mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
PATCH v4 3/5 mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed
From: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Invoke a hypercall when a memory region is changed from encrypted -> decrypted and vice versa. Hypervisor needs to know the page encryption status during the guest migration.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c | 1 + arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 6 +++ 6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h +6 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,12 @@ static inline void paravirt_arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)PVOP_VCALL1 (mmu.exit_mmap, mm); } +static inline void notify_page_enc_status_changed (unsigned long pfn, +int npages,bool enc) +{ +PVOP_VCALL3 (mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed, pfn, npages, enc); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL static inline void load_sp0 (unsigned long sp0) {
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h +1 -0
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ struct pv_mmu_ops {/* Hook for intercepting the destruction of an mm_struct. */ void (*exit_mmap)(struct mm_struct *mm); +void (*notify_page_enc_status_changed)(unsigned long pfn,int npages,bool enc);#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL struct paravirt_callee_save read_cr2;
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +1 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ int set_pages_rw(struct page *page, int numpages);int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page);int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page); +void notify_range_enc_status_changed (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc);extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c +1 -0
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ struct paravirt_patch_template pv_ops = { (void (*)(struct mmu_gather *, void *))tlb_remove_page, .mmu.exit_mmap = paravirt_nop, + .mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed = paravirt_nop, #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL .mmu.read_cr2 = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(native_read_cr2),
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +58 -9
105 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +6 -0
@@ -2020,6 +2020,12 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)*/ cpa_flush (&cpa,0 ); +/* +* Notify hypervisor that a given memory range is mapped encrypted +* or decrypted. +*/ +notify_range_enc_status_changed (addr, numpages, enc); +return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v4 4/5 EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID.
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
Introduce a new AMD Memory Encryption GUID which is currently used for defining a new UEFI environment variable which indicates UEFI/OVMF support for the SEV live migration feature. This variable is setup when UEFI/OVMF detects host/hypervisor support for SEV live migration and later this variable is read by the kernel using EFI runtime services to verify if OVMF supports the live migration feature.
--- include/linux/efi.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
include/linux/efi.h +1 -0
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);/* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55) +#define AMD_SEV_MEM_ENCRYPT_GUID EFI_GUID(0x0cf29b71, 0x9e51, 0x433a, 0xa3, 0xb7, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xab, 0x16, 0xb8, 0x75) typedef struct { efi_guid_t guid;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v4 5/5 x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature.
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
The guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live migration feature uses the following logic :
- kvm_init_plaform() checks if its booted under the EFI
- If not EFI,
i) if kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), issue a wrmsrl() to enable the SEV live migration support
- If EFI,
i) If kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), read the UEFI variable which indicates OVMF support for live migration
ii) the variable indicates live migration is supported, issue a wrmsrl() to
enable the SEV live migration support
The EFI live migration check is done using a late_initcall() callback.
Also, ensure that _bss_decrypted section is marked as decrypted in the shared pages list.
Also adds kexec support for SEV Live Migration.
Reset the host's shared pages list related to kernel specific page encryption status settings before we load a new kernel by kexec. We cannot reset the complete shared pages list here as we need to retain the UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings.
The host's shared pages list is maintained for the guest to keep track of all unencrypted guest memory regions, therefore we need to explicitly mark all shared pages as encrypted again before rebooting into the new guest kernel.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 5 ++ 3 files changed, 116 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +4 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);int __init early_set_memory_decrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size);int __init early_set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size); +void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall (unsigned long vaddr,int npages, +bool enc);void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem (void );
@@ -83,6 +85,8 @@ static inline int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }static inline int __init early_set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size) {return 0 ; } +static inline void __init +early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {}static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem (void ) { }
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +107 -0
139 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +5 -0
@@ -409,6 +409,11 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)return early_set_memory_enc_dec (vaddr, size, true); } +void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) +{ +notify_range_enc_status_changed (vaddr, npages, enc); +} +/* * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature.
Quoted 233 lines · Ashish Kalra
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
The guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live migration feature uses the following logic :
-
kvm_init_plaform()checks if its booted under the EFI- If not EFI,
i) if
kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), issue awrmsrl()to enable the SEV live migration support- If EFI,
i) If
kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), read the UEFI variable which indicates OVMF support for live migrationii) the variable indicates live migration is supported, issue a
wrmsrl()to
enable the SEV live migration supportThe EFI live migration check is done using a
late_initcall()callback.Also, ensure that
_bss_decryptedsection is marked as decrypted in the shared pages list.Also adds kexec support for SEV Live Migration.
