Patch review
PATCH 6/10 lttng-modules: do not search in non-existing folder during install
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Andrey Zhizhikin <[email protected]>
When CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS is not enabled in kernel config - module compilation is skipped, which causes the ${D}/${nonarch_base_libdir} not to be created.
This fails later in do_install:append() due to the fact that find command in executed for non-existing folder.
Check for folder existence before find command in executed.
--- meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-modules_2.11.6.bb | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-modules_2.11.6.bb +3 -1
@@ -39,7 +39,9 @@ EXTRA_OEMAKE += "KERNELDIR='${STAGING_KERNEL_DIR}'" do_install_append() { # Delete empty directories to avoid QA failures if no modules were built - find ${D}/${nonarch_base_libdir} -depth -type d -empty -exec rmdir {} \; + if [ -d ${D}/${nonarch_base_libdir} ]; then + find ${D}/${nonarch_base_libdir} -depth -type d -empty -exec rmdir {} \; + fi } python do_package_prepend() {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
cover Patch review
Please review this set of patches for dunfell and have comments back by end of day Wednesday.
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/3026
with the exception of a known autobuilder intermittent issue which passed on subsequent retest:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/86/builds/2924
The following changes since commit f788765e1b9832d0da8ec4ce49aa811115864b0e:
README.OE-Core.md: update URLs (2021-12-06 04:48:48 -1000)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/dunfell-nut
http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/dunfell-nut
Andrey Zhizhikin (1):
lttng-modules: do not search in non-existing folder during install
Markus Volk (1):
wic:direct.py: ignore invalid mountpoints during fstab update
Marta Rybczynska (1):
libgcrypt: solve CVE-2021-33560 and CVE-2021-40528
Richard Purdie (1):
gcc: Add CVE-2021-37322 to the list of CVEs to ignore
Ross Burton (1):
runqemu: check the qemu PID has been set before kill()ing it
Sana Kazi (1):
busybox: Fix multiple security issues in awk
Stefan Herbrechtsmeier (2):
recipetool: Set master branch only as fallback
selftest/devtool: Check branch in git fetch
Steve Sakoman (2):
cve-extra-exclusions: add db CVEs to exclusion list
selftest: skip virgl test on centos 8 entirely
.../distro/include/cve-extra-exclusions.inc | 9 +- meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/devtool.py | 5 +- meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/runtime_test.py | 2 + meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.31.1.bb | 1 + .../busybox/files/CVE-2021-423xx-awk.patch | 215 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-9.3.inc | 3 + .../lttng/lttng-modules_2.11.6.bb | 4 +- .../libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-33560.patch | 138 +++++------ .../libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-40528.patch | 109 +++++++++ .../libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.5.bb | 1 + scripts/lib/recipetool/create.py | 15 +- scripts/lib/wic/plugins/imager/direct.py | 2 +- scripts/runqemu | 3 +- 13 files changed, 408 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/busybox/files/CVE-2021-423xx-awk.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-40528.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/10 cve-extra-exclusions: add db CVEs to exclusion list
Since Oracle relicensed bdb, the open source community is slowly but surely replacing bdb with supported and open source friendly alternatives. As a result these CVEs are unlikely to ever be fixed.
--- meta/conf/distro/include/cve-extra-exclusions.inc | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/conf/distro/include/cve-extra-exclusions.inc +8 -1
@@ -44,7 +44,14 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2010-4756" # exposing this interface in an exploitable way CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-29509 CVE-2020-29511" - +# db +# Since Oracle relicensed bdb, the open source community is slowly but surely replacing bdb with +# supported and open source friendly alternatives. As a result these CVEs are unlikely to ever be fixed. +CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2015-2583 CVE-2015-2624 CVE-2015-2626 CVE-2015-2640 CVE-2015-2654 \ +CVE-2015-2656 CVE-2015-4754 CVE-2015-4764 CVE-2015-4774 CVE-2015-4775 CVE-2015-4776 CVE-2015-4777 \ +CVE-2015-4778 CVE-2015-4779 CVE-2015-4780 CVE-2015-4781 CVE-2015-4782 CVE-2015-4783 CVE-2015-4784 \ +CVE-2015-4785 CVE-2015-4786 CVE-2015-4787 CVE-2015-4788 CVE-2015-4789 CVE-2015-4790 CVE-2016-0682 \ +CVE-2016-0689 CVE-2016-0692 CVE-2016-0694 CVE-2016-3418 CVE-2020-2981" #### CPE update pending ####
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 2/10 libgcrypt: solve CVE-2021-33560 and CVE-2021-40528
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
This change fixes patches for two issues reported in a research paper [1]: a side channel attack (*) and a cross-configuration attack (**).
