Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of patches for dunfell and have comments back by end of day Friday.
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/4200
The following changes since commit 345193f36d08cfe4899c65e8edf3f79db09c50d2:
relocate_sdk.py: ensure interpreter size error causes relocation to fail (2022-08-29 05:02:16 -1000)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/dunfell-nut
http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/dunfell-nut
Hitendra Prajapati (1):
sqlite: CVE-2022-35737 assertion failure
Joshua Watt (1):
classes: cve-check: Get shared database lock
Ranjitsinh Rathod (2):
libarchive: Fix CVE-2021-23177 issue
libarchive: Fix CVE-2021-31566 issue
Richard Purdie (1):
vim: Upgrade 9.0.0242 -> 9.0.0341
Robert Joslyn (1):
curl: Backport patch for CVE-2022-35252
Ross Burton (1):
cve-check: close cursors as soon as possible
meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass | 36 ++-- .../recipes-core/meta/cve-update-db-native.bb | 51 ++--- .../libarchive/CVE-2021-23177.patch | 183 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/CVE-2021-31566-01.patch | 23 +++ .../libarchive/CVE-2021-31566-02.patch | 172 ++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.4.2.bb | 3 + .../curl/curl/CVE-2022-35252.patch | 72 +++++++ meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb | 1 + .../sqlite/files/CVE-2022-35737.patch | 29 +++ meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.31.1.bb | 1 + meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 4 +- 11 files changed, 535 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-23177.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-31566-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-31566-02.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-35252.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2022-35737.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/7 sqlite: CVE-2022-35737 assertion failure
From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Source: https://www.sqlite.org/
MR: 120541
Type: Security Fix
Disposition: Backport from https://www.sqlite.org/src/info/aab790a16e1bdff7
ChangeID: cf6d0962be0d1f7d4a5019843da6349eb7f9acda
Description:
CVE-2022-35737 sqlite: assertion failure via query when compiled with -DSQLITE_ENABLE_STAT4.
--- .../sqlite/files/CVE-2022-35737.patch | 29 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.31.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2022-35737.patch
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2022-35737.patch new file +29 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From 2bbf4c999dbb4b520561a57e0bafc19a15562093 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2022 11:22:29 +0530 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-35737 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://www.sqlite.org/src/info/aab790a16e1bdff7] +CVE: CVE-2022-35737 +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + sqlite3.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/sqlite3.c b/sqlite3.c +index f664217..33dfb78 100644 +--- a/sqlite3.c ++++ b/sqlite3.c +@@ -28758,7 +28758,8 @@ SQLITE_API void sqlite3_str_vappendf( + case etSQLESCAPE: /* %q: Escape ' characters */ + case etSQLESCAPE2: /* %Q: Escape ' and enclose in '...' */ + case etSQLESCAPE3: { /* %w: Escape " characters */ +- int i, j, k, n, isnull; ++ i64 i, j, k, n; ++ int isnull; + int needQuote; + char ch; + char q = ((xtype==etSQLESCAPE3)?'"':'\''); /* Quote character */ +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.31.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.sqlite.org/2020/sqlite-autoconf-${SQLITE_PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2020-13630.patch \ file://CVE-2020-13631.patch \ file://CVE-2020-13632.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-35737.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2d0a553534c521504e3ac3ad3b90f125" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "62284efebc05a76f909c580ffa5c008a7d22a1287285d68b7825a2b6b51949ae"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 2/7 curl: Backport patch for CVE-2022-35252
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Robert Joslyn <[email protected]>
https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-35252.html
--- .../curl/curl/CVE-2022-35252.patch | 72 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-35252.patch
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-35252.patch new file +72 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From c9212bdb21f0cc90a1a60dfdbb716deefe78fd40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2022 00:09:17 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cookie: reject cookies with "control bytes" + +Rejects 0x01 - 0x1f (except 0x09) plus 0x7f + +Reported-by: Axel Chong + +Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-35252.html + +CVE-2022-35252 + +Closes #9381 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/8dfc93e573ca740544a2d79ebb] + +Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <[email protected]> +--- + lib/cookie.