Reset the host's shared pages list related to kernel specific page encryption status settings before we load a new kernel by kexec. We cannot reset the complete shared pages list here as we need to retain the UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings.
The host's shared pages list is maintained for the guest to keep track of all unencrypted guest memory regions, therefore we need to explicitly mark all shared pages as encrypted again before rebooting into the new guest kernel.
Signed-off-by Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 5 ++ 3 files changed, 116 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +4
-0@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);int __init early_set_memory_decrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size);int __init early_set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size); +void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall (unsigned long vaddr,int npages, +bool enc);void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem (void );@@ -83,6 +85,8 @@ static inline int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }static inline int __init early_set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size) {return 0 ; } +static inline void __init +early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {}static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem (void ) { }arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +107
-0@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#include <linux/nmi.h> #include <linux/swait.h> #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> +#include <linux/efi.h> #include <asm/timer.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/traps.h> @@ -40,6 +41,7 @@#include <asm/ptrace.h> #include <asm/reboot.h> #include <asm/svm.h> +#include <asm/e820/api.h> DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kvm_async_pf_enabled);@@ -433,6 +435,8 @@ static void kvm_guest_cpu_offline(bool shutdown)kvm_disable_steal_time ();if (kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI ))wrmsrl (MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN ,0 ); +if (kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL )) +wrmsrl (MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL ,0 );kvm_pv_disable_apf ();if (!shutdown)apf_task_wake_all ();@@ -547,6 +551,55 @@ static void kvm_send_ipi_mask_allbutself(const struct cpumask *mask, int vector)__send_ipi_mask (local_mask, vector); } +static int __init setup_efi_kvm_sev_migration (void ) +{ +efi_char16_t efi_sev_live_migration_enabled[] =L"SevLiveMigrationEnabled" ; +efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid =AMD_SEV_MEM_ENCRYPT_GUID ; +efi_status_t status; +unsigned long size; +bool enabled; + +if (!sev_active () || + !kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL )) +return 0 ; + +if (!efi_enabled (EFI_BOOT )) +return 0 ; + +if (!efi_enabled (EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES )) { +pr_info ("%s : EFI runtime services are not enabled\n" , __func__); +return 0 ; + } + + size =sizeof (enabled); + +/* Get variable contents into buffer */ + status = efi.get_variable (efi_sev_live_migration_enabled, + &efi_variable_guid,NULL , &size, &enabled); + +if (status ==EFI_NOT_FOUND ) { +pr_info ("%s : EFI live migration variable not found\n" , __func__); +return 0 ; + } + +if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { +pr_info ("%s : EFI variable retrieval failed\n" , __func__); +return 0 ; + } + +if (enabled ==0 ) { +pr_info ("%s: live migration disabled in EFI\n" , __func__); +return 0 ; + } + +pr_info ("%s : live migration enabled in EFI\n" , __func__); +wrmsrl (MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL ,KVM_MIGRATION_READY ); + +return true; +} + +late_initcall (setup_efi_kvm_sev_migration); +/* * Set the IPI entry points */ @@ -805,8 +858,62 @@ static bool __init kvm_msi_ext_dest_id(void)return kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID ); } +static void kvm_sev_hc_page_enc_status (unsigned long pfn,int npages,bool enc) +{ +kvm_hypercall3 (KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE , pfn <<PAGE_SHIFT , npages, +KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENC_STAT (enc) |KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_4K ); +} +static void __init kvm_init_platform (void ) { +if (sev_active () && +kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL )) { +unsigned long nr_pages; +int i; + + pv_ops.mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed = + kvm_sev_hc_page_enc_status; + +/* +* Reset the host's shared pages list related to kernel +* specific page encryption status settings before we load a +* new kernel by kexec. Reset the page encryption status +* during early boot intead of just before kexec to avoid SMP +* races during kvm_pv_guest_cpu_reboot(). +* NOTE: We cannot reset the complete shared pages list +* here as we need to retain the UEFI/OVMF firmware +* specific settings. +*/ + +for (i =0 ; i < e820_table->nr_entries; i++) { +struct e820_entry *entry = &e820_table->entries[i]; + +if (entry->type !