Skip to contentSkip to conversation

x86/sgx and selftests/sgx: Support SGX2

PATCH Superseded Reinette Chatre 7 participants 130 messages Feb 8, 2022 – Mar 30, 2022 Page 1 of 2

Subsystems (4)

v2 of 5 Superseded Latest is v5 →

lore
Share & tools
lore
#17 lore raw

PATCH v2 7/32 x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs

In reply to Reinette Chatre

By default a write page fault on a present PTE inherits the permissions of the VMA.

When using SGX2, enclave page permissions maintained in the hardware's Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) may change after a VMA accessing the page is created. A VMA's permissions may thus be more relaxed than the EPCM permissions even though the VMA was originally created not to have more relaxed permissions. Following the default behavior during a page fault on a present PTE while the VMA permissions are more relaxed than the EPCM permissions would result in the PTE for an enclave page to be writable even though the page is not writable according to the EPCM permissions.

The kernel should not allow writing to a page if that page is not
writable: the PTE should accurately reflect the EPCM permissions while not being more relaxed than the VMA permissions.

Do not blindly accept VMA permissions on a page fault due to a write attempt to a present PTE. Install a pfn_mkwrite() handler that ensures that the VMA permissions agree with the EPCM permissions in this regard.

Before and after page fault flow scenarios
==========================================

Consider the following scenario that will be possible when using SGX2:
* An enclave page exists with RW EPCM permissions.
* A RW VMA maps the range spanning the enclave page.
* The enclave page's EPCM permissions are changed to read-only.
* There is no PTE for the enclave page.

Considering that the PTE is not present in the scenario, user space will observe the following when attempting to write to the enclave page from within the enclave:
1) Instruction writing to enclave page is run from within the enclave.
2) A page fault with second and third bits set (0x6) is encountered and handled by the SGX handler sgx_vma_fault() that installs a read-only page table entry following previous patch that installs a PTE with permissions that VMA and enclave agree on (read-only in this case).
3) Instruction writing to enclave page is re-attempted.
4) A page fault with first three bits set (0x7) is encountered and transparently (from SGX driver and user space perspective) handled by the kernel with the PTE made writable because the VMA is writable.
5) Instruction writing to enclave page is re-attempted.
6) Since the EPCM permissions prevents writing to the page a new page fault is encountered, this time with the SGX flag set in the error code (0x8007). No action is taken by the kernel for this page fault and execution returns to user space.
7) Typically such a fault will be passed on to an application with a signal but if the enclave is entered with the vDSO function provided by the kernel then user space does not receive a signal but instead the vDSO function returns successfully with exception information (vector=14, error code=0x8007, and address) within the exception fields within the vDSO function's struct sgx_enclave_run.

As can be observed it is not possible for user space to write to an enclave page if that page's EPCM permissions do not allow so, no matter what the VMA or PTE allows.

Even so, the kernel should not allow writing to a page if that page is not writable. The PTE should accurately reflect the EPCM permissions.

With a pfn_mkwrite() handler that ensures that the VMA permissions agree with the EPCM permissions user space observes the following when attempting to write to the enclave page from within the enclave:
1) Instruction writing to enclave page is run from within the enclave.
2) A page fault with second and third bits set (0x6) is encountered and handled by the SGX handler sgx_vma_fault() that installs a read-only page table entry following previous patch that installs a PTE with permissions that VMA and enclave agree on (read-only in this case).
3) Instruction writing to enclave page is re-attempted.
4) A page fault with first three bits set (0x7) is encountered and passed to the pfn_mkwrite() handler for consideration. The handler determines that the page should not be writable and returns SIGBUS.
5) Typically such a fault will be passed on to an application with a signal but if the enclave is entered with the vDSO function provided by the kernel then user space does not receive a signal but instead the vDSO function returns successfully with exception information (vector=14, error code=0x7, and address) within the exception fields within the vDSO function's struct sgx_enclave_run.

The accurate exception information supports the SGX runtime, which is virtually always implemented inside a shared library, by providing accurate information in support of its management of the SGX enclave.

---
Changes since V1:
- Highlight in commit message that the behavior cannot happen in existing code but instead is behavior that becomes possible with SGX2 (Jarkko).
- Reword commit message and remove the Q&A format (Jarkko).

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +42 -0
index b6105d9e7c46..1ba01c75a579 100644
@@ -184,6 +184,47 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
 }
 
+/*
+ * A fault occurred while writing to a present enclave PTE. Since PTE is
+ * present this will not be handled by sgx_vma_fault(). VMA may allow
+ * writing to the page while enclave (as based on EPCM permissions) does
+ * not. Do not follow the default of inheriting VMA permissions in this
+ * regard, ensure enclave also allows writing to the page.
+ */
+static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	struct sgx_encl *encl;
+	vm_fault_t ret = 0;
+
+	encl = vma->vm_private_data;
+
+	/*
+	 * It's very unlikely but possible that allocating memory for the
+	 * mm_list entry of a forked process failed in sgx_vma_open(). When
+	 * this happens, vm_private_data is set to NULL.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!encl))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+	entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
+	if (!entry) {
+		ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!(entry->vm_max_prot_bits & VM_WRITE))
+		ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static void sgx_vma_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
@@ -381,6 +422,7 @@ const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = {
 	.mprotect = sgx_vma_mprotect,
 	.open = sgx_vma_open,
 	.access = sgx_vma_access,
+	.pfn_mkwrite = sgx_vma_pfn_mkwrite,
 };
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#18 lore raw

PATCH v2 8/32 x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Enclave creators declare their enclave page permissions (EPCM permissions) at the time the pages are added to the enclave. These page permissions are the vetted permissible accesses of the enclave pages and stashed off (in struct sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits) for later comparison with enclave PTEs and VMAs.

Current permission support assume that EPCM permissions remain static for the lifetime of the enclave. This is about to change with the addition of support for SGX2 where the EPCM permissions of enclave pages belonging to an initialized enclave may change during the enclave's lifetime.

Support for changing of EPCM permissions should continue to respect the vetted maximum protection bits maintained in sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits. Towards this end, add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits in preparation for support of enclave page permission changes. sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits reflect the active EPCM permissions of an enclave page and are not to exceed sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits.

Two permission fields are used: sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits reflects the current EPCM permissions and is used to manage the page table entries while sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits contains the vetted maximum protection bits and is used to guide which EPCM permissions are allowed in the upcoming SGX2 permission changing support (it guides what values sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits may have).

Consider this example how sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits and sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits are used:

(1) Add an enclave page with secinfo of RW to an uninitialized enclave:

    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = RW

    At this point RW VMAs would be allowed to access this page and PTEs
    would allow write access as guided by
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits.

(2) User space invokes SGX2 to change the EPCM permissions to read-only.

    This is allowed because sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW:
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = R

    At this point only new read-only VMAs would be allowed to access
    this page and PTEs would not allow write access as guided
    by sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits.

(3) User space invokes SGX2 to change the EPCM permissions to RX.

    This will not be supported by the kernel because
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW:
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = R

(3) User space invokes SGX2 to change the EPCM permissions to RW.

    This will be allowed because sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW:
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = RW

    At this point RW VMAs would again be allowed to access this page
    and PTEs would allow write access as guided by
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits.

struct sgx_encl_page hosting this information is maintained for each enclave page so the space consumed by the struct is important. The existing sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits is already unsigned long while only using three bits. Transition to a bitfield for the two members containing protection bits.

---
Changes since V1:
- Add snippet to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst that details the difference between vm_max_prot_bits and vm_run_prot_bits (Andy and Jarkko).
- Change subject line (Jarkko).
- Refer to actual variables instead of using English rephrasing - sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits instead of "runtime protection bits" (Jarkko).
- Add information in commit message on why two fields are needed (Jarkko).

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst       | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c  |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c |  6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +10 -0
index 5659932728a5..9df620b59f83 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ The relationships between the different permission masks are:
 * PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
   relaxed than the VMA permissions.
 
+During runtime the EPCM permissions of enclave pages belonging to an
+initialized enclave can change on systems supporting SGX2. In support
+of these runtime changes the kernel maintains (for each enclave page)
+the most permissive EPCM permission mask allowed by policy as
+the ``vm_max_prot_bits`` of that page. EPCM permissions are not allowed
+to be relaxed beyond ``vm_max_prot_bits``.  The kernel also maintains
+the currently active EPCM permissions of an enclave page as its
+``vm_run_prot_bits`` to ensure PTEs and new VMAs respect the active
+EPCM permission values.
+
 On systems supporting SGX2 EPCM permissions may change while the
 enclave page belongs to a VMA without impacting the VMA permissions.
 This means that a running VMA may appear to allow access to an enclave
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +3 -3
index 1ba01c75a579..a980d8458949 100644
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	 * exceed the VMA permissions.
 	 */
 	vm_prot_bits = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
-	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
+	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_run_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
 	/*
 	 * Add VM_SHARED so that PTE is made writable right away if VMA
 	 * and EPCM are writable (no COW in SGX).
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (!(entry->vm_max_prot_bits & VM_WRITE))
+	if (!(entry->vm_run_prot_bits & VM_WRITE))
 		ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
 
 out:
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 	xas_lock(&xas);
 	xas_for_each(&xas, page, PFN_DOWN(end - 1)) {
-		if (~page->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) {
+		if (~page->vm_run_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) {
 			ret = -EACCES;
 			break;
 		}
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +2 -1
index fec43ca65065..dc262d843411 100644
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
 
 struct sgx_encl_page {
 	unsigned long desc;
-	unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits;
+	unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits:8;
+	unsigned long vm_run_prot_bits:8;
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +6 -0
index 83df20e3e633..7e0819a89532 100644
@@ -197,6 +197,12 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	/* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
 
+	/*
+	 * At time of allocation, the runtime protection bits are the same
+	 * as the maximum protection bits.
+	 */
+	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits;
+
 	return encl_page;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#27 lore raw

PATCH v2 15/32 x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions

In reply to Reinette Chatre

In the initial (SGX1) version of SGX, pages in an enclave need to be created with permissions that support all usages of the pages, from the time the enclave is initialized until it is unloaded. For example, pages used by a JIT compiler or when code needs to otherwise be relocated need to always have RWX permissions.

With the SGX2 function ENCLU[EMODPE] an enclave is able to relax the EPCM permissions of its pages after the enclave is initialized. Relaxing EPCM permissions is not possible from outside the enclave, including from the kernel. The kernel does control the PTEs though and the enclave still depends on the kernel to install PTEs with the new relaxed permissions before it (the enclave) can access the pages using the new permissions.

Introduce ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS to support relaxing of EPCM permissions done from within the enclave. With this ioctl() the user specifies a page range and the permissions to be applied to all pages in the provided range. After checking the new permissions (more detail below) the PTEs are reset and it is ensured that any new PTEs will contain the new, relaxed, permissions.

The permission change request could fail on any page within the provided range. To support partial success the ioctl() returns an error code based on failures encountered by the kernel and the number of pages that were successfully changed.

Checking user provided new permissions
======================================

Enclave page permission changes need to be approached with care and for this reason permission changes are only allowed if the new permissions are the same or more restrictive that the vetted permissions. Thus, even though an enclave is able to relax the EPCM permissions of its pages beyond what was originally vetted, the kernel will not. The kernel will only install PTEs that respect the vetted enclave page permissions.

For example, enclave pages with vetted EPCM permissions in brackets below are allowed to have PTE permissions as follows:
* (RWX) R => RW => RX => RWX
* (RW) R => RW
* (RX) R => RX

---
Changes since V1:
- Change terminology to use "relax" instead of "extend" to refer to the case when enclave page permissions are added (Dave).
- Use ioctl() in commit message (Dave).
- Add examples on what permissions would be allowed (Dave).
- Split enclave page permission changes into two ioctl()s, one for permission restricting (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS) and one for permission relaxing (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS) (Jarkko).
- In support of the ioctl() name change the following names have been changed:
struct sgx_page_modp -> struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm sgx_ioc_page_modp() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm() sgx_page_modp() -> sgx_enclave_relax_perm()
- ioctl() takes entire secinfo as input instead of
page permissions only (Jarkko).
- Fix kernel-doc to include () in function name.
- Introduce small helper to check for SGX2 readiness instead of duplicating the same two checks in every SGX2 supporting ioctl().
- Fixups in comments
- Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for Documentation/x86/sgx.rst.
- Remove redundant comment.
- Make explicit which member of struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm is for output (Dave).

 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h |  19 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 218 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +19 -0
index f4b81587e90b..5c678b27bb72 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_provision)
 #define SGX_IOC_VEPC_REMOVE_ALL \
 	_IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS \
+	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -76,6 +78,23 @@ struct sgx_enclave_provision {
 	__u64 fd;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm - parameters for ioctl
+ *                                 %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS
+ * @offset:	starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
+ *		address defined in SECS)
+ * @length:	length of memory (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data containing the new permission bits
+ *		for pages in range described by @offset and @length
+ * @count:	(output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm {
+	__u64 offset;
+	__u64 length;
+	__u64 secinfo;
+	__u64 count;
+};
+
 struct sgx_enclave_run;
 
 /**
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +199 -0

211 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/32 x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODPR function

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Add a wrapper for the EMODPR ENCLS leaf function used to restrict enclave page permissions as maintained in the SGX hardware's Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM).

EMODPR:
1) Updates the EPCM permissions of an enclave page by treating the new permissions as a mask - supplying a value that relaxes EPCM permissions has no effect.
2) Sets the PR bit in the EPCM entry of the enclave page to indicate that permission restriction is in progress. The bit is reset by the enclave by invoking ENCLU leaf function EACCEPT or EACCEPTCOPY.

The enclave may access the page throughout the entire process if conforming to the EPCM permissions for the enclave page.

After performing the permission restriction by issuing EMODPR the kernel needs to collaborate with the hardware to ensure that all logical processors sees the new restricted permissions. This is required for the enclave's EACCEPT/EACCEPTCOPY to succeed and is accomplished with the ETRACK flow.

Expand enum sgx_return_code with the possible EMODPR return values.

---
Changes since V1:
- Split original patch ("x86/sgx: Add wrappers for SGX2 functions") in three to introduce the SGX2 functions separately (Jarkko).
- Rewrite commit message to include how the EPCM within the hardware is changed by the SGX2 function as well as the calling conditions (Jarkko).
- Make short description more specific to which permissions (EPCM permissions) the function modifies.

 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h      | 5 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +5 -0
index 3f9334ef67cd..d67810b50a81 100644
@@ -65,17 +65,22 @@ enum sgx_encls_function {
 
 /**
  * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV
+ * %SGX_EPC_PAGE_CONFLICT:	Page is being written by other ENCLS function.
  * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED:		Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not
  *				been completed yet.
  * %SGX_CHILD_PRESENT		SECS has child pages present in the EPC.
  * %SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN:	EINITTOKEN is invalid and enclave signer's
  *				public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH.
+ * %SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE:	The EPC page cannot be modified because it
+ *				is in the PENDING or MODIFIED state.
  * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT:		An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received
  */
 enum sgx_return_code {
+	SGX_EPC_PAGE_CONFLICT		= 7,
 	SGX_NOT_TRACKED			= 11,
 	SGX_CHILD_PRESENT		= 13,
 	SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN		= 16,
+	SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE		= 20,
 	SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT		= 128,
 };
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +6 -0
index 0e22fa8f77c5..2b091912f038 100644
@@ -215,4 +215,10 @@ static inline int __ewb(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr,
 	return __encls_ret_3(EWB, pginfo, addr, va);
 }
 
+/* Restrict the EPCM permissions of an EPC page. */
+static inline int __emodpr(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr)
+{
+	return __encls_ret_2(EMODPR, secinfo, addr);
+}
+
 #endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/32 x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODT function

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Add a wrapper for the EMODT ENCLS leaf function used to change the type of an enclave page as maintained in the SGX hardware's Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM).

EMODT:
1) Updates the EPCM page type of the enclave page.
2) Sets the MODIFIED bit in the EPCM entry of the enclave page. This bit is reset by the enclave by invoking ENCLU leaf function EACCEPT or EACCEPTCOPY.

Access from within the enclave to the enclave page is not possible while the MODIFIED bit is set.

After changing the enclave page type by issuing EMODT the kernel needs to collaborate with the hardware to ensure that no logical processor continues to hold a reference to the changed page. This is required to ensure no required security checks are circumvented and is required for the enclave's EACCEPT/EACCEPTCOPY to succeed. Ensuring that no references to the changed page remain is accomplished with the ETRACK flow.

---
Changes since V1:
- Split original patch ("x86/sgx: Add wrappers for SGX2 functions") in three to introduce the SGX2 functions separately (Jarkko).
- Rewrite commit message to include how the EPCM within the hardware is changed by the SGX2 function as well as the calling conditions (Jarkko).

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +6 -0
index 2b091912f038..7a1ecf704ec1 100644
@@ -221,4 +221,10 @@ static inline int __emodpr(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr)
 	return __encls_ret_2(EMODPR, secinfo, addr);
 }
 
+/* Change the type of an EPC page. */
+static inline int __emodt(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr)
+{
+	return __encls_ret_2(EMODT, secinfo, addr);
+}
+
 #endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#29 lore raw

PATCH v2 16/32 x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Reinette Chatre

In the initial (SGX1) version of SGX, pages in an enclave need to be created with permissions that support all usages of the pages, from the time the enclave is initialized until it is unloaded. For example, pages used by a JIT compiler or when code needs to otherwise be relocated need to always have RWX permissions.

SGX2 includes a new function ENCLS[EMODPR] that is run from the kernel and can be used to restrict the EPCM permissions of regular enclave pages within an initialized enclave.

Introduce ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS to support restricting EPCM permissions. With this ioctl() the user specifies a page range and the permissions to be applied to all pages in the provided range. After checking the new permissions (more detail below) the page table entries are reset and any new page table entries will contain the new, restricted, permissions. ENCLS[EMODPR] is run to restrict the EPCM permissions followed by the ENCLS[ETRACK] flow that will ensure no cached linear-to-physical address mappings to the changed pages remain.

It is possible for the permission change request to fail on any page within the provided range, either with an error encountered by the kernel or by the SGX hardware while running ENCLS[EMODPR]. To support partial success the ioctl() returns an error code based on failures encountered by the kernel as well as two result output parameters: one for the number of pages that were successfully changed and one for the SGX return code.

Checking user provided new permissions
======================================

Enclave page permission changes need to be approached with care and for this reason permission changes are only allowed if the new permissions are the same or more restrictive that the vetted permissions. No additional checking is done to ensure that the permissions are actually being restricted. This is because the enclave may have relaxed the EPCM permissions from within the enclave without letting the kernel know. An attempt to relax permissions using this call will be ignored by the hardware.

For example, together with the support for relaxing of EPCM permissions, enclave pages added with the vetted permissions in brackets below are allowed to have permissions as follows:
* (RWX) => RW => R => RX => RWX
* (RW) => R => RW
* (RX) => R => RX

---
Changes since V1:
- Change terminology to use "relax" instead of "extend" to refer to the case when enclave page permissions are added (Dave).
- Use ioctl() in commit message (Dave).
- Add examples on what permissions would be allowed (Dave).
- Split enclave page permission changes into two ioctl()s, one for permission restricting (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS) and one for permission relaxing (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS) (Jarkko).
- In support of the ioctl() name change the following names have been changed:
struct sgx_page_modp -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm sgx_ioc_page_modp() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() sgx_page_modp() -> sgx_enclave_restrict_perm()
- ioctl() takes entire secinfo as input instead of
page permissions only (Jarkko).
- Fix kernel-doc to include () in function name.
- Create and use utility for the ETRACK flow.
- Fixups in comments
- Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for Documentation/x86/sgx.rst.
- Remove redundant comment.
- Make explicit which members of struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm are for output (Dave).

 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h |  21 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c  |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 229 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 255 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +21 -0
index 5c678b27bb72..b0ffb80bc67f 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04)
 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS \
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \
+	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x06, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -95,6 +97,25 @@ struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm {
 	__u64 count;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm - parameters for ioctl
+ *                                    %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
+ * @offset:	starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
+ *		address defined in SECS)
+ * @length:	length of memory (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data containing the new permission bits
+ *		for pages in range described by @offset and @length
+ * @result:	(output) SGX result code of ENCLS[EMODPR] function
+ * @count:	(output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm {
+	__u64 offset;
+	__u64 length;
+	__u64 secinfo;
+	__u64 result;
+	__u64 count;
+};
+
 struct sgx_enclave_run;
 
 /**
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +2 -2
index 8da813504249..a5d4a7efb986 100644
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 	return epc_page;
 }
 
-static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr)
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					 unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +3 -0
index cb9f16d457ac..848a28d28d3d 100644
@@ -120,4 +120,7 @@ void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset);
 bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
 void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					 unsigned long addr);
+
 #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +229 -0

241 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#99 lore raw

PATCH v2 18/32 selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page permission changes

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Kernel should not allow permission changes on TCS pages. Add test to confirm this behavior.

---
Changes since V1:
- Adapt test to the kernel interface changes: the ioctl() name change and providing entire secinfo as parameter.
- Rewrite error path to reduce line lengths.

 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +74 -0
index 4f348ed1dc29..1398cd1b0983 100644
@@ -121,6 +121,24 @@ static Elf64_Sym *vdso_symtab_get(struct vdso_symtab *symtab, const char *name)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Return the offset in the enclave where the TCS segment can be found.
+ * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS.
+ */
+static off_t encl_get_tcs_offset(struct encl *encl)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+		struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+		if (i == 0 && seg->prot == (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE))
+			return seg->offset;
+	}
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
 /*
  * Return the offset in the enclave where the data segment can be found.
  * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS, skip that to get info on the
@@ -567,6 +585,62 @@ TEST_F(enclave, pte_permissions)
 	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Modifying permissions of TCS page should not be possible.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, tcs_permissions)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm ioc;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed
+	 * commands.
+	 */
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/* ret == -1 */
+	if (errno_save == ENOTTY)
+		SKIP(return,
+		     "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()");
+	else if (errno_save == ENODEV)
+		SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+
+	/*
+	 * Attempt to make TCS page read-only. This is not allowed and
+	 * should be prevented by the kernel.
+	 */
+	secinfo.flags = PROT_READ;
+	ioc.offset = encl_get_tcs_offset(&self->encl);
+	ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EINVAL);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 0);
+}
+
 /*
  * Enclave page permission test.
  *
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#111 lore raw

PATCH v2 23/32 x86/sgx: Support complete page removal

In reply to Reinette Chatre

The SGX2 page removal flow was introduced in previous patch and is as follows:
1) Change the type of the pages to be removed to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM using the ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE introduced in previous patch.
2) Approve the page removal by running ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave.
3) Initiate actual page removal using the ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES introduced here.

Support the final step of the SGX2 page removal flow with ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES. With this ioctl() the user specifies a page range that should be removed. All pages in the provided range should have the SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM page type and the request will fail with EPERM (Operation not permitted) if a page that does not have the correct type is encountered. Page removal can fail on any page within the provided range. Support partial success by returning the number of pages that were successfully removed.

Since actual page removal will succeed even if ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run from within the enclave the ENCLU[EMODPR] instruction with RWX permissions is used as a no-op mechanism to ensure ENCLU[EACCEPT] was successfully run from within the enclave before the enclave page is removed.

If the user omits running SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES the pages will still be removed when the enclave is unloaded.

---
Changes since V1:
- Update comments to refer to new ioctl() names SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE.
- Fix kernel-doc to have () as part of function name.
- Change name of ioctl():
SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES (Jarkko).
- With the above name change the page removal ioctl() has its name aligned with existing SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES ioctl(). Also align naming of struct and functions:
struct sgx_page_remove -> struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages sgx_page_remove() -> sgx_encl_remove_pages() sgx_ioc_page_remove() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages()
- Use new SGX2 checking helper.
- When loading enclave page, make error code consistent with other instances to help user distinguish between permanent and temporary failures.
- Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for Documentation/x86/sgx.rst.
- Remove redundant comment.
- Use offset/length validation utility.
- Make explicit which member of struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages is for output (Dave).

 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h |  21 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 166 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +21 -0
index 1df91517b612..db969a2a1874 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x06, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm)
 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE \
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x07, struct sgx_enclave_modt)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES \
+	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x08, struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -136,6 +138,25 @@ struct sgx_enclave_modt {
 	__u64 count;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages - %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES parameters
+ * @offset:	starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
+ *		address defined in SECS)
+ * @length:	length of memory (multiple of the page size)
+ * @count:	(output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
+ *
+ * Regular (PT_REG) or TCS (PT_TCS) can be removed from an initialized
+ * enclave if the system supports SGX2. First, the %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE
+ * ioctl() should be used to change the page type to PT_TRIM. After that
+ * succeeds ENCLU[EACCEPT] should be run from within the enclave and then
+ * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES can be used to complete the page removal.
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages {
+	__u64 offset;
+	__u64 length;
+	__u64 count;
+};
+
 struct sgx_enclave_run;
 
 /**
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +145 -0

157 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#119 lore raw

PATCH v2 31/32 x86/sgx: Free up EPC pages directly to support large page ranges

In reply to Reinette Chatre

The page reclaimer ensures availability of EPC pages across all enclaves. In support of this it runs independently from the individual enclaves in order to take locks from the different enclaves as it writes pages to swap.

When needing to load a page from swap an EPC page needs to be available for its contents to be loaded into. Loading an existing enclave page from swap does not reclaim EPC pages directly if none are available, instead the reclaimer is woken when the available EPC pages are found to be below a watermark.

When iterating over a large number of pages in an oversubscribed environment there is a race between the reclaimer woken up and EPC pages reclaimed fast enough for the page operations to proceed.

Ensure there are EPC pages available before attempting to load a page that may potentially be pulled from swap into an available EPC page.

---
Changes since v1:
- Reword commit message.

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c  | 6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h   | 1 +
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +6 -0
index 0ffb07095a80..d8c3c07badb3 100644
@@ -962,6 +962,8 @@ static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
 		addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;
 
+		sgx_direct_reclaim();
+
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
 		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
@@ -1156,6 +1158,8 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modt(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	for (c = 0 ; c < modt->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
 		addr = encl->base + modt->offset + c;
 
+		sgx_direct_reclaim();
+
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
 		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
@@ -1354,6 +1358,8 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	for (c = 0 ; c < params->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
 		addr = encl->base + params->offset + c;
 
+		sgx_direct_reclaim();
+
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
 		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +6 -0
index 6e2cb7564080..545da16bb3ea 100644
@@ -370,6 +370,12 @@ static bool sgx_should_reclaim(unsigned long watermark)
 	       !list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list);
 }
 
+void sgx_direct_reclaim(void)
+{
+	if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES))
+		sgx_reclaim_pages();
+}
+
 static int ksgxd(void *p)
 {
 	set_freezable();
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +1 -0
index b30cee4de903..85cbf103b0dd 100644
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static inline void *sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
 struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void);
 void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 
+void sgx_direct_reclaim(void);
 void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#100 lore raw

PATCH v2 19/32 x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave

In reply to Reinette Chatre

With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with its maximum memory demands allocated. Pages cannot be added to an enclave after it is initialized. SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EAUG], that can be used to add pages to an initialized enclave. With SGX2 the enclave still needs to set aside address space for its maximum memory demands during enclave creation, but all pages need not be added before enclave initialization. Pages can be added during enclave runtime.

Add support for dynamically adding pages to an initialized enclave, architecturally limited to RW permission. Add pages via the page fault handler at the time an enclave address without a backing enclave page is accessed, potentially directly reclaiming pages if no free pages are available.

The enclave is still required to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on the page before it can be used. A useful flow is for the enclave to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on an uninitialized address. This will trigger the page fault handler that will add the enclave page and return execution to the enclave to repeat the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction, this time successful.

If the enclave accesses an uninitialized address in another way, for example by expanding the enclave stack to a page that has not yet been added, then the page fault handler would add the page on the first write but upon returning to the enclave the instruction that triggered the page fault would be repeated and since ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run yet it would trigger a second page fault, this time with the SGX flag set in the page fault error code. This can only be recovered by entering the enclave again and directly running the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction on the now initialized address.

Accessing an uninitialized address from outside the enclave also triggers this flow but the page will remain inaccessible (access will result in #PF) until accepted from within the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT].

The page is added with the architecturally constrained RW permissions as runtime as well as maximum allowed permissions. It is understood that there are some use cases, for example code relocation, that requires RWX maximum permissions. Supporting these use cases require guidance from user space policy before such maximum permissions can be allowed. Integration with user policy is deferred.

---
Changes since V1:
- Fix subject line "to initialized" -> "to an initialized" (Jarkko).
- Move text about hardware's PENDING state to the patch that introduces the ENCLS[EAUG] wrapper (Jarkko).
- Ensure kernel-doc uses brackets when referring to function.

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c  | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c |   4 +-
 3 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +133 -0
index a5d4a7efb986..d1e3ea86b902 100644
@@ -124,6 +124,128 @@ struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	return entry;
 }
 
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_eaug_page() - Dynamically add page to initialized enclave
+ * @vma:	VMA obtained from fault info from where page is accessed
+ * @encl:	enclave accessing the page
+ * @addr:	address that triggered the page fault
+ *
+ * When an initialized enclave accesses a page with no backing EPC page
+ * on a SGX2 system then the EPC can be added dynamically via the SGX2
+ * ENCLS[EAUG] instruction.
+ *
+ * Returns: Appropriate vm_fault_t: VM_FAULT_NOPAGE when PTE was installed
+ * successfully, VM_FAULT_SIGBUS or VM_FAULT_OOM as error otherwise.
+ */
+static vm_fault_t sgx_encl_eaug_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				     struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo = {0};
+	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+	struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+	unsigned long phys_addr;
+	unsigned long prot;
+	vm_fault_t vmret;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!encl_page)
+		return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+
+	encl_page->desc = addr;
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+
+	/*
+	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
+	 * be created with RW permissions.
+	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
+	 * of RWX.
+	 */
+	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;
+
+	epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, true);
+	if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+		kfree(encl_page);
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+	}
+
+	va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl);
+	if (IS_ERR(va_page)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(va_page);
+		goto err_out_free;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy comment from sgx_encl_add_page() to maintain guidance in
+	 * this similar flow:
+	 * Adding to encl->va_pages must be done under encl->lock.  Ditto for
+	 * deleting (via sgx_encl_shrink()) in the error path.
+	 */
+	if (va_page)
+		list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+
+	ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
+			encl_page, GFP_KERNEL);
+	/*
+	 * If ret == -EBUSY then page was created in another flow while
+	 * running without encl->lock
+	 */
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out_unlock;
+
+	pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+	pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
+	pginfo.metadata = 0;
+
+	ret = __eaug(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out;
+
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+	encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+	encl_page->type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG;
+	encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+
+	sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page);
+
+	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(epc_page);
+	/*
+	 * Do not undo everything when creating PTE entry fails - next #PF
+	 * would find page ready for a PTE.
+	 * PAGE_SHARED because protection is forced to be RW above and COW
+	 * is not supported.
+	 */
+	vmret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				    PAGE_SHARED);
+	if (vmret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+
+err_out:
+	xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
+
+err_out_unlock:
+	sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page);
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+err_out_free:
+	sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+	kfree(encl_page);
+
+	return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+}
+
 static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
@@ -145,6 +267,17 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	if (unlikely(!encl))
 		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
 
+	/*
+	 * The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they
+	 * are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and
+	 * the system supports SGX2 then it is possible to dynamically add
+	 * a new enclave page. This is only possible for an initialized
+	 * enclave that will be checked for right away.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2) &&
+	    (!xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr))))
+		return sgx_encl_eaug_page(vma, encl, addr);
+
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
 	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +2 -0
index 848a28d28d3d..1b6ce1da7c92 100644
@@ -123,4 +123,6 @@ void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 					 unsigned long addr);
 
+struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl);
+void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
 #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2 -2
index 23bdf558b231..58ff62a1fb00 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 #include "encl.h"
 #include "encls.h"
 
-static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
 {
 	struct sgx_va_page *va_page = NULL;
 	void *err;
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
 	return va_page;
 }
 
-static void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
+void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
 {
 	encl->page_cnt--;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#112 lore raw

PATCH v2 24/32 Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management section

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Enclave runtime management is introduced following the pattern of the section describing enclave building. Provide a brief summary of enclave runtime management, pointing to the functions implementing the ioctl()s that will contain details within their kernel-doc.

---
Changes since V1:
- New patch.

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +16 -0
index 9df620b59f83..4059efbb4d2e 100644
@@ -138,6 +138,22 @@ pages and establish enclave page permissions.
                sgx_ioc_enclave_init
                sgx_ioc_enclave_provision
 
+Enclave runtime management
+--------------------------
+
+Systems supporting SGX2 additionally support changes to initialized
+enclaves: modifying enclave page permissions and type, and dynamically
+adding and removing of enclave pages. When an enclave accesses an address
+within its address range that does not have a backing page then a new
+regular page will be dynamically added to the enclave. The enclave is
+still required to run EACCEPT on the new page before it can be used.
+
+.. kernel-doc:: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+   :functions: sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm
+               sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm
+               sgx_ioc_enclave_modt
+               sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages
+
 Enclave vDSO
 ------------
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#113 lore raw

PATCH v2 25/32 selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point

In reply to Reinette Chatre

The test enclave (test_encl.elf) is built with two initialized Thread Control Structures (TCS) included in the binary. Both TCS are initialized with the same entry point, encl_entry, that correctly computes the absolute address of the stack based on the stack of each TCS that is also built into the binary.

A new TCS can be added dynamically to the enclave and requires to be initialized with an entry point used to enter the enclave. Since the existing entry point, encl_entry, assumes that the TCS and its stack exists at particular offsets within the binary it is not able to handle a dynamically added TCS and its stack.

Introduce a new entry point, encl_dyn_entry, that initializes the absolute address of that thread's stack to the address immediately preceding the TCS itself. It is now possible to dynamically add a contiguous memory region to the enclave with the new stack preceding the new TCS. With the new TCS initialized with encl_dyn_entry as entry point the absolute address of the stack is computed correctly on entry.

---
No changes since V1.

 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S +6 -0
index 82fb0dfcbd23..03ae0f57e29d 100644
@@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ encl_entry:
 	# TCS #2. By adding the value of encl_stack to it, we get
 	# the absolute address for the stack.
 	lea	(encl_stack)(%rbx), %rax
+	jmp encl_entry_core
+encl_dyn_entry:
+	# Entry point for dynamically created TCS page expected to follow
+	# its stack directly.
+	lea -1(%rbx), %rax
+encl_entry_core:
 	xchg	%rsp, %rax
 	push	%rax
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#108 lore raw

PATCH v2 21/32 selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Enclave pages can be added to an initialized enclave when an address belonging to the enclave but without a backing page is accessed from within the enclave.

Accessing memory without a backing enclave page from within an enclave can be in different ways:
1) Pre-emptively run ENCLU[EACCEPT]. Since the addition of a page always needs to be accepted by the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT] this flow is efficient since the first execution of ENCLU[EACCEPT] triggers the addition of the page and when execution returns to the same instruction the second execution would be successful as an acceptance of the page.

2) A direct read or write. The flow where a direct read or write triggers the page addition execution cannot resume from the instruction (read/write) that triggered the fault but instead the enclave needs to be entered at a different entry point to run needed ENCLU[EACCEPT] before execution can return to the original entry point and the read/write instruction that faulted.

Add tests for both flows.

---
Changes since v1:
- Replace __cpuid() definition and usage with __cpuid_count().
- Fix accuracy of comments.

 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 243 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 243 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +243 -0
index 1398cd1b0983..68285603b3f0 100644
@@ -86,6 +86,15 @@ static bool vdso_get_symtab(void *addr, struct vdso_symtab *symtab)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static inline int sgx2_supported(void)
+{
+	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+	__cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0x0, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
+
+	return eax & 0x2;
+}
+
 static unsigned long elf_sym_hash(const char *name)
 {
 	unsigned long h = 0, high;
@@ -882,4 +891,238 @@ TEST_F(enclave, epcm_permissions)
 	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Test the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via writing to
+ * a page belonging to the enclave's address space but was not added
+ * during enclave creation.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, augment)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	size_t total_size = 0;
+	void *addr;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!sgx2_supported())
+		SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported");
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+		struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+		total_size += seg->size;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded
+	 * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes
+	 * and test_encl does not consume it all.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size);
+
+	/*
+	 * Create memory mapping for the page that will be added. New
+	 * memory mapping is for one page right after all existing
+	 * mappings.
+	 */
+	addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE,
+		    PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+		    MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, self->encl.fd, 0);
+	EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+	self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+	self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+	self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Attempt to write to the new page from within enclave.
+	 * Expected to fail since page is not (yet) part of the enclave.
+	 * The first #PF will trigger the addition of the page to the
+	 * enclave, but since the new page needs an EACCEPT from within the
+	 * enclave before it can be used it would not be possible
+	 * to successfully return to the failing instruction. This is the
+	 * cause of the second #PF captured here having the SGX bit set,
+	 * it is from hardware preventing the page from being used.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, (unsigned long)addr);
+
+	if (self->run.exception_error_code == 0x6) {
+		munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+		SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave");
+	}
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8007);
+
+	self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+	self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+	self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+	/* Handle AEX by running EACCEPT from new entry point. */
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	/* Can now return to main TCS to resume execution. */
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0,
+					 ERESUME, 0, 0,
+					 &self->run),
+		  0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to,
+	 * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test for the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via a
+ * pre-emptive run of EACCEPT on page to be added.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, augment_via_eaccept)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	size_t total_size = 0;
+	void *addr;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!sgx2_supported())
+		SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported");
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+		struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+		total_size += seg->size;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded
+	 * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes while
+	 * test_encl does not consume it all.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size);
+
+	/*
+	 * mmap() a page at end of existing enclave to be used for dynamic
+	 * EPC page.
+	 */
+
+	addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE,
+		    PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED,
+		    self->encl.fd, 0);
+	EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+	self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+	self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+	self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Run EACCEPT on new page to trigger the #PF->EAUG->EACCEPT(again
+	 * without a #PF). All should be transparent to userspace.
+	 */
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 &&
+	    self->run.exception_error_code == 4 &&
+	    self->run.exception_addr == self->encl.encl_base + total_size) {
+		munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+		SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave");
+	}
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * New page should be accessible from within enclave - attempt to
+	 * write to it.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to,
+	 * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
 TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#117 lore raw

PATCH v2 29/32 selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Removing a page from an initialized enclave involves three steps:
(1) the user requests changing the page type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl(), (2) on success the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction is run from within the enclave to accept the page removal, (3) the user initiates the actual removal of the page via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl().

Test two possible invalid accesses during the page removal flow:
* Test the behavior when a request to remove the page by changing its type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM completes successfully but instead of executing ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave the enclave attempts to read from the page. Even though the page is accessible from the page table entries its type is SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM and thus not accessible according to SGX. The expected behavior is a page fault with the SGX flag set in the error code.
* Test the behavior when the page type is changed successfully and ENCLU[EACCEPT] was run from within the enclave. The final ioctl(), SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, is omitted and replaced with an attempt to access the page. Even though the page is accessible from the page table entries its type is SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM and thus not accessible according to SGX. The expected behavior is a page fault with the SGX flag set in the error code.

---
Changes since V1:
- Update to support ioctl() name change (SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE) and provide secinfo as parameter instead of just page type (Jarkko).
- Use ioctl() instead of ioctl (Dave).

 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 247 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +247 -0
index e9513ced1853..239d3c9df169 100644
@@ -1588,4 +1588,251 @@ TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_no_eaccept)
 	EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 0);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Request enclave page removal but instead of correctly following with
+ * EACCEPT a read attempt to page is made from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	struct sgx_enclave_modt ioc;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	unsigned long data_start;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+	 * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+	 */
+	memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &ioc);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOTTY)
+			SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl()");
+		else if (errno == ENODEV)
+			SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+	 * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+	 * enclave.
+	 */
+	data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+		     encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+	 * removing it.
+	 *
+	 * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+	 * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */
+	memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+	secinfo.flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8;
+	ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read from page that was just removed.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the
+	 * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is
+	 * expected.
+	 */
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request enclave page removal and correctly follow with
+ * EACCEPT but do not follow with removal ioctl() but instead a read attempt
+ * to removed page is made from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access_after_eaccept)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	struct sgx_enclave_modt ioc;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	unsigned long data_start;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+	 * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+	 */
+	memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &ioc);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOTTY)
+			SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl()");
+		else if (errno == ENODEV)
+			SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+	 * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+	 * enclave.
+	 */
+	data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+		     encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+	 * removing it.
+	 *
+	 * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+	 * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */
+	memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+	secinfo.flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8;
+	ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096);
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)data_start;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	/* Skip ioctl() to remove page. */
+
+	/*
+	 * Read from page that was just removed.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the
+	 * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is
+	 * expected.
+	 */
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+}
+
 TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#24 lore raw

PATCH v2 12/32 x86/sgx: Make sgx_ipi_cb() available internally

In reply to Reinette Chatre

The ETRACK function followed by an IPI to all CPUs within an enclave is a common pattern with more frequent use in support of SGX2.

Make the (empty) IPI callback function available internally in preparation for usage by SGX2.

---
Changes since V1:
- Replace "for more usages" by "for usage by SGX2" (Jarkko)

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h  | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +1 -1
index ce9e87d5f8ec..6e2cb7564080 100644
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static int __sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, void *va_slot,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info)
+void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info)
 {
 }
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +2 -0
index 0f17def9fe6f..b30cee4de903 100644
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim);
 
+void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
 int __init sgx_vepc_init(void);
 #else
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/32 x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EAUG function

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Add a wrapper for the EAUG ENCLS leaf function used to add a page to an initialized enclave.

EAUG:
1) Stores all properties of the new enclave page in the SGX hardware's Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM).
2) Sets the PENDING bit in the EPCM entry of the enclave page. This bit is cleared by the enclave by invoking ENCLU leaf function EACCEPT or EACCEPTCOPY.

Access from within the enclave to the new enclave page is not possible until the PENDING bit is cleared.

---
Changes since V1:
- Split original patch ("x86/sgx: Add wrappers for SGX2 functions") in three to introduce the SGX2 functions separately (Jarkko).
- Rewrite commit message to include how the EPCM within the hardware is changed by the SGX2 function as well as any calling conditions (Jarkko).

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +6 -0
index 7a1ecf704ec1..99004b02e2ed 100644
@@ -227,4 +227,10 @@ static inline int __emodt(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr)
 	return __encls_ret_2(EMODT, secinfo, addr);
 }
 
+/* Zero a page of EPC memory and add it to an initialized enclave. */
+static inline int __eaug(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr)
+{
+	return __encls_2(EAUG, pginfo, addr);
+}
+
 #endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH v2 6/32 x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions

In reply to Reinette Chatre

=== Summary ===

An SGX VMA can only be created if its permissions are the same or weaker than the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) permissions. After VMA creation this same rule is again enforced by the page fault handler:
faulted enclave pages are required to have equal or more relaxed EPCM permissions than the VMA permissions.

On SGX1 systems the additional enforcement in the page fault handler is redundant and on SGX2 systems it incorrectly prevents access. On SGX1 systems it is unnecessary to repeat the enforcement of the permission rule. The rule used during original VMA creation will ensure that any access attempt will use correct permissions. With SGX2 the EPCM permissions of a page can change after VMA creation resulting in the VMA permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions and the page fault handler incorrectly blocking valid access attempts.

Enable the VMA's pages to remain accessible while ensuring that the PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions but not be more relaxed than the VMA permissions.

=== Full Changelog ===

An SGX enclave is an area of memory where parts of an application can reside. First an enclave is created and loaded (from non-enclave memory) with the code and data of an application, then user space can map (mmap()) the enclave memory to be able to enter the enclave at its defined entry points for execution within it.

The hardware maintains a secure structure, the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), that tracks the contents of the enclave. Of interest here is its tracking of the enclave page permissions. When a page is loaded into the enclave its permissions are specified and recorded in the EPCM. In parallel the kernel maintains permissions within the page table entries (PTEs) and the rule is that PTE permissions are not allowed to be more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

A new mapping (mmap()) of enclave memory can only succeed if the mapping has the same or weaker permissions than the permissions that were vetted during enclave creation. This is enforced by sgx_encl_may_map() that is called on the mmap() as well as mprotect() paths. This rule remains.

One feature of SGX2 is to support the modification of EPCM permissions after enclave initialization. Enclave pages may thus already be part of a VMA at the time their EPCM permissions are changed resulting in the VMA's permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

Allow permissions of existing VMAs to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions in preparation for dynamic EPCM permission changes made possible in SGX2. New VMAs that attempt to have more relaxed permissions than EPCM permissions continue to be unsupported.

Reasons why permissions of existing VMAs are allowed to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions instead of dynamically changing VMA permissions when EPCM permissions change are:
1) Changing VMA permissions involve splitting VMAs which is an operation that can fail. Additionally changing EPCM permissions of a range of pages could also fail on any of the pages involved. Handling these error cases causes problems. For example, if an EPCM permission change fails and the VMA has already been split then it is not possible to undo the VMA split nor possible to undo the EPCM permission changes that did succeed before the failure.
2) The kernel has little insight into the user space where EPCM permissions are controlled from. For example, a RW page may be made RO just before it is made RX and splitting the VMAs while the VMAs may change soon is unnecessary.