In this commit we add a fix for (*) that wasn't marked as a CVE initially upstream. A fix of (**) previosly available in OE backports is in fact fixing CVE-2021-40528, not CVE-2021-33560 as marked in the commit message.
We commit the accual fix for CVE-2021-33560 and rename the existing fix with the correct CVE-2021-40528.
For details of the mismatch and the timeline see [2] (fix of the documentation) and [3] (the related ticket upstream).
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/923.pdf
[2] https://dev.gnupg.org/rCb118681ebc4c9ea4b9da79b0f9541405a64f4c13
[3] https://dev.gnupg.org/T5328#149606
--- .../libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-33560.patch | 138 +++++++----------- .../libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-40528.patch | 109 ++++++++++++++ .../libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.5.bb | 1 + 3 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-40528.patch
meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-33560.patch +53 -85
@@ -1,109 +1,77 @@ -From 707c3c5c511ee70ad0e39ec613471f665305fbea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From e8b7f10be275bcedb5fc05ed4837a89bfd605c61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: NIIBE Yutaka <[email protected]> -Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 11:15:07 +0900 -Subject: [PATCH] cipher: Fix ElGamal encryption for other implementations. +Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2021 10:00:00 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] cipher: Hardening ElGamal by introducing exponent blinding + too. -* cipher/elgamal.c (gen_k): Remove support of smaller K. -(do_encrypt): Never use smaller K. -(sign): Folllow the change of gen_k. +* cipher/elgamal.c (do_encrypt): Also do exponent blinding. -- -Cherry-pick master commit of: - 632d80ef30e13de6926d503aa697f92b5dbfbc5e +Base blinding had been introduced with USE_BLINDING. This patch add +exponent blinding as well to mitigate side-channel attack on mpi_powm. -This change basically reverts encryption changes in two commits: - - 74386120dad6b3da62db37f7044267c8ef34689b - 78531373a342aeb847950f404343a05e36022065 - -Use of smaller K for ephemeral key in ElGamal encryption is only good, -when we can guarantee that recipient's key is generated by our -implementation (or compatible). - -For detail, please see: - - Luca De Feo, Bertram Poettering, Alessandro Sorniotti, - "On the (in)security of ElGamal in OpenPGP"; - in the proceedings of CCS'2021. - -CVE-id: CVE-2021-33560 GnuPG-bug-id: 5328 -Suggested-by: Luca De Feo, Bertram Poettering, Alessandro Sorniotti Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <[email protected]> Upstream-Status: Backport CVE: CVE-2021-33560 -Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> --- - cipher/elgamal.c | 24 ++++++------------------ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) + cipher/elgamal.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/cipher/elgamal.c b/cipher/elgamal.c -index 4eb52d62..ae7a631e 100644 +index 4eb52d62..9835122f 100644 --- a/cipher/elgamal.c +++ b/cipher/elgamal.c -@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static const char *elg_names[] = - +@@ -522,8 +522,9 @@ do_encrypt(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey ) + static void + decrypt (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, ELG_secret_key *skey ) + { +- gcry_mpi_t t1, t2, r; ++ gcry_mpi_t t1, t2, r, r1, h; + unsigned int nbits = mpi_get_nbits (skey->p); ++ gcry_mpi_t x_blind; - static int test_keys (ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, int nodie); --static gcry_mpi_t gen_k (gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k); -+static gcry_mpi_t gen_k (gcry_mpi_t p); - static gcry_err_code_t