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btrfs: fixes for send with relocation and reclaim

PATCH Superseded [email protected] 2 participants 8 messages Jun 17, 2021 – Jun 22, 2021 Btrfs file system

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cover btrfs: fixes for send with relocation and reclaim

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

There's a recent report from Chris Murphy on a crash caused by send triggering reclaim and inode eviction due to page/memory allocation, the second patch fixes that. The first one just prevents relocation from happening while there are send operations in progress, as currently only balance is prevented from running but other operations can trigger relocation too (device shrinking and automatic chunk relocation on zoned filesystems). Details are in the changelogs of the patches.

Filipe Manana (2):
btrfs: ensure relocation never runs while we have send operations
running
btrfs: send: fix crash when memory allocations trigger reclaim

 fs/btrfs/block-group.c | 10 ++++++++--
 fs/btrfs/ctree.h       |  5 +++--
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c     | 19 ++-----------------
 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c      |  8 +-------
 fs/btrfs/relocation.c  | 13 +++++++++++++
 fs/btrfs/send.c        | 12 +++++-------
 fs/btrfs/transaction.c |  3 ---
 fs/btrfs/transaction.h |  2 --
 fs/btrfs/volumes.c     |  8 --------
 9 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 btrfs: ensure relocation never runs while we have send operations running

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

Relocation and send do not play well together because while send is running a block group can be relocated, a transaction committed and the respective disk extents get re-allocated and written to or discarded while send is about to do something with the extents.

This was explained in commit 9e967495e0e0ae ("Btrfs: prevent send failures and crashes due to concurrent relocation"), which prevented balance and send from running in parallel but it did not address one remaining case where chunk relocation can happen: shrinking a device (and device deletion which shrinks a device's size to 0 before deleting the device).

We also have now one more case where relocation is triggered: on zoned filesystems partially used block groups get relocated by a background thread, introduced in commit 18bb8bbf13c183 ("btrfs: zoned: automatically reclaim zones").

So make sure that instead of preventing balance from running when there are ongoing send operations, we prevent relocation from happening. This uses the infrastructure recently added by a patch that has the
subject: "btrfs: add cancellable chunk relocation support".

Also it adds a spinlock used exclusively for the exclusivity between send and relocation, as before fs_info->balance_mutex was used, which would make an attempt to run send to block waiting for balance to finish, which can take a lot of time on large filesystems.

---
 fs/btrfs/block-group.c | 10 ++++++++--
 fs/btrfs/ctree.h       |  5 +++--
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c     |  1 +
 fs/btrfs/relocation.c  | 13 +++++++++++++
 fs/btrfs/send.c        | 10 +++++-----
 fs/btrfs/volumes.c     |  8 --------
 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/block-group.c +8 -2
index 38885b29e6e5..cbcb3ec99e3f 100644
@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@ void btrfs_reclaim_bgs_work(struct work_struct *work)
 		container_of(work, struct btrfs_fs_info, reclaim_bgs_work);
 	struct btrfs_block_group *bg;
 	struct btrfs_space_info *space_info;
-	int ret;
+	LIST_HEAD(again_list);
 
 	if (!test_bit(BTRFS_FS_OPEN, &fs_info->flags))
 		return;
@@ -1502,6 +1502,8 @@ void btrfs_reclaim_bgs_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	mutex_lock(&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock);
 	spin_lock(&fs_info->unused_bgs_lock);
 	while (!list_empty(&fs_info->reclaim_bgs)) {
+		int ret = 0;
+
 		bg = list_first_entry(&fs_info->reclaim_bgs,
 				      struct btrfs_block_group,
 				      bg_list);
@@ -1547,9 +1549,13 @@ void btrfs_reclaim_bgs_work(struct work_struct *work)
 				  bg->start);
 
 next:
-		btrfs_put_block_group(bg);
 		spin_lock(&fs_info->unused_bgs_lock);
+		if (ret == -EAGAIN && list_empty(&bg->bg_list))
+			list_add_tail(&bg->bg_list, &again_list);
+		else
+			btrfs_put_block_group(bg);
 	}
+	list_splice_tail(&again_list, &fs_info->reclaim_bgs);
 	spin_unlock(&fs_info->unused_bgs_lock);
 	mutex_unlock(&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock);
 	btrfs_exclop_finish(fs_info);
fs/btrfs/ctree.h +3 -2
index 6131b58f779f..0f56af5739fb 100644
@@ -561,13 +561,13 @@ enum {
 	/*
 	 * Indicate that balance has been set up from the ioctl and is in the
 	 * main phase. The fs_info::balance_ctl is initialized.
-	 * Set and cleared while holding fs_info::balance_mutex.
 	 */
 	BTRFS_FS_BALANCE_RUNNING,
 
 	/*
 	 * Indicate that relocation of a chunk has started, it's set per chunk
 	 * and is toggled between chunks.
+	 * Set, tested and cleared while holding fs_info::send_reloc_lock.
 	 */
 	BTRFS_FS_RELOC_RUNNING,
 
@@ -995,9 +995,10 @@ struct btrfs_fs_info {
 
 	struct crypto_shash *csum_shash;
 
+	spinlock_t send_reloc_lock;
 	/*
 	 * Number of send operations in progress.
-	 * Updated while holding fs_info::balance_mutex.
+	 * Updated while holding fs_info::send_reloc_lock.
 	 */
 	int send_in_progress;
 
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +1 -0
index 544bb7a82e57..3ded062d303c 100644
@@ -2999,6 +2999,7 @@ void btrfs_init_fs_info(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
 	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->swapfile_pins_lock);
 	fs_info->swapfile_pins = RB_ROOT;
 