Remove the extra permission check called on a page fault (vm_operations_struct->fault) or during debugging (vm_operations_struct->access) when loading the enclave page from swap that ensures that the VMA permissions are not more relaxed than the EPCM permissions. Since a VMA could only exist if it passed the original permission checks during mmap() and a VMA may indeed have more relaxed permissions than the EPCM permissions this extra permission check is no longer appropriate.

With the permission check removed, ensure that PTEs do
not blindly inherit the VMA permissions but instead the permissions that the VMA and EPCM agree on. PTEs for writable pages (from VMA and enclave perspective) are installed with the writable bit set, reducing the need for this additional flow to the permission mismatch cases handled next.

---
Changes since V1:
- Reword commit message (Jarkko).
- Use "relax" instead of "exceed" when referring to permissions (Dave).
- Add snippet to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst that highlights the relationship between VMA, EPCM, and PTE permissions on SGX systems (Andy).

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst      | 10 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +10 -0
index 89ff924b1480..5659932728a5 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ The relationships between the different permission masks are:
 * PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
   relaxed than the VMA permissions.
 
+On systems supporting SGX2 EPCM permissions may change while the
+enclave page belongs to a VMA without impacting the VMA permissions.
+This means that a running VMA may appear to allow access to an enclave
+page that is not allowed by its EPCM permissions. For example, when an
+enclave page with RW EPCM permissions is mapped by a RW VMA but is
+subsequently changed to have read-only EPCM permissions. The kernel
+continues to maintain correct access to the enclave page through the
+PTE that will ensure that only access allowed by both the VMA
+and EPCM permissions are permitted.
+
 Application interface
 =====================
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +20 -18
index 48afe96ae0f0..b6105d9e7c46 100644
@@ -91,10 +91,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 }
 
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr,
-						unsigned long vm_flags)
+						unsigned long addr)
 {
-	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
@@ -102,14 +100,6 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	if (!entry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 
-	/*
-	 * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time
-	 * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
-	 * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
-	 */
-	if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-
 	/* Entry successfully located. */
 	if (entry->epc_page) {
 		if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)
@@ -138,7 +128,9 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+	unsigned long page_prot_bits;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	unsigned long vm_prot_bits;
 	unsigned long phys_addr;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	vm_fault_t ret;
@@ -155,7 +147,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
+	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 	if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -167,7 +159,19 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page);
 
-	ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
+	/*
+	 * Insert PTE to match the EPCM page permissions ensured to not
+	 * exceed the VMA permissions.
+	 */
+	vm_prot_bits = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
+	/*
+	 * Add VM_SHARED so that PTE is made writable right away if VMA
+	 * and EPCM are writable (no COW in SGX).
+	 */
+	page_prot_bits |= (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
+	ret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				  vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));
 	if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -295,15 +299,14 @@ static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *pag
  * Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock.
  */
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						   unsigned long addr,
-						   unsigned long vm_flags)
+						   unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
 	for ( ; ; ) {
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 		if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
 			break;
 
@@ -339,8 +342,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
-		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK,
-					      vma->vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK);
 		if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
 			break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#114 lore raw

PATCH v2 26/32 selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation

In reply to Reinette Chatre

The Thread Control Structure (TCS) contains meta-data used by the hardware to save and restore thread specific information when entering/exiting the enclave. A TCS can be added to an initialized enclave by first adding a new regular enclave page, initializing the content of the new page from within the enclave, and then changing that page's type to a TCS.

Support the initialization of a TCS from within the enclave. The variable information needed that should be provided from outside the enclave is the address of the TCS, address of the State Save Area (SSA), and the entry point that the thread should use to enter the enclave. With this information provided all needed fields of a TCS can be initialized.

---
No changes since V1.

 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h   |  8 +++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h +8 -0
index b638eb98c80c..d8587c971941 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum encl_op_type {
 	ENCL_OP_NOP,
 	ENCL_OP_EACCEPT,
 	ENCL_OP_EMODPE,
+	ENCL_OP_INIT_TCS_PAGE,
 	ENCL_OP_MAX,
 };
 
@@ -68,4 +69,11 @@ struct encl_op_emodpe {
 	uint64_t flags;
 };
 
+struct encl_op_init_tcs_page {
+	struct encl_op_header header;
+	uint64_t tcs_page;
+	uint64_t ssa;
+	uint64_t entry;
+};
+
 #endif /* DEFINES_H */
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c +30 -0
index 5b6c65331527..c0d6397295e3 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,35 @@ static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n)
 	return dest;
 }
 
+static void *memset(void *dest, int c, size_t n)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+		((char *)dest)[i] = c;
+
+	return dest;
+}
+
+static void do_encl_init_tcs_page(void *_op)
+{
+	struct encl_op_init_tcs_page *op = _op;
+	void *tcs = (void *)op->tcs_page;
+	uint32_t val_32;
+
+	memset(tcs, 0, 16);			/* STATE and FLAGS */
+	memcpy(tcs + 16, &op->ssa, 8);		/* OSSA */
+	memset(tcs + 24, 0, 4);			/* CSSA */
+	val_32 = 1;
+	memcpy(tcs + 28, &val_32, 4);		/* NSSA */
+	memcpy(tcs + 32, &op->entry, 8);	/* OENTRY */
+	memset(tcs + 40, 0, 24);		/* AEP, OFSBASE, OGSBASE */
+	val_32 = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+	memcpy(tcs + 64, &val_32, 4);		/* FSLIMIT */
+	memcpy(tcs + 68, &val_32, 4);		/* GSLIMIT */
+	memset(tcs + 72, 0, 4024);		/* Reserved */
+}
+
 static void do_encl_op_put_to_buf(void *op)
 {
 	struct encl_op_put_to_buf *op2 = op;
@@ -100,6 +129,7 @@ void encl_body(void *rdi,  void *rsi)
 		do_encl_op_nop,
 		do_encl_eaccept,
 		do_encl_emodpe,
+		do_encl_init_tcs_page,
 	};
 
 	struct encl_op_header *op = (struct encl_op_header *)rdi;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#120 lore raw

PATCH v2 32/32 selftests/sgx: Page removal stress test

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Create enclave with additional heap that consumes all physical SGX memory and then remove it.

Depending on the available SGX memory this test could take a significant time to run (several minutes) as it (1) creates the enclave, (2) changes the type of every page to be trimmed,
(3) enters the enclave once per page to run EACCEPT, before
(4) the pages are finally removed.

---
Changes since V1:
- Exit test completely on first failure of EACCEPT of a removed page. Since this is an oversubscribed test the number of pages on which this is attempted can be significant and in case of failure the per-page error logging would overwhelm the system.
- Update test to call renamed ioctl() (SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE) and provide secinfo as parameter (Jarkko).
- Fixup definitions to be reverse xmas tree.
- Update test to reflect page removal ioctl() and struct name change:
SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE->SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES,
struct sgx_page_remove -> struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages (Jarkko).
- Ensure test is skipped when SGX2 not supported by kernel.
- Cleanup comments.

 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 122 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +122 -0
index 4fe5a0324c97..22abda2696e2 100644
@@ -378,7 +378,129 @@ TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed)
 	EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
 	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
 	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F_TIMEOUT(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed_remove, 900)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+	struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+	struct sgx_enclave_modt modt_ioc;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	struct encl_segment *heap;
+	unsigned long total_mem;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Create enclave with additional heap that is as big as all
+	 * available physical SGX memory.
+	 */
+	total_mem = get_total_epc_mem();
+	ASSERT_NE(total_mem, 0);
+	TH_LOG("Creating an enclave with %lu bytes heap may take a while ...",
+	       total_mem);
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+	 * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+	 */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOTTY)
+			SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl()");
+		else if (errno == ENODEV)
+			SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/* SGX2 is supported by kernel and hardware, test can proceed. */
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	heap = &self->encl.segment_tbl[self->encl.nr_segments - 1];
+
+	put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+	put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+	get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+	get_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+	/* Trim entire heap. */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+	secinfo.flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8;
+	modt_ioc.offset = heap->offset;
+	modt_ioc.length = heap->size;
+	modt_ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+
+	TH_LOG("Changing type of %zd bytes to trimmed may take a while ...",
+	       heap->size);
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, heap->size);
+
+	/* EACCEPT all removed pages. */
+	addr = self->encl.encl_base + heap->offset;
+
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	TH_LOG("Entering enclave to run EACCEPT for each page of %zd bytes may take a while ...",
+	       heap->size);
+	for (i = 0; i < heap->size; i += 4096) {
+		eaccept_op.epc_addr = addr + i;
+		eaccept_op.ret = 0;
 
+		EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+		EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+		EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+		EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+		ASSERT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+		ASSERT_EQ(self->run.function, EEXIT);
+	}
+
+	/* Complete page removal. */
+	memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+	remove_ioc.offset = heap->offset;
+	remove_ioc.length = heap->size;
+
+	TH_LOG("Removing %zd bytes from enclave may take a while ...",
+	       heap->size);
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, heap->size);
 }
 
 TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#21 lore raw

PATCH v2 9/32 x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Using sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() to learn which CPUs might have executed an enclave is useful to ensure that TLBs are cleared when changes are made to enclave pages.

sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is used within the reclaimer when an enclave page is evicted. The upcoming SGX2 support enables changes to be made to enclave pages and will require TLBs to not refer to the changed pages and thus will be needing sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask().

Relocate sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() to be with the rest of the enclave code in encl.c now that it is no longer unique to the reclaimer.

Take care to ensure that any future usage maintains the current context requirement that ETRACK has been called first. Expand the existing comments to highlight this while moving them to a more prominent location before the function.

No functional change.

---
Changes since V1:
- New patch split from original "x86/sgx: Use more generic name for enclave cpumask function" (Jarkko).
- Change subject line (Jarkko).
- Fixup kernel-doc to use brackets in function name.

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 29 ---------------
 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +67 -0
index a980d8458949..687166769ca8 100644
@@ -597,6 +597,73 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() - Query which CPUs might be accessing the enclave
+ * @encl: the enclave
+ *
+ * Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical address
+ * mappings are present before they can succeed. For example, ENCLS[EWB]
+ * copies a page from the enclave page cache to regular main memory but
+ * it fails if it cannot ensure that there are no cached
+ * linear-to-physical address mappings referring to the page.
+ *
+ * SGX hardware flushes all cached linear-to-physical mappings on a CPU
+ * when an enclave is exited via ENCLU[EEXIT] or an Asynchronous Enclave
+ * Exit (AEX). Exiting an enclave will thus ensure cached linear-to-physical
+ * address mappings are cleared but coordination with the tracking done within
+ * the SGX hardware is needed to support the SGX functions that depend on this
+ * cache clearing.
+ *
+ * When the ENCLS[ETRACK] function is issued on an enclave the hardware
+ * tracks threads operating inside the enclave at that time. The SGX
+ * hardware tracking require that all the identified threads must have
+ * exited the enclave in order to flush the mappings before a function such
+ * as ENCLS[EWB] will be permitted
+ *
+ * The following flow is used to support SGX functions that require that
+ * no cached linear-to-physical address mappings are present:
+ * 1) Execute ENCLS[ETRACK] to initiate hardware tracking.
+ * 2) Use this function (sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()) to query which CPUs might be
+ *    accessing the enclave.
+ * 3) Send IPI to identified CPUs, kicking them out of the enclave and
+ *    thus flushing all locally cached linear-to-physical address mappings.
+ * 4) Execute SGX function.
+ *
+ * Context: It is required to call this function after ENCLS[ETRACK].
+ *          This will ensure that if any new mm appears (racing with
+ *          sgx_encl_mm_add()) then the new mm will enter into the
+ *          enclave with fresh linear-to-physical address mappings.
+ *
+ *          It is required that all IPIs are completed before a new
+ *          ENCLS[ETRACK] is issued so be sure to protect steps 1 to 3
+ *          of the above flow with the enclave's mutex.
+ *
+ * Return: cpumask of CPUs that might be accessing @encl
+ */
+const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+	cpumask_t *cpumask = &encl->cpumask;
+	struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+	int idx;
+
+	cpumask_clear(cpumask);
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
+		if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
+			continue;
+
+		cpumask_or(cpumask, cpumask, mm_cpumask(encl_mm->mm));
+
+		mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
+	}
+
+	srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
+
+	return cpumask;
+}
+
 static struct page *sgx_encl_get_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 					      pgoff_t index)
 {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +1 -0
index dc262d843411..44431da21757 100644
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
 
 void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref);
 int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm);
+const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl);
 int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
 			 struct sgx_backing *backing);
 void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +0 -29
index 8e4bc6453d26..2de85f459492 100644
@@ -203,35 +203,6 @@ static void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info)
 {
 }
 
-static const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl)
-{
-	cpumask_t *cpumask = &encl->cpumask;
-	struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
-	int idx;
-
-	/*
-	 * Can race with sgx_encl_mm_add(), but ETRACK has already been
-	 * executed, which means that the CPUs running in the new mm will enter
-	 * into the enclave with a fresh epoch.
-	 */
-	cpumask_clear(cpumask);
-
-	idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
-
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
-		if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
-			continue;
-
-		cpumask_or(cpumask, cpumask, mm_cpumask(encl_mm->mm));
-
-		mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
-	}
-
-	srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
-
-	return cpumask;
-}
-
 /*
  * Swap page to the regular memory transformed to the blocked state by using
  * EBLOCK, which means that it can no longer be referenced (no new TLB entries).
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#26 lore raw

PATCH v2 14/32 x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type

In reply to Reinette Chatre

SGX2 functions are not allowed on all page types. For example, ENCLS[EMODPR] is only allowed on regular SGX enclave pages and ENCLS[EMODPT] is only allowed on TCS and regular pages. If these functions are attempted on another type of page the hardware would trigger a fault.

Keep a record of the SGX page type so that there is more certainty whether an SGX2 instruction can succeed and faults can be treated as real failures.

The page type is a property of struct sgx_encl_page
and thus does not cover the VA page type. VA pages are maintained in separate structures and their type can be determined in a different way. The SGX2 instructions needing the page type do not operate on VA pages and this is thus not a scenario needing to be covered at this time.

With the protection bits consuming 16 bits of the unsigned long there is room available in the bitfield to include the page type information without increasing the space consumed by the struct.

---
Changes since V1:
- Add Acked-by from Jarkko.

 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h      | 3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  | 1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 ++
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +3 -0
index d67810b50a81..eae20fa52b93 100644
@@ -239,6 +239,9 @@ struct sgx_pageinfo {
  * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG:	a regular page
  * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA:	a VA page
  * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM:	a page in trimmed state
+ *
+ * Make sure when making changes to this enum that its values can still fit
+ * in the bitfield within &struct sgx_encl_page
  */
 enum sgx_page_type {
 	SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +1 -0
index 82e21088e68b..cb9f16d457ac 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct sgx_encl_page {
 	unsigned long desc;
 	unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits:8;
 	unsigned long vm_run_prot_bits:8;
+	enum sgx_page_type type:16;
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2 -0
index 6e7cc441156b..b8336d5d9029 100644
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
 		set_bit(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags);
 
 	encl->secs.encl = encl;
+	encl->secs.type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS;
 	encl->base = secs->base;
 	encl->size = secs->size;
 	encl->attributes = secs->attributes;
@@ -350,6 +351,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
 	 */
 	encl_page->encl = encl;
 	encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+	encl_page->type = (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) >> 8;
 	encl->secs_child_cnt++;
 
 	if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#107 lore raw

PATCH v2 20/32 x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Before an enclave is initialized the enclave's memory range is unknown. The enclave's memory range is learned at the time it is created via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl() where the provided memory range is obtained from an earlier mmap() of /dev/sgx_enclave. After an enclave is initialized its memory can be mapped into user space (mmap()) from where it can be entered at its defined entry points.

With the enclave's memory range known after it is initialized there is no reason why it should be possible to map memory outside this range.

Lock down access to the initialized enclave's memory range by denying any attempt to map memory outside its memory range.

Locking down the memory range also makes adding pages to an initialized enclave more efficient. Pages are added to an initialized enclave by accessing memory that belongs to the enclave's memory range but not yet backed by an enclave page. If it is possible for user space to map memory that does not form part of the enclave then an access to this memory would eventually fail. Failures range from a prompt general protection fault if the access was an ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave, or a page fault via the vDSO if it was another access from within the enclave, or a SIGBUS (also resulting from a page fault) if the access was from outside the enclave.

Disallowing invalid memory to be mapped in the first place avoids preventable failures.

---
Changes since V1:
- Add comment (Jarkko).

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +5 -0
index d1e3ea86b902..c20100245411 100644
@@ -403,6 +403,11 @@ int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
 
 	XA_STATE(xas, &encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(start));
 
+	/* Disallow mapping outside enclave's address range. */
+	if (test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags) &&
+	    (start < encl->base || end > encl->base + encl->size))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	/*
 	 * Disallow READ_IMPLIES_EXEC tasks as their VMA permissions might
 	 * conflict with the enclave page permissions.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#116 lore raw

PATCH v2 28/32 selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Removing a page from an initialized enclave involves three steps:
first the user requests changing the page type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM via an ioctl(), on success the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction needs to be run from within the enclave to accept the page removal, finally the user requests page removal to be completed via an ioctl(). Only after acceptance (ENCLU[EACCEPT]) from within the enclave can the kernel remove the page from a running enclave.

Test the behavior when the user's request to change the page type succeeds, but the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction is not run before the ioctl() requesting page removal is run. This should not be permitted.

---
Changes since V1:
- Update to support ioctl() name change (SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE) and provide secinfo as parameter instead of just page type (Jarkko).
- Update test to reflect page removal ioctl() and struct name change:
SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE->SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES,
struct sgx_page_remove -> struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages (Jarkko).
- Use ioctl() instead of ioctl in text (Dave).

 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 116 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +116 -0
index 53a581bd56c5..e9513ced1853 100644
@@ -1472,4 +1472,120 @@ TEST_F(enclave, tcs_create)
 	munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Ensure sane behavior if user requests page removal, does not run
+ * EACCEPT from within enclave but still attempts to finalize page removal
+ * with the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl(). The latter should fail
+ * because the removal was not EACCEPTed from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_no_eaccept)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	struct sgx_enclave_modt modt_ioc;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	unsigned long data_start;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+	 * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+	 */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOTTY)
+			SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl()");
+		else if (errno == ENODEV)
+			SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+	 * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+	 * enclave.
+	 */
+	data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+		     encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+	 * removing it.
+	 *
+	 * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+	 * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+	secinfo.flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8;
+	modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	modt_ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+	/* Skip EACCEPT */
+
+	/* Send final ioctl() to complete page removal */
+	memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+	remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	/* Operation not permitted since EACCEPT was omitted. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EPERM);
+	EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 0);
+}
+
 TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#0 lore raw

v2 cover x86/sgx and selftests/sgx: Support SGX2

V1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/

Changes since V1 that directly impact user space:
- SGX2 permission changes changed from a single ioctl() named SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODP to two new ioctl()s:
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, supported by two different parameter structures (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS does not support a result output parameter) (Jarkko).

User space flow impact: After user space runs ENCLU[EMODPE] it needs to call SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS to have PTEs updated. Previously running SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODP in this scenario resulted in EPCM.PR being set but calling SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS will not result in EPCM.PR being set anymore and thus no need for an additional ENCLU[EACCEPT].

- SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
obtain new permissions from secinfo as parameter instead of the permissions directly (Jarkko).

- ioctl() supporting SGX2 page type change is renamed from SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE (Jarkko).

- SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE obtains new page type from secinfo as parameter instead of the page type directly (Jarkko).

- ioctl() supporting SGX2 page removal is renamed from SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES (Jarkko).

- All ioctl() parameter structures have been renamed as a result of the ioctl() renaming:
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS => struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS => struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE => struct sgx_enclave_modt SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES => struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages

Changes since V1 that do not directly impact user space:
- Number of patches in series increased from 25 to 32 primarily because of splitting the original submission:
- Wrappers for the new SGX2 functions are introduced in three separate patches replacing the original "x86/sgx: Add wrappers for SGX2 functions"
(Jarkko).
- Moving and renaming sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is done with two patches replacing the original "x86/sgx: Use more generic name for enclave cpumask function" (Jarkko).
- Support for SGX2 EPCM permission changes is split into two ioctls(), one for relaxing and one for restricting permissions, each introduced by a new patch replacing the original "x86/sgx: Support enclave page permission changes" (Jarkko).
- Extracted code used by existing ioctls() for usage by new ioctl()s into a new utility in new patch "x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length" (Dave did not specifically ask for this but it addresses his review feedback).
- Two new Documentation patches to support the SGX2 work ("Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management") and a dedicated section on the enclave permission management ("Documentation/x86: Document SGX permission details") (Andy).
- Most patches were reworked to improve the language by:
* aiming to refer to exact item instead of English rephrasing (Jarkko).
* use ioctl() instead of ioctl throughout (Dave).
* Use "relaxed" instead of "exceed" when referring to permissions

    (Dave).

- Improved documentation with several additions to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst.
- Many smaller changes, please refer to individual patches.

Hi Everybody,

The current Linux kernel support for SGX includes support for SGX1 that requires that an enclave be created with properties that accommodate all usages over its (the enclave's) lifetime. This includes properties such as permissions of enclave pages, the number of enclave pages, and the number of threads supported by the enclave.

Consequences of this requirement to have the enclave be created to accommodate all usages include:
* pages needing to support relocated code are required to have RWX permissions for their entire lifetime,
* an enclave needs to be created with the maximum stack and heap projected to be needed during the enclave's entire lifetime which can be longer than the processes running within it,
* an enclave needs to be created with support for the maximum number of threads projected to run in the enclave.

Since SGX1 a few more functions were introduced, collectively called SGX2, that support modifications to an initialized enclave. Hardware supporting these functions are already available as listed on
https://github.com/ayeks/SGX-hardware

This series adds support for SGX2, also referred to as Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM). This includes:

* Support modifying permissions of regular enclave pages belonging to an initialized enclave. New permissions are not allowed to exceed the originally vetted permissions. For example, RX isn't allowed unless the page was originally added with RX or RWX.
Modifying permissions is accomplished with two new ioctl()s:
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS.

* Support dynamic addition of regular enclave pages to an initialized enclave. Pages are added with RW permissions as their "originally vetted permissions" (see previous bullet) and thus not allowed to be made executable at this time. Enabling dynamically added pages to obtain executable permissions require integration with user space policy that is deferred until the core SGX2 enabling is complete. Pages are dynamically added to an initialized enclave from the SGX page fault handler.

* Support expanding an initialized enclave to accommodate more threads. More threads can be accommodated by an enclave with the addition of Thread Control Structure (TCS) pages that is done by changing the type of regular enclave pages to TCS pages using a new ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE.

* Support removing regular and TCS pages from an initialized enclave. Removing pages is accomplished in two stages as supported by two new ioctl()s SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE (same ioctl() as mentioned in previous bullet) and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES.

* Tests covering all the new flows, some edge cases, and one comprehensive stress scenario.

No additional work is needed to support SGX2 in a virtualized environment. The tests included in this series can also be run from a guest and was tested with the recent QEMU release based on 6.2.0 that supports SGX.

Patches 1 to 14 prepares the existing code for SGX2 support by introducing the SGX2 functions, making sure pages remain accessible after their enclave permissions are changed, and tracking enclave page types as well as runtime permissions as needed by SGX2.

Patches 15 through 32 are a mix of x86/sgx and selftests/sgx patches that follow the format where first an SGX2 feature is enabled and then followed by tests of the new feature and/or tests of scenarios that combine SGX2 features enabled up to that point.

In two cases (patches 20 and 31) code in support of SGX2 is separated out with detailed motivation to support the review.

This series is based on v5.17-rc2 with the following fixes additionally applied:

"selftests/sgx: Remove extra newlines in test output"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/16317683a1822bbd44ab3ca48b60a9a217ac24de.1643754040.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"selftests/sgx: Ensure enclave data available during debug print"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/eaaeeb9122916d831942fc8a3043c687137314c1.1643754040.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"selftests/sgx: Do not attempt enclave build without valid enclave"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/4e4ea6d70c286c209964bec1e8d29ac8e692748b.1643754040.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"selftests/sgx: Fix NULL-pointer-dereference upon early test failure"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/89824888783fd8e770bfc64530c7549650a41851.1643754040.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"x86/sgx: Add poison handling to reclaimer"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/dcc95eb2aaefb042527ac50d0a50738c7c160dac.1643830353.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"x86/sgx: Silence softlockup detection when releasing large enclaves"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/b5e9f218064aa76e3026f778e1ad0a1d823e3db8.1643133224.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

Your feedback will be greatly appreciated.

Regards,

Reinette

Reinette Chatre (32):
x86/sgx: Add short descriptions to ENCLS wrappers
x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODPR function
x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODT function
x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EAUG function Documentation/x86: Document SGX permission details x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic
permission changes
x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()
x86/sgx: Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() as sgx_encl_cpumask() x86/sgx: Move PTE zap code to new sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() x86/sgx: Make sgx_ipi_cb() available internally
x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type
x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM permission changes selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page permission changes x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows
x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type
x86/sgx: Support complete page removal
Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management section selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior
selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page
x86/sgx: Free up EPC pages directly to support large page ranges selftests/sgx: Page removal stress test

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst                     |   64 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h                    |    8 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h               |   81 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c                |  334 +++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h                |   12 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h               |   33 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c               |  831 ++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c                |   70 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h                 |    3 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h         |   23 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c            |   41 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c            | 1484 +++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h            |    1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c       |   68 +
 .../selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S       |    6 +
 15 files changed, 2963 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)

base-commit: 26291c54e111ff6ba87a164d85d4a4e134b7315c
prerequisite-patch-id: 3c3908f1c3536cc04ba020fb3e81f51395b44223
prerequisite-patch-id: e860923423c3387cf6fdcceb2fa41dc5e9454ef4
prerequisite-patch-id: 986260c8bc4255eb61e2c4afa88d2b723e376423
prerequisite-patch-id: ba014a99fced2b57d5d9e2dfb9d80ddf4333c13e
prerequisite-patch-id: 65cbb72889b6353a5639b984615d12019136b270
prerequisite-patch-id: e3296a2f0345a77c8a7ca91f76697ae2e1dca21f

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#23 lore raw

PATCH v2 11/32 x86/sgx: Move PTE zap code to new sgx_zap_enclave_ptes()

The SGX reclaimer removes page table entries pointing to pages that are moved to swap.

SGX2 enables changes to pages belonging to an initialized enclave, thus enclave pages may have their permission or type changed while the page is being accessed by an enclave. Supporting SGX2 requires page table entries to be removed so that any cached mappings to changed pages are removed. For example, with the ability to change enclave page types a regular enclave page may be changed to a Thread Control Structure (TCS) page that may not be accessed by an enclave.

Factor out the code removing page table entries to a separate function sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(), fixing accuracy of comments in the process, and make it available to the upcoming SGX2 code.

Place sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() with the rest of the enclave code in encl.c interacting with the page table since this code is no longer unique to the reclaimer.

---
Changes since V1:
- Elaborate why SGX2 needs this ability (Jarkko).
- More specific subject.
- Fix kernel-doc to have brackets in function name.

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 31 ++---------------------
 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +44 -1
index 6f5d01121766..8da813504249 100644
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm)
 
 	spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock);
 	list_add_rcu(&encl_mm->list, &encl->mm_list);
-	/* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_reclaimer_block(). */
+	/* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(). */
 	smp_wmb();
 	encl->mm_list_version++;
 	spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
@@ -778,6 +778,49 @@ int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/**
+ * sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() - remove PTEs mapping the address from enclave
+ * @encl: the enclave
+ * @addr: page aligned pointer to single page for which PTEs will be removed
+ *
+ * Multiple VMAs may have an enclave page mapped. Remove the PTE mapping
+ * @addr from each VMA. Ensure that page fault handler is ready to handle
+ * new mappings of @addr before calling this function.
+ */
+void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	unsigned long mm_list_version;
+	struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	int idx, ret;
+
+	do {
+		mm_list_version = encl->mm_list_version;
+
+		/* Pairs with smp_wmb() in sgx_encl_mm_add(). */
+		smp_rmb();
+
+		idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
+
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
+			if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
+				continue;
+
+			mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm);
+
+			ret = sgx_encl_find(encl_mm->mm, addr, &vma);
+			if (!ret && encl == vma->vm_private_data)
+				zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+			mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm);
+
+			mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
+		}
+
+		srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
+	} while (unlikely(encl->mm_list_version != mm_list_version));
+}
+
 /**
  * sgx_alloc_va_page() - Allocate a Version Array (VA) page
  *
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +1 -1
index becb68503baa..82e21088e68b 100644
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
 void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write);
 int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				  struct sgx_encl_page *page);
-
+void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr);
 struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void);
 unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
 void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +2 -29
index fa33922879bf..ce9e87d5f8ec 100644
@@ -137,36 +137,9 @@ static void sgx_reclaimer_block(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
 	struct sgx_encl_page *page = epc_page->owner;
 	unsigned long addr = page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl;
-	unsigned long mm_list_version;
-	struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
-	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
-	int idx, ret;
-
-	do {
-		mm_list_version = encl->mm_list_version;
-
-		/* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_encl_mm_add(). */
-		smp_rmb();
-
-		idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
-
-		list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
-			if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
-				continue;
-
-			mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm);
-
-			ret = sgx_encl_find(encl_mm->mm, addr, &vma);
-			if (!ret && encl == vma->vm_private_data)
-				zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE);
-
-			mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm);
-
-			mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
-		}
+	int ret;
 
-		srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
-	} while (unlikely(encl->mm_list_version != mm_list_version));
+	sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
 
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#115 lore raw

PATCH v2 27/32 selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Support for changing an enclave page's type enables an initialized enclave to be expanded with support for more threads by changing the type of a regular enclave page to that of a Thread Control Structure (TCS). Additionally, being able to change a TCS or regular enclave page's type to be trimmed (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM) initiates the removal of the page from the enclave.

Test changing page type to TCS as well as page removal flows in two phases: In the first phase support for a new thread is dynamically added to an initialized enclave and in the second phase the pages associated with the new thread are removed from the enclave. As an additional sanity check after the second phase the page used as a TCS page during the first phase is added back as a regular page and ensured that it can be written to (which is not possible if it was a TCS page).

---
Changes since V1:
- Update to support ioctl() name change (SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE) and provide secinfo as parameter instead of just page type (Jarkko).
- Update test to reflect page removal ioctl() and struct name change:
SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE->SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES,
struct sgx_page_remove -> struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages (Jarkko).
- Use ioctl() instead of ioctl (Dave).

 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c |  41 ++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 347 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h |   1 +
 3 files changed, 389 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c +41 -0
index 006b464c8fc9..94bdeac1cf04 100644
@@ -130,6 +130,47 @@ static bool encl_ioc_add_pages(struct encl *encl, struct encl_segment *seg)
 	return true;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Parse the enclave code's symbol table to locate and return address of
+ * the provided symbol
+ */
+uint64_t encl_get_entry(struct encl *encl, const char *symbol)
+{
+	Elf64_Shdr *sections;
+	Elf64_Sym *symtab;
+	Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr;
+	char *sym_names;
+	int num_sym;
+	int i;
+
+	ehdr = encl->bin;
+	sections = encl->bin + ehdr->e_shoff;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_shnum; i++) {
+		if (sections[i].sh_type == SHT_SYMTAB) {
+			symtab = (Elf64_Sym *)((char *)encl->bin + sections[i].sh_offset);
+			num_sym = sections[i].sh_size / sections[i].sh_entsize;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_shnum; i++) {
+		if (sections[i].sh_type == SHT_STRTAB) {
+			sym_names = (char *)encl->bin + sections[i].sh_offset;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_sym; i++) {
+		Elf64_Sym *sym = &symtab[i];
+
+		if (!strcmp(symbol, sym_names + sym->st_name))
+			return (uint64_t)sym->st_value;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size)
 {
 	const char device_path[] = "/dev/sgx_enclave";
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +347 -0

351 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h +1 -0
index b45c52ec7ab3..fc585be97e2f 100644
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ void encl_delete(struct encl *ctx);
 bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size);
 bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl);
 bool encl_build(struct encl *encl);
+uint64_t encl_get_entry(struct encl *encl, const char *symbol);
 
 int sgx_enter_enclave(void *rdi, void *rsi, long rdx, u32 function, void *r8, void *r9,
 		      struct sgx_enclave_run *run);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#98 lore raw

PATCH v2 17/32 selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM permission changes

In reply to Reinette Chatre

EPCM permission changes could be made from within (to relax permissions) or out (to restrict permissions) the enclave. Kernel support is needed when permissions are restricted to be able to call the privileged ENCLS[EMODPR] instruction and ensure PTEs allowing the restricted permissions are flushed. EPCM permissions can be relaxed via ENCLU[EMODPE] from within the enclave but the enclave still depends on the kernel to install PTEs with the new permissions.

Add a test that exercises a few of the enclave page permission flows:
1) Test starts with a RW (from enclave and kernel perspective) enclave page that is mapped via a RW VMA.
2) Use the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl() to restrict the enclave (EPCM) page permissions to read-only (kernel removes PTE in the process).
3) Run ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave to accept the new page permissions.
4) Attempt to write to the enclave page from within the enclave - this should fail with a page fault on the PTE since the page table entry accurately reflects the (read-only) EPCM permissions.
5) Restore EPCM permissions to RW by running ENCLU[EMODPE] from within the enclave.
6) Attempt to write to the enclave page from within the enclave - this should fail again with a page fault because even though the EPCM permissions are RW the PTE does not yet reflect that.
7) Use the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS ioctl() to inform the kernel of new page permissions and PTEs will accurately reflect RW EPCM permissions.
8) Writing to enclave page from within enclave succeeds.

---
Changes since V1:
- Adapt test to the kernel interface changes: the ioctl() name change and providing entire secinfo as parameter.
- Remove the ENCLU[EACCEPT] call after permissions are relaxed since the new flow no longer results in the EPCM PR bit being set.
- Rewrite error path to reduce line lengths.

 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h   |  15 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c      | 253 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c |  38 ++++
 3 files changed, 306 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h +15 -0
index 02d775789ea7..b638eb98c80c 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ enum encl_op_type {
 	ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS,
 	ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS,
 	ENCL_OP_NOP,
+	ENCL_OP_EACCEPT,
+	ENCL_OP_EMODPE,
 	ENCL_OP_MAX,
 };
 
@@ -53,4 +55,17 @@ struct encl_op_get_from_addr {
 	uint64_t addr;
 };
 
+struct encl_op_eaccept {
+	struct encl_op_header header;
+	uint64_t epc_addr;
+	uint64_t flags;
+	uint64_t ret;
+};
+
+struct encl_op_emodpe {
+	struct encl_op_header header;
+	uint64_t epc_addr;
+	uint64_t flags;
+};
+
 #endif /* DEFINES_H */
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +253 -0

263 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c +38 -0
index 4fca01cfd898..5b6c65331527 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,42 @@
  */
 static uint8_t encl_buffer[8192] = { 1 };
 
+enum sgx_enclu_function {
+	EACCEPT = 0x5,
+	EMODPE = 0x6,
+};
+
+static void do_encl_emodpe(void *_op)
+{
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
+	struct encl_op_emodpe *op = _op;
+
+	secinfo.flags = op->flags;
+
+	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
+				:
+				: "a" (EMODPE),
+				  "b" (&secinfo),
+				  "c" (op->epc_addr));
+}
+
+static void do_encl_eaccept(void *_op)
+{
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
+	struct encl_op_eaccept *op = _op;
+	int rax;
+
+	secinfo.flags = op->flags;
+
+	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
+				: "=a" (rax)
+				: "a" (EACCEPT),
+				  "b" (&secinfo),
+				  "c" (op->epc_addr));
+
+	op->ret = rax;
+}
+
 static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n)
 {
 	size_t i;
@@ -62,6 +98,8 @@ void encl_body(void *rdi,  void *rsi)
 		do_encl_op_put_to_addr,
 		do_encl_op_get_from_addr,
 		do_encl_op_nop,
+		do_encl_eaccept,
+		do_encl_emodpe,
 	};
 
 	struct encl_op_header *op = (struct encl_op_header *)rdi;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#110 lore raw

PATCH v2 22/32 x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Every enclave contains one or more Thread Control Structures (TCS). The TCS contains meta-data used by the hardware to save and restore thread specific information when entering/exiting the enclave. With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with enough TCSs to support the largest number of threads expecting to use the enclave and enough enclave pages to meet all its anticipated memory demands. In SGX1 all pages remain in the enclave until the enclave is unloaded.

SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EMODT], that is used to change the type of an enclave page from a regular (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) enclave page to a TCS (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS) page or change the type from a regular (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) or TCS (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS)
page to a trimmed (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM) page (setting it up for later removal).

With the existing support of dynamically adding regular enclave pages to an initialized enclave and changing the page type to TCS it is possible to dynamically increase the number of threads supported by an enclave.

Changing the enclave page type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM is the first step of dynamically removing pages from an initialized enclave. The complete page removal flow is:
1) Change the type of the pages to be removed to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM using the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl() introduced here.
2) Approve the page removal by running ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave.
3) Initiate actual page removal using the ioctl() introduced in the following patch.

Add ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE to support changing SGX enclave page types within an initialized enclave. With SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE the user specifies a page range and the enclave page type to be applied to all pages in the provided range. The ioctl() itself can return an error code based on failures encountered by the kernel. It is also possible for SGX specific failures to be encountered. Add a result output parameter to communicate the SGX return code. It is possible for the enclave page type change request to fail on any page within the provided range. Support partial success by returning the number of pages that were successfully changed.

After the page type is changed the page continues to be accessible from the kernel perspective with page table entries and internal state. The page may be moved to swap. Any access until ENCLU[EACCEPT] will encounter a page fault with SGX flag set in error code.

---
Changes since V1:
- Remove the "Earlier changes ..." paragraph (Jarkko).
- Change "new ioctl" text to "Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MOD_TYPE" (Jarkko).
- Discussion about EPCM interaction and the EPCM MODIFIED bit is moved to new patch that introduces the ENCLS[EMODT] wrapper while keeping the higher level discussion on page accessibility in
this commit log (Jarkko).
- Rename SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT ioctl() to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE (Jarkko).
- Rename struct sgx_page_modt to struct sgx_enclave_modt in support of ioctl() rename.
- Rename sgx_page_modt() to sgx_enclave_modt() and sgx_ioc_page_modt() to sgx_ioc_enclave_modt() in support of ioctl() rename.
- Provide secinfo as parameter to ioctl() instead of just page type (Jarkko).
- Update comments to refer to new ioctl() names.
- Use new SGX2 checking helper().
- Use ETRACK flow utility.
- Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for Documentation/x86/sgx.rst.
- Remove redundant comment.
- Use offset/length validation utility.
- Make explicit which members of struct sgx_enclave_modt are for output (Dave).

 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h |  20 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 212 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 232 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +20 -0
index b0ffb80bc67f..1df91517b612 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm)
 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x06, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE \
+	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x07, struct sgx_enclave_modt)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -116,6 +118,24 @@ struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm {
 	__u64 count;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_modt - parameters for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE
+ * @offset:	starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
+ *		address defined in SECS)
+ * @length:	length of memory (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data containing the new type
+ *		for pages in range described by @offset and @length
+ * @result:	(output) SGX result code of ENCLS[EMODT] function
+ * @count:	(output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_modt {
+	__u64 offset;
+	__u64 length;
+	__u64 secinfo;
+	__u64 result;
+	__u64 count;
+};
+
 struct sgx_enclave_run;
 
 /**
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +212 -0

224 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#22 lore raw

PATCH v2 10/32 x86/sgx: Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() as sgx_encl_cpumask()

In reply to Reinette Chatre

sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is no longer unique to the reclaimer where it is used during the EWB ENCLS leaf function when EPC pages are written out to main memory and sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is used to learn which CPUs might have executed the enclave to ensure that TLBs are cleared.

Upcoming SGX2 enabling will use sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() during the EMODPR and EMODT ENCLS leaf functions that make changes to enclave pages. The function is needed for the same reason it is used now: to learn which CPUs might have executed the enclave to ensure that TLBs no longer point to the changed pages.

Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() to sgx_encl_cpumask() to reflect the broader usage.

---
Changes since V1:
- New patch split from original "x86/sgx: Use more generic name for enclave cpumask function" (Jarkko).

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +3 -3
index 687166769ca8..6f5d01121766 100644
@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm)
 }
 
 /**
- * sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() - Query which CPUs might be accessing the enclave
+ * sgx_encl_cpumask() - Query which CPUs might be accessing the enclave
  * @encl: the enclave
  *
  * Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical address
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm)
  * The following flow is used to support SGX functions that require that
  * no cached linear-to-physical address mappings are present:
  * 1) Execute ENCLS[ETRACK] to initiate hardware tracking.
- * 2) Use this function (sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()) to query which CPUs might be
+ * 2) Use this function (sgx_encl_cpumask()) to query which CPUs might be
  *    accessing the enclave.
  * 3) Send IPI to identified CPUs, kicking them out of the enclave and
  *    thus flushing all locally cached linear-to-physical address mappings.
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm)
  *
  * Return: cpumask of CPUs that might be accessing @encl
  */
-const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl)
 {
 	cpumask_t *cpumask = &encl->cpumask;
 	struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +1 -1
index 44431da21757..becb68503baa 100644
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
 
 void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref);
 int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm);
-const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl);
+const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl);
 int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
 			 struct sgx_backing *backing);
 void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +1 -1
index 2de85f459492..fa33922879bf 100644
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static void sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
 			 * miss cpus that entered the enclave between
 			 * generating the mask and incrementing epoch.
 			 */
-			on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(encl),
+			on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl),
 					 sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
 			ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing);
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 5/32 Documentation/x86: Document SGX permission details

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Provide summary of the various permissions involved in managing access to enclave pages. This summary documents the foundation for additions related to runtime managing of enclave page permissions that is made possible with SGX2.

---
Changes since V1:
- New patch.

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +23 -5
index 265568a9292c..89ff924b1480 100644
@@ -71,16 +71,34 @@ The processor tracks EPC pages in a hardware metadata structure called the
 which describes the owning enclave, access rights and page type among the other
 things.
 
-EPCM permissions are separate from the normal page tables.  This prevents the
-kernel from, for instance, allowing writes to data which an enclave wishes to
-remain read-only.  EPCM permissions may only impose additional restrictions on
-top of normal x86 page permissions.
-
 For all intents and purposes, the SGX architecture allows the processor to
 invalidate all EPCM entries at will.  This requires that software be prepared to
 handle an EPCM fault at any time.  In practice, this can happen on events like
 power transitions when the ephemeral key that encrypts enclave memory is lost.
 
+Details about enclave page permissions
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+EPCM permissions are separate from the normal page tables.  This prevents the
+kernel from, for instance, allowing writes to data which an enclave wishes
+to remain read-only.
+
+Three permission masks are relevant to SGX:
+
+* EPCM permissions.
+* Page Table Entry (PTE) permissions.
+* Virtual Memory Area (VMA) permissions.
+
+An enclave is only able to access an enclave page if all three permission
+masks enable it to do so.
+
+The relationships between the different permission masks are:
+
+* An SGX VMA can only be created if its permissions are the same or weaker
+  than the EPCM permissions.
+* PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
+  relaxed than the VMA permissions.
+
 Application interface
 =====================
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#118 lore raw

PATCH v2 30/32 selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Removing a page from an initialized enclave involves three steps:
(1) the user requests changing the page type to PT_TRIM via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl()
(2) on success the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction is run from within the enclave to accept the page removal
(3) the user initiates the actual removal of the page via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl().

Remove a page that has never been accessed. This means that when the first ioctl() requesting page removal arrives, there will be no page table entry, yet a valid page table entry needs to exist for the ENCLU[EACCEPT] function to succeed. In this test it is verified that a page table entry can still be installed for a page that is in the process of being removed.

---
Changes since V1:
- Update to support ioctl() name change (SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE) and provide secinfo as parameter instead of just page type (Jarkko).
- Update test to reflect page removal ioctl() and struct name change:
SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE->SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES,
struct sgx_page_remove -> struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages (Jarkko).
- Ensure test is skipped when SGX2 not supported by kernel.

 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 82 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +82 -0
index 239d3c9df169..4fe5a0324c97 100644
@@ -1835,4 +1835,86 @@ TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access_after_eaccept)
 	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
 }
 
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_untouched_page)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	struct sgx_enclave_modt modt_ioc;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	unsigned long data_start;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+	 * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+	 */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOTTY)
+			SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE ioctl()");
+		else if (errno == ENODEV)
+			SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/* SGX2 is supported by kernel and hardware, test can proceed. */
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+			 encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+	secinfo.flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8;
+	modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	modt_ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE, &modt_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+	/*
+	 * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and approve page removal by sending
+	 * EACCEPT for removed page.
+	 */
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = data_start;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+	remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 4096);
+}
+
 TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/32 x86/sgx: Add short descriptions to ENCLS wrappers

In reply to Reinette Chatre

The SGX ENCLS instruction uses EAX to specify an SGX function and may require additional registers, depending on the SGX function. ENCLS invokes the specified privileged SGX function for managing and debugging enclaves. Macros are used to wrap the ENCLS functionality and several wrappers are used to wrap the macros to make the different SGX functions accessible in the code.

