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KVM SGX virtualization support

RFC PATCH Superseded Kai Huang 5 participants 49 messages Feb 8, 2021 – Feb 13, 2021

Subsystems (6)
Documentation x86 KVM Kselftest +2 more subsystems

v4 of 6 Superseded Latest is v6 →

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Kai Huang

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v4 cover KVM SGX virtualization support

--- Disclaimer ---

These patches were originally written by Sean Christopherson while at Intel. Now that Sean has left Intel, I (Kai) have taken over getting them upstream. This series needs more review before it can be merged. It is being posted publicly and under RFC so Sean and others can review it. X86 Maintainers are safe ignoring it for now.

------------------

Hi all,

This series adds KVM SGX virtualization support. The first 14 patches starting with x86/sgx or x86/cpu.. are necessary changes to x86 and SGX core/driver to support KVM SGX virtualization, while the rest are patches to KVM subsystem.

Please help to review this series. Any feedback is highly appreciated. Please let me know if I forgot to CC anyone, or anyone wants to be removed from CC. Thanks in advance!

This series is based against tip/x86/sgx. You can also get the code from upstream branch of kvm-sgx repo on github:

https://github.com/intel/kvm-sgx.git upstream

It also requires Qemu changes to create VM with SGX support. You can find Qemu repo here:

https://github.com/intel/qemu-sgx.git upstream

Please refer to README.md of above qemu-sgx repo for detail on how to create guest with SGX support. At meantime, for your quick reference you can use below command to create SGX guest:

	#qemu-system-x86_64 -smp 4 -m 2G -drive file=<your_vm_image>,if=virtio \
		-cpu host,+sgx_provisionkey \
		-sgx-epc id=epc1,memdev=mem1 \
		-object memory-backend-epc,id=mem1,size=64M,prealloc

Please note that the SGX relevant part is:

		-cpu host,+sgx_provisionkey \
		-sgx-epc id=epc1,memdev=mem1 \
		-object memory-backend-epc,id=mem1,size=64M,prealloc

And you can change other parameters of your qemu command based on your needs.

=========
Changelog:

(Changelog here is for global changes. Please see each patch's changelog for
changes made to specific patch.)

v3->v4:

- Removed Jarkko's first patch, which removes WARN() against EPC page's SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED flag. Dave and Sean were not convinced, and Sean "tripped more than once in the past during one of the many rebases of the virtual EPC and EPC cgroup branches".
- Switched the patch to introduce SGX1/SGX2 feature bits, and the patch to move SGX_LC to cpuid_deps[] table, per Jarkko. Now SGX_LC patch can be applied to existing upstream code directly, if needed.
- Fixed two problems in one KVM patch (trap ECREATE) after review from Rick and Sean.
- Some other minor changes, i.e. update new file's copyright to 2021.

Hi Dave, Sean, Paolo, Rick, and others,

Btw, in last review, we identified that malicious guest can cause KVM to access EPC, which will trigger "page abort", which drops on write, and returns all ones on read. If I understand correctly, we agreed that a better option is to make memremap() deny EPC. However so far this series doesn't contain this work, since looks more discussion is required, and this work can be done independently from KVM SGX series.

v2->v3:

- Split original "x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features" patch into two patches, by splitting moving SGX_LC bit also into cpuid-deps table logic into a separate patch 2:
[RFC PATCH v3 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features [RFC PATCH v3 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit
- Changed from /dev/sgx_virt_epc to /dev/sgx_vepc, per Jarkko. And accordingly, changed prefix 'sgx_virt_epc_xx' to 'sgx_vepc_xx' in various functions and structures.
- Changed CONFIG_X86_SGX_VIRTUALIZATION to CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM, per Dave. Couple of x86 patches and KVM patches are changed too due to the renaming.

v1->v2:

- Refined this cover letter by addressing comments from Dave and Jarkko.
- The original patch which introduced new X86_FEATURE_SGX1/SGX2 were replaced
by 3 new patches from Sean, following Boris and Sean's discussion.
[RFC PATCH v2 01/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features
[RFC PATCH v2 18/26] KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features [RFC PATCH v2 19/26] KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features
- The original patch 1
x86/sgx: Split out adding EPC page to free list to separate helper
was replaced with 2 new patches from Jarkko
[RFC PATCH v2 02/26] x86/sgx: Remove a warn from sgx_free_epc_page()
[RFC PATCH v2 03/26] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()
addressing Jarkko's comments.
- Moved modifying sgx_init() to always initialize sgx_virt_epc_init() out of
patch
x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests
to a separate patch:
[RFC PATCH v2 07/26] x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled
to address Dave's comment that patch ordering can be improved due to before patch "Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support", all SGX, including SGX virtualization, is actually disabled when SGX LC is not
present.

=========
KVM SGX virtualization Overview

- Virtual EPC

SGX enclave memory is special and is reserved specifically for enclave use. In bare-metal SGX enclaves, the kernel allocates enclave pages, copies data into the pages with privileged instructions, then allows the enclave to start. In this scenario, only initialized pages already assigned to an enclave are mapped to userspace.

In virtualized environments, the hypervisor still needs to do the physical enclave page allocation. The guest kernel is responsible for the data copying (among other things). This means that the job of starting an enclave is now split between hypervisor and guest.

This series introduces a new misc device: /dev/sgx_vepc. This device allows the host to map *uninitialized* enclave memory into userspace, which can then be passed into a guest.

While it might be *possible* to start a host-side enclave with /dev/sgx_enclave and pass its memory into a guest, it would be wasteful and convoluted.

Implement the *raw* EPC allocation in the x86 core-SGX subsystem via /dev/sgx_vepc rather than in KVM. Doing so has two major advantages:

- Does not require changes to KVM's uAPI, e.g. EPC gets handled as just another memory backend for guests.

- EPC management is wholly contained in the SGX subsystem, e.g. SGX does not have to export any symbols, changes to reclaim flows don't need to be routed through KVM, SGX's dirty laundry doesn't have to get aired out for the world to see, and so on and so forth.

The virtual EPC pages allocated to guests are currently not reclaimable. Reclaiming EPC page used by enclave requires a special reclaim mechanism separate from normal page reclaim, and that mechanism is not supported for virutal EPC pages. Due to the complications of handling reclaim conflicts between guest and host, reclaiming virtual EPC pages is significantly more complex than basic support for SGX virtualization.

- Support SGX virtualization without SGX Flexible Launch Control

SGX hardware supports two "launch control" modes to limit which enclaves can run. In the "locked" mode, the hardware prevents enclaves from running unless they are blessed by a third party. In the unlocked mode, the kernel is in full control of which enclaves can run. The bare-metal SGX code refuses to launch enclaves unless it is in the unlocked mode.

This sgx_virt_epc driver does not have such a restriction. This allows guests which are OK with the locked mode to use SGX, even if the host kernel refuses to.

- Support exposing SGX2

Due to the same reason above, SGX2 feature detection is added to core SGX code to allow KVM to expose SGX2 to guest, even currently SGX driver doesn't support SGX2, because SGX2 can work just fine in guest w/o any interaction to host SGX driver.

- Restricit SGX guest access to provisioning key

To grant guest being able to fully use SGX, guest needs to be able to access provisioning key. The provisioning key is sensitive, and accessing to it should be restricted. In bare-metal driver, allowing enclave to access provisioning key is restricted by being able to open /dev/sgx_provision.

Add a new KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE to KVM uAPI to extend above mechanism to KVM guests as well. When userspace hypervisor creates a new VM, the new cap is only added to VM when userspace hypervisior is able to open /dev/sgx_provision, following the same role as in bare-metal driver. KVM then traps ECREATE from guest, and only allows ECREATE with provisioning key bit to run when guest supports KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE.

Jarkko Sakkinen (1):
x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()

Kai Huang (3):
x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is
disabled
x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs

Sean Christopherson (22):
x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features
x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT) x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper
x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver
KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union
KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX)
KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit
KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features
KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features
KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave
KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization
KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions
KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs
KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC)
KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC
KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX
attribute

 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst                |  23 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |  12 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h               |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h                    |  19 +
 .../cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx_arch.h} |  20 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h                    |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h               |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c              |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c                |  69 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c               |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile              |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c              |  17 -
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c                |  22 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h               |  30 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c               |  23 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c                |  93 +++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h                 |  13 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c                | 353 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile                         |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                          |  89 +++-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h                          |  50 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c                     |  70 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h                     |   5 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c                        | 466 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h                        |  34 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c                     |   1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h                     |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                        | 171 +++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h                        |  27 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                            |  24 +
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h         |   2 +-
 33 files changed, 1499 insertions(+), 156 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h
 rename arch/x86/{kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx_arch.h} (96%)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#2 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 2/26 x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add SGX1 and SGX2 feature flags, via CPUID.0x12.0x0.EAX, as scattered features, since adding a new leaf for only two bits would be wasteful. As part of virtualizing SGX, KVM will expose the SGX CPUID leafs to its guest, and to do so correctly needs to query hardware and kernel support for SGX1 and SGX2.

---
v3->v4:

- Refined the comments of SGX1/SGX2 bits, per comments from Dave, Paolo, Sean and Jarkko.
- Moved this patch after the patch which moves SGX_LC to cpuid_deps[] table too.

v2->v3:

- Split moving SGX_LC to cpuid-deps table logic into separate patch.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c   | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c    | 2 ++
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -0
index 84b887825f12..0432e7303996 100644
@@ -292,6 +292,8 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL	(11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT	(11*32+ 6) /* #AC for split lock */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA	(11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1		(11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2        	(11*32+ 9) /* SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c +2 -0
index d40f8e0a54ce..defda61f372d 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,			X86_FEATURE_XSAVES    },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA,		X86_FEATURE_MBA       },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC,			X86_FEATURE_SGX	      },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX1,			X86_FEATURE_SGX       },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX2,			X86_FEATURE_SGX1      },
 	{}
 };
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +2 -0
index 236924930bf0..fea0df867d18 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2,		CPUID_ECX,  2, 0x00000010, 2 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_MBA,		CPUID_EBX,  3, 0x00000010, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA,	CPUID_ECX,  0, 0x00000010, 3 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX1,		CPUID_EAX,  0, 0x00000012, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX2,		CPUID_EAX,  1, 0x00000012, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE,	CPUID_EDX,  7, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CPB,		CPUID_EDX,  9, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK,    CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#4 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 3/26 x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>

Encapsulate the snippet in sgx_free_epc_page() concerning EREMOVE to sgx_reset_epc_page(), which is a static helper function for sgx_encl_release(). It's the only function existing, which deals with initialized pages.

---
v3->v4:

- Moved WARN() on SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED flag to sgx_reset_epc_page(), since the patch to remove the WARN() in v3 was removed. Dave and Sean were not convinced, and Sean "tripped more than once in the past during one of the many rebases of the virtual EPC and EPC cgroup branches".
- Added a comment in sgx_reset_epc_page() to explain sgx_free_epc_page() now won't do EREMOVE and is expecting EPC page already in clean slate, per Dave.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 12 ++++--------
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +20 -0
index 20a2dd5ba2b4..a758c7870f06 100644
@@ -381,6 +381,23 @@ const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = {
 	.access = sgx_vma_access,
 };
 
+
+/*
+ * Place the page in uninitialized state.  Called by in sgx_encl_release()
+ * before sgx_free_epc_page(), which requires EPC page is already in clean
+ * slate.
+ */
+static void sgx_reset_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(epc_page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED);
+
+	ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+	if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret))
+		return;
+}
+
 /**
  * sgx_encl_release - Destroy an enclave instance
  * @kref:	address of a kref inside &sgx_encl
@@ -404,6 +421,7 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
 			if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page))
 				continue;
 
+			sgx_reset_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
 			sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
 			encl->secs_child_cnt--;
 			entry->epc_page = NULL;
@@ -415,6 +433,7 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
 	xa_destroy(&encl->page_array);
 
 	if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && encl->secs.epc_page) {
+		sgx_reset_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
 		sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
 		encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
 	}
@@ -423,6 +442,7 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
 		va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page,
 					   list);
 		list_del(&va_page->list);
+		sgx_reset_epc_page(va_page->epc_page);
 		sgx_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page);
 		kfree(va_page);
 	}
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +4 -8
index 8df81a3ed945..21c2ffa13870 100644
@@ -598,18 +598,14 @@ struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim)
  * sgx_free_epc_page() - Free an EPC page
  * @page:	an EPC page
  *
- * Call EREMOVE for an EPC page and insert it back to the list of free pages.
+ * Put the EPC page back to the list of free pages. It's the callers
+ * responsibility to make sure that the page is in uninitialized state In other
+ * words, do EREMOVE, EWB or whatever operation is necessary before calling
+ * this function.
  */
 void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
 {
 	struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section];
-	int ret;
-
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED);
-
-	ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page));
-	if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret))
-		return;
 
 	spin_lock(&section->lock);
 	list_add_tail(&page->list, &section->page_list);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#1 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 1/26 x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit

In reply to Kai Huang

Move SGX_LC feature bit to CPUID dependency table to make clearing all SGX feature bits easier. Also remove clear_sgx_caps() since it is just a wrapper of setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX) now.

---

Hi Jarkko, Dave,

I had your Acked-by in v3. Jarkko said this patch should be before the patch which introduced SGX1/SGX2 bit, since it is improvement of existing code, so I switched the order. I assumed I can still have your Acked-by because code change was just due to patch re-ordering.

v3->v4:

- Changed patch order with the patch that introduced new SGX1/SGX2 bits, since it is improvement of existing code, per Jarkko.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c   | 12 +++---------
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c +1 -0
index 42af31b64c2c..d40f8e0a54ce 100644
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16,		X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW  },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,			X86_FEATURE_XSAVES    },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA,		X86_FEATURE_MBA       },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC,			X86_FEATURE_SGX	      },
 	{}
 };
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +3 -9
index 3b1b01f2b248..27533a6e04fa 100644
@@ -93,15 +93,9 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */
 
-static void clear_sgx_caps(void)
-{
-	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
-	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
-}
-
 static int __init nosgx(char *str)
 {
-	clear_sgx_caps();
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -116,7 +110,7 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) {
 		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
-		clear_sgx_caps();
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -177,6 +171,6 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	    !(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) || !enable_sgx) {
 		if (enable_sgx)
 			pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS\n");
-		clear_sgx_caps();
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
 	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#24 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 6/26 x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

The kernel will currently disable all SGX support if the hardware does not support launch control. Make it more permissive to allow SGX virtualization on systems without Launch Control support. This will allow KVM to expose SGX to guests that have less-strict requirements on the availability of flexible launch control.