generate (ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits, - gcry_mpi_t **factors); - static int check_secret_key (ELG_secret_key *sk); -@@ -189,11 +189,10 @@ test_keys ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, int nodie ) + mpi_normalize (a); + mpi_normalize (b); +@@ -534,20 +535,33 @@ decrypt (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, ELG_secret_key *skey ) - /**************** - * Generate a random secret exponent k from prime p, so that k is -- * relatively prime to p-1. With SMALL_K set, k will be selected for -- * better encryption performance - this must never be used signing! -+ * relatively prime to p-1. - */ - static gcry_mpi_t --gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k ) -+gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p ) - { - gcry_mpi_t k = mpi_alloc_secure( 0 ); - gcry_mpi_t temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) ); -@@ -202,18 +201,7 @@ gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k ) - unsigned int nbits, nbytes; - char *rndbuf = NULL; + t2 = mpi_snew (nbits); + r = mpi_new (nbits); ++ r1 = mpi_new (nbits); ++ h = mpi_new (nbits); ++ x_blind = mpi_snew (nbits); -- if (small_k) -- { -- /* Using a k much lesser than p is sufficient for encryption and -- * it greatly improves the encryption performance. We use -- * Wiener's table and add a large safety margin. */ -- nbits = wiener_map( orig_nbits ) * 3 / 2; -- if( nbits >= orig_nbits ) -- BUG(); -- } -- else -- nbits = orig_nbits; -- -+ nbits = orig_nbits; + /* We need a random number of about the prime size. The random + number merely needs to be unpredictable; thus we use level 0. */ + _gcry_mpi_randomize (r, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM); - nbytes = (nbits+7)/8; - if( DBG_CIPHER ) -@@ -492,7 +480,7 @@ do_encrypt(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey ) - * error code. - */ ++ /* Also, exponent blinding: x_blind = x + (p-1)*r1 */ ++ _gcry_mpi_randomize (r1, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM); ++ mpi_set_highbit (r1, nbits - 1); ++ mpi_sub_ui (h, skey->p, 1); ++ mpi_mul (x_blind, h, r1); ++ mpi_add (x_blind, skey->x, x_blind); ++ + /* t1 = r^x mod p */ +- mpi_powm (t1, r, skey->x, skey->p); ++ mpi_powm (t1, r, x_blind, skey->p); + /* t2 = (a * r)^-x mod p */ + mpi_mulm (t2, a, r, skey->p); +- mpi_powm (t2, t2, skey->x, skey->p); ++ mpi_powm (t2, t2, x_blind, skey->p); + mpi_invm (t2, t2, skey->p); + /* t1 = (t1 * t2) mod p*/ + mpi_mulm (t1, t1, t2, skey->p); -- k = gen_k( pkey->p, 1 ); -+ k = gen_k( pkey->p ); - mpi_powm (a, pkey->g, k, pkey->p); ++ mpi_free (x_blind); ++ mpi_free (h); ++ mpi_free (r1); + mpi_free (r); + mpi_free (t2); - /* b = (y^k * input) mod p -@@ -594,7 +582,7 @@ sign(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_secret_key *skey ) - * - */ - mpi_sub_ui(p_1, p_1, 1); -- k = gen_k( skey->p, 0 /* no small K ! */ ); -+ k = gen_k( skey->p ); - mpi_powm( a, skey->g, k, skey->p ); - mpi_mul(t, skey->x, a ); - mpi_subm(t, input, t, p_1 ); -- -2.30.2 +2.11.0
meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-40528.patch new file +109 -0
109 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.5.bb +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://0003-GCM-move-look-up-table-to-.data-section-and-unshare-.patch \ file://determinism.patch \ file://CVE-2021-33560.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-40528.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "348cc4601ca34307fc6cd6c945467743" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "3b4a2a94cb637eff5bdebbcaf46f4d95c4f25206f459809339cdada0eb577ac3"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 3/10 gcc: Add CVE-2021-37322 to the list of CVEs to ignore
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