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c +index a9ad20a..66c7715 100644 +--- a/lib/cookie.c ++++ b/lib/cookie.c +@@ -412,6 +412,30 @@ static bool bad_domain(const char *domain) + return !strchr(domain, '.') && !strcasecompare(domain, "localhost"); + } + ++/* ++ RFC 6265 section 4.1.1 says a server should accept this range: ++ ++ cookie-octet = %x21 / %x23-2B / %x2D-3A / %x3C-5B / %x5D-7E ++ ++ But Firefox and Chrome as of June 2022 accept space, comma and double-quotes ++ fine. The prime reason for filtering out control bytes is that some HTTP ++ servers return 400 for requests that contain such. ++*/ ++static int invalid_octets(const char *p) ++{ ++ /* Reject all bytes \x01 - \x1f (*except* \x09, TAB) + \x7f */ ++ static const char badoctets[] = { ++ "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x0a" ++ "\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14" ++ "\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x7f" ++ }; ++ size_t vlen, len; ++ /* scan for all the octets that are *not* in cookie-octet */ ++ len = strcspn(p, badoctets); ++ vlen = strlen(p); ++ return (len != vlen); ++} ++ + /**************************************************************************** + * + * Curl_cookie_add() +@@ -558,6 +582,11 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data, + badcookie = TRUE; + break; + } ++ if(invalid_octets(whatptr) || invalid_octets(name)) { ++ infof(data, "invalid octets in name/value, cookie dropped"); ++ badcookie = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } + } + else if(!len) { + /* this was a "<name>=" with no content, and we must allow +-- +2.35.1 +
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://CVE-2022-32206.patch \ file://CVE-2022-32207.patch \ file://CVE-2022-32208.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-35252.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ec5fc263f898a3dfef08e805f1ecca42"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 3/7 libarchive: Fix CVE-2021-23177 issue
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Ranjitsinh Rathod <[email protected]>
Add patch to fix CVE-2021-23177 issue for libarchive
--- .../libarchive/CVE-2021-23177.patch | 183 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.4.2.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 184 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-23177.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-23177.patch new file +183 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +Description: Fix handling of symbolic link ACLs + Published as CVE-2021-23177 +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/fba4f123cc456d2b2538f811bb831483bf336bad +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1001986 +Author: Martin Matuska <[email protected]> +Last-Updated: 2021-12-20 + +CVE: CVE-2021-23177 +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://deb.debian.org/debian/pool/main/liba/libarchive/libarchive_3.4.3-2+deb11u1.debian.tar.xz] +Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <[email protected]> + +--- a/libarchive/archive_disk_acl_freebsd.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_disk_acl_freebsd.c +@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ + + static int + set_acl(struct archive *a, int fd, const char *name, +- struct archive_acl *abstract_acl, ++ struct archive_acl *abstract_acl, __LA_MODE_T mode, + int ae_requested_type, const char *tname) + { + int acl_type = 0; +@@ -364,6 +364,13 @@ + return (ARCHIVE_FAILED); + } + ++ if (acl_type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT && !S_ISDIR(mode)) { ++ errno = EINVAL; ++ archive_set_error(a, errno, ++ "Cannot set default ACL on non-directory"); ++ return (ARCHIVE_WARN); ++ } ++ + acl = acl_init(entries); + if (acl == (acl_t)NULL) { + archive_set_error(a, errno, +@@ -542,7 +549,10 @@ + else if (acl_set_link_np(name, acl_type, acl) != 0) + #else + /* FreeBSD older than 8.0 */ +- else if (acl_set_file(name, acl_type, acl) != 0) ++ else if (S_ISLNK(mode)) { ++ /* acl_set_file() follows symbolic links, skip */ ++ ret = ARCHIVE_OK; ++ } else if (acl_set_file(name, acl_type, acl) != 0) + #endif + { + if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP) { +@@ -677,14 +687,14 @@ + & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_POSIX1E) != 0) { + if ((archive_acl_types(abstract_acl) + & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) != 0) { +- ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, ++ ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, mode, + ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, "access"); + if (ret != ARCHIVE_OK) + return (ret); + } + if ((archive_acl_types(abstract_acl) + & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) != 0) +- ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, ++ ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, mode, + ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, "default"); + + /* Simultaneous POSIX.1e and NFSv4 is not supported */ +@@ -693,7 +703,7 @@ + #if ARCHIVE_ACL_FREEBSD_NFS4 + else if ((archive_acl_types(abstract_acl) & + ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4) != 0) { +- ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, ++ ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, mode, + ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4, "nfs4"); + } + #endif +--- a/libarchive/archive_disk_acl_linux.