The wrappers of the supported SGX functions are cryptic. Add short descriptions of each as a comment.

---
Changes since V1:
- Fix commit message and subject to not refer to descriptions as "changelog descriptions" or "shortlog descriptions" (Jarkko).
- Improve all descriptions with guidance from Jarkko.

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +15 -0
index fa04a73daf9c..0e22fa8f77c5 100644
@@ -136,57 +136,71 @@ static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)
 	ret;						\
 	})
 
+/* Initialize an EPC page into an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) page. */
 static inline int __ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *secs)
 {
 	return __encls_2(ECREATE, pginfo, secs);
 }
 
+/* Hash a 256 byte region of an enclave page to SECS:MRENCLAVE. */
 static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void *addr)
 {
 	return __encls_2(EEXTEND, secs, addr);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Associate an EPC page to an enclave either as a REG or TCS page
+ * populated with the provided data.
+ */
 static inline int __eadd(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr)
 {
 	return __encls_2(EADD, pginfo, addr);
 }
 
+/* Finalize enclave build, initialize enclave for user code execution. */
 static inline int __einit(void *sigstruct, void *token, void *secs)
 {
 	return __encls_ret_3(EINIT, sigstruct, secs, token);
 }
 
+/* Disassociate EPC page from its enclave and mark it as unused. */
 static inline int __eremove(void *addr)
 {
 	return __encls_ret_1(EREMOVE, addr);
 }
 
+/* Copy data to an EPC page belonging to a debug enclave. */
 static inline int __edbgwr(void *addr, unsigned long *data)
 {
 	return __encls_2(EDGBWR, *data, addr);
 }
 
+/* Copy data from an EPC page belonging to a debug enclave. */
 static inline int __edbgrd(void *addr, unsigned long *data)
 {
 	return __encls_1_1(EDGBRD, *data, addr);
 }
 
+/* Track that software has completed the required TLB address clears. */
 static inline int __etrack(void *addr)
 {
 	return __encls_ret_1(ETRACK, addr);
 }
 
+/* Load, verify, and unblock an EPC page. */
 static inline int __eldu(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr,
 			 void *va)
 {
 	return __encls_ret_3(ELDU, pginfo, addr, va);
 }
 
+/* Make EPC page inaccessible to enclave, ready to be written to memory. */
 static inline int __eblock(void *addr)
 {
 	return __encls_ret_1(EBLOCK, addr);
 }
 
+/* Initialize an EPC page into a Version Array (VA) page. */
 static inline int __epa(void *addr)
 {
 	unsigned long rbx = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA;
@@ -194,6 +208,7 @@ static inline int __epa(void *addr)
 	return __encls_2(EPA, rbx, addr);
 }
 
+/* Invalidate an EPC page and write it out to main memory. */
 static inline int __ewb(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr,
 			void *va)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#25 lore raw

PATCH v2 13/32 x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length

In reply to Reinette Chatre

User provided offset and length is validated when parsing the parameters of the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES ioctl(). Extract this validation into a utility that can be used by the SGX2 ioctl()s that will also provide these values.

---
Changes since V1:
- New patch

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +22 -6
index 7e0819a89532..6e7cc441156b 100644
@@ -378,6 +378,26 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Ensure user provided offset and length values are valid for
+ * an enclave.
+ */
+static int sgx_validate_offset_length(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+				      unsigned long offset,
+				      unsigned long length)
+{
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, PAGE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!length || length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (offset + length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
  * @encl:       an enclave pointer
@@ -431,14 +451,10 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
 	if (copy_from_user(&add_arg, arg, sizeof(add_arg)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (!IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
-	    !IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (!add_arg.length || add_arg.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (add_arg.offset + add_arg.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
+	if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, add_arg.offset, add_arg.length))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)add_arg.secinfo,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#101 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 19/32] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave

In reply to Reinette Chatre
Quoted 242 lines · Reinette Chatre

With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with its maximum memory demands allocated. Pages cannot be added to an enclave after it is initialized. SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EAUG], that can be used to add pages to an initialized enclave. With SGX2 the enclave still needs to set aside address space for its maximum memory demands during enclave creation, but all pages need not be added before enclave initialization. Pages can be added during enclave runtime.

Add support for dynamically adding pages to an initialized enclave, architecturally limited to RW permission. Add pages via the page fault handler at the time an enclave address without a backing enclave page is accessed, potentially directly reclaiming pages if no free pages are available.

The enclave is still required to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on the page before it can be used. A useful flow is for the enclave to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on an uninitialized address. This will trigger the page fault handler that will add the enclave page and return execution to the enclave to repeat the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction, this time successful.

If the enclave accesses an uninitialized address in another way, for example by expanding the enclave stack to a page that has not yet been added, then the page fault handler would add the page on the first write but upon returning to the enclave the instruction that triggered the page fault would be repeated and since ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run yet it would trigger a second page fault, this time with the SGX flag set in the page fault error code. This can only be recovered by entering the enclave again and directly running the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction on the now initialized address.

Accessing an uninitialized address from outside the enclave also triggers this flow but the page will remain inaccessible (access will result in #PF) until accepted from within the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT].

The page is added with the architecturally constrained RW permissions as runtime as well as maximum allowed permissions. It is understood that there are some use cases, for example code relocation, that requires RWX maximum permissions. Supporting these use cases require guidance from user space policy before such maximum permissions can be allowed. Integration with user policy is deferred.

---
Changes since V1:
- Fix subject line "to initialized" -> "to an initialized" (Jarkko).
- Move text about hardware's PENDING state to the patch that introduces the ENCLS[EAUG] wrapper (Jarkko).
- Ensure kernel-doc uses brackets when referring to function.

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c  | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c |   4 +-
 3 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +133 -0
index a5d4a7efb986..d1e3ea86b902 100644
@@ -124,6 +124,128 @@ struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	return entry;
 }
 
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_eaug_page() - Dynamically add page to initialized enclave
+ * @vma:	VMA obtained from fault info from where page is accessed
+ * @encl:	enclave accessing the page
+ * @addr:	address that triggered the page fault
+ *
+ * When an initialized enclave accesses a page with no backing EPC page
+ * on a SGX2 system then the EPC can be added dynamically via the SGX2
+ * ENCLS[EAUG] instruction.
+ *
+ * Returns: Appropriate vm_fault_t: VM_FAULT_NOPAGE when PTE was installed
+ * successfully, VM_FAULT_SIGBUS or VM_FAULT_OOM as error otherwise.
+ */
+static vm_fault_t sgx_encl_eaug_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				     struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo = {0};
+	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+	struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+	unsigned long phys_addr;
+	unsigned long prot;
+	vm_fault_t vmret;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!encl_page)
+		return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+
+	encl_page->desc = addr;
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+
+	/*
+	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
+	 * be created with RW permissions.
+	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
+	 * of RWX.
+	 */
+	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;
+
+	epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, true);
+	if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+		kfree(encl_page);
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+	}
+
+	va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl);
+	if (IS_ERR(va_page)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(va_page);
+		goto err_out_free;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy comment from sgx_encl_add_page() to maintain guidance in
+	 * this similar flow:
+	 * Adding to encl->va_pages must be done under encl->lock.  Ditto for
+	 * deleting (via sgx_encl_shrink()) in the error path.
+	 */
+	if (va_page)
+		list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+
+	ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
+			encl_page, GFP_KERNEL);
+	/*
+	 * If ret == -EBUSY then page was created in another flow while
+	 * running without encl->lock
+	 */
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out_unlock;
+
+	pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+	pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
+	pginfo.metadata = 0;
+
+	ret = __eaug(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out;
+
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+	encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+	encl_page->type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG;
+	encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+
+	sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page);
+
+	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(epc_page);
+	/*
+	 * Do not undo everything when creating PTE entry fails - next #PF
+	 * would find page ready for a PTE.
+	 * PAGE_SHARED because protection is forced to be RW above and COW
+	 * is not supported.
+	 */
+	vmret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				    PAGE_SHARED);
+	if (vmret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+
+err_out:
+	xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
+
+err_out_unlock:
+	sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page);
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+err_out_free:
+	sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+	kfree(encl_page);
+
+	return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+}
+
 static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
@@ -145,6 +267,17 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	if (unlikely(!encl))
 		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
 
+	/*
+	 * The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they
+	 * are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and
+	 * the system supports SGX2 then it is possible to dynamically add
+	 * a new enclave page. This is only possible for an initialized
+	 * enclave that will be checked for right away.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2) &&
+	    (!xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr))))
+		return sgx_encl_eaug_page(vma, encl, addr);
+
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
 	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +2 -0
index 848a28d28d3d..1b6ce1da7c92 100644
@@ -123,4 +123,6 @@ void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 					 unsigned long addr);
 
+struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl);
+void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
 #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2 -2
index 23bdf558b231..58ff62a1fb00 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 #include "encl.h"
 #include "encls.h"
 
-static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
 {
 	struct sgx_va_page *va_page = NULL;
 	void *err;
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
 	return va_page;
 }
 
-static void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
+void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
 {
 	encl->page_cnt--;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

Quickly looking through also this sequence is possible:

1. Enclave's run-time flow ignores the whole EACCEPT but instead a memory dereference will initialize the sequence.
2. This causes #PF handler to do EAUG and after the enclave is re-entered the vDSO exists because the page is not EACCEPT'd.
2. Enclave host enter in-enclave exception handler, which does EACCEPT.

Can you confirm this? I'm planning to test this patch by implementing EAUG support in Rust for Enarx. At this point I'm not yet sure whether I choose EACCEPT initiated or memory deference initiated code path but I think it is good if the kernel implementation is good enough to support both.

Other than that, this looks super solid!

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#102 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 19/32] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave

Quoted 252 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 242 lines · Reinette Chatre

With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with its maximum memory demands allocated. Pages cannot be added to an enclave after it is initialized. SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EAUG], that can be used to add pages to an initialized enclave. With SGX2 the enclave still needs to set aside address space for its maximum memory demands during enclave creation, but all pages need not be added before enclave initialization. Pages can be added during enclave runtime.

Add support for dynamically adding pages to an initialized enclave, architecturally limited to RW permission. Add pages via the page fault handler at the time an enclave address without a backing enclave page is accessed, potentially directly reclaiming pages if no free pages are available.

The enclave is still required to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on the page before it can be used. A useful flow is for the enclave to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on an uninitialized address. This will trigger the page fault handler that will add the enclave page and return execution to the enclave to repeat the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction, this time successful.

If the enclave accesses an uninitialized address in another way, for example by expanding the enclave stack to a page that has not yet been added, then the page fault handler would add the page on the first write but upon returning to the enclave the instruction that triggered the page fault would be repeated and since ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run yet it would trigger a second page fault, this time with the SGX flag set in the page fault error code. This can only be recovered by entering the enclave again and directly running the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction on the now initialized address.

Accessing an uninitialized address from outside the enclave also triggers this flow but the page will remain inaccessible (access will result in #PF) until accepted from within the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT].

The page is added with the architecturally constrained RW permissions as runtime as well as maximum allowed permissions. It is understood that there are some use cases, for example code relocation, that requires RWX maximum permissions. Supporting these use cases require guidance from user space policy before such maximum permissions can be allowed. Integration with user policy is deferred.

---
Changes since V1:
- Fix subject line "to initialized" -> "to an initialized" (Jarkko).
- Move text about hardware's PENDING state to the patch that introduces the ENCLS[EAUG] wrapper (Jarkko).
- Ensure kernel-doc uses brackets when referring to function.

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c  | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c |   4 +-
 3 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +133 -0
index a5d4a7efb986..d1e3ea86b902 100644
@@ -124,6 +124,128 @@ struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	return entry;
 }
 
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_eaug_page() - Dynamically add page to initialized enclave
+ * @vma:	VMA obtained from fault info from where page is accessed
+ * @encl:	enclave accessing the page
+ * @addr:	address that triggered the page fault
+ *
+ * When an initialized enclave accesses a page with no backing EPC page
+ * on a SGX2 system then the EPC can be added dynamically via the SGX2
+ * ENCLS[EAUG] instruction.
+ *
+ * Returns: Appropriate vm_fault_t: VM_FAULT_NOPAGE when PTE was installed
+ * successfully, VM_FAULT_SIGBUS or VM_FAULT_OOM as error otherwise.
+ */
+static vm_fault_t sgx_encl_eaug_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				     struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo = {0};
+	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+	struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+	unsigned long phys_addr;
+	unsigned long prot;
+	vm_fault_t vmret;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!encl_page)
+		return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+
+	encl_page->desc = addr;
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+
+	/*
+	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
+	 * be created with RW permissions.
+	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
+	 * of RWX.
+	 */
+	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;
+
+	epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, true);
+	if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+		kfree(encl_page);
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+	}
+
+	va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl);
+	if (IS_ERR(va_page)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(va_page);
+		goto err_out_free;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy comment from sgx_encl_add_page() to maintain guidance in
+	 * this similar flow:
+	 * Adding to encl->va_pages must be done under encl->lock.  Ditto for
+	 * deleting (via sgx_encl_shrink()) in the error path.
+	 */
+	if (va_page)
+		list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+
+	ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
+			encl_page, GFP_KERNEL);
+	/*
+	 * If ret == -EBUSY then page was created in another flow while
+	 * running without encl->lock
+	 */
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out_unlock;
+
+	pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+	pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
+	pginfo.metadata = 0;
+
+	ret = __eaug(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out;
+
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+	encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+	encl_page->type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG;
+	encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+
+	sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page);
+
+	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(epc_page);
+	/*
+	 * Do not undo everything when creating PTE entry fails - next #PF
+	 * would find page ready for a PTE.
+	 * PAGE_SHARED because protection is forced to be RW above and COW
+	 * is not supported.
+	 */
+	vmret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				    PAGE_SHARED);
+	if (vmret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+
+err_out:
+	xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
+
+err_out_unlock:
+	sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page);
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+err_out_free:
+	sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+	kfree(encl_page);
+
+	return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+}
+
 static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
@@ -145,6 +267,17 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	if (unlikely(!encl))
 		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
 
+	/*
+	 * The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they
+	 * are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and
+	 * the system supports SGX2 then it is possible to dynamically add
+	 * a new enclave page. This is only possible for an initialized
+	 * enclave that will be checked for right away.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2) &&
+	    (!xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr))))
+		return sgx_encl_eaug_page(vma, encl, addr);
+
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
 	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +2 -0
index 848a28d28d3d..1b6ce1da7c92 100644
@@ -123,4 +123,6 @@ void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 					 unsigned long addr);
 
+struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl);
+void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
 #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2 -2
index 23bdf558b231..58ff62a1fb00 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 #include "encl.h"
 #include "encls.h"
 
-static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
 {
 	struct sgx_va_page *va_page = NULL;
 	void *err;
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
 	return va_page;
 }
 
-static void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
+void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
 {
 	encl->page_cnt--;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

Quickly looking through also this sequence is possible:

1. Enclave's run-time flow ignores the whole EACCEPT but instead a memory dereference will initialize the sequence.
2. This causes #PF handler to do EAUG and after the enclave is re-entered the vDSO exists because the page is not EACCEPT'd.
2. Enclave host enter in-enclave exception handler, which does EACCEPT.

Quoted 6 lines

Can you confirm this? I'm planning to test this patch by implementing EAUG support in Rust for Enarx. At this point I'm not yet sure whether I choose EACCEPT initiated or memory deference initiated code path but I think it is good if the kernel implementation is good enough to support both.

Other than that, this looks super solid!

I got my answer:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/32c1116934a588bd3e6c174684e3e36a05c0a4d4.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

I could almost give reviewed-by but I need to write the user space implementation first to check that this works for Enarx.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#103 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 19/32] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave

Quoted 258 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 257 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 242 lines · Reinette Chatre

With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with its maximum memory demands allocated. Pages cannot be added to an enclave after it is initialized. SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EAUG], that can be used to add pages to an initialized enclave. With SGX2 the enclave still needs to set aside address space for its maximum memory demands during enclave creation, but all pages need not be added before enclave initialization. Pages can be added during enclave runtime.

Add support for dynamically adding pages to an initialized enclave, architecturally limited to RW permission. Add pages via the page fault handler at the time an enclave address without a backing enclave page is accessed, potentially directly reclaiming pages if no free pages are available.

The enclave is still required to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on the page before it can be used. A useful flow is for the enclave to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on an uninitialized address. This will trigger the page fault handler that will add the enclave page and return execution to the enclave to repeat the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction, this time successful.

If the enclave accesses an uninitialized address in another way, for example by expanding the enclave stack to a page that has not yet been added, then the page fault handler would add the page on the first write but upon returning to the enclave the instruction that triggered the page fault would be repeated and since ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run yet it would trigger a second page fault, this time with the SGX flag set in the page fault error code. This can only be recovered by entering the enclave again and directly running the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction on the now initialized address.

Accessing an uninitialized address from outside the enclave also triggers this flow but the page will remain inaccessible (access will result in #PF) until accepted from within the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT].

The page is added with the architecturally constrained RW permissions as runtime as well as maximum allowed permissions. It is understood that there are some use cases, for example code relocation, that requires RWX maximum permissions. Supporting these use cases require guidance from user space policy before such maximum permissions can be allowed. Integration with user policy is deferred.

---
Changes since V1:
- Fix subject line "to initialized" -> "to an initialized" (Jarkko).
- Move text about hardware's PENDING state to the patch that introduces the ENCLS[EAUG] wrapper (Jarkko).
- Ensure kernel-doc uses brackets when referring to function.

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c  | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c |   4 +-
 3 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +133 -0
index a5d4a7efb986..d1e3ea86b902 100644
@@ -124,6 +124,128 @@ struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	return entry;
 }
 
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_eaug_page() - Dynamically add page to initialized enclave
+ * @vma:	VMA obtained from fault info from where page is accessed
+ * @encl:	enclave accessing the page
+ * @addr:	address that triggered the page fault
+ *
+ * When an initialized enclave accesses a page with no backing EPC page
+ * on a SGX2 system then the EPC can be added dynamically via the SGX2
+ * ENCLS[EAUG] instruction.
+ *
+ * Returns: Appropriate vm_fault_t: VM_FAULT_NOPAGE when PTE was installed
+ * successfully, VM_FAULT_SIGBUS or VM_FAULT_OOM as error otherwise.
+ */
+static vm_fault_t sgx_encl_eaug_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				     struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo = {0};
+	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+	struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+	unsigned long phys_addr;
+	unsigned long prot;
+	vm_fault_t vmret;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!encl_page)
+		return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+
+	encl_page->desc = addr;
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+
+	/*
+	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
+	 * be created with RW permissions.
+	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
+	 * of RWX.
+	 */
+	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;
+
+	epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, true);
+	if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+		kfree(encl_page);
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+	}
+
+	va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl);
+	if (IS_ERR(va_page)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(va_page);
+		goto err_out_free;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy comment from sgx_encl_add_page() to maintain guidance in
+	 * this similar flow:
+	 * Adding to encl->va_pages must be done under encl->lock.  Ditto for
+	 * deleting (via sgx_encl_shrink()) in the error path.
+	 */
+	if (va_page)
+		list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+
+	ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
+			encl_page, GFP_KERNEL);
+	/*
+	 * If ret == -EBUSY then page was created in another flow while
+	 * running without encl->lock
+	 */
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out_unlock;
+
+	pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+	pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
+	pginfo.metadata = 0;
+
+	ret = __eaug(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out;
+
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+	encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+	encl_page->type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG;
+	encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+
+	sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page);
+
+	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(epc_page);
+	/*
+	 * Do not undo everything when creating PTE entry fails - next #PF
+	 * would find page ready for a PTE.
+	 * PAGE_SHARED because protection is forced to be RW above and COW
+	 * is not supported.
+	 */
+	vmret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				    PAGE_SHARED);
+	if (vmret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+
+err_out:
+	xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
+
+err_out_unlock:
+	sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page);
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+err_out_free:
+	sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+	kfree(encl_page);
+
+	return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+}
+
 static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
@@ -145,6 +267,17 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	if (unlikely(!encl))
 		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
 
+	/*
+	 * The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they
+	 * are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and
+	 * the system supports SGX2 then it is possible to dynamically add
+	 * a new enclave page. This is only possible for an initialized
+	 * enclave that will be checked for right away.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2) &&
+	    (!xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr))))
+		return sgx_encl_eaug_page(vma, encl, addr);
+
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
 	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +2 -0
index 848a28d28d3d..1b6ce1da7c92 100644
@@ -123,4 +123,6 @@ void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 					 unsigned long addr);
 
+struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl);
+void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
 #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2 -2
index 23bdf558b231..58ff62a1fb00 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 #include "encl.h"
 #include "encls.h"
 
-static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
 {
 	struct sgx_va_page *va_page = NULL;
 	void *err;
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
 	return va_page;
 }
 
-static void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
+void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
 {
 	encl->page_cnt--;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

Quickly looking through also this sequence is possible:

1. Enclave's run-time flow ignores the whole EACCEPT but instead a memory dereference will initialize the sequence.
2. This causes #PF handler to do EAUG and after the enclave is re-entered the vDSO exists because the page is not EACCEPT'd.
2. Enclave host enter in-enclave exception handler, which does EACCEPT.

Can you confirm this? I'm planning to test this patch by implementing EAUG support in Rust for Enarx. At this point I'm not yet sure whether I choose EACCEPT initiated or memory deference initiated code path but I think it is good if the kernel implementation is good enough to support both.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

Other than that, this looks super solid!

I got my answer:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/32c1116934a588bd3e6c174684e3e36a05c0a4d4.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

I could almost give reviewed-by but I need to write the user space implementation first to check that this works for Enarx.

Do you know if it is possible to do EAUG, EMODPR and the do a single EACCEPT for both? Just looking at pseudo-code, it looked doable but I need to check this.

I.e. EAUG has this

EPCM(DS:RCX).BLOCKED := 0;
EPCM(DS:RCX).PENDING := 1;
EPCM(DS:RCX).MODIFIED := 0;
EPCM(DS:RCX).PR := 0;
(* associate the EPCPAGE with the SECS by storing the SECS identifier of DS:TMP_SECS *) Update EPCM(DS:RCX) SECS identifier to reference DS:TMP_SECS identifier; (* Set EPCM valid fields *)
EPCM(DS:RCX).VALID := 1;

And EMODPR only checks .VALID.

Doing two EACCEPT rounds is a bit rough as you have the page available in a kind of "stalled' state.

/Jarkko

maintainer
#30 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Reinette Chatre
Quoted 396 lines · Reinette Chatre

In the initial (SGX1) version of SGX, pages in an enclave need to be created with permissions that support all usages of the pages, from the time the enclave is initialized until it is unloaded. For example, pages used by a JIT compiler or when code needs to otherwise be relocated need to always have RWX permissions.

SGX2 includes a new function ENCLS[EMODPR] that is run from the kernel and can be used to restrict the EPCM permissions of regular enclave pages within an initialized enclave.

Introduce ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS to support restricting EPCM permissions. With this ioctl() the user specifies a page range and the permissions to be applied to all pages in the provided range. After checking the new permissions (more detail below) the page table entries are reset and any new page table entries will contain the new, restricted, permissions. ENCLS[EMODPR] is run to restrict the EPCM permissions followed by the ENCLS[ETRACK] flow that will ensure no cached linear-to-physical address mappings to the changed pages remain.

It is possible for the permission change request to fail on any page within the provided range, either with an error encountered by the kernel or by the SGX hardware while running ENCLS[EMODPR]. To support partial success the ioctl() returns an error code based on failures encountered by the kernel as well as two result output parameters: one for the number of pages that were successfully changed and one for the SGX return code.

Checking user provided new permissions
======================================

Enclave page permission changes need to be approached with care and for this reason permission changes are only allowed if the new permissions are the same or more restrictive that the vetted permissions. No additional checking is done to ensure that the permissions are actually being restricted. This is because the enclave may have relaxed the EPCM permissions from within the enclave without letting the kernel know. An attempt to relax permissions using this call will be ignored by the hardware.

For example, together with the support for relaxing of EPCM permissions, enclave pages added with the vetted permissions in brackets below are allowed to have permissions as follows:
* (RWX) => RW => R => RX => RWX
* (RW) => R => RW
* (RX) => R => RX

---
Changes since V1:
- Change terminology to use "relax" instead of "extend" to refer to the case when enclave page permissions are added (Dave).
- Use ioctl() in commit message (Dave).
- Add examples on what permissions would be allowed (Dave).
- Split enclave page permission changes into two ioctl()s, one for permission restricting (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS) and one for permission relaxing (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS) (Jarkko).
- In support of the ioctl() name change the following names have been changed:
struct sgx_page_modp -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm sgx_ioc_page_modp() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() sgx_page_modp() -> sgx_enclave_restrict_perm()
- ioctl() takes entire secinfo as input instead of
page permissions only (Jarkko).
- Fix kernel-doc to include () in function name.
- Create and use utility for the ETRACK flow.
- Fixups in comments
- Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for Documentation/x86/sgx.rst.
- Remove redundant comment.
- Make explicit which members of struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm are for output (Dave).

 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h |  21 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c  |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 229 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 255 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +21 -0
index 5c678b27bb72..b0ffb80bc67f 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04)
 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS \
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \
+	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x06, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -95,6 +97,25 @@ struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm {
 	__u64 count;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm - parameters for ioctl
+ *                                    %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
+ * @offset:	starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
+ *		address defined in SECS)
+ * @length:	length of memory (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data containing the new permission bits
+ *		for pages in range described by @offset and @length
+ * @result:	(output) SGX result code of ENCLS[EMODPR] function
+ * @count:	(output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm {
+	__u64 offset;
+	__u64 length;
+	__u64 secinfo;
+	__u64 result;
+	__u64 count;
+};
+
 struct sgx_enclave_run;
 
 /**
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +2 -2
index 8da813504249..a5d4a7efb986 100644
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 	return epc_page;
 }
 
-static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr)
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					 unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +3 -0
index cb9f16d457ac..848a28d28d3d 100644
@@ -120,4 +120,7 @@ void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset);
 bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
 void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					 unsigned long addr);
+
 #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +229 -0
index 9cc6af404bf6..23bdf558b231 100644
@@ -894,6 +894,232 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical address
+ * mappings are present before they can succeed. Collaborate with
+ * hardware via ENCLS[ETRACK] to ensure that all cached
+ * linear-to-physical address mappings belonging to all threads of
+ * the enclave are cleared. See sgx_encl_cpumask() for details.
+ */
+static int sgx_enclave_etrack(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+	void *epc_virt;
+	int ret;
+
+	epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+	ret = __etrack(epc_virt);
+	if (ret) {
+		/*
+		 * ETRACK only fails when there is an OS issue. For
+		 * example, two consecutive ETRACK was sent without
+		 * completed IPI between.
+		 */
+		pr_err_once("ETRACK returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
+		/*
+		 * Send IPIs to kick CPUs out of the enclave and
+		 * try ETRACK again.
+		 */
+		on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
+		ret = __etrack(epc_virt);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_err_once("ETRACK repeat returned %d (0x%x)",
+				    ret, ret);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+	}
+	on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_enclave_restrict_perm() - Restrict EPCM permissions and align OS view
+ * @encl:	Enclave to which the pages belong.
+ * @modp:	Checked parameters from user on which pages need modifying.
+ * @secinfo_perm: New (validated) permission bits.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0:		Success.
+ * - -errno:	Otherwise.
+ */
+static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+				      struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm *modp,
+				      u64 secinfo_perm)
+{
+	unsigned long vm_prot, run_prot_restore;
+	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	unsigned long c;
+	void *epc_virt;
+	int ret;
+
+	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+	secinfo.flags = secinfo_perm;
+
+	vm_prot = vm_prot_from_secinfo(secinfo_perm);
+
+	for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+		addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;
+
+		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
+		if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -EFAULT;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Changing EPCM permissions is only supported on regular
+		 * SGX pages. Attempting this change on other pages will
+		 * result in #PF.
+		 */
+		if (entry->type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not verify if current runtime protection bits are what
+		 * is being requested. The enclave may have relaxed EPCM
+		 * permissions calls without letting the kernel know and
+		 * thus permission restriction may still be needed even if
+		 * from the kernel's perspective the permissions are unchanged.
+		 */
+
+		/* New permissions should never exceed vetted permissions. */
+		if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot) != vm_prot) {
+			ret = -EPERM;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		/* Make sure page stays around while releasing mutex. */
+		if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page)) {
+			ret = -EAGAIN;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Change runtime protection before zapping PTEs to ensure
+		 * any new #PF uses new permissions. EPCM permissions (if
+		 * needed) not changed yet.
+		 */
+		run_prot_restore = entry->vm_run_prot_bits;
+		entry->vm_run_prot_bits = vm_prot;
+
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		/*
+		 * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on
+		 * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
+		 */
+		sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
+
+		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+		/* Change EPCM permissions. */
+		epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page);
+		ret = __emodpr(&secinfo, epc_virt);
+		if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
+			/*
+			 * All possible faults should be avoidable:
+			 * parameters have been checked, will only change
+			 * permissions of a regular page, and no concurrent
+			 * SGX1/SGX2 ENCLS instructions since these
+			 * are protected with mutex.
+			 */
+			pr_err_once("EMODPR encountered exception %d\n",
+				    ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret));
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto out_prot_restore;
+		}
+		if (encls_failed(ret)) {
+			modp->result = ret;
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto out_prot_restore;
+		}
+
+		ret = sgx_enclave_etrack(encl);
+		if (ret) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto out_reclaim;
+		}
+
+		sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page);
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+	goto out;
+
+out_prot_restore:
+	entry->vm_run_prot_bits = run_prot_restore;
+out_reclaim:
+	sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page);
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+out:
+	modp->count = c;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() - handler for
+ *                                   %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
+ * @encl:	an enclave pointer
+ * @arg:	userspace pointer to a &struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm
+ *		instance
+ *
+ * SGX2 distinguishes between relaxing and restricting the enclave page
+ * permissions maintained by the hardware (EPCM permissions) of pages
+ * belonging to an initialized enclave (after SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT).
+ *
+ * EPCM permissions cannot be restricted from within the enclave, the enclave
+ * requires the kernel to run the privileged level 0 instructions ENCLS[EMODPR]
+ * and ENCLS[ETRACK]. An attempt to relax EPCM permissions with this call
+ * will be ignored by the hardware.
+ *
+ * Enclave page permissions are not allowed to exceed the maximum vetted
+ * permissions maintained in &struct sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0:		Success
+ * - -errno:	Otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					  void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm params;
+	u64 secinfo_perm;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = sgx_perm_from_user_secinfo((void __user *)params.secinfo,
+					 &secinfo_perm);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (params.result || params.count)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(encl, &params, secinfo_perm);
+
+	if (copy_to_user(arg, &params, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data;
@@ -918,6 +1144,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS:
 		ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(encl, (void __user *)arg);
 		break;
+	case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS:
+		ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
 		break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

Just a suggestion but these might be a bit less cluttered explanations of the fields:

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

pub struct RelaxPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the relaxed permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

pub struct RestrictPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the restricted permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// In: ENCLU[EMODPR] return value
    result: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

I can live with the current ones too but I rewrote them so that I can quickly make sense of the fields later. It's Rust code but the point is the documentation...

Also, it should not be too much trouble to use the struct in user space code even if the struct names are struct sgx_enclave_relax_permissions and struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions, given that you most likely have exactly single call-site in the run-time.

Other than that, looks quite good.

BR, Jarkko

#31 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 1 line · Jarkko Sakkinen

On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 04:45:38PM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:

...

Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 39 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +21 -0
index 5c678b27bb72..b0ffb80bc67f 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04)
 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS \
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \
+	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x06, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -95,6 +97,25 @@ struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm {
 	__u64 count;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm - parameters for ioctl
+ *                                    %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
+ * @offset:	starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
+ *		address defined in SECS)
+ * @length:	length of memory (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data containing the new permission bits
+ *		for pages in range described by @offset and @length
+ * @result:	(output) SGX result code of ENCLS[EMODPR] function
+ * @count:	(output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm {
+	__u64 offset;
+	__u64 length;
+	__u64 secinfo;
+	__u64 result;
+	__u64 count;
+};
+
 struct sgx_enclave_run;
 
 /**

...

Quoted 19 lines

Just a suggestion but these might be a bit less cluttered explanations of the fields:

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

pub struct RelaxPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the relaxed permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

Quoted 12 lines
pub struct RestrictPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the restricted permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// In: ENCLU[EMODPR] return value
    result: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

In your proposal you shorten the descriptions from the current implementation. I do consider the removed information valuable since I believe that it helps users understand the kernel interface requirements without needing to be familiar with or dig into the kernel code to understand how the provided data is used.

For example, you shorten offset to "starting page offset", but what was removed was the requirement that this offset has to be page aligned and what the offset is relative to. I do believe summarizing these requirements upfront helps a user space developer by not needing to dig through kernel code later in order to understand why an -EINVAL was received.

Quoted 3 lines

I can live with the current ones too but I rewrote them so that I can quickly make sense of the fields later. It's Rust code but the point is the documentation...

Since you do seem to be ok with the current descriptions I would prefer to keep them.

Quoted 4 lines

Also, it should not be too much trouble to use the struct in user space code even if the struct names are struct sgx_enclave_relax_permissions and struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions, given that you most likely have exactly single call-site in the run-time.

Are you requesting that I make the following name changes? struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm -> struct sgx_enclave_relax_permissions struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions

If so, do you want the function names also written out in this way?

sgx_enclave_relax_perm()        -> sgx_enclave_relax_permissions()
sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm()    -> sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_permissions()
sgx_enclave_restrict_perm()     -> sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions()

sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions()

Quoted 1 line

Other than that, looks quite good.

Thank you very much for reviewing and testing this work.

Reinette

#104 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 19/32] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Hi Jarkko,

On 2/20/2022 10:40 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
...

Quoted 15 lines

Do you know if it is possible to do EAUG, EMODPR and the do a single EACCEPT for both? Just looking at pseudo-code, it looked doable but I need to check this.

I.e. EAUG has this

EPCM(DS:RCX).BLOCKED := 0;
EPCM(DS:RCX).PENDING := 1;
EPCM(DS:RCX).MODIFIED := 0;
EPCM(DS:RCX).PR := 0;
(* associate the EPCPAGE with the SECS by storing the SECS identifier of DS:TMP_SECS *) Update EPCM(DS:RCX) SECS identifier to reference DS:TMP_SECS identifier; (* Set EPCM valid fields *)
EPCM(DS:RCX).VALID := 1;

Quoted 1 line

And EMODPR only checks .VALID.

After that check there is also:
IF (EPCM(DS:RCX).PENDING is not 0 or (EPCM(DS:RCX).MODIFIED is not 0) )

    THEN
        RFLAGS.ZF := 1;
        RAX := SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE;
        GOTO DONE;

FI;

Attempting the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl() on a recently added page (EAUG) that has not yet been EACCEPTed is thus expected to fail with errno of EFAULT (indicating ENCLS[EMODPR] failure) and the returned structure's result field set to 20 (SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE).

I confirmed this behavior by modifying the "augment" kselftest test by adding a SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS call between the new memory access and the EACCEPT.

Reinette

#121 lore raw
In reply to Reinette Chatre

1. This interface looks very odd to me. mmap() is the kernel interface for changing user space memory maps. Why are we introducing a new interface for this? You can just simply add a new mmap flag (i.e. MAP_SGX_TCS*) and then figure out which SGX instructions to execute based on the desired state of the memory maps. If you do this, none of the following ioctls are needed:

* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE

It also means that languages don't have to grow support for all these ioctls. Instead, they can just reuse the existing mmap() bindings with the new flag. Also, multiple operations can be combined into a single mmap() call, amortizing the changes over a single context switch.

2. Automatically adding pages with hard-coded permissions in a fault handler seems like a really bad idea. How do you distinguish between accesses which should result in an updated mapping and accesses that should result in a fault? IMHO, all unmapped page accesses should result in a page fault. mmap() should be called first to identify the correct permissions for these pages. Then the page handler should be updated to use the permissions from the mapping when backfilling physical pages. If I understand correctly, this should also obviate the need for the weird userspace callback to allow for execute permissions.

3. Implementing as I've suggested also means that we can lock down an enclave, for example - after code has been JITed, by closing the file descriptor. Once the file descriptor used to create the enclave is closed, no further mmap() can be performed on the enclave. Attempting to do EACCEPT on an unmapped page will generate a page fault.

* - I'm aware that a new flag might be frowned upon. I see a few other options:
1. reuse an existing flag which doesn't make sense in this context
2. communicate the page type in the offset argument
3. keep SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE

Quoted 231 lines · Reinette Chatre

V1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/

Changes since V1 that directly impact user space:
- SGX2 permission changes changed from a single ioctl() named SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODP to two new ioctl()s:
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, supported by two different parameter structures (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS does not support a result output parameter) (Jarkko).

User space flow impact: After user space runs ENCLU[EMODPE] it needs to call SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS to have PTEs updated. Previously running SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODP in this scenario resulted in EPCM.PR being set but calling SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS will not result in EPCM.PR being set anymore and thus no need for an additional ENCLU[EACCEPT].

- SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
obtain new permissions from secinfo as parameter instead of the permissions directly (Jarkko).

- ioctl() supporting SGX2 page type change is renamed from SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE (Jarkko).

- SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE obtains new page type from secinfo as parameter instead of the page type directly (Jarkko).

- ioctl() supporting SGX2 page removal is renamed from SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES (Jarkko).

- All ioctl() parameter structures have been renamed as a result of the ioctl() renaming:
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS => struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS => struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE => struct sgx_enclave_modt SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES => struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages

Changes since V1 that do not directly impact user space:
- Number of patches in series increased from 25 to 32 primarily because of splitting the original submission:
- Wrappers for the new SGX2 functions are introduced in three separate patches replacing the original "x86/sgx: Add wrappers for SGX2 functions"
(Jarkko).
- Moving and renaming sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is done with two patches replacing the original "x86/sgx: Use more generic name for enclave cpumask function" (Jarkko).
- Support for SGX2 EPCM permission changes is split into two ioctls(), one for relaxing and one for restricting permissions, each introduced by a new patch replacing the original "x86/sgx: Support enclave page permission changes" (Jarkko).
- Extracted code used by existing ioctls() for usage by new ioctl()s into a new utility in new patch "x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length" (Dave did not specifically ask for this but it addresses his review feedback).
- Two new Documentation patches to support the SGX2 work ("Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management") and a dedicated section on the enclave permission management ("Documentation/x86: Document SGX permission details") (Andy).
- Most patches were reworked to improve the language by:
* aiming to refer to exact item instead of English rephrasing (Jarkko).
* use ioctl() instead of ioctl throughout (Dave).
* Use "relaxed" instead of "exceed" when referring to permissions

    (Dave).

- Improved documentation with several additions to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst.
- Many smaller changes, please refer to individual patches.

Hi Everybody,

The current Linux kernel support for SGX includes support for SGX1 that requires that an enclave be created with properties that accommodate all usages over its (the enclave's) lifetime. This includes properties such as permissions of enclave pages, the number of enclave pages, and the number of threads supported by the enclave.

Consequences of this requirement to have the enclave be created to accommodate all usages include:
* pages needing to support relocated code are required to have RWX permissions for their entire lifetime,
* an enclave needs to be created with the maximum stack and heap projected to be needed during the enclave's entire lifetime which can be longer than the processes running within it,
* an enclave needs to be created with support for the maximum number of threads projected to run in the enclave.

Since SGX1 a few more functions were introduced, collectively called SGX2, that support modifications to an initialized enclave. Hardware supporting these functions are already available as listed on
https://github.com/ayeks/SGX-hardware

This series adds support for SGX2, also referred to as Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM). This includes:

* Support modifying permissions of regular enclave pages belonging to an initialized enclave. New permissions are not allowed to exceed the originally vetted permissions. For example, RX isn't allowed unless the page was originally added with RX or RWX.
Modifying permissions is accomplished with two new ioctl()s:
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS.

* Support dynamic addition of regular enclave pages to an initialized enclave. Pages are added with RW permissions as their "originally vetted permissions" (see previous bullet) and thus not allowed to be made executable at this time. Enabling dynamically added pages to obtain executable permissions require integration with user space policy that is deferred until the core SGX2 enabling is complete. Pages are dynamically added to an initialized enclave from the SGX page fault handler.

* Support expanding an initialized enclave to accommodate more threads. More threads can be accommodated by an enclave with the addition of Thread Control Structure (TCS) pages that is done by changing the type of regular enclave pages to TCS pages using a new ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE.

* Support removing regular and TCS pages from an initialized enclave. Removing pages is accomplished in two stages as supported by two new ioctl()s SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE (same ioctl() as mentioned in previous bullet) and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES.

* Tests covering all the new flows, some edge cases, and one comprehensive stress scenario.

No additional work is needed to support SGX2 in a virtualized environment. The tests included in this series can also be run from a guest and was tested with the recent QEMU release based on 6.2.0 that supports SGX.

Patches 1 to 14 prepares the existing code for SGX2 support by introducing the SGX2 functions, making sure pages remain accessible after their enclave permissions are changed, and tracking enclave page types as well as runtime permissions as needed by SGX2.

Patches 15 through 32 are a mix of x86/sgx and selftests/sgx patches that follow the format where first an SGX2 feature is enabled and then followed by tests of the new feature and/or tests of scenarios that combine SGX2 features enabled up to that point.

In two cases (patches 20 and 31) code in support of SGX2 is separated out with detailed motivation to support the review.

This series is based on v5.17-rc2 with the following fixes additionally applied:

"selftests/sgx: Remove extra newlines in test output"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/16317683a1822bbd44ab3ca48b60a9a217ac24de.1643754040.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"selftests/sgx: Ensure enclave data available during debug print"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/eaaeeb9122916d831942fc8a3043c687137314c1.1643754040.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"selftests/sgx: Do not attempt enclave build without valid enclave"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/4e4ea6d70c286c209964bec1e8d29ac8e692748b.1643754040.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"selftests/sgx: Fix NULL-pointer-dereference upon early test failure"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/89824888783fd8e770bfc64530c7549650a41851.1643754040.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"x86/sgx: Add poison handling to reclaimer"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/dcc95eb2aaefb042527ac50d0a50738c7c160dac.1643830353.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/
"x86/sgx: Silence softlockup detection when releasing large enclaves"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/b5e9f218064aa76e3026f778e1ad0a1d823e3db8.1643133224.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

Your feedback will be greatly appreciated.

Regards,

Reinette

Reinette Chatre (32):
x86/sgx: Add short descriptions to ENCLS wrappers
x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODPR function
x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODT function
x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EAUG function Documentation/x86: Document SGX permission details x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic
permission changes
x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()
x86/sgx: Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() as sgx_encl_cpumask() x86/sgx: Move PTE zap code to new sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() x86/sgx: Make sgx_ipi_cb() available internally
x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type
x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM permission changes selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page permission changes x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows
x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type
x86/sgx: Support complete page removal
Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management section selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior
selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page
x86/sgx: Free up EPC pages directly to support large page ranges selftests/sgx: Page removal stress test

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst                     |   64 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h                    |    8 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h               |   81 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c                |  334 +++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h                |   12 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h               |   33 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c               |  831 ++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c                |   70 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h                 |    3 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h         |   23 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c            |   41 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c            | 1484 +++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h            |    1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c       |   68 +
 .../selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S       |    6 +
 15 files changed, 2963 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)

base-commit: 26291c54e111ff6ba87a164d85d4a4e134b7315c
prerequisite-patch-id: 3c3908f1c3536cc04ba020fb3e81f51395b44223
prerequisite-patch-id: e860923423c3387cf6fdcceb2fa41dc5e9454ef4
prerequisite-patch-id: 986260c8bc4255eb61e2c4afa88d2b723e376423
prerequisite-patch-id: ba014a99fced2b57d5d9e2dfb9d80ddf4333c13e
prerequisite-patch-id: 65cbb72889b6353a5639b984615d12019136b270
prerequisite-patch-id: e3296a2f0345a77c8a7ca91f76697ae2e1dca21f --
2.25.1

#122 lore raw

Hi Nathaniel,

Quoted 3 lines · Nathaniel McCallum

1. This interface looks very odd to me. mmap() is the kernel interface for changing user space memory maps. Why are we introducing a new interface for this?

mmap() is the kernel interface used to create new mappings in the virtual address space of the calling process. This is different from the permissions and properties of the underlying file/memory being mapped.

A new interface is introduced because changes need to be made to the permissions and properties of the underlying enclave. A new virtual address space is not needed nor should existing VMAs be impacted.

This is similar to how mmap() is not used to change file permissions.

VMA permissions are separate from enclave page permissions as found in the EPCM (Enclave Page Cache Map). The current implementation (SGX1) already distinguishes between the VMA and EPCM permissions - for example, it is already possible to create a read-only VMA from enclave pages that have RW EPCM permissions. mmap() of a portion of EPC memory with a particular permission does not imply that the underlying EPCM permissions (should)have that permission.