=E820_TYPE_RAM ) +continue ; + + nr_pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (entry->size,PAGE_SIZE ); + +kvm_hypercall3 (KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE , entry->addr, + nr_pages, +KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENCRYPTED |KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_4K ); + } + +/* +* Ensure that _bss_decrypted section is marked as decrypted in the +* shared pages list. +*/ + nr_pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (__end_bss_decrypted - __start_bss_decrypted, +PAGE_SIZE ); +early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall ((unsigned long )__start_bss_decrypted, + nr_pages,0 ); + +/* +* If not booted using EFI, enable Live migration support. +*/ +if (!efi_enabled (EFI_BOOT )) +wrmsrl (MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL , +KVM_MIGRATION_READY ); + }kvmclock_init (); x86_platform.apic_post_init = kvm_apic_init; }arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +5
-1@@ -409,6 +409,11 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)return early_set_memory_enc_dec (vaddr, size, true); } +void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) +{ +notify_range_enc_status_changed (vaddr, npages, enc); +} +/* * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The --
Quoted 2 lines
2.17.1
Most of this looks good to me.
The one thing I find hard to understand is the kexec state machine. Based on my naive reading, this should work fine for "normal" kexecs, since it should disable migration on shutdown (with one call per vCPU), and reenable on reboot (with a single call). That said, I don't really understand how this interacts with the hibernate-old-kernel/preserve-context mode of kexec (which allows jumping back into the original kernel). That may "just work" if reloading memory would also trigger all of the necessary c-bit hypercalls. If there are concerns that this would not "just work", the kernel could choose not to reenable migration on return to the original kernel until someone implements support for this.
Boris, do you have any thoughts on the kexec aspect of this change?
Steve
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature.
Quoted 1 line · Steve Rutherford
Boris, do you have any thoughts on the kexec aspect of this change?
I'm suspecting you're asking here the wrong guy - I think you mean Paolo.
But if I were to give some thoughts on this, I'd first request that this patch be split because it is doing a bunch of things at once.
Then, I have no clue what "kexec support for SEV Live Migration" is. So this whole use case would need a lot more detailed explanation of all the moving parts and the "why" and the "because" and so on...
But I'm no virt guy so perhaps this all makes sense to virt folks.
Oh, and there's silly stuff like
+static int __init setup_efi_kvm_sev_migration(void)
{
...
return true;
}returning a bool but that's minor.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature.
Hello Steve,
Do you have any final thoughts on this ?
I do need to resend the patch as per Boris's review below and i want to do that before the merge window closes.
Thanks,
Ashish
Quoted 30 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Steve Rutherford
Boris, do you have any thoughts on the kexec aspect of this change?
I'm suspecting you're asking here the wrong guy - I think you mean Paolo.
But if I were to give some thoughts on this, I'd first request that this patch be split because it is doing a bunch of things at once.
Then, I have no clue what "kexec support for SEV Live Migration" is. So this whole use case would need a lot more detailed explanation of all the moving parts and the "why" and the "because" and so on...
But I'm no virt guy so perhaps this all makes sense to virt folks.
Oh, and there's silly stuff like
+static int
__initsetup_efi_kvm_sev_migration(void){ ... return true; }returning a bool but that's minor.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpeople.kernel.org%2Ftglx%2Fnotes-about-netiquette&data=04%7C01%7CAshish.Kalra%40amd.com%7Cfca523e6b5b64a467b0408d93827ccc1%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637602565894090530%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=JmqtrGxhzgVczPYWdCKEyRIxDDRcDI2Q%2FI83j2dxhGE%3D&reserved=0
Re: [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature.
Quoted 4 lines · Ashish Kalra
Hello Steve,
Do you have any final thoughts on this ?
Hi Ashish,
Don't block this because of my lack of understanding. I'm still curious about the interactions between SEV and kexec --preserved-state. If you have concerns about --preserved-state breaking live-migration (when returning to the original kernel), you could have kexec's with that flag return an error on Live Migratable SEV kernels.
Thanks,
Steve