Improve error message to distinguish between three cases. There are two cases where SGX support is completely disabled:
1) SGX has been disabled completely by the BIOS
2) SGX LC is locked by the BIOS. Bare-metal support is disabled because of LC unavailability. SGX virtualization is unavailable (because of Kconfig).
One where it is partially available:
3) SGX LC is locked by the BIOS. Bare-metal support is disabled because of LC unavailability. SGX virtualization is supported.

---
v3->v4:

- Removed cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX1) check in enable_sgx_any, since it logically is not related to KVM SGX series, per Sean.
- Changed declaration of variables to be in reverse-christmas tree style, per Jarkko.

v2->v3:

- Added to use 'enable_sgx_any', per Dave.
- Changed to call clear_cpu_cap() directly, rather than using clear_sgx_caps() and clear_sgx_lc().
- Changed to use CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM, instead of CONFIG_X86_SGX_VIRTUALIZATION.

v1->v2:

- Refined commit message per Dave's comments.
- Added check to only enable SGX virtualization when VMX is supported, per Dave's comment.
- Refined error msg print to explicitly call out SGX virtualization will be supported when LC is locked by BIOS, per Dave's comment.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +44 -13
index 27533a6e04fa..96c370284913 100644
@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ early_param("nosgx", nosgx);
 void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	bool tboot = tboot_enabled();
-	bool enable_sgx;
+	bool enable_sgx_any, enable_sgx_kvm, enable_sgx_driver;
+	bool enable_vmx;
 	u64 msr;
 
 	if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) {
@@ -114,13 +115,21 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	enable_vmx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
+		     IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL);
+
 	/*
-	 * Enable SGX if and only if the kernel supports SGX and Launch Control
-	 * is supported, i.e. disable SGX if the LE hash MSRs can't be written.
+	 * Separate out SGX driver enabling from KVM.  This allows KVM
+	 * guests to use SGX even if the kernel SGX driver refuses to
+	 * use it.  This happens if flexible Faunch Control is not
+	 * available.
 	 */
-	enable_sgx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) &&
-		     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) &&
-		     IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX);
+	enable_sgx_any = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) &&
+			 IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX);
+	enable_sgx_driver = enable_sgx_any &&
+			    cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+	enable_sgx_kvm = enable_sgx_any && enable_vmx &&
+			  IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM);
 
 	if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED)
 		goto update_caps;
@@ -136,15 +145,18 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	 * i.e. KVM is enabled, to avoid unnecessarily adding an attack vector
 	 * for the kernel, e.g. using VMX to hide malicious code.
 	 */
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) {
+	if (enable_vmx) {
 		msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
 
 		if (tboot)
 			msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
 	}
 
-	if (enable_sgx)
-		msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED | FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+	if (enable_sgx_kvm || enable_sgx_driver) {
+		msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
+		if (enable_sgx_driver)
+			msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+	}
 
 	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr);
 
@@ -167,10 +179,29 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	}
 
 update_sgx:
-	if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED) ||
-	    !(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) || !enable_sgx) {
-		if (enable_sgx)
-			pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS\n");
+	if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED)) {
+		if (enable_sgx_kvm || enable_sgx_driver)
+			pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS.\n");
 		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * VMX feature bit may be cleared due to being disabled in BIOS,
+	 * in which case SGX virtualization cannot be supported either.
+	 */
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && enable_sgx_kvm) {
+		pr_err_once("SGX virtualization disabled due to lack of VMX.\n");
+		enable_sgx_kvm = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) && enable_sgx_driver) {
+		if (!enable_sgx_kvm) {
+			pr_err_once("SGX Launch Control is locked. Disable SGX.\n");
+			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+		} else {
+			pr_err_once("SGX Launch Control is locked. Support SGX virtualization only.\n");
+			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+		}
 	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#25 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 7/26 x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled

In reply to Kai Huang

Modify sgx_init() to always try to initialize the virtual EPC driver, even if the SGX driver is disabled. The SGX driver might be disabled if SGX Launch Control is in locked mode, or not supported in the hardware at all. This allows (non-Linux) guests that support non-LC configurations to use SGX.

---
v3->v4:

- Added comment to explain virtual EPC driver can be supported in both cases that SGX driver is not supported, or failed to initialize, per Dave and Jarkko.
- Removed "virt.h" inclusion since it was removed in previous patch, per Dave.

v2->v3:

- Changed from sgx_virt_epc_init() to sgx_vepc_init().

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +9 -1
index 21c2ffa13870..60a7a630212e 100644
@@ -712,7 +712,15 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void)
 		goto err_page_cache;
 	}
 
-	ret = sgx_drv_init();
+	/*
+	 * Always try to initialize the native *and* KVM drivers.
+	 * The KVM driver is less picky than the native one and
+	 * can function if the native one is not supported on the
+	 * current system or fails to initialize.
+	 *
+	 * Error out only if both fail to initialize.
+	 */
+	ret = !!sgx_drv_init() & !!sgx_vepc_init();
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_kthread;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#26 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 8/26 x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Expose SGX architectural structures, as KVM will use many of the architectural constants and structs to virtualize SGX.

---
v3->v4:

- No code change.
- Added Jarkko's Acked-by. Restored Dave's Acked-by.

v2->v3:

- Added "Expose SGX architectural structures, as..." to commit message, per Jarkko.

---
 arch/x86/{kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx_arch.h} | 0
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c                             | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h                              | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h                      | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 rename arch/x86/{kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx_arch.h} (100%)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h renamed from arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h +0 -0
similarity index 100%
rename from arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h
rename to arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +1 -1
index a758c7870f06..855a68aadda1 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
 #include <linux/suspend.h>
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
-#include "arch.h"
+#include <asm/sgx_arch.h>
 #include "encl.h"
 #include "encls.h"
 #include "sgx.h"
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +1 -1
index 1bff93be7bf4..161d2d8ac3b6 100644
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
-#include "arch.h"
+#include <asm/sgx_arch.h>
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "sgx: " fmt
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h +1 -1
index 592c1ccf4576..4dd39a003f40 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 #define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x)))
 #define __packed __attribute__((packed))
 
-#include "../../../../arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h"
+#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h"
 #include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h"
 #include "../../../../arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#37 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 16/26 KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX)

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Export the gva_to_gpa() helpers for use by SGX virtualization when executing ENCLS[ECREATE] and ENCLS[EINIT] on behalf of the guest. To execute ECREATE and EINIT, KVM must obtain the GPA of the target Secure Enclave Control Structure (SECS) in order to get its corresponding HVA.

Because the SECS must reside in the Enclave Page Cache (EPC), copying the SECS's data to a host-controlled buffer via existing exported helpers is not a viable option as the EPC is not readable or writable by the kernel.

SGX virtualization will also use gva_to_gpa() to obtain HVAs for non-EPC pages in order to pass user pointers directly to ECREATE and EINIT, which avoids having to copy pages worth of data into the kernel.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +2 -0
index 9a8969a6dd06..5ca7b181a3ae 100644
@@ -5891,6 +5891,7 @@ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
 	u32 access = (kvm_x86_ops.get_cpl(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
 	return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, gva, access, exception);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read);
 
  gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_fetch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
 				struct x86_exception *exception)
@@ -5907,6 +5908,7 @@ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
 	access |= PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
 	return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, gva, access, exception);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write);
 
 /* uses this to access any guest's mapped memory without checking CPL */
 gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#38 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 17/26 KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Page faults that are signaled by the SGX Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), as opposed to the traditional IA32/EPT page tables, set an SGX bit in the error code to indicate that the #PF was induced by SGX. KVM will need to emulate this behavior as part of its trap-and-execute scheme for virtualizing SGX Launch Control, e.g. to inject SGX-induced #PFs if EINIT faults in the host, and to support live migration.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
index 3d6616f6f6ef..9581f81e62a4 100644
@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
 #define PFERR_RSVD_BIT 3
 #define PFERR_FETCH_BIT 4
 #define PFERR_PK_BIT 5
+#define PFERR_SGX_BIT 15
 #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT 32
 #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT 33
 
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
 #define PFERR_RSVD_MASK (1U << PFERR_RSVD_BIT)
 #define PFERR_FETCH_MASK (1U << PFERR_FETCH_BIT)
 #define PFERR_PK_MASK (1U << PFERR_PK_BIT)
+#define PFERR_SGX_MASK (1U << PFERR_SGX_BIT)
 #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT)
 #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT)
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#33 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 15/26 KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason from a u32 to a union (of size u32). The full VM_EXIT_REASON field is comprised of a 16-bit basic exit reason in bits 15:0, and single-bit modifiers in bits 31:16.

Historically, KVM has only had to worry about handling the "failed VM-Entry" modifier, which could only be set in very specific flows and required dedicated handling. I.e. manually stripping the FAILED_VMENTRY bit was a somewhat viable approach. But even with only a single bit to worry about, KVM has had several bugs related to comparing a basic exit reason against the full exit reason store in vcpu_vmx.

Upcoming Intel features, e.g. SGX, will add new modifier bits that can be set on more or less any VM-Exit, as opposed to the significantly more restricted FAILED_VMENTRY, i.e. correctly handling everything in one-off flows isn't scalable. Tracking exit reason in a union forces code to explicitly choose between consuming the full exit reason and the basic exit, and is a convenient way to document and access the modifiers.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 42 +++++++++++++++---------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h    | 25 +++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +27 -15
index 0fbb46990dfc..f112c2482887 100644
@@ -3311,7 +3311,11 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
 	enum vm_entry_failure_code entry_failure_code;
 	bool evaluate_pending_interrupts;
-	u32 exit_reason, failed_index;
+	u32 failed_index;
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = {
+		.basic = -1,
+		.failed_vmentry = 1,
+	};
 
 	if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu))
 		kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);
@@ -3363,7 +3367,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 		if (nested_vmx_check_guest_state(vcpu, vmcs12,
 						 &entry_failure_code)) {
-			exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
+			exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
 			vmcs12->exit_qualification = entry_failure_code;
 			goto vmentry_fail_vmexit;
 		}
@@ -3374,7 +3378,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		vcpu->arch.tsc_offset += vmcs12->tsc_offset;
 
 	if (prepare_vmcs02(vcpu, vmcs12, &entry_failure_code)) {
-		exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
+		exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
 		vmcs12->exit_qualification = entry_failure_code;
 		goto vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode;
 	}
@@ -3384,7 +3388,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 						   vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_addr,
 						   vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count);
 		if (failed_index) {
-			exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL;
+			exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL;
 			vmcs12->exit_qualification = failed_index;
 			goto vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode;
 		}
@@ -3452,7 +3456,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT;
 
 	load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
-	vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = exit_reason | VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY;
+	vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = exit_reason.full;
 	if (enable_shadow_vmcs || vmx->nested.hv_evmcs)
 		vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync = true;
 	return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT;
@@ -5540,7 +5544,12 @@ static int handle_vmfunc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 
 fail:
-	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, vmx->exit_reason,
+	/*
+	 * This is effectively a reflected VM-Exit, as opposed to a synthesized
+	 * nested VM-Exit.  Pass the original exit reason, i.e. don't hardcode
+	 * EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC as the exit reason.
+	 */
+	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, vmx->exit_reason.full,
 			  vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu),
 			  vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu));
 	return 1;
@@ -5608,7 +5617,8 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
  * MSR bitmap. This may be the case even when L0 doesn't use MSR bitmaps.
  */
 static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, u32 exit_reason)
+					struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+					union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason)
 {
 	u32 msr_index = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
 	gpa_t bitmap;
@@ -5622,7 +5632,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	 * First we need to figure out which of the four to use:
 	 */
 	bitmap = vmcs12->msr_bitmap;
-	if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
+	if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
 		bitmap += 2048;
 	if (msr_index >= 0xc0000000) {
 		msr_index -= 0xc0000000;
@@ -5759,11 +5769,12 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_mtf(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
  * Return true if L0 wants to handle an exit from L2 regardless of whether or not
  * L1 wants the exit.  Only call this when in is_guest_mode (L2).
  */
-static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
+static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason)
 {
 	u32 intr_info;
 
-	switch ((u16)exit_reason) {
+	switch (exit_reason.basic) {
 	case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
 		intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
 		if (is_nmi(intr_info))
@@ -5819,12 +5830,13 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
  * Return 1 if L1 wants to intercept an exit from L2.  Only call this when in
  * is_guest_mode (L2).
  */
-static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
+static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason)
 {
 	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
 	u32 intr_info;
 
-	switch ((u16)exit_reason) {
+	switch (exit_reason.basic) {
 	case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
 		intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
 		if (is_nmi(intr_info))
@@ -5943,7 +5955,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
 bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-	u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
 	unsigned long exit_qual;
 	u32 exit_intr_info;
 
@@ -5962,7 +5974,7 @@ bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		goto reflect_vmexit;
 	}
 
-	trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(exit_reason, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
+	trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(exit_reason.full, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
 
 	/* If L0 (KVM) wants the exit, it trumps L1's desires. */
 	if (nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(vcpu, exit_reason))
@@ -5988,7 +6000,7 @@ bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	exit_qual = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
 
 reflect_vmexit:
-	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason, exit_intr_info, exit_qual);
+	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason.full, exit_intr_info, exit_qual);
 	return true;
 }
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +35 -33

157 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +24 -1
index 9d3a557949ac..903f246b5abd 100644
@@ -70,6 +70,29 @@ struct pt_desc {
 	struct pt_ctx guest;
 };
 
+union vmx_exit_reason {
+	struct {
+		u32	basic			: 16;
+		u32	reserved16		: 1;
+		u32	reserved17		: 1;
+		u32	reserved18		: 1;
+		u32	reserved19		: 1;
+		u32	reserved20		: 1;
+		u32	reserved21		: 1;
+		u32	reserved22		: 1;
+		u32	reserved23		: 1;
+		u32	reserved24		: 1;
+		u32	reserved25		: 1;
+		u32	reserved26		: 1;
+		u32	sgx_enclave_mode	: 1;
+		u32	smi_pending_mtf		: 1;
+		u32	smi_from_vmx_root	: 1;
+		u32	reserved30		: 1;
+		u32	failed_vmentry		: 1;
+	};
+	u32 full;
+};
+
 /*
  * The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need
  * for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu.
@@ -244,7 +267,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 	int vpid;
 	bool emulation_required;
 
-	u32 exit_reason;
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason;
 
 	/* Posted interrupt descriptor */
 	struct pi_desc pi_desc;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#27 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 9/26 x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Move the ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h so that they can be used by KVM. And because they're architectural.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 15 ---------------
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h +15 -0
index abf99bb71fdc..3dbe7aacf552 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,21 @@
 /* The bitmask for the EPC section type. */
 #define SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK	GENMASK(3, 0)
 
+enum sgx_encls_function {
+	ECREATE	= 0x00,
+	EADD	= 0x01,
+	EINIT	= 0x02,
+	EREMOVE	= 0x03,
+	EDGBRD	= 0x04,
+	EDGBWR	= 0x05,
+	EEXTEND	= 0x06,
+	ELDU	= 0x08,
+	EBLOCK	= 0x09,
+	EPA	= 0x0A,
+	EWB	= 0x0B,
+	ETRACK	= 0x0C,
+};
+
 /**
  * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV
  * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED:		Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +0 -15
index 443188fe7e70..be5c49689980 100644
@@ -11,21 +11,6 @@
 #include <asm/traps.h>
 #include "sgx.h"
 
-enum sgx_encls_function {
-	ECREATE	= 0x00,
-	EADD	= 0x01,
-	EINIT	= 0x02,
-	EREMOVE	= 0x03,
-	EDGBRD	= 0x04,
-	EDGBWR	= 0x05,
-	EEXTEND	= 0x06,
-	ELDU	= 0x08,
-	EBLOCK	= 0x09,
-	EPA	= 0x0A,
-	EWB	= 0x0B,
-	ETRACK	= 0x0C,
-};
-
 /**
  * ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG - flag signifying an ENCLS return code is a trapnr
  *
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#48 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 26/26 KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a file handle to a valid SGX attribute file.

