KEXEC_SIG with appended signature
Subsystems (12)
v5 cover KEXEC_SIG with appended signature
Hello,
This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing with appended signatures in the kernel.
powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm. On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one option should be used on all platforms.
Thanks
Michal
Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek at suse.de/ Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
Michal Suchanek (6):
s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check. powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
verify_appended_signature
module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 16 +++++++ arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 12 +++++ arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 41 +---------------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 + include/linux/module_signature.h | 4 +- include/linux/verification.h | 5 ++ kernel/module-internal.h | 2 - kernel/module.c | 12 ++--- kernel/module_signature.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/module_signing.c | 34 ++++++-------- security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 22 ++------- 12 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v5 1/6 s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
Module verification already implements appeded signature check.
Reuse it for kexec_file.
The kexec_file implementation uses EKEYREJECTED error in some cases when there is no key and the common implementation uses ENOPKG or EBADMSG instead.
---
v3: Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about change of return value
--- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 22 +++++----------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +5 -17
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ;struct module_signature *ms;unsigned long sig_len; +int ret;/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,25 +46,12 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) kernel_len -= marker_len; ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len -sizeof (*ms); - kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms); + ret =mod_check_sig (ms, kernel_len,"kexec" ); +if (ret) +return ret; sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); -if (sig_len >= kernel_len) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - kernel_len -= sig_len; - -if (ms->id_type !=PKEY_ID_PKCS7 ) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - -if (ms->algo !=0 || - ms->hash !=0 || - ms->signer_len !=0 || - ms->key_id_len !=0 || - ms->__pad[0 ] !=0 || - ms->__pad[1 ] !=0 || - ms->__pad[2 ] !=0 ) { -return -EBADMSG ; - } + kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms) + sig_len; return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len, kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v5 2/6 powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
In reply to Michal SuchanekCopy the code from s390x
Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI based patforms using PE format).
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the comit message with
explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
- Include correct header for mod_check_sig
- Nayna <[email protected]>: Mention additional IMA features in kconfig text
--- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +16 -0
@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE +config KEXEC_SIG + bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + help + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for + the kexec_file_load() syscall. + + In addition to that option, you need to enable signature + verification for the corresponding kernel image type being + loaded in order for this to work. + + Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel + verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement + list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image + blacklist by hash. + config RELOCATABLE bool "Build a relocatable kernel" depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +36 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <linux/of_fdt.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,return ret ?ERR_PTR (ret) :NULL ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG +int elf64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) +{ +const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; +struct module_signature *ms; +unsigned long sig_len; +int ret; + +if (marker_len > kernel_len) +return -EKEYREJECTED ; + +if (memcmp (kernel + kernel_len - marker_len,MODULE_SIG_STRING , + marker_len)) +return -EKEYREJECTED ; + kernel_len -= marker_len; + + ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len -sizeof (*ms); + ret =mod_check_sig (ms, kernel_len,"kexec" ); +if (ret) +return ret; + + sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); + kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms) + sig_len; + +return verify_pkcs7_signature (kernel, kernel_len, + kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, +VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , +VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , +NULL ,NULL ); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ +const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = { .probe = kexec_elf_probe, .load = elf64_load, +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG + .verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig, +#endif };
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v5 3/6 kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
In reply to Michal SuchanekModule verification already implements appeded signature verification.
Reuse it for kexec_file.
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the dependency on
MODULE_SIG_FORMAT to MODULE_SIG
- Include linux/verification.h - previously added in earlier patch
v4: - kernel test robot <[email protected]>: Use unsigned long rather than size_t for data length
- Update the code in kernel/module_signing.c to use pointer rather
than memcpy as the kexec and IMA code does
--- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 19 +++------------ arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 18 ++------------ include/linux/verification.h | 3 +++ kernel/module-internal.h | 2 -- kernel/module.c | 4 +++- kernel/module_signing.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++----------- 8 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" - depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG help This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for the kexec_file_load() syscall.
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +3 -16
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <linux/of_fdt.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <linux/module_signature.h> static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
@@ -156,9 +157,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,int elf64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) {const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; -struct module_signature *ms; -unsigned long sig_len; -int ret;if (marker_len > kernel_len)return -EKEYREJECTED ;
@@ -168,19 +166,8 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)return -EKEYREJECTED ; kernel_len -= marker_len; - ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len -sizeof (*ms); - ret =mod_check_sig (ms, kernel_len,"kexec" ); -if (ret) -return ret; - - sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); - kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms) + sig_len; - -return verify_pkcs7_signature (kernel, kernel_len, - kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, -VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , -VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , - NULL, NULL); +return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , + "kexec_file"); }#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
arch/s390/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" - depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG help This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for the kexec_file_load() syscall.
