MTE it will only make it harder provided that the attacker is able to predict allocation tags.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

kasan.mode=full has 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection.

FTR, this only accounts for slab memory overhead that comes from redzones that store stack ids. There's also page_alloc overhead from the stacks themselves, which I didn't measure yet.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

=== Questions

Any concerns about the boot parameters?

For boot parameters I think we are now "safe" in the sense that we provide maximum possible flexibility and can defer any actual decisions.

Perfect!

I realized that I actually forgot to think about the default values when no boot params are specified, I'll fix this in the next version.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Should we try to deal with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT-like behavor mentioned above?

How hard it is to allow KASAN with CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT? Are there any principal conflicts?

I'll explore this.

Quoted 4 lines

The numbers you provided look quite substantial (on a par of what MTE itself may introduce). So I would assume if a vendor does not have CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT disabled, it may not want to disable it because of MTE (effectively doubles overhead).

Sounds reasonable.

Thanks!