The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint.

To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by default.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c             | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h       |  1 +
 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +23 -0
index c136e254b496..47c7c7c33025 100644
@@ -6037,6 +6037,29 @@ KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications which user space
 can then handle to implement model specific MSR handling and/or user notifications
 to inform a user that an MSR was not handled.
 
+7.22 KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE
+----------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] is a file handle of a SGX attribute file in securityfs
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if the file handle is invalid or if a requested
+          attribute is not supported by KVM.
+
+KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE enables a userspace VMM to grant a VM access to one or
+more priveleged enclave attributes.  args[0] must hold a file handle to a valid
+SGX attribute file corresponding to an attribute that is supported/restricted
+by KVM (currently only PROVISIONKEY).
+
+The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide
+additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. use of the PROVISIONKEY
+is restricted to deter malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to obtain a stable
+system fingerprint.  To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions
+by running an enclave in a VM, KVM prevents access to privileged attributes by
+default.
+
+See Documentation/x86/sgx/2.Kernel-internals.rst for more details.
+
 8. Other capabilities.
 ======================
 
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
index 04b2f5de2d7b..ad00a1af1545 100644
@@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 		 * expected to derive it from supported XCR0.
 		 */
 		entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT |
-			      /* PROVISIONKEY | */ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY |
+			      SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY | SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY |
 			      SGX_ATTR_KSS;
 		entry->ebx &= 0;
 		break;
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +22 -0
index 5ca7b181a3ae..3d1b4113a57b 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/intel_pt.h>
 #include <asm/emulate_prefix.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include <asm/sgx_arch.h>
 #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -3767,6 +3769,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 	case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR:
 	case KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER:
 	case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID:
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE:
+#endif
 		r = 1;
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS:
@@ -5295,6 +5300,23 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
 		kvm->arch.user_space_msr_mask = cap->args[0];
 		r = 0;
 		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: {
+		unsigned long allowed_attributes = 0;
+
+		r = sgx_set_attribute(&allowed_attributes, cap->args[0]);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		/* KVM only supports the PROVISIONKEY privileged attribute. */
+		if ((allowed_attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY) &&
+		    !(allowed_attributes & ~SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY))
+			kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed = true;
+		else
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		break;
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1 -0
index 374c67875cdb..e17bda18a9b4 100644
@@ -1058,6 +1058,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
 #define KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID 190
 #define KVM_CAP_SYS_HYPERV_CPUID 191
 #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING 192
+#define KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE 200
 
 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#7 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 4/26 x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

SGX driver can accurately track how enclave pages are used. This enables SECS to be specifically targeted and EREMOVE'd only after all child pages have been EREMOVE'd. This ensures that SGX driver will never encounter SGX_CHILD_PRESENT in normal operation.

Virtual EPC is different. The host does not track how EPC pages are used by the guest, so it cannot guarantee EREMOVE success. It might, for instance, encounter a SECS with a non-zero child count.

Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for use by SGX virtualization to assert EREMOVE failures are expected, but only due to SGX_CHILD_PRESENT.

---
v3->v4:

- Refined the commit msg, per Dave.

v2->v3:

- Changed from 'Enclave has child' to 'SECS has child', per Jarkko.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h +2 -0
index dd7602c44c72..abf99bb71fdc 100644
@@ -26,12 +26,14 @@
  * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV
  * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED:		Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not
  *				been completed yet.
+ * %SGX_CHILD_PRESENT		SECS has child pages present in the EPC.
  * %SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN:	EINITTOKEN is invalid and enclave signer's
  *				public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH.
  * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT:		An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received
  */
 enum sgx_return_code {
 	SGX_NOT_TRACKED			= 11,
+	SGX_CHILD_PRESENT		= 13,
 	SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN		= 16,
 	SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT		= 128,
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#13 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 5/26 x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add a misc device /dev/sgx_vepc to allow userspace to allocate "raw" EPC without an associated enclave. The intended and only known use case for raw EPC allocation is to expose EPC to a KVM guest, hence the 'vepc' moniker, virt.{c,h} files and X86_SGX_KVM Kconfig.

More specifically, to allocate a virtual EPC instance with particular size, the userspace hypervisor opens the device node, and uses mmap() with the intended size to get an address range of virtual EPC. Then it may use the address range to create one KVM memory slot as virtual EPC for guest.

Implement the "raw" EPC allocation in the x86 core-SGX subsystem via /dev/sgx_vepc rather than in KVM. Doing so has two major advantages:

- Does not require changes to KVM's uAPI, e.g. EPC gets handled as just another memory backend for guests.

- EPC management is wholly contained in the SGX subsystem, e.g. SGX does not have to export any symbols, changes to reclaim flows don't need to be routed through KVM, SGX's dirty laundry doesn't have to get aired out for the world to see, and so on and so forth.

The virtual EPC pages allocated to guests are currently not reclaimable. Reclaiming EPC page used by enclave requires a special reclaim mechanism separate from normal page reclaim, and that mechanism is not supported for virutal EPC pages. Due to the complications of handling reclaim conflicts between guest and host, reclaiming virtual EPC pages is significantly more complex than basic support for SGX virtualization.

---
v3->v4:

- Removed #define pr_fmt(fmt), per Dave and Jarkko.
- Added one line summary next to copyright, and also updated copyright, per Dave.
- Added comment to explain zombie_secs_pages and the lock, per Dave.
- Removed !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) in sgx_vepc_init(), per Dave.
- Removed virt.h, per Dave, and put the declaration of sgx_vepc_init() to arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h.

v2->v3:

- Changed from /dev/sgx_virt_epc to /dev/sgx_vepc, per Jarkko. Accordingly, renamed 'sgx_virt_epc_xx' to 'sgx_vepc_xx' for various functions and structrues.
- Changed CONFIG_X86_SGX_VIRTUALIZATION to CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM, per Dave.

v1->v2:

- Added one paragraph to explain fops of virtual EPC, per Jarkko's suggestion.
- Moved change to sgx_init() out of this patch to a separate patch, as stated in cover letter.
- In sgx_virt_epc_init(), return error if VMX is not supported, or CONFIG_KVM_INTEL is not enabled, because there's no point to create /dev/sgx_virt_epc if KVM is not supported.
- Removed 'struct mm_struct *mm' in 'struct sgx_virt_epc', and related logic in sgx_virt_epc_open/release/mmap(), per Dave's comment.
- Renamed 'virtual_epc_zombie_pages' and 'virt_epc_lock' to 'zombie_secs_pages' 'zombie_secs_pages_lock', per Dave's suggestion.
- Changed __sgx_free_epc_page() to sgx_free_epc_page() due to Jarkko's patch removes EREMOVE in sgx_free_epc_page().
- Changed all struct sgx_virt_epc *epc to struct sgx_virt_epc *vepc.
- In __sgx_virt_epc_fault(), changed comment to use WARN_ON() to make sure vepc->lock has already been hold, per Dave's suggestion.
- In sgx_virt_epc_free_page(), added comments to explain SGX_ENCLAVE_ACT is not expected; and changed to use WARN_ONCE() to dump actual error code, per Dave's comment.
- Removed NULL page check in sgx_virt_epc_free_page(), per Dave's comment.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                 |  12 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h    |   9 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c   | 259 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 281 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c
arch/x86/Kconfig +12 -0
index 21f851179ff0..ccb35d14c297 100644
@@ -1951,6 +1951,18 @@ config X86_SGX
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config X86_SGX_KVM
+	bool "Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) Virtualization"
+	depends on X86_SGX && KVM_INTEL
+	help
+
+	  Enables KVM guests to create SGX enclaves.
+
+	  This includes support to expose "raw" unreclaimable enclave memory to
+	  guests via a device node, e.g. /dev/sgx_vepc.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile +1 -0
index 91d3dc784a29..9c1656779b2a 100644
@@ -3,3 +3,4 @@ obj-y += \
 	encl.o \
 	ioctl.o \
 	main.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM)	+= virt.o
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +9 -0
index 5fa42d143feb..1bff93be7bf4 100644
@@ -83,4 +83,13 @@ void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+int __init sgx_vepc_init(void);
+#else
+static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)
+{
+	return -ENODEV;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c new file +259 -0

259 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#28 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 10/26 x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT)

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Define the ENCLS leafs that are available with SGX2, also referred to as Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM). The leafs will be used by KVM to conditionally expose SGX2 capabilities to guests.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h +3 -0
index 3dbe7aacf552..756c8dacc52a 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ enum sgx_encls_function {
 	EPA	= 0x0A,
 	EWB	= 0x0B,
 	ETRACK	= 0x0C,
+	EAUG	= 0x0D,
+	EMODPR	= 0x0E,
+	EMODT	= 0x0F,
 };
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#29 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 11/26 x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add a helper to extract the fault indicator from an encoded ENCLS return value. SGX virtualization will also need to detect ENCLS faults.

---
v3->v4:

- No code change. Added Jarkko's Acked-by.

v2->v3:

- Changed commenting style for return value, per Jarkko.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +14 -1
index be5c49689980..3219d011ee28 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,19 @@
 	} while (0);							  \
 }
 
+/*
+ * encls_faulted() - Check if an ENCLS leaf faulted given an error code
+ * @ret 	the return value of an ENCLS leaf function call
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - true:	ENCLS leaf faulted.
+ * - false:	Otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool encls_faulted(int ret)
+{
+	return ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG;
+}
+
 /**
  * encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS function failed
  * @ret:	the return value of an ENCLS function call
@@ -50,7 +63,7 @@
  */
 static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)
 {
-	if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)
+	if (encls_faulted(ret))
 		return ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != X86_TRAP_PF;
 
 	return !!ret;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1 -1
index 90a5caf76939..e5977752c7be 100644
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
+	if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
 		if (encls_failed(ret))
 			ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#39 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 18/26 KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Introduce a scheme that allows KVM's CPUID magic to support features that are scattered in the kernel's feature words. To advertise and/or query guest support for CPUID-based features, KVM requires the bit number of an X86_FEATURE_* to match the bit number in its associated CPUID entry. For scattered features, this does not hold true.

Add a framework to allow defining KVM-only words, stored in kvm_cpu_caps after the shared kernel caps, that can be used to gather the scattered feature bits by translating X86_FEATURE_* flags into their KVM-defined feature.

Note, because reverse_cpuid_check() effectively forces kvm_cpu_caps lookups to be resolved at compile time, there is no runtime cost for translating from kernel-defined to kvm-defined features.