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +2 -16
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {int s390_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) {const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; -struct module_signature *ms; -unsigned long sig_len; -int ret;/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,19 +42,8 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)return -EKEYREJECTED ; kernel_len -= marker_len; - ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len -sizeof (*ms); - ret =mod_check_sig (ms, kernel_len,"kexec" ); -if (ret) -return ret; - - sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); - kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms) + sig_len; - -return verify_pkcs7_signature (kernel, kernel_len, - kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, -VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , -VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , - NULL, NULL); +return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , + "kexec_file"); }#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
include/linux/verification.h +3 -0
@@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, enum key_being_used_for usage);#endif +int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, +struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what); +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
kernel/module-internal.h +0 -2
@@ -27,5 +27,3 @@ struct load_info {unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu; } index; }; - -extern int mod_verify_sig (const void *mod,struct load_info *info);
kernel/module.c +3 -1
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@#include <linux/bsearch.h> #include <linux/dynamic_debug.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <uapi/linux/module.h> #include "module-internal.h"
@@ -2894,7 +2895,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */ info->len -= markerlen; - err =mod_verify_sig (mod, info); + err =verify_appended_signature (mod, &info->len, +VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ,"module" );if (!err) { info->sig_ok = true;return 0 ;
kernel/module_signing.c +20 -14
@@ -14,32 +14,38 @@#include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "module-internal.h" -/* -* Verify the signature on a module. +/** +* verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the +* signature marker stripped. +* @data: The data to be verified +* @len: Size of @data. +* @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification +* @what: Informational string for log messages */ -int mod_verify_sig (const void *mod,struct load_info *info) +int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, +struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what) { -struct module_signature ms; -size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len; +struct module_signature *ms; +unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;int ret; -pr_devel ("==>%s(,%zu)\n" , __func__, modlen); +pr_devel ("==>%s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, modlen); -if (modlen <=sizeof (ms)) +if (modlen <=sizeof (*ms))return -EBADMSG ; -memcpy (&ms, mod + (modlen -sizeof (ms)),sizeof (ms)); + ms = data + modlen -sizeof (*ms); - ret =mod_check_sig (&ms, modlen,"module" ); + ret =mod_check_sig (ms, modlen, what);if (ret)return ret; - sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms.sig_len); - modlen -= sig_len +sizeof (ms); - info->len = modlen; + sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); + modlen -= sig_len +sizeof (*ms); + *len = modlen; -return verify_pkcs7_signature (mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, -VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING , +return verify_pkcs7_signature (data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len, + trusted_keys,VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE ,NULL ,NULL ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v5 4/6 module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
In reply to Michal SuchanekIt is stripped by each caller separately.
Note: this changes the error for kexec_file from EKEYREJECTED to ENODATA when the signature marker is missing.
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about
change of raturn value
- the module_signature.h is now no longer needed for kexec_file
--- arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 11 ----------- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 11 ----------- kernel/module.c | 7 +------ kernel/module_signing.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +0 -11
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@#include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/verification.h> -#include <linux/module_signature.h> static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -156,16 +155,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG int elf64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) { -const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; - -if (marker_len > kernel_len) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - -if (memcmp (kernel + kernel_len - marker_len,MODULE_SIG_STRING , - marker_len)) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - kernel_len -= marker_len; -return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ,"kexec_file" ); }
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +0 -11
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@#include <linux/elf.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> -#include <linux/module_signature.h> #include <linux/verification.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <asm/boot_data.h>
@@ -28,20 +27,10 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG int s390_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) { -const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; -/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ if (!ipl_secure_flag)return 0 ; -if (marker_len > kernel_len) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - -if (memcmp (kernel + kernel_len - marker_len,MODULE_SIG_STRING , - marker_len)) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - kernel_len -= marker_len; -return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ,"kexec_file" ); }
kernel/module.c +1 -6
@@ -2882,7 +2882,6 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,static int module_sig_check (struct load_info *info,int flags) {int err = -ENODATA ; -const unsigned long markerlen =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ;const char *reason;const void *mod = info->hdr;
@@ -2890,11 +2889,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)* Require flags == 0, as a module with version information * removed is no longer the module that was signed */ -if (flags ==0 && - info->len > markerlen && -memcmp (mod + info->len - markerlen,MODULE_SIG_STRING , markerlen) ==0 ) { -/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */ - info->len -= markerlen; +if (flags ==0 ) { err =verify_appended_signature (mod, &info->len,VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ,"module" );if (!err) {
kernel/module_signing.c +10 -2
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@#include "module-internal.h" /** -* verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the -* signature marker stripped. +* verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module * @data: The data to be verified * @len: Size of @data. * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
@@ -25,12 +24,21 @@int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len,struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what) { +const unsigned long markerlen =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ;struct module_signature *ms;unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;int ret;pr_devel ("==>%s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, modlen); +if (markerlen > modlen) +return -ENODATA ; + +if (memcmp (data + modlen - markerlen,MODULE_SIG_STRING , + markerlen)) +return -ENODATA ; + modlen -= markerlen; +if (modlen <=sizeof (*ms))return -EBADMSG ;
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v5 5/6 module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature
In reply to Michal SuchanekAdd value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log messages about the signature.
--- arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 + include/linux/verification.h | 4 +++- kernel/module.c | 3 ++- kernel/module_signing.c | 11 ++++++----- 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +1 -1
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,int elf64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) {return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , -"kexec_file" ); +VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE ); }#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +1 -1
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)return 0 ;return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , - "kexec_file"); + VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE); }#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = { [VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig", [VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig", [VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig", + [VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE] = "kexec appended sig", [VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE ] ="unspec sig" , };EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (key_being_used_for);
include/linux/verification.h +3 -1
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for {VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE ,VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE ,VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE , +VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE ,VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE , NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR };
@@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,#endif int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, -struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what); +struct key *trusted_keys, +enum key_being_used_for purpose);#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
kernel/module.c +2 -1
@@ -2891,7 +2891,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)*/ if (flags ==0 ) { err =verify_appended_signature (mod, &info->len, -VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ,"module" ); +VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING , +VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE );if (!err) { info->sig_ok = true;return 0 ;
kernel/module_signing.c +6 -5
@@ -19,17 +19,18 @@* @data: The data to be verified * @len: Size of @data. * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification -* @what: Informational string for log messages +* @purpose: The use to which the key is being put */ int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, -struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what) +struct key *trusted_keys, +enum key_being_used_for purpose) {const unsigned long markerlen =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ;struct module_signature *ms;unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;int ret; -pr_devel ("==>%s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, modlen); +pr_devel ("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);if (markerlen > modlen)return -ENODATA ;
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len, ms = data + modlen -sizeof (*ms); - ret =mod_check_sig (ms, modlen, what); + ret =mod_check_sig (ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);if (ret)return ret;
@@ -54,6 +55,6 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,return verify_pkcs7_signature (data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len, trusted_keys, -VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , + purpose,NULL ,NULL ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v5 6/6 module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
In reply to Michal SuchanekMultiple users of mod_check_sig check for the marker, then call mod_check_sig, extract signature length, and remove the signature.
Put this code in one place together with mod_check_sig.
This changes the error from ENOENT to ENODATA for ima_read_modsig in the case the signature marker is missing.
This also changes the buffer length in ima_read_modsig from size_t to unsigned long. This reduces the possible value range on 32bit but the length refers to kernel in-memory buffer which cannot be longer than ULONG_MAX.
Also change mod_check_sig to unsigned long while at it.
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about
change of raturn value
- Preserve the EBADMSG error code while moving code araound
v4: - remove unused variable ms in module_signing.c
- note about buffer length
v5: - also change the functions in module_signature.c to unsigned long
--- include/linux/module_signature.h | 4 +- kernel/module_signature.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/module_signing.c | 27 ++------------ security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 22 ++--------- 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
include/linux/module_signature.h +3 -1
@@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ struct module_signature { __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */ }; -int mod_check_sig (const struct module_signature *ms,size_t file_len, +int mod_check_sig (const struct module_signature *ms,unsigned long file_len, +const char *name); +int mod_parse_sig (const void *data,unsigned long *len,unsigned long *sig_len,const char *name);#endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */
kernel/module_signature.c +56 -2
76 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/module_signing.c +4 -23
@@ -25,35 +25,16 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,struct key *trusted_keys, enum key_being_used_for purpose) { -const unsigned long markerlen =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; -struct module_signature *ms; -unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len; + unsigned long sig_len;int ret; -pr_devel ("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen); +pr_devel ("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], *len); -if (markerlen > modlen) -return -ENODATA ; - -if (memcmp (data + modlen - markerlen,MODULE_SIG_STRING , - markerlen)) -return -ENODATA ; - modlen -= markerlen; - -if (modlen <=sizeof (*ms)) -return -EBADMSG ; - - ms = data + modlen -sizeof (*ms); - - ret =mod_check_sig (ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]); + ret =mod_parse_sig (data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);if (ret)return ret; - sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); - modlen -= sig_len +sizeof (*ms); - *len = modlen; - -return verify_pkcs7_signature (data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len, +return verify_pkcs7_signature (data, *len, data + *len, sig_len, trusted_keys, purpose,NULL ,NULL );
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +3 -19
@@ -37,33 +37,17 @@ struct modsig {* * Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise. */ -int ima_read_modsig (enum ima_hooks func,const void *buf,loff_t buf_len, +int ima_read_modsig (enum ima_hooks func,const void *buf,loff_t len,struct modsig **modsig) { -const size_t marker_len =strlen (MODULE_SIG_STRING ); -const struct module_signature *sig;struct modsig *hdr; -size_t sig_len; -const void *p; +unsigned long sig_len, buf_len = len;int rc; -if (buf_len <= marker_len +sizeof (*sig)) -return -ENOENT ; - - p = buf + buf_len - marker_len; -if (memcmp (p,MODULE_SIG_STRING , marker_len)) -return -ENOENT ; - - buf_len -= marker_len; - sig = (const struct module_signature *)(p -sizeof (*sig)); - - rc =mod_check_sig (sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]); + rc =mod_parse_sig (buf, &buf_len, &sig_len, func_tokens[func]);if (rc)return rc; - sig_len =be32_to_cpu (sig->sig_len); - buf_len -= sig_len +sizeof (*sig); -/* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */ hdr =kzalloc (sizeof (*hdr) + sig_len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!hdr)
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
In reply to Michal Suchanekinclude/linux/verification.h extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, · line 65
Quoted 11 lines · Michal Suchanek
include/linux/verification.h +3
-0@@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, enum key_being_used_for usage);#endif +int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, +struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what); +
Looks very non-module specific.