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_disk_acl_linux.c +@@ -343,6 +343,11 @@ + return (ARCHIVE_FAILED); + } + ++ if (S_ISLNK(mode)) { ++ /* Linux does not support RichACLs on symbolic links */ ++ return (ARCHIVE_OK); ++ } ++ + richacl = richacl_alloc(entries); + if (richacl == NULL) { + archive_set_error(a, errno, +@@ -455,7 +460,7 @@ + #if ARCHIVE_ACL_LIBACL + static int + set_acl(struct archive *a, int fd, const char *name, +- struct archive_acl *abstract_acl, ++ struct archive_acl *abstract_acl, __LA_MODE_T mode, + int ae_requested_type, const char *tname) + { + int acl_type = 0; +@@ -488,6 +493,18 @@ + return (ARCHIVE_FAILED); + } + ++ if (S_ISLNK(mode)) { ++ /* Linux does not support ACLs on symbolic links */ ++ return (ARCHIVE_OK); ++ } ++ ++ if (acl_type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT && !S_ISDIR(mode)) { ++ errno = EINVAL; ++ archive_set_error(a, errno, ++ "Cannot set default ACL on non-directory"); ++ return (ARCHIVE_WARN); ++ } ++ + acl = acl_init(entries); + if (acl == (acl_t)NULL) { + archive_set_error(a, errno, +@@ -727,14 +744,14 @@ + & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_POSIX1E) != 0) { + if ((archive_acl_types(abstract_acl) + & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) != 0) { +- ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, ++ ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, mode, + ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, "access"); + if (ret != ARCHIVE_OK) + return (ret); + } + if ((archive_acl_types(abstract_acl) + & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) != 0) +- ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, ++ ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, mode, + ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, "default"); + } + #endif /* ARCHIVE_ACL_LIBACL */ +--- a/libarchive/archive_disk_acl_sunos.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_disk_acl_sunos.c +@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ + + static int + set_acl(struct archive *a, int fd, const char *name, +- struct archive_acl *abstract_acl, ++ struct archive_acl *abstract_acl, __LA_MODE_T mode, + int ae_requested_type, const char *tname) + { + aclent_t *aclent; +@@ -467,7 +467,6 @@ + if (entries == 0) + return (ARCHIVE_OK); + +- + switch (ae_requested_type) { + case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_POSIX1E: + cmd = SETACL; +@@ -492,6 +491,12 @@ + return (ARCHIVE_FAILED); + } + ++ if (S_ISLNK(mode)) { ++ /* Skip ACLs on symbolic links */ ++ ret = ARCHIVE_OK; ++ goto exit_free; ++ } ++ + e = 0; + + while (archive_acl_next(a, abstract_acl, ae_requested_type, &ae_type, +@@ -801,7 +806,7 @@ + if ((archive_acl_types(abstract_acl) + & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_POSIX1E) != 0) { + /* Solaris writes POSIX.1e access and default ACLs together */ +- ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, ++ ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, mode, + ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_POSIX1E, "posix1e"); + + /* Simultaneous POSIX.1e and NFSv4 is not supported */ +@@ -810,7 +815,7 @@ + #if ARCHIVE_ACL_SUNOS_NFS4 + else if ((archive_acl_types(abstract_acl) & + ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4) != 0) { +- ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, ++ ret = set_acl(a, fd, name, abstract_acl, mode, + ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4, "nfs4"); + } + #endif
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.4.2.bb +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2021-36976-1.patch \ file://CVE-2021-36976-2.patch \ file://CVE-2021-36976-3.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-23177.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d953ed6b47694dadf0e6042f8f9ff451"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 4/7 libarchive: Fix CVE-2021-31566 issue
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Ranjitsinh Rathod <[email protected]>
Add patch to fix CVE-2021-31566 issue for libarchive
--- .../libarchive/CVE-2021-31566-01.patch | 23 +++ .../libarchive/CVE-2021-31566-02.patch | 172 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.4.2.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 197 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-31566-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-31566-02.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-31566-01.patch new file +23 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +Description: Never follow symlinks when setting file flags on Linux + Published as CVE-2021-31566 +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/e2ad1a2c3064fa9eba6274b3641c4c1beed25c0b +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1001990 +Author: Martin Matuska <[email protected]> +Last-Update: 2021-12-20 + +CVE: CVE-2021-31566 +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://deb.debian.org/debian/pool/main/liba/libarchive/libarchive_3.4.3-2+deb11u1.debian.tar.xz] +Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <[email protected]> + +--- a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c +@@ -3927,7 +3927,8 @@ + + /* If we weren't given an fd, open it ourselves. */ + if (myfd < 0) { +- myfd = open(name, O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC); ++ myfd = open(name, O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK | O_BINARY | ++ O_CLOEXEC | O_NOFOLLOW); + __archive_ensure_cloexec_flag(myfd); + } + if (myfd < 0)
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-31566-02.patch new file +172 -0
172 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.4.2.bb +2 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2021-36976-2.patch \ file://CVE-2021-36976-3.patch \ file://CVE-2021-23177.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-31566-01.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-31566-02.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d953ed6b47694dadf0e6042f8f9ff451"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 5/7 classes: cve-check: Get shared database lock
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Joshua Watt <[email protected]>
The CVE check database needs to have a shared lock acquired on it before it is accessed. This to prevent cve-update-db-native from deleting the database file out from underneath it.