+	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 	fs_info->send_in_progress = 0;
 
 	fs_info->bg_reclaim_threshold = BTRFS_DEFAULT_RECLAIM_THRESH;
fs/btrfs/relocation.c +13 -0
index 420a89869889..fc831597cb22 100644
@@ -3789,14 +3789,25 @@ struct inode *create_reloc_inode(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
  *   0             success
  *   -EINPROGRESS  operation is already in progress, that's probably a bug
  *   -ECANCELED    cancellation request was set before the operation started
+ *   -EAGAIN       can not start because there are ongoing send operations
  */
 static int reloc_chunk_start(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
 {
+	spin_lock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
+	if (fs_info->send_in_progress) {
+		btrfs_warn_rl(fs_info,
+"cannot run relocation while send operations are in progress (%d in progress)",
+			      fs_info->send_in_progress);
+		spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	}
 	if (test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_FS_RELOC_RUNNING, &fs_info->flags)) {
 		/* This should not happen */
+		spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 		btrfs_err(fs_info, "reloc already running, cannot start");
 		return -EINPROGRESS;
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 
 	if (atomic_read(&fs_info->reloc_cancel_req) > 0) {
 		btrfs_info(fs_info, "chunk relocation canceled on start");
@@ -3818,7 +3829,9 @@ static void reloc_chunk_end(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
 	/* Requested after start, clear bit first so any waiters can continue */
 	if (atomic_read(&fs_info->reloc_cancel_req) > 0)
 		btrfs_info(fs_info, "chunk relocation canceled during operation");
+	spin_lock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 	clear_and_wake_up_bit(BTRFS_FS_RELOC_RUNNING, &fs_info->flags);
+	spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 	atomic_set(&fs_info->reloc_cancel_req, 0);
 }
 
fs/btrfs/send.c +5 -5
index 6e69302828ef..f1bec8cbf254 100644
@@ -7416,16 +7416,16 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, struct btrfs_ioctl_send_args *arg)
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
-	mutex_lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
-	if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_BALANCE_RUNNING, &fs_info->flags)) {
-		mutex_unlock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
+	spin_lock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
+	if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_RELOC_RUNNING, &fs_info->flags)) {
+		spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 		btrfs_warn_rl(fs_info,
-		"cannot run send because a balance operation is in progress");
+		"cannot run send because a relocation operation is in progress");
 		ret = -EAGAIN;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	fs_info->send_in_progress++;
-	mutex_unlock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
+	spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 
 	current->journal_info = BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB;
 	ret = send_subvol(sctx);
fs/btrfs/volumes.c +0 -8
index 582695cee9d1..782e16795bc4 100644
@@ -4217,14 +4217,6 @@ int btrfs_balance(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 				btrfs_bg_type_to_raid_name(data_target));
 	}
 
-	if (fs_info->send_in_progress) {
-		btrfs_warn_rl(fs_info,
-"cannot run balance while send operations are in progress (%d in progress)",
-			      fs_info->send_in_progress);
-		ret = -EAGAIN;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	ret = insert_balance_item(fs_info, bctl);
 	if (ret && ret != -EEXIST)
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 btrfs: send: fix crash when memory allocations trigger reclaim

In reply to [email protected]

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

When doing a send we don't expect the task to ever start a transaction after the initial check that verifies if commit roots match the regular roots. This is because after that we set current->journal_info with a stub (special value) that signals we are in send context, so that we take a read lock on an extent buffer when reading it from disk and verifying it is valid (its generation matches the generation stored in the parent). This stub was introduced in 2014 by commit a26e8c9f75b0bf ("Btrfs: don't clear uptodate if the eb is under IO") in order to fix a concurrency issue between send and balance.

However there is one particular exception where we end up needing to start a transaction and when this happens it results in a crash with a stack trace like the following:

[60015.902283] kernel: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 58159 at arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h:44 kfence_protect_page+0x21/0x80
[60015.902292] kernel: Modules linked in: uinput rfcomm snd_seq_dummy (...)
[60015.902384] kernel: CPU: 3 PID: 58159 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.12.9-300.fc34.x86_64 #1
[60015.902387] kernel: Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./F2A88XN-WIFI, BIOS F6 12/24/2015
[60015.902389] kernel: RIP: 0010:kfence_protect_page+0x21/0x80
[60015.902393] kernel: Code: ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 fd (...)
[60015.902396] kernel: RSP: 0018:ffff9fb583453220 EFLAGS: 00010246
[60015.902399] kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9fb583453224
[60015.902401] kernel: RDX: ffff9fb583453224 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[60015.902402] kernel: RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[60015.902404] kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000002
[60015.902406] kernel: R13: ffff9fb583453348 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
[60015.902408] kernel: FS:  00007f158e62d8c0(0000) GS:ffff93bd37580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[60015.902410] kernel: CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[60015.902412] kernel: CR2: 0000000000000039 CR3: 00000001256d2000 CR4: 00000000000506e0
[60015.902414] kernel: Call Trace:
[60015.902419] kernel:  kfence_unprotect+0x13/0x30
[60015.902423] kernel:  page_fault_oops+0x89/0x270
[60015.902427] kernel:  ? search_module_extables+0xf/0x40
[60015.902431] kernel:  ? search_bpf_extables+0x57/0x70
[60015.902435] kernel:  kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0xd6/0xf0
[60015.902437] kernel:  __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x142/0x180
[60015.902440] kernel:  exc_page_fault+0x67/0x150
[60015.902445] kernel:  asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[60015.902450] kernel: RIP: 0010:start_transaction+0x71/0x580
[60015.902454] kernel: Code: d3 0f 84 92 00 00 00 80 e7 06 0f 85 63 (...)
[60015.902456] kernel: RSP: 0018:ffff9fb5834533f8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[60015.902458] kernel: RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[60015.902460] kernel: RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000039
[60015.902462] kernel: RBP: ffff93bc0a7eb800 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[60015.902463] kernel: R10: 0000000000098a00 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
[60015.902464] kernel: R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff93bc0c92b000 R15: ffff93bc0c92b000
[60015.902468] kernel:  btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5d/0x120
[60015.902473] kernel:  btrfs_evict_inode+0x2c5/0x3f0
[60015.902476] kernel:  evict+0xd1/0x180
[60015.902480] kernel:  inode_lru_isolate+0xe7/0x180
[60015.902483] kernel:  __list_lru_walk_one+0x77/0x150
[60015.902487] kernel:  ? iput+0x1a0/0x1a0
[60015.902489] kernel:  ? iput+0x1a0/0x1a0
[60015.902491] kernel:  list_lru_walk_one+0x47/0x70
[60015.902495] kernel:  prune_icache_sb+0x39/0x50
[60015.902497] kernel:  super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1f0
[60015.902501] kernel:  do_shrink_slab+0x142/0x240
[60015.902505] kernel:  shrink_slab+0x164/0x280
[60015.902509] kernel:  shrink_node+0x2c8/0x6e0
[60015.902512] kernel:  do_try_to_free_pages+0xcb/0x4b0
[60015.902514] kernel:  try_to_free_pages+0xda/0x190
[60015.902516] kernel:  __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x373/0xcc0
[60015.902521] kernel:  ? __memcg_kmem_charge_page+0xc2/0x1e0
[60015.902525] kernel:  __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x30a/0x340
[60015.902528] kernel:  pipe_write+0x30b/0x5c0
[60015.902531] kernel:  ? set_next_entity+0xad/0x1e0
[60015.902534] kernel:  ? switch_mm_irqs_off+0x58/0x440
[60015.902538] kernel:  __kernel_write+0x13a/0x2b0
[60015.902541] kernel:  kernel_write+0x73/0x150
[60015.902543] kernel:  send_cmd+0x7b/0xd0
[60015.902545] kernel:  send_extent_data+0x5a3/0x6b0
[60015.902549] kernel:  process_extent+0x19b/0xed0
[60015.902551] kernel:  btrfs_ioctl_send+0x1434/0x17e0
[60015.902554] kernel:  ? _btrfs_ioctl_send+0xe1/0x100
[60015.902557] kernel:  _btrfs_ioctl_send+0xbf/0x100
[60015.902559] kernel:  ? enqueue_entity+0x18c/0x7b0
[60015.902562] kernel:  btrfs_ioctl+0x185f/0x2f80
[60015.902564] kernel:  ? psi_task_change+0x84/0xc0
[60015.902569] kernel:  ? _flat_send_IPI_mask+0x21/0x40
[60015.902572] kernel:  ? check_preempt_curr+0x2f/0x70
[60015.902576] kernel:  ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x137/0x1e0
[60015.902579] kernel:  ? expand_files+0x1cb/0x1d0
[60015.902582] kernel:  ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
[60015.902585] kernel:  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
[60015.902588] kernel:  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[60015.902591] kernel:  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[60015.902595] kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7f158e38f0ab
[60015.902599] kernel: Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b (...)
[60015.902602] kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffcb2519bf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[60015.902605] kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcb251ae00 RCX: 00007f158e38f0ab
[60015.902607] kernel: RDX: 00007ffcb2519cf0 RSI: 0000000040489426 RDI: 0000000000000004
[60015.902608] kernel: RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007f158e297640 R09: 00007f158e297640
[60015.902610] kernel: R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[60015.902612] kernel: R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007ffcb251aee0 R15: 0000558c1a83e2a0
[60015.902615] kernel: ---[ end trace 7bbc33e23bb887ae ]---

This happens because when writing to the pipe, by calling kernel_write(), we end up doing page allocations using GFP_HIGHUSER | __GFP_ACCOUNT as the gfp flags, which allow reclaim to happen if there is memory pressure. This allocation happens at fs/pipe.c:pipe_write().

If the reclaim is triggered, inode eviction can be triggered and that in turn can result in starting a transaction if the inode has a link count of 0. The transaction start happens early on during eviction, when we call btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode() at btrfs_evict_inode(). This happens if there is currently an open file descriptor for an inode with a link count of 0 and the reclaim task gets a reference on the inode before that descriptor is closed, in which case the reclaim task ends up doing the final iput that triggers the inode eviction.

When we have assertions enabled (CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT=y), this triggers the following assertion at transaction.c:start_transaction():

    /* Send isn't supposed to start transactions. */
    ASSERT(current->journal_info != BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB);

And when assertions are not enabled, it triggers a crash since after that assertion we cast current->journal_info into a transaction handle pointer and then dereference it:

   if (current->journal_info) {
       WARN_ON(type & TRANS_EXTWRITERS);
       h = current->journal_info;
       refcount_inc(&h->use_count);
       (...)

Which obviously results in a crash due to an invalid memory access.

The same type of issue can happen during other memory allocations we do directly in the send code with kmalloc (and friends) as they use GFP_KERNEL and therefore may trigger reclaim too, which started to happen since 2016 after commit e780b0d1c1523e ("btrfs: send: use GFP_KERNEL everywhere").

The issue could be solved by setting up a NOFS context for the entire send operation so that reclaim could not be triggered when allocating memory or pages through kernel_write(). However that is not very friendly and we can in fact get rid of the send stub because:

1) The stub was introduced way back in 2014 by commit a26e8c9f75b0bf ("Btrfs: don't clear uptodate if the eb is under IO") to solve an issue exclusive to when send and balance are running in paralllel, however there were other problems between balance and send and we do not allow anymore to have balance and send run concurrently since commit 9e967495e0e0ae ("Btrfs: prevent send failures and crashes due to concurrent relocation"). More generically the issues are between send and relocation, and that last commit eliminated only the possibility of having send and balance run concurrently, but shrinking a device also can trigger relocation, and on zoned filesystems we have relocation of partially used block groups triggered automatically as well. The previous patch that has a subject of:

"btrfs: ensure relocation never runs while we have send operations running"

Addresses all the remaining cases that can trigger relocation.