Quoted 15 lines
kernel/module_signing.c +5
-2@@ -14,32 +14,38 @@#include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "module-internal.h" -/* -* Verify the signature on a module. +/** +* verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the +* signature marker stripped. +* @data: The data to be verified +* @len: Size of @data.
kernel/module_signing.c line 28
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/module_signing.c +5
-3+* @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification +* @what: Informational string for log messages */ -int mod_verify_sig (const void *mod,struct load_info *info) +int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, +struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what) { -struct module_signature ms; -size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len; +struct module_signature *ms;
There goes the abstraction, so why not make this clear where we re-use the struct module_signature for various things and call it as it is, verify_mod_appended_signature() or some such?
David? Any preference?
Other than that:
Luis
Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
In reply to Michal SuchanekQuoted 10 lines · Michal Suchanek
It is stripped by each caller separately.
Note: this changes the error for
kexec_filefrom EKEYREJECTED to ENODATA when the signature marker is missing.Signed-off-by Michal Suchanek <[email protected]>---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about
change of raturn value
- themodule_signature.his now no longer needed forkexec_file
Luis
Re: [PATCH v5 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature
In reply to Michal SuchanekQuoted 5 lines · Michal Suchanek
Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in
key_being_used_forenum rather than a string toverify_appended_signatureto produce log messages about the signature.Signed-off-by Michal Suchanek <[email protected]>
Luis
Re: [PATCH v5 6/6] module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
In reply to Michal SuchanekQuoted 8 lines · Michal Suchanek
Multiple users of
mod_check_sigcheck for the marker, then callmod_check_sig, extract signature length, and remove the signature.Put this code in one place together with
mod_check_sig.This changes the error from ENOENT to ENODATA for
ima_read_modsigin the case the signature marker is missing.
Quoted 8 lines
This also changes the buffer length in
ima_read_modsigfromsize_tto unsigned long. This reduces the possible value range on 32bit but the length refers to kernel in-memory buffer which cannot be longer thanULONG_MAX.Also change
mod_check_sigto unsigned long while at it.Signed-off-by Michal Suchanek <[email protected]>
Luis
Luis Chamberlain
maintainerQuoted 20 lines · Michal Suchanek
Hello,
This is a refresh of the
KEXEC_SIGseries.This adds
KEXEC_SIGsupport on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing with appended signatures in the kernel.powerpc supports
IMA_KEXECbut that's an exception rather than the norm. On the other hand,KEXEC_SIGis portable across platforms.For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one option should be used on all platforms.
Thanks
Michal
Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek at suse.de/ Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
Quoted 8 lines
Michal Suchanek (6):
s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check. powerpc/kexec_file: AddKEXEC_SIGsupport.
kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
module: Usekey_being_used_forfor log messages in
verify_appended_signature
module: Move duplicatemod_check_sigusers code tomod_parse_sig
What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his code refactoring of kernel/module*.c to kernel/module/
Luis
Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
In reply to Luis ChamberlainHello,
thanks for the review.
Quoted 9 lines · Luis Chamberlain
Quoted 8 lines · Michal Suchanek
include/linux/verification.h +0
-0@@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, enum key_being_used_for usage);#endif
Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/verification.h extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, · line 65
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/verification.h +3
-0+int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, +struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what); +Looks very non-module specific.
Which it is now that the same signature format is used for kernels.
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 22 lines
kernel/module_signing.c +9
-3@@ -14,32 +14,38 @@#include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "module-internal.h" -/* -* Verify the signature on a module. +/** +* verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the +* signature marker stripped. +* @data: The data to be verified +* @len: Size of @data. +* @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification +* @what: Informational string for log messages */ -int mod_verify_sig (const void *mod,struct load_info *info) +int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, +struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what)
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/module_signing.c line 28
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/module_signing.c +1
-2{ -struct module_signature ms; -size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len; +struct module_signature *ms;There goes the abstraction, so why not make this clear where we re-use the struct
module_signaturefor various things and call it as it is,verify_mod_appended_signature()or some such?
It sounds like the abstraction is actually improved by callers no longer dealing with struct module_signature when verifying signature on a kernel. That is the structure is misnamed but it is now hidden behind an abstraction.
Or am I missing something?
Thanks
Michal
Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
In reply to Michal SuchanekQuoted 12 lines · Michal Suchanek
Copy the code from s390x
Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI based patforms using PE format).
Signed-off-by Michal Suchanek <[email protected]>---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the comit message with
explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
- Include correct header formod_check_sig
- Nayna <[email protected]>: Mention additional IMA features in kconfig text
Quoted 4 lines
--- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
I haven't tested this on powerpc, but assuming you have Michal this looks OK to me.
cheers
Michael Ellerman
reviewerQuoted 30 lines · Luis Chamberlain
Quoted 20 lines · Michal Suchanek
Hello,
This is a refresh of the
KEXEC_SIGseries.This adds
KEXEC_SIGsupport on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing with appended signatures in the kernel.powerpc supports
IMA_KEXECbut that's an exception rather than the norm. On the other hand,KEXEC_SIGis portable across platforms.For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one option should be used on all platforms.
