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Add guest support for SEV live migration.

PATCH Superseded Ashish Kalra 2 participants 6 messages Apr 22, 2021 – Apr 23, 2021

Subsystems (7)
x86 KVM KVM x86 x86 MM +3 more subsystems

v1 of 6 Superseded Latest is v6 →

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#0 lore raw

cover Add guest support for SEV live migration.

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

The series adds guest support for SEV live migration.

The patch series introduces a new hypercall. The guest OS can use this hypercall to notify the page encryption status. If the page is encrypted with guest specific-key then we use SEV command during the migration. If page is not encrypted then fallback to default.

This section descibes how the SEV live migration feature is negotiated between the host and guest, the host indicates this feature support via KVM_FEATURE_CPUID. The guest firmware (OVMF) detects this feature and sets a UEFI enviroment variable indicating OVMF support for live migration, the guest kernel also detects the host support for this feature via cpuid and in case of an EFI boot verifies if OVMF also supports this feature by getting the UEFI enviroment variable and if it set then enables live migration feature on host by writing to a custom MSR, if not booted under EFI, then it simply enables the feature by again writing to the custom MSR.

Ashish Kalra (2):
EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID. x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live
Migration feature.

Brijesh Singh (2):
KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3
mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed

 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h       |  12 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h    |   4 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h       |   6 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h     |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c                 | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c            |   1 +
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c             |  72 ++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c          |   7 ++
 include/linux/efi.h                   |   1 +
 10 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/4 KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3

From: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>

KVM hypercall framework relies on alternative framework to patch the VMCALL -> VMMCALL on AMD platform. If a hypercall is made before apply_alternative() is called then it defaults to VMCALL. The approach works fine on non SEV guest. A VMCALL would causes #UD, and hypervisor will be able to decode the instruction and do the right things. But when SEV is active, guest memory is encrypted with guest key and hypervisor will not be able to decode the instruction bytes.

Add SEV specific hypercall3, it unconditionally uses VMMCALL. The hypercall will be used by the SEV guest to notify encrypted pages to the hypervisor.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h +12 -0
index 338119852512..bc1b11d057fc 100644
@@ -85,6 +85,18 @@ static inline long kvm_hypercall4(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static inline long kvm_sev_hypercall3(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
+				      unsigned long p2, unsigned long p3)
+{
+	long ret;
+
+	asm volatile("vmmcall"
+		     : "=a"(ret)
+		     : "a"(nr), "b"(p1), "c"(p2), "d"(p3)
+		     : "memory");
+	return ret;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
 bool kvm_para_available(void);
 unsigned int kvm_arch_para_features(void);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3

Quoted 10 lines · Ashish Kalra

From: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>

KVM hypercall framework relies on alternative framework to patch the VMCALL -> VMMCALL on AMD platform. If a hypercall is made before apply_alternative() is called then it defaults to VMCALL. The approach works fine on non SEV guest. A VMCALL would causes #UD, and hypervisor will be able to decode the instruction and do the right things. But when SEV is active, guest memory is encrypted with guest key and hypervisor will not be able to decode the instruction bytes.

Quoted 2 lines

Add SEV specific hypercall3, it unconditionally uses VMMCALL. The hypercall will be used by the SEV guest to notify encrypted pages to the hypervisor.

I still think we should invert the default and avoid having an SEV specific variant of kvm_hypercall3().

https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/X8gyhCsEMf8QU9H%[email protected]/

#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/4 mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed

In reply to Ashish Kalra

From: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>

Invoke a hypercall when a memory region is changed from encrypted -> decrypted and vice versa. Hypervisor needs to know the page encryption status during the guest migration.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h       |  6 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h |  2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h     |  2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c            |  1 +
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c             | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c          |  7 +++
 6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h +6 -0
index 4abf110e2243..c0ef13e97f5a 100644
@@ -84,6 +84,12 @@ static inline void paravirt_arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	PVOP_VCALL1(mmu.exit_mmap, mm);
 }
 