The CVE applies to binutils 2.26 and not to gcc so ignore there.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-9.3.inc | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-9.3.inc +3 -0
@@ -124,3 +124,6 @@ EXTRA_OECONF_PATHS = "\ --with-sysroot=/not/exist \ --with-build-sysroot=${STAGING_DIR_TARGET} \ " + +# Is a binutils 2.26 issue, not gcc +CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-37322"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 4/10 busybox: Fix multiple security issues in awk
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Sana Kazi <[email protected]>
CVE-2021-423xx-awk.patch fixes below listed CVEs for busybox:
CVE-2021-42378, CVE-2021-42379, CVE-2021-42380, CVE-2021-42381, CVE-2021-42382, CVE-2021-42384, CVE-2021-42385, CVE-2021-42386
--- meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.31.1.bb | 1 + .../busybox/files/CVE-2021-423xx-awk.patch | 215 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 216 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/busybox/files/CVE-2021-423xx-awk.patch
meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.31.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://busybox.net/downloads/busybox-${PV}.tar.bz2;name=tarball \ file://0001-mktemp-add-tmpdir-option.patch \ file://CVE-2021-42374.patch \ file://CVE-2021-42376.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-423xx-awk.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://musl.cfg "
meta/recipes-core/busybox/files/CVE-2021-423xx-awk.patch new file +215 -0
215 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 5/10 wic:direct.py: ignore invalid mountpoints during fstab update
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Markus Volk <[email protected]>
wic fstab-update creates invalid entries for partitons that are not supposed to be mounted from userspace eg u-boot partitions.
The following lines were added to fstab on a rock-pi-4:/dev/mmcblk1p1 loader1 vfat defaults 0 0 /dev/mmcblk1p2 reserved1 vfat defaults 0 0 /dev/mmcblk1p3 reserved2 vfat defaults 0 0 /dev/mmcblk1p4 loader2 vfat defaults 0 0 /dev/mmcblk1p5 atf vfat defaults 0 0 /dev/mmcblk1p6 /boot vfat defaults 0 0
With this patch only valid entries should be added /dev/mmcblk1p6 /boot vfat defaults 0 0
--- scripts/lib/wic/plugins/imager/direct.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/lib/wic/plugins/imager/direct.py +1 -1
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ class DirectPlugin(ImagerPlugin): updated = False for part in self.parts: if not part.realnum or not part.mountpoint \ - or part.mountpoint == "/": + or part.mountpoint == "/" or not part.mountpoint.startswith('/'): continue if part.use_uuid:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 7/10 runqemu: check the qemu PID has been set before kill()ing it
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Ross Burton <[email protected]>
If runqemu is killed, check that we have a valid PID for the qemu before sending a kill() to it.
[ YOCTO #14651 ]
--- scripts/runqemu | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/runqemu +2 -1
@@ -1516,7 +1516,8 @@ def main(): def sigterm_handler(signum, frame): logger.info("SIGTERM received") - os.kill(config.qemupid, signal.SIGTERM) + if config.qemupid: + os.kill(config.qemupid, signal.SIGTERM) config.cleanup() # Deliberately ignore the return code of 'tput smam'. subprocess.call(["tput", "smam"])
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 8/10 recipetool: Set master branch only as fallback
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Stefan Herbrechtsmeier <[email protected]>
The commit 'meta/scripts: Manual git url branch additions (dc53fe75cc)' sets the branch= parameter too early to master and thereby breaks the -B/--srcbranch option.