2) We can actually allow starting and even committing transactions while in a send context if needed because send is not holding any locks that would block the start or the commit of a transaction.

So get rid of all the logic added by commit a26e8c9f75b0bf ("Btrfs: don't clear uptodate if the eb is under IO"). We can now always call clear_extent_buffer_uptodate() at verify_parent_transid() since send is the only case that uses commit roots without having a transaction open or without holding the commit_root_sem.

---
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c     | 18 +-----------------
 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c      |  8 +-------
 fs/btrfs/send.c        |  2 --
 fs/btrfs/transaction.c |  3 ---
 fs/btrfs/transaction.h |  2 --
 5 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +1 -17
index 3ded062d303c..d1e3424aea16 100644
@@ -241,7 +241,6 @@ static int verify_parent_transid(struct extent_io_tree *io_tree,
 {
 	struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL;
 	int ret;
-	bool need_lock = (current->journal_info == BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB);
 
 	if (!parent_transid || btrfs_header_generation(eb) == parent_transid)
 		return 0;
@@ -249,9 +248,6 @@ static int verify_parent_transid(struct extent_io_tree *io_tree,
 	if (atomic)
 		return -EAGAIN;
 
-	if (need_lock)
-		btrfs_tree_read_lock(eb);
-
 	lock_extent_bits(io_tree, eb->start, eb->start + eb->len - 1,
 			 &cached_state);
 	if (extent_buffer_uptodate(eb) &&
@@ -264,22 +260,10 @@ static int verify_parent_transid(struct extent_io_tree *io_tree,
 			eb->start,
 			parent_transid, btrfs_header_generation(eb));
 	ret = 1;
-
-	/*
-	 * Things reading via commit roots that don't have normal protection,
-	 * like send, can have a really old block in cache that may point at a
-	 * block that has been freed and re-allocated.  So don't clear uptodate
-	 * if we find an eb that is under IO (dirty/writeback) because we could
-	 * end up reading in the stale data and then writing it back out and
-	 * making everybody very sad.
-	 */
-	if (!extent_buffer_under_io(eb))
-		clear_extent_buffer_uptodate(eb);
+	clear_extent_buffer_uptodate(eb);
 out:
 	unlock_extent_cached(io_tree, eb->start, eb->start + eb->len - 1,
 			     &cached_state);
-	if (need_lock)
-		btrfs_tree_read_unlock(eb);
 	return ret;
 }
 
fs/btrfs/qgroup.c +1 -7
index d72885903b8c..07ec06d4e972 100644
@@ -3545,13 +3545,7 @@ static int try_flush_qgroup(struct btrfs_root *root)
 	struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
 	int ret;
 
-	/*
-	 * Can't hold an open transaction or we run the risk of deadlocking,
-	 * and can't either be under the context of a send operation (where
-	 * current->journal_info is set to BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB), as that
-	 * would result in a crash when starting a transaction and does not
-	 * make sense either (send is a read-only operation).
-	 */
+	/* Can't hold an open transaction or we run the risk of deadlocking. */
 	ASSERT(current->journal_info == NULL);
 	if (WARN_ON(current->journal_info))
 		return 0;
fs/btrfs/send.c +0 -2
index f1bec8cbf254..e212fceac925 100644
@@ -7427,9 +7427,7 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, struct btrfs_ioctl_send_args *arg)
 	fs_info->send_in_progress++;
 	spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 
-	current->journal_info = BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB;
 	ret = send_subvol(sctx);
-	current->journal_info = NULL;
 	mutex_lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
 	fs_info->send_in_progress--;
 	mutex_unlock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
fs/btrfs/transaction.c +0 -3
index 73df8b81496e..143f7a5dec30 100644
@@ -583,9 +583,6 @@ start_transaction(struct btrfs_root *root, unsigned int num_items,
 	bool do_chunk_alloc = false;
 	int ret;
 
-	/* Send isn't supposed to start transactions. */
-	ASSERT(current->journal_info != BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB);
-
 	if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR, &fs_info->fs_state))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EROFS);
 
fs/btrfs/transaction.h +0 -2
index 0702e8d9b30e..07d76029f598 100644
@@ -122,8 +122,6 @@ struct btrfs_transaction {
 
 #define TRANS_EXTWRITERS	(__TRANS_START | __TRANS_ATTACH)
 
-#define BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB	((void *)1)
-
 struct btrfs_trans_handle {
 	u64 transid;
 	u64 bytes_reserved;
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
#3 lore raw

v2 cover btrfs: fixes for send with relocation and reclaim

In reply to [email protected]

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

There's a recent report from Chris Murphy on a crash caused by send triggering reclaim and inode eviction due to page/memory allocation, the second patch fixes that. The first one just prevents relocation from happening while there are send operations in progress, as currently only balance is prevented from running but other operations can trigger relocation too (device shrinking and automatic chunk relocation on zoned filesystems). Details are in the changelogs of the patches.

V2: Add missing hunk to patch 1 where fs_info->send_in_progress is

    decremented while holding fs_info->send_reloc_lock and no longer
    while holding fs_info->balance_mutex. No changes to patch 2
    except for the rebase.

Filipe Manana (2):
btrfs: ensure relocation never runs while we have send operations
running
btrfs: send: fix crash when memory allocations trigger reclaim

 fs/btrfs/block-group.c | 10 ++++++++--
 fs/btrfs/ctree.h       |  5 +++--
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c     | 19 ++-----------------
 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c      |  8 +-------
 fs/btrfs/relocation.c  | 13 +++++++++++++
 fs/btrfs/send.c        | 16 +++++++---------
 fs/btrfs/transaction.c |  3 ---
 fs/btrfs/transaction.h |  2 --
 fs/btrfs/volumes.c     |  8 --------
 9 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 btrfs: ensure relocation never runs while we have send operations running

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

Relocation and send do not play well together because while send is running a block group can be relocated, a transaction committed and the respective disk extents get re-allocated and written to or discarded while send is about to do something with the extents.