Quoted 10 lines

You can just simply add a new mmap flag (i.e.
MAP_SGX_TCS*) and then figure out which SGX instructions to execute based on the desired state of the memory maps. If you do this, none of the following ioctls are needed:

* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE

Quoted 7 lines

It also means that languages don't have to grow support for all these ioctls. Instead, they can just reuse the existing mmap() bindings with the new flag. Also, multiple operations can be combined into a single mmap() call, amortizing the changes over a single context switch.

2. Automatically adding pages with hard-coded permissions in a fault handler seems like a really bad idea.

Could you please elaborate why this is a bad idea?

Quoted 3 lines

How do you distinguish between
accesses which should result in an updated mapping and accesses that should result in a fault?

Accesses that should result in an updated mapping have two requirements:
(a) address accessed belongs to the enclave based on the address range specified during enclave create
(b) there is no backing enclave page for the address

Quoted 6 lines

IMHO, all unmapped page accesses should
result in a page fault. mmap() should be called first to identify the correct permissions for these pages.
Then the page handler should be
updated to use the permissions from the mapping when backfilling physical pages. If I understand correctly, this should also obviate

Regular enclave pages can _only_ be dynamically added with RW permission.

SGX2's support for adding regular pages to an enclave via the EAUG instruction is architecturally set at RW. The OS cannot change those permissions via the EAUG instruction nor can the OS do so with a different/additional instruction because:
* the OS is not able to relax permissions since that can only be done from within the enclave with ENCLU[EMODPE], thus it is not possible for the OS to dynamically add pages via EAUG as RW and then relax permissions to RWX.
* the OS is not able to EAUG a page and immediately attempt an EMODPR either as Jarkko also recently inquired about:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/

Quoted 2 lines

the need for the weird userspace callback to allow for execute permissions.

User policy integration would always be required to allow execute permissions on a writable page. This is not expected to be a userspace callback but instead integration with existing user policy subsystem(s).

Quoted 6 lines

3. Implementing as I've suggested also means that we can lock down an enclave, for example - after code has been JITed, by closing the file descriptor. Once the file descriptor used to create the enclave is closed, no further mmap() can be performed on the enclave. Attempting to do EACCEPT on an unmapped page will generate a page fault.

This is not clear to me. If the file descriptor is closed and no further mmap() is allowed then how would a process be able to enter the enclave to execute code within it?

This series does indeed lock down the address range to ensure that it is not possible to map memory that does not belong to the enclave after the enclave is created. Please see:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/1b833dbce6c937f71523f4aaf4b2181b9673519f.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

Quoted 6 lines

* - I'm aware that a new flag might be frowned upon. I see a few other options:
1. reuse an existing flag which doesn't make sense in this context
2. communicate the page type in the offset argument
3. keep SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE

Reinette

#123 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Nathaniel,

Quoted 3 lines · Nathaniel McCallum

1. This interface looks very odd to me. mmap() is the kernel interface for changing user space memory maps. Why are we introducing a new interface for this?

mmap() is the kernel interface used to create new mappings in the virtual address space of the calling process. This is different from the permissions and properties of the underlying file/memory being mapped.

A new interface is introduced because changes need to be made to the permissions and properties of the underlying enclave. A new virtual address space is not needed nor should existing VMAs be impacted.

This is similar to how mmap() is not used to change file permissions.

Quoted 7 lines

VMA permissions are separate from enclave page permissions as found in the EPCM (Enclave Page Cache Map). The current implementation (SGX1) already distinguishes between the VMA and EPCM permissions - for example, it is already possible to create a read-only VMA from enclave pages that have RW EPCM permissions. mmap() of a portion of EPC memory with a particular permission does not imply that the underlying EPCM permissions (should)have that permission.

Yes. BUT... unlike the file permissions, this leaks an implementation detail.

The user process is governed by VMA permissions. And during enclave creation, it had to mmap() all the enclave regions to their final VMA permissions. So during enclave creation you have to use mmap() but after enclave creation you use custom APIs? That's inconsistent at best.

Forcing userspace to worry about the (mostly undocumented!) interactions between EPC, PTE and VMA permissions makes these APIs hard to use and difficult to reason about.

When I call SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS, do I also have to call mmap() to update the VMA permissions to match? It isn't clear. Nor is it really clear why I'm calling completely separate APIs.

Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines

You can just simply add a new mmap flag (i.e.
MAP_SGX_TCS*) and then figure out which SGX instructions to execute based on the desired state of the memory maps. If you do this, none of the following ioctls are needed:

* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE

It also means that languages don't have to grow support for all these ioctls. Instead, they can just reuse the existing mmap() bindings with the new flag. Also, multiple operations can be combined into a single mmap() call, amortizing the changes over a single context switch.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

2. Automatically adding pages with hard-coded permissions in a fault handler seems like a really bad idea.

Could you please elaborate why this is a bad idea?

Because implementations that miss this subtlety suddenly have pages with magic permissions. Magic is bad. Explicit is good.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

How do you distinguish between
accesses which should result in an updated mapping and accesses that should result in a fault?

Accesses that should result in an updated mapping have two requirements:
(a) address accessed belongs to the enclave based on the address range specified during enclave create
(b) there is no backing enclave page for the address

What happens if the enclave is buggy? Or has been compromised. In both of those cases, there should be a userspace visible fault and pages should not be added.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines

IMHO, all unmapped page accesses should
result in a page fault. mmap() should be called first to identify the correct permissions for these pages.
Then the page handler should be
updated to use the permissions from the mapping when backfilling physical pages. If I understand correctly, this should also obviate

Regular enclave pages can _only_ be dynamically added with RW permission.

Quoted 10 lines

SGX2's support for adding regular pages to an enclave via the EAUG instruction is architecturally set at RW. The OS cannot change those permissions via the EAUG instruction nor can the OS do so with a different/additional instruction because:
* the OS is not able to relax permissions since that can only be done from within the enclave with ENCLU[EMODPE], thus it is not possible for the OS to dynamically add pages via EAUG as RW and then relax permissions to RWX.
* the OS is not able to EAUG a page and immediately attempt an EMODPR either as Jarkko also recently inquired about:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/

This design looks... unfinished. EAUG takes a PAGEINFO in RBX, but PAGEINFO.SECINFO must be zeroed and EAUG instead sets magic hard-coded permissions. Why doesn't EAUG just respect the permissions in PAGEINFO.SECINFO? We aren't told.

Further, if the enclave can do EMODPE, why does SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS even exist? None of the documentation explains what this ioctl even does. Does it update PTE permissions? VMA permissions? Nobody knows without reading the source code.

Userspace should not be bothered with the subtle details of the interaction between EPC, PTE and VMA permissions. But this API does everything it can do to expose all these details to userspace. And it doesn't bother to document them (probably because it is hard). It would be much better to avoid exposing these details to userspace.

IMHO, there should be a simple flow like this (if EAUG respects PAGEINFO.SECINFO):

1. Non-enclave calls mmap()/munmap().
2. Enclave issues EACCEPT, if necessary.
3. Enclave issues EMODPE, if necessary.

Notice that in the second step above, during the mmap() call, the kernel ensures that EPC, PTE and VMA are in sync and fails if they cannot be made to be compatible. Also note that in the above flow EAUG instructions can be efficiently batched.

Given the current poor state of the EAUG instruction, we might need to do this flow instead:

1. Enclave issues EACCEPT, if necessary. (Add RW pages...)
2. Non-enclave calls mmap()/munmap().
3. Enclave issues EACCEPT, if necessary.
4. Enclave issues EMODPE, if necessary.

However, doing EAUG only via the page access handler means that there is no way to batch EAUG instructions and this forces a context switch for every page you want to add. This has to be terrible for performance. Note specifically that the SDM calls out batching, which is currently impossible under this patch set. 35.5.7 - "Page allocation operations may be batched to improve efficiency."

As it stands today, if I want to add 256MiB of pages to an enclave, I'll have to do 2^16 context switches. That doesn't seem scalable.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

the need for the weird userspace callback to allow for execute permissions.

User policy integration would always be required to allow execute permissions on a writable page. This is not expected to be a userspace callback but instead integration with existing user policy subsystem(s).

Why? This isn't documented.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines

3. Implementing as I've suggested also means that we can lock down an enclave, for example - after code has been JITed, by closing the file descriptor. Once the file descriptor used to create the enclave is closed, no further mmap() can be performed on the enclave. Attempting to do EACCEPT on an unmapped page will generate a page fault.

This is not clear to me. If the file descriptor is closed and no further mmap() is allowed then how would a process be able to enter the enclave to execute code within it?

EENTER (or the vdso function) with the address of a TCS page, like normal. In Enarx, we don't retain the enclave fd after the final mmap() following EINIT. Everything works just fine.

Quoted 4 lines

This series does indeed lock down the address range to ensure that it is not possible to map memory that does not belong to the enclave after the enclave is created. Please see:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/1b833dbce6c937f71523f4aaf4b2181b9673519f.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about a workflow like this:

1. Enclave initialization: ECREATE ... EINIT
2. EENTER
3. Enclave JITs some code (changes page permissions)
4. EEXIT
5. Close enclave fd.
6. EENTER
7. If an enclave attempts page modifications, a fault occurs.

Think of this similar to seccomp(). The enclave wants to do some dynamic page table manipulation. But then it wants to lock down page table modification so that, if compromised, attackers have no ability to obtain RWX permissions.

maintainer
#32 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Reinette Chatre
Quoted 94 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 1 line · Jarkko Sakkinen

On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 04:45:38PM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:

...

Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 39 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +21 -0
index 5c678b27bb72..b0ffb80bc67f 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04)
 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS \
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \
+	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x06, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -95,6 +97,25 @@ struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm {
 	__u64 count;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm - parameters for ioctl
+ *                                    %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
+ * @offset:	starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
+ *		address defined in SECS)
+ * @length:	length of memory (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data containing the new permission bits
+ *		for pages in range described by @offset and @length
+ * @result:	(output) SGX result code of ENCLS[EMODPR] function
+ * @count:	(output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm {
+	__u64 offset;
+	__u64 length;
+	__u64 secinfo;
+	__u64 result;
+	__u64 count;
+};
+
 struct sgx_enclave_run;
 
 /**

...

Quoted 19 lines

Just a suggestion but these might be a bit less cluttered explanations of the fields:

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

pub struct RelaxPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the relaxed permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

Quoted 12 lines
pub struct RestrictPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the restricted permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// In: ENCLU[EMODPR] return value
    result: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

In your proposal you shorten the descriptions from the current implementation. I do consider the removed information valuable since I believe that it helps users understand the kernel interface requirements without needing to be familiar with or dig into the kernel code to understand how the provided data is used.

For example, you shorten offset to "starting page offset", but what was removed was the requirement that this offset has to be page aligned and what the offset is relative to. I do believe summarizing these requirements upfront helps a user space developer by not needing to dig through kernel code later in order to understand why an -EINVAL was received.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I can live with the current ones too but I rewrote them so that I can quickly make sense of the fields later. It's Rust code but the point is the documentation...

Since you do seem to be ok with the current descriptions I would prefer to keep them.

Yeah, they are fine to me.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Also, it should not be too much trouble to use the struct in user space code even if the struct names are struct sgx_enclave_relax_permissions and struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions, given that you most likely have exactly single call-site in the run-time.

Are you requesting that I make the following name changes? struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm -> struct sgx_enclave_relax_permissions struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions

Quoted 5 lines

If so, do you want the function names also written out in this way?

sgx_enclave_relax_perm()        -> sgx_enclave_relax_permissions()
sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm()    -> sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_permissions()
sgx_enclave_restrict_perm()     -> sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions()

sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions()

Yes, unless you have a specific reason to shorten them :-)

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

Other than that, looks quite good.

Thank you very much for reviewing and testing this work.

NP

Quoted 1 line

Reinette

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#105 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 19/32] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave

In reply to Reinette Chatre
Quoted 30 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

On 2/20/2022 10:40 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
...

Quoted 15 lines

Do you know if it is possible to do EAUG, EMODPR and the do a single EACCEPT for both? Just looking at pseudo-code, it looked doable but I need to check this.

I.e. EAUG has this

EPCM(DS:RCX).BLOCKED := 0;
EPCM(DS:RCX).PENDING := 1;
EPCM(DS:RCX).MODIFIED := 0;
EPCM(DS:RCX).PR := 0;
(* associate the EPCPAGE with the SECS by storing the SECS identifier of DS:TMP_SECS *) Update EPCM(DS:RCX) SECS identifier to reference DS:TMP_SECS identifier; (* Set EPCM valid fields *)
EPCM(DS:RCX).VALID := 1;

Quoted 1 line

And EMODPR only checks .VALID.

After that check there is also:
IF (EPCM(DS:RCX).PENDING is not 0 or (EPCM(DS:RCX).MODIFIED is not 0) )

    THEN
        RFLAGS.ZF := 1;
        RAX := SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE;
        GOTO DONE;

FI;

Quoted 8 lines

Attempting the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl() on a recently added page (EAUG) that has not yet been EACCEPTed is thus expected to fail with errno of EFAULT (indicating ENCLS[EMODPR] failure) and the returned structure's result field set to 20 (SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE).

I confirmed this behavior by modifying the "augment" kselftest test by adding a SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS call between the new memory access and the EACCEPT.

Thank you, also Mark confirmed this.

BR, Jarkko

#124 lore raw
In reply to Nathaniel McCallum

Hi Nathaniel,

Quoted 28 lines · Nathaniel McCallum
Quoted 18 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Nathaniel,

Quoted 3 lines · Nathaniel McCallum

1. This interface looks very odd to me. mmap() is the kernel interface for changing user space memory maps. Why are we introducing a new interface for this?

mmap() is the kernel interface used to create new mappings in the virtual address space of the calling process. This is different from the permissions and properties of the underlying file/memory being mapped.

A new interface is introduced because changes need to be made to the permissions and properties of the underlying enclave. A new virtual address space is not needed nor should existing VMAs be impacted.

This is similar to how mmap() is not used to change file permissions.

Quoted 7 lines

VMA permissions are separate from enclave page permissions as found in the EPCM (Enclave Page Cache Map). The current implementation (SGX1) already distinguishes between the VMA and EPCM permissions - for example, it is already possible to create a read-only VMA from enclave pages that have RW EPCM permissions. mmap() of a portion of EPC memory with a particular permission does not imply that the underlying EPCM permissions (should)have that permission.

Quoted 1 line

Yes. BUT... unlike the file permissions, this leaks an implementation detail.

Not really - just like a RW file can be mapped read-only or RW, RW enclave memory can be mapped read-only or RW.

Quoted 6 lines

The user process is governed by VMA permissions. And during enclave creation, it had to mmap() all the enclave regions to their final VMA permissions. So during enclave creation you have to use mmap() but after enclave creation you use custom APIs? That's inconsistent at best.

No. ioctl()s are consistently used to manage enclave memory.

The existing ioctls() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT are used to set up to initialize the enclave memory.

The new ioctls() are used to manage enclave memory after enclave initialization.

The enclave memory is thus managed with a consistent interface.

mmap() is required before SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE to obtain a base address for the enclave that is required by the ioctl(). The rest of the ioctl()s, existing and new, are consistent in interface by not requiring a memory mapping but instead work from an offset from the base address.

Quoted 3 lines

Forcing userspace to worry about the (mostly undocumented!) interactions between EPC, PTE and VMA permissions makes these APIs hard to use and difficult to reason about.

This is not new. The current SGX1 user space is already prevented from creating a mapping of enclave memory that is more relaxed than the enclave memory. For example, if the enclave memory has RW EPCM permissions then it is not possible to mmap() that memory as RWX.

Quoted 3 lines

When I call SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS, do I also have to call mmap() to update the VMA permissions to match? It isn't clear. Nor is

mprotect() may be the better call to use.

Quoted 17 lines

it really clear why I'm calling completely separate APIs.

Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines

You can just simply add a new mmap flag (i.e.
MAP_SGX_TCS*) and then figure out which SGX instructions to execute based on the desired state of the memory maps. If you do this, none of the following ioctls are needed:

* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE

It also means that languages don't have to grow support for all these ioctls. Instead, they can just reuse the existing mmap() bindings with the new flag. Also, multiple operations can be combined into a single mmap() call, amortizing the changes over a single context switch.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

2. Automatically adding pages with hard-coded permissions in a fault handler seems like a really bad idea.

Could you please elaborate why this is a bad idea?

Because implementations that miss this subtlety suddenly have pages with magic permissions. Magic is bad. Explicit is good.

There is no magic. Any new pages have to be accepted by the enclave. The enclave will not be able to access these pages unless explicitly accepted, ENCLU[EACCEPT], from within the enclave.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines

How do you distinguish between
accesses which should result in an updated mapping and accesses that should result in a fault?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Accesses that should result in an updated mapping have two requirements:
(a) address accessed belongs to the enclave based on the address range specified during enclave create
(b) there is no backing enclave page for the address

What happens if the enclave is buggy? Or has been compromised. In both of those cases, there should be a userspace visible fault and pages should not be added.

If user space accesses a memory address with a regular read/write that results in a new page added then there is indeed a user space visible fault. You can see this flow in action in the "augment" test case in
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/32c1116934a588bd3e6c174684e3e36a05c0a4d4.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

If user space indeed wants the page after encountering such a fault then it needs to enter the enclave again, from a different entry point, to run ENCLU[EACCEPT], before it can return to the original entry point to continue execution from the instruction that triggered the original read/write.

The only flow where a page is added without a user space visible fault is when user space explicitly runs the ENCLU[EACCEPT] to do so.

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines

IMHO, all unmapped page accesses should
result in a page fault. mmap() should be called first to identify the correct permissions for these pages.
Then the page handler should be
updated to use the permissions from the mapping when backfilling physical pages. If I understand correctly, this should also obviate

Regular enclave pages can _only_ be dynamically added with RW permission.

Quoted 10 lines

SGX2's support for adding regular pages to an enclave via the EAUG instruction is architecturally set at RW. The OS cannot change those permissions via the EAUG instruction nor can the OS do so with a different/additional instruction because:
* the OS is not able to relax permissions since that can only be done from within the enclave with ENCLU[EMODPE], thus it is not possible for the OS to dynamically add pages via EAUG as RW and then relax permissions to RWX.
* the OS is not able to EAUG a page and immediately attempt an EMODPR either as Jarkko also recently inquired about:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/

Quoted 4 lines

This design looks... unfinished. EAUG takes a PAGEINFO in RBX, but PAGEINFO.SECINFO must be zeroed and EAUG instead sets magic hard-coded permissions. Why doesn't EAUG just respect the permissions in PAGEINFO.SECINFO? We aren't told.

This design is finished and respects the hardware specification. You can find the details in the SDM's documentation of the EAUG function.

If the SECINFO field has a value then the hardware requires it to indicate that it is a new shadow stack page being added, not a regular page. Support for shadow stack pages is not in scope for this work. Attempting to dynamically add a regular page with explicit permissions will result in a #GP(0).

The only way to add a regular enclave page is to make the SECINFO field empty and doing so forces the page type to be a regular page and the permissions to be RW.

Quoted 6 lines

Further, if the enclave can do EMODPE, why does SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS even exist? None of the documentation explains what this ioctl even does. Does it update PTE permissions? VMA permissions? Nobody knows without reading the source code.

Build the documentation (after applying this series) and it should contain all the information you are searching for. As is the current custom in the SGX documentation the built documentation pulls its content from the kernel doc of the functions that implement the core of the user space interactions.

Quoted 9 lines

Userspace should not be bothered with the subtle details of the interaction between EPC, PTE and VMA permissions. But this API does everything it can do to expose all these details to userspace. And it doesn't bother to document them (probably because it is hard). It would be much better to avoid exposing these details to userspace.

IMHO, there should be a simple flow like this (if EAUG respects PAGEINFO.SECINFO):

EAUG does not respect PAGEINFO.SECINFO for regular pages.

Quoted 18 lines

1. Non-enclave calls mmap()/munmap().
2. Enclave issues EACCEPT, if necessary.
3. Enclave issues EMODPE, if necessary.

Notice that in the second step above, during the mmap() call, the kernel ensures that EPC, PTE and VMA are in sync and fails if they cannot be made to be compatible. Also note that in the above flow EAUG instructions can be efficiently batched.

Given the current poor state of the EAUG instruction, we might need to do this flow instead:

1. Enclave issues EACCEPT, if necessary. (Add RW pages...)
2. Non-enclave calls mmap()/munmap().
3. Enclave issues EACCEPT, if necessary.
4. Enclave issues EMODPE, if necessary.

Quoted 6 lines

However, doing EAUG only via the page access handler means that there is no way to batch EAUG instructions and this forces a context switch for every page you want to add. This has to be terrible for performance. Note specifically that the SDM calls out batching, which is currently impossible under this patch set. 35.5.7 - "Page allocation operations may be batched to improve efficiency."

These page functions are all per-page so it is not possible to add multiple pages with a single instruction. It is indeed possible to pre-fault pages.

Quoted 2 lines

As it stands today, if I want to add 256MiB of pages to an enclave, I'll have to do 2^16 context switches. That doesn't seem scalable.

No. Running ENCLU[EACCEPT] on each of the pages within that range should not need any explicit context switch out of the enclave. See the "augment_via_eaccept" test case in:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/32c1116934a588bd3e6c174684e3e36a05c0a4d4.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

the need for the weird userspace callback to allow for execute permissions.

User policy integration would always be required to allow execute permissions on a writable page. This is not expected to be a userspace callback but instead integration with existing user policy subsystem(s).

Why? This isn't documented.

This is similar to the existing policies involved in managing the permissions of mapped memory. When user space calls mprotect() to change permissions of a mapped region then the kernel will not blindly allow the permissions but instead ensure that it is allowed based on user policy by calling the LSM (Linux Security Module) hooks.

You can learn more about LSM and various security modules at:
Documentation/security/lsm.rst Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/*

You can compare what is needed here to what is currently done when user space attempts to make some memory executable (see:
mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_key()->security_file_mprotect()). User policy needs to help the kernel determine if this is allowed. For example, when SELinux is the security module of choice then the process or file (depending on what type of memory is being changed) needs to have a special permission (PROCESS__EXECHEAP, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, or FILE__EXECMOD) assigned by user space to allow this.

Integration with user space policy is required for RWX of dynamically added pages to be supported. In this series dynamically added pages will not be allowed to be made executable, a follow-up series will add support for user policy integration to support RWX permissions of dynamically added pages.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines

3. Implementing as I've suggested also means that we can lock down an enclave, for example - after code has been JITed, by closing the file descriptor. Once the file descriptor used to create the enclave is closed, no further mmap() can be performed on the enclave. Attempting to do EACCEPT on an unmapped page will generate a page fault.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

This is not clear to me. If the file descriptor is closed and no further mmap() is allowed then how would a process be able to enter the enclave to execute code within it?

EENTER (or the vdso function) with the address of a TCS page, like normal. In Enarx, we don't retain the enclave fd after the final mmap() following EINIT. Everything works just fine.

The OS fault handler is responsible for managing the PTEs that is required for the enclave to be able to access the memory within the enclave. The OS fault handler is attached to a VMA that is created with mmap().

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

This series does indeed lock down the address range to ensure that it is not possible to map memory that does not belong to the enclave after the enclave is created. Please see:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/1b833dbce6c937f71523f4aaf4b2181b9673519f.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about a workflow like this:

Quoted 7 lines

1. Enclave initialization: ECREATE ... EINIT
2. EENTER
3. Enclave JITs some code (changes page permissions)
4. EEXIT
5. Close enclave fd.
6. EENTER
7. If an enclave attempts page modifications, a fault occurs.

The original fd that was created to obtain the enclave base address may be closed at (5) but the executable and data portions of the enclave still needs to be mapped afterwards to be able to have OS support for managing the PTEs that the enclave depends on to access those pages.

Quoted 5 lines

Think of this similar to seccomp(). The enclave wants to do some dynamic page table manipulation. But then it wants to lock down page table modification so that, if compromised, attackers have no ability to obtain RWX permissions.

Reinette

#35 lore raw

RE: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Hi All,

Regarding the recent update of splitting the page permissions change request into two IOCTLS (RELAX and RESTRICT), can we combine them into one? That is, revert to how it was done in the v1 version?

Why? Currently in Gramine (a library OS for unmodified applications, https://gramineproject.io/) with the new proposed change, one needs to store the page permission for each page or range of pages. And for every request of mmap or mprotect, Gramine would have to do a lookup of the page permissions for the request range and then call the respective IOCTL either RESTRICT or RELAX. This seems a little overwhelming.

Request: Instead, can we do MODPE, call RESTRICT IOCTL, and then do an EACCEPT irrespective of RELAX or RESTRICT page permission request? With this approach, we can avoid storing page permissions and simplify the implementation.

I understand RESTRICT IOCTL would do a MODPR and trigger ETRACK flows to do TLB shootdowns which might not be needed for RELAX IOCTL but I am not sure what will be the performance impact. Is there any data point to see the performance impact?

Thanks,
-Vijay

Quoted 476 lines

-----Original Message-----
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, February 20, 2022 4:50 PM
To: Reinette Chatre <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Quoted 48 lines · Reinette Chatre

In the initial (SGX1) version of SGX, pages in an enclave need to be created with permissions that support all usages of the pages, from the time the enclave is initialized until it is unloaded. For example, pages used by a JIT compiler or when code needs to otherwise be relocated need to always have RWX permissions.

SGX2 includes a new function ENCLS[EMODPR] that is run from the kernel and can be used to restrict the EPCM permissions of regular enclave pages within an initialized enclave.

Introduce ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS to support restricting EPCM permissions. With this ioctl() the user specifies a page range and the permissions to be applied to all pages in the provided range. After checking the new permissions (more detail below) the page table entries are reset and any new page table entries will contain the new, restricted, permissions. ENCLS[EMODPR] is run to restrict the EPCM permissions followed by the ENCLS[ETRACK] flow that will ensure no cached linear-to-physical address mappings to the changed pages remain.

It is possible for the permission change request to fail on any page within the provided range, either with an error encountered by the kernel or by the SGX hardware while running ENCLS[EMODPR]. To support partial success the ioctl() returns an error code based on failures encountered by the kernel as well as two result output parameters: one for the number of pages that were successfully changed and one for the SGX return code.

Checking user provided new permissions
======================================

Enclave page permission changes need to be approached with care and for this reason permission changes are only allowed if the new permissions are the same or more restrictive that the vetted permissions. No additional checking is done to ensure that the permissions are actually being restricted. This is because the enclave may have relaxed the EPCM permissions from within the enclave without letting the kernel know. An attempt to relax permissions using this call will be ignored by the hardware.

For example, together with the support for relaxing of EPCM permissions, enclave pages added with the vetted permissions in brackets below are allowed to have permissions as follows:
* (RWX) => RW => R => RX => RWX
* (RW) => R => RW
* (RX) => R => RX

Quoted 9 lines

---
Changes since V1:
- Change terminology to use "relax" instead of "extend" to refer to the case when enclave page permissions are added (Dave).
- Use ioctl() in commit message (Dave).
- Add examples on what permissions would be allowed (Dave).
- Split enclave page permission changes into two ioctl()s, one for permission restricting (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS) and one for permission relaxing

(SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS)

Quoted 39 lines

(Jarkko).
- In support of the ioctl() name change the following names have been changed:
struct sgx_page_modp -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm sgx_ioc_page_modp() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() sgx_page_modp() -> sgx_enclave_restrict_perm()
- ioctl() takes entire secinfo as input instead of
page permissions only (Jarkko).
- Fix kernel-doc to include () in function name.
- Create and use utility for the ETRACK flow.
- Fixups in comments
- Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for Documentation/x86/sgx.rst.
- Remove redundant comment.
- Make explicit which members of struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm are for output (Dave).

 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h |  21 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c  |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 229
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 255 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h index 5c678b27bb72..b0ffb80bc67f 100644

arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +3 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04)
 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS \
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \
+	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x06, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the @@ -95,6
+97,25 @@ struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm {

arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h enum sgx_page_flags {

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +7 -0
 	__u64 count;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm - parameters for ioctl
+ *                                    %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
+ * @offset:	starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
+ *		address defined in SECS)
+ * @length:	length of memory (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data containing the new permission

bits

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct

Quoted 21 lines

+ * for pages in range described by @offset and @length
+ * @result: (output) SGX result code of ENCLS[EMODPR] function
+ * @count: (output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
+ */

arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +8 -0
+struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm {
+	__u64 offset;
+	__u64 length;
+	__u64 secinfo;
+	__u64 result;
+	__u64 count;
+};
+
 struct sgx_enclave_run;
 
 /**
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 8da813504249..a5d4a7efb986 100644

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +0 -0
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct

sgx_encl_page *encl_page,

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page

Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +2 -2
 	return epc_page;
 }
 
-static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr)
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					 unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index cb9f16d457ac..848a28d28d3d 100644

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +0 -0
@@ -120,4 +120,7 @@ void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page

*va_page,

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct

Quoted 13 lines

unsigned int offset); bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +3 -0
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					 unsigned long addr);
+
 #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 9cc6af404bf6..23bdf558b231 100644

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +0 -0
@@ -894,6 +894,232 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct

sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)

Quoted 19 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +16 -0
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical
+address
+ * mappings are present before they can succeed. Collaborate with
+ * hardware via ENCLS[ETRACK] to ensure that all cached
+ * linear-to-physical address mappings belonging to all threads of
+ * the enclave are cleared. See sgx_encl_cpumask() for details.
+ */
+static int sgx_enclave_etrack(struct sgx_encl *encl) {
+	void *epc_virt;
+	int ret;
+
+	epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+	ret = __etrack(epc_virt);
+	if (ret) {
+		/*

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10 -0
+		 * ETRACK only fails when there is an OS issue. For
+		 * example, two consecutive ETRACK was sent without
+		 * completed IPI between.
+		 */
+		pr_err_once("ETRACK returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
+		/*
+		 * Send IPIs to kick CPUs out of the enclave and
+		 * try ETRACK again.
+		 */
+		on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb,

NULL, 1);

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +4 -0
+		ret = __etrack(epc_virt);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_err_once("ETRACK repeat returned %d (0x%x)",
+				    ret, ret);

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10 -0
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+	}
+	on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_enclave_restrict_perm() - Restrict EPCM permissions and align OS

view

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct · line 938

Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2 -0
+ * @encl:	Enclave to which the pages belong.
+ * @modp:	Checked parameters from user on which pages need

modifying.

Quoted 21 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +21 -0
+ * @secinfo_perm: New (validated) permission bits.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0:		Success.
+ * - -errno:	Otherwise.
+ */
+static long sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+				      struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm *modp,
+				      u64 secinfo_perm)
+{
+	unsigned long vm_prot, run_prot_restore;
+	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	unsigned long c;
+	void *epc_virt;
+	int ret;
+
+	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+	secinfo.flags = secinfo_perm;
+

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10 -0
+	vm_prot = vm_prot_from_secinfo(secinfo_perm);
+
+	for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+		addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;
+
+		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
+		if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -

EFAULT;

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +9 -0
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Changing EPCM permissions is only supported on regular
+		 * SGX pages. Attempting this change on other pages will
+		 * result in #PF.
+		 */
+		if (entry->type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) {

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10 -0
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not verify if current runtime protection bits are what
+		 * is being requested. The enclave may have relaxed EPCM
+		 * permissions calls without letting the kernel know and
+		 * thus permission restriction may still be needed even if
+		 * from the kernel's perspective the permissions are

unchanged.

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct · line 991

Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +3 -0
+		 */
+
+		/* New permissions should never exceed vetted

permissions. */

Quoted 30 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +30 -0
+		if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot) != vm_prot) {
+			ret = -EPERM;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		/* Make sure page stays around while releasing mutex. */
+		if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page)) {
+			ret = -EAGAIN;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Change runtime protection before zapping PTEs to ensure
+		 * any new #PF uses new permissions. EPCM permissions (if
+		 * needed) not changed yet.
+		 */
+		run_prot_restore = entry->vm_run_prot_bits;
+		entry->vm_run_prot_bits = vm_prot;
+
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		/*
+		 * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on
+		 * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
+		 */
+		sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
+
+		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+		/* Change EPCM permissions. */
+		epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page);

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10 -0
+		ret = __emodpr(&secinfo, epc_virt);
+		if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
+			/*
+			 * All possible faults should be avoidable:
+			 * parameters have been checked, will only change
+			 * permissions of a regular page, and no concurrent
+			 * SGX1/SGX2 ENCLS instructions since these
+			 * are protected with mutex.
+			 */
+			pr_err_once("EMODPR encountered exception

%d\n",

Quoted 100 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +96 -0
+				    ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret));
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto out_prot_restore;
+		}
+		if (encls_failed(ret)) {
+			modp->result = ret;
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto out_prot_restore;
+		}
+
+		ret = sgx_enclave_etrack(encl);
+		if (ret) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto out_reclaim;
+		}
+
+		sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page);
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+	goto out;
+
+out_prot_restore:
+	entry->vm_run_prot_bits = run_prot_restore;
+out_reclaim:
+	sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page);
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+out:
+	modp->count = c;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() - handler for
+ *                                   %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
+ * @encl:	an enclave pointer
+ * @arg:	userspace pointer to a &struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm
+ *		instance
+ *
+ * SGX2 distinguishes between relaxing and restricting the enclave
+page
+ * permissions maintained by the hardware (EPCM permissions) of pages
+ * belonging to an initialized enclave (after SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT).
+ *
+ * EPCM permissions cannot be restricted from within the enclave, the
+enclave
+ * requires the kernel to run the privileged level 0 instructions
+ENCLS[EMODPR]
+ * and ENCLS[ETRACK]. An attempt to relax EPCM permissions with this
+call
+ * will be ignored by the hardware.
+ *
+ * Enclave page permissions are not allowed to exceed the maximum
+vetted
+ * permissions maintained in &struct sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0:		Success
+ * - -errno:	Otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					  void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm params;
+	u64 secinfo_perm;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = sgx_perm_from_user_secinfo((void __user *)params.secinfo,
+					 &secinfo_perm);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (params.result || params.count)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = sgx_enclave_restrict_perm(encl, &params, secinfo_perm);
+
+	if (copy_to_user(arg, &params, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long

arg) {
struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; @@ -918,6 +1144,9 @@
long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2 -0
 	case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS:
 		ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(encl, (void __user *)arg);
 		break;
+	case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS:
+		ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm(encl, (void __user

*)arg);

Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1 -1
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
 		break;
--

2.25.1

Just a suggestion but these might be a bit less cluttered explanations of the fields:

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

pub struct RelaxPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the relaxed permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

pub struct RestrictPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the restricted permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// In: ENCLU[EMODPR] return value
    result: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

I can live with the current ones too but I rewrote them so that I can quickly make sense of the fields later. It's Rust code but the point is the documentation...

Also, it should not be too much trouble to use the struct in user space code even if the struct names are struct sgx_enclave_relax_permissions and struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions, given that you most likely have exactly single call-site in the run-time.

Other than that, looks quite good.

BR, Jarkko

#33 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 113 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 94 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 1 line · Jarkko Sakkinen

On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 04:45:38PM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:

...

Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 39 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +21 -0
index 5c678b27bb72..b0ffb80bc67f 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04)
 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS \
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \
+	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x06, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -95,6 +97,25 @@ struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm {
 	__u64 count;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm - parameters for ioctl
+ *                                    %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
+ * @offset:	starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
+ *		address defined in SECS)
+ * @length:	length of memory (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data containing the new permission bits
+ *		for pages in range described by @offset and @length
+ * @result:	(output) SGX result code of ENCLS[EMODPR] function
+ * @count:	(output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm {
+	__u64 offset;
+	__u64 length;
+	__u64 secinfo;
+	__u64 result;
+	__u64 count;
+};
+
 struct sgx_enclave_run;
 
 /**

...

Quoted 19 lines

Just a suggestion but these might be a bit less cluttered explanations of the fields:

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

pub struct RelaxPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the relaxed permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

Quoted 12 lines
pub struct RestrictPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the restricted permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// In: ENCLU[EMODPR] return value
    result: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

In your proposal you shorten the descriptions from the current implementation. I do consider the removed information valuable since I believe that it helps users understand the kernel interface requirements without needing to be familiar with or dig into the kernel code to understand how the provided data is used.

For example, you shorten offset to "starting page offset", but what was removed was the requirement that this offset has to be page aligned and what the offset is relative to. I do believe summarizing these requirements upfront helps a user space developer by not needing to dig through kernel code later in order to understand why an -EINVAL was received.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I can live with the current ones too but I rewrote them so that I can quickly make sense of the fields later. It's Rust code but the point is the documentation...

Since you do seem to be ok with the current descriptions I would prefer to keep them.

Yeah, they are fine to me.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Also, it should not be too much trouble to use the struct in user space code even if the struct names are struct sgx_enclave_relax_permissions and struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions, given that you most likely have exactly single call-site in the run-time.

Are you requesting that I make the following name changes? struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm -> struct sgx_enclave_relax_permissions struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

If so, do you want the function names also written out in this way?

sgx_enclave_relax_perm()        -> sgx_enclave_relax_permissions()
sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm()    -> sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_permissions()
sgx_enclave_restrict_perm()     -> sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions()

sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions()

Yes, unless you have a specific reason to shorten them :-)

Just aesthetic reasons ... having a long function name can look unbalanced if it has many parameters and if the parameters themselves are long it becomes hard to keep to the required line length.

Even so, it does look as though the longest ones can be made to work within 80 characters:
sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(...
struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions *modp, ...)

Other (aesthetic) consequence would be, for example, the core sgx_ioctl() would now have some branches span more lines than other so it would not look as neat as now (this is subjective I know).

Apart from the aesthetic reasons I do not have another reason not to make the change and I will do so in the next version.

Reinette

#36 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Dhanraj, Vijay

Hi Vijay,

Quoted 5 lines · Vijay

Hi All,

Regarding the recent update of splitting the page permissions changerequest into two IOCTLS (RELAX and RESTRICT), can we combine them into one? That is, revert to how it was done in the v1 version?

While V1 did have a single ioctl() to handle both relaxing and restricting permissions it never was possible for the kernel to distinguish what the user intended. For this reason, even though there was a single ioctl() in V1, it implemented permission restriction while supporting permission relaxing as a side effect since the PTEs are flushed and new PTEs will support the new permission. A consequence was that the V1 SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODP required ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave even if it was only intended to be used to relax permissions. SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS in V2 is exactly the same as SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODP of V1.

Quoted 7 lines

Why? Currently in Gramine (a library OS for unmodified applications,
https://gramineproject.io/) with the new proposed change, one needs to store the page permission for each page or range of pages. And for every request of mmap or mprotect, Gramine would have to do a lookup of the page permissions for the request range and then call the respective IOCTL either RESTRICT or RELAX. This seems a little overwhelming.

Gramine would also need to know when to enter the enclave to run EMODPE, which goes in hand with running SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS.

Quoted 4 lines

Request: Instead, can we do MODPE, call RESTRICT IOCTL, and then do an EACCEPT irrespective of RELAX or RESTRICT page permission request? With this approach, we can avoid storing page permissions and simplify the implementation.

This should be possible with the current implementation, similar to previous implementation, but not optimal if only EMODPE followed by SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS is what is needed.

Quoted 4 lines

I understand RESTRICT IOCTL would do a MODPR and trigger ETRACK flows to do TLB shootdowns which might not be needed for RELAX IOCTL but I am not sure what will be the performance impact. Is there any data point to see the performance impact?

It can be worse than just that. EMODPR requires the EPC page to be present and thus the page would need to be loaded from swap and decrypted if it is not present. This may also mean that existing EPC pages need to be swapped out (first blocked, then encrypted to backing storage, then the ETRACK flow followed by IPIs to ensure there are no more references to that page) ... before there is space available for needed page to be loaded and decrypted.

That only takes care of the EMODPR ... which as you state needs to be followed by the ETRACK flow and IPIs.

The above is also just for the OS portion - after that there is the EACCEPT that needs to be run from within the enclave for every page whether permissions were relaxed or restricted. This would be dependent on the implementation - whether the enclave is entered once per EACCEPT or once for all EACCEPTs.

All of the above would be unnecessary if permissions were just relaxed from within the enclave while SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS used to perform the OS actions.

The performance impact should be easy to determine: run both ioctl()s and compare how long they take. Since you are asking about Gramine this may be best to do in that environment but I can attempt something on your behalf by using the existing SGX selftest infrastructure.

As an experiment I modified the existing "unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed_remove" test case that currently runs the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE on a large memory region to instead run ioctl()s SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS. In my test I ran these ioctl()s on a 4GB memory range to amplify any performance impact since I was just measuring it by printing timestamps from user space.

My result showed that:
* Running SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS on the 4GB region took less than a second No EACCEPT needed from user space.

* Running SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS on the 4GB region took about 20 seconds.
* Running EACCEPT on each enclave page took an additional 20 seconds. (Please note that this is using a sub obtimal way of entering the enclave for each EACCEPT where it would be more efficient to enter the enclave once and run EACCEPT for each page without exiting the enclave.)

The performance impact seems significant to me.

Reinette

maintainer
#37 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Dhanraj, Vijay
Quoted 5 lines · Vijay

Hi All,

Regarding the recent update of splitting the page permissions change request into two IOCTLS (RELAX and RESTRICT), can we combine them into one? That is, revert to how it was done in the v1 version?

They are logically separate complex functionalities:

1. "restrict" calls EMODPR and requires EACCEPT
2. "relax" increases permissions up to vetted ("EADD") and could be combined with EMODPE called inside enclave.

I don't think it is a good idea.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#34 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Reinette Chatre
Quoted 134 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 113 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 94 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 1 line · Jarkko Sakkinen

On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 04:45:38PM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:

...

Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 39 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +21 -0
index 5c678b27bb72..b0ffb80bc67f 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04)
 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS \
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \
+	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x06, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -95,6 +97,25 @@ struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm {
 	__u64 count;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm - parameters for ioctl
+ *                                    %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
+ * @offset:	starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
+ *		address defined in SECS)
+ * @length:	length of memory (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data containing the new permission bits
+ *		for pages in range described by @offset and @length
+ * @result:	(output) SGX result code of ENCLS[EMODPR] function
+ * @count:	(output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm {
+	__u64 offset;
+	__u64 length;
+	__u64 secinfo;
+	__u64 result;
+	__u64 count;
+};
+
 struct sgx_enclave_run;
 
 /**

...

Quoted 19 lines

Just a suggestion but these might be a bit less cluttered explanations of the fields:

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

pub struct RelaxPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the relaxed permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

/// SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS parameter structure #[repr(C)]

Quoted 12 lines
pub struct RestrictPermissions {
    /// In: starting page offset
    offset: u64,
    /// In: length of the address range (multiple of the page size)
    length: u64,
    /// In: SECINFO containing the restricted permissions
    secinfo: u64,
    /// In: ENCLU[EMODPR] return value
    result: u64,
    /// Out: length of the address range successfully changed
    count: u64,
};

In your proposal you shorten the descriptions from the current implementation. I do consider the removed information valuable since I believe that it helps users understand the kernel interface requirements without needing to be familiar with or dig into the kernel code to understand how the provided data is used.

For example, you shorten offset to "starting page offset", but what was removed was the requirement that this offset has to be page aligned and what the offset is relative to. I do believe summarizing these requirements upfront helps a user space developer by not needing to dig through kernel code later in order to understand why an -EINVAL was received.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I can live with the current ones too but I rewrote them so that I can quickly make sense of the fields later. It's Rust code but the point is the documentation...

Since you do seem to be ok with the current descriptions I would prefer to keep them.

Yeah, they are fine to me.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Also, it should not be too much trouble to use the struct in user space code even if the struct names are struct sgx_enclave_relax_permissions and struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions, given that you most likely have exactly single call-site in the run-time.

Are you requesting that I make the following name changes? struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm -> struct sgx_enclave_relax_permissions struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

If so, do you want the function names also written out in this way?

sgx_enclave_relax_perm()        -> sgx_enclave_relax_permissions()
sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm()    -> sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_permissions()
sgx_enclave_restrict_perm()     -> sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions()

sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions()

Yes, unless you have a specific reason to shorten them :-)

Just aesthetic reasons ... having a long function name can look unbalanced if it has many parameters and if the parameters themselves are long it becomes hard to keep to the required line length.

Even so, it does look as though the longest ones can be made to work within 80 characters:
sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(...
struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions *modp, ...)

Quoted 6 lines

Other (aesthetic) consequence would be, for example, the core sgx_ioctl() would now have some branches span more lines than other so it would not look as neat as now (this is subjective I know).

Apart from the aesthetic reasons I do not have another reason not to make the change and I will do so in the next version.

IMHO, for one call site aesthics reason in alignment is less important than a no-brainer function name.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#38 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 5 lines · Vijay

Hi All,

Regarding the recent update of splitting the page permissions change request into two IOCTLS (RELAX and RESTRICT), can we combine them into one? That is, revert to how it was done in the v1 version?

Quoted 7 lines

They are logically separate complex functionalities:

1. "restrict" calls EMODPR and requires EACCEPT
2. "relax" increases permissions up to vetted ("EADD") and could be combined with EMODPE called inside enclave.