More details here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/X/[email protected]

---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +27 -5
index 13036cf0b912..f8037fab8950 100644
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
  * Unlike "struct cpuinfo_x86.x86_capability", kvm_cpu_caps doesn't need to be
  * aligned to sizeof(unsigned long) because it's not accessed via bitops.
  */
-u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly;
+u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_caps);
 
 static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
 }
 
 #define F feature_bit
+#define SF(name) (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_##name) ? F(name) : 0)
 
 static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(
 	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent, u32 function, u32 index)
@@ -331,13 +332,13 @@ int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return r;
 }
 
-static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
+/* Mask kvm_cpu_caps for @leaf with the raw CPUID capabilities of this CPU. */
+static __always_inline void __kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf)
 {
 	const struct cpuid_reg cpuid = x86_feature_cpuid(leaf * 32);
 	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entry;
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(leaf);
-	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask;
 
 	cpuid_count(cpuid.function, cpuid.index,
 		    &entry.eax, &entry.ebx, &entry.ecx, &entry.edx);
@@ -345,6 +346,26 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
 	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= *__cpuid_entry_get_reg(&entry, cpuid.reg);
 }
 
+static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
+{
+	/* Use the "init" variant for scattered leafs. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf >= NCAPINTS);
+
+	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask;
+
+	__kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_init(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
+{
+	/* Use the "mask" variant for hardwared-defined leafs. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf < NCAPINTS);
+
+	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] = mask;
+
+	__kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf);
+}
+
 void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 {
 	unsigned int f_nx = is_efer_nx() ? F(NX) : 0;
@@ -355,12 +376,13 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	unsigned int f_gbpages = 0;
 	unsigned int f_lm = 0;
 #endif
+	memset(kvm_cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps));
 
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) >
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)) >
 		     sizeof(boot_cpu_data.x86_capability));
 
 	memcpy(&kvm_cpu_caps, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability,
-	       sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps));
+	       sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)));
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_1_ECX,
 		/*
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +34 -5
index dc921d76e42e..2041e2f07347 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,20 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h>
 
-extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly;
+/*
+ * Hardware-defined CPUID leafs that are scattered in the kernel, but need to
+ * be directly used by KVM.  Note, these word values conflict with the kernel's
+ * "bug" caps, but KVM doesn't use those.
+ */
+enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs {
+	NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS = NCAPINTS,
+
+	NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS,
+};
+
+#define X86_KVM_FEATURE(w, f)		((w)*32 + (f))
+
+extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
 void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void);
 
 void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -83,6 +96,20 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf)
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf].function == 0);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Translate feature bits that are scattered in the kernel's cpufeatures word
+ * into KVM feature words that align with hardware's definitions.
+ */
+static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature)
+{
+	return x86_feature;
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 __feature_leaf(int x86_feature)
+{
+	return __feature_translate(x86_feature) / 32;
+}
+
 /*
  * Retrieve the bit mask from an X86_FEATURE_* definition.  Features contain
  * the hardware defined bit number (stored in bits 4:0) and a software defined
@@ -91,6 +118,8 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf)
  */
 static __always_inline u32 __feature_bit(int x86_feature)
 {
+	x86_feature = __feature_translate(x86_feature);
+
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_feature / 32);
 	return 1 << (x86_feature & 31);
 }
@@ -99,7 +128,7 @@ static __always_inline u32 __feature_bit(int x86_feature)
 
 static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	return reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf];
@@ -291,7 +320,7 @@ static inline bool cpuid_fault_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_clear(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] &= ~__feature_bit(x86_feature);
@@ -299,7 +328,7 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_clear(unsigned int x86_feature)
 
 static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_set(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] |= __feature_bit(x86_feature);
@@ -307,7 +336,7 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_set(unsigned int x86_feature)
 
 static __always_inline u32 kvm_cpu_cap_get(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	return kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] & __feature_bit(x86_feature);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#41 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 19/26 KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Define a new KVM-only feature word for advertising and querying SGX sub-features in CPUID.0x12.0x0.EAX. Because SGX1 and SGX2 are scattered in the kernel's feature word, they need to be translated so that the bit numbers match those of hardware.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +12 -1
index 2041e2f07347..f55701ef58fc 100644
@@ -13,13 +13,18 @@
  * "bug" caps, but KVM doesn't use those.
  */
 enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs {
-	NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS = NCAPINTS,
+	CPUID_12_EAX	 = NCAPINTS,
+	NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS,
 
 	NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS,
 };
 
 #define X86_KVM_FEATURE(w, f)		((w)*32 + (f))
 
+/* Intel-defined SGX sub-features, CPUID level 0x12 (EAX). */
+#define __X86_FEATURE_SGX1		X86_KVM_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 0)
+#define __X86_FEATURE_SGX2		X86_KVM_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 1)
+
 extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
 void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void);
 
@@ -76,6 +81,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
 	[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
 	[CPUID_7_EDX]         = {         7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
 	[CPUID_7_1_EAX]       = {         7, 1, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_12_EAX]        = {0x00000012, 0, CPUID_EAX},
 };
 
 /*
@@ -102,6 +108,11 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf)
  */
 static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature)
 {
+	if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX1)
+		return __X86_FEATURE_SGX1;
+	else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX2)
+		return __X86_FEATURE_SGX2;
+
 	return x86_feature;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#42 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 20/26 KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add support for handling VM-Exits that originate from a guest SGX enclave. In SGX, an "enclave" is a new CPL3-only execution environment, wherein the CPU and memory state is protected by hardware to make the state inaccesible to code running outside of the enclave. When exiting an enclave due to an asynchronous event (from the perspective of the enclave), e.g. exceptions, interrupts, and VM-Exits, the enclave's state is automatically saved and scrubbed (the CPU loads synthetic state), and then reloaded when re-entering the enclave. E.g. after an instruction based VM-Exit from an enclave, vmcs.GUEST_RIP will not contain the RIP of the enclave instruction that trigered VM-Exit, but will instead point to a RIP in the enclave's untrusted runtime (the guest userspace code that coordinates entry/exit to/from the enclave).

To help a VMM recognize and handle exits from enclaves, SGX adds bits to existing VMCS fields, VM_EXIT_REASON.VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE and GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO.GUEST_INTR_STATE_ENCLAVE_INTR. Define the new architectural bits, and add a boolean to struct vcpu_vmx to cache VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE. Clear the bit in exit_reason so that checks against exit_reason do not need to account for SGX, e.g. "if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)" continues to work.

KVM is a largely a passive observer of the new bits, e.g. KVM needs to account for the bits when propagating information to a nested VMM, but otherwise doesn't need to act differently for the majority of VM-Exits from enclaves.

The one scenario that is directly impacted is emulation, which is for all intents and purposes impossible[1] since KVM does not have access to the RIP or instruction stream that triggered the VM-Exit. The inability to emulate is a non-issue for KVM, as most instructions that might trigger VM-Exit unconditionally #UD in an enclave (before the VM-Exit check. For the few instruction that conditionally #UD, KVM either never sets the exiting control, e.g. PAUSE_EXITING[2], or sets it if and only if the feature is not exposed to the guest in order to inject a #UD, e.g. RDRAND_EXITING.

But, because it is still possible for a guest to trigger emulation, e.g. MMIO, inject a #UD if KVM ever attempts emulation after a VM-Exit from an enclave. This is architecturally accurate for instruction VM-Exits, and for MMIO it's the least bad choice, e.g. it's preferable to killing the VM. In practice, only broken or particularly stupid guests should ever encounter this behavior.

Add a WARN in skip_emulated_instruction to detect any attempt to modify the guest's RIP during an SGX enclave VM-Exit as all such flows should either be unreachable or must handle exits from enclaves before getting to skip_emulated_instruction.

[1] Impossible for all practical purposes. Not truly impossible since KVM could implement some form of para-virtualization scheme.

[2] PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING only affects CPL0 and enclaves exist only at CPL3, so we also don't need to worry about that interaction.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h      |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c       |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +1 -0
index 38ca445a8429..e99021a00eb9 100644
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS		0x00000002
 #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_SMI		0x00000004
 #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI		0x00000008
+#define GUEST_INTR_STATE_ENCLAVE_INTR	0x00000010
 
 /* GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE flags */
 #define GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE		0
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h +1 -0
index ada955c5ebb6..c7a18eb2a074 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 
 
 #define VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY         0x80000000
+#define VMX_EXIT_REASONS_SGX_ENCLAVE_MODE	0x08000000
 
 #define EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI       0
 #define EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT  1
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +2 -0
index f112c2482887..562eab7b0a51 100644
@@ -4126,6 +4126,8 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
 {
 	/* update exit information fields: */
 	vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = vm_exit_reason;
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.sgx_enclave_mode)
+		vmcs12->vm_exit_reason |= VMX_EXIT_REASONS_SGX_ENCLAVE_MODE;
 	vmcs12->exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
 	vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info;
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +36 -2
index 746b87375aff..4cb8a3f1374c 100644
@@ -1561,12 +1561,18 @@ static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
 
 static bool vmx_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *insn, int insn_len)
 {
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.sgx_enclave_mode) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return false;
+	}
 	return true;
 }
 
 static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason;
 	unsigned long rip, orig_rip;
+	u32 instr_len;
 
 	/*
 	 * Using VMCS.VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig depends on
@@ -1577,9 +1583,33 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value.
 	 */
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
-	    to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+	    exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+		instr_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+
+		/*
+		 * Emulating an enclave's instructions isn't supported as KVM
+		 * cannot access the enclave's memory or its true RIP, e.g. the
+		 * vmcs.GUEST_RIP points at the exit point of the enclave, not
+		 * the RIP that actually triggered the VM-Exit.  But, because
+		 * most instructions that cause VM-Exit will #UD in an enclave,
+		 * most instruction-based VM-Exits simply do not occur.
+		 *
+		 * There are a few exceptions, notably the debug instructions
+		 * INT1ICEBRK and INT3, as they are allowed in debug enclaves
+		 * and generate #DB/#BP as expected, which KVM might intercept.
+		 * But again, the CPU does the dirty work and saves an instr
+		 * length of zero so VMMs don't shoot themselves in the foot.
+		 * WARN if KVM tries to skip a non-zero length instruction on
+		 * a VM-Exit from an enclave.
+		 */
+		if (!instr_len)
+			goto rip_updated;
+
+		WARN(exit_reason.sgx_enclave_mode,
+		     "KVM: skipping instruction after SGX enclave VM-Exit");
+
 		orig_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
-		rip = orig_rip + vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+		rip = orig_rip + instr_len;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 		/*
 		 * We need to mask out the high 32 bits of RIP if not in 64-bit
@@ -1595,6 +1625,7 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 			return 0;
 	}
 
+rip_updated:
 	/* skipping an emulated instruction also counts */
 	vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
 
@@ -5341,6 +5372,9 @@ static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	gpa_t gpa;
 
+	if (!vmx_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, NULL, 0))
+		return 1;
+
 	/*
 	 * A nested guest cannot optimize MMIO vmexits, because we have an
 	 * nGPA here instead of the required GPA.
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#32 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 14/26 x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

And extract sgx_set_attribute() out of sgx_ioc_enclave_provision() and export it as symbol for KVM to use.

Provisioning key is sensitive. SGX driver only allows to create enclave which can access provisioning key when enclave creator has permission to open /dev/sgx_provision. It should apply to VM as well, as provisioning key is platform specific, thus unrestricted VM can also potentially compromise provisioning key.

Move provisioning device creation out of sgx_drv_init() to sgx_init() as preparation for adding SGX virtualization support, so that even SGX driver is not enabled due to flexible launch control is not available, SGX virtualization can still be enabled, and use it to restrict VM's capability of being able to access provisioning key.

---
v3->v4:

- No code change. Added Jarkko's Reviewed-by.

v2->v3:

- Added kdoc for sgx_set_attribute(), per Jarkko.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h       |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 17 ----------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c  | 16 ++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c   | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +3 -0
index 8a3ea3e1efbe..d67afb051db3 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
+int sgx_set_attribute(unsigned long *allowed_attributes,
+		      unsigned int attribute_fd);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
 struct sgx_pageinfo;
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +0 -17
index f2eac41bb4ff..4f3241109bda 100644
@@ -133,10 +133,6 @@ static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = {
 	.get_unmapped_area	= sgx_get_unmapped_area,
 };
 
-const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops = {
-	.owner			= THIS_MODULE,
-};
-
 static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = {
 	.minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
 	.name = "sgx_enclave",
@@ -144,13 +140,6 @@ static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = {
 	.fops = &sgx_encl_fops,
 };
 
-static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = {
-	.minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
-	.name = "sgx_provision",
-	.nodename = "sgx_provision",
-	.fops = &sgx_provision_fops,
-};
-
 int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
 {
 	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -184,11 +173,5 @@ int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_provision);
-	if (ret) {
-		misc_deregister(&sgx_dev_enclave);
-		return ret;
-	}
-
 	return 0;
 }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2 -14
index 1bae754268d1..4714de12422d 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 /*  Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
 
 #include <asm/mman.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
@@ -664,24 +665,11 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
 static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
 {
 	struct sgx_enclave_provision params;
-	struct file *file;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	file = fget(params.fd);
-	if (!file)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (file->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops) {
-		fput(file);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	encl->attributes_mask |= SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY;
-
-	fput(file);
-	return 0;
+	return sgx_set_attribute(&encl->attributes_mask, params.fd);
 }
 
 long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +57 -1

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Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#43 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 21/26 KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Introduce sgx.c and sgx.h, along with the framework for handling ENCLS VM-Exits. Add a bool, enable_sgx, that will eventually be wired up to a module param to control whether or not SGX virtualization is enabled at runtime.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h | 15 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |  9 +++++---
 4 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +2 -0
index 4bd14ab01323..5c86edc73b72 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ kvm-y			+= x86.o emulate.o i8259.o irq.o lapic.o \
 
 kvm-intel-y		+= vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \
 			   vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o
+kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM)	+= vmx/sgx.o
+
 kvm-amd-y		+= svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_KVM)	+= kvm.o
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c new file +51 -0

51 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h new file +15 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6e17ecd4aca3
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_SGX_H
+#define __KVM_X86_SGX_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx;
+
+int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+#else
+#define enable_sgx 0
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +6 -3
index 4cb8a3f1374c..dbe585329842 100644
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 #include "mmu.h"
 #include "nested.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
+#include "sgx.h"
 #include "trace.h"
 #include "vmcs.h"
 #include "vmcs12.h"
@@ -5623,16 +5624,18 @@ static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
 static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	/*
-	 * SGX virtualization is not yet supported.  There is no software
-	 * enable bit for SGX, so we have to trap ENCLS and inject a #UD
-	 * to prevent the guest from executing ENCLS.
+	 * SGX virtualization is disabled.  There is no software enable bit for
+	 * SGX, so KVM intercepts all ENCLS leafs and injects a #UD to prevent
+	 * the guest from executing ENCLS (when SGX is supported by hardware).
 	 */
 	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
 	return 1;
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM */
 
 /*
  * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#44 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 22/26 KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add an ECREATE handler that will be used to intercept ECREATE for the purpose of enforcing and enclave's MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM, i.e. to allow userspace to restrict SGX features via CPUID. ECREATE will be intercepted when any of the aforementioned masks diverges from hardware in order to enforce the desired CPUID model, i.e. inject #GP if the guest attempts to set a bit that hasn't been enumerated as allowed-1 in CPUID.

Note, access to the PROVISIONKEY is not yet supported.

---
v3->v4:

- Added canonical check for guest's PAGEINFO.metadata and PAGEINFO.contents, per Rick and Sean.
- Added deep copy of guest's PAGEINFO.contents to kernel memory to avoid TOCTOU attack, per Rick and Sean.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   3 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c          | 247 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 250 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +3 -0
index 9581f81e62a4..cd71f30fbdd1 100644
@@ -1000,6 +1000,9 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 		struct msr_bitmap_range ranges[16];
 	} msr_filter;
 
+	/* Guest can access the SGX PROVISIONKEY. */
+	bool sgx_provisioning_allowed;
+
 	struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *pmu_event_filter;
 	struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread;
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +247 -0

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2.29.2
author
#31 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 13/26 x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

The host kernel must intercept ECREATE to be able to impose policies on guests. When it does this, the host kernel runs ECREATE against the userspace mapping of the virtualized EPC.