This was explained in commit 9e967495e0e0ae ("Btrfs: prevent send failures and crashes due to concurrent relocation"), which prevented balance and send from running in parallel but it did not address one remaining case where chunk relocation can happen: shrinking a device (and device deletion which shrinks a device's size to 0 before deleting the device).

We also have now one more case where relocation is triggered: on zoned filesystems partially used block groups get relocated by a background thread, introduced in commit 18bb8bbf13c183 ("btrfs: zoned: automatically reclaim zones").

So make sure that instead of preventing balance from running when there are ongoing send operations, we prevent relocation from happening. This uses the infrastructure recently added by a patch that has the
subject: "btrfs: add cancellable chunk relocation support".

Also it adds a spinlock used exclusively for the exclusivity between send and relocation, as before fs_info->balance_mutex was used, which would make an attempt to run send to block waiting for balance to finish, which can take a lot of time on large filesystems.

---
 fs/btrfs/block-group.c | 10 ++++++++--
 fs/btrfs/ctree.h       |  5 +++--
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c     |  1 +
 fs/btrfs/relocation.c  | 13 +++++++++++++
 fs/btrfs/send.c        | 14 +++++++-------
 fs/btrfs/volumes.c     |  8 --------
 6 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/block-group.c +8 -2
index 38885b29e6e5..cbcb3ec99e3f 100644
@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@ void btrfs_reclaim_bgs_work(struct work_struct *work)
 		container_of(work, struct btrfs_fs_info, reclaim_bgs_work);
 	struct btrfs_block_group *bg;
 	struct btrfs_space_info *space_info;
-	int ret;
+	LIST_HEAD(again_list);
 
 	if (!test_bit(BTRFS_FS_OPEN, &fs_info->flags))
 		return;
@@ -1502,6 +1502,8 @@ void btrfs_reclaim_bgs_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	mutex_lock(&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock);
 	spin_lock(&fs_info->unused_bgs_lock);
 	while (!list_empty(&fs_info->reclaim_bgs)) {
+		int ret = 0;
+
 		bg = list_first_entry(&fs_info->reclaim_bgs,
 				      struct btrfs_block_group,
 				      bg_list);
@@ -1547,9 +1549,13 @@ void btrfs_reclaim_bgs_work(struct work_struct *work)
 				  bg->start);
 
 next:
-		btrfs_put_block_group(bg);
 		spin_lock(&fs_info->unused_bgs_lock);
+		if (ret == -EAGAIN && list_empty(&bg->bg_list))
+			list_add_tail(&bg->bg_list, &again_list);
+		else
+			btrfs_put_block_group(bg);
 	}
+	list_splice_tail(&again_list, &fs_info->reclaim_bgs);
 	spin_unlock(&fs_info->unused_bgs_lock);
 	mutex_unlock(&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock);
 	btrfs_exclop_finish(fs_info);
fs/btrfs/ctree.h +3 -2
index 6131b58f779f..0f56af5739fb 100644
@@ -561,13 +561,13 @@ enum {
 	/*
 	 * Indicate that balance has been set up from the ioctl and is in the
 	 * main phase. The fs_info::balance_ctl is initialized.
-	 * Set and cleared while holding fs_info::balance_mutex.
 	 */
 	BTRFS_FS_BALANCE_RUNNING,
 
 	/*
 	 * Indicate that relocation of a chunk has started, it's set per chunk
 	 * and is toggled between chunks.
+	 * Set, tested and cleared while holding fs_info::send_reloc_lock.
 	 */
 	BTRFS_FS_RELOC_RUNNING,
 
@@ -995,9 +995,10 @@ struct btrfs_fs_info {
 
 	struct crypto_shash *csum_shash;
 
+	spinlock_t send_reloc_lock;
 	/*
 	 * Number of send operations in progress.
-	 * Updated while holding fs_info::balance_mutex.
+	 * Updated while holding fs_info::send_reloc_lock.
 	 */
 	int send_in_progress;
 
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +1 -0
index 544bb7a82e57..3ded062d303c 100644
@@ -2999,6 +2999,7 @@ void btrfs_init_fs_info(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
 	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->swapfile_pins_lock);
 	fs_info->swapfile_pins = RB_ROOT;
 
+	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 	fs_info->send_in_progress = 0;
 
 	fs_info->bg_reclaim_threshold = BTRFS_DEFAULT_RECLAIM_THRESH;
fs/btrfs/relocation.c +13 -0
index 420a89869889..fc831597cb22 100644
@@ -3789,14 +3789,25 @@ struct inode *create_reloc_inode(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
  *   0             success
  *   -EINPROGRESS  operation is already in progress, that's probably a bug
  *   -ECANCELED    cancellation request was set before the operation started
+ *   -EAGAIN       can not start because there are ongoing send operations
  */
 static int reloc_chunk_start(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
 {
+	spin_lock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
+	if (fs_info->send_in_progress) {
+		btrfs_warn_rl(fs_info,
+"cannot run relocation while send operations are in progress (%d in progress)",
+			      fs_info->send_in_progress);
+		spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	}
 	if (test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_FS_RELOC_RUNNING, &fs_info->flags)) {
 		/* This should not happen */
+		spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 		btrfs_err(fs_info, "reloc already running, cannot start");
 		return -EINPROGRESS;
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 
 	if (atomic_read(&fs_info->reloc_cancel_req) > 0) {
 		btrfs_info(fs_info, "chunk relocation canceled on start");
@@ -3818,7 +3829,9 @@ static void reloc_chunk_end(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
 	/* Requested after start, clear bit first so any waiters can continue */
 	if (atomic_read(&fs_info->reloc_cancel_req) > 0)
 		btrfs_info(fs_info, "chunk relocation canceled during operation");
+	spin_lock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 	clear_and_wake_up_bit(BTRFS_FS_RELOC_RUNNING, &fs_info->flags);
+	spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 	atomic_set(&fs_info->reloc_cancel_req, 0);
 }
 