Thanks
Michal
Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek at suse.de/ Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
Quoted 8 lines
Michal Suchanek (6):
s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check. powerpc/kexec_file: AddKEXEC_SIGsupport.
kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
module: Usekey_being_used_forfor log messages in
verify_appended_signature
module: Move duplicatemod_check_sigusers code tomod_parse_sig
Quoted 3 lines
What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his code refactoring of
kernel/module*.ctokernel/module/
Yeah that's fine by me, the arch changes are pretty minimal and unlikely to conflict much.
cheers
Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
In reply to Michal SuchanekDear Michal,
Thank you for the patch.
Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:
Could you please remove the dot/period at the end of the git commit message summary?
Quoted 4 lines
Copy the code from s390x
Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI based patforms using PE format).
patforms ? platforms
How can this be tested?
Quoted 25 lines
Signed-off-by Michal Suchanek <[email protected]>---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the comit message with
explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
- Include correct header formod_check_sig
- Nayna <[email protected]>: Mention additional IMA features in kconfig text--- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)arch/powerpc/Kconfig +5
-0@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE +config KEXEC_SIG + bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + help + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
arch/powerpc/Kconfig config KEXEC_FILE · line 577
Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +10
-0+ the kexec_file_load() syscall. + + In addition to that option, you need to enable signature + verification for the corresponding kernel image type being + loaded in order for this to work. + + Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel + verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement + list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image + blacklist by hash.
So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? What is the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?
Quoted 17 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +1
-0+ config RELOCATABLE bool "Build a relocatable kernel" depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +1
-0@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <linux/of_fdt.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, · line 160
Quoted 9 lines
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +6
-0@@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,return ret ?ERR_PTR (ret) :NULL ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG +int elf64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) +{ +const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; +struct module_signature *ms; +unsigned long sig_len;
Use size_t to match the signature of verify_pkcs7_signature()?
Quoted 23 lines
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +23
-0+int ret; + +if (marker_len > kernel_len) +return -EKEYREJECTED ; + +if (memcmp (kernel + kernel_len - marker_len,MODULE_SIG_STRING , + marker_len)) +return -EKEYREJECTED ; + kernel_len -= marker_len; + + ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len -sizeof (*ms); + ret =mod_check_sig (ms, kernel_len,"kexec" ); +if (ret) +return ret; + + sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); + kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms) + sig_len; + +return verify_pkcs7_signature (kernel, kernel_len, + kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, +VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , +VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , +NULL ,NULL );
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, · line 193
Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +6
-0+} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ +const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = { .probe = kexec_elf_probe, .load = elf64_load, +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG + .verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig, +#endif };
Kind regards,
Paul
Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
Hello,
Quoted 10 lines · Paul Menzel
Dear Michal,
Thank you for the patch.
Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:
Could you please remove the dot/period at the end of the git commit message summary?
Sure
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Copy the code from s390x
Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI based patforms using PE format).
patforms ? platforms
Thanks for noticing
Quoted 1 line
How can this be tested?
Apparently KEXEC_SIG_FORCE is x86 only although the use of the option is arch neutral:
arch/x86/Kconfig:config KEXEC_SIG_FORCEkernel/kexec_file.c: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE))
{
Maybe it should be moved?
I used a patched kernel that enables lockdown in secure boot, and then verified that signed kernel can be loaded by kexec and unsigned not, with KEXEC_SIG enabled and IMA_KEXEC disabled.
The lockdown support can be enabled on any platform, and although I can't find it documented anywhere there appears to be code in kexec_file to take it into account:
kernel/kexec.c: result = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC); kernel/kexec_file.c: security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) kernel/module.c: return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE); kernel/params.c: security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS))
and lockdown can be enabled with a buildtime option, a kernel parameter, or a debugfs file.
Still for testing lifting KEXEC_SIG_FORCE to some arch-neutral Kconfig file is probably the simplest option.
kexec -s option should be used to select kexec_file rather than the old style kexec which would either fail always or succeed always regardelss of signature.
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 29 lines
Signed-off-by Michal Suchanek <[email protected]>---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the comit message with
explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
- Include correct header formod_check_sig
- Nayna <[email protected]>: Mention additional IMA features in kconfig text--- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)arch/powerpc/Kconfig +10
-0@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE +config KEXEC_SIG + bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + help + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for + the kexec_file_load() syscall. + + In addition to that option, you need to enable signature + verification for the corresponding kernel image type being + loaded in order for this to work.
Quoted 8 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig config KEXEC_FILE · line 577
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +5
-0+ + Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel + verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement + list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image + blacklist by hash.So, what is the takeaway for the user?
IMA_ARCH_POLICYis preferred? What is the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?
IMA_KEXEC does more than KEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.
Arguably the simpler implementation hass less potential for bugs, too. Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.
Interestingly IMA_ARCH_POLICY depends on KEXEC_SIG rather than IMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.
The main problem with IMA_KEXEC from my point of view is it is not portable. To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on all platforms. It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms that use PE kernel signature format.
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 19 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +1
-0+ config RELOCATABLE bool "Build a relocatable kernel" depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +1
-0@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <linux/of_fdt.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,@@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,return ret ?ERR_PTR (ret) :NULL ; }
Quoted 8 lines
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, · line 160
Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +6
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG +int elf64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) +{ +const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; +struct module_signature *ms; +unsigned long sig_len;Use
size_tto match the signature ofverify_pkcs7_signature()?
