fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
Subsystems (4)
cover fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
- patch 1/2 fixes openvswitch IPv4 fragmentation, that does a stack OOB read after commit d52e5a7e7ca4 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
- patch 2/2 fixes the same issue in TC 'sch_frag' code
Davide Caratti (2):
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
net/openvswitch/actions.c | 8 ++++---- net/sched/sch_frag.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH 1/2 openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch] do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch] ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch] ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0 genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490 netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630 netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0 sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160 __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000() raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]
this frame has 2 objects:
[32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
[192, 424) 'ovs_rt'
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
^
ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then, in the following call graph:
ip_do_fragment()
ip_skb_dst_mtu()
ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
ip_mtu_locked()the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.
--- net/openvswitch/actions.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/openvswitch/actions.c +4 -4
@@ -827,17 +827,17 @@ static void ovs_fragment(struct net *net, struct vport *vport, }if (key->eth.type ==htons (ETH_P_IP )) { -struct dst_entry ovs_dst; +struct rtable ovs_rt = {0 };unsigned long orig_dst;prepare_frag (vport, skb, orig_network_offset,ovs_key_mac_proto (key)); -dst_init (&ovs_dst, &ovs_dst_ops,NULL ,1 , +dst_init (&ovs_rt.dst, &ovs_dst_ops,NULL ,1 ,DST_OBSOLETE_NONE ,DST_NOCOUNT ); - ovs_dst.dev = vport->dev; + ovs_rt.dst.dev = vport->dev; orig_dst = skb->_skb_refdst; -skb_dst_set_noref (skb, &ovs_dst); +skb_dst_set_noref (skb, &ovs_rt.dst);IPCB (skb)->frag_max_size = mru;ip_do_fragment (net, skb->sk, skb, ovs_vport_output);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Re: [PATCH net 1/2] openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
Quoted 2 lines · Davide Caratti
running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:
<SNIP>
Quoted 8 lines
for IPv4 packets,
ovs_fragment()uses a temporary structdst_entry. Then, in the following call graph:
ip_do_fragment()ip_skb_dst_mtu() ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward() ip_mtu_locked()
Quoted 8 lines
the pointer to struct
dst_entryis used as pointer to struct rtable: this turns the access to struct members likert_mtu_lockedinto an OOB read in the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets inovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.Fixes d52e5a7e7ca4 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")Cc <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Davide Caratti <[email protected]>
The fix looks good to me, however isn’t the real root cause ip_mtu_locked() who casts struct dst_entry to struct rtable (not even using container_of())?
I do not know details in this area of the code, so maybe it’s just fine to always assume dst_entry is part of a rtable struct, as I see other core functions do the same ipv4_neigh_lookup()/ipv4_confirm_neigh().
Re: [PATCH net 1/2] openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
hello Eelco, thanks for looking at this!
Quoted 26 lines · Eelco Chaudron
Quoted 3 lines · Davide Caratti
running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:<SNIP>
Quoted 17 lines
for IPv4 packets,
ovs_fragment()uses a temporary structdst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:ip_do_fragment()
ip_skb_dst_mtu()
ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
ip_mtu_locked()the pointer to struct
dst_entryis used as pointer to struct rtable:
this
turns the access to struct members likert_mtu_lockedinto an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
inovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Fixes d52e5a7e7ca4 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU <net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Davide Caratti <[email protected]>The fix looks good to me, however isn’t the real root cause
ip_mtu_locked()who casts structdst_entryto struct rtable (not even usingcontainer_of())?
good point, that's my understanding (and the reason for that 'Fixes:' tag). Probably openvswitch was doing this on purpose, and it was "just working" until commit d52e5a7e7ca4.
But at the current state, I see much easier to just fix the IPv4 part to have the same behavior as other "users" of ip_do_fragment(), like it happens for ovs_fragment() when the packet is IPv6 (or br_netfilter core, see [1]).
By the way, apparently ip_do_fragment() already assumes that a struct rtable is available for the skb [2]. So, the fix in ovs_fragment() looks safer to me. WDYT?
Signature · 4 lines
davide [1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.12-rc8/source/net/bridge/br_nf_core.c#L72 [2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.12-rc8/source/net/ipv4/ip_output.c#L778
Eelco Chaudron
maintainerRe: [PATCH net 1/2] openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
Quoted 42 lines · Davide Caratti
hello Eelco, thanks for looking at this!