Provide wrappers around __ecreate() and __einit() to hide the ugliness of overloading the ENCLS return value to encode multiple error formats in a single int. KVM will trap-and-execute ECREATE and EINIT as part of SGX virtualization, and on an exception, KVM needs the trapnr so that it can inject the correct fault into the guest.

---
v3->v4:

- Added one new line before last return in sgx_virt_einit(), per Jarkko.

v2->v3:

- Added kdoc for sgx_virt_ecreate() and sgx_virt_einit(), per Jarkko.
- Changed to use CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h     | 16 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h new file +16 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8a3ea3e1efbe
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_SGX_H
+#define _ASM_X86_SGX_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+struct sgx_pageinfo;
+
+int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs,
+		     int *trapnr);
+int sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token,
+		   void __user *secs, u64 *lepubkeyhash, int *trapnr);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +94 -0

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Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#45 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 23/26 KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Emulate the four Launch Enclave public key hash MSRs (LE hash MSRs) that exist on CPUs that support SGX Launch Control (LC). SGX LC modifies the behavior of ENCLS[EINIT] to use the LE hash MSRs when verifying the key used to sign an enclave. On CPUs without LC support, the LE hash is hardwired into the CPU to an Intel controlled key (the Intel key is also the reset value of the LE hash MSRs). Track the guest's desired hash so that a future patch can stuff the hash into the hardware MSRs when executing EINIT on behalf of the guest, when those MSRs are writable in host.

Note, KVM allows writes to the LE hash MSRs if IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL is unlocked. This is technically not architectural behavior, but it's roughly equivalent to the arch behavior of the MSRs being writable prior to activating SGX[1]. Emulating SGX activation is feasible, but adds no tangible benefits and would just create extra work for KVM and guest firmware.

[1] SGX related bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL cannot be set until SGX is activated, e.g. by firmware. SGX activation is triggered by setting bit 0 in MSR 0x7a. Until SGX is activated, the LE hash MSRs are writable, e.g. to allow firmware to lock down the LE root key with a non-Intel value.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h |  6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +35 -0
index 7bdb125325ef..177ee1c826a8 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
 
 bool __read_mostly enable_sgx;
 
+/* Initial value of guest's virtual SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs */
+static u64 sgx_pubkey_hash[4] __ro_after_init;
+
 /*
  * ENCLS's memory operands use a fixed segment (DS) and a fixed
  * address size based on the mode.  Related prefixes are ignored.
@@ -296,3 +299,35 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 	return 1;
 }
+
+void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Use Intel's default value for Skylake hardware if Launch Control is
+	 * not supported, i.e. Intel's hash is hardcoded into silicon, or if
+	 * Launch Control is supported and enabled, i.e. mimic the reset value
+	 * and let the guest write the MSRs at will.  If Launch Control is
+	 * supported but disabled, then use the current MSR values as the hash
+	 * MSRs exist but are read-only (locked and not writable).
+	 */
+	if (!enable_sgx || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) ||
+	    rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0, &sgx_pubkey_hash[0])) {
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[0] = 0xa6053e051270b7acULL;
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[1] = 0x6cfbe8ba8b3b413dULL;
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[2] = 0xc4916d99f2b3735dULL;
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[3] = 0xd4f8c05909f9bb3bULL;
+	} else {
+		/* MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 is read above */
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1, sgx_pubkey_hash[1]);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2, sgx_pubkey_hash[2]);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3, sgx_pubkey_hash[3]);
+	}
+}
+
+void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	memcpy(vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, sgx_pubkey_hash,
+	       sizeof(sgx_pubkey_hash));
+}
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h +6 -0
index 6e17ecd4aca3..6502fa52c7e9 100644
@@ -8,8 +8,14 @@
 extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx;
 
 int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void);
+void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 #else
 #define enable_sgx 0
+
+static inline void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void) { }
+static inline void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { }
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +20 -0
index dbe585329842..349585f63c4d 100644
@@ -1888,6 +1888,13 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 	case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
 		msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control;
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash
+			[msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0];
+		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
 		if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
 			return 1;
@@ -2154,6 +2161,15 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
 			vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) ||
+		    ((vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) &&
+		    !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED))))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash
+			[msr_index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0] = data;
+		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
 		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
 			return 1; /* they are read-only */
@@ -6957,6 +6973,8 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	else
 		memset(&vmx->nested.msrs, 0, sizeof(vmx->nested.msrs));
 
+	vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(vcpu);
+
 	vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
 	vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
 
@@ -7907,6 +7925,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
 	if (!enable_ept || !cpu_has_vmx_intel_pt())
 		pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
 
+	setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash();
+
 	if (nested) {
 		nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_config.nested,
 					   vmx_capability.ept);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +2 -0
index 903f246b5abd..af4bced6c84b 100644
@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 	 */
 	u64 msr_ia32_feature_control;
 	u64 msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
+	/* SGX Launch Control public key hash */
+	u64 msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash[4];
 	u64 ept_pointer;
 
 	struct pt_desc pt_desc;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#47 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 25/26 KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Enable SGX virtualization now that KVM has the VM-Exit handlers needed to trap-and-execute ENCLS to ensure correctness and/or enforce the CPU model exposed to the guest. Add a KVM module param, "sgx", to allow an admin to disable SGX virtualization independent of the kernel.

When supported in hardware and the kernel, advertise SGX1, SGX2 and SGX LC to userspace via CPUID and wire up the ENCLS_EXITING bitmap based on the guest's SGX capabilities, i.e. to allow ENCLS to be executed in an SGX-enabled guest. With the exception of the provision key, all SGX attribute bits may be exposed to the guest. Guest access to the provision key, which is controlled via securityfs, will be added in a future patch.

Note, KVM does not yet support exposing ENCLS_C leafs or ENCLV leafs.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c      | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 26 +++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h |  5 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c    | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h    | 13 +++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h |  4 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 38 ++++++++++++++++++-
 8 files changed, 215 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +55 -2
index f8037fab8950..04b2f5de2d7b 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/user.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/sgx_arch.h>
 #include "cpuid.h"
 #include "lapic.h"
 #include "mmu.h"
@@ -171,6 +172,21 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 =
 			(best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32)) & supported_xcr0;
 
+	/*
+	 * Bits 127:0 of the allowed SECS.ATTRIBUTES (CPUID.0x12.0x1) enumerate
+	 * the supported XSAVE Feature Request Mask (XFRM), i.e. the enclave's
+	 * requested XCR0 value.  The enclave's XFRM must be a subset of XCRO
+	 * at the time of EENTER, thus adjust the allowed XFRM by the guest's
+	 * supported XCR0.  Similar to XCR0 handling, FP and SSE are forced to
+	 * '1' even on CPUs that don't support XSAVE.
+	 */
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0x1);
+	if (best) {
+		best->ecx &= vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 & 0xffffffff;
+		best->edx &= vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 >> 32;
+		best->ecx |= XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
+	}
+
 	kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu);
 
 	vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr = cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu);
@@ -413,7 +429,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	);
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_0_EBX,
-		F(FSGSBASE) | F(BMI1) | F(HLE) | F(AVX2) | F(SMEP) |
+		F(FSGSBASE) | F(SGX) | F(BMI1) | F(HLE) | F(AVX2) | F(SMEP) |
 		F(BMI2) | F(ERMS) | 0 /*INVPCID*/ | F(RTM) | 0 /*MPX*/ | F(RDSEED) |
 		F(ADX) | F(SMAP) | F(AVX512IFMA) | F(AVX512F) | F(AVX512PF) |
 		F(AVX512ER) | F(AVX512CD) | F(CLFLUSHOPT) | F(CLWB) | F(AVX512DQ) |
@@ -424,7 +440,8 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 		F(AVX512VBMI) | F(LA57) | F(PKU) | 0 /*OSPKE*/ | F(RDPID) |
 		F(AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ) | F(UMIP) | F(AVX512_VBMI2) | F(GFNI) |
 		F(VAES) | F(VPCLMULQDQ) | F(AVX512_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BITALG) |
-		F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/
+		F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/ |
+		F(SGX_LC)
 	);
 	/* Set LA57 based on hardware capability. */
 	if (cpuid_ecx(7) & F(LA57))
@@ -463,6 +480,10 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 		F(XSAVEOPT) | F(XSAVEC) | F(XGETBV1) | F(XSAVES)
 	);
 
+	kvm_cpu_cap_init(CPUID_12_EAX,
+		SF(SGX1) | SF(SGX2)
+	);
+
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0001_ECX,
 		F(LAHF_LM) | F(CMP_LEGACY) | 0 /*SVM*/ | 0 /* ExtApicSpace */ |
 		F(CR8_LEGACY) | F(ABM) | F(SSE4A) | F(MISALIGNSSE) |
@@ -784,6 +805,38 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 			entry->edx = 0;
 		}
 		break;
+	case 0x12:
+		/* Intel SGX */
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Index 0: Sub-features, MISCSELECT (a.k.a extended features)
+		 * and max enclave sizes.   The SGX sub-features and MISCSELECT
+		 * are restricted by kernel and KVM capabilities (like most
+		 * feature flags), while enclave size is unrestricted.
+		 */
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_12_EAX);
+		entry->ebx &= SGX_MISC_EXINFO;
+
+		entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 1);
+		if (!entry)
+			goto out;
+
+		/*
+		 * Index 1: SECS.ATTRIBUTES.  ATTRIBUTES are restricted a la
+		 * feature flags.  Advertise all supported flags, including
+		 * privileged attributes that require explicit opt-in from
+		 * userspace.  ATTRIBUTES.XFRM is not adjusted as userspace is
+		 * expected to derive it from supported XCR0.
+		 */
+		entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT |
+			      /* PROVISIONKEY | */ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY |
+			      SGX_ATTR_KSS;
+		entry->ebx &= 0;
+		break;
 	/* Intel PT */
 	case 0x14:
 		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT)) {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +23 -3
index 562eab7b0a51..fca1f4c8cc5b 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include "mmu.h"
 #include "nested.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
+#include "sgx.h"
 #include "trace.h"
 #include "x86.h"
 
@@ -2318,6 +2319,9 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_early(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
 		if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST))
 		    exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
 
+		if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
+			vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, vmcs12);
+
 		secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, exec_control);
 	}
 
@@ -5726,6 +5730,20 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return false;
 }
 
+static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	u32 encls_leaf;
+
+	if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING))
+		return false;
+
+	encls_leaf = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+	if (encls_leaf > 62)
+		encls_leaf = 63;
+	return vmcs12->encls_exiting_bitmap & BIT_ULL(encls_leaf);
+}
+
 static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_vmcs_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, gpa_t bitmap)
 {
@@ -5819,9 +5837,6 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	case EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC:
 		/* VM functions are emulated through L2->L0 vmexits. */
 		return true;
-	case EXIT_REASON_ENCLS:
-		/* SGX is never exposed to L1 */
-		return true;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -5945,6 +5960,8 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	case EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE:
 		return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
 			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE);
+	case EXIT_REASON_ENCLS:
+		return nested_vmx_exit_handled_encls(vcpu, vmcs12);
 	default:
 		return true;
 	}
@@ -6517,6 +6534,9 @@ void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 ept_caps)
 		msrs->secondary_ctls_high |=
 			SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
 
+	if (enable_sgx)
+		msrs->secondary_ctls_high |= SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+
 	/* miscellaneous data */
 	rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC,
 		msrs->misc_low,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h +5 -0
index 197148d76b8f..184418baeb3c 100644
@@ -244,6 +244,11 @@ static inline bool nested_exit_on_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK;
 }
 
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_encls_exit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING);
+}
+
 /*
  * if fixed0[i] == 1: val[i] must be 1
  * if fixed1[i] == 0: val[i] must be 0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +79 -1

93 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h +13 -0
index 6502fa52c7e9..a400888b376d 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
 
 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 
+#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "vmx_ops.h"
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
 extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx;
 
@@ -11,11 +14,21 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void);
 void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12);
 #else
 #define enable_sgx 0
 
 static inline void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void) { }
 static inline void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { }
+
+static inline void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do if hardware doesn't support SGX */
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+		vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
+}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c +1 -0
index c8e51c004f78..034adb6404dc 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = {
 	FIELD64(VMREAD_BITMAP, vmread_bitmap),
 	FIELD64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, vmwrite_bitmap),
 	FIELD64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, xss_exit_bitmap),
+	FIELD64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, encls_exiting_bitmap),
 	FIELD64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS, guest_physical_address),
 	FIELD64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, vmcs_link_pointer),
 	FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, guest_ia32_debugctl),
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h +3 -1
index 80232daf00ff..13494956d0e9 100644
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 {
 	u64 vm_function_control;
 	u64 eptp_list_address;
 	u64 pml_address;
-	u64 padding64[3]; /* room for future expansion */
+	u64 encls_exiting_bitmap;
+	u64 padding64[2]; /* room for future expansion */
 	/*
 	 * To allow migration of L1 (complete with its L2 guests) between
 	 * machines of different natural widths (32 or 64 bit), we cannot have
@@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ static inline void vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets(void)
 	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_function_control, 296);
 	CHECK_OFFSET(eptp_list_address, 304);
 	CHECK_OFFSET(pml_address, 312);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(encls_exiting_bitmap, 320);
 	CHECK_OFFSET(cr0_guest_host_mask, 344);
 	CHECK_OFFSET(cr4_guest_host_mask, 352);
 	CHECK_OFFSET(cr0_read_shadow, 360);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +36 -2
index 349585f63c4d..9a2293a39e37 100644
@@ -2160,6 +2160,9 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control = data;
 		if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
 			vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
+
+		/* SGX may be enabled/disabled by guest's firmware */
+		vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
 		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
@@ -4317,6 +4320,15 @@ static void vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control, waitpkg, WAITPKG,
 				    ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE, false);
 
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit() && nested) {
+		if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX))
+			vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+		else
+			vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
+				~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+	}
+
 	vmx->secondary_exec_control = exec_control;
 }
 
@@ -4416,8 +4428,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 		vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
 	}
 
-	if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
-		vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
+	vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, NULL);
 
 	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) {
 		memset(&vmx->pt_desc, 0, sizeof(vmx->pt_desc));
@@ -7301,6 +7312,22 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
 
+	vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL);
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX))
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
+	else
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &= ~FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
+	/*
+	 * Only allow guest to write its virtual SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs when
+	 * host is writable, otherwise it is meaningless.
+	 */
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
+			FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+	else
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
+			~FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+
 	/* Refresh #PF interception to account for MAXPHYADDR changes. */
 	update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
 }
@@ -7321,6 +7348,13 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
 		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT);
 
+	if (!enable_sgx) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX1);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX2);
+	}
+
 	if (vmx_umip_emulated())
 		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_UMIP);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#46 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 24/26 KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC)

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add a VM-Exit handler to trap-and-execute EINIT when SGX LC is enabled in the host. When SGX LC is enabled, the host kernel may rewrite the hardware values at will, e.g. to launch enclaves with different signers, thus KVM needs to intercept EINIT to ensure it is executed with the correct LE hash (even if the guest sees a hardwired hash).