Nope. struct module_signature uses unsigned long, and this needs to be matched to avoid type errors on 32bit.
Technically using size_t for in-memory buffers is misguided because AFAICT no memory buffer can be bigger than ULONG_MAX, and size_t is non-native type on 32bit.
Sure, the situation with ssize_t/int is different but that's not what we are dealing with here.
Thanks
Michal
Luis Chamberlain
maintainerQuoted 31 lines · Michael Ellerman
Quoted 30 lines · Luis Chamberlain
Quoted 28 lines · Michal Suchanek
Hello,
This is a refresh of the
KEXEC_SIGseries.This adds
KEXEC_SIGsupport on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing with appended signatures in the kernel.powerpc supports
IMA_KEXECbut that's an exception rather than the norm. On the other hand,KEXEC_SIGis portable across platforms.For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one option should be used on all platforms.
Thanks
Michal
Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek at suse.de/ Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
Michal Suchanek (6):
s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check. powerpc/kexec_file: AddKEXEC_SIGsupport.
kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
module: Usekey_being_used_forfor log messages in
verify_appended_signature
module: Move duplicatemod_check_sigusers code tomod_parse_sig
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his code refactoring of
kernel/module*.ctokernel/module/Yeah that's fine by me, the arch changes are pretty minimal and unlikely to conflict much.
Ok sounds good thanks.
Luis
Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
In reply to Michal SuchánekDear Michal,
Am 09.02.22 um 13:01 schrieb Michal Such?nek:
Quoted 3 lines · Paul Menzel
Quoted 2 lines
Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:
[?]
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 1 line
How can this be tested?
Apparently
KEXEC_SIG_FORCEis x86 only although the use of the option is arch neutral:arch/x86/Kconfig:config
KEXEC_SIG_FORCEkernel/kexec_file.c: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE))
{Maybe it should be moved?
Sounds good.
Quoted 14 lines
I used a patched kernel that enables lockdown in secure boot, and then verified that signed kernel can be loaded by kexec and unsigned not, with
KEXEC_SIGenabled andIMA_KEXECdisabled.The lockdown support can be enabled on any platform, and although I can't find it documented anywhere there appears to be code in
kexec_fileto take it into account:kernel/kexec.c: result = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC); kernel/kexec_file.c: security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) kernel/module.c: return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE); kernel/params.c: security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS))and lockdown can be enabled with a buildtime option, a kernel parameter, or a debugfs file.
Quoted 6 lines
Still for testing lifting
KEXEC_SIG_FORCEto some arch-neutralKconfigfile is probably the simplest option.kexec -s option should be used to select
kexec_filerather than the old style kexec which would either fail always or succeed always regardelss of signature.
Thank you.
Quoted 38 lines
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 29 lines
Signed-off-by Michal Suchanek <[email protected]>---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the comit message with
explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
- Include correct header formod_check_sig
- Nayna <[email protected]>: Mention additional IMA features in kconfig text--- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)arch/powerpc/Kconfig +10
-0@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE +config KEXEC_SIG + bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + help + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for + the kexec_file_load() syscall. + + In addition to that option, you need to enable signature + verification for the corresponding kernel image type being + loaded in order for this to work.Quoted 8 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig config KEXEC_FILE · line 577
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +5
-0+ + Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel + verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement + list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image + blacklist by hash.So, what is the takeaway for the user?
IMA_ARCH_POLICYis preferred? What is the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?
Quoted 8 lines
IMA_KEXECdoes more thanKEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.Arguably the simpler implementation has less potential for bugs, too. Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.
Interestingly
IMA_ARCH_POLICYdepends onKEXEC_SIGrather thanIMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.
I have not looked into that.
Quoted 4 lines
The main problem with
IMA_KEXECfrom my point of view is it is not portable. To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on all platforms. It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms that use PE kernel signature format.
Could you add that to the comment please?
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +1
-0+ config RELOCATABLE bool "Build a relocatable kernel" depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +1
-0@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <linux/of_fdt.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,@@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,return ret ?ERR_PTR (ret) :NULL ; }Quoted 8 lines
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, · line 160
Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +6
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG +int elf64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) +{ +const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; +struct module_signature *ms; +unsigned long sig_len;Use
size_tto match the signature ofverify_pkcs7_signature()?
Quoted 2 lines
Nope. struct
module_signatureuses unsigned long, and this needs to be matched to avoid type errors on 32bit.
I meant for sig_len.
Quoted 6 lines
Technically using
size_tfor in-memory buffers is misguided because AFAICT no memory buffer can be bigger thanULONG_MAX, andsize_tis non-native type on 32bit.Sure, the situation with ssize_t/int is different but that's not what we are dealing with here.
True. In my experience it prevents compiler warnings when building for 32 bit or 64 bit. Anyway, not that important.
Kind regards,
Paul
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
In reply to Michal SuchánekHi Michal,
Quoted 26 lines · Michal Such?nek
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +10
-0@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE +config KEXEC_SIG + bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + help + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for + the kexec_file_load() syscall. + + In addition to that option, you need to enable signature + verification for the corresponding kernel image type being + loaded in order for this to work.Quoted 8 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig config KEXEC_FILE · line 577
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +5
-0+ + Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel + verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement + list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image + blacklist by hash.So, what is the takeaway for the user?