Quoted 26 lines · Eelco Chaudron
Quoted 3 lines · Davide Caratti
running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:<SNIP>
Quoted 17 lines
for IPv4 packets,
ovs_fragment()uses a temporary structdst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:ip_do_fragment()
ip_skb_dst_mtu()
ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
ip_mtu_locked()the pointer to struct
dst_entryis used as pointer to struct rtable:
this
turns the access to struct members likert_mtu_lockedinto an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
inovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Fixes d52e5a7e7ca4 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU <net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Davide Caratti <[email protected]>The fix looks good to me, however isn’t the real root cause
ip_mtu_locked()who casts structdst_entryto struct rtable (not even usingcontainer_of())?good point, that's my understanding (and the reason for that 'Fixes:' tag). Probably openvswitch was doing this on purpose, and it was "just working" until commit
d52e5a7e7ca4.
Quoted 8 lines
But at the current state, I see much easier to just fix the IPv4 part to have the same behavior as other "users" of
ip_do_fragment(), like it happens forovs_fragment()when the packet is IPv6 (orbr_netfiltercore, see [1]).By the way, apparently
ip_do_fragment()already assumes that a struct rtable is available for the skb [2]. So, the fix inovs_fragment()looks safer to me. WDYT?
It looks like the assumption that a dst_entry is always embedded in rtable seems deeply embedded already, looking at skb_rtable(), so I agree this patch is the best solution.
So again, Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]>
PATCH 2/2 net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
In reply to Davide Carattiwhen 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on kernels built with KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947
CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40
tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred]
tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0
fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower]
tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820
__netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0
process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0
__napi_poll+0xaa/0x500
net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0
__do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f
do_softirq+0x71/0x90
</IRQ>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0
ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120
ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60
__ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0
ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0
ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00
sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
__sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0
__x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb
Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89
RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb
RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0
R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009
flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved)
raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
>ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
^
ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then, in the following call graph:
ip_do_fragment()
ip_skb_dst_mtu()
ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
ip_mtu_locked()the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.
--- net/sched/sch_frag.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_frag.c +4 -4
@@ -90,16 +90,16 @@ static int sch_fragment(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, }if (skb_protocol (skb, true) ==htons (ETH_P_IP )) { -struct dst_entry sch_frag_dst; +struct rtable sch_frag_rt = {0 };unsigned long orig_dst;sch_frag_prepare_frag (skb, xmit); -dst_init (&sch_frag_dst, &sch_frag_dst_ops,NULL ,1 , +dst_init (&sch_frag_rt.dst, &sch_frag_dst_ops,NULL ,1 ,DST_OBSOLETE_NONE ,DST_NOCOUNT ); - sch_frag_dst.dev = skb->dev; + sch_frag_rt.dst.dev = skb->dev; orig_dst = skb->_skb_refdst; -skb_dst_set_noref (skb, &sch_frag_dst); +skb_dst_set_noref (skb, &sch_frag_rt.dst);IPCB (skb)->frag_max_size = mru; ret =ip_do_fragment (net, skb->sk, skb, sch_frag_xmit);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Re: [PATCH net 2/2] net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
Quoted 3 lines · Davide Caratti
when '
act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on kernels built with KASAN:
Re: [PATCH net 2/2] net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
In reply to Davide Carattinet/sched/sch_frag.c static int sch_fragment(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, · line 93
Quoted 10 lines · Davide Caratti
net/sched/sch_frag.c +1
-1@@ -90,16 +90,16 @@ static int sch_fragment(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, }if (skb_protocol (skb, true) ==htons (ETH_P_IP )) { -struct dst_entry sch_frag_dst; +struct rtable sch_frag_rt = {0 };
Is setting these fields 0 sufficient here? Because normally a struct table is initialized by rt_dst_alloc() which sets several of them to non-zero, notably, rt->rt_type and rt->rt_uncached.
Similar for the IPv6 part, which is initialized by rt6_info_init().
Thanks.
Re: [PATCH net 2/2] net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
hello Cong, thanks for looking at this!
Quoted 16 lines · Cong Wang
net/sched/sch_frag.c static int sch_fragment(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, · line 93
Quoted 10 lines · Davide Caratti
net/sched/sch_frag.c +1
-1@@ -90,16 +90,16 @@ static int sch_fragment(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, } if (skb_protocol(skb, true) == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { -struct dst_entry sch_frag_dst; +struct rtable sch_frag_rt = {0 };Is setting these fields 0 sufficient here? Because normally a struct table is initialized by
rt_dst_alloc()which sets several of them to non-zero, notably,rt->rt_typeandrt->rt_uncached.