I don't think it is a good idea.

I.e. in microarchitecture there is no EMODP but two different flows, and thus it is not sane to act like there was with that kind of ioctl. It is as granular as the hardware is this way, and I think that is common sense.

It would make much sense as combining ECREATE/EADD/EINIT into a single multi-function ioctl. Often user space needs to be anyway have at least some logically distinct flows fore these.

BR, Jarkko

#39 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 3 lines

Regarding the recent update of splitting the page permissions change request into two IOCTLS (RELAX and RESTRICT), can we combine them into one? That is, revert to how it was done in the v1 version?

They are logically separate complex functionalities:

1. "restrict" calls EMODPR and requires EACCEPT
2. "relax" increases permissions up to vetted ("EADD") and could be combined with EMODPE called inside enclave.

It would be great to have a _slightly_ better justification than that. Existing permission interfaces like chmod or mprotect() don't have this asymmetry.

I think you're saying that the underlying hardware implementation is asymmetric, so the interface should be too. I don't find that argument very convincing. If the hardware interface is arcane and we can make it look more sane in the ioctl() layer, we should that, asymmetry or not.

If we can't make it any more sane, let's say why the ioctl() must or should be asymmetric.

The SGX2 page permission mechanism is horribly counter intuitive. *Everybody* that looks at it thinks that it's wrong. That means that we have a lot of work ahead of us to explain the interfaces that get layered on top.

#40 lore raw

RE: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Quoted 10 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Regarding the recent update of splitting the page permissions change request into two IOCTLS (RELAX and RESTRICT), can we combine them into one? That is, revert to how it was done in the v1 version?

They are logically separate complex functionalities:

1. "restrict" calls EMODPR and requires EACCEPT 2. "relax" increases permissions up to vetted ("EADD") and could be
combined with EMODPE called inside enclave.

Quoted 9 lines

It would be great to have a _slightly_ better justification than that. Existing permission interfaces like chmod or mprotect() don't have this asymmetry.

I think you're saying that the underlying hardware implementation is asymmetric, so the interface should be too. I don't find that argument very convincing. If the hardware interface is arcane and we can make it look more sane in the ioctl() layer, we should that, asymmetry or not.

Very nice analogy with mprotect and agree to this. It would be simpler from user space point of view if we can abstract this and maintain a single interface to relax or restrict permission. But if committee feels having two IOCTLS is the way, then will modify Gramine to adopt this approach.

maintainer
#41 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 3 lines

Regarding the recent update of splitting the page permissions change request into two IOCTLS (RELAX and RESTRICT), can we combine them into one? That is, revert to how it was done in the v1 version?

They are logically separate complex functionalities:

1. "restrict" calls EMODPR and requires EACCEPT
2. "relax" increases permissions up to vetted ("EADD") and could be combined with EMODPE called inside enclave.

Quoted 8 lines

It would be great to have a _slightly_ better justification than that. Existing permission interfaces like chmod or mprotect() don't have this asymmetry.

I think you're saying that the underlying hardware implementation is asymmetric, so the interface should be too. I don't find that argument very convincing. If the hardware interface is arcane and we can make it look more sane in the ioctl() layer, we should that, asymmetry or not.

That is my argument, yes.

Quoted 2 lines

If we can't make it any more sane, let's say why the ioctl() must or should be asymmetric.

Perhaps underling this asymmetry in kdoc would be enough.

Quoted 4 lines

The SGX2 page permission mechanism is horribly counter intuitive. *Everybody* that looks at it thinks that it's wrong. That means that we have a lot of work ahead of us to explain the interfaces that get layered on top.

I fully agree on this :-)

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R and RX pages but obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
	 * be created with RW permissions.
	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize then also in the page permission ioctls.

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully known territory, we have one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from unpredictable effect to future API changes.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#42 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Quoted 49 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 3 lines

Regarding the recent update of splitting the page permissions change request into two IOCTLS (RELAX and RESTRICT), can we combine them into one? That is, revert to how it was done in the v1 version?

They are logically separate complex functionalities:

1. "restrict" calls EMODPR and requires EACCEPT
2. "relax" increases permissions up to vetted ("EADD") and could be combined with EMODPE called inside enclave.

Quoted 8 lines

It would be great to have a _slightly_ better justification than that. Existing permission interfaces like chmod or mprotect() don't have this asymmetry.

I think you're saying that the underlying hardware implementation is asymmetric, so the interface should be too. I don't find that argument very convincing. If the hardware interface is arcane and we can make it look more sane in the ioctl() layer, we should that, asymmetry or not.

That is my argument, yes.

Quoted 2 lines

If we can't make it any more sane, let's say why the ioctl() must or should be asymmetric.

Perhaps underling this asymmetry in kdoc would be enough.

Quoted 4 lines

The SGX2 page permission mechanism is horribly counter intuitive. *Everybody* that looks at it thinks that it's wrong. That means that we have a lot of work ahead of us to explain the interfaces that get layered on top.

I fully agree on this :-)

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R and RX pages but obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
	 * be created with RW permissions.
	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;
Quoted 7 lines

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize then also in the page permission ioctls.

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully known territory, we have one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from unpredictable effect to future API changes.

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions. Then you can easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

BR, Jarkko

#43 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 15 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 15 lines

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R and RX pages but obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
	 * be created with RW permissions.
	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize then also in the page permission ioctls.

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully known territory, we have one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from unpredictable effect to future API changes.

The plan to complete the "TBD" in the above snippet was to follow this work with user policy integration at this location. On a high level the plan was for this to look something like:

/*
* Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
* be created with RW permissions.
* Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
* of RWX.
*/
prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);

        if (user space policy allows RWX on dynamically added pages)
	 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, 0);
	else
		encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 0);

The work that follows this series aimed to do the integration with user space policy.

Quoted 3 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions. Then you can easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be used for this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be useful if needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

How this could work is user space calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES after enclave initialization on any memory region within the enclave where pages are planned to be added dynamically. This ioctl() calls EAUG to add the new pages with RW permissions and their vm_max_prot_bits can be set to the permissions found in the included SECINFO. This will support later EACCEPTCOPY as well as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history behind this topic.

Quoted 3 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

In this series this is indeed not possible because it lacks the user policy integration. JIT will be possible after user policy integration.

Reinette

maintainer
#44 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Quoted 45 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 15 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 15 lines

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R and RX pages but obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
	 * be created with RW permissions.
	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize then also in the page permission ioctls.

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully known territory, we have one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from unpredictable effect to future API changes.

The plan to complete the "TBD" in the above snippet was to follow this work with user policy integration at this location. On a high level the plan was for this to look something like:

(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	/*
 	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
 	 * be created with RW permissions.
 	 * Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
 	 * of RWX.
 	 */
 	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
 	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
 
        if (user space policy allows RWX on dynamically added pages)
	 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, 0);
	else
		encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 0);
Quoted 2 lines

The work that follows this series aimed to do the integration with user space policy.

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm sorry but I just don't fully understand this.

It's too big of a risk to accept this series without X taken care of. Patch series should neither have TODO nor TBD comments IMHO. I don't want to ack a series based on speculation what might happen in the future.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions. Then you can easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be used for this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be useful if needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and call it a day.

And if there is plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES what is this weird thing added to the #PF handler? Why is it added at all then?

Quoted 6 lines

How this could work is user space calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES after enclave initialization on any memory region within the enclave where pages are planned to be added dynamically. This ioctl() calls EAUG to add the new pages with RW permissions and their vm_max_prot_bits can be set to the permissions found in the included SECINFO. This will support later EACCEPTCOPY as well as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

Quoted 4 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history behind this topic.

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space policy.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

In this series this is indeed not possible because it lacks the user policy integration. JIT will be possible after user policy integration.

Like this I don't what this series can be used in practice.

Majority of practical use cases for EDMM boil down to having a way to add new executable code (not just Enarx).

Quoted 1 line

Reinette

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#45 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Quoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 2 lines

The work that follows this series aimed to do the integration with user space policy.

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm sorry but I just don't fully understand this.

It's too big of a risk to accept this series without X taken care of. Patch series should neither have TODO nor TBD comments IMHO. I don't want to ack a series based on speculation what might happen in the future.

If I accept this, then I'm kind of pre-acking code that I have no idea what it looks like, can it be acked, or am I doing the right thing for the kernel by acking this.

It's unfortunately force majeure situation for me. I simply could not ack this, whether I want it or not.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#46 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Quoted 11 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 2 lines

The work that follows this series aimed to do the integration with user space policy.

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm sorry but I just don't fully understand this.

It's too big of a risk to accept this series without X taken care of. Patch series should neither have TODO nor TBD comments IMHO. I don't want to ack a series based on speculation what might happen in the future.

Quoted 6 lines

If I accept this, then I'm kind of pre-acking code that I have no idea what it looks like, can it be acked, or am I doing the right thing for the kernel by acking this.

It's unfortunately force majeure situation for me. I simply could not ack this, whether I want it or not.

I'd actually to leave out permission change madness completely out of this patch set, as we all know it is a grazy beast of microarchitecture. For user space having that is less critical than having executable pages.

Simply with EAUG/EACCEPTCOPY you can already populate enclave with any permissions you had in mind. Augmenting alone would be logically consistent patch set that is actually usable for many workloads.

Now there is half-broken augmenting (this is even writtend down to the TBD comment) and complex code for EMODPR and EMODT that is usable only for kselftests and not much else before there is fully working augmenting.

This way we get actually sound patch set that is easy to review and apply to the mainline. It is also factors easier for you to iterate a smaller set of patches.

After this it is so much easier to start to look at remaining functionality, and at the same time augmenting part can be stress tested with real-world code and it will mature quickly.

This whole thing *really* needs a serious U-turn on how it is delivered to the upstream. Sometimes it is better just to admit that this didn't start with the right foot.

BR, Jarkko

#125 lore raw
In reply to Reinette Chatre

Reinette,

Perhaps it would be better for us to have a shared understanding on how the patches as posted are supposed to work in the most common cases? I'm thinking here of projects such as Enarx, Gramine and Occulum, which all have a similar process. Namely they execute an executable (called exec in the below chart) which has things like syscalls handled by a shim. These two components (shim and exec) are supported by a non-enclave userspace runtime. Given this common architectural pattern, this is how I understand adding pages via an exec call to mmap() to work.

https://mermaid.live/edit#pako:eNp1k81qwzAQhF9F6NRCAu1Vh0BIRemhoeSHBuIettYmFpElVZZLQ8i7144sJ8aOT2bmY3d2vT7R1AikjBb4U6JO8UXC3kGeaFI9FpyXqbSgPTmg06j6uiu1lzn2jSKTA2XwD9NEB31uPBLzi-6iMpLnYB8Wn4-kOBYpKBW52iXj8WQSmzEy5Zvt01ewG5HUQN2UEc7nK77YPjdALd64GWih8NpkALGwR_JtzOGAaKXexyTKGEt2pgoMaXahgj5Qgk9nM_6xGvDDJpsmOyiVv0LB62B8un4dBDrLiLPeWciCL9fvvKVQizhSG6stFz9Df7sxUpcYitR-SodFO2A_Vw-7l4nzzduqjX9bKJxOHDDeBB3RHF0OUlS3faq1hPoMqzulrHoVGPZOE32u0NIK8MiF9MZRtgNV4IhC6c3yqFPKvCsxQs3_0VDnfzf-CPg

This only covers adding RW pages. I haven't even tackled permission changes yet. Is that understanding correct? If not, please provide an alternative sequence diagram to explain how you expect this to be used.

Quoted 307 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Nathaniel,

Quoted 28 lines · Nathaniel McCallum
Quoted 18 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Nathaniel,

Quoted 3 lines · Nathaniel McCallum

1. This interface looks very odd to me. mmap() is the kernel interface for changing user space memory maps. Why are we introducing a new interface for this?

mmap() is the kernel interface used to create new mappings in the virtual address space of the calling process. This is different from the permissions and properties of the underlying file/memory being mapped.

A new interface is introduced because changes need to be made to the permissions and properties of the underlying enclave. A new virtual address space is not needed nor should existing VMAs be impacted.

This is similar to how mmap() is not used to change file permissions.

Quoted 7 lines

VMA permissions are separate from enclave page permissions as found in the EPCM (Enclave Page Cache Map). The current implementation (SGX1) already distinguishes between the VMA and EPCM permissions - for example, it is already possible to create a read-only VMA from enclave pages that have RW EPCM permissions. mmap() of a portion of EPC memory with a particular permission does not imply that the underlying EPCM permissions (should)have that permission.

Quoted 1 line

Yes. BUT... unlike the file permissions, this leaks an implementation detail.

Not really - just like a RW file can be mapped read-only or RW, RW enclave memory can be mapped read-only or RW.

Quoted 6 lines

The user process is governed by VMA permissions. And during enclave creation, it had to mmap() all the enclave regions to their final VMA permissions. So during enclave creation you have to use mmap() but after enclave creation you use custom APIs? That's inconsistent at best.

No. ioctl()s are consistently used to manage enclave memory.

The existing ioctls() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT are used to set up to initialize the enclave memory.

The new ioctls() are used to manage enclave memory after enclave initialization.

The enclave memory is thus managed with a consistent interface.

mmap() is required before SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE to obtain a base address for the enclave that is required by the ioctl(). The rest of the ioctl()s, existing and new, are consistent in interface by not requiring a memory mapping but instead work from an offset from the base address.

Quoted 3 lines

Forcing userspace to worry about the (mostly undocumented!) interactions between EPC, PTE and VMA permissions makes these APIs hard to use and difficult to reason about.

This is not new. The current SGX1 user space is already prevented from creating a mapping of enclave memory that is more relaxed than the enclave memory. For example, if the enclave memory has RW EPCM permissions then it is not possible to mmap() that memory as RWX.

Quoted 3 lines

When I call SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS, do I also have to call mmap() to update the VMA permissions to match? It isn't clear. Nor is

mprotect() may be the better call to use.

Quoted 17 lines

it really clear why I'm calling completely separate APIs.

Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines

You can just simply add a new mmap flag (i.e.
MAP_SGX_TCS*) and then figure out which SGX instructions to execute based on the desired state of the memory maps. If you do this, none of the following ioctls are needed:

* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES
* SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE

It also means that languages don't have to grow support for all these ioctls. Instead, they can just reuse the existing mmap() bindings with the new flag. Also, multiple operations can be combined into a single mmap() call, amortizing the changes over a single context switch.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

2. Automatically adding pages with hard-coded permissions in a fault handler seems like a really bad idea.

Could you please elaborate why this is a bad idea?

Because implementations that miss this subtlety suddenly have pages with magic permissions. Magic is bad. Explicit is good.

There is no magic. Any new pages have to be accepted by the enclave. The enclave will not be able to access these pages unless explicitly accepted, ENCLU[EACCEPT], from within the enclave.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines

How do you distinguish between
accesses which should result in an updated mapping and accesses that should result in a fault?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Accesses that should result in an updated mapping have two requirements:
(a) address accessed belongs to the enclave based on the address range specified during enclave create
(b) there is no backing enclave page for the address

What happens if the enclave is buggy? Or has been compromised. In both of those cases, there should be a userspace visible fault and pages should not be added.

If user space accesses a memory address with a regular read/write that results in a new page added then there is indeed a user space visible fault. You can see this flow in action in the "augment" test case in
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/32c1116934a588bd3e6c174684e3e36a05c0a4d4.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

If user space indeed wants the page after encountering such a fault then it needs to enter the enclave again, from a different entry point, to run ENCLU[EACCEPT], before it can return to the original entry point to continue execution from the instruction that triggered the original read/write.

The only flow where a page is added without a user space visible fault is when user space explicitly runs the ENCLU[EACCEPT] to do so.

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines

IMHO, all unmapped page accesses should
result in a page fault. mmap() should be called first to identify the correct permissions for these pages.
Then the page handler should be
updated to use the permissions from the mapping when backfilling physical pages. If I understand correctly, this should also obviate

Regular enclave pages can _only_ be dynamically added with RW permission.

Quoted 10 lines

SGX2's support for adding regular pages to an enclave via the EAUG instruction is architecturally set at RW. The OS cannot change those permissions via the EAUG instruction nor can the OS do so with a different/additional instruction because:
* the OS is not able to relax permissions since that can only be done from within the enclave with ENCLU[EMODPE], thus it is not possible for the OS to dynamically add pages via EAUG as RW and then relax permissions to RWX.
* the OS is not able to EAUG a page and immediately attempt an EMODPR either as Jarkko also recently inquired about:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/

Quoted 4 lines

This design looks... unfinished. EAUG takes a PAGEINFO in RBX, but PAGEINFO.SECINFO must be zeroed and EAUG instead sets magic hard-coded permissions. Why doesn't EAUG just respect the permissions in PAGEINFO.SECINFO? We aren't told.

This design is finished and respects the hardware specification. You can find the details in the SDM's documentation of the EAUG function.

If the SECINFO field has a value then the hardware requires it to indicate that it is a new shadow stack page being added, not a regular page. Support for shadow stack pages is not in scope for this work. Attempting to dynamically add a regular page with explicit permissions will result in a #GP(0).

The only way to add a regular enclave page is to make the SECINFO field empty and doing so forces the page type to be a regular page and the permissions to be RW.

Quoted 6 lines

Further, if the enclave can do EMODPE, why does SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS even exist? None of the documentation explains what this ioctl even does. Does it update PTE permissions? VMA permissions? Nobody knows without reading the source code.

Build the documentation (after applying this series) and it should contain all the information you are searching for. As is the current custom in the SGX documentation the built documentation pulls its content from the kernel doc of the functions that implement the core of the user space interactions.

Quoted 9 lines

Userspace should not be bothered with the subtle details of the interaction between EPC, PTE and VMA permissions. But this API does everything it can do to expose all these details to userspace. And it doesn't bother to document them (probably because it is hard). It would be much better to avoid exposing these details to userspace.

IMHO, there should be a simple flow like this (if EAUG respects PAGEINFO.SECINFO):

EAUG does not respect PAGEINFO.SECINFO for regular pages.

Quoted 18 lines

1. Non-enclave calls mmap()/munmap().
2. Enclave issues EACCEPT, if necessary.
3. Enclave issues EMODPE, if necessary.

Notice that in the second step above, during the mmap() call, the kernel ensures that EPC, PTE and VMA are in sync and fails if they cannot be made to be compatible. Also note that in the above flow EAUG instructions can be efficiently batched.

Given the current poor state of the EAUG instruction, we might need to do this flow instead:

1. Enclave issues EACCEPT, if necessary. (Add RW pages...)
2. Non-enclave calls mmap()/munmap().
3. Enclave issues EACCEPT, if necessary.
4. Enclave issues EMODPE, if necessary.

Quoted 6 lines

However, doing EAUG only via the page access handler means that there is no way to batch EAUG instructions and this forces a context switch for every page you want to add. This has to be terrible for performance. Note specifically that the SDM calls out batching, which is currently impossible under this patch set. 35.5.7 - "Page allocation operations may be batched to improve efficiency."

These page functions are all per-page so it is not possible to add multiple pages with a single instruction. It is indeed possible to pre-fault pages.

Quoted 2 lines

As it stands today, if I want to add 256MiB of pages to an enclave, I'll have to do 2^16 context switches. That doesn't seem scalable.

No. Running ENCLU[EACCEPT] on each of the pages within that range should not need any explicit context switch out of the enclave. See the "augment_via_eaccept" test case in:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/32c1116934a588bd3e6c174684e3e36a05c0a4d4.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

the need for the weird userspace callback to allow for execute permissions.

User policy integration would always be required to allow execute permissions on a writable page. This is not expected to be a userspace callback but instead integration with existing user policy subsystem(s).

Why? This isn't documented.

This is similar to the existing policies involved in managing the permissions of mapped memory. When user space calls mprotect() to change permissions of a mapped region then the kernel will not blindly allow the permissions but instead ensure that it is allowed based on user policy by calling the LSM (Linux Security Module) hooks.

You can learn more about LSM and various security modules at:
Documentation/security/lsm.rst Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/*

You can compare what is needed here to what is currently done when user space attempts to make some memory executable (see:
mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_key()->security_file_mprotect()). User policy needs to help the kernel determine if this is allowed. For example, when SELinux is the security module of choice then the process or file (depending on what type of memory is being changed) needs to have a special permission (PROCESS__EXECHEAP, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, or FILE__EXECMOD) assigned by user space to allow this.

Integration with user space policy is required for RWX of dynamically added pages to be supported. In this series dynamically added pages will not be allowed to be made executable, a follow-up series will add support for user policy integration to support RWX permissions of dynamically added pages.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines

3. Implementing as I've suggested also means that we can lock down an enclave, for example - after code has been JITed, by closing the file descriptor. Once the file descriptor used to create the enclave is closed, no further mmap() can be performed on the enclave. Attempting to do EACCEPT on an unmapped page will generate a page fault.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

This is not clear to me. If the file descriptor is closed and no further mmap() is allowed then how would a process be able to enter the enclave to execute code within it?

EENTER (or the vdso function) with the address of a TCS page, like normal. In Enarx, we don't retain the enclave fd after the final mmap() following EINIT. Everything works just fine.

The OS fault handler is responsible for managing the PTEs that is required for the enclave to be able to access the memory within the enclave. The OS fault handler is attached to a VMA that is created with mmap().

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

This series does indeed lock down the address range to ensure that it is not possible to map memory that does not belong to the enclave after the enclave is created. Please see:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/1b833dbce6c937f71523f4aaf4b2181b9673519f.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about a workflow like this:

Quoted 7 lines

1. Enclave initialization: ECREATE ... EINIT
2. EENTER
3. Enclave JITs some code (changes page permissions)
4. EEXIT
5. Close enclave fd.
6. EENTER
7. If an enclave attempts page modifications, a fault occurs.

The original fd that was created to obtain the enclave base address may be closed at (5) but the executable and data portions of the enclave still needs to be mapped afterwards to be able to have OS support for managing the PTEs that the enclave depends on to access those pages.

Quoted 5 lines

Think of this similar to seccomp(). The enclave wants to do some dynamic page table manipulation. But then it wants to lock down page table modification so that, if compromised, attackers have no ability to obtain RWX permissions.

Reinette

#126 lore raw

Hi Nathaniel,

Quoted 10 lines · Nathaniel McCallum

Perhaps it would be better for us to have a shared understanding on how the patches as posted are supposed to work in the most common cases? I'm thinking here of projects such as Enarx, Gramine and Occulum, which all have a similar process. Namely they execute an executable (called exec in the below chart) which has things like syscalls handled by a shim. These two components (shim and exec) are supported by a non-enclave userspace runtime. Given this common architectural pattern, this is how I understand adding pages via an exec call to mmap() to work.

Quoted 6 lines

https://mermaid.live/edit#pako:eNp1k81qwzAQhF9F6NRCAu1Vh0BIRemhoeSHBuIettYmFpElVZZLQ8i7144sJ8aOT2bmY3d2vT7R1AikjBb4U6JO8UXC3kGeaFI9FpyXqbSgPTmg06j6uiu1lzn2jSKTA2XwD9NEB31uPBLzi-6iMpLnYB8Wn4-kOBYpKBW52iXj8WQSmzEy5Zvt01ewG5HUQN2UEc7nK77YPjdALd64GWih8NpkALGwR_JtzOGAaKXexyTKGEt2pgoMaXahgj5Qgk9nM_6xGvDDJpsmOyiVv0LB62B8un4dBDrLiLPeWciCL9fvvKVQizhSG6stFz9Df7sxUpcYitR-SodFO2A_Vw-7l4nzzduqjX9bKJxOHDDeBB3RHF0OUlS3faq1hPoMqzulrHoVGPZOE32u0NIK8MiF9MZRtgNV4IhC6c3yqFPKvCsxQs3_0VDnfzf-CPg

This only covers adding RW pages. I haven't even tackled permission changes yet. Is that understanding correct? If not, please provide an alternative sequence diagram to explain how you expect this to be used.

Please find my attempt linked below:

https://mermaid.live/edit#pako:eNqFUsFqAjEQ_ZWQUwsK7XUPgthQeqiUVang9jAkoxu6m2yzWVsR_72J2WTbKnSOb97MvPeSI-VaIM1oix8dKo4PEnYG6kIRVw0YK7lsQFlSghGfYPCy845GYXWJm05ZWV8ZaEt55QB-IS9UwOfaItF7NGc0I3UNzU3-ekvaQ8uhqiLPd8l4PJnEYxmZsvXm7i20e5B4QlA5rAqMgJJfG9Ixg21X2ctVXn9GGJsvWb65729FSZXWDdlqpxx46Qzu-gB8-cHzhhim2zKdzdjLcuAAt3IPzv6Qkq84EdxGM3492UJS-cdSpLHp6nEgCPz3RjI5NPvAlRisJjspOsbWT8sUyc_MwjuynC1Wzyw9EB3RGk0NUrgvePRYQW2J7tNQd5sKDN5ooU6O2jXCiWZCWm1otoWqxRGFzurFQXGaWdNhJPXfuGedvgFejOuH

The changes include:
* Move mmap() to occur before attempting EACCEPT on the addresses. This is required for EACCEPT (as well as any subsequent access from within the enclave) to be able to access the pages.
* Remove AEX[1] to the runtime within the loop. After EAUG returns execution will return to the instruction pointer that triggered the #PF, EACCEPT, this will cause the EACCEPT to be run again, this time succeeding.

This is based on the implementation within this series. When supporting the new ioctl() requested by Jarkko there will be an additional ioctl() required before the loop.

Reinette

#47 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 46 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 45 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 15 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 15 lines

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R and RX pages but obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
	 * be created with RW permissions.
	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize then also in the page permission ioctls.

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully known territory, we have one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from unpredictable effect to future API changes.

The plan to complete the "TBD" in the above snippet was to follow this work with user policy integration at this location. On a high level the plan was for this to look something like:

(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	/*
 	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
 	 * be created with RW permissions.
 	 * Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
 	 * of RWX.
 	 */
 	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
 	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
 
        if (user space policy allows RWX on dynamically added pages)
	 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, 0);
	else
		encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 0);
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

The work that follows this series aimed to do the integration with user space policy.

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm sorry but I just don't fully understand this.

My apologies - I just assumed that you would need no reminder about this contentious part of SGX history. Essentially it means that, yes, the kernel could theoretically permit any kind of access to any file/page, but some accesses are known to generally be a bad idea - like making memory executable as well as writable - and thus there are additional checks based on what user space permits before the kernel allows such accesses.

For example, mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect()

User policy and SGX has seen significant discussion. Some notable threads:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CALCETrXf8mSK45h7sTK5Wf+pXLVn=Bjsc_RLpgO-h-qdzBRo5Q@mail.gmail.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/

Quoted 3 lines

It's too big of a risk to accept this series without X taken care of. Patch series should neither have TODO nor TBD comments IMHO. I don't want to ack a series based on speculation what might happen in the future.

ok

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions. Then you can easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be used for this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be useful if needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and call it a day.

I could, yes.

Quoted 2 lines

And if there is plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES what is this weird thing added to the #PF handler? Why is it added at all then?

I was just speculating in my response, there is no plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES (that I am aware of).

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

How this could work is user space calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES after enclave initialization on any memory region within the enclave where pages are planned to be added dynamically. This ioctl() calls EAUG to add the new pages with RW permissions and their vm_max_prot_bits can be set to the permissions found in the included SECINFO. This will support later EACCEPTCOPY as well as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

I could proceed with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES if there is consensus after considering the user policy question (above) and performance trade-off (more below).

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history behind this topic.

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space policy.

This discussion is about some enclave usages needing RWX permissions
on dynamically added enclave pages. RWX permissions on dynamically added pages is not something that should blindly be allowed for all SGX enclaves but instead the user needs to explicitly allow specific enclaves to have such ability. This is equivalent to (but not the same as) what exists in Linux today with LSM. As seen in mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect() Linux is able to make files and memory be both writable and executable, but it would only do so for those files and memory that the LSM (which is how user policy is communicated, like SELinux) indicates it is allowed, not blindly do so for all files and all memory.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

I understand how SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES can be more deterministic but from what I understand it would have a performance impact since it would require all memory that may be needed by the enclave be pre-allocated from outside the enclave and not just dynamically allocated from within the enclave at the time it is needed.

Would such a performance impact be acceptable?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

In this series this is indeed not possible because it lacks the user policy integration. JIT will be possible after user policy integration.

Like this I don't what this series can be used in practice.

Majority of practical use cases for EDMM boil down to having a way to add new executable code (not just Enarx).

Understood.

Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

I'd actually to leave out permission change madness completely out of this patch set, as we all know it is a grazy beast of microarchitecture. For user space having that is less critical than having executable pages.

Simply with EAUG/EACCEPTCOPY you can already populate enclave with any permissions you had in mind. Augmenting alone would be logically consistent patch set that is actually usable for many workloads.

Support for permission changes is required in order to support dynamically added pages (EAUG pages) to be made executable. Yes, you could make
a dynamically added page have executable EPCM permissions using EACCEPTCOPY but the kernel is still required to make the PTE executable.

Quoted 8 lines

Now there is half-broken augmenting (this is even writtend down to the TBD comment) and complex code for EMODPR and EMODT that is usable only for kselftests and not much else before there is fully working augmenting.

This way we get actually sound patch set that is easy to review and apply to the mainline. It is also factors easier for you to iterate a smaller set of patches.

Quoted 7 lines

After this it is so much easier to start to look at remaining functionality, and at the same time augmenting part can be stress tested with real-world code and it will mature quickly.

This whole thing *really* needs a serious U-turn on how it is delivered to the upstream. Sometimes it is better just to admit that this didn't start with the right foot.

As mentioned above, from what I understand the support for (as you state) the "majority of practical use cases" on dynamically added pages do require supporting permission changes also. It thus seems to me that it would help consuming this feature if dynamic addition of pages and permission changes are presented together. The SGX2 functionality that remains after that is the changing of page type, which forms part of the page removal flow. In this regard I also find that presenting the page addition flow at the same time as the page removal flow would make these features easier to consume. I think supporting the addition of pages and leaving page removal to "future work" would be similarly frustrating to consume.

Reinette

#127 lore raw
In reply to Reinette Chatre
Quoted 33 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Nathaniel,

Quoted 10 lines · Nathaniel McCallum

Perhaps it would be better for us to have a shared understanding on how the patches as posted are supposed to work in the most common cases? I'm thinking here of projects such as Enarx, Gramine and Occulum, which all have a similar process. Namely they execute an executable (called exec in the below chart) which has things like syscalls handled by a shim. These two components (shim and exec) are supported by a non-enclave userspace runtime. Given this common architectural pattern, this is how I understand adding pages via an exec call to mmap() to work.

Quoted 6 lines

https://mermaid.live/edit#pako:eNp1k81qwzAQhF9F6NRCAu1Vh0BIRemhoeSHBuIettYmFpElVZZLQ8i7144sJ8aOT2bmY3d2vT7R1AikjBb4U6JO8UXC3kGeaFI9FpyXqbSgPTmg06j6uiu1lzn2jSKTA2XwD9NEB31uPBLzi-6iMpLnYB8Wn4-kOBYpKBW52iXj8WQSmzEy5Zvt01ewG5HUQN2UEc7nK77YPjdALd64GWih8NpkALGwR_JtzOGAaKXexyTKGEt2pgoMaXahgj5Qgk9nM_6xGvDDJpsmOyiVv0LB62B8un4dBDrLiLPeWciCL9fvvKVQizhSG6stFz9Df7sxUpcYitR-SodFO2A_Vw-7l4nzzduqjX9bKJxOHDDeBB3RHF0OUlS3faq1hPoMqzulrHoVGPZOE32u0NIK8MiF9MZRtgNV4IhC6c3yqFPKvCsxQs3_0VDnfzf-CPg

This only covers adding RW pages. I haven't even tackled permission changes yet. Is that understanding correct? If not, please provide an alternative sequence diagram to explain how you expect this to be used.

Please find my attempt linked below:

https://mermaid.live/edit#pako:eNqFUsFqAjEQ_ZWQUwsK7XUPgthQeqiUVang9jAkoxu6m2yzWVsR_72J2WTbKnSOb97MvPeSI-VaIM1oix8dKo4PEnYG6kIRVw0YK7lsQFlSghGfYPCy845GYXWJm05ZWV8ZaEt55QB-IS9UwOfaItF7NGc0I3UNzU3-ekvaQ8uhqiLPd8l4PJnEYxmZsvXm7i20e5B4QlA5rAqMgJJfG9Ixg21X2ctVXn9GGJsvWb65729FSZXWDdlqpxx46Qzu-gB8-cHzhhim2zKdzdjLcuAAt3IPzv6Qkq84EdxGM3492UJS-cdSpLHp6nEgCPz3RjI5NPvAlRisJjspOsbWT8sUyc_MwjuynC1Wzyw9EB3RGk0NUrgvePRYQW2J7tNQd5sKDN5ooU6O2jXCiWZCWm1otoWqxRGFzurFQXGaWdNhJPXfuGedvgFejOuH

The changes include:
* Move mmap() to occur before attempting EACCEPT on the addresses. This is required for EACCEPT (as well as any subsequent access from within the enclave) to be able to access the pages.
* Remove AEX[1] to the runtime within the loop. After EAUG returns execution will return to the instruction pointer that triggered the #PF, EACCEPT, this will cause the EACCEPT to be run again, this time succeeding.

Quoted 3 lines

This is based on the implementation within this series. When supporting the new ioctl() requested by Jarkko there will be an additional ioctl() required before the loop.

https://mermaid.live/edit/#pako:eNp1U9FqgzAU_ZWQpw1a2F6FFaQLYw8ro7asUPeQmWsNNYlL4rZS-u-LRmut1ie953jvOecmR5woBjjABr5LkAk8c7rTVMQSuYeWVslSfIH23wXVlie8oNKijGr2SzUMkT1oCfmwrktpuRj5wWRcDKvwB0ksfX2hLCD1A7quBkgIWtwtP-6ROZiE5nnLq1A0nc5m7bAAhWSzffj0cFNEFaEaGiBCFiuy3D42hKp4gWZUshy6ISOUL6X2e4CCy10rQhUW8dR52QESivGUJ9RyJQ2SAAyYZ_V6ndUSsnldneVca_bJdvY7lkf6vc4haTBlbsdbDmLoaLlSBUqVy5wmWW2nw3rq26Pg-oTzOXlf9Xkt7BfTeqjjSWlP2JWTlkrC9cutlmcLlUlxoRBkE3T9Mrq7KArd0UBPqFDGTpstI2OphSv-jf1cBukPJlmSaP1GXFs8wQK0oJy523Ws-DG2GTiJOHCvDLx3HMuTo5YFc1MJ41ZpHKQ0NzDB1fWLDjLBgdUltKTmhjas0z-kWy8L

My comments below correspond to the arrow numbers in the diagram.

2. When the runtime receives the AEX, it doesn't have enough knowledge to know whether or not to ask the kernel for an mmap(). So it has to reenter the shim.

3. The shim has to handle the syscall instruction routing it to the enclave's memory management subsystem.

4. The shim has to do bookkeeping and decide if additional pages are even needed. If pages are already allocated, for example, it can skip directly to step 13. However, if modifications are needed, it will go to steps 5-12.

5-12. This is the part that represents new code from the kernel's perspective for SGX2. It is also in a performance critical path and should be evaluated with greater scrutiny. The number of context switches is O(2N + 4) for each new allocated block, where N is the number of pages: a context switch occurs at step 5, 6, 7, 8, 9/10 and
12. However, this can be reduced to O(4) for each new allocated block with a simple modification:

https://mermaid.live/edit/#pako:eNqNk11rwyAUhv-KeLVBC9ttYIXQydjFymhaVmh24fSkkUbN1Gwrpf99pvlsk8G80nMez3l91SNmmgMOsIXPAhSDR0F3hspYIT9o4bQq5AeYap1T4wQTOVUOpdTwb2pgmNmDUZAN46ZQTsiRDTYVchiFH2CxquIL7QDpLzDnaICkpPnN8u0W2YNlNMsarsyi6XQ2a5oFKCSb7d17la6DqATKpgEiZLEiy-19DZTBXjalimfQNRlBPrTe7wFyoXaNCJ07JBJ_lh0gqblIBKNOaGWRAuDAK-qiVquWkM3zqpVzrblytjt-R2Va5yjR3h_K0nPrLleOaudFERKunzoIVE9Xj26VtZYbsEXmxgUOTP2_witfSTifk9fViMDzZPQuoij0V40eUK6tm9a3hqyjDq74P_zuH6V6aGRJovUL8WXxBEswkgruf8ux5GPsUvDvGQd-yiGhpS04ViePFjn3XQkXThscJDSzMMHld4oOiuHAmQIaqP5xNXX6BeBJIEk

The interesting thing about this pattern is that this can be done for all page modification types except EMODT. For example, here's the same process for changing a mapping from RW to RX:

https://mermaid.live/edit/#pako:eNqNk11rwyAUhv-KeLVBC9ttYIVCvdhFu5F0UGh24fSkkUbN1Gwrpf995jttMphXes7jOa-vesZMc8ABtvBZgGKwEvRgqIwV8oMWTqtCfoCp1zk1TjCRU-VQSg3_pgbGmSMYBdk4bgrlhJzYYFMhx1H4ARarOr7RDpD-AlNFAyQlze_C3T2yJ8tolrVcmUXz-WLRNgvQkuz2D-91ugmiEiibBoiQzZaE-8cGKIODbEoVz6BvMoF8aH08AuRCHVoROndIJP4sB0BSc5EIRp3QyiIFwIHX1FWtTi0hu-dtJ-dWc-1sf_yeyrTOUaK9P5SlVes-V45651URsn5ZvYY9BmqgbMB32jrTDdgic9MSR7b-X-ONs5U-MqGvmkxeRhQt_V2jJ5Rr6-bNtSHrqIMb_g_DhyepXxoJSfS2Jr4snmEJRlLB_Xc5l3yMXQr-QePATzkktHQFx-ri0SLnvivhwmmDg4RmFma4_E_RSTEcOFNACzVfrqEuvytQILY

My point in this thread has always been that it is an anti-feature to presume that there is a need to treat EPC and VLA permissions separately. This is a performance sink and it optimizes for a use case which doesn't exist. Nobody actually wants there to be a mismatch between EPC and VLA permissions.

So, besides EMODT, the only userspace interface we need is mmap()/mprotect()/munmap(). The kernel should either succeed the mmap()/mprotect()/munmap() syscall if the EPC permissions can be made compatible or should fail otherwise.

Another interesting property arises from this flow. Since the EPC and VLA permissions are always synchronized from the perspective of userspace, in cases where the memory state between the kernel and the exec layer is roughly synchronous, bookkeeping in the shim can be implemented without any persistent memory between syscall handling events. So, for example, the shim can implement brk() and mmap()/munmap()/mprotect() with just two pointers: one to the break position and one to the lowest mmap().

It is true that this basically commits enclave authors to doing all EACCEPT calls immediately after modifications. But I suspect everyone will do this anyway since there is no efficient (read: performant) way for shims to handle page faults. So trying to do this lazily will just result in a huge decrease in performance.

#48 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Reinette Chatre

Hi all,

Quoted 130 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 48 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 47 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 15 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 15 lines

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R and RX pages but obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
	 * be created with RW permissions.
	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize then also in the page permission ioctls.

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully known territory, we have one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from unpredictable effect to future API changes.

The plan to complete the "TBD" in the above snippet was to follow this work with user policy integration at this location. On a high level the plan was for this to look something like:

(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	/*
 	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
 	 * be created with RW permissions.
 	 * Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
 	 * of RWX.
 	 */
 	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
 	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
 
        if (user space policy allows RWX on dynamically added pages)
	 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |  
PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, 0);
	else
		encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |  

PROT_WRITE, 0);

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

The work that follows this series aimed to do the integration with user space policy.

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm sorry but I just don't fully understand this.

My apologies - I just assumed that you would need no reminder about this contentious part of SGX history. Essentially it means that, yes, the kernel could theoretically permit any kind of access to any file/page, but some accesses are known to generally be a bad idea - like making memory executable as well as writable - and thus there are additional checks based on what user space permits before the kernel allows such accesses.

For example, mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect()

User policy and SGX has seen significant discussion. Some notable threads:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CALCETrXf8mSK45h7sTK5Wf+pXLVn=Bjsc_RLpgO-h-qdzBRo5Q@mail.gmail.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/

Quoted 3 lines

It's too big of a risk to accept this series without X taken care of. Patch series should neither have TODO nor TBD comments IMHO. I don't want to ack a series based on speculation what might happen in the future.

ok

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions. Then you can easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be used for this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be useful if needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and call it a day.

I could, yes.

Quoted 2 lines

And if there is plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES what is this weird thing added to the #PF handler? Why is it added at all then?

I was just speculating in my response, there is no plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES (that I am aware of).

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

How this could work is user space calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES after enclave initialization on any memory region within the enclave where pages are planned to be added dynamically. This ioctl() calls EAUG to add the new pages with RW permissions and their vm_max_prot_bits can be set to the permissions found in the included SECINFO. This will support later EACCEPTCOPY as well as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

I could proceed with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES if there is consensus after considering the user policy question (above) and performance trade-off (more below).

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history behind this topic.

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space policy.

This discussion is about some enclave usages needing RWX permissions
on dynamically added enclave pages. RWX permissions on dynamically added pages is not something that should blindly be allowed for all SGX enclaves but instead the user needs to explicitly allow specific enclaves to have such ability. This is equivalent to (but not the same as) what exists in Linux today with LSM. As seen in mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect() Linux is able to make files and memory be both writable and executable, but it would only do so for those files and memory that the LSM (which is how user policy is communicated, like SELinux) indicates it is allowed, not blindly do so for all files and all memory.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

Quoted 7 lines

I understand how SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES can be more deterministic but from what I understand it would have a performance impact since it would require all memory that may be needed by the enclave be pre-allocated from outside the enclave and not just dynamically allocated from within the enclave at the time it is needed.

Would such a performance impact be acceptable?

User space won't always have enough info to decide whether the pages to be EAUG'd immediately. In some cases (shared libraries, JVM for example) lots of code/data pages can be mapped but never actually touched. One enclave/process does not know if any other more important enclave/process would need the EPC.

It should be for kernel to make the final decision as it has overall picture of the system EPC usage and availability.

User space can provide a hint (similar to MAP_POPULATE) to kernel that the mmap'd area will soon be needed and kernel should EAUG as soon as it sees fit based on current system usage. Or kernel implement some policy to avoid #PF triggered by EACCEPT, for example, if the system has ton of free EPC relative to the requested by mmap at the time.

BR
Haitao

#128 lore raw
In reply to Nathaniel McCallum

Hi Nathaniel,

Quoted 63 lines · Nathaniel McCallum
Quoted 33 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Nathaniel,

Quoted 10 lines · Nathaniel McCallum

Perhaps it would be better for us to have a shared understanding on how the patches as posted are supposed to work in the most common cases? I'm thinking here of projects such as Enarx, Gramine and Occulum, which all have a similar process. Namely they execute an executable (called exec in the below chart) which has things like syscalls handled by a shim. These two components (shim and exec) are supported by a non-enclave userspace runtime. Given this common architectural pattern, this is how I understand adding pages via an exec call to mmap() to work.

Quoted 6 lines

https://mermaid.live/edit#pako:eNp1k81qwzAQhF9F6NRCAu1Vh0BIRemhoeSHBuIettYmFpElVZZLQ8i7144sJ8aOT2bmY3d2vT7R1AikjBb4U6JO8UXC3kGeaFI9FpyXqbSgPTmg06j6uiu1lzn2jSKTA2XwD9NEB31uPBLzi-6iMpLnYB8Wn4-kOBYpKBW52iXj8WQSmzEy5Zvt01ewG5HUQN2UEc7nK77YPjdALd64GWih8NpkALGwR_JtzOGAaKXexyTKGEt2pgoMaXahgj5Qgk9nM_6xGvDDJpsmOyiVv0LB62B8un4dBDrLiLPeWciCL9fvvKVQizhSG6stFz9Df7sxUpcYitR-SodFO2A_Vw-7l4nzzduqjX9bKJxOHDDeBB3RHF0OUlS3faq1hPoMqzulrHoVGPZOE32u0NIK8MiF9MZRtgNV4IhC6c3yqFPKvCsxQs3_0VDnfzf-CPg

This only covers adding RW pages. I haven't even tackled permission changes yet. Is that understanding correct? If not, please provide an alternative sequence diagram to explain how you expect this to be used.