[YOCTO #14899]
--- meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass +12 -11
@@ -138,17 +138,18 @@ python do_cve_check () { """ from oe.cve_check import get_patched_cves - if os.path.exists(d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE")): - try: - patched_cves = get_patched_cves(d) - except FileNotFoundError: - bb.fatal("Failure in searching patches") - whitelisted, patched, unpatched, status = check_cves(d, patched_cves) - if patched or unpatched or (d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_COVERAGE") == "1" and status): - cve_data = get_cve_info(d, patched + unpatched + whitelisted) - cve_write_data(d, patched, unpatched, whitelisted, cve_data, status) - else: - bb.note("No CVE database found, skipping CVE check") + with bb.utils.fileslocked([d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE_LOCK")], shared=True): + if os.path.exists(d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE")): + try: + patched_cves = get_patched_cves(d) + except FileNotFoundError: + bb.fatal("Failure in searching patches") + ignored, patched, unpatched, status = check_cves(d, patched_cves) + if patched or unpatched or (d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_COVERAGE") == "1" and status): + cve_data = get_cve_info(d, patched + unpatched + ignored) + cve_write_data(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data, status) + else: + bb.note("No CVE database found, skipping CVE check") }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 6/7 cve-check: close cursors as soon as possible
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Ross Burton <[email protected]>
We can have multiple processes reading the database at the same time, and cursors only release their locks when they're garbage collected.
This might be the cause of random sqlite errors on the autobuilder, so explicitly close the cursors when we're done with them.
--- meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass | 13 +++-- .../recipes-core/meta/cve-update-db-native.bb | 51 ++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass +9 -4
@@ -290,7 +290,8 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves): vendor = "%" # Find all relevant CVE IDs. - for cverow in conn.execute("SELECT DISTINCT ID FROM PRODUCTS WHERE PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (product, vendor)): + cve_cursor = conn.execute("SELECT DISTINCT ID FROM PRODUCTS WHERE PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (product, vendor)) + for cverow in cve_cursor: cve = cverow[0] if cve in cve_whitelist:
@@ -309,7 +310,8 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves): vulnerable = False ignored = False - for row in conn.execute("SELECT * FROM PRODUCTS WHERE ID IS ? AND PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (cve, product, vendor)): + product_cursor = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM PRODUCTS WHERE ID IS ? AND PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (cve, product, vendor)) + for row in product_cursor: (_, _, _, version_start, operator_start, version_end, operator_end) = row #bb.debug(2, "Evaluating row " + str(row)) if cve in cve_whitelist:
@@ -353,10 +355,12 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves): bb.note("%s-%s is vulnerable to %s" % (pn, real_pv, cve)) cves_unpatched.append(cve) break + product_cursor.close() if not vulnerable: bb.note("%s-%s is not vulnerable to %s" % (pn, real_pv, cve)) patched_cves.add(cve) + cve_cursor.close() if not cves_in_product: bb.note("No CVE records found for product %s, pn %s" % (product, pn))
@@ -378,14 +382,15 @@ def get_cve_info(d, cves): conn = sqlite3.connect(db_file, uri=True) for cve in cves: - for row in conn.execute("SELECT * FROM NVD WHERE ID IS ?", (cve,)): + cursor = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM NVD WHERE ID IS ?", (cve,)) + for row in cursor: cve_data[row[0]] = {} cve_data[row[0]]["summary"] = row[1] cve_data[row[0]]["scorev2"] = row[2] cve_data[row[0]]["scorev3"] = row[3] cve_data[row[0]]["modified"] = row[4] cve_data[row[0]]["vector"] = row[5] - + cursor.close() conn.close() return cve_data
meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-db-native.bb +28 -23
97 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 7/7 vim: Upgrade 9.0.0242 -> 9.0.0341
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
Addresses CVE-2022-2980, CVE-2022-2946 and CVE-2022-2982.
--- meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +2 -2
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://no-path-adjust.patch \ " -PV .= ".0242" -SRCREV = "171c683237149262665135c7d5841a89bb156f53" +PV .= ".0341" +SRCREV = "92a3d20682d46359bb50a452b4f831659e799155" # Remove when 8.3 is out UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1