Quoted 1 line
Similar for the IPv6 part, which is initialized by
rt6_info_init().
for what we do now in openvswitch and sch_frag, that should be
sufficient: a similar thing is done by br_netfilter [1], apparently for the same "refragmentation" purposes. On a fedora host (running 5.10, but it shouldn't be much different than current Linux), I just dumped 'fake_rtable' from a bridge device:
# ip link add name test-br0 type bridge
# ip link set dev test-br0 up
# ip link add name test-port0 type dummy
# ip link set dev test-port0 master test-br0 up
# crash
[...]
crash> net
NET_DEVICE NAME IP ADDRESS(ES)
[...]
ffff89fb44ed8000 test-br0
ffff89fbfc45c000 test-port0
crash> p sizeof(struct net_device)
$12 = 3200
crash> p ((struct net_bridge*)(0xffff89fb44ed8000 + 3200))->fake_rtable
$13 = {
dst = {
dev = 0xffff89fb44ed8000,
ops = 0xffffffffc0afef40,
_metrics = 18446744072647256257,
expires = 0,
xfrm = 0x0,
input = 0x0,
output = 0x0,
flags = 18, <-- that should be DST_NOXFRM | DST_FAKE_RTABLE
obsolete = 0,
header_len = 0,
trailer_len = 0,
__refcnt = {
counter = 1
},
__use = 0,
lastuse = 0,
lwtstate = 0x0,
callback_head = {
next = 0x0,
func = 0x0
},
error = 0,
__pad = 0,
tclassid = 0
},
rt_genid = 0,
rt_flags = 0,
rt_type = 0,
rt_is_input = 0 '\000',
rt_uses_gateway = 0 '\000',
rt_iif = 0,
rt_gw_family = 0 '\000',
{
rt_gw4 = 0,
rt_gw6 = {
in6_u = {
u6_addr8 = "\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",
u6_addr16 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
u6_addr32 = {0, 0, 0, 0}
}
}
},
rt_mtu_locked = 0,
rt_pmtu = 0,
rt_uncached = {
next = 0x0,
prev = 0x0
},
rt_uncached_list = 0x0
} only fake_rtable.dst members are set to something, the remaining are all zero-ed.
Signature · 3 lines
davide [1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/net/bridge/br_nf_core.c#L62
Re: [PATCH net 2/2] net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
Quoted 20 lines · Davide Caratti
hello Cong, thanks for looking at this!
Quoted 16 lines · Cong Wang
net/sched/sch_frag.c static int sch_fragment(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, · line 93
Quoted 10 lines · Davide Caratti
net/sched/sch_frag.c +1
-1@@ -90,16 +90,16 @@ static int sch_fragment(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, }if (skb_protocol (skb, true) ==htons (ETH_P_IP )) { -struct dst_entry sch_frag_dst; +struct rtable sch_frag_rt = {0 };Is setting these fields 0 sufficient here? Because normally a struct table is initialized by
rt_dst_alloc()which sets several of them to non-zero, notably,rt->rt_typeandrt->rt_uncached.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Similar for the IPv6 part, which is initialized by
rt6_info_init().for what we do now in openvswitch and
sch_frag, that should be
sufficient: a similar thing is done bybr_netfilter[1], apparently for the same "refragmentation" purposes. On a fedora host (running 5.10, but it shouldn't be much different than current Linux), I just dumped 'fake_rtable' from a bridge device:
Sounds fair. It looks like all of these cases merely use dst->dev->mtu, so it is overkill to pass a full dst just to satisfy some callees.
Anyway, your patch should be okay as a fix for -net.
Thanks.
Re: [PATCH net 2/2] net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
In reply to Davide CarattiQuoted 4 lines · Davide Caratti
when '
act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on kernels built with KASAN:
[...]
Quoted 13 lines
for IPv4 packets,
sch_fragment()uses a temporary structdst_entry. Then, in the following call graph:
ip_do_fragment()ip_skb_dst_mtu() ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward() ip_mtu_locked()the pointer to struct
dst_entryis used as pointer to struct rtable: this turns the access to struct members likert_mtu_lockedinto an OOB read in the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets insch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.
Quoted 4 lines
Fixes c129412f74e9 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.")Cc <[email protected]> # 5.11Reported-by Shuang Li <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Davide Caratti <[email protected]>
Thanks.
Quoted 5 lines · Davide Caratti
- patch 1/2 fixes openvswitch IPv4 fragmentation, that does a stack OOB read after commit
d52e5a7e7ca4("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
- patch 2/2 fixes the same issue in TC 'sch_frag' code
hello Dave and Jakub,
I see that patches in this series [1][2] are marked with 'Changes Requested' in patchwork, but in my understanding no further changes are requested for the moment.
do I need to re-send the series, or you can manage to change the status inside patchwork?
thanks,
Signature · 4 lines
davide [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/94839fa9e7995afa6139b4f65c12ac15c1a8dc2f.1618844973.git.dcaratti@redhat.com/ [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/80dbe764b5ae660bba3cf6edcb045a74b0f85853.1618844973.git.dcaratti@redhat.com/