Switching the LE hash MSRs on VM-Enter/VM-Exit is not a viable option as writing the MSRs is prohibitively expensive, e.g. on SKL hardware each WRMSR is ~400 cycles. And because EINIT takes tens of thousands of cycles to execute, the ~1500 cycle overhead to trap-and-execute EINIT is unlikely to be noticed by the guest, let alone impact its overall SGX performance.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +55 -0
index 177ee1c826a8..36e65b7c1129 100644
@@ -260,6 +260,59 @@ static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 }
 
+static int handle_encls_einit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long sig_hva, secs_hva, token_hva, rflags;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	gva_t sig_gva, secs_gva, token_gva;
+	gpa_t sig_gpa, secs_gpa, token_gpa;
+	int ret, trapnr;
+
+	if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 1808, 4096, &sig_gva) ||
+	    sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, &secs_gva) ||
+	    sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rdx_read(vcpu), 304, 512, &token_gva))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Translate the SIGSTRUCT, SECS and TOKEN pointers from GVA to GPA.
+	 * Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF.
+	 */
+	if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, sig_gva, false, &sig_gpa) ||
+	    sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, &secs_gpa) ||
+	    sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, token_gva, false, &token_gpa))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * ...and then to HVA.  The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e.
+	 * KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time.  Exit to
+	 * userspace if a GPA is invalid.  Note, all structures are aligned and
+	 * cannot split pages.
+	 */
+	if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, sig_gpa, &sig_hva) ||
+	    sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, &secs_hva) ||
+	    sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, token_gpa, &token_hva))
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = sgx_virt_einit((void __user *)sig_hva, (void __user *)token_hva,
+			     (void __user *)secs_hva,
+			     vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, &trapnr);
+
+	if (ret == -EFAULT)
+		return sgx_inject_fault(vcpu, secs_gva, trapnr);
+
+	rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & ~(X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF |
+					  X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_SF |
+					  X86_EFLAGS_OF);
+	if (ret)
+		rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
+	else
+		rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
+	vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
+
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, ret);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
 static inline bool encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf)
 {
 	if (!enable_sgx || !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX))
@@ -292,6 +345,8 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	} else {
 		if (leaf == ECREATE)
 			return handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu);
+		if (leaf == EINIT)
+			return handle_encls_einit(vcpu);
 		WARN(1, "KVM: unexpected exit on ENCLS[%u]", leaf);
 		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
 		vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_ENCLS;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#30 lore raw

RFC PATCH v4 12/26 x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs

In reply to Kai Huang

Add a helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs. SGX virtualization also needs to update those MSRs based on guest's "virtual" SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn before EINIT from guest.

---
v3->v4:
- Patch rebase due to sgx/virt.h was removed per Dave, and sgx_vepc_init() declaration was moved to sgx/sgx.h.
- Added Jarkko's Ack-by. Restored Dave's Acked-by.

v2->v3:

- Added comment for sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(), per Jarkko and Dave.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c |  5 ++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c  | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h   |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2 -3
index e5977752c7be..1bae754268d1 100644
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
 			 void *token)
 {
 	u64 mrsigner[4];
-	int i, j, k;
+	int i, j;
 	void *addr;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -544,8 +544,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
 
 			preempt_disable();
 
-			for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
-				wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 + k, mrsigner[k]);
+			sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(mrsigner);
 
 			ret = __einit(sigstruct, token, addr);
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +15 -0
index 60a7a630212e..dadd7acac4ad 100644
@@ -696,6 +696,21 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
+
+/*
+ * Update the SGX_LEPUBKEYHASH MSRs to the values specified by caller.
+ * Bare-metal driver requires to update them to hash of enclave's signer
+ * before EINIT. KVM needs to update them to guest's virtual MSR values
+ * before doing EINIT from guest.
+ */
+void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(u64 *lepubkeyhash)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 + i, lepubkeyhash[i]);
+}
+
 static int __init sgx_init(void)
 {
 	int ret;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +2 -0
index 161d2d8ac3b6..371fdf3b16a8 100644
@@ -92,4 +92,6 @@ static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)
 }
 #endif
 
+void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(u64 *lepubkeyhash);
+
 #endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#40 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 18/26] KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features

In reply to Kai Huang

Hi Paolo,

Although this series was sent as RFC, would you consider reviewing and merging this patch from Sean? As more Intel features are coming, KVM reverse lookup needs to handle scattered x86 feature bits. One example is Robert's KVM keylocker support:

https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg233638.html

Thanks!

Quoted 201 lines · On Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:28 +1300 Kai Huang wrote:

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Introduce a scheme that allows KVM's CPUID magic to support features that are scattered in the kernel's feature words. To advertise and/or query guest support for CPUID-based features, KVM requires the bit number of an X86_FEATURE_* to match the bit number in its associated CPUID entry. For scattered features, this does not hold true.

Add a framework to allow defining KVM-only words, stored in kvm_cpu_caps after the shared kernel caps, that can be used to gather the scattered feature bits by translating X86_FEATURE_* flags into their KVM-defined feature.

Note, because reverse_cpuid_check() effectively forces kvm_cpu_caps lookups to be resolved at compile time, there is no runtime cost for translating from kernel-defined to kvm-defined features.

More details here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/X/[email protected]

---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +27 -5
index 13036cf0b912..f8037fab8950 100644
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
  * Unlike "struct cpuinfo_x86.x86_capability", kvm_cpu_caps doesn't need to be
  * aligned to sizeof(unsigned long) because it's not accessed via bitops.
  */
-u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly;
+u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_caps);
 
 static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
 }
 
 #define F feature_bit
+#define SF(name) (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_##name) ? F(name) : 0)
 
 static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(
 	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent, u32 function, u32 index)
@@ -331,13 +332,13 @@ int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return r;
 }
 
-static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
+/* Mask kvm_cpu_caps for @leaf with the raw CPUID capabilities of this CPU. */
+static __always_inline void __kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf)
 {
 	const struct cpuid_reg cpuid = x86_feature_cpuid(leaf * 32);
 	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entry;
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(leaf);
-	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask;
 
 	cpuid_count(cpuid.function, cpuid.index,
 		    &entry.eax, &entry.ebx, &entry.ecx, &entry.edx);
@@ -345,6 +346,26 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
 	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= *__cpuid_entry_get_reg(&entry, cpuid.reg);
 }
 
+static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
+{
+	/* Use the "init" variant for scattered leafs. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf >= NCAPINTS);
+
+	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask;
+
+	__kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_init(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
+{
+	/* Use the "mask" variant for hardwared-defined leafs. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf < NCAPINTS);
+
+	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] = mask;
+
+	__kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf);
+}
+
 void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 {
 	unsigned int f_nx = is_efer_nx() ? F(NX) : 0;
@@ -355,12 +376,13 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	unsigned int f_gbpages = 0;
 	unsigned int f_lm = 0;
 #endif
+	memset(kvm_cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps));
 
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) >
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)) >
 		     sizeof(boot_cpu_data.x86_capability));
 
 	memcpy(&kvm_cpu_caps, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability,
-	       sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps));
+	       sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)));
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_1_ECX,
 		/*
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +34 -5
index dc921d76e42e..2041e2f07347 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,20 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h>
 
-extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly;
+/*
+ * Hardware-defined CPUID leafs that are scattered in the kernel, but need to
+ * be directly used by KVM.  Note, these word values conflict with the kernel's
+ * "bug" caps, but KVM doesn't use those.
+ */
+enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs {
+	NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS = NCAPINTS,
+
+	NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS,
+};
+
+#define X86_KVM_FEATURE(w, f)		((w)*32 + (f))
+
+extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
 void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void);
 
 void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -83,6 +96,20 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf)
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf].function == 0);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Translate feature bits that are scattered in the kernel's cpufeatures word
+ * into KVM feature words that align with hardware's definitions.
+ */
+static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature)
+{
+	return x86_feature;
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 __feature_leaf(int x86_feature)
+{
+	return __feature_translate(x86_feature) / 32;
+}
+
 /*
  * Retrieve the bit mask from an X86_FEATURE_* definition.  Features contain
  * the hardware defined bit number (stored in bits 4:0) and a software defined
@@ -91,6 +118,8 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf)
  */
 static __always_inline u32 __feature_bit(int x86_feature)
 {
+	x86_feature = __feature_translate(x86_feature);
+
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_feature / 32);
 	return 1 << (x86_feature & 31);
 }
@@ -99,7 +128,7 @@ static __always_inline u32 __feature_bit(int x86_feature)
 
 static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	return reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf];
@@ -291,7 +320,7 @@ static inline bool cpuid_fault_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_clear(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] &= ~__feature_bit(x86_feature);
@@ -299,7 +328,7 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_clear(unsigned int x86_feature)
 
 static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_set(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] |= __feature_bit(x86_feature);
@@ -307,7 +336,7 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_set(unsigned int x86_feature)
 
 static __always_inline u32 kvm_cpu_cap_get(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	return kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] & __feature_bit(x86_feature);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#34 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 15/26] KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union

In reply to Kai Huang

Hi Paolo,

Although this series was sent as RFC, would you consider reviewing and merging this patch from Sean? Intel TDX support (already sent by Isaku as RFC) has conflict with this one, and I am expecting other features might also conflict with it too.

Thanks!

Quoted 390 lines · On Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:25 +1300 Kai Huang wrote:

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason from a u32 to a union (of size u32). The full VM_EXIT_REASON field is comprised of a 16-bit basic exit reason in bits 15:0, and single-bit modifiers in bits 31:16.

Historically, KVM has only had to worry about handling the "failed VM-Entry" modifier, which could only be set in very specific flows and required dedicated handling. I.e. manually stripping the FAILED_VMENTRY bit was a somewhat viable approach. But even with only a single bit to worry about, KVM has had several bugs related to comparing a basic exit reason against the full exit reason store in vcpu_vmx.

Upcoming Intel features, e.g. SGX, will add new modifier bits that can be set on more or less any VM-Exit, as opposed to the significantly more restricted FAILED_VMENTRY, i.e. correctly handling everything in one-off flows isn't scalable. Tracking exit reason in a union forces code to explicitly choose between consuming the full exit reason and the basic exit, and is a convenient way to document and access the modifiers.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 42 +++++++++++++++---------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h    | 25 +++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +27 -15
index 0fbb46990dfc..f112c2482887 100644
@@ -3311,7 +3311,11 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
 	enum vm_entry_failure_code entry_failure_code;
 	bool evaluate_pending_interrupts;
-	u32 exit_reason, failed_index;
+	u32 failed_index;
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = {
+		.basic = -1,
+		.failed_vmentry = 1,
+	};
 
 	if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu))
 		kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);
@@ -3363,7 +3367,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 		if (nested_vmx_check_guest_state(vcpu, vmcs12,
 						 &entry_failure_code)) {
-			exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
+			exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
 			vmcs12->exit_qualification = entry_failure_code;
 			goto vmentry_fail_vmexit;
 		}
@@ -3374,7 +3378,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		vcpu->arch.tsc_offset += vmcs12->tsc_offset;
 
 	if (prepare_vmcs02(vcpu, vmcs12, &entry_failure_code)) {
-		exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
+		exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
 		vmcs12->exit_qualification = entry_failure_code;
 		goto vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode;
 	}
@@ -3384,7 +3388,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 						   vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_addr,
 						   vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count);
 		if (failed_index) {
-			exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL;
+			exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL;
 			vmcs12->exit_qualification = failed_index;
 			goto vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode;
 		}
@@ -3452,7 +3456,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT;
 
 	load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
-	vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = exit_reason | VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY;
+	vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = exit_reason.full;
 	if (enable_shadow_vmcs || vmx->nested.hv_evmcs)
 		vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync = true;
 	return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT;
@@ -5540,7 +5544,12 @@ static int handle_vmfunc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 
 fail:
-	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, vmx->exit_reason,
+	/*
+	 * This is effectively a reflected VM-Exit, as opposed to a synthesized
+	 * nested VM-Exit.  Pass the original exit reason, i.e. don't hardcode
+	 * EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC as the exit reason.
+	 */
+	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, vmx->exit_reason.full,
 			  vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu),
 			  vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu));
 	return 1;
@@ -5608,7 +5617,8 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
  * MSR bitmap. This may be the case even when L0 doesn't use MSR bitmaps.
  */
 static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, u32 exit_reason)
+					struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+					union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason)
 {
 	u32 msr_index = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
 	gpa_t bitmap;
@@ -5622,7 +5632,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	 * First we need to figure out which of the four to use:
 	 */
 	bitmap = vmcs12->msr_bitmap;
-	if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
+	if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
 		bitmap += 2048;
 	if (msr_index >= 0xc0000000) {
 		msr_index -= 0xc0000000;
@@ -5759,11 +5769,12 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_mtf(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
  * Return true if L0 wants to handle an exit from L2 regardless of whether or not
  * L1 wants the exit.  Only call this when in is_guest_mode (L2).
  */
-static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
+static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason)
 {
 	u32 intr_info;
 
-	switch ((u16)exit_reason) {
+	switch (exit_reason.basic) {
 	case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
 		intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
 		if (is_nmi(intr_info))
@@ -5819,12 +5830,13 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
  * Return 1 if L1 wants to intercept an exit from L2.  Only call this when in
  * is_guest_mode (L2).
  */
-static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
+static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason)
 {
 	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
 	u32 intr_info;
 