fs/btrfs/send.c +7 -7
index 6e69302828ef..37e502b09a80 100644
@@ -7416,23 +7416,23 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, struct btrfs_ioctl_send_args *arg)
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
-	mutex_lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
-	if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_BALANCE_RUNNING, &fs_info->flags)) {
-		mutex_unlock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
+	spin_lock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
+	if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_RELOC_RUNNING, &fs_info->flags)) {
+		spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 		btrfs_warn_rl(fs_info,
-		"cannot run send because a balance operation is in progress");
+		"cannot run send because a relocation operation is in progress");
 		ret = -EAGAIN;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	fs_info->send_in_progress++;
-	mutex_unlock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
+	spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 
 	current->journal_info = BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB;
 	ret = send_subvol(sctx);
 	current->journal_info = NULL;
-	mutex_lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
+	spin_lock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 	fs_info->send_in_progress--;
-	mutex_unlock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
+	spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
fs/btrfs/volumes.c +0 -8
index 582695cee9d1..782e16795bc4 100644
@@ -4217,14 +4217,6 @@ int btrfs_balance(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 				btrfs_bg_type_to_raid_name(data_target));
 	}
 
-	if (fs_info->send_in_progress) {
-		btrfs_warn_rl(fs_info,
-"cannot run balance while send operations are in progress (%d in progress)",
-			      fs_info->send_in_progress);
-		ret = -EAGAIN;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	ret = insert_balance_item(fs_info, bctl);
 	if (ret && ret != -EEXIST)
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
#6 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 btrfs: send: fix crash when memory allocations trigger reclaim

In reply to [email protected]

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

When doing a send we don't expect the task to ever start a transaction after the initial check that verifies if commit roots match the regular roots. This is because after that we set current->journal_info with a stub (special value) that signals we are in send context, so that we take a read lock on an extent buffer when reading it from disk and verifying it is valid (its generation matches the generation stored in the parent). This stub was introduced in 2014 by commit a26e8c9f75b0bf ("Btrfs: don't clear uptodate if the eb is under IO") in order to fix a concurrency issue between send and balance.

However there is one particular exception where we end up needing to start a transaction and when this happens it results in a crash with a stack trace like the following:

[60015.902283] kernel: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 58159 at arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h:44 kfence_protect_page+0x21/0x80
[60015.902292] kernel: Modules linked in: uinput rfcomm snd_seq_dummy (...)
[60015.902384] kernel: CPU: 3 PID: 58159 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.12.9-300.fc34.x86_64 #1
[60015.902387] kernel: Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./F2A88XN-WIFI, BIOS F6 12/24/2015
[60015.902389] kernel: RIP: 0010:kfence_protect_page+0x21/0x80
[60015.902393] kernel: Code: ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 fd (...)
[60015.902396] kernel: RSP: 0018:ffff9fb583453220 EFLAGS: 00010246
[60015.902399] kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9fb583453224
[60015.902401] kernel: RDX: ffff9fb583453224 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[60015.902402] kernel: RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[60015.902404] kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000002
[60015.902406] kernel: R13: ffff9fb583453348 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
[60015.902408] kernel: FS:  00007f158e62d8c0(0000) GS:ffff93bd37580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[60015.902410] kernel: CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[60015.902412] kernel: CR2: 0000000000000039 CR3: 00000001256d2000 CR4: 00000000000506e0
[60015.902414] kernel: Call Trace:
[60015.902419] kernel:  kfence_unprotect+0x13/0x30
[60015.902423] kernel:  page_fault_oops+0x89/0x270
[60015.902427] kernel:  ? search_module_extables+0xf/0x40
[60015.902431] kernel:  ? search_bpf_extables+0x57/0x70
[60015.902435] kernel:  kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0xd6/0xf0
[60015.902437] kernel:  __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x142/0x180
[60015.902440] kernel:  exc_page_fault+0x67/0x150
[60015.902445] kernel:  asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[60015.902450] kernel: RIP: 0010:start_transaction+0x71/0x580
[60015.902454] kernel: Code: d3 0f 84 92 00 00 00 80 e7 06 0f 85 63 (...)
[60015.902456] kernel: RSP: 0018:ffff9fb5834533f8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[60015.902458] kernel: RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[60015.902460] kernel: RDX: 0000000000000801 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000039
[60015.902462] kernel: RBP: ffff93bc0a7eb800 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[60015.902463] kernel: R10: 0000000000098a00 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
[60015.902464] kernel: R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff93bc0c92b000 R15: ffff93bc0c92b000
[60015.902468] kernel:  btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5d/0x120
[60015.902473] kernel:  btrfs_evict_inode+0x2c5/0x3f0
[60015.902476] kernel:  evict+0xd1/0x180
[60015.902480] kernel:  inode_lru_isolate+0xe7/0x180
[60015.902483] kernel:  __list_lru_walk_one+0x77/0x150
[60015.902487] kernel:  ? iput+0x1a0/0x1a0
[60015.902489] kernel:  ? iput+0x1a0/0x1a0
[60015.902491] kernel:  list_lru_walk_one+0x47/0x70
[60015.902495] kernel:  prune_icache_sb+0x39/0x50
[60015.902497] kernel:  super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1f0
[60015.902501] kernel:  do_shrink_slab+0x142/0x240
[60015.902505] kernel:  shrink_slab+0x164/0x280
[60015.902509] kernel:  shrink_node+0x2c8/0x6e0
[60015.902512] kernel:  do_try_to_free_pages+0xcb/0x4b0
[60015.902514] kernel:  try_to_free_pages+0xda/0x190
[60015.902516] kernel:  __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x373/0xcc0
[60015.902521] kernel:  ? __memcg_kmem_charge_page+0xc2/0x1e0
[60015.902525] kernel:  __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x30a/0x340
[60015.902528] kernel:  pipe_write+0x30b/0x5c0
[60015.902531] kernel:  ? set_next_entity+0xad/0x1e0
[60015.902534] kernel:  ? switch_mm_irqs_off+0x58/0x440
[60015.902538] kernel:  __kernel_write+0x13a/0x2b0
[60015.902541] kernel:  kernel_write+0x73/0x150
[60015.902543] kernel:  send_cmd+0x7b/0xd0
[60015.902545] kernel:  send_extent_data+0x5a3/0x6b0
[60015.902549] kernel:  process_extent+0x19b/0xed0
[60015.902551] kernel:  btrfs_ioctl_send+0x1434/0x17e0
[60015.902554] kernel:  ? _btrfs_ioctl_send+0xe1/0x100
[60015.902557] kernel:  _btrfs_ioctl_send+0xbf/0x100
[60015.902559] kernel:  ? enqueue_entity+0x18c/0x7b0
[60015.902562] kernel:  btrfs_ioctl+0x185f/0x2f80
[60015.902564] kernel:  ? psi_task_change+0x84/0xc0
[60015.902569] kernel:  ? _flat_send_IPI_mask+0x21/0x40
[60015.902572] kernel:  ? check_preempt_curr+0x2f/0x70
[60015.902576] kernel:  ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x137/0x1e0
[60015.902579] kernel:  ? expand_files+0x1cb/0x1d0
[60015.902582] kernel:  ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
[60015.902585] kernel:  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
[60015.902588] kernel:  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[60015.902591] kernel:  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[60015.902595] kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7f158e38f0ab
[60015.902599] kernel: Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b (...)
[60015.902602] kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffcb2519bf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[60015.902605] kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcb251ae00 RCX: 00007f158e38f0ab
[60015.902607] kernel: RDX: 00007ffcb2519cf0 RSI: 0000000040489426 RDI: 0000000000000004
[60015.902608] kernel: RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007f158e297640 R09: 00007f158e297640
[60015.902610] kernel: R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[60015.902612] kernel: R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007ffcb251aee0 R15: 0000558c1a83e2a0
[60015.902615] kernel: ---[ end trace 7bbc33e23bb887ae ]---