Please find my attempt linked below:

https://mermaid.live/edit#pako:eNqFUsFqAjEQ_ZWQUwsK7XUPgthQeqiUVang9jAkoxu6m2yzWVsR_72J2WTbKnSOb97MvPeSI-VaIM1oix8dKo4PEnYG6kIRVw0YK7lsQFlSghGfYPCy845GYXWJm05ZWV8ZaEt55QB-IS9UwOfaItF7NGc0I3UNzU3-ekvaQ8uhqiLPd8l4PJnEYxmZsvXm7i20e5B4QlA5rAqMgJJfG9Ixg21X2ctVXn9GGJsvWb65729FSZXWDdlqpxx46Qzu-gB8-cHzhhim2zKdzdjLcuAAt3IPzv6Qkq84EdxGM3492UJS-cdSpLHp6nEgCPz3RjI5NPvAlRisJjspOsbWT8sUyc_MwjuynC1Wzyw9EB3RGk0NUrgvePRYQW2J7tNQd5sKDN5ooU6O2jXCiWZCWm1otoWqxRGFzurFQXGaWdNhJPXfuGedvgFejOuH

The changes include:
* Move mmap() to occur before attempting EACCEPT on the addresses. This is required for EACCEPT (as well as any subsequent access from within the enclave) to be able to access the pages.
* Remove AEX[1] to the runtime within the loop. After EAUG returns execution will return to the instruction pointer that triggered the #PF, EACCEPT, this will cause the EACCEPT to be run again, this time succeeding.

Quoted 3 lines

This is based on the implementation within this series. When supporting the new ioctl() requested by Jarkko there will be an additional ioctl() required before the loop.

https://mermaid.live/edit/#pako:eNp1U9FqgzAU_ZWQpw1a2F6FFaQLYw8ro7asUPeQmWsNNYlL4rZS-u-LRmut1ie953jvOecmR5woBjjABr5LkAk8c7rTVMQSuYeWVslSfIH23wXVlie8oNKijGr2SzUMkT1oCfmwrktpuRj5wWRcDKvwB0ksfX2hLCD1A7quBkgIWtwtP-6ROZiE5nnLq1A0nc5m7bAAhWSzffj0cFNEFaEaGiBCFiuy3D42hKp4gWZUshy6ISOUL6X2e4CCy10rQhUW8dR52QESivGUJ9RyJQ2SAAyYZ_V6ndUSsnldneVca_bJdvY7lkf6vc4haTBlbsdbDmLoaLlSBUqVy5wmWW2nw3rq26Pg-oTzOXlf9Xkt7BfTeqjjSWlP2JWTlkrC9cutlmcLlUlxoRBkE3T9Mrq7KArd0UBPqFDGTpstI2OphSv-jf1cBukPJlmSaP1GXFs8wQK0oJy523Ws-DG2GTiJOHCvDLx3HMuTo5YFc1MJ41ZpHKQ0NzDB1fWLDjLBgdUltKTmhjas0z-kWy8L

My comments below correspond to the arrow numbers in the diagram.

2. When the runtime receives the AEX, it doesn't have enough knowledge to know whether or not to ask the kernel for an mmap(). So it has to reenter the shim.

3. The shim has to handle the syscall instruction routing it to the enclave's memory management subsystem.

4. The shim has to do bookkeeping and decide if additional pages are even needed. If pages are already allocated, for example, it can skip directly to step 13. However, if modifications are needed, it will go to steps 5-12.

5-12. This is the part that represents new code from the kernel's perspective for SGX2. It is also in a performance critical path and should be evaluated with greater scrutiny. The number of context switches is O(2N + 4) for each new allocated block, where N is the number of pages: a context switch occurs at step 5, 6, 7, 8, 9/10 and
12. However, this can be reduced to O(4) for each new allocated block with a simple modification:

Quoted 1 line

https://mermaid.live/edit/#pako:eNqNk11rwyAUhv-KeLVBC9ttYIXQydjFymhaVmh24fSkkUbN1Gwrpf99pvlsk8G80nMez3l91SNmmgMOsIXPAhSDR0F3hspYIT9o4bQq5AeYap1T4wQTOVUOpdTwb2pgmNmDUZAN46ZQTsiRDTYVchiFH2CxquIL7QDpLzDnaICkpPnN8u0W2YNlNMsarsyi6XQ2a5oFKCSb7d17la6DqATKpgEiZLEiy-19DZTBXjalimfQNRlBPrTe7wFyoXaNCJ07JBJ_lh0gqblIBKNOaGWRAuDAK-qiVquWkM3zqpVzrblytjt-R2Va5yjR3h_K0nPrLleOaudFERKunzoIVE9Xj26VtZYbsEXmxgUOTP2_witfSTifk9fViMDzZPQuoij0V40eUK6tm9a3hqyjDq74P_zuH6V6aGRJovUL8WXxBEswkgruf8ux5GPsUvDvGQd-yiGhpS04ViePFjn3XQkXThscJDSzMMHld4oOiuHAmQIaqP5xNXX6BeBJIEk

Your optimized proposal is possible in the current implementation as follows:

https://mermaid.live/edit#pako:eNp1k11vgjAUhv_KSa-2RJPtlmQmxvViFzOLuMxEdlHbgzTSlrVlmzH-9xUBUWFclfc8nI-X0wPhRiCJiMOvEjXHZ8m2lqlEQ3hY6Y0u1QZt_V4w6yWXBdMeMmbFD7PYj-zQasz7ui21l2rgA5dJ1VfxF3mia31uPIL5RntSI1CKFXeLj3twe8dZnrdcFYXxeDJpi0Uwpav1w2cdbkSogKpoBJTOl3SxfmyASryIZkyLHLsiA8jGmN0OsZB62zZhCg8yDbNsEZQRMpWceWm0A40oUNTUVa5zt5SuXpbndm57rp3txu-oOnKd62ySRVfmfjhlz4YOy40pIDXBc8az0zhdbMAJOp3N6NuyY1A3o54Og-7F8TT8HHiCwjg_bnwG55nHG_4fhy5HqVeDLmj8_kpDWjIiCq1iUoT9PlR8QnyGYQNJFI4CU1bZQhJ9DGhZiFCVCumNJVHKcocjUl2AeK85ibwtsYWaO9JQxz-gBQs-

You can think of that EACCEPT instruction similar to a current (SGX1) enclave memory read or write when the enclave page is not currently in the EPC, for example, if the enclave memory being accessed is swapped out and need to be decrypted and loaded back. Instead of ENCLS[ELDU] incorporated to load the enclave page back into EPC, ENCLS[EAUG] is incorporated to create a new EPC page.

You can find an example of such a flow involving EACCEPT in the "augment_via_eaccept" test found in "[PATCH V2 21/32] selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows"

Quoted 11 lines

The interesting thing about this pattern is that this can be done for all page modification types except EMODT. For example, here's the same process for changing a mapping from RW to RX:

https://mermaid.live/edit/#pako:eNqNk11rwyAUhv-KeLVBC9ttYIVCvdhFu5F0UGh24fSkkUbN1Gwrpf995jttMphXes7jOa-vesZMc8ABtvBZgGKwEvRgqIwV8oMWTqtCfoCp1zk1TjCRU-VQSg3_pgbGmSMYBdk4bgrlhJzYYFMhx1H4ARarOr7RDpD-AlNFAyQlze_C3T2yJ8tolrVcmUXz-WLRNgvQkuz2D-91ugmiEiibBoiQzZaE-8cGKIODbEoVz6BvMoF8aH08AuRCHVoROndIJP4sB0BSc5EIRp3QyiIFwIHX1FWtTi0hu-dtJ-dWc-1sf_yeyrTOUaK9P5SlVes-V45651URsn5ZvYY9BmqgbMB32jrTDdgic9MSR7b-X-ONs5U-MqGvmkxeRhQt_V2jJ5Rr6-bNtSHrqIMb_g_DhyepXxoJSfS2Jr4snmEJRlLB_Xc5l3yMXQr-QePATzkktHQFx-ri0SLnvivhwmmDg4RmFma4_E_RSTEcOFNACzVfrqEuvytQILY

My point in this thread has always been that it is an anti-feature to presume that there is a need to treat EPC and VLA permissions separately. This is a performance sink and it optimizes for a use case which doesn't exist. Nobody actually wants there to be a mismatch between EPC and VLA permissions.

I assume you mean VMA permissions. It is hard for me to trust the statement that nobody wants there to be a mismatch since VMA permissions being separate from EPC permissions is an intentional (as documented) and integral part of the current SGX ABI. Current SGX implementation explicitly checks for and supports VMA mappings with permissions different from EPC permissions.

This SGX2 implementation follows and respects the current ABI and changing ABI cannot be taken lightly.

Reinette

#49 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Haitao Huang

Hi Haitao,

Quoted 4 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 3 lines · Reinette Chatre
Quoted 2 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 1 line · Reinette Chatre

On 3/1/2022 5:42 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:

...

Quoted 57 lines
Quoted 57 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions. Then you can easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be used for this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be useful if needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and call it a day.

I could, yes.

Quoted 2 lines

And if there is plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES what is this weird thing added to the #PF handler? Why is it added at all then?

I was just speculating in my response, there is no plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES (that I am aware of).

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

How this could work is user space calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES after enclave initialization on any memory region within the enclave where pages are planned to be added dynamically. This ioctl() calls EAUG to add the new pages with RW permissions and their vm_max_prot_bits can be set to the permissions found in the included SECINFO. This will support later EACCEPTCOPY as well as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

I could proceed with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES if there is consensus after considering the user policy question (above) and performance trade-off (more below).

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history behind this topic.

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space policy.

This discussion is about some enclave usages needing RWX permissions
on dynamically added enclave pages. RWX permissions on dynamically added pages is not something that should blindly be allowed for all SGX enclaves but instead the user needs to explicitly allow specific enclaves to have such ability. This is equivalent to (but not the same as) what exists in Linux today with LSM. As seen in mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect() Linux is able to make files and memory be both writable and executable, but it would only do so for those files and memory that the LSM (which is how user policy is communicated, like SELinux) indicates it is allowed, not blindly do so for all files and all memory.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

I understand how SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES can be more deterministic but from what I understand it would have a performance impact since it would require all memory that may be needed by the enclave be pre-allocated from outside the enclave and not just dynamically allocated from within the enclave at the time it is needed.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Would such a performance impact be acceptable?

User space won't always have enough info to decide whether the pages to be EAUG'd immediately. In some cases (shared libraries, JVM for example) lots of code/data pages can be mapped but never actually touched. One enclave/process does not know if any other more important enclave/process would need the EPC.

It should be for kernel to make the final decision as it has overall picture of the system EPC usage and availability.

User space can provide a hint (similar to MAP_POPULATE) to kernel that the mmap'd area will soon be needed and kernel should EAUG as soon as it sees fit based on current system usage. Or kernel implement some policy to avoid #PF triggered by EACCEPT, for example, if the system has ton of free EPC relative to the requested by mmap at the time.

mmap(...,...,...,MAP_POPULATE,...,...) would be most fitting and ideal since it would enable user space to indicate that the pages would be needed soon and the kernel can then prefault the pages. This is already desirable in the current implementation to avoid the first page fault on pages added via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES.

Unfortunately MAP_POPULATE is not supported by SGX VMAs because of their VM_IO and VM_PFNMAP flags. When VMAs with such flags obtain this capability then I believe that SGX would benefit.

Reinette

#50 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Quoted 3 lines · Reinette Chatre

Unfortunately MAP_POPULATE is not supported by SGX VMAs because of their VM_IO and VM_PFNMAP flags. When VMAs with such flags obtain this capability then I believe that SGX would benefit.

Some Intel folks asked for this quite a while ago. I think it's entirely doable: add a new vm_ops->populate() function that will allow ignoring VM_IO|VM_PFNMAP if present.

Or, if nobody wants to waste all of the vm_ops space, just add an arch_vma_populate() or something which can call over into SGX.

I'll happily review the patches if anyone can put such a beast together.

maintainer
#62 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Reinette Chatre
Quoted 9 lines · Reinette Chatre
Quoted 2 lines

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm sorry but I just don't fully understand this.

My apologies - I just assumed that you would need no reminder about this contentious part of SGX history. Essentially it means that, yes, the kernel could theoretically permit any kind of access to any file/page, but some accesses are known to generally be a bad idea - like making memory executable as well as writable - and thus there are additional checks based on what user space permits before the kernel allows such accesses.

The device files are limited by a GID (in systemd upstream), which is a "user policy".

What you want to add and why augmentation cannot be made complete before the unknown factor is added to the access control?

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions. Then you can easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be used for this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be useful if needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and call it a day.

I could, yes.

And this enables EACCEPTCOPY pattern nicely.

E.g. you can implement mmap() with EAUG and then EACCEPTCOPY feeded with permissions and a zero page:

1. enclave calls back to host to do mmap()
2. host does eaug on given range and enter back to enclave.
3. enclave does eacceptcopy with given permissions and a zero page.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

I could proceed with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES if there is consensus after considering the user policy question (above) and performance trade-off (more below).

Ok.

If adding this would be a bottleneck it would be already persistent int "add pages", so whatever limitation there might be, it already exist.

Thus, logically, that could be safely added without worrying about user policies all that much...

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history behind this topic.

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space policy.

This discussion is about some enclave usages needing RWX permissions on dynamically added enclave pages. RWX permissions on dynamically added pages is

I'm not sure if that is actually necessary, if you use EAUG-EACCEPTCOPY type of pattern. Please correct if I'm wrong.

Quoted 7 lines

not something that should blindly be allowed for all SGX enclaves but instead the user needs to explicitly allow specific enclaves to have such ability. This is equivalent to (but not the same as) what exists in Linux today with LSM. As seen in mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect() Linux is able to make files and memory be both writable and executable, but it would only do so for those files and memory that the LSM (which is how user policy is communicated, like SELinux) indicates it is allowed, not blindly do so for all files and all memory.

We could also potentially make LSM hooks to ioctls, if that is ever needed.

And as I said earlier, EAUG ioctl does not make things any worse they might be.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

I understand how SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES can be more deterministic but from what I understand it would have a performance impact since it would require all memory that may be needed by the enclave be pre-allocated from outside the enclave and not just dynamically allocated from within the enclave at the time it is needed.

Would such a performance impact be acceptable?

IMHO yes because bad behaving enclave can cause the same issue anyway, and more indeterministic manner.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#56 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Haitao Huang
Quoted 183 lines · Haitao Huang

Hi all,

Quoted 175 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 55 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 54 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 22 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 22 lines

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of
EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R and RX pages but obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
	 * be created with RW permissions.
	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a
risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize then also in the page
permission ioctls.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully known territory, we have
one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from unpredictable effect to
future API changes.

The plan to complete the "TBD" in the above snippet was to follow this work
with user policy integration at this location. On a high level the plan was
for this to look something like:

(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	/*
 	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
 	 * be created with RW permissions.
 	 * Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
 	 * of RWX.
 	 */
 	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
 	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
 
        if (user space policy allows RWX on dynamically added pages)
	 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |
PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, 0);
	else
		encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |

PROT_WRITE, 0);

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

The work that follows this series aimed to do the integration with user space policy.

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm sorry but I just don't fully understand this.

My apologies - I just assumed that you would need no reminder about this contentious
part of SGX history. Essentially it means that, yes, the kernel could theoretically
permit any kind of access to any file/page, but some accesses are known to generally
be a bad idea - like making memory executable as well as writable - and thus there
are additional checks based on what user space permits before the kernel allows
such accesses.

For example, mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect()

User policy and SGX has seen significant discussion. Some notable threads:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CALCETrXf8mSK45h7sTK5Wf+pXLVn=Bjsc_RLpgO-h-qdzBRo5Q@mail.gmail.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/

Quoted 5 lines

It's too big of a risk to accept this series without X taken care of. Patch
series should neither have TODO nor TBD comments IMHO. I don't want to ack
a series based on speculation what might happen in the future.

ok

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with
an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions. Then you can easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be used for this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be useful if needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and call it a day.

I could, yes.

Quoted 3 lines

And if there is plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES what is this weird
thing added to the #PF handler? Why is it added at all then?

I was just speculating in my response, there is no plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES (that I am aware of).

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines

How this could work is user space calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES after enclave initialization on any memory region within the enclave where
pages are planned to be added dynamically. This ioctl() calls EAUG to add the
new pages with RW permissions and their vm_max_prot_bits can be set to the
permissions found in the included SECINFO. This will support later EACCEPTCOPY
as well as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS

Quoted 1 line

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

I could proceed with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES if there is consensus after
considering the user policy question (above) and performance trade-off (more below).

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization
via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would
appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history
behind this topic.

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space policy.

This discussion is about some enclave usages needing RWX permissions on dynamically added enclave pages. RWX permissions on dynamically added pages is
not something that should blindly be allowed for all SGX enclaves but instead the user
needs to explicitly allow specific enclaves to have such ability. This is equivalent
to (but not the same as) what exists in Linux today with LSM. As seen in mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect() Linux is able to make
files and memory be both writable and executable, but it would only do so for those
files and memory that the LSM (which is how user policy is communicated, like SELinux)
indicates it is allowed, not blindly do so for all files and all memory.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and
hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to
mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

I understand how SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES can be more deterministic but from
what I understand it would have a performance impact since it would require all memory
that may be needed by the enclave be pre-allocated from outside the enclave and not
just dynamically allocated from within the enclave at the time it is needed.

Quoted 2 lines

Would such a performance impact be acceptable?

Quoted 8 lines

User space won't always have enough info to decide whether the pages to be EAUG'd immediately. In some cases (shared libraries, JVM for example) lots of code/data pages can be mapped but never actually touched. One enclave/process does not know if any other more important enclave/process would need the EPC.

It should be for kernel to make the final decision as it has overall picture of the system EPC usage and availability.

EAUG ioctl does not give better capabilities for user space to waste EPC given that EADD ioctl already exists, i.e. your argument is logically incorrect.

BR, Jarkko

#63 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 11 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 9 lines · Reinette Chatre
Quoted 2 lines

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm sorry but I just don't fully understand this.

My apologies - I just assumed that you would need no reminder about this contentious part of SGX history. Essentially it means that, yes, the kernel could theoretically permit any kind of access to any file/page, but some accesses are known to generally be a bad idea - like making memory executable as well as writable - and thus there are additional checks based on what user space permits before the kernel allows such accesses.

Quoted 5 lines

The device files are limited by a GID (in systemd upstream), which is a "user policy".

What you want to add and why augmentation cannot be made complete before the unknown factor is added to the access control?

After studying this part of SGX history I learned that unfortunately none of the existing user policy controls have been found to be a perfect fit for enclaves. Current user policy type permissions are associated with files and processes and enclaves have properties of both. One process can execute multiple enclaves and only one/some of those enclaves may require to execute dirty pages. Associating a permission to execute dirty pages with the process, and thus giving that ability to all of its enclaves, is not ideal. Similarly, the file /dev/sgx_enclave can represent multiple enclaves used by multiple processes and a file permission is similarly too broad.

What I was planning to propose and discuss after the SGX2 core enabling was an ability for user space to uniquely identify enclaves that require the ability to execute dirty pages. This identification can be specified by using enclave properties like MRENCLAVE and MRSIGNER. Executing dirty pages would only be allowed for these specific enclaves identified to require this ability. A solution like this is possible using the kernel's keys subsystem by introducing a new "enclave_execdirty" key that contains these properties. I have this working as a PoC.

Perhaps the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES what you propose can also be seen as a solution to support user space policy ... instead that it is more fine grained in that it is used to identify specific memory ranges within specific enclaves that are allowed to execute dirty pages. What do you think?

Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions. Then you can easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be used for this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be useful if needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and call it a day.

I could, yes.

And this enables EACCEPTCOPY pattern nicely.

E.g. you can implement mmap() with EAUG and then EACCEPTCOPY feeded with permissions and a zero page:

1. enclave calls back to host to do mmap()
2. host does eaug on given range and enter back to enclave.
3. enclave does eacceptcopy with given permissions and a zero page.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I could proceed with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES if there is consensus after considering the user policy question (above) and performance trade-off (more below).

Ok.

If adding this would be a bottleneck it would be already persistent int "add pages", so whatever limitation there might be, it already exist.

Currently this checking is built in as part of "add pages", for example, user space is prevented from circumventing existing protections on the source pages with the "vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC" check in __sgx_encl_add_page().

Further, there is trust here in that the pages added before enclave initialization are accompanied by their secinfo with the permissions of the pages and those values are included in the measurement (MRENCLAVE) of the final enclave. The maximum permissions any enclave page specified during "add pages" may have is "locked down" during this time.

Permissions of EAUG pages are not included in the MRENCLAVE of the enclave and there is no backing memory that can be referenced to learn what is already allowed.

It is possible that some of the code dynamically loaded into the enclave could indeed be buggy or malicious so effort should be made to only allow executing of dirty pages to those enclaves specified to require the ability.

Quoted 10 lines

Thus, logically, that could be safely added without worrying about user policies all that much...

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history behind this topic.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space policy.

This discussion is about some enclave usages needing RWX permissions on dynamically added enclave pages. RWX permissions on dynamically added pages is

I'm not sure if that is actually necessary, if you use EAUG-EACCEPTCOPY type of pattern. Please correct if I'm wrong.

This only takes EPCM permissions into account. The issue comes in when the kernel needs to determine whether it should allow the PTEs pointing to these pages to be executable.

To elaborate your example, to use dynamically added RWX pages EAUG->EACCEPTCOPY->SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS is required and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS will only allow PTEs that are allowed. In the driver sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits dictates what permissions are allowed and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS will return EPERM if an attempt is made to relax permissions beyond that.

When considering the user space policy integration, sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits will be initialized to reflect allowed permissions, RWX if the enclave is so allowed, in this way EAUG pages can be made executable using SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines

not something that should blindly be allowed for all SGX enclaves but instead the user needs to explicitly allow specific enclaves to have such ability. This is equivalent to (but not the same as) what exists in Linux today with LSM. As seen in mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect() Linux is able to make files and memory be both writable and executable, but it would only do so for those files and memory that the LSM (which is how user policy is communicated, like SELinux) indicates it is allowed, not blindly do so for all files and all memory.

We could also potentially make LSM hooks to ioctls, if that is ever needed.

Could you please elaborate?

Quoted 3 lines

And as I said earlier, EAUG ioctl does not make things any worse they might be.

I hope my earlier comments noting the differences with adding pages shine some light here.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

I understand how SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES can be more deterministic but from what I understand it would have a performance impact since it would require all memory that may be needed by the enclave be pre-allocated from outside the enclave and not just dynamically allocated from within the enclave at the time it is needed.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

Would such a performance impact be acceptable?

IMHO yes because bad behaving enclave can cause the same issue anyway, and more indeterministic manner.

With EAUG pages supported in the page fault handler it is possible to support both usages. Especially now that Dave provided guidance on how to support MAP_POPULATE. As I understand, when MAP_POPULATE is supported a usage needing deterministic behavior can pre-fault all the EAUG pages while those usages mapping a lot of memory that mostly will go unused are also supported.

Reinette

maintainer
#129 lore raw
In reply to Nathaniel McCallum
Quoted 69 lines · Nathaniel McCallum
Quoted 33 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Nathaniel,

Quoted 10 lines · Nathaniel McCallum

Perhaps it would be better for us to have a shared understanding on how the patches as posted are supposed to work in the most common cases? I'm thinking here of projects such as Enarx, Gramine and Occulum, which all have a similar process. Namely they execute an executable (called exec in the below chart) which has things like syscalls handled by a shim. These two components (shim and exec) are supported by a non-enclave userspace runtime. Given this common architectural pattern, this is how I understand adding pages via an exec call to mmap() to work.

Quoted 6 lines

https://mermaid.live/edit#pako:eNp1k81qwzAQhF9F6NRCAu1Vh0BIRemhoeSHBuIettYmFpElVZZLQ8i7144sJ8aOT2bmY3d2vT7R1AikjBb4U6JO8UXC3kGeaFI9FpyXqbSgPTmg06j6uiu1lzn2jSKTA2XwD9NEB31uPBLzi-6iMpLnYB8Wn4-kOBYpKBW52iXj8WQSmzEy5Zvt01ewG5HUQN2UEc7nK77YPjdALd64GWih8NpkALGwR_JtzOGAaKXexyTKGEt2pgoMaXahgj5Qgk9nM_6xGvDDJpsmOyiVv0LB62B8un4dBDrLiLPeWciCL9fvvKVQizhSG6stFz9Df7sxUpcYitR-SodFO2A_Vw-7l4nzzduqjX9bKJxOHDDeBB3RHF0OUlS3faq1hPoMqzulrHoVGPZOE32u0NIK8MiF9MZRtgNV4IhC6c3yqFPKvCsxQs3_0VDnfzf-CPg

This only covers adding RW pages. I haven't even tackled permission changes yet. Is that understanding correct? If not, please provide an alternative sequence diagram to explain how you expect this to be used.

Please find my attempt linked below:

https://mermaid.live/edit#pako:eNqFUsFqAjEQ_ZWQUwsK7XUPgthQeqiUVang9jAkoxu6m2yzWVsR_72J2WTbKnSOb97MvPeSI-VaIM1oix8dKo4PEnYG6kIRVw0YK7lsQFlSghGfYPCy845GYXWJm05ZWV8ZaEt55QB-IS9UwOfaItF7NGc0I3UNzU3-ekvaQ8uhqiLPd8l4PJnEYxmZsvXm7i20e5B4QlA5rAqMgJJfG9Ixg21X2ctVXn9GGJsvWb65729FSZXWDdlqpxx46Qzu-gB8-cHzhhim2zKdzdjLcuAAt3IPzv6Qkq84EdxGM3492UJS-cdSpLHp6nEgCPz3RjI5NPvAlRisJjspOsbWT8sUyc_MwjuynC1Wzyw9EB3RGk0NUrgvePRYQW2J7tNQd5sKDN5ooU6O2jXCiWZCWm1otoWqxRGFzurFQXGaWdNhJPXfuGedvgFejOuH

The changes include:
* Move mmap() to occur before attempting EACCEPT on the addresses. This is required for EACCEPT (as well as any subsequent access from within the enclave) to be able to access the pages.
* Remove AEX[1] to the runtime within the loop. After EAUG returns execution will return to the instruction pointer that triggered the #PF, EACCEPT, this will cause the EACCEPT to be run again, this time succeeding.

Quoted 3 lines

This is based on the implementation within this series. When supporting the new ioctl() requested by Jarkko there will be an additional ioctl() required before the loop.

https://mermaid.live/edit/#pako:eNp1U9FqgzAU_ZWQpw1a2F6FFaQLYw8ro7asUPeQmWsNNYlL4rZS-u-LRmut1ie953jvOecmR5woBjjABr5LkAk8c7rTVMQSuYeWVslSfIH23wXVlie8oNKijGr2SzUMkT1oCfmwrktpuRj5wWRcDKvwB0ksfX2hLCD1A7quBkgIWtwtP-6ROZiE5nnLq1A0nc5m7bAAhWSzffj0cFNEFaEaGiBCFiuy3D42hKp4gWZUshy6ISOUL6X2e4CCy10rQhUW8dR52QESivGUJ9RyJQ2SAAyYZ_V6ndUSsnldneVca_bJdvY7lkf6vc4haTBlbsdbDmLoaLlSBUqVy5wmWW2nw3rq26Pg-oTzOXlf9Xkt7BfTeqjjSWlP2JWTlkrC9cutlmcLlUlxoRBkE3T9Mrq7KArd0UBPqFDGTpstI2OphSv-jf1cBukPJlmSaP1GXFs8wQK0oJy523Ws-DG2GTiJOHCvDLx3HMuTo5YFc1MJ41ZpHKQ0NzDB1fWLDjLBgdUltKTmhjas0z-kWy8L

My comments below correspond to the arrow numbers in the diagram.

2. When the runtime receives the AEX, it doesn't have enough knowledge to know whether or not to ask the kernel for an mmap(). So it has to reenter the shim.

3. The shim has to handle the syscall instruction routing it to the enclave's memory management subsystem.

4. The shim has to do bookkeeping and decide if additional pages are even needed. If pages are already allocated, for example, it can skip directly to step 13. However, if modifications are needed, it will go to steps 5-12.

5-12. This is the part that represents new code from the kernel's perspective for SGX2. It is also in a performance critical path and should be evaluated with greater scrutiny. The number of context switches is O(2N + 4) for each new allocated block, where N is the number of pages: a context switch occurs at step 5, 6, 7, 8, 9/10 and
12. However, this can be reduced to O(4) for each new allocated block with a simple modification:

https://mermaid.live/edit/#pako:eNqNk11rwyAUhv-KeLVBC9ttYIXQydjFymhaVmh24fSkkUbN1Gwrpf99pvlsk8G80nMez3l91SNmmgMOsIXPAhSDR0F3hspYIT9o4bQq5AeYap1T4wQTOVUOpdTwb2pgmNmDUZAN46ZQTsiRDTYVchiFH2CxquIL7QDpLzDnaICkpPnN8u0W2YNlNMsarsyi6XQ2a5oFKCSb7d17la6DqATKpgEiZLEiy-19DZTBXjalimfQNRlBPrTe7wFyoXaNCJ07JBJ_lh0gqblIBKNOaGWRAuDAK-qiVquWkM3zqpVzrblytjt-R2Va5yjR3h_K0nPrLleOaudFERKunzoIVE9Xj26VtZYbsEXmxgUOTP2_witfSTifk9fViMDzZPQuoij0V40eUK6tm9a3hqyjDq74P_zuH6V6aGRJovUL8WXxBEswkgruf8ux5GPsUvDvGQd-yiGhpS04ViePFjn3XQkXThscJDSzMMHld4oOiuHAmQIaqP5xNXX6BeBJIEk

The interesting thing about this pattern is that this can be done for all page modification types except EMODT. For example, here's the same process for changing a mapping from RW to RX:

Quoted 7 lines

https://mermaid.live/edit/#pako:eNqNk11rwyAUhv-KeLVBC9ttYIVCvdhFu5F0UGh24fSkkUbN1Gwrpf995jttMphXes7jOa-vesZMc8ABtvBZgGKwEvRgqIwV8oMWTqtCfoCp1zk1TjCRU-VQSg3_pgbGmSMYBdk4bgrlhJzYYFMhx1H4ARarOr7RDpD-AlNFAyQlze_C3T2yJ8tolrVcmUXz-WLRNgvQkuz2D-91ugmiEiibBoiQzZaE-8cGKIODbEoVz6BvMoF8aH08AuRCHVoROndIJP4sB0BSc5EIRp3QyiIFwIHX1FWtTi0hu-dtJ-dWc-1sf_yeyrTOUaK9P5SlVes-V45651URsn5ZvYY9BmqgbMB32jrTDdgic9MSR7b-X-ONs5U-MqGvmkxeRhQt_V2jJ5Rr6-bNtSHrqIMb_g_DhyepXxoJSfS2Jr4snmEJRlLB_Xc5l3yMXQr-QePATzkktHQFx-ri0SLnvivhwmmDg4RmFma4_E_RSTEcOFNACzVfrqEuvytQILY

My point in this thread has always been that it is an anti-feature to presume that there is a need to treat EPC and VLA permissions separately. This is a performance sink and it optimizes for a use case which doesn't exist. Nobody actually wants there to be a mismatch between EPC and VLA permissions.

I would not touch pre-initialization, EADD'd pages. The reason is backwards compatibility.

For post-initialization, options are still open.

Quoted 4 lines

So, besides EMODT, the only userspace interface we need is mmap()/mprotect()/munmap(). The kernel should either succeed the mmap()/mprotect()/munmap() syscall if the EPC permissions can be made compatible or should fail otherwise.

For mmap() it is the enclave who sets the permissions, not kernel, i.e. you get a half-broken mmap() implementation. Kernel does EAUG, enclave does EACCEPTCOPY.

I think what you're asking is too simple to be true, and even if we could do it, it might limit possibilities to optimize user space, e.g. because there is two ENCLU leaf functions (EMODPE, EACCEPTCOPY) and one ENCLS leaf function (EMODPR), which can modify permissions.

A kernel syscall is essentially something that can be fully serviced by the kernel. This is not such situation. The work is split.

BR, Jarkko

#57 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 212 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 211 lines · Haitao Huang

Hi all,

Quoted 10 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 6 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 3 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 3 lines

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of
EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R and RX

pages but

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to  

only

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

* be created with RW permissions.
* TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max

permissions

Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a
risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize then also in the page
permission ioctls.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully known territory, we have
one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from unpredictable effect to
future API changes.

The plan to complete the "TBD" in the above snippet was to follow this work
with user policy integration at this location. On a high level the plan was
for this to look something like:

(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	/*
 	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
 	 * be created with RW permissions.
 	 * Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
 	 * of RWX.
 	 */
 	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
 	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

if (user space policy allows RWX on dynamically added

pages)

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
	 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |
PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, 0);
	else
		encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |

PROT_WRITE, 0);

The work that follows this series aimed to do the integration

with user

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

space policy.

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm sorry

but I

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

just don't fully understand this.

My apologies - I just assumed that you would need no reminder about

this

Quoted 4 lines

contentious
part of SGX history. Essentially it means that, yes, the kernel could theoretically
permit any kind of access to any file/page, but some accesses are

known

Quoted 2 lines

to generally
be a bad idea - like making memory executable as well as writable -

and

Quoted 2 lines

thus there
are additional checks based on what user space permits before the

kernel

Quoted 9 lines

allows
such accesses.

For example, mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect()

User policy and SGX has seen significant discussion. Some notable threads:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CALCETrXf8mSK45h7sTK5Wf+pXLVn=Bjsc_RLpgO-h-qdzBRo5Q@mail.gmail.com/

Quoted 1 line

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 6 lines

It's too big of a risk to accept this series without X taken care of. Patch
series should neither have TODO nor TBD comments IMHO. I don't want to ack
a series based on speculation what might happen in the future.

ok

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with
an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions. Then

you can

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be

used for

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be

useful if

Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and call it a day.

I could, yes.

Quoted 3 lines

And if there is plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES what is this weird
thing added to the #PF handler? Why is it added at all then?

I was just speculating in my response, there is no plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES (that I am aware of).

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines

How this could work is user space calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES after enclave initialization on any memory region within the enclave where
pages are planned to be added dynamically. This ioctl() calls EAUG to add the
new pages with RW permissions and their vm_max_prot_bits can be set to the
permissions found in the included SECINFO. This will support later EACCEPTCOPY
as well as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

I could proceed with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES if there is

consensus

Quoted 13 lines

after
considering the user policy question (above) and performance trade-off (more below).

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization
via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would
appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history
behind this topic.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space policy.

This discussion is about some enclave usages needing RWX permissions on dynamically added enclave pages. RWX permissions on dynamically

added

Quoted 6 lines

pages is
not something that should blindly be allowed for all SGX enclaves but instead the user
needs to explicitly allow specific enclaves to have such ability. This is equivalent
to (but not the same as) what exists in Linux today with LSM. As seen

in

Quoted 1 line

mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect() Linux is

able

Quoted 4 lines

to make
files and memory be both writable and executable, but it would only do so for those
files and memory that the LSM (which is how user policy is

communicated,

Quoted 2 lines

like SELinux)
indicates it is allowed, not blindly do so for all files and all

memory.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and
hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to
mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

I understand how SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES can be more

deterministic

Quoted 10 lines

but from
what I understand it would have a performance impact since it would require all memory
that may be needed by the enclave be pre-allocated from outside the enclave and not
just dynamically allocated from within the enclave at the time it is needed.

Would such a performance impact be acceptable?

User space won't always have enough info to decide whether the pages to be EAUG'd immediately. In some cases (shared libraries, JVM for example) lots of code/data pages can be mapped but never actually touched. One enclave/process does not know if any other more important enclave/process would need the EPC.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

It should be for kernel to make the final decision as it has overall picture of the system EPC usage and availability.

EAUG ioctl does not give better capabilities for user space to waste EPC given that EADD ioctl already exists, i.e. your argument is logically incorrect.

The point of adding EAUG is to allow more efficient use of EPC pages. Without EAUG, enclaves have to EADD everything upfront into EPC, consuming predetermined number of EPC pages, some of which may not be used at all. With EAUG, enclaves should be able to load minimal pages to get started, pages added on #PF as they are actually accessed.

Obviously as you pointed out, some usages make more sense to pre-EAUG (EAUG before #PF). But your proposal of supporting only pre-EAUG here essentially makes EAUG behave almost the same as EADD. If the current implementation with EAUG on #PF can also use MAP_POPULATE for pre-EAUG (seems possible based on Dave's comments), then it is flxible to cover all cases and allow kernel to optimize allocation of EPC pages.

Thanks
Haitao

maintainer
#58 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Quoted 231 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 213 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 212 lines · Haitao Huang

Hi all,

Quoted 10 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 6 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 3 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 3 lines

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of
EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R and RX

pages but

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed

to only

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

* be created with RW permissions.
* TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max

permissions

Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a
risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize then also in the page
permission ioctls.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully known territory, we have
one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from unpredictable effect to
future API changes.

The plan to complete the "TBD" in the above snippet was to follow this work
with user policy integration at this location. On a high level the plan was
for this to look something like:

(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	/*
 	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
 	 * be created with RW permissions.
 	 * Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
 	 * of RWX.
 	 */
 	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
 	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

if (user space policy allows RWX on dynamically added

pages)

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
	 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |
PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, 0);
	else
		encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |

PROT_WRITE, 0);

The work that follows this series aimed to do the integration

with user

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

space policy.

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm

sorry but I

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

just don't fully understand this.

My apologies - I just assumed that you would need no reminder

about this

Quoted 4 lines

contentious
part of SGX history. Essentially it means that, yes, the kernel could theoretically
permit any kind of access to any file/page, but some accesses are

known

Quoted 2 lines

to generally
be a bad idea - like making memory executable as well as writable

- and

Quoted 2 lines

thus there
are additional checks based on what user space permits before the

kernel

Quoted 11 lines

allows
such accesses.

For example, mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect()

User policy and SGX has seen significant discussion. Some notable threads:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CALCETrXf8mSK45h7sTK5Wf+pXLVn=Bjsc_RLpgO-h-qdzBRo5Q@mail.gmail.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 5 lines

It's too big of a risk to accept this series without X taken care of. Patch
series should neither have TODO nor TBD comments IMHO. I don't want to ack
a series based on speculation what might happen in the future.

ok

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with
an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions.

Then you can

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be

used for

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be

useful if

Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and call it a day.

I could, yes.

Quoted 3 lines

And if there is plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES what is this weird
thing added to the #PF handler? Why is it added at all then?

I was just speculating in my response, there is no plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES (that I am aware of).

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines

How this could work is user space calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES after enclave initialization on any memory region within the enclave where
pages are planned to be added dynamically. This ioctl() calls EAUG to add the
new pages with RW permissions and their vm_max_prot_bits can be set to the
permissions found in the included SECINFO. This will support later EACCEPTCOPY
as well as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

I could proceed with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES if there is

consensus

Quoted 13 lines

after
considering the user policy question (above) and performance trade-off (more below).

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization
via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would
appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history
behind this topic.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space policy.

This discussion is about some enclave usages needing RWX permissions on dynamically added enclave pages. RWX permissions on dynamically

added

Quoted 6 lines

pages is
not something that should blindly be allowed for all SGX enclaves but instead the user
needs to explicitly allow specific enclaves to have such ability. This is equivalent
to (but not the same as) what exists in Linux today with LSM. As

seen in

Quoted 1 line

mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect() Linux

is able

Quoted 4 lines

to make
files and memory be both writable and executable, but it would only do so for those
files and memory that the LSM (which is how user policy is

communicated,

Quoted 2 lines

like SELinux)
indicates it is allowed, not blindly do so for all files and all

memory.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and
hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to
mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

I understand how SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES can be more

deterministic

Quoted 10 lines

but from
what I understand it would have a performance impact since it would require all memory
that may be needed by the enclave be pre-allocated from outside the enclave and not
just dynamically allocated from within the enclave at the time it is needed.

Would such a performance impact be acceptable?

User space won't always have enough info to decide whether the pages to be
EAUG'd immediately. In some cases (shared libraries, JVM for example) lots
of code/data pages can be mapped but never actually touched. One enclave/process does not know if any other more important enclave/process
would need the EPC.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

It should be for kernel to make the final decision as it has overall picture
of the system EPC usage and availability.

EAUG ioctl does not give better capabilities for user space to waste EPC given that EADD ioctl already exists, i.e. your argument is logically incorrect.

The point of adding EAUG is to allow more efficient use of EPC pages. Without EAUG, enclaves have to EADD everything upfront into EPC, consuming predetermined number of EPC pages, some of which may not be used at all. With EAUG, enclaves should be able to load minimal pages to get started, pages added on #PF as they are actually accessed.

Quoted 6 lines

Obviously as you pointed out, some usages make more sense to pre-EAUG (EAUG before #PF). But your proposal of supporting only pre-EAUG here essentially makes EAUG behave almost the same as EADD. If the current implementation with EAUG on #PF can also use MAP_POPULATE for pre-EAUG (seems possible based on Dave's comments), then it is flxible to cover all cases and allow kernel to optimize allocation of EPC pages.

There is no even a working #PF based implementation in existance, and your argument has too many if's for my taste.

Reinette, can you squash this fixup to your patch set and send v3 so that we get to a working implementation that can be benchmarked against e.g. ioctl based version:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/T/#u

This also objectively fixes some performance issues, e.g. EMODPE can be just used without any round-trips (v2 requires relax ioctl).

BR, Jark

maintainer
#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 08/32] x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes

In reply to Reinette Chatre
Quoted 172 lines · Reinette Chatre

Enclave creators declare their enclave page permissions (EPCM permissions) at the time the pages are added to the enclave. These page permissions are the vetted permissible accesses of the enclave pages and stashed off (in struct sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits) for later comparison with enclave PTEs and VMAs.

Current permission support assume that EPCM permissions remain static for the lifetime of the enclave. This is about to change with the addition of support for SGX2 where the EPCM permissions of enclave pages belonging to an initialized enclave may change during the enclave's lifetime.

Support for changing of EPCM permissions should continue to respect the vetted maximum protection bits maintained in sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits. Towards this end, add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits in preparation for support of enclave page permission changes. sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits reflect the active EPCM permissions of an enclave page and are not to exceed sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits.

Two permission fields are used: sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits reflects the current EPCM permissions and is used to manage the page table entries while sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits contains the vetted maximum protection bits and is used to guide which EPCM permissions are allowed in the upcoming SGX2 permission changing support (it guides what values sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits may have).

Consider this example how sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits and sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits are used:

(1) Add an enclave page with secinfo of RW to an uninitialized enclave:

    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = RW

    At this point RW VMAs would be allowed to access this page and PTEs
    would allow write access as guided by
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits.

(2) User space invokes SGX2 to change the EPCM permissions to read-only.

    This is allowed because sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW:
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = R

    At this point only new read-only VMAs would be allowed to access
    this page and PTEs would not allow write access as guided
    by sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits.

(3) User space invokes SGX2 to change the EPCM permissions to RX.

    This will not be supported by the kernel because
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW:
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = R

(3) User space invokes SGX2 to change the EPCM permissions to RW.

    This will be allowed because sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW:
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = RW

    At this point RW VMAs would again be allowed to access this page
    and PTEs would allow write access as guided by
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits.

struct sgx_encl_page hosting this information is maintained for each enclave page so the space consumed by the struct is important. The existing sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits is already unsigned long while only using three bits. Transition to a bitfield for the two members containing protection bits.

---
Changes since V1:
- Add snippet to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst that details the difference between vm_max_prot_bits and vm_run_prot_bits (Andy and Jarkko).
- Change subject line (Jarkko).
- Refer to actual variables instead of using English rephrasing - sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits instead of "runtime protection bits" (Jarkko).
- Add information in commit message on why two fields are needed (Jarkko).

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst       | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c  |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c |  6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +10 -0
index 5659932728a5..9df620b59f83 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ The relationships between the different permission masks are:
 * PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
   relaxed than the VMA permissions.
 
+During runtime the EPCM permissions of enclave pages belonging to an
+initialized enclave can change on systems supporting SGX2. In support
+of these runtime changes the kernel maintains (for each enclave page)
+the most permissive EPCM permission mask allowed by policy as
+the ``vm_max_prot_bits`` of that page. EPCM permissions are not allowed
+to be relaxed beyond ``vm_max_prot_bits``.  The kernel also maintains
+the currently active EPCM permissions of an enclave page as its
+``vm_run_prot_bits`` to ensure PTEs and new VMAs respect the active
+EPCM permission values.
+
 On systems supporting SGX2 EPCM permissions may change while the
 enclave page belongs to a VMA without impacting the VMA permissions.
 This means that a running VMA may appear to allow access to an enclave
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +3 -3
index 1ba01c75a579..a980d8458949 100644
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	 * exceed the VMA permissions.
 	 */
 	vm_prot_bits = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
-	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
+	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_run_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
 	/*
 	 * Add VM_SHARED so that PTE is made writable right away if VMA
 	 * and EPCM are writable (no COW in SGX).
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (!(entry->vm_max_prot_bits & VM_WRITE))
+	if (!(entry->vm_run_prot_bits & VM_WRITE))
 		ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
 
 out:
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 	xas_lock(&xas);
 	xas_for_each(&xas, page, PFN_DOWN(end - 1)) {
-		if (~page->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) {
+		if (~page->vm_run_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) {
 			ret = -EACCES;
 			break;
 		}
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +2 -1
index fec43ca65065..dc262d843411 100644
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
 
 struct sgx_encl_page {
 	unsigned long desc;
-	unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits;
+	unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits:8;
+	unsigned long vm_run_prot_bits:8;
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +6 -0
index 83df20e3e633..7e0819a89532 100644
@@ -197,6 +197,12 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	/* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
 
+	/*
+	 * At time of allocation, the runtime protection bits are the same
+	 * as the maximum protection bits.
+	 */
+	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits;
+
 	return encl_page;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

This patch I can NAK without 2nd thought. It adds to the round-trips of using ENCLU[EMODPE].