IMA_ARCH_POLICYis preferred? What is the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?
Quoted 8 lines
IMA_KEXECdoes more thanKEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.Arguably the simpler implementation hass less potential for bugs, too. Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.
Interestingly
IMA_ARCH_POLICYdepends onKEXEC_SIGrather thanIMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.
FYI, a soft boot doesn't clear the TPM PCRs. To be able to verify the IMA measurement list after a kexec against a TPM quote, requires carrying the measurement list across kexec.
The "IMA_KEXEC" config enables carrying the IMA measurement list across kexec. It has nothing to do with verifying the appended signature. That is based on kernel module appended signature code.
Quoted 4 lines
The main problem with
IMA_KEXECfrom my point of view is it is not portable. To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on all platforms.
Measuring the kexec kernel image and extending the TPM with the measurement is required for trusted boot. Boot loaders extend the TPM's BIOS measurements. Similarly, IMA does not require a TPM, but if one is available the kexec kernel image measurement is extended into the IMA measurement list. Otherwise, IMA goes into "TPM by-pass" mode.
Quoted 2 lines
It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms that use PE kernel signature format.
True. However, a kernel image with an appended signature may be kexec'ed, regardless of the architecture. Because some boot loaders don't support appended signatures, from my point of view does not make IMA kexec support not portable.
Signature · 3 lines
thanks, Mimi
Mimi Zohar
maintainerHi Michal,
Quoted 9 lines · Michal Suchanek
Hello,
This is a refresh of the
KEXEC_SIGseries.This adds
KEXEC_SIGsupport on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing with appended signatures in the kernel.powerpc supports
IMA_KEXECbut that's an exception rather than the norm. On the other hand,KEXEC_SIGis portable across platforms.
This Kconfig carries the IMA measurement list across kexec. This has nothing to do with appended signatures.
config IMA_KEXEC
bool "Enable carrying the IMA measurement list across a soft
boot"
depends on IMA && TCG_TPM && HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
In addition to powerpc, arm64 sets HAVE_IMA_KEXEC.
Even prior to the kexec appended signature support, like all other files, the kexec kernel image signature could be stored in security.ima.
Quoted 3 lines
For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one option should be used on all platforms.
The kexec kernel image measurement will not be included in the BIOS event log. Even if the measurement is included in the IMA measurement list, without the IMA_KEXEC Kconfig the measurement list will not be carried across kexec. For those not interested in "trusted boot" or those who do not need it for compliance, the simplification should be fine.
Signature · 3 lines
thanks, Mimi
Mimi Zohar
maintainer[Cc'ing Nageswara R Sastry]
Hi Michal,
Quoted 6 lines · Michal Suchanek
Hello,
This is a refresh of the
KEXEC_SIGseries.This adds
KEXEC_SIGsupport on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing with appended signatures in the kernel.
tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh probably needs to be updated to reflect the new Kconfig support.
FYI, commit 65e38e32a959 ("selftests/kexec: Enable secureboot tests for PowerPC") recently was upstreamed.
Signature · 3 lines
thanks, Mimi
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
In reply to Michal SuchanekHi Michal,
Quoted 5 lines · Michal Suchanek
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +0
-0
arch/powerpc/Kconfig config KEXEC_FILE · line 568
Quoted 9 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +6
-0@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE +config KEXEC_SIG + bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + help + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for + the kexec_file_load() syscall.
When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a kexec 'appraise' policy rule. Refer to the policy rules in security/ima/ima_efi.c. Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.
Signature · 3 lines
thanks, Mimi
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
Hi Michal,
Quoted 10 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 8 lines · Michal Suchanek
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE
Quoted 11 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig config KEXEC_FILE · line 568
Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +6
-0+config KEXEC_SIG + bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + help + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for + the kexec_file_load() syscall.When
KEXEC_SIGis enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a kexec 'appraise' policy rule. Refer to the policy rules insecurity/ima/ima_efi.c. Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule inarch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.cshould not be defined.
The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG kernel image signature verification. Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.
1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of signature type - PE, appended signature.
solution: enable KEXEC_SIG (This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA policy changes.)
2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation, if desired.
solution: enable IMA_ARCH_POLICY
- Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
- EFI: requires secure boot to be enabled. The IMA efi policy
doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.
3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired and supported on the architecture.
solution: enable IMA_KEXEC
Comparison:
- Are there any differences between IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG measuring the kexec kernel image?
One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement list differs. In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash including the appended signature. With IMA and the 'ima-modsig' template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined, as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.
Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.
Other differences are already included in the Kconfig KEXEC_SIG "Notes" section.
Signature · 3 lines
thanks, Mimi
Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
Hello,
Quoted 14 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Michal,
Quoted 10 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 8 lines · Michal Suchanek
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig config KEXEC_FILE · line 567
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +5
-0+config KEXEC_SIG + bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + help + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
This is actually wrong. KEXEC_SIG makes it mandatory that any signature that is appended is valid and made by a key that is part of the platform keyiring (which is also wrong, built-in keys should be also accepted). KEXEC_SIG_FORCE or an IMA policy makes it mandatory that the signature is present.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig config KEXEC_FILE · line 568
Quoted 1 line
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +1
-0+ the kexec_file_load() syscall.When
KEXEC_SIGis enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a kexec 'appraise' policy rule. Refer to the policy rules insecurity/ima/ima_efi.c. Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in
I suppose you mean security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
I also think it's misguided because KEXEC_SIG in itself does not enforce the signature. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE does.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.cshould not be defined.