+static inline void notify_page_enc_status_changed(unsigned long pfn,
+						  int npages, bool enc)
+{
+	PVOP_VCALL3(mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed, pfn, npages, enc);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL
 static inline void load_sp0(unsigned long sp0)
 {
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h +2 -0
index de87087d3bde..7245d08f5500 100644
@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ struct pv_mmu_ops {
 
 	/* Hook for intercepting the destruction of an mm_struct. */
 	void (*exit_mmap)(struct mm_struct *mm);
+	void (*notify_page_enc_status_changed)(unsigned long pfn, int npages,
+					       bool enc);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL
 	struct paravirt_callee_save read_cr2;
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +2 -0
index 4352f08bfbb5..ed9cfe062634 100644
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ int set_pages_rw(struct page *page, int numpages);
 int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page);
 int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page);
 bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
+void notify_addr_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,
+				    bool enc);
 
 extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
 
arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c +1 -0
index c60222ab8ab9..192230247ad7 100644
@@ -335,6 +335,7 @@ struct paravirt_patch_template pv_ops = {
 			(void (*)(struct mmu_gather *, void *))tlb_remove_page,
 
 	.mmu.exit_mmap		= paravirt_nop,
+	.mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed	= paravirt_nop,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL
 	.mmu.read_cr2		= __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(native_read_cr2),
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +57 -9

104 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +7 -0
index 16f878c26667..45e65517405a 100644
@@ -2012,6 +2012,13 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
 	 */
 	cpa_flush(&cpa, 0);
 
+	/*
+	 * Notify hypervisor that a given memory range is mapped encrypted
+	 * or decrypted. The hypervisor will use this information during the
+	 * VM migration.
+	 */
+	notify_addr_enc_status_changed(addr, numpages, enc);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH 3/4 EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID.

In reply to Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

Introduce a new AMD Memory Encryption GUID which is currently used for defining a new UEFI environment variable which indicates UEFI/OVMF support for the SEV live migration feature. This variable is setup when UEFI/OVMF detects host/hypervisor support for SEV live migration and later this variable is read by the kernel using EFI runtime services to verify if OVMF supports the live migration feature.

---
 include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
include/linux/efi.h +1 -0
index 8710f5710c1d..e95c144d1d02 100644
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
 
 /* OEM GUIDs */
 #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID		EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a,  0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55)
+#define MEM_ENCRYPT_GUID			EFI_GUID(0x0cf29b71, 0x9e51, 0x433a,  0xa3, 0xb7, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xab, 0x16, 0xb8, 0x75)
 
 typedef struct {
 	efi_guid_t guid;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH 4/4 x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature.

In reply to Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

The guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live migration feature uses the following logic :

- kvm_init_plaform() checks if its booted under the EFI

- If not EFI,

i) if kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), issue a wrmsrl() to enable the SEV live migration support

- If EFI,

i) If kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), read the UEFI variable which indicates OVMF support for live migration

ii) the variable indicates live migration is supported, issue a wrmsrl() to
enable the SEV live migration support

The EFI live migration check is done using a late_initcall() callback.

Also, ensure that _bss_decrypted section is marked as decrypted in the shared pages list.

Also adds kexec support for SEV Live Migration.

Reset the host's shared pages list related to kernel specific page encryption status settings before we load a new kernel by kexec. We cannot reset the complete shared pages list here as we need to retain the UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings.

The host's shared pages list is maintained for the guest to keep track of all unencrypted guest memory regions, therefore we need to explicitly mark all shared pages as encrypted again before rebooting into the new guest kernel.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |   4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c              | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   6 ++
 3 files changed, 116 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +4 -0
index 31c4df123aa0..776e3378a782 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
 
 int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size);
 int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size);
+void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,
+					    bool enc);
 
 void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
 
@@ -84,6 +86,8 @@ static inline int __init
 early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
 static inline int __init
 early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
+static inline void __init
+early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) {}
 
 static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
 
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +106 -0

138 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +6 -0
index e4b94099645b..5294e7057ce1 100644
@@ -409,6 +409,12 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
 	return early_set_memory_enc_dec(vaddr, size, true);
 }
 
+void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,
+					bool enc)
+{
+	notify_addr_enc_status_changed(vaddr, npages, enc);
+}
+
 /*
  * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are
  * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1