-	switch ((u16)exit_reason) {
+	switch (exit_reason.basic) {
 	case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
 		intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
 		if (is_nmi(intr_info))
@@ -5943,7 +5955,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
 bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-	u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
 	unsigned long exit_qual;
 	u32 exit_intr_info;
 
@@ -5962,7 +5974,7 @@ bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		goto reflect_vmexit;
 	}
 
-	trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(exit_reason, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
+	trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(exit_reason.full, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
 
 	/* If L0 (KVM) wants the exit, it trumps L1's desires. */
 	if (nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(vcpu, exit_reason))
@@ -5988,7 +6000,7 @@ bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	exit_qual = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
 
 reflect_vmexit:
-	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason, exit_intr_info, exit_qual);
+	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason.full, exit_intr_info, exit_qual);
 	return true;
 }
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +35 -33
index 2af05d3b0590..746b87375aff 100644
@@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value.
 	 */
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
-	    to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+	    to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
 		orig_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
 		rip = orig_rip + vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -5667,7 +5667,7 @@ static void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *info1, u64 *info2,
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
 	*info1 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
-	if (!(vmx->exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY)) {
+	if (!vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry) {
 		*info2 = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
 		*intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
 		if (is_exception_with_error_code(*intr_info))
@@ -5911,8 +5911,9 @@ void dump_vmcs(void)
 static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-	u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
 	u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
+	u16 exit_handler_index;
 
 	/*
 	 * Flush logged GPAs PML buffer, this will make dirty_bitmap more
@@ -5954,11 +5955,11 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
 			return 1;
 	}
 
-	if (exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY) {
+	if (exit_reason.failed_vmentry) {
 		dump_vmcs();
 		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
 		vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
-			= exit_reason;
+			= exit_reason.full;
 		vcpu->run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -5980,18 +5981,18 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
 	 * will cause infinite loop.
 	 */
 	if ((vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
-			(exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
-			exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION &&
-			exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL &&
-			exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS &&
-			exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH)) {
+	    (exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH)) {
 		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 		vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_DELIVERY_EV;
 		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3;
 		vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vectoring_info;
-		vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = exit_reason;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = exit_reason.full;
 		vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = vcpu->arch.exit_qualification;
-		if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+		if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
 			vcpu->run->internal.ndata++;
 			vcpu->run->internal.data[3] =
 				vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
@@ -6023,38 +6024,39 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
 	if (exit_fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE)
 		return 1;
 
-	if (exit_reason >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers)
+	if (exit_reason.basic >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers)
 		goto unexpected_vmexit;
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-	if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
+	if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
 		return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
-	else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
 		return handle_preemption_timer(vcpu);
-	else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW)
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW)
 		return handle_interrupt_window(vcpu);
-	else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
 		return handle_external_interrupt(vcpu);
-	else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_HLT)
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_HLT)
 		return kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu);
-	else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG)
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG)
 		return handle_ept_misconfig(vcpu);
 #endif
 
-	exit_reason = array_index_nospec(exit_reason,
-					 kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers);
-	if (!kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason])
+	exit_handler_index = array_index_nospec((u16)exit_reason.basic,
+						kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers);
+	if (!kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_handler_index])
 		goto unexpected_vmexit;
 
-	return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason](vcpu);
+	return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_handler_index](vcpu);
 
 unexpected_vmexit:
-	vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmx: unexpected exit reason 0x%x\n", exit_reason);
+	vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmx: unexpected exit reason 0x%x\n",
+		    exit_reason.full);
 	dump_vmcs();
 	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	vcpu->run->internal.suberror =
 			KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
 	vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
-	vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_reason;
+	vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_reason.full;
 	vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -6373,9 +6375,9 @@ static void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
-	if (vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
+	if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
 		handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu);
-	else if (vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
+	else if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
 		handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(vmx);
 }
 
@@ -6567,7 +6569,7 @@ void noinstr vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp)
 
 static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason) {
+	switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic) {
 	case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
 		return handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu);
 	case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER:
@@ -6766,17 +6768,17 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vmx->idt_vectoring_info = 0;
 
 	if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
-		vmx->exit_reason = 0xdead;
+		vmx->exit_reason.full = 0xdead;
 		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
 	}
 
-	vmx->exit_reason = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
-	if (unlikely((u16)vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY))
+	vmx->exit_reason.full = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
+	if (unlikely(vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY))
 		kvm_machine_check();
 
-	trace_kvm_exit(vmx->exit_reason, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
+	trace_kvm_exit(vmx->exit_reason.full, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
 
-	if (unlikely(vmx->exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY))
+	if (unlikely(vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
 		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
 
 	vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +24 -1
index 9d3a557949ac..903f246b5abd 100644
@@ -70,6 +70,29 @@ struct pt_desc {
 	struct pt_ctx guest;
 };
 
+union vmx_exit_reason {
+	struct {
+		u32	basic			: 16;
+		u32	reserved16		: 1;
+		u32	reserved17		: 1;
+		u32	reserved18		: 1;
+		u32	reserved19		: 1;
+		u32	reserved20		: 1;
+		u32	reserved21		: 1;
+		u32	reserved22		: 1;
+		u32	reserved23		: 1;
+		u32	reserved24		: 1;
+		u32	reserved25		: 1;
+		u32	reserved26		: 1;
+		u32	sgx_enclave_mode	: 1;
+		u32	smi_pending_mtf		: 1;
+		u32	smi_from_vmx_root	: 1;
+		u32	reserved30		: 1;
+		u32	failed_vmentry		: 1;
+	};
+	u32 full;
+};
+
 /*
  * The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need
  * for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu.
@@ -244,7 +267,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 	int vpid;
 	bool emulation_required;
 
-	u32 exit_reason;
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason;
 
 	/* Posted interrupt descriptor */
 	struct pi_desc pi_desc;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
#35 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 15/26] KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union

Quoted 7 lines · Kai Huang

Hi Paolo,

Although this series was sent as RFC, would you consider reviewing and merging this patch from Sean? Intel TDX support (already sent by Isaku as RFC) has conflict with this one, and I am expecting other features might also conflict with it too.

I see this patch is already queued with Bus Lock VM exit series.

author
#36 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 15/26] KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union

Quoted 11 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 7 lines · Kai Huang

Hi Paolo,

Although this series was sent as RFC, would you consider reviewing and merging this patch from Sean? Intel TDX support (already sent by Isaku as RFC) has conflict with this one, and I am expecting other features might also conflict with it too.

I see this patch is already queued with Bus Lock VM exit series.

Great. :)

Acked-by on v4 2/26
#3 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features

In reply to Kai Huang
Quoted 5 lines · Kai Huang

Add SGX1 and SGX2 feature flags, via CPUID.0x12.0x0.EAX, as scattered features, since adding a new leaf for only two bits would be wasteful. As part of virtualizing SGX, KVM will expose the SGX CPUID leafs to its guest, and to do so correctly needs to query hardware and kernel support for SGX1 and SGX2.

Looks good now.

#5 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 03/26] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()

In reply to Kai Huang
Quoted 6 lines · Kai Huang

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>

Encapsulate the snippet in sgx_free_epc_page() concerning EREMOVE to sgx_reset_epc_page(), which is a static helper function for sgx_encl_release(). It's the only function existing, which deals with initialized pages.

I didn't really like the changelog the last time around, so I wrote you a new one:

Quoted 1 line

https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/

The "v4" changelog is pretty hard for me to read. It doesn't tell me why we can "wipe out EREMOVE" or how it is going to get used going forward.

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = { · line 389

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +6 -0
+
+/*
+ * Place the page in uninitialized state.  Called by in sgx_encl_release()
+ * before sgx_free_epc_page(), which requires EPC page is already in clean
+ * slate.
+ */

I really don't like comments like that that refer to callers. They're basically guaranteed to become obsolete.

/*
* Place the page in uninitialized state. Only usable by callers that
* know the page is in a clean state in which EREMOVE will succeed. */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = { · line 399

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +10 -0
+static void sgx_reset_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(epc_page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED);
+
+	ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+	if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret))
+		return;
+}

The uncommented warnings aren't very nice, but I guess they're in the existing code.

#8 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code

In reply to Kai Huang

On 2/8/21 2:54 AM, Kai Huang wrote:
...

Quoted 2 lines

Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for use by SGX virtualization to assert EREMOVE failures are expected, but only due to SGX_CHILD_PRESENT.

This paragraph broke my brain when I read it. How about:

Add a definition of SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. It will be used exclusively by the SGX virtualization driver to suppress EREMOVE warnings.

#9 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code

Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen

On 2/8/21 2:54 AM, Kai Huang wrote:
...

Quoted 2 lines

Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for use by SGX virtualization to assert EREMOVE failures are expected, but only due to SGX_CHILD_PRESENT.

This paragraph broke my brain when I read it. How about:

Add a definition of SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. It will be used exclusively by the SGX virtualization driver to suppress EREMOVE warnings.

Maybe worth clarifying that the driver isn't suppressing warnings willy-nilly? And the error code isn't about suppressing warnings, it's about identifying the expected EREMOVE failure scenario. The patch that creates the separate helper for doing EREMOVE without the WARN is what provides the suppression mechanism.

Something like this?

Add a definition of SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. It will be used exclusively by the SGX virtualization driver to handle recoverable EREMOVE errors when saniziting EPC pages after they are reclaimed from a guest.

#10 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code

Quoted 15 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen

On 2/8/21 2:54 AM, Kai Huang wrote:
...

Quoted 2 lines

Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for use by SGX virtualization to assert EREMOVE failures are expected, but only due to SGX_CHILD_PRESENT.

This paragraph broke my brain when I read it. How about:

Add a definition of SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. It will be used exclusively by the SGX virtualization driver to suppress EREMOVE warnings.

Maybe worth clarifying that the driver isn't suppressing warnings willy-nilly? And the error code isn't about suppressing warnings, it's about identifying the expected EREMOVE failure scenario. The patch that creates the separate helper for doing EREMOVE without the WARN is what provides the suppression mechanism.

Quoted 5 lines

Something like this?

Add a definition of SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. It will be used exclusively by the SGX virtualization driver to handle recoverable EREMOVE errors when saniziting EPC pages after they are reclaimed from a guest.

Looks great to me. One nit: to a me, "reclaim" is different than "free". Reclaim is a specific operation where a page is taken from one user and reclaimed for other use. "Free" is the more general case (which includes reclaim) when a physical page is no longer being used (because the user is done *or* had the page reclaimed) and may be either used by someone else or put in a free pool.

I *think* this is actually a "free" operation, rather than a "reclaim".
IIRC, this code gets used at munmap().

#11 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code

Quoted 29 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 15 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen

On 2/8/21 2:54 AM, Kai Huang wrote:
...

Quoted 2 lines

Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for use by SGX virtualization to assert EREMOVE failures are expected, but only due to SGX_CHILD_PRESENT.

This paragraph broke my brain when I read it. How about:

Add a definition of SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. It will be used exclusively by the SGX virtualization driver to suppress EREMOVE warnings.

Maybe worth clarifying that the driver isn't suppressing warnings willy-nilly? And the error code isn't about suppressing warnings, it's about identifying the expected EREMOVE failure scenario. The patch that creates the separate helper for doing EREMOVE without the WARN is what provides the suppression mechanism.

Quoted 5 lines

Something like this?

Add a definition of SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. It will be used exclusively by the SGX virtualization driver to handle recoverable EREMOVE errors when saniziting EPC pages after they are reclaimed from a guest.

Looks great to me. One nit: to a me, "reclaim" is different than "free". Reclaim is a specific operation where a page is taken from one user and reclaimed for other use. "Free" is the more general case (which includes reclaim) when a physical page is no longer being used (because the user is done *or* had the page reclaimed) and may be either used by someone else or put in a free pool.

Quoted 2 lines

I *think* this is actually a "free" operation, rather than a "reclaim".
IIRC, this code gets used at munmap().

It does. I used reclaim because userspace, which does the freeing from this code's perspective, never touches the EPC pages. The SGX_CHILD_PRESENT case is handling the scenario where userspace has for all intents and purposed reclaimed the EPC from a guest. If the guest cleanly tears down its enclaves, EREMOVE will not fail.

"free" is probably better though, the above is far from obvious and still not guaranteed to be a true reclaim scenario. If using "freed", drop the "from a guest" part.

author
#6 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 03/26] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()

In reply to Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines · Kai Huang

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>

Encapsulate the snippet in sgx_free_epc_page() concerning EREMOVE to sgx_reset_epc_page(), which is a static helper function for sgx_encl_release(). It's the only function existing, which deals with initialized pages.

Quoted 7 lines

I didn't really like the changelog the last time around, so I wrote you a new one:

Quoted 1 line

https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/

The "v4" changelog is pretty hard for me to read. It doesn't tell me why we can "wipe out EREMOVE" or how it is going to get used going forward.

Oh sorry I missed this. I'll use yours in next version. Thanks.

Quoted 12 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = { · line 389

Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +6 -0
+
+/*
+ * Place the page in uninitialized state.  Called by in sgx_encl_release()
+ * before sgx_free_epc_page(), which requires EPC page is already in clean
+ * slate.
+ */

I really don't like comments like that that refer to callers. They're basically guaranteed to become obsolete.

Quoted 4 lines

/*
 * Place the page in uninitialized state. Only usable by callers that
 * know the page is in a clean state in which EREMOVE will succeed. */

Thanks. Agreed it's not good to mention specific caller name.

Quoted 14 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = { · line 399

Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +10 -0
+static void sgx_reset_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(epc_page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED);
+
+	ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+	if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret))
+		return;
+}

The uncommented warnings aren't very nice, but I guess they're in the existing code.

Yes. Adding comment should be another patch logically, and I don't want to introduce it in this patch.

author
#12 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 39 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 29 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 15 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen

On 2/8/21 2:54 AM, Kai Huang wrote:
...

Quoted 2 lines

Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for use by SGX virtualization to assert EREMOVE failures are expected, but only due to SGX_CHILD_PRESENT.

This paragraph broke my brain when I read it. How about:

Add a definition of SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. It will be used exclusively by the SGX virtualization driver to suppress EREMOVE warnings.