ERROR: branch= parameter and -B/--srcbranch option cannot both be specified - use one or the other
--- scripts/lib/recipetool/create.py | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
scripts/lib/recipetool/create.py +7 -8
@@ -389,9 +389,6 @@ def reformat_git_uri(uri): parms.update({('protocol', 'ssh')}) elif (scheme == "http" or scheme == 'https' or scheme == 'ssh') and not ('protocol' in parms): parms.update({('protocol', scheme)}) - # We assume 'master' branch if not set - if not 'branch' in parms: - parms.update({('branch', 'master')}) # Always append 'git://' fUrl = bb.fetch2.encodeurl(('git', host, path, user, pswd, parms)) return fUrl
@@ -481,6 +478,9 @@ def create_recipe(args): storeTagName = params['tag'] params['nobranch'] = '1' del params['tag'] + # Assume 'master' branch if not set + if scheme in ['git', 'gitsm'] and 'branch' not in params and 'nobranch' not in params: + params['branch'] = 'master' fetchuri = bb.fetch2.encodeurl((scheme, network, path, user, passwd, params)) tmpparent = tinfoil.config_data.getVar('BASE_WORKDIR')
@@ -530,10 +530,9 @@ def create_recipe(args): # Remove HEAD reference point and drop remote prefix get_branch = [x.split('/', 1)[1] for x in get_branch if not x.startswith('origin/HEAD')] if 'master' in get_branch: - # If it is master, we do not need to append 'branch=master' as this is default. # Even with the case where get_branch has multiple objects, if 'master' is one # of them, we should default take from 'master' - srcbranch = '' + srcbranch = 'master' elif len(get_branch) == 1: # If 'master' isn't in get_branch and get_branch contains only ONE object, then store result into 'srcbranch' srcbranch = get_branch[0]
@@ -546,8 +545,8 @@ def create_recipe(args): # Since we might have a value in srcbranch, we need to # recontruct the srcuri to include 'branch' in params. scheme, network, path, user, passwd, params = bb.fetch2.decodeurl(srcuri) - if srcbranch: - params['branch'] = srcbranch + if scheme in ['git', 'gitsm']: + params['branch'] = srcbranch or 'master' if storeTagName and scheme in ['git', 'gitsm']: # Check srcrev using tag and check validity of the tag
@@ -606,7 +605,7 @@ def create_recipe(args): splitline = line.split() if len(splitline) > 1: if splitline[0] == 'origin' and scriptutils.is_src_url(splitline[1]): - srcuri = reformat_git_uri(splitline[1]) + srcuri = reformat_git_uri(splitline[1]) + ';branch=master' srcsubdir = 'git' break
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 9/10 selftest/devtool: Check branch in git fetch
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Stefan Herbrechtsmeier <[email protected]>
The commit 'meta/scripts: Manual git url branch additions (dc53fe75cc)' forget the url branch= parameter in the devtool git fetch test.
--- meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/devtool.py | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/devtool.py +3 -2
@@ -442,6 +442,7 @@ class DevtoolAddTests(DevtoolBase): tempdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='devtoolqa') self.track_for_cleanup(tempdir) url = 'gitsm://git.yoctoproject.org/mraa' + url_branch = '%s;branch=master' % url checkrev = 'ae127b19a50aa54255e4330ccfdd9a5d058e581d' testrecipe = 'mraa' srcdir = os.path.join(tempdir, testrecipe)
@@ -462,7 +463,7 @@ class DevtoolAddTests(DevtoolBase): checkvars = {} checkvars['S'] = '${WORKDIR}/git' checkvars['PV'] = '1.0+git${SRCPV}' - checkvars['SRC_URI'] = url + checkvars['SRC_URI'] = url_branch checkvars['SRCREV'] = '${AUTOREV}' self._test_recipe_contents(recipefile, checkvars, []) # Try with revision and version specified
@@ -481,7 +482,7 @@ class DevtoolAddTests(DevtoolBase): checkvars = {} checkvars['S'] = '${WORKDIR}/git' checkvars['PV'] = '1.5+git${SRCPV}' - checkvars['SRC_URI'] = url + checkvars['SRC_URI'] = url_branch checkvars['SRCREV'] = checkrev self._test_recipe_contents(recipefile, checkvars, [])
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 10/10 selftest: skip virgl test on centos 8 entirely
In reply to Steve SakomanWith the sdl frontend, qemu isn't able to even boot fully, so let's skip the test early.
--- meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/runtime_test.py | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/runtime_test.py +2 -0
@@ -179,6 +179,8 @@ class TestImage(OESelftestTestCase): self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Debian 8') if distro and distro == 'centos-7': self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Centos 7') + if distro and distro == 'centos-8': + self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Centos 8') if distro and distro == 'opensuseleap-15.0': self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Opensuse 15.0')
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1