A better idea is the one I explain in

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/T/#u

The only thing this patch is doing is adding artifical complexity when we already have somewhat complex microarchitecture for permissions.

Please just drop this patch from the next version and also ioctl for relax.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#28 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 15/32] x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions

In reply to Reinette Chatre
Quoted 333 lines · Reinette Chatre

In the initial (SGX1) version of SGX, pages in an enclave need to be created with permissions that support all usages of the pages, from the time the enclave is initialized until it is unloaded. For example, pages used by a JIT compiler or when code needs to otherwise be relocated need to always have RWX permissions.

With the SGX2 function ENCLU[EMODPE] an enclave is able to relax the EPCM permissions of its pages after the enclave is initialized. Relaxing EPCM permissions is not possible from outside the enclave, including from the kernel. The kernel does control the PTEs though and the enclave still depends on the kernel to install PTEs with the new relaxed permissions before it (the enclave) can access the pages using the new permissions.

Introduce ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS to support relaxing of EPCM permissions done from within the enclave. With this ioctl() the user specifies a page range and the permissions to be applied to all pages in the provided range. After checking the new permissions (more detail below) the PTEs are reset and it is ensured that any new PTEs will contain the new, relaxed, permissions.

The permission change request could fail on any page within the provided range. To support partial success the ioctl() returns an error code based on failures encountered by the kernel and the number of pages that were successfully changed.

Checking user provided new permissions
======================================

Enclave page permission changes need to be approached with care and for this reason permission changes are only allowed if the new permissions are the same or more restrictive that the vetted permissions. Thus, even though an enclave is able to relax the EPCM permissions of its pages beyond what was originally vetted, the kernel will not. The kernel will only install PTEs that respect the vetted enclave page permissions.

For example, enclave pages with vetted EPCM permissions in brackets below are allowed to have PTE permissions as follows:
* (RWX) R => RW => RX => RWX
* (RW) R => RW
* (RX) R => RX

---
Changes since V1:
- Change terminology to use "relax" instead of "extend" to refer to the case when enclave page permissions are added (Dave).
- Use ioctl() in commit message (Dave).
- Add examples on what permissions would be allowed (Dave).
- Split enclave page permission changes into two ioctl()s, one for permission restricting (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS) and one for permission relaxing (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS) (Jarkko).
- In support of the ioctl() name change the following names have been changed:
struct sgx_page_modp -> struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm sgx_ioc_page_modp() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm() sgx_page_modp() -> sgx_enclave_relax_perm()
- ioctl() takes entire secinfo as input instead of
page permissions only (Jarkko).
- Fix kernel-doc to include () in function name.
- Introduce small helper to check for SGX2 readiness instead of duplicating the same two checks in every SGX2 supporting ioctl().
- Fixups in comments
- Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for Documentation/x86/sgx.rst.
- Remove redundant comment.
- Make explicit which member of struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm is for output (Dave).

 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h |  19 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 218 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +19 -0
index f4b81587e90b..5c678b27bb72 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_provision)
 #define SGX_IOC_VEPC_REMOVE_ALL \
 	_IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS \
+	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -76,6 +78,23 @@ struct sgx_enclave_provision {
 	__u64 fd;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm - parameters for ioctl
+ *                                 %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS
+ * @offset:	starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
+ *		address defined in SECS)
+ * @length:	length of memory (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data containing the new permission bits
+ *		for pages in range described by @offset and @length
+ * @count:	(output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm {
+	__u64 offset;
+	__u64 length;
+	__u64 secinfo;
+	__u64 count;
+};
+
 struct sgx_enclave_run;
 
 /**
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +199 -0
index b8336d5d9029..9cc6af404bf6 100644
@@ -698,6 +698,202 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
 	return sgx_set_attribute(&encl->attributes_mask, params.fd);
 }
 
+static unsigned long vm_prot_from_secinfo(u64 secinfo_perm)
+{
+	unsigned long vm_prot;
+
+	vm_prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_perm, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ)  |
+		  _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_perm, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
+		  _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_perm, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
+	vm_prot = calc_vm_prot_bits(vm_prot, 0);
+
+	return vm_prot;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_enclave_relax_perm() - Update OS after permissions relaxed by enclave
+ * @encl:	Enclave to which the pages belong.
+ * @modp:	Checked parameters from user on which pages need modifying.
+ * @secinfo_perm: New validated permission bits.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0:		Success.
+ * - -errno:	Otherwise.
+ */
+static long sgx_enclave_relax_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+				   struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm *modp,
+				   u64 secinfo_perm)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	unsigned long vm_prot;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	unsigned long c;
+	int ret;
+
+	vm_prot = vm_prot_from_secinfo(secinfo_perm);
+
+	for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+		addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;
+
+		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+		entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
+		if (!entry) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Changing EPCM permissions is only supported on regular
+		 * SGX pages.
+		 */
+		if (entry->type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not accept permissions that are more relaxed
+		 * than vetted permissions.
+		 * If this check fails then EPCM permissions may be more
+		 * relaxed that what would be allowed by the kernel via
+		 * PTEs.
+		 */
+		if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot) != vm_prot) {
+			ret = -EPERM;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Change runtime protection before zapping PTEs to ensure
+		 * any new #PF uses new permissions.
+		 */
+		entry->vm_run_prot_bits = vm_prot;
+
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+		/*
+		 * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on
+		 * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
+		 */
+		sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+	goto out;
+
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+out:
+	modp->count = c;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure enclave is ready for SGX2 functions. Readiness is checked
+ * by ensuring the hardware supports SGX2 and the enclave is initialized
+ * and thus able to handle requests to modify pages within it.
+ */
+static int sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+	if (!(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return valid permission fields from a secinfo structure provided by
+ * user space. The secinfo structure is required to only have bits in
+ * the permission fields set.
+ */
+static int sgx_perm_from_user_secinfo(void __user *_secinfo, u64 *secinfo_perm)
+{
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	u64 perm;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)_secinfo,
+			   sizeof(secinfo)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (secinfo.flags & ~SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (memchr_inv(secinfo.reserved, 0, sizeof(secinfo.reserved)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	perm = secinfo.flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
+
+	if ((perm & SGX_SECINFO_W) && !(perm & SGX_SECINFO_R))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*secinfo_perm = perm;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm() - handler for
+ *                                %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS
+ * @encl:	an enclave pointer
+ * @arg:	userspace pointer to a &struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm instance
+ *
+ * SGX2 distinguishes between relaxing and restricting the enclave page
+ * permissions maintained by the hardware (EPCM permissions) of pages
+ * belonging to an initialized enclave (after %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT).
+ *
+ * EPCM permissions can be relaxed anytime directly from within the enclave
+ * with no visibility from the kernel. This is accomplished with
+ * ENCLU[EMODPE] run from within the enclave. Accessing pages with
+ * the new, relaxed permissions requires the kernel to update the PTE
+ * to handle the subsequent #PF correctly.
+ *
+ * Enclave page permissions are not allowed to exceed the
+ * maximum vetted permissions maintained in
+ * &struct sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits. If the enclave
+ * exceeds these permissions by running ENCLU[EMODPE] from within the enclave
+ * the kernel will prevent access to the pages via PTE and
+ * VMA permissions.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0:		Success
+ * - -errno:	Otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm params;
+	u64 secinfo_perm;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = sgx_perm_from_user_secinfo((void __user *)params.secinfo,
+					 &secinfo_perm);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (params.count)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = sgx_enclave_relax_perm(encl, &params, secinfo_perm);
+
+	if (copy_to_user(arg, &params, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data;
@@ -719,6 +915,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION:
 		ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(encl, (void __user *)arg);
 		break;
+	case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS:
+		ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
 		break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

Definitive NAK.

Should be dropped from the next patch set version. We *do not* want to artificially construct an extra round-trip to EMODPE flow.

BR, Jarkko

#59 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Hi Jarkko

Quoted 259 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 251 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 23 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 22 lines · Haitao Huang

Hi all,

Quoted 10 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 6 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 3 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 3 lines

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of
EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R and RX

pages but

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed

to only

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

* be created with RW permissions.
* TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max

permissions

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits =  

encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;

Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a
risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize then also in the page
permission ioctls.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully known territory, we have
one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from unpredictable effect to
future API changes.

The plan to complete the "TBD" in the above snippet was to follow this work
with user policy integration at this location. On a high level the plan was
for this to look something like:

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	/*
 	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to  

only

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	 * be created with RW permissions.
 	 * Interface with user space policy to support max  

permissions

Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Review

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	 * of RWX.
 	 */
 	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
 	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
 
        if (user space policy allows RWX on dynamically added

pages)

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
	 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |
PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, 0);
	else
		encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |

PROT_WRITE, 0);

The work that follows this series aimed to do the integration

with user

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line

space policy.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm

sorry but I

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

just don't fully understand this.

My apologies - I just assumed that you would need no reminder

about this

Quoted 2 lines

contentious
part of SGX history. Essentially it means that, yes, the kernel

could

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 2 lines

theoretically
permit any kind of access to any file/page, but some accesses are

known

Quoted 2 lines

to generally
be a bad idea - like making memory executable as well as writable

- and

Quoted 2 lines

thus there
are additional checks based on what user space permits before the

kernel

Quoted 3 lines

allows
such accesses.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

For example, mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect()

User policy and SGX has seen significant discussion. Some notable threads:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CALCETrXf8mSK45h7sTK5Wf+pXLVn=Bjsc_RLpgO-h-qdzBRo5Q@mail.gmail.com/

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

It's too big of a risk to accept this series without X taken

care

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

of. Patch
series should neither have TODO nor TBD comments IMHO. I don't

want

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines

to ack
a series based on speculation what might happen in the future.

ok

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with
an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions.

Then you can

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line

easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be

used for

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be

useful if

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and

call it

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

a day.

I could, yes.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

And if there is plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES what is this weird
thing added to the #PF handler? Why is it added at all then?

I was just speculating in my response, there is no plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES (that I am aware of).

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

How this could work is user space calls

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

after enclave initialization on any memory region within the enclave where
pages are planned to be added dynamically. This ioctl() calls EAUG to add the
new pages with RW permissions and their vm_max_prot_bits can

be

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

set to the
permissions found in the included SECINFO. This will support later EACCEPTCOPY
as well as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

I could proceed with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES if there is

consensus

Quoted 2 lines

after
considering the user policy question (above) and performance

trade-off

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines

(more below).

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization
via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would
appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history
behind this topic.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space policy.

This discussion is about some enclave usages needing RWX

permissions

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

on dynamically added enclave pages. RWX permissions on dynamically

added

Quoted 2 lines

pages is
not something that should blindly be allowed for all SGX enclaves

but

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

instead the user
needs to explicitly allow specific enclaves to have such ability.

This

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

is equivalent
to (but not the same as) what exists in Linux today with LSM. As

seen in

Quoted 1 line

mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect() Linux

is able

Quoted 2 lines

to make
files and memory be both writable and executable, but it would

only do

Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 2 lines

so for those
files and memory that the LSM (which is how user policy is

communicated,

Quoted 2 lines

like SELinux)
indicates it is allowed, not blindly do so for all files and all

memory.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and
hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to
mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

I understand how SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES can be more

deterministic

Quoted 2 lines

but from
what I understand it would have a performance impact since it

would

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

require all memory
that may be needed by the enclave be pre-allocated from outside

the

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

enclave and not
just dynamically allocated from within the enclave at the time it

is

Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 4 lines

needed.

Would such a performance impact be acceptable?

User space won't always have enough info to decide whether the pages to be
EAUG'd immediately. In some cases (shared libraries, JVM for example) lots
of code/data pages can be mapped but never actually touched. One enclave/process does not know if any other more important enclave/process
would need the EPC.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

It should be for kernel to make the final decision as it has overall picture
of the system EPC usage and availability.

EAUG ioctl does not give better capabilities for user space to waste EPC given that EADD ioctl already exists, i.e. your argument is

logically

Quoted 1 line

incorrect.

The point of adding EAUG is to allow more efficient use of EPC pages. Without EAUG, enclaves have to EADD everything upfront into EPC, consuming predetermined number of EPC pages, some of which may not be used at all. With EAUG, enclaves should be able to load minimal pages to get started, pages added on #PF as they are actually accessed.

Quoted 6 lines

Obviously as you pointed out, some usages make more sense to pre-EAUG (EAUG before #PF). But your proposal of supporting only pre-EAUG here essentially makes EAUG behave almost the same as EADD. If the current implementation with EAUG on #PF can also use MAP_POPULATE for pre-EAUG (seems possible based on Dave's comments), then it is flxible to cover all cases and allow kernel to optimize allocation of EPC pages.

Quoted 2 lines

There is no even a working #PF based implementation in existance, and your argument has too many if's for my taste.

1) if you mean no user space is implementing this kind of solution, read this section, otherwise, skip to 2) below which is only couple of sentences.

If you are willing to look, there is already implementation in our SDK to do heap and stack expansion on demand on #PF. Enclaves may not know heap/stack size up front, we have implemented these features to make EPC usage more efficient. I don't know why normal processes can add RAM on #PF, but enclaves adding EPC on #PF becomes so unacceptable concept to you. And the kernel does that for EPC swapping already when #PF happens on a swapped out EPC page.

Our implementation has gone through several rounds, the latest is here:https://github.com/intel/linux-sgx/tree/edmm_v2/sdk/emm. It was also implemented in original OOT driver based SDK implementation. Customers are using it and found them useful. I think this is a critical feature that many other runtimes will also need.

2)
It's OK for you to request additional support for your usage and I agree it is needed. But IMHO, totally getting rid of EAUG on #PF is bad and unnecessary. Current implementation can be extended to support your usage. What's the reason you think MAP_POPULATE won't work for you?

BR
Haitao

#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 08/32] x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 177 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 172 lines · Reinette Chatre

Enclave creators declare their enclave page permissions (EPCM permissions) at the time the pages are added to the enclave. These page permissions are the vetted permissible accesses of the enclave pages and stashed off (in struct sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits) for later comparison with enclave PTEs and VMAs.

Current permission support assume that EPCM permissions remain static for the lifetime of the enclave. This is about to change with the addition of support for SGX2 where the EPCM permissions of enclave pages belonging to an initialized enclave may change during the enclave's lifetime.

Support for changing of EPCM permissions should continue to respect the vetted maximum protection bits maintained in sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits. Towards this end, add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits in preparation for support of enclave page permission changes. sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits reflect the active EPCM permissions of an enclave page and are not to exceed sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits.

Two permission fields are used: sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits reflects the current EPCM permissions and is used to manage the page table entries while sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits contains the vetted maximum protection bits and is used to guide which EPCM permissions are allowed in the upcoming SGX2 permission changing support (it guides what values sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits may have).

Consider this example how sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits and sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits are used:

(1) Add an enclave page with secinfo of RW to an uninitialized enclave:

    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = RW

    At this point RW VMAs would be allowed to access this page and PTEs
    would allow write access as guided by
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits.

(2) User space invokes SGX2 to change the EPCM permissions to read-only.

    This is allowed because sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW:
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = R

    At this point only new read-only VMAs would be allowed to access
    this page and PTEs would not allow write access as guided
    by sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits.

(3) User space invokes SGX2 to change the EPCM permissions to RX.

    This will not be supported by the kernel because
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW:
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = R

(3) User space invokes SGX2 to change the EPCM permissions to RW.

    This will be allowed because sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW:
    sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = RW
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = RW

    At this point RW VMAs would again be allowed to access this page
    and PTEs would allow write access as guided by
    sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits.

struct sgx_encl_page hosting this information is maintained for each enclave page so the space consumed by the struct is important. The existing sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits is already unsigned long while only using three bits. Transition to a bitfield for the two members containing protection bits.

---
Changes since V1:
- Add snippet to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst that details the difference between vm_max_prot_bits and vm_run_prot_bits (Andy and Jarkko).
- Change subject line (Jarkko).
- Refer to actual variables instead of using English rephrasing - sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits instead of "runtime protection bits" (Jarkko).
- Add information in commit message on why two fields are needed (Jarkko).

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst       | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c  |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h  |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c |  6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +10 -0
index 5659932728a5..9df620b59f83 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ The relationships between the different permission masks are:
 * PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
   relaxed than the VMA permissions.
 
+During runtime the EPCM permissions of enclave pages belonging to an
+initialized enclave can change on systems supporting SGX2. In support
+of these runtime changes the kernel maintains (for each enclave page)
+the most permissive EPCM permission mask allowed by policy as
+the ``vm_max_prot_bits`` of that page. EPCM permissions are not allowed
+to be relaxed beyond ``vm_max_prot_bits``.  The kernel also maintains
+the currently active EPCM permissions of an enclave page as its
+``vm_run_prot_bits`` to ensure PTEs and new VMAs respect the active
+EPCM permission values.
+
 On systems supporting SGX2 EPCM permissions may change while the
 enclave page belongs to a VMA without impacting the VMA permissions.
 This means that a running VMA may appear to allow access to an enclave
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +3 -3
index 1ba01c75a579..a980d8458949 100644
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	 * exceed the VMA permissions.
 	 */
 	vm_prot_bits = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
-	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
+	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_run_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
 	/*
 	 * Add VM_SHARED so that PTE is made writable right away if VMA
 	 * and EPCM are writable (no COW in SGX).
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (!(entry->vm_max_prot_bits & VM_WRITE))
+	if (!(entry->vm_run_prot_bits & VM_WRITE))
 		ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
 
 out:
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 	xas_lock(&xas);
 	xas_for_each(&xas, page, PFN_DOWN(end - 1)) {
-		if (~page->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) {
+		if (~page->vm_run_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) {
 			ret = -EACCES;
 			break;
 		}
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +2 -1
index fec43ca65065..dc262d843411 100644
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
 
 struct sgx_encl_page {
 	unsigned long desc;
-	unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits;
+	unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits:8;
+	unsigned long vm_run_prot_bits:8;
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +6 -0
index 83df20e3e633..7e0819a89532 100644
@@ -197,6 +197,12 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	/* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
 
+	/*
+	 * At time of allocation, the runtime protection bits are the same
+	 * as the maximum protection bits.
+	 */
+	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits;
+
 	return encl_page;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

This patch I can NAK without 2nd thought. It adds to the round-trips of using ENCLU[EMODPE].

Quoted 6 lines

A better idea is the one I explain in

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/T/#u

The only thing this patch is doing is adding artifical complexity when we already have somewhat complex microarchitecture for permissions.

The motivation of this change is to ensure that the kernel does not allow access to a page that the page does not allow. For example, this change ensures that the kernel will not allow execution on an enclave page that is not executable.

In your change this is removed and the kernel will, for example, allow execution of enclave pages that are not executable.

It could be seen as complex, but it is done out of respect for security.

Quoted 3 lines

Please just drop this patch from the next version and also ioctl for relax.

I responded with more detail to your proposal in:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/

Reinette

maintainer
#60 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Haitao Huang
Quoted 274 lines · Haitao Huang

Hi Jarkko

Quoted 262 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 250 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 23 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 22 lines · Haitao Huang

Hi all,

Quoted 10 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 6 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 3 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 3 lines

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of
EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R and RX

pages but

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed

to only

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

* be created with RW permissions.
* TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max

permissions

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits =

encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;

Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a
risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize then also in the page
permission ioctls.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully known territory, we have
one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from unpredictable effect to
future API changes.

The plan to complete the "TBD" in the above snippet was to follow this work
with user policy integration at this location. On a high level the plan was
for this to look something like:

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	/*
 	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed

to only

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	 * be created with RW permissions.
 	 * Interface with user space policy to support max

permissions

Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Review

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	 * of RWX.
 	 */
 	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
 	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
 
        if (user space policy allows RWX on dynamically added

pages)

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
	 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |
PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, 0);
	else
		encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |

PROT_WRITE, 0);

The work that follows this series aimed to do the integration

with user

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line

space policy.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm

sorry but I

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

just don't fully understand this.

My apologies - I just assumed that you would need no reminder

about this

Quoted 2 lines

contentious
part of SGX history. Essentially it means that, yes, the

kernel could

Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 2 lines

theoretically
permit any kind of access to any file/page, but some accesses are

known

Quoted 2 lines

to generally
be a bad idea - like making memory executable as well as writable

- and

Quoted 2 lines

thus there
are additional checks based on what user space permits before the

kernel

Quoted 6 lines

allows
such accesses.

For example, mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect()

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

User policy and SGX has seen significant discussion. Some notable threads:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CALCETrXf8mSK45h7sTK5Wf+pXLVn=Bjsc_RLpgO-h-qdzBRo5Q@mail.gmail.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/

Quoted 1 line

It's too big of a risk to accept this series without X taken

care

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

of. Patch
series should neither have TODO nor TBD comments IMHO. I

don't want

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines

to ack
a series based on speculation what might happen in the future.

ok

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do EAUG's explicitly with
an ioctl that could also include secinfo for permissions.

Then you can

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line

easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could possibly be

used for

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also be

useful if

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and

call it

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

a day.

I could, yes.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

And if there is plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES what is this weird
thing added to the #PF handler? Why is it added at all then?

I was just speculating in my response, there is no plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES (that I am aware of).

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

How this could work is user space calls

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

after enclave initialization on any memory region within the enclave where
pages are planned to be added dynamically. This ioctl() calls EAUG to add the
new pages with RW permissions and their vm_max_prot_bits

can be

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

set to the
permissions found in the included SECINFO. This will support later EACCEPTCOPY
as well as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

I could proceed with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES if there is

consensus

Quoted 2 lines

after
considering the user policy question (above) and performance

trade-off

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines

(more below).

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy after enclave initialization
via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is acceptable to all? I would
appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering the significant history
behind this topic.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space policy.

This discussion is about some enclave usages needing RWX

permissions

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

on dynamically added enclave pages. RWX permissions on dynamically

added

Quoted 2 lines

pages is
not something that should blindly be allowed for all SGX

enclaves but

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

instead the user
needs to explicitly allow specific enclaves to have such

ability. This

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

is equivalent
to (but not the same as) what exists in Linux today with LSM. As

seen in

Quoted 1 line

mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect() Linux

is able

Quoted 2 lines

to make
files and memory be both writable and executable, but it would

only do

Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 2 lines

so for those
files and memory that the LSM (which is how user policy is

communicated,

Quoted 2 lines

like SELinux)
indicates it is allowed, not blindly do so for all files and all

memory.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it just too flakky and
hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our use case (not to
mention that JIT is not possible at all because inability to do RX pages).

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

I understand how SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES can be more

deterministic

Quoted 2 lines

but from
what I understand it would have a performance impact since it

would

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

require all memory
that may be needed by the enclave be pre-allocated from

outside the

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

enclave and not
just dynamically allocated from within the enclave at the time

it is

Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 4 lines

needed.

Would such a performance impact be acceptable?

User space won't always have enough info to decide whether the pages to be
EAUG'd immediately. In some cases (shared libraries, JVM for example) lots
of code/data pages can be mapped but never actually touched. One enclave/process does not know if any other more important enclave/process
would need the EPC.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

It should be for kernel to make the final decision as it has overall picture
of the system EPC usage and availability.

EAUG ioctl does not give better capabilities for user space to waste EPC given that EADD ioctl already exists, i.e. your argument is

logically

Quoted 1 line

incorrect.

The point of adding EAUG is to allow more efficient use of EPC pages. Without EAUG, enclaves have to EADD everything upfront into EPC, consuming
predetermined number of EPC pages, some of which may not be used at all. With EAUG, enclaves should be able to load minimal pages to get started, pages added on #PF as they are actually accessed.

Quoted 10 lines

Obviously as you pointed out, some usages make more sense to pre-EAUG (EAUG
before #PF). But your proposal of supporting only pre-EAUG here essentially
makes EAUG behave almost the same as EADD. If the current implementation
with EAUG on #PF can also use MAP_POPULATE for pre-EAUG (seems possible based on Dave's comments), then it is flxible to cover all cases and allow
kernel to optimize allocation of EPC pages.

Quoted 3 lines

There is no even a working #PF based implementation in existance, and your
argument has too many if's for my taste.

1) if you mean no user space is implementing this kind of solution, read this section, otherwise, skip to 2) below which is only couple of sentences.

Quoted 7 lines

If you are willing to look, there is already implementation in our SDK to do heap and stack expansion on demand on #PF. Enclaves may not know heap/stack size up front, we have implemented these features to make EPC usage more efficient. I don't know why normal processes can add RAM on #PF, but enclaves adding EPC on #PF becomes so unacceptable concept to you. And the kernel does that for EPC swapping already when #PF happens on a swapped out EPC page.

In adds O(n) round-trips for a mmap() emulation, which can be done in O(1) round-trips with a ioctl.

Quoted 5 lines

Our implementation has gone through several rounds, the latest is here:https://github.com/intel/linux-sgx/tree/edmm_v2/sdk/emm. It was also implemented in original OOT driver based SDK implementation. Customers are using it and found them useful. I think this is a critical feature that many other runtimes will also need.

I'm not sure what the common sense argument here is.

Quoted 5 lines

2)
It's OK for you to request additional support for your usage and I agree it is needed. But IMHO, totally getting rid of EAUG on #PF is bad and unnecessary. Current implementation can be extended to support your usage. What's the reason you think MAP_POPULATE won't work for you?

I do not recall taking stand on MAP_POPULATE.

Quoted 2 lines

BR
Haitao

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#51 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Dave Hansen

Sorry, I missed this.

Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 3 lines · Reinette Chatre

Unfortunately MAP_POPULATE is not supported by SGX VMAs because of their VM_IO and VM_PFNMAP flags. When VMAs with such flags obtain this capability then I believe that SGX would benefit.

Some Intel folks asked for this quite a while ago. I think it's entirely doable: add a new vm_ops->populate() function that will allow ignoring VM_IO|VM_PFNMAP if present.

I'm sorry what I don't understand what you mean by ignoring here, i.e. cannot fully comprehend the last sentece.

And would the vm_ops->populate() be called right after the existing ones involved with the VMA creation process?

Quoted 4 lines

Or, if nobody wants to waste all of the vm_ops space, just add an arch_vma_populate() or something which can call over into SGX.

I'll happily review the patches if anyone can put such a beast together.

I'll start with vm_ops->populate() and check the feedback first for that.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#52 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Quoted 18 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Sorry, I missed this.

Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 3 lines · Reinette Chatre

Unfortunately MAP_POPULATE is not supported by SGX VMAs because of their VM_IO and VM_PFNMAP flags. When VMAs with such flags obtain this capability then I believe that SGX would benefit.

Some Intel folks asked for this quite a while ago. I think it's entirely doable: add a new vm_ops->populate() function that will allow ignoring VM_IO|VM_PFNMAP if present.

I'm sorry what I don't understand what you mean by ignoring here, i.e. cannot fully comprehend the last sentece.

And would the vm_ops->populate() be called right after the existing ones involved with the VMA creation process?

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Or, if nobody wants to waste all of the vm_ops space, just add an arch_vma_populate() or something which can call over into SGX.

I'll happily review the patches if anyone can put such a beast together.

I'll start with vm_ops->populate() and check the feedback first for that.

I would instead extend populate() in file_operations into:

int (*populate)(struct file *, struct vm_area_struct *, bool populate);

This does not add to memory consumption.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#53 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

Quoted 24 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 23 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Sorry, I missed this.

Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 3 lines · Reinette Chatre

Unfortunately MAP_POPULATE is not supported by SGX VMAs because of their VM_IO and VM_PFNMAP flags. When VMAs with such flags obtain this capability then I believe that SGX would benefit.

Some Intel folks asked for this quite a while ago. I think it's entirely doable: add a new vm_ops->populate() function that will allow ignoring VM_IO|VM_PFNMAP if present.

I'm sorry what I don't understand what you mean by ignoring here, i.e. cannot fully comprehend the last sentece.

And would the vm_ops->populate() be called right after the existing ones involved with the VMA creation process?

Quoted 4 lines

Or, if nobody wants to waste all of the vm_ops space, just add an arch_vma_populate() or something which can call over into SGX.

I'll happily review the patches if anyone can put such a beast together.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I'll start with vm_ops->populate() and check the feedback first for that.

I would instead extend populate() in file_operations into:

int (*populate)(struct file *, struct vm_area_struct *, bool populate);

This does not add to memory consumption.

Ugh, mixing my words, sorry :-) I meant:

int (*mmap)(struct file *, struct vm_area_struct *, bool populate);

BR, Jarkko

#61 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 334 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 322 lines · Haitao Huang

Hi Jarkko

Quoted 3 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 2 lines · Haitao Huang

On Thu, 03 Mar 2022 17:18:33 -0600, Jarkko Sakkinen

<[email protected]>

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 10 lines · wrote:
Quoted 9 lines · Haitao Huang

Hi all,

Quoted 4 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 1 line · Jarkko Sakkinen

On Tue, Mar 01, 2022 at 09:48:48AM -0800, Reinette Chatre

Quoted 6 lines · wrote:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 3 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 3 lines

With EACCEPTCOPY (kudos to Mark S. for reminding me of this version of
EACCEPT @ chat.enarx.dev) it is possible to make R

and RX

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

pages but

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

obviously new RX pages are now out of the picture:

	/*
	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally  

allowed

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

to only

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

* be created with RW permissions.
* TBD: Interface with user space policy to support

max

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

permissions

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
	 * of RWX.
	 */
	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits =  

calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits =

encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

If that TBD is left out to the final version the page augmentation has a
risk of a API bottleneck, and that risk can realize

then

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

also in the page
permission ioctls.

I.e. now any review comment is based on not fully

known

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

territory, we have
one known unknown, and some unknown unknowns from
unpredictable effect to
future API changes.

The plan to complete the "TBD" in the above snippet was to follow this work
with user policy integration at this location. On a high

level

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

the plan was
for this to look something like:

(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	/*
 	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines

to only

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	 * be created with RW permissions.
 	 * Interface with user space policy to support max

permissions

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +0 -0
 	 * of RWX.
 	 */
 	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
 	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot,  

0);

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

if (user space policy allows RWX on dynamically

added

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

pages)

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
	 	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits =  

calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, 0);
	else
		encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits =  

calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_READ |

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

PROT_WRITE, 0);

The work that follows this series aimed to do the

integration

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

with user

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

space policy.

What do you mean by "user space policy" anyway exactly? I'm

sorry but I

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line

just don't fully understand this.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

My apologies - I just assumed that you would need no reminder

about this

Quoted 2 lines

contentious
part of SGX history. Essentially it means that, yes, the

kernel could

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

theoretically
permit any kind of access to any file/page, but some accesses

are

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

known

Quoted 2 lines

to generally
be a bad idea - like making memory executable as well as

writable

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

- and

Quoted 2 lines

thus there
are additional checks based on what user space permits before

the

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines

kernel

Quoted 7 lines

allows
such accesses.

For example, mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect()

User policy and SGX has seen significant discussion. Some

notable

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

threads:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CALCETrXf8mSK45h7sTK5Wf+pXLVn=Bjsc_RLpgO-h-qdzBRo5Q@mail.gmail.com/

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

It's too big of a risk to accept this series without X taken

care

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

of. Patch
series should neither have TODO nor TBD comments IMHO. I

don't want

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

to ack
a series based on speculation what might happen in the

future.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

ok

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I think the best way to move forward would be to do

EAUG's

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

explicitly with
an ioctl that could also include secinfo for

permissions.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Then you can

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

easily do the rest with EACCEPTCOPY inside the enclave.

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES already exists and could

possibly be

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

used for

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

this purpose. It already includes SECINFO which may also

be

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

useful if

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

needing to later support EAUG of PT_SS* pages.

You could also simply add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES and

call it

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

a day.

I could, yes.

Quoted 1 line

And if there is plan to extend SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES

what is

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

this weird
thing added to the #PF handler? Why is it added at all then?

I was just speculating in my response, there is no plan to

extend

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES (that I am aware of).

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

How this could work is user space calls

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

after enclave initialization on any memory region within

the

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

enclave where
pages are planned to be added dynamically. This ioctl()

calls

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

EAUG to add the
new pages with RW permissions and their vm_max_prot_bits

can be

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

set to the
permissions found in the included SECINFO. This will

support

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

later EACCEPTCOPY
as well as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS

I don't like this type of re-use of the existing API.

I could proceed with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES if there is

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

consensus

Quoted 2 lines

after
considering the user policy question (above) and performance

trade-off

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

(more below).

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

The big question is whether communicating user policy

after

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

enclave initialization
via the SECINFO within SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is

acceptable

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

to all? I would
appreciate a confirmation on this direction considering

the

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

significant history
behind this topic.

I have no idea because I don't know what is user space

policy.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

This discussion is about some enclave usages needing RWX

permissions

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

on dynamically added enclave pages. RWX permissions on

dynamically

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

added

Quoted 2 lines

pages is
not something that should blindly be allowed for all SGX

enclaves but

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

instead the user
needs to explicitly allow specific enclaves to have such

ability. This

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

is equivalent
to (but not the same as) what exists in Linux today with LSM.

As

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

seen in

Quoted 1 line

mm/mprotect.c:do_mprotect_pkey()->security_file_mprotect()

Linux

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

is able

Quoted 2 lines

to make
files and memory be both writable and executable, but it would

only do

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

so for those
files and memory that the LSM (which is how user policy is

communicated,

Quoted 2 lines

like SELinux)
indicates it is allowed, not blindly do so for all files and

all

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

memory.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Putting EAUG to the #PF handler and implicitly call it

just

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

too flakky and
hard to make deterministic for e.g. JIT compiler in our

use

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

case (not to
mention that JIT is not possible at all because

inability to

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

do RX pages).

I understand how SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_AUGMENT_PAGES can be more

deterministic

Quoted 2 lines

but from
what I understand it would have a performance impact since it

would

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

require all memory
that may be needed by the enclave be pre-allocated from

outside the

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

enclave and not
just dynamically allocated from within the enclave at the time

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

it is

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

needed.

Would such a performance impact be acceptable?

User space won't always have enough info to decide whether the

pages

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

to be
EAUG'd immediately. In some cases (shared libraries, JVM for example) lots
of code/data pages can be mapped but never actually touched. One enclave/process does not know if any other more important enclave/process
would need the EPC.

It should be for kernel to make the final decision as it has

overall

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

picture
of the system EPC usage and availability.

EAUG ioctl does not give better capabilities for user space to

waste

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

EPC given that EADD ioctl already exists, i.e. your argument is

logically

Quoted 1 line

incorrect.

The point of adding EAUG is to allow more efficient use of EPC

pages.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Without EAUG, enclaves have to EADD everything upfront into EPC, consuming
predetermined number of EPC pages, some of which may not be used at

all.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

With EAUG, enclaves should be able to load minimal pages to get

started,

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

pages added on #PF as they are actually accessed.

Obviously as you pointed out, some usages make more sense to pre-EAUG (EAUG
before #PF). But your proposal of supporting only pre-EAUG here essentially
makes EAUG behave almost the same as EADD. If the current implementation
with EAUG on #PF can also use MAP_POPULATE for pre-EAUG (seems

possible

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

based on Dave's comments), then it is flxible to cover all cases and allow
kernel to optimize allocation of EPC pages.

There is no even a working #PF based implementation in existance, and your
argument has too many if's for my taste.

1) if you mean no user space is implementing this kind of solution, read this section, otherwise, skip to 2) below which is only couple of sentences.

Quoted 7 lines

If you are willing to look, there is already implementation in our SDK to do heap and stack expansion on demand on #PF. Enclaves may not know heap/stack size up front, we have implemented these features to make EPC usage more efficient. I don't know why normal processes can add RAM on #PF, but enclaves adding EPC on #PF becomes so unacceptable concept to you. And the kernel does that for EPC swapping already when #PF happens on a swapped out EPC page.

In adds O(n) round-trips for a mmap() emulation, which can be done in O(1) round-trips with a ioctl.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Our implementation has gone through several rounds, the latest is here:https://github.com/intel/linux-sgx/tree/edmm_v2/sdk/emm. It was also implemented in original OOT driver based SDK implementation. Customers are using it and found them useful. I think this is a critical feature that many other runtimes will also need.

I'm not sure what the common sense argument here is.

My (wrong) assumption was that you are disabling EAUG on #PF totally, and all I was saying EAUG on #PF is critical for many usages and disabling it requires good justification.

But you are expecting an ioctl call for each #PF for those usages: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/#t. IIUC, that's better than total disabling but less optimal. (I have not checked all call sequences in detail to be sure it would work for all our cases)

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

2)
It's OK for you to request additional support for your usage and I agree it is needed. But IMHO, totally getting rid of EAUG on #PF is bad and unnecessary. Current implementation can be extended to support your usage. What's the reason you think MAP_POPULATE won't work for you?

I do not recall taking stand on MAP_POPULATE.

Thanks for looking into that. Like I said, that should cover all usages.

maintainer
#106 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 19/32] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave

In reply to Reinette Chatre
Quoted 6 lines · Reinette Chatre
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +6 -0
+	encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!encl_page)
+		return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+
+	encl_page->desc = addr;
+	encl_page->encl = encl;

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, · line 170

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +10 -0
+
+	/*
+	 * Adding a regular page that is architecturally allowed to only
+	 * be created with RW permissions.
+	 * TBD: Interface with user space policy to support max permissions
+	 * of RWX.
+	 */
+	prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+	encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits;

You should use sgx_encl_page_alloc() here and not reinvent wheel.

I wrote a patch that exports it:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/T/#u

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#109 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 21/32] selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows

In reply to Reinette Chatre

tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c TEST_F(enclave, epcm_permissions) · line 936

Quoted 3 lines · Reinette Chatre
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +3 -0
+	addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE,
+		    PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+		    MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, self->encl.fd, 0);

Maybe inline comment to just state that this is expected to work because the range does not contain enclave pages, just as a reminder (had xref to sgx_encl_may_map() to check this assumption). Otherwise, fine.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions

In reply to Reinette Chatre
Quoted 224 lines · Reinette Chatre

=== Summary ===

An SGX VMA can only be created if its permissions are the same or weaker than the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) permissions. After VMA creation this same rule is again enforced by the page fault handler:
faulted enclave pages are required to have equal or more relaxed EPCM permissions than the VMA permissions.

On SGX1 systems the additional enforcement in the page fault handler is redundant and on SGX2 systems it incorrectly prevents access. On SGX1 systems it is unnecessary to repeat the enforcement of the permission rule. The rule used during original VMA creation will ensure that any access attempt will use correct permissions. With SGX2 the EPCM permissions of a page can change after VMA creation resulting in the VMA permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions and the page fault handler incorrectly blocking valid access attempts.

Enable the VMA's pages to remain accessible while ensuring that the PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions but not be more relaxed than the VMA permissions.

=== Full Changelog ===

An SGX enclave is an area of memory where parts of an application can reside. First an enclave is created and loaded (from non-enclave memory) with the code and data of an application, then user space can map (mmap()) the enclave memory to be able to enter the enclave at its defined entry points for execution within it.

The hardware maintains a secure structure, the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), that tracks the contents of the enclave. Of interest here is its tracking of the enclave page permissions. When a page is loaded into the enclave its permissions are specified and recorded in the EPCM. In parallel the kernel maintains permissions within the page table entries (PTEs) and the rule is that PTE permissions are not allowed to be more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

A new mapping (mmap()) of enclave memory can only succeed if the mapping has the same or weaker permissions than the permissions that were vetted during enclave creation. This is enforced by sgx_encl_may_map() that is called on the mmap() as well as mprotect() paths. This rule remains.

One feature of SGX2 is to support the modification of EPCM permissions after enclave initialization. Enclave pages may thus already be part of a VMA at the time their EPCM permissions are changed resulting in the VMA's permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

Allow permissions of existing VMAs to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions in preparation for dynamic EPCM permission changes made possible in SGX2. New VMAs that attempt to have more relaxed permissions than EPCM permissions continue to be unsupported.

Reasons why permissions of existing VMAs are allowed to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions instead of dynamically changing VMA permissions when EPCM permissions change are:
1) Changing VMA permissions involve splitting VMAs which is an operation that can fail. Additionally changing EPCM permissions of a range of pages could also fail on any of the pages involved. Handling these error cases causes problems. For example, if an EPCM permission change fails and the VMA has already been split then it is not possible to undo the VMA split nor possible to undo the EPCM permission changes that did succeed before the failure.
2) The kernel has little insight into the user space where EPCM permissions are controlled from. For example, a RW page may be made RO just before it is made RX and splitting the VMAs while the VMAs may change soon is unnecessary.

Remove the extra permission check called on a page fault (vm_operations_struct->fault) or during debugging (vm_operations_struct->access) when loading the enclave page from swap that ensures that the VMA permissions are not more relaxed than the EPCM permissions. Since a VMA could only exist if it passed the original permission checks during mmap() and a VMA may indeed have more relaxed permissions than the EPCM permissions this extra permission check is no longer appropriate.

With the permission check removed, ensure that PTEs do
not blindly inherit the VMA permissions but instead the permissions that the VMA and EPCM agree on. PTEs for writable pages (from VMA and enclave perspective) are installed with the writable bit set, reducing the need for this additional flow to the permission mismatch cases handled next.

---
Changes since V1:
- Reword commit message (Jarkko).
- Use "relax" instead of "exceed" when referring to permissions (Dave).
- Add snippet to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst that highlights the relationship between VMA, EPCM, and PTE permissions on SGX systems (Andy).

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst      | 10 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +10 -0
index 89ff924b1480..5659932728a5 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ The relationships between the different permission masks are:
 * PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
   relaxed than the VMA permissions.
 
+On systems supporting SGX2 EPCM permissions may change while the
+enclave page belongs to a VMA without impacting the VMA permissions.
+This means that a running VMA may appear to allow access to an enclave
+page that is not allowed by its EPCM permissions. For example, when an
+enclave page with RW EPCM permissions is mapped by a RW VMA but is
+subsequently changed to have read-only EPCM permissions. The kernel
+continues to maintain correct access to the enclave page through the
+PTE that will ensure that only access allowed by both the VMA
+and EPCM permissions are permitted.
+
 Application interface
 =====================
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +20 -18
index 48afe96ae0f0..b6105d9e7c46 100644
@@ -91,10 +91,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 }
 
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr,
-						unsigned long vm_flags)
+						unsigned long addr)
 {
-	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
@@ -102,14 +100,6 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	if (!entry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 
-	/*
-	 * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time
-	 * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
-	 * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
-	 */
-	if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-
 	/* Entry successfully located. */
 	if (entry->epc_page) {
 		if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)
@@ -138,7 +128,9 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+	unsigned long page_prot_bits;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	unsigned long vm_prot_bits;
 	unsigned long phys_addr;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	vm_fault_t ret;
@@ -155,7 +147,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
+	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 	if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -167,7 +159,19 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page);
 
-	ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
+	/*
+	 * Insert PTE to match the EPCM page permissions ensured to not
+	 * exceed the VMA permissions.
+	 */
+	vm_prot_bits = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
+	/*
+	 * Add VM_SHARED so that PTE is made writable right away if VMA
+	 * and EPCM are writable (no COW in SGX).
+	 */
+	page_prot_bits |= (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
+	ret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				  vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));
 	if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -295,15 +299,14 @@ static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *pag
  * Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock.
  */
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						   unsigned long addr,
-						   unsigned long vm_flags)
+						   unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
 	for ( ; ; ) {
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 		if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
 			break;
 
@@ -339,8 +342,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
-		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK,
-					      vma->vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK);
 		if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
 			break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

If you unconditionally set vm_max_prot_bits to RWX for dynamically created pags, you would not need to do this.

These patches could be then safely dropped then:

- [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions
- [PATCH V2 08/32] x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes
- [PATCH V2 15/32] x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions

And that would also keep full ABI compatibility without exceptions to the existing mainline code.

BR, Jarkko

#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 229 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 224 lines · Reinette Chatre

=== Summary ===

An SGX VMA can only be created if its permissions are the same or weaker than the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) permissions. After VMA creation this same rule is again enforced by the page fault handler:
faulted enclave pages are required to have equal or more relaxed EPCM permissions than the VMA permissions.

On SGX1 systems the additional enforcement in the page fault handler is redundant and on SGX2 systems it incorrectly prevents access. On SGX1 systems it is unnecessary to repeat the enforcement of the permission rule. The rule used during original VMA creation will ensure that any access attempt will use correct permissions. With SGX2 the EPCM permissions of a page can change after VMA creation resulting in the VMA permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions and the page fault handler incorrectly blocking valid access attempts.

Enable the VMA's pages to remain accessible while ensuring that the PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions but not be more relaxed than the VMA permissions.

=== Full Changelog ===

An SGX enclave is an area of memory where parts of an application can reside. First an enclave is created and loaded (from non-enclave memory) with the code and data of an application, then user space can map (mmap()) the enclave memory to be able to enter the enclave at its defined entry points for execution within it.