Maybe worth clarifying that the driver isn't suppressing warnings willy-nilly? And the error code isn't about suppressing warnings, it's about identifying the expected EREMOVE failure scenario. The patch that creates the separate helper for doing EREMOVE without the WARN is what provides the suppression mechanism.

Quoted 5 lines

Something like this?

  Add a definition of SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. It will be used exclusively by the SGX virtualization driver to handle recoverable EREMOVE errors when saniziting EPC pages after they are reclaimed from a guest.

Looks great to me. One nit: to a me, "reclaim" is different than "free". Reclaim is a specific operation where a page is taken from one user and reclaimed for other use. "Free" is the more general case (which includes reclaim) when a physical page is no longer being used (because the user is done *or* had the page reclaimed) and may be either used by someone else or put in a free pool.

Quoted 2 lines

I *think* this is actually a "free" operation, rather than a "reclaim". IIRC, this code gets used at munmap().

It does. I used reclaim because userspace, which does the freeing from this code's perspective, never touches the EPC pages. The SGX_CHILD_PRESENT case is handling the scenario where userspace has for all intents and purposed reclaimed the EPC from a guest. If the guest cleanly tears down its enclaves, EREMOVE will not fail.

Quoted 3 lines

"free" is probably better though, the above is far from obvious and still not guaranteed to be a true reclaim scenario. If using "freed", drop the "from a guest" part.

Thanks for feedback. I'll use below:

Add a definition of SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. It will be used exclusively by the SGX virtualization driver to handle recoverable EREMOVE errors when saniziting EPC pages after they are freed.

#16 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 1 line

Without that clearly documented, it would be unwise to merge this.

E.g.

- Have ioctl() to turn opened fd as vEPC.
- If FLC is disabled, you could only use the fd for creating vEPC.

Quite easy stuff to implement.

The most important question to me is not how close vEPC is today, but how close it will be in the future. It's basically the age old question
of: do we make one syscall that does two things or two syscalls?

Is there a _compelling_ reason to change direction? How much code would we save?

maintainer
#15 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 12 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 6 lines · Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add a misc device /dev/sgx_vepc to allow userspace to allocate "raw" EPC without an associated enclave. The intended and only known use case for raw EPC allocation is to expose EPC to a KVM guest, hence the 'vepc' moniker, virt.{c,h} files and X86_SGX_KVM Kconfig.

This commit message does give existential background for having vEPC. I.e. everything below this paragraph is "good enough" to make the case for SGX subsystem controlled vEPC.

Quoted 7 lines

However, it does not give any existential background for /dev/sgx_vpec. Even with differing internals you could just as well make the whole thing as subfunction of /dev/sgx_enclave. It's perfectly doable. It does not really matter how much the same internals are used (e.g. sgx_encl).

Without that clearly documented, it would be unwise to merge this.

E.g.

- Have ioctl() to turn opened fd as vEPC.
- If FLC is disabled, you could only use the fd for creating vEPC.

Quite easy stuff to implement.

/Jarkko

maintainer
#14 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests

In reply to Kai Huang
Quoted 6 lines · Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add a misc device /dev/sgx_vepc to allow userspace to allocate "raw" EPC without an associated enclave. The intended and only known use case for raw EPC allocation is to expose EPC to a KVM guest, hence the 'vepc' moniker, virt.{c,h} files and X86_SGX_KVM Kconfig.

This commit message does give existential background for having vEPC. I.e. everything below this paragraph is "good enough" to make the case for SGX subsystem controlled vEPC.

However, it does not give any existential background for /dev/sgx_vpec. Even with differing internals you could just as well make the whole thing as subfunction of /dev/sgx_enclave. It's perfectly doable. It does not really matter how much the same internals are used (e.g. sgx_encl).

Without that clearly documented, it would be unwise to merge this.

/Jarkko

author
#17 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests

In reply to Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 1 line

Without that clearly documented, it would be unwise to merge this.

E.g.

- Have ioctl() to turn opened fd as vEPC.
- If FLC is disabled, you could only use the fd for creating vEPC.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

Quite easy stuff to implement.

The most important question to me is not how close vEPC is today, but how close it will be in the future. It's basically the age old question
of: do we make one syscall that does two things or two syscalls?

Is there a _compelling_ reason to change direction? How much code would we save?

Basically we need to defer 'sgx_encl' related code from open to after mmap(). For instance, We need to defer 'sgx_encl' allocation from open to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE. And due to this change, we also need to move some members out of 'sgx_encl', and use them as common for enclave and vEPC. The 'struct xarray page_array' would be a good example.

The code we can save, from my first glance, is just misc_register("/dev/sgx_vepc") related, maybe plus some mmap() related code. The logic to handle both host enclave and vEPC still needs to be there.

To me the major concern is /dev/sgx_enclave, by its name, implies it is associated with host enclave. Adding IOCTL to *convert* it to vEPC is just mixing things up, and is ugly. If we really want to do this, IMHO we need at least change /dev/sgx_enclave to /dev/sgx_epc, for instance, to imply the fd we opened and mmap()'d just represents some raw EPC. However this is changing to existing userspace ABI.

Sean,

What's your opinion? Did I miss anything?

#18 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests

Quoted 9 lines · Kai Huang
Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 1 line

Without that clearly documented, it would be unwise to merge this.

E.g.

- Have ioctl() to turn opened fd as vEPC.
- If FLC is disabled, you could only use the fd for creating vEPC.

Quite easy stuff to implement.

...

Quoted 1 line

What's your opinion? Did I miss anything?

Frankly, I think trying to smush them together would be a complete trainwreck.

The vast majority of flows would need to go down completely different paths, so you'd end up with code like this:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +11 -0
index f2eac41bb4ff..5128043c7871 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static int sgx_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
        struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
        struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
 
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_release(encl);
+
        /*
         * Drain the remaining mm_list entries. At this point the list contains
         * entries for processes, which have closed the enclave file but have
@@ -83,6 +86,9 @@ static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
        struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
        int ret;
 
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_mmap(encl, vma);
+
        ret = sgx_encl_may_map(encl, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags);
        if (ret)
                return ret;
@@ -104,6 +110,11 @@ static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,
                                           unsigned long pgoff,
                                           unsigned long flags)
 {
+       struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
+
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_mmap(encl, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
+
        if ((flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE)
                return -EINVAL;
 

I suspect it would also be tricky to avoid introducing races, since anything that is different for virtual EPC would have a dependency on the ioctl() being called.

This would also prevent making /dev/sgx_enclave root-only while allowing users access to /dev/sgx_vepc. Forcing admins to use LSMs to do the same is silly.

For the few flows that can share code, just split out the common bits to helpers.

author
#19 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests

Quoted 59 lines · On Wed, 10 Feb 2021 08:52:25 -0800 Sean Christopherson wrote:
Quoted 9 lines · Kai Huang
Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 1 line

Without that clearly documented, it would be unwise to merge this.

E.g.

- Have ioctl() to turn opened fd as vEPC.
- If FLC is disabled, you could only use the fd for creating vEPC.

Quite easy stuff to implement.

...

Quoted 1 line

What's your opinion? Did I miss anything?

Frankly, I think trying to smush them together would be a complete trainwreck.

The vast majority of flows would need to go down completely different paths, so you'd end up with code like this:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +11 -0
index f2eac41bb4ff..5128043c7871 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static int sgx_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
        struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
        struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
 
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_release(encl);
+
        /*
         * Drain the remaining mm_list entries. At this point the list contains
         * entries for processes, which have closed the enclave file but have
@@ -83,6 +86,9 @@ static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
        struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
        int ret;
 
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_mmap(encl, vma);
+
        ret = sgx_encl_may_map(encl, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags);
        if (ret)
                return ret;
@@ -104,6 +110,11 @@ static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,
                                           unsigned long pgoff,
                                           unsigned long flags)
 {
+       struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
+
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_mmap(encl, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
+
        if ((flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE)
                return -EINVAL;
 

I suspect it would also be tricky to avoid introducing races, since anything that is different for virtual EPC would have a dependency on the ioctl() being called.

Quoted 2 lines

This would also prevent making /dev/sgx_enclave root-only while allowing users access to /dev/sgx_vepc. Forcing admins to use LSMs to do the same is silly.

Agreed. This is really a good point. Two different device nodes allows different permission control. Thanks.

Quoted 2 lines

For the few flows that can share code, just split out the common bits to helpers.

maintainer
#23 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests

In reply to Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 1 line

Without that clearly documented, it would be unwise to merge this.

E.g.

- Have ioctl() to turn opened fd as vEPC.
- If FLC is disabled, you could only use the fd for creating vEPC.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

Quite easy stuff to implement.

The most important question to me is not how close vEPC is today, but how close it will be in the future. It's basically the age old question
of: do we make one syscall that does two things or two syscalls?

Is there a _compelling_ reason to change direction? How much code would we save?

I'm not really concerned about saving any code, at all. I'm more concerned of adding unnecessary bells and whistles to uapi.

IMHO when new uapi is adding it has the burden of ensuring that it is relevant, and necessary.

For me it like now to be frank that I'm sure, which one is the right way to go, i.e. I'm not positioned to any side. But being unsure neither is not a great position to ack anything.

/Jarkko

maintainer
#22 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests

In reply to Kai Huang
Quoted 33 lines · Kai Huang
Quoted 7 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 1 line

Without that clearly documented, it would be unwise to merge this.

E.g.

- Have ioctl() to turn opened fd as vEPC.
- If FLC is disabled, you could only use the fd for creating vEPC.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

Quite easy stuff to implement.

The most important question to me is not how close vEPC is today, but how close it will be in the future. It's basically the age old question
of: do we make one syscall that does two things or two syscalls?

Is there a _compelling_ reason to change direction? How much code would we save?

Basically we need to defer 'sgx_encl' related code from open to after mmap(). For instance, We need to defer 'sgx_encl' allocation from open to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE. And due to this change, we also need to move some members out of 'sgx_encl', and use them as common for enclave and vEPC. The 'struct xarray page_array' would be a good example.

The code we can save, from my first glance, is just misc_register("/dev/sgx_vepc") related, maybe plus some mmap() related code. The logic to handle both host enclave and vEPC still needs to be there.

To me the major concern is /dev/sgx_enclave, by its name, implies it is associated with host enclave. Adding IOCTL to *convert* it to vEPC is just mixing things up, and is ugly. If we really want to do this, IMHO we need at least change /dev/sgx_enclave to /dev/sgx_epc, for instance, to imply the fd we opened and mmap()'d just represents some raw EPC. However this is changing to existing userspace ABI.

Quoted 3 lines

Sean,

What's your opinion? Did I miss anything?

I think this mostly makes sense to me.

And also, it gives an opportunity to have add some granularity to access control (worth of mentioning in the commit message).

Thanks.

/Jarkko

maintainer
#20 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests'

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 59 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Kai Huang
Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 1 line

Without that clearly documented, it would be unwise to merge this.

E.g.

- Have ioctl() to turn opened fd as vEPC.
- If FLC is disabled, you could only use the fd for creating vEPC.

Quite easy stuff to implement.

...

Quoted 1 line

What's your opinion? Did I miss anything?

Frankly, I think trying to smush them together would be a complete trainwreck.

The vast majority of flows would need to go down completely different paths, so you'd end up with code like this:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +11 -0
index f2eac41bb4ff..5128043c7871 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static int sgx_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
        struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
        struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
 
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_release(encl);
+
        /*
         * Drain the remaining mm_list entries. At this point the list contains
         * entries for processes, which have closed the enclave file but have
@@ -83,6 +86,9 @@ static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
        struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
        int ret;
 
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_mmap(encl, vma);
+
        ret = sgx_encl_may_map(encl, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags);
        if (ret)
                return ret;
@@ -104,6 +110,11 @@ static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,
                                           unsigned long pgoff,
                                           unsigned long flags)
 {
+       struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
+
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_mmap(encl, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
+
        if ((flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE)
                return -EINVAL;
 

I suspect it would also be tricky to avoid introducing races, since anything that is different for virtual EPC would have a dependency on the ioctl() being called.

Quoted 4 lines

This would also prevent making /dev/sgx_enclave root-only while allowing users access to /dev/sgx_vepc. Forcing admins to use LSMs to do the same is silly.

For the few flows that can share code, just split out the common bits to helpers.

I'm cool with keeping the device. This is just my opinion that even "obvious" should be documented when it comes to uapi. I.e. no matter how stupid and simple reasons are to add a new device file, please just write it down to commit message.

/Jarkko

author
#21 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests'

Quoted 65 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 64 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Kai Huang
Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 1 line

Without that clearly documented, it would be unwise to merge this.

E.g.

- Have ioctl() to turn opened fd as vEPC.
- If FLC is disabled, you could only use the fd for creating vEPC.

Quite easy stuff to implement.

...

Quoted 1 line

What's your opinion? Did I miss anything?

Frankly, I think trying to smush them together would be a complete trainwreck.

The vast majority of flows would need to go down completely different paths, so you'd end up with code like this:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +0 -0
index f2eac41bb4ff..5128043c7871 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static int sgx_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
         struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
         struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +3 -0
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_release(encl);
+

        /*
         * Drain the remaining mm_list entries. At this point the list contains
         * entries for processes, which have closed the enclave file but have

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +0 -0
@@ -83,6 +86,9 @@ static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
         struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
         int ret;

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +3 -0
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_mmap(encl, vma);
+

        ret = sgx_encl_may_map(encl, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags); if (ret)
                return ret;

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +5 -0
@@ -104,6 +110,11 @@ static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,
                                            unsigned long pgoff,
                                            unsigned long flags)
  {
+       struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
+
+       if (encl->not_an_enclave)
+               return sgx_virt_epc_mmap(encl, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
+
         if ((flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE)
                 return -EINVAL;
 

I suspect it would also be tricky to avoid introducing races, since anything that is different for virtual EPC would have a dependency on the ioctl() being called.

This would also prevent making /dev/sgx_enclave root-only while allowing users access to /dev/sgx_vepc. Forcing admins to use LSMs to do the same is silly.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

For the few flows that can share code, just split out the common bits to helpers.

I'm cool with keeping the device. This is just my opinion that even "obvious" should be documented when it comes to uapi. I.e. no matter how stupid and simple reasons are to add a new device file, please just write it down to commit message.

/Jarkko

Yes reasonable. I added some description to the commit message. I have already sent out the v5. Please take a look and see whether it is OK for you. Thanks!