This happens because when writing to the pipe, by calling kernel_write(), we end up doing page allocations using GFP_HIGHUSER | __GFP_ACCOUNT as the gfp flags, which allow reclaim to happen if there is memory pressure. This allocation happens at fs/pipe.c:pipe_write().

If the reclaim is triggered, inode eviction can be triggered and that in turn can result in starting a transaction if the inode has a link count of 0. The transaction start happens early on during eviction, when we call btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode() at btrfs_evict_inode(). This happens if there is currently an open file descriptor for an inode with a link count of 0 and the reclaim task gets a reference on the inode before that descriptor is closed, in which case the reclaim task ends up doing the final iput that triggers the inode eviction.

When we have assertions enabled (CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT=y), this triggers the following assertion at transaction.c:start_transaction():

    /* Send isn't supposed to start transactions. */
    ASSERT(current->journal_info != BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB);

And when assertions are not enabled, it triggers a crash since after that assertion we cast current->journal_info into a transaction handle pointer and then dereference it:

   if (current->journal_info) {
       WARN_ON(type & TRANS_EXTWRITERS);
       h = current->journal_info;
       refcount_inc(&h->use_count);
       (...)

Which obviously results in a crash due to an invalid memory access.

The same type of issue can happen during other memory allocations we do directly in the send code with kmalloc (and friends) as they use GFP_KERNEL and therefore may trigger reclaim too, which started to happen since 2016 after commit e780b0d1c1523e ("btrfs: send: use GFP_KERNEL everywhere").

The issue could be solved by setting up a NOFS context for the entire send operation so that reclaim could not be triggered when allocating memory or pages through kernel_write(). However that is not very friendly and we can in fact get rid of the send stub because:

1) The stub was introduced way back in 2014 by commit a26e8c9f75b0bf ("Btrfs: don't clear uptodate if the eb is under IO") to solve an issue exclusive to when send and balance are running in paralllel, however there were other problems between balance and send and we do not allow anymore to have balance and send run concurrently since commit 9e967495e0e0ae ("Btrfs: prevent send failures and crashes due to concurrent relocation"). More generically the issues are between send and relocation, and that last commit eliminated only the possibility of having send and balance run concurrently, but shrinking a device also can trigger relocation, and on zoned filesystems we have relocation of partially used block groups triggered automatically as well. The previous patch that has a subject of:

"btrfs: ensure relocation never runs while we have send operations running"

Addresses all the remaining cases that can trigger relocation.

2) We can actually allow starting and even committing transactions while in a send context if needed because send is not holding any locks that would block the start or the commit of a transaction.

So get rid of all the logic added by commit a26e8c9f75b0bf ("Btrfs: don't clear uptodate if the eb is under IO"). We can now always call clear_extent_buffer_uptodate() at verify_parent_transid() since send is the only case that uses commit roots without having a transaction open or without holding the commit_root_sem.