The hardware maintains a secure structure, the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), that tracks the contents of the enclave. Of interest here is its tracking of the enclave page permissions. When a page is loaded into the enclave its permissions are specified and recorded in the EPCM. In parallel the kernel maintains permissions within the page table entries (PTEs) and the rule is that PTE permissions are not allowed to be more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

A new mapping (mmap()) of enclave memory can only succeed if the mapping has the same or weaker permissions than the permissions that were vetted during enclave creation. This is enforced by sgx_encl_may_map() that is called on the mmap() as well as mprotect() paths. This rule remains.

One feature of SGX2 is to support the modification of EPCM permissions after enclave initialization. Enclave pages may thus already be part of a VMA at the time their EPCM permissions are changed resulting in the VMA's permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

Allow permissions of existing VMAs to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions in preparation for dynamic EPCM permission changes made possible in SGX2. New VMAs that attempt to have more relaxed permissions than EPCM permissions continue to be unsupported.

Reasons why permissions of existing VMAs are allowed to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions instead of dynamically changing VMA permissions when EPCM permissions change are:
1) Changing VMA permissions involve splitting VMAs which is an operation that can fail. Additionally changing EPCM permissions of a range of pages could also fail on any of the pages involved. Handling these error cases causes problems. For example, if an EPCM permission change fails and the VMA has already been split then it is not possible to undo the VMA split nor possible to undo the EPCM permission changes that did succeed before the failure.
2) The kernel has little insight into the user space where EPCM permissions are controlled from. For example, a RW page may be made RO just before it is made RX and splitting the VMAs while the VMAs may change soon is unnecessary.

Remove the extra permission check called on a page fault (vm_operations_struct->fault) or during debugging (vm_operations_struct->access) when loading the enclave page from swap that ensures that the VMA permissions are not more relaxed than the EPCM permissions. Since a VMA could only exist if it passed the original permission checks during mmap() and a VMA may indeed have more relaxed permissions than the EPCM permissions this extra permission check is no longer appropriate.

With the permission check removed, ensure that PTEs do
not blindly inherit the VMA permissions but instead the permissions that the VMA and EPCM agree on. PTEs for writable pages (from VMA and enclave perspective) are installed with the writable bit set, reducing the need for this additional flow to the permission mismatch cases handled next.

---
Changes since V1:
- Reword commit message (Jarkko).
- Use "relax" instead of "exceed" when referring to permissions (Dave).
- Add snippet to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst that highlights the relationship between VMA, EPCM, and PTE permissions on SGX systems (Andy).

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst      | 10 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +10 -0
index 89ff924b1480..5659932728a5 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ The relationships between the different permission masks are:
 * PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
   relaxed than the VMA permissions.
 
+On systems supporting SGX2 EPCM permissions may change while the
+enclave page belongs to a VMA without impacting the VMA permissions.
+This means that a running VMA may appear to allow access to an enclave
+page that is not allowed by its EPCM permissions. For example, when an
+enclave page with RW EPCM permissions is mapped by a RW VMA but is
+subsequently changed to have read-only EPCM permissions. The kernel
+continues to maintain correct access to the enclave page through the
+PTE that will ensure that only access allowed by both the VMA
+and EPCM permissions are permitted.
+
 Application interface
 =====================
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +20 -18
index 48afe96ae0f0..b6105d9e7c46 100644
@@ -91,10 +91,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 }
 
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr,
-						unsigned long vm_flags)
+						unsigned long addr)
 {
-	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
@@ -102,14 +100,6 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	if (!entry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 
-	/*
-	 * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time
-	 * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
-	 * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
-	 */
-	if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-
 	/* Entry successfully located. */
 	if (entry->epc_page) {
 		if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)
@@ -138,7 +128,9 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+	unsigned long page_prot_bits;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	unsigned long vm_prot_bits;
 	unsigned long phys_addr;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	vm_fault_t ret;
@@ -155,7 +147,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
+	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 	if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -167,7 +159,19 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page);
 
-	ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
+	/*
+	 * Insert PTE to match the EPCM page permissions ensured to not
+	 * exceed the VMA permissions.
+	 */
+	vm_prot_bits = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
+	/*
+	 * Add VM_SHARED so that PTE is made writable right away if VMA
+	 * and EPCM are writable (no COW in SGX).
+	 */
+	page_prot_bits |= (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
+	ret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				  vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));
 	if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -295,15 +299,14 @@ static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *pag
  * Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock.
  */
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						   unsigned long addr,
-						   unsigned long vm_flags)
+						   unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
 	for ( ; ; ) {
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 		if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
 			break;
 
@@ -339,8 +342,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
-		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK,
-					      vma->vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK);
 		if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
 			break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

If you unconditionally set vm_max_prot_bits to RWX for dynamically created pags, you would not need to do this.

Quoted 9 lines

These patches could be then safely dropped then:

- [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions
- [PATCH V2 08/32] x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes
- [PATCH V2 15/32] x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions

And that would also keep full ABI compatibility without exceptions to the existing mainline code.

Dropping these changes do not just impact dynamically created pages. Dropping these patches would result in EPCM page permission restriction being supported for all pages, those added before enclave initialization as well as dynamically added pages, but their PTEs will not be impacted.

For example, if a RW enclave page is added via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES and then later made read-only via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS then Linux would keep allowing and installing RW PTEs to this page.

Allowing this goes against something explicitly disallowed from the beginning of SGX as per:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst#n74

"EPCM permissions are separate from the normal page tables. This prevents the kernel from, for instance, allowing writes to data which an enclave wishes to remain read-only."

Reinette

maintainer
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions

Quoted 242 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 229 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 224 lines · Reinette Chatre

=== Summary ===

An SGX VMA can only be created if its permissions are the same or weaker than the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) permissions. After VMA creation this same rule is again enforced by the page fault handler:
faulted enclave pages are required to have equal or more relaxed EPCM permissions than the VMA permissions.

On SGX1 systems the additional enforcement in the page fault handler is redundant and on SGX2 systems it incorrectly prevents access. On SGX1 systems it is unnecessary to repeat the enforcement of the permission rule. The rule used during original VMA creation will ensure that any access attempt will use correct permissions. With SGX2 the EPCM permissions of a page can change after VMA creation resulting in the VMA permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions and the page fault handler incorrectly blocking valid access attempts.

Enable the VMA's pages to remain accessible while ensuring that the PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions but not be more relaxed than the VMA permissions.

=== Full Changelog ===

An SGX enclave is an area of memory where parts of an application can reside. First an enclave is created and loaded (from non-enclave memory) with the code and data of an application, then user space can map (mmap()) the enclave memory to be able to enter the enclave at its defined entry points for execution within it.

The hardware maintains a secure structure, the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), that tracks the contents of the enclave. Of interest here is its tracking of the enclave page permissions. When a page is loaded into the enclave its permissions are specified and recorded in the EPCM. In parallel the kernel maintains permissions within the page table entries (PTEs) and the rule is that PTE permissions are not allowed to be more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

A new mapping (mmap()) of enclave memory can only succeed if the mapping has the same or weaker permissions than the permissions that were vetted during enclave creation. This is enforced by sgx_encl_may_map() that is called on the mmap() as well as mprotect() paths. This rule remains.

One feature of SGX2 is to support the modification of EPCM permissions after enclave initialization. Enclave pages may thus already be part of a VMA at the time their EPCM permissions are changed resulting in the VMA's permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

Allow permissions of existing VMAs to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions in preparation for dynamic EPCM permission changes made possible in SGX2. New VMAs that attempt to have more relaxed permissions than EPCM permissions continue to be unsupported.

Reasons why permissions of existing VMAs are allowed to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions instead of dynamically changing VMA permissions when EPCM permissions change are:
1) Changing VMA permissions involve splitting VMAs which is an operation that can fail. Additionally changing EPCM permissions of a range of pages could also fail on any of the pages involved. Handling these error cases causes problems. For example, if an EPCM permission change fails and the VMA has already been split then it is not possible to undo the VMA split nor possible to undo the EPCM permission changes that did succeed before the failure.
2) The kernel has little insight into the user space where EPCM permissions are controlled from. For example, a RW page may be made RO just before it is made RX and splitting the VMAs while the VMAs may change soon is unnecessary.

Remove the extra permission check called on a page fault (vm_operations_struct->fault) or during debugging (vm_operations_struct->access) when loading the enclave page from swap that ensures that the VMA permissions are not more relaxed than the EPCM permissions. Since a VMA could only exist if it passed the original permission checks during mmap() and a VMA may indeed have more relaxed permissions than the EPCM permissions this extra permission check is no longer appropriate.

With the permission check removed, ensure that PTEs do
not blindly inherit the VMA permissions but instead the permissions that the VMA and EPCM agree on. PTEs for writable pages (from VMA and enclave perspective) are installed with the writable bit set, reducing the need for this additional flow to the permission mismatch cases handled next.

---
Changes since V1:
- Reword commit message (Jarkko).
- Use "relax" instead of "exceed" when referring to permissions (Dave).
- Add snippet to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst that highlights the relationship between VMA, EPCM, and PTE permissions on SGX systems (Andy).

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst      | 10 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +10 -0
index 89ff924b1480..5659932728a5 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ The relationships between the different permission masks are:
 * PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
   relaxed than the VMA permissions.
 
+On systems supporting SGX2 EPCM permissions may change while the
+enclave page belongs to a VMA without impacting the VMA permissions.
+This means that a running VMA may appear to allow access to an enclave
+page that is not allowed by its EPCM permissions. For example, when an
+enclave page with RW EPCM permissions is mapped by a RW VMA but is
+subsequently changed to have read-only EPCM permissions. The kernel
+continues to maintain correct access to the enclave page through the
+PTE that will ensure that only access allowed by both the VMA
+and EPCM permissions are permitted.
+
 Application interface
 =====================
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +20 -18
index 48afe96ae0f0..b6105d9e7c46 100644
@@ -91,10 +91,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 }
 
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr,
-						unsigned long vm_flags)
+						unsigned long addr)
 {
-	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
@@ -102,14 +100,6 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	if (!entry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 
-	/*
-	 * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time
-	 * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
-	 * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
-	 */
-	if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-
 	/* Entry successfully located. */
 	if (entry->epc_page) {
 		if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)
@@ -138,7 +128,9 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+	unsigned long page_prot_bits;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	unsigned long vm_prot_bits;
 	unsigned long phys_addr;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	vm_fault_t ret;
@@ -155,7 +147,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
+	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 	if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -167,7 +159,19 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page);
 
-	ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
+	/*
+	 * Insert PTE to match the EPCM page permissions ensured to not
+	 * exceed the VMA permissions.
+	 */
+	vm_prot_bits = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
+	/*
+	 * Add VM_SHARED so that PTE is made writable right away if VMA
+	 * and EPCM are writable (no COW in SGX).
+	 */
+	page_prot_bits |= (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
+	ret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				  vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));
 	if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -295,15 +299,14 @@ static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *pag
  * Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock.
  */
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						   unsigned long addr,
-						   unsigned long vm_flags)
+						   unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
 	for ( ; ; ) {
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 		if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
 			break;
 
@@ -339,8 +342,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
-		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK,
-					      vma->vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK);
 		if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
 			break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

If you unconditionally set vm_max_prot_bits to RWX for dynamically created pags, you would not need to do this.

Quoted 9 lines

These patches could be then safely dropped then:

- [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions
- [PATCH V2 08/32] x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes
- [PATCH V2 15/32] x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions

And that would also keep full ABI compatibility without exceptions to the existing mainline code.

Quoted 8 lines

Dropping these changes do not just impact dynamically created pages. Dropping these patches would result in EPCM page permission restriction being supported for all pages, those added before enclave initialization as well as dynamically added pages, but their PTEs will not be impacted.

For example, if a RW enclave page is added via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES and then later made read-only via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS then Linux would keep allowing and installing RW PTEs to this page.

I think that would be perfectly fine, if someone wants to do that. There is no corrateral damage on doing that. Kernel does not get messed because of that. It's a use case that does not make sense in the first place, so it'd be stupid to build anything extensive around it to the kernel.

Shooting yourself to the foot is something that kernel does and should not protect user space from unless there is a risk of messing the state of the kernel itself.

Much worse is that we have e.g. completely artificial ioctl SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS to support this scheme, which could e.g. cause extra roundtrips for simple EMODPE.

Also this means not having to include 06/32, which keeps 100% backwards compatibility in run-time behaviour to the mainline while not restricting at all dynamically created pages. And we get rid of complex book keeping of vm_run_prot_bits.

And generally the whole model is then very easy to understand and explain. If I had to keep presentation of the current mess in the patch set in a conference, I can honestly say that I would be in serious trouble. It's not clean and clear security model, which is a risk by itself.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions

Quoted 270 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 242 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 229 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 224 lines · Reinette Chatre

=== Summary ===

An SGX VMA can only be created if its permissions are the same or weaker than the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) permissions. After VMA creation this same rule is again enforced by the page fault handler:
faulted enclave pages are required to have equal or more relaxed EPCM permissions than the VMA permissions.

On SGX1 systems the additional enforcement in the page fault handler is redundant and on SGX2 systems it incorrectly prevents access. On SGX1 systems it is unnecessary to repeat the enforcement of the permission rule. The rule used during original VMA creation will ensure that any access attempt will use correct permissions. With SGX2 the EPCM permissions of a page can change after VMA creation resulting in the VMA permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions and the page fault handler incorrectly blocking valid access attempts.

Enable the VMA's pages to remain accessible while ensuring that the PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions but not be more relaxed than the VMA permissions.

=== Full Changelog ===

An SGX enclave is an area of memory where parts of an application can reside. First an enclave is created and loaded (from non-enclave memory) with the code and data of an application, then user space can map (mmap()) the enclave memory to be able to enter the enclave at its defined entry points for execution within it.

The hardware maintains a secure structure, the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), that tracks the contents of the enclave. Of interest here is its tracking of the enclave page permissions. When a page is loaded into the enclave its permissions are specified and recorded in the EPCM. In parallel the kernel maintains permissions within the page table entries (PTEs) and the rule is that PTE permissions are not allowed to be more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

A new mapping (mmap()) of enclave memory can only succeed if the mapping has the same or weaker permissions than the permissions that were vetted during enclave creation. This is enforced by sgx_encl_may_map() that is called on the mmap() as well as mprotect() paths. This rule remains.

One feature of SGX2 is to support the modification of EPCM permissions after enclave initialization. Enclave pages may thus already be part of a VMA at the time their EPCM permissions are changed resulting in the VMA's permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

Allow permissions of existing VMAs to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions in preparation for dynamic EPCM permission changes made possible in SGX2. New VMAs that attempt to have more relaxed permissions than EPCM permissions continue to be unsupported.

Reasons why permissions of existing VMAs are allowed to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions instead of dynamically changing VMA permissions when EPCM permissions change are:
1) Changing VMA permissions involve splitting VMAs which is an operation that can fail. Additionally changing EPCM permissions of a range of pages could also fail on any of the pages involved. Handling these error cases causes problems. For example, if an EPCM permission change fails and the VMA has already been split then it is not possible to undo the VMA split nor possible to undo the EPCM permission changes that did succeed before the failure.
2) The kernel has little insight into the user space where EPCM permissions are controlled from. For example, a RW page may be made RO just before it is made RX and splitting the VMAs while the VMAs may change soon is unnecessary.

Remove the extra permission check called on a page fault (vm_operations_struct->fault) or during debugging (vm_operations_struct->access) when loading the enclave page from swap that ensures that the VMA permissions are not more relaxed than the EPCM permissions. Since a VMA could only exist if it passed the original permission checks during mmap() and a VMA may indeed have more relaxed permissions than the EPCM permissions this extra permission check is no longer appropriate.

With the permission check removed, ensure that PTEs do
not blindly inherit the VMA permissions but instead the permissions that the VMA and EPCM agree on. PTEs for writable pages (from VMA and enclave perspective) are installed with the writable bit set, reducing the need for this additional flow to the permission mismatch cases handled next.

---
Changes since V1:
- Reword commit message (Jarkko).
- Use "relax" instead of "exceed" when referring to permissions (Dave).
- Add snippet to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst that highlights the relationship between VMA, EPCM, and PTE permissions on SGX systems (Andy).

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst      | 10 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +10 -0
index 89ff924b1480..5659932728a5 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ The relationships between the different permission masks are:
 * PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
   relaxed than the VMA permissions.
 
+On systems supporting SGX2 EPCM permissions may change while the
+enclave page belongs to a VMA without impacting the VMA permissions.
+This means that a running VMA may appear to allow access to an enclave
+page that is not allowed by its EPCM permissions. For example, when an
+enclave page with RW EPCM permissions is mapped by a RW VMA but is
+subsequently changed to have read-only EPCM permissions. The kernel
+continues to maintain correct access to the enclave page through the
+PTE that will ensure that only access allowed by both the VMA
+and EPCM permissions are permitted.
+
 Application interface
 =====================
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +20 -18
index 48afe96ae0f0..b6105d9e7c46 100644
@@ -91,10 +91,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 }
 
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr,
-						unsigned long vm_flags)
+						unsigned long addr)
 {
-	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
@@ -102,14 +100,6 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	if (!entry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 
-	/*
-	 * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time
-	 * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
-	 * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
-	 */
-	if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-
 	/* Entry successfully located. */
 	if (entry->epc_page) {
 		if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)
@@ -138,7 +128,9 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+	unsigned long page_prot_bits;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	unsigned long vm_prot_bits;
 	unsigned long phys_addr;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	vm_fault_t ret;
@@ -155,7 +147,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
+	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 	if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -167,7 +159,19 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page);
 
-	ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
+	/*
+	 * Insert PTE to match the EPCM page permissions ensured to not
+	 * exceed the VMA permissions.
+	 */
+	vm_prot_bits = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
+	/*
+	 * Add VM_SHARED so that PTE is made writable right away if VMA
+	 * and EPCM are writable (no COW in SGX).
+	 */
+	page_prot_bits |= (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
+	ret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				  vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));
 	if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -295,15 +299,14 @@ static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *pag
  * Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock.
  */
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						   unsigned long addr,
-						   unsigned long vm_flags)
+						   unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
 	for ( ; ; ) {
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 		if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
 			break;
 
@@ -339,8 +342,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
-		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK,
-					      vma->vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK);
 		if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
 			break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

If you unconditionally set vm_max_prot_bits to RWX for dynamically created pags, you would not need to do this.

Quoted 9 lines

These patches could be then safely dropped then:

- [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions
- [PATCH V2 08/32] x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes
- [PATCH V2 15/32] x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions

And that would also keep full ABI compatibility without exceptions to the existing mainline code.

Quoted 8 lines

Dropping these changes do not just impact dynamically created pages. Dropping these patches would result in EPCM page permission restriction being supported for all pages, those added before enclave initialization as well as dynamically added pages, but their PTEs will not be impacted.

For example, if a RW enclave page is added via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES and then later made read-only via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS then Linux would keep allowing and installing RW PTEs to this page.

I think that would be perfectly fine, if someone wants to do that. There is no corrateral damage on doing that. Kernel does not get messed because of that. It's a use case that does not make sense in the first place, so it'd be stupid to build anything extensive around it to the kernel.

Shooting yourself to the foot is something that kernel does and should not protect user space from unless there is a risk of messing the state of the kernel itself.

Much worse is that we have e.g. completely artificial ioctl SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS to support this scheme, which could e.g. cause extra roundtrips for simple EMODPE.

Also this means not having to include 06/32, which keeps 100% backwards compatibility in run-time behaviour to the mainline while not restricting at all dynamically created pages. And we get rid of complex book keeping of vm_run_prot_bits.

Quoted 4 lines

And generally the whole model is then very easy to understand and explain. If I had to keep presentation of the current mess in the patch set in a conference, I can honestly say that I would be in serious trouble. It's not clean and clear security model, which is a risk by itself.

I.e.

1. For EADD'd pages: stick what has been the invariant 1,5 years now. Do not change it by any means (e.g. 06/32).
2. For EAUG'd pages: set vm_max_prot_bits RWX, which essentially means do what ever you want with PTE's and EPCM.

It's a clear and understandable model that does nothing bad to the kernel, and a run-time developer can surely find away to get things on going. For user space, the most important thing is the clarity in kernel behaviour, and this does deliver that clarity. It's not perfect but it does do the job and anyone can get it.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions

Quoted 283 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 270 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 242 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 229 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 224 lines · Reinette Chatre

=== Summary ===

An SGX VMA can only be created if its permissions are the same or weaker than the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) permissions. After VMA creation this same rule is again enforced by the page fault handler:
faulted enclave pages are required to have equal or more relaxed EPCM permissions than the VMA permissions.

On SGX1 systems the additional enforcement in the page fault handler is redundant and on SGX2 systems it incorrectly prevents access. On SGX1 systems it is unnecessary to repeat the enforcement of the permission rule. The rule used during original VMA creation will ensure that any access attempt will use correct permissions. With SGX2 the EPCM permissions of a page can change after VMA creation resulting in the VMA permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions and the page fault handler incorrectly blocking valid access attempts.

Enable the VMA's pages to remain accessible while ensuring that the PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions but not be more relaxed than the VMA permissions.

=== Full Changelog ===

An SGX enclave is an area of memory where parts of an application can reside. First an enclave is created and loaded (from non-enclave memory) with the code and data of an application, then user space can map (mmap()) the enclave memory to be able to enter the enclave at its defined entry points for execution within it.

The hardware maintains a secure structure, the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), that tracks the contents of the enclave. Of interest here is its tracking of the enclave page permissions. When a page is loaded into the enclave its permissions are specified and recorded in the EPCM. In parallel the kernel maintains permissions within the page table entries (PTEs) and the rule is that PTE permissions are not allowed to be more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

A new mapping (mmap()) of enclave memory can only succeed if the mapping has the same or weaker permissions than the permissions that were vetted during enclave creation. This is enforced by sgx_encl_may_map() that is called on the mmap() as well as mprotect() paths. This rule remains.

One feature of SGX2 is to support the modification of EPCM permissions after enclave initialization. Enclave pages may thus already be part of a VMA at the time their EPCM permissions are changed resulting in the VMA's permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

Allow permissions of existing VMAs to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions in preparation for dynamic EPCM permission changes made possible in SGX2. New VMAs that attempt to have more relaxed permissions than EPCM permissions continue to be unsupported.

Reasons why permissions of existing VMAs are allowed to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions instead of dynamically changing VMA permissions when EPCM permissions change are:
1) Changing VMA permissions involve splitting VMAs which is an operation that can fail. Additionally changing EPCM permissions of a range of pages could also fail on any of the pages involved. Handling these error cases causes problems. For example, if an EPCM permission change fails and the VMA has already been split then it is not possible to undo the VMA split nor possible to undo the EPCM permission changes that did succeed before the failure.
2) The kernel has little insight into the user space where EPCM permissions are controlled from. For example, a RW page may be made RO just before it is made RX and splitting the VMAs while the VMAs may change soon is unnecessary.

Remove the extra permission check called on a page fault (vm_operations_struct->fault) or during debugging (vm_operations_struct->access) when loading the enclave page from swap that ensures that the VMA permissions are not more relaxed than the EPCM permissions. Since a VMA could only exist if it passed the original permission checks during mmap() and a VMA may indeed have more relaxed permissions than the EPCM permissions this extra permission check is no longer appropriate.

With the permission check removed, ensure that PTEs do
not blindly inherit the VMA permissions but instead the permissions that the VMA and EPCM agree on. PTEs for writable pages (from VMA and enclave perspective) are installed with the writable bit set, reducing the need for this additional flow to the permission mismatch cases handled next.

---
Changes since V1:
- Reword commit message (Jarkko).
- Use "relax" instead of "exceed" when referring to permissions (Dave).
- Add snippet to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst that highlights the relationship between VMA, EPCM, and PTE permissions on SGX systems (Andy).

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst      | 10 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +10 -0
index 89ff924b1480..5659932728a5 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ The relationships between the different permission masks are:
 * PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
   relaxed than the VMA permissions.
 
+On systems supporting SGX2 EPCM permissions may change while the
+enclave page belongs to a VMA without impacting the VMA permissions.
+This means that a running VMA may appear to allow access to an enclave
+page that is not allowed by its EPCM permissions. For example, when an
+enclave page with RW EPCM permissions is mapped by a RW VMA but is
+subsequently changed to have read-only EPCM permissions. The kernel
+continues to maintain correct access to the enclave page through the
+PTE that will ensure that only access allowed by both the VMA
+and EPCM permissions are permitted.
+
 Application interface
 =====================
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +20 -18
index 48afe96ae0f0..b6105d9e7c46 100644
@@ -91,10 +91,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 }
 
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr,
-						unsigned long vm_flags)
+						unsigned long addr)
 {
-	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
@@ -102,14 +100,6 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	if (!entry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 
-	/*
-	 * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time
-	 * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
-	 * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
-	 */
-	if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-
 	/* Entry successfully located. */
 	if (entry->epc_page) {
 		if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)
@@ -138,7 +128,9 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+	unsigned long page_prot_bits;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	unsigned long vm_prot_bits;
 	unsigned long phys_addr;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	vm_fault_t ret;
@@ -155,7 +147,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
+	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 	if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -167,7 +159,19 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page);
 
-	ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
+	/*
+	 * Insert PTE to match the EPCM page permissions ensured to not
+	 * exceed the VMA permissions.
+	 */
+	vm_prot_bits = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
+	/*
+	 * Add VM_SHARED so that PTE is made writable right away if VMA
+	 * and EPCM are writable (no COW in SGX).
+	 */
+	page_prot_bits |= (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
+	ret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				  vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));
 	if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -295,15 +299,14 @@ static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *pag
  * Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock.
  */
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						   unsigned long addr,
-						   unsigned long vm_flags)
+						   unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
 	for ( ; ; ) {
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 		if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
 			break;
 
@@ -339,8 +342,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
-		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK,
-					      vma->vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK);
 		if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
 			break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

If you unconditionally set vm_max_prot_bits to RWX for dynamically created pags, you would not need to do this.

Quoted 9 lines

These patches could be then safely dropped then:

- [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions
- [PATCH V2 08/32] x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes
- [PATCH V2 15/32] x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions

And that would also keep full ABI compatibility without exceptions to the existing mainline code.

Quoted 8 lines

Dropping these changes do not just impact dynamically created pages. Dropping these patches would result in EPCM page permission restriction being supported for all pages, those added before enclave initialization as well as dynamically added pages, but their PTEs will not be impacted.

For example, if a RW enclave page is added via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES and then later made read-only via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS then Linux would keep allowing and installing RW PTEs to this page.

I think that would be perfectly fine, if someone wants to do that. There is no corrateral damage on doing that. Kernel does not get messed because of that. It's a use case that does not make sense in the first place, so it'd be stupid to build anything extensive around it to the kernel.

Shooting yourself to the foot is something that kernel does and should not protect user space from unless there is a risk of messing the state of the kernel itself.

Much worse is that we have e.g. completely artificial ioctl SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS to support this scheme, which could e.g. cause extra roundtrips for simple EMODPE.

Also this means not having to include 06/32, which keeps 100% backwards compatibility in run-time behaviour to the mainline while not restricting at all dynamically created pages. And we get rid of complex book keeping of vm_run_prot_bits.

Quoted 4 lines

And generally the whole model is then very easy to understand and explain. If I had to keep presentation of the current mess in the patch set in a conference, I can honestly say that I would be in serious trouble. It's not clean and clear security model, which is a risk by itself.

I.e.

1. For EADD'd pages: stick what has been the invariant 1,5 years now. Do not change it by any means (e.g. 06/32).
2. For EAUG'd pages: set vm_max_prot_bits RWX, which essentially means do what ever you want with PTE's and EPCM.

Quoted 5 lines

It's a clear and understandable model that does nothing bad to the kernel, and a run-time developer can surely find away to get things on going. For user space, the most important thing is the clarity in kernel behaviour, and this does deliver that clarity. It's not perfect but it does do the job and anyone can get it.

Also a quantitive argument for this is that by simplifying security model this way it is one ioctl less, which must be considered as +1. We do not want to add new ioctls unless it is something we absolutely cannnot live without. We absolutely can live without SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS.

BR, Jarkko

#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 290 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 283 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 270 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 242 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 229 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 224 lines · Reinette Chatre

=== Summary ===

An SGX VMA can only be created if its permissions are the same or weaker than the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) permissions. After VMA creation this same rule is again enforced by the page fault handler:
faulted enclave pages are required to have equal or more relaxed EPCM permissions than the VMA permissions.

On SGX1 systems the additional enforcement in the page fault handler is redundant and on SGX2 systems it incorrectly prevents access. On SGX1 systems it is unnecessary to repeat the enforcement of the permission rule. The rule used during original VMA creation will ensure that any access attempt will use correct permissions. With SGX2 the EPCM permissions of a page can change after VMA creation resulting in the VMA permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions and the page fault handler incorrectly blocking valid access attempts.

Enable the VMA's pages to remain accessible while ensuring that the PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions but not be more relaxed than the VMA permissions.

=== Full Changelog ===

An SGX enclave is an area of memory where parts of an application can reside. First an enclave is created and loaded (from non-enclave memory) with the code and data of an application, then user space can map (mmap()) the enclave memory to be able to enter the enclave at its defined entry points for execution within it.

The hardware maintains a secure structure, the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), that tracks the contents of the enclave. Of interest here is its tracking of the enclave page permissions. When a page is loaded into the enclave its permissions are specified and recorded in the EPCM. In parallel the kernel maintains permissions within the page table entries (PTEs) and the rule is that PTE permissions are not allowed to be more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

A new mapping (mmap()) of enclave memory can only succeed if the mapping has the same or weaker permissions than the permissions that were vetted during enclave creation. This is enforced by sgx_encl_may_map() that is called on the mmap() as well as mprotect() paths. This rule remains.

One feature of SGX2 is to support the modification of EPCM permissions after enclave initialization. Enclave pages may thus already be part of a VMA at the time their EPCM permissions are changed resulting in the VMA's permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

Allow permissions of existing VMAs to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions in preparation for dynamic EPCM permission changes made possible in SGX2. New VMAs that attempt to have more relaxed permissions than EPCM permissions continue to be unsupported.

Reasons why permissions of existing VMAs are allowed to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions instead of dynamically changing VMA permissions when EPCM permissions change are:
1) Changing VMA permissions involve splitting VMAs which is an operation that can fail. Additionally changing EPCM permissions of a range of pages could also fail on any of the pages involved. Handling these error cases causes problems. For example, if an EPCM permission change fails and the VMA has already been split then it is not possible to undo the VMA split nor possible to undo the EPCM permission changes that did succeed before the failure.
2) The kernel has little insight into the user space where EPCM permissions are controlled from. For example, a RW page may be made RO just before it is made RX and splitting the VMAs while the VMAs may change soon is unnecessary.

Remove the extra permission check called on a page fault (vm_operations_struct->fault) or during debugging (vm_operations_struct->access) when loading the enclave page from swap that ensures that the VMA permissions are not more relaxed than the EPCM permissions. Since a VMA could only exist if it passed the original permission checks during mmap() and a VMA may indeed have more relaxed permissions than the EPCM permissions this extra permission check is no longer appropriate.

With the permission check removed, ensure that PTEs do
not blindly inherit the VMA permissions but instead the permissions that the VMA and EPCM agree on. PTEs for writable pages (from VMA and enclave perspective) are installed with the writable bit set, reducing the need for this additional flow to the permission mismatch cases handled next.

---
Changes since V1:
- Reword commit message (Jarkko).
- Use "relax" instead of "exceed" when referring to permissions (Dave).
- Add snippet to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst that highlights the relationship between VMA, EPCM, and PTE permissions on SGX systems (Andy).

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst      | 10 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +10 -0
index 89ff924b1480..5659932728a5 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ The relationships between the different permission masks are:
 * PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
   relaxed than the VMA permissions.
 
+On systems supporting SGX2 EPCM permissions may change while the
+enclave page belongs to a VMA without impacting the VMA permissions.
+This means that a running VMA may appear to allow access to an enclave
+page that is not allowed by its EPCM permissions. For example, when an
+enclave page with RW EPCM permissions is mapped by a RW VMA but is
+subsequently changed to have read-only EPCM permissions. The kernel
+continues to maintain correct access to the enclave page through the
+PTE that will ensure that only access allowed by both the VMA
+and EPCM permissions are permitted.
+
 Application interface
 =====================
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +20 -18
index 48afe96ae0f0..b6105d9e7c46 100644
@@ -91,10 +91,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 }
 
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr,
-						unsigned long vm_flags)
+						unsigned long addr)
 {
-	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
@@ -102,14 +100,6 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	if (!entry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 
-	/*
-	 * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time
-	 * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
-	 * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
-	 */
-	if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-
 	/* Entry successfully located. */
 	if (entry->epc_page) {
 		if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)
@@ -138,7 +128,9 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+	unsigned long page_prot_bits;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	unsigned long vm_prot_bits;
 	unsigned long phys_addr;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	vm_fault_t ret;
@@ -155,7 +147,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
+	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 	if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -167,7 +159,19 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page);
 
-	ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
+	/*
+	 * Insert PTE to match the EPCM page permissions ensured to not
+	 * exceed the VMA permissions.
+	 */
+	vm_prot_bits = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
+	/*
+	 * Add VM_SHARED so that PTE is made writable right away if VMA
+	 * and EPCM are writable (no COW in SGX).
+	 */
+	page_prot_bits |= (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
+	ret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				  vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));
 	if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -295,15 +299,14 @@ static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *pag
  * Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock.
  */
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						   unsigned long addr,
-						   unsigned long vm_flags)
+						   unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
 	for ( ; ; ) {
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 		if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
 			break;
 
@@ -339,8 +342,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
-		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK,
-					      vma->vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK);
 		if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
 			break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

If you unconditionally set vm_max_prot_bits to RWX for dynamically created pags, you would not need to do this.

Quoted 9 lines

These patches could be then safely dropped then:

- [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions
- [PATCH V2 08/32] x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes
- [PATCH V2 15/32] x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions

And that would also keep full ABI compatibility without exceptions to the existing mainline code.

Quoted 8 lines

Dropping these changes do not just impact dynamically created pages. Dropping these patches would result in EPCM page permission restriction being supported for all pages, those added before enclave initialization as well as dynamically added pages, but their PTEs will not be impacted.

For example, if a RW enclave page is added via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES and then later made read-only via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS then Linux would keep allowing and installing RW PTEs to this page.

I think that would be perfectly fine, if someone wants to do that. There is no corrateral damage on doing that. Kernel does not get messed because of that. It's a use case that does not make sense in the first place, so it'd be stupid to build anything extensive around it to the kernel.

Shooting yourself to the foot is something that kernel does and should not protect user space from unless there is a risk of messing the state of the kernel itself.

Much worse is that we have e.g. completely artificial ioctl SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS to support this scheme, which could e.g. cause extra roundtrips for simple EMODPE.

Also this means not having to include 06/32, which keeps 100% backwards compatibility in run-time behaviour to the mainline while not restricting at all dynamically created pages. And we get rid of complex book keeping of vm_run_prot_bits.

Quoted 4 lines

And generally the whole model is then very easy to understand and explain. If I had to keep presentation of the current mess in the patch set in a conference, I can honestly say that I would be in serious trouble. It's not clean and clear security model, which is a risk by itself.

I.e.

1. For EADD'd pages: stick what has been the invariant 1,5 years now. Do not change it by any means (e.g. 06/32).
2. For EAUG'd pages: set vm_max_prot_bits RWX, which essentially means do what ever you want with PTE's and EPCM.

Quoted 5 lines

It's a clear and understandable model that does nothing bad to the kernel, and a run-time developer can surely find away to get things on going. For user space, the most important thing is the clarity in kernel behaviour, and this does deliver that clarity. It's not perfect but it does do the job and anyone can get it.

Quoted 5 lines

Also a quantitive argument for this is that by simplifying security model this way it is one ioctl less, which must be considered as +1. We do not want to add new ioctls unless it is something we absolutely cannnot live without. We absolutely can live without SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS.

ok, with the implications understood and accepted I will proceed with a new series that separates EPCM from PTEs and make RWX PTEs possible by default for EAUG pages. This has broader impact than just removing
the three patches you list. "[PATCH 07/32] x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs" is also no longer needed and there is no longer a need to flush PTEs after restricting permissions. New changes also need to be considered - at least the current documentation. I'll rework the series.

Reinette

maintainer
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions

Quoted 299 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 290 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 283 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 270 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 242 lines · Reinette Chatre

Hi Jarkko,

Quoted 229 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 224 lines · Reinette Chatre

=== Summary ===

An SGX VMA can only be created if its permissions are the same or weaker than the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) permissions. After VMA creation this same rule is again enforced by the page fault handler:
faulted enclave pages are required to have equal or more relaxed EPCM permissions than the VMA permissions.

On SGX1 systems the additional enforcement in the page fault handler is redundant and on SGX2 systems it incorrectly prevents access. On SGX1 systems it is unnecessary to repeat the enforcement of the permission rule. The rule used during original VMA creation will ensure that any access attempt will use correct permissions. With SGX2 the EPCM permissions of a page can change after VMA creation resulting in the VMA permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions and the page fault handler incorrectly blocking valid access attempts.

Enable the VMA's pages to remain accessible while ensuring that the PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions but not be more relaxed than the VMA permissions.

=== Full Changelog ===

An SGX enclave is an area of memory where parts of an application can reside. First an enclave is created and loaded (from non-enclave memory) with the code and data of an application, then user space can map (mmap()) the enclave memory to be able to enter the enclave at its defined entry points for execution within it.

The hardware maintains a secure structure, the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), that tracks the contents of the enclave. Of interest here is its tracking of the enclave page permissions. When a page is loaded into the enclave its permissions are specified and recorded in the EPCM. In parallel the kernel maintains permissions within the page table entries (PTEs) and the rule is that PTE permissions are not allowed to be more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

A new mapping (mmap()) of enclave memory can only succeed if the mapping has the same or weaker permissions than the permissions that were vetted during enclave creation. This is enforced by sgx_encl_may_map() that is called on the mmap() as well as mprotect() paths. This rule remains.

One feature of SGX2 is to support the modification of EPCM permissions after enclave initialization. Enclave pages may thus already be part of a VMA at the time their EPCM permissions are changed resulting in the VMA's permissions potentially being more relaxed than the EPCM permissions.

Allow permissions of existing VMAs to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions in preparation for dynamic EPCM permission changes made possible in SGX2. New VMAs that attempt to have more relaxed permissions than EPCM permissions continue to be unsupported.

Reasons why permissions of existing VMAs are allowed to be more relaxed than EPCM permissions instead of dynamically changing VMA permissions when EPCM permissions change are:
1) Changing VMA permissions involve splitting VMAs which is an operation that can fail. Additionally changing EPCM permissions of a range of pages could also fail on any of the pages involved. Handling these error cases causes problems. For example, if an EPCM permission change fails and the VMA has already been split then it is not possible to undo the VMA split nor possible to undo the EPCM permission changes that did succeed before the failure.
2) The kernel has little insight into the user space where EPCM permissions are controlled from. For example, a RW page may be made RO just before it is made RX and splitting the VMAs while the VMAs may change soon is unnecessary.

Remove the extra permission check called on a page fault (vm_operations_struct->fault) or during debugging (vm_operations_struct->access) when loading the enclave page from swap that ensures that the VMA permissions are not more relaxed than the EPCM permissions. Since a VMA could only exist if it passed the original permission checks during mmap() and a VMA may indeed have more relaxed permissions than the EPCM permissions this extra permission check is no longer appropriate.

With the permission check removed, ensure that PTEs do
not blindly inherit the VMA permissions but instead the permissions that the VMA and EPCM agree on. PTEs for writable pages (from VMA and enclave perspective) are installed with the writable bit set, reducing the need for this additional flow to the permission mismatch cases handled next.

---
Changes since V1:
- Reword commit message (Jarkko).
- Use "relax" instead of "exceed" when referring to permissions (Dave).
- Add snippet to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst that highlights the relationship between VMA, EPCM, and PTE permissions on SGX systems (Andy).

 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst      | 10 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +10 -0
index 89ff924b1480..5659932728a5 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ The relationships between the different permission masks are:
 * PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more
   relaxed than the VMA permissions.
 
+On systems supporting SGX2 EPCM permissions may change while the
+enclave page belongs to a VMA without impacting the VMA permissions.
+This means that a running VMA may appear to allow access to an enclave
+page that is not allowed by its EPCM permissions. For example, when an
+enclave page with RW EPCM permissions is mapped by a RW VMA but is
+subsequently changed to have read-only EPCM permissions. The kernel
+continues to maintain correct access to the enclave page through the
+PTE that will ensure that only access allowed by both the VMA
+and EPCM permissions are permitted.
+
 Application interface
 =====================
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +20 -18
index 48afe96ae0f0..b6105d9e7c46 100644
@@ -91,10 +91,8 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 }
 
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr,
-						unsigned long vm_flags)
+						unsigned long addr)
 {
-	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
@@ -102,14 +100,6 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	if (!entry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 
-	/*
-	 * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time
-	 * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
-	 * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
-	 */
-	if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-
 	/* Entry successfully located. */
 	if (entry->epc_page) {
 		if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)
@@ -138,7 +128,9 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+	unsigned long page_prot_bits;
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+	unsigned long vm_prot_bits;
 	unsigned long phys_addr;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl;
 	vm_fault_t ret;
@@ -155,7 +147,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
+	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 	if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -167,7 +159,19 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page);
 
-	ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
+	/*
+	 * Insert PTE to match the EPCM page permissions ensured to not
+	 * exceed the VMA permissions.
+	 */
+	vm_prot_bits = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+	page_prot_bits = entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits;
+	/*
+	 * Add VM_SHARED so that PTE is made writable right away if VMA
+	 * and EPCM are writable (no COW in SGX).
+	 */
+	page_prot_bits |= (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
+	ret = vmf_insert_pfn_prot(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr),
+				  vm_get_page_prot(page_prot_bits));
 	if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -295,15 +299,14 @@ static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *pag
  * Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock.
  */
 static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						   unsigned long addr,
-						   unsigned long vm_flags)
+						   unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
 
 	for ( ; ; ) {
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
 		if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
 			break;
 
@@ -339,8 +342,7 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
-		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK,
-					      vma->vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK);
 		if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
 			break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

If you unconditionally set vm_max_prot_bits to RWX for dynamically created pags, you would not need to do this.

Quoted 9 lines

These patches could be then safely dropped then:

- [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions
- [PATCH V2 08/32] x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes
- [PATCH V2 15/32] x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions

And that would also keep full ABI compatibility without exceptions to the existing mainline code.

Quoted 8 lines

Dropping these changes do not just impact dynamically created pages. Dropping these patches would result in EPCM page permission restriction being supported for all pages, those added before enclave initialization as well as dynamically added pages, but their PTEs will not be impacted.

For example, if a RW enclave page is added via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES and then later made read-only via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS then Linux would keep allowing and installing RW PTEs to this page.

I think that would be perfectly fine, if someone wants to do that. There is no corrateral damage on doing that. Kernel does not get messed because of that. It's a use case that does not make sense in the first place, so it'd be stupid to build anything extensive around it to the kernel.

Shooting yourself to the foot is something that kernel does and should not protect user space from unless there is a risk of messing the state of the kernel itself.

Much worse is that we have e.g. completely artificial ioctl SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS to support this scheme, which could e.g. cause extra roundtrips for simple EMODPE.

Also this means not having to include 06/32, which keeps 100% backwards compatibility in run-time behaviour to the mainline while not restricting at all dynamically created pages. And we get rid of complex book keeping of vm_run_prot_bits.

Quoted 4 lines

And generally the whole model is then very easy to understand and explain. If I had to keep presentation of the current mess in the patch set in a conference, I can honestly say that I would be in serious trouble. It's not clean and clear security model, which is a risk by itself.

I.e.

1. For EADD'd pages: stick what has been the invariant 1,5 years now. Do not change it by any means (e.g. 06/32).
2. For EAUG'd pages: set vm_max_prot_bits RWX, which essentially means do what ever you want with PTE's and EPCM.

Quoted 5 lines

It's a clear and understandable model that does nothing bad to the kernel, and a run-time developer can surely find away to get things on going. For user space, the most important thing is the clarity in kernel behaviour, and this does deliver that clarity. It's not perfect but it does do the job and anyone can get it.

Quoted 5 lines

Also a quantitive argument for this is that by simplifying security model this way it is one ioctl less, which must be considered as +1. We do not want to add new ioctls unless it is something we absolutely cannnot live without. We absolutely can live without SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS.

Quoted 7 lines

ok, with the implications understood and accepted I will proceed with a new series that separates EPCM from PTEs and make RWX PTEs possible by default for EAUG pages. This has broader impact than just removing
the three patches you list. "[PATCH 07/32] x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs" is also no longer needed and there is no longer a need to flush PTEs after restricting permissions. New changes also need to be considered - at least the current documentation. I'll rework the series.

Yes, I really think it is a solid plan. Any possible LSM hooks would most likely attach to build product, not the dynamic behaviour.

As far as the page fault handler goes, Haitao is correct after the all discussions that it makes sense. The purpose of MAP_POPULATE series is not to replace it but instead complement it. Just wanted to clear this up as I said otherwise earlier this week.

Thank you.

BR, Jarkko