I suppose you mean arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c - see above.
Thanks for taking the time to reseach and summarize the differences.
Quoted 34 lines
The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs.
KEXEC_SIGkernel image signature verification. Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of signature type - PE, appended signature.
solution: enable
KEXEC_SIG(This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA policy changes.)2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation, if desired.
solution: enable
IMA_ARCH_POLICY
- Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
- EFI: requires secure boot to be enabled. The IMA efi policy
doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired and supported on the architecture.
solution: enable
IMA_KEXECComparison:
- Are there any differences between IMA vs.KEXEC_SIGmeasuring the kexec kernel image?One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement list differs. In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash including the appended signature. With IMA and the 'ima-modsig' template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined, as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.
Quoted 3 lines
Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.
I don't understand this part. Isn't the hash *with* signature always included, and the distinguishing part about IMA is the hash *without* signature which is the same irrespective of signature type (PE, appended xattr) and irrespective of the keyt used for signoing?
Quoted 2 lines
Other differences are already included in the
KconfigKEXEC_SIG"Notes" section.
Which besides what is already described above would be blacklisting specific binaries, which is much more effective if you have hashes of binaries without signature.
Thanks
Michal
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
Quoted 17 lines · Michal Such?nek
Hello,
Quoted 14 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Michal,
Quoted 10 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 8 lines · Michal Suchanek
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig config KEXEC_FILE · line 567
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +5
-0+config KEXEC_SIG + bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + help + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory forThis is actually wrong.
KEXEC_SIGmakes it mandatory that any signature that is appended is valid and made by a key that is part of the platform keyiring (which is also wrong, built-in keys should be also accepted).KEXEC_SIG_FORCEor an IMA policy makes it mandatory that the signature is present.
I'm aware of MODULE_SIG_FORCE, which isn't normally enabled by distros, but enabling MODULE_SIG allows MODULE_SIG_FORCE to be enabled on the boot command line. In the IMA arch policies, if MODULE_SIG is enabled, it is then enforced, otherwise an IMA "appraise" policy rule is defined. This rule would prevent the module_load syscall.
I'm not aware of KEXEC_SIG_FORCE. If there is such a Kconfig, then I assume it could work similarly.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig config KEXEC_FILE · line 568
Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +1
-0+ the kexec_file_load() syscall.When
KEXEC_SIGis enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a kexec 'appraise' policy rule. Refer to the policy rules insecurity/ima/ima_efi.c. Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule inI suppose you mean
security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
Yes
Quoted 3 lines
I also think it's misguided because
KEXEC_SIGin itself does not enforce the signature.KEXEC_SIG_FORCEdoes.
Right, which is why the IMA efi policy calls set_module_sig_enforced().
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.cshould not be defined.I suppose you mean
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c- see above.
Sorry, yes.
Quoted 38 lines
Thanks for taking the time to reseach and summarize the differences.
Quoted 34 lines
The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs.
KEXEC_SIGkernel image signature verification. Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of signature type - PE, appended signature.
solution: enable
KEXEC_SIG(This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA policy changes.)2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation, if desired.
solution: enable
IMA_ARCH_POLICY
- Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
- EFI: requires secure boot to be enabled. The IMA efi policy
doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired and supported on the architecture.
solution: enable
IMA_KEXECComparison:
- Are there any differences between IMA vs.KEXEC_SIGmeasuring the kexec kernel image?One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement list differs. In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash including the appended signature. With IMA and the 'ima-modsig' template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined, as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.
I don't understand this part. Isn't the hash *with* signature always included, and the distinguishing part about IMA is the hash *without* signature which is the same irrespective of signature type (PE, appended xattr) and irrespective of the keyt used for signoing?
Roberto Sassu added support for IMA templates. These are the definitions of 'ima-sig' and 'ima-modsig'.
{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
{.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"}
d-ng: is the file hash. With the proposed IMA support for fs-verity digests, the 'd-ng' field may also include the fsverity digest, based on policy.
n-ng: is the file pathname.
sig: is the file signature stored as a 'security.ima' xattr (may be NULL).
d-modsig: is the file hash without the appended signature (may be NULL).
FYI, changing from "module signature" to "appended signature", might impact the template field and name. :)
modsig: is the appended signature (May be NULL).
I really haven't looked at PE signatures, so I can't comment on them.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Other differences are already included in the
KconfigKEXEC_SIG"Notes" section.Which besides what is already described above would be blacklisting specific binaries, which is much more effective if you have hashes of binaries without signature.
Thanks, Nayna will be happy to hear you approve.
FYI, IMA calculates the file hash once, which is then added to the IMA measurement list, extended into the TPM (when available), used to verify signatures, and included in the audit log.
With the KEXEC_SIG support, assuming the IMA arch policy is enabled, the file hash would be calculated twice - once for verifying the file signature and again for the measurement.
Signature · 3 lines
thanks, Mimi