---
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c     | 18 +-----------------
 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c      |  8 +-------
 fs/btrfs/send.c        |  2 --
 fs/btrfs/transaction.c |  3 ---
 fs/btrfs/transaction.h |  2 --
 5 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +1 -17
index 3ded062d303c..d1e3424aea16 100644
@@ -241,7 +241,6 @@ static int verify_parent_transid(struct extent_io_tree *io_tree,
 {
 	struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL;
 	int ret;
-	bool need_lock = (current->journal_info == BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB);
 
 	if (!parent_transid || btrfs_header_generation(eb) == parent_transid)
 		return 0;
@@ -249,9 +248,6 @@ static int verify_parent_transid(struct extent_io_tree *io_tree,
 	if (atomic)
 		return -EAGAIN;
 
-	if (need_lock)
-		btrfs_tree_read_lock(eb);
-
 	lock_extent_bits(io_tree, eb->start, eb->start + eb->len - 1,
 			 &cached_state);
 	if (extent_buffer_uptodate(eb) &&
@@ -264,22 +260,10 @@ static int verify_parent_transid(struct extent_io_tree *io_tree,
 			eb->start,
 			parent_transid, btrfs_header_generation(eb));
 	ret = 1;
-
-	/*
-	 * Things reading via commit roots that don't have normal protection,
-	 * like send, can have a really old block in cache that may point at a
-	 * block that has been freed and re-allocated.  So don't clear uptodate
-	 * if we find an eb that is under IO (dirty/writeback) because we could
-	 * end up reading in the stale data and then writing it back out and
-	 * making everybody very sad.
-	 */
-	if (!extent_buffer_under_io(eb))
-		clear_extent_buffer_uptodate(eb);
+	clear_extent_buffer_uptodate(eb);
 out:
 	unlock_extent_cached(io_tree, eb->start, eb->start + eb->len - 1,
 			     &cached_state);
-	if (need_lock)
-		btrfs_tree_read_unlock(eb);
 	return ret;
 }
 
fs/btrfs/qgroup.c +1 -7
index d72885903b8c..07ec06d4e972 100644
@@ -3545,13 +3545,7 @@ static int try_flush_qgroup(struct btrfs_root *root)
 	struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
 	int ret;
 
-	/*
-	 * Can't hold an open transaction or we run the risk of deadlocking,
-	 * and can't either be under the context of a send operation (where
-	 * current->journal_info is set to BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB), as that
-	 * would result in a crash when starting a transaction and does not
-	 * make sense either (send is a read-only operation).
-	 */
+	/* Can't hold an open transaction or we run the risk of deadlocking. */
 	ASSERT(current->journal_info == NULL);
 	if (WARN_ON(current->journal_info))
 		return 0;
fs/btrfs/send.c +0 -2
index 37e502b09a80..6ac37ae6c811 100644
@@ -7427,9 +7427,7 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, struct btrfs_ioctl_send_args *arg)
 	fs_info->send_in_progress++;
 	spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 
-	current->journal_info = BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB;
 	ret = send_subvol(sctx);
-	current->journal_info = NULL;
 	spin_lock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 	fs_info->send_in_progress--;
 	spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
fs/btrfs/transaction.c +0 -3
index 73df8b81496e..143f7a5dec30 100644
@@ -583,9 +583,6 @@ start_transaction(struct btrfs_root *root, unsigned int num_items,
 	bool do_chunk_alloc = false;
 	int ret;
 
-	/* Send isn't supposed to start transactions. */
-	ASSERT(current->journal_info != BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB);
-
 	if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR, &fs_info->fs_state))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EROFS);
 
fs/btrfs/transaction.h +0 -2
index 0702e8d9b30e..07d76029f598 100644
@@ -122,8 +122,6 @@ struct btrfs_transaction {
 
 #define TRANS_EXTWRITERS	(__TRANS_START | __TRANS_ATTACH)
 
-#define BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB	((void *)1)
-
 struct btrfs_trans_handle {
 	u64 transid;
 	u64 bytes_reserved;
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] btrfs: ensure relocation never runs while we have send operations running

In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 23 lines · On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 11:10:38AM +0100, [email protected] wrote:

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

Relocation and send do not play well together because while send is running a block group can be relocated, a transaction committed and the respective disk extents get re-allocated and written to or discarded while send is about to do something with the extents.

This was explained in commit 9e967495e0e0ae ("Btrfs: prevent send failures and crashes due to concurrent relocation"), which prevented balance and send from running in parallel but it did not address one remaining case where chunk relocation can happen: shrinking a device (and device deletion which shrinks a device's size to 0 before deleting the device).

We also have now one more case where relocation is triggered: on zoned filesystems partially used block groups get relocated by a background thread, introduced in commit 18bb8bbf13c183 ("btrfs: zoned: automatically reclaim zones").

So make sure that instead of preventing balance from running when there are ongoing send operations, we prevent relocation from happening. This uses the infrastructure recently added by a patch that has the
subject: "btrfs: add cancellable chunk relocation support".

Quoted 6 lines

Also it adds a spinlock used exclusively for the exclusivity between send and relocation, as before fs_info->balance_mutex was used, which would make an attempt to run send to block waiting for balance to finish, which can take a lot of time on large filesystems.

Added to misc-next, thanks.

fs/btrfs/relocation.c static void reloc_chunk_end(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) · line 3835

Quoted 8 lines
fs/btrfs/relocation.c +2 -0
@@ -3818,7 +3829,9 @@ static void reloc_chunk_end(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
 	/* Requested after start, clear bit first so any waiters can continue */
 	if (atomic_read(&fs_info->reloc_cancel_req) > 0)
 		btrfs_info(fs_info, "chunk relocation canceled during operation");
+	spin_lock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 	clear_and_wake_up_bit(BTRFS_FS_RELOC_RUNNING, &fs_info->flags);
+	spin_unlock(&fs_info->send_reloc_lock);
 	atomic_set(&fs_info->reloc_cancel_req, 0);

This is an interesting pattern, the lock protects the first part in start and the atomic bit changes and wakeup are for the rest.

#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] btrfs: send: fix crash when memory allocations trigger reclaim

In reply to [email protected]

fs/btrfs/transaction.h struct btrfs_transaction { · line 125

Quoted 7 lines · On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 11:10:39AM +0100, [email protected] wrote:
fs/btrfs/transaction.h +0 -1
@@ -122,8 +122,6 @@ struct btrfs_transaction {
 
 #define TRANS_EXTWRITERS	(__TRANS_START | __TRANS_ATTACH)
 
-#define BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB	((void *)1)

Good riddance.