Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of patches for dunfell and have comments back by end of day Thursday.
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/4224
The following changes since commit c9a9d5a1f7fbe88422ccee542a89afbc4c5336e4:
vim: Upgrade 9.0.0242 -> 9.0.0341 (2022-09-07 04:40:43 -1000)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/dunfell-nut
http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/dunfell-nut
Chee Yang Lee (3):
connman: fix CVE-2022-32292
gnutls: fix CVE-2021-4209
virglrenderer: fix CVE-2022-0135
Florin Diaconescu (1):
binutils : CVE-2022-38533
[email protected] (1):
python3: Fix CVE-2021-28861 for python3
Virendra Thakur (1):
tiff: Fix for CVE-2022-2867/8/9
Yi Zhao (1):
tiff: Security fixes CVE-2022-1354 and CVE-2022-1355
[email protected] (2):
systemd: Fix unwritable /var/lock when no sysvinit handling
systemd: Add 'no-dns-fallback' PACKAGECONFIG option
.../connman/connman/CVE-2022-32292.patch | 37 +++ .../connman/connman_1.37.bb | 1 + .../systemd/systemd/00-create-volatile.conf | 1 + meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_244.5.bb | 1 + .../binutils/binutils-2.34.inc | 1 + .../binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-38533.patch | 37 +++ .../python/python3/CVE-2021-28861.patch | 135 +++++++++++ .../recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.13.bb | 1 + .../virglrenderer/CVE-2022-0135.patch | 100 +++++++++ .../virglrenderer/virglrenderer_0.8.2.bb | 1 + ...022-2867-CVE-2022-2868-CVE-2022-2869.patch | 159 +++++++++++++ .../libtiff/tiff/CVE-2022-1354.patch | 212 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libtiff/tiff/CVE-2022-1355.patch | 62 +++++ meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb | 3 + .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-4209.patch | 37 +++ meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb | 1 + 16 files changed, 789 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-32292.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-38533.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2021-28861.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/virglrenderer/virglrenderer/CVE-2022-0135.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-2867-CVE-2022-2868-CVE-2022-2869.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/CVE-2022-1354.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/CVE-2022-1355.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-4209.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/9 python3: Fix CVE-2021-28861 for python3
From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Add patch to fix CVE-2021-28861
CVE-2021-28861.patch
--- .../python/python3/CVE-2021-28861.patch | 135 ++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.13.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 136 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2021-28861.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2021-28861.patch new file +135 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +From 4dc2cae3abd75f386374d0635d00443b897d0672 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Islington (bot)" + <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 01:42:52 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] gh-87389: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in + http.server. (GH-93879) (GH-94094) + +Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when +an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header +with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix +proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan). + +Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google]. +(cherry picked from commit 4abab6b603dd38bec1168e9a37c40a48ec89508e) + +Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <[email protected]> + +Signed-off-by: Riyaz Khan <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2021-28861 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/4dc2cae3abd75f386374d0635d00443b897d0672] + +--- + Lib/http/server.py | 7 +++ + Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 53 ++++++++++++++++++- + ...2-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst | 3 ++ + 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/http/server.py b/Lib/http/server.py +index 38f7accad7a3..39de35458c38 100644 +--- a/Lib/http/server.py ++++ b/Lib/http/server.py +@@ -332,6 +332,13 @@ def parse_request(self): + return False + self.command, self.path = command, path + ++ # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect ++ # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts ++ # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI ++ # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path. ++ if self.path.startswith('//'): ++ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single / ++ + # Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive. + try: + self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile, +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py +index 87d4924a34b3..fb026188f0b4 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py +@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ class request_handler(NoLogRequestHandler, SimpleHTTPRequestHandler): + pass + + def setUp(self): +- BaseTestCase.setUp(self) ++ super().setUp() + self.cwd = os.getcwd() + basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir() + os.chdir(basetempdir) +@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ def tearDown(self): + except: + pass + finally: +- BaseTestCase.tearDown(self) ++ super().tearDown() + + def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None): + def close_conn(): +@@ -414,6 +414,55 @@ def test_undecodable_filename(self): + self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK, + data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE) + ++ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self): ++ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location. ++ ++ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host. ++ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389 ++ ++ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot ++ resolve into a redirect to another server. ++ """ ++ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory')) ++ url = f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory' ++ expected_location = f'{url}/' # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash ++ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does ++ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic. ++ response = self.request(url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!') ++ ++ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash ++ attack_url = f'/{url}' ++ response = self.request(attack_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location) ++ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, ++ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and ' ++ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.') ++ ++ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash ++ attack3_url = f'//{url}' ++ response = self.request(attack3_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location) ++ ++ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http ++ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed ++ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head ++ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen. ++ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}' ++ expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/' ++ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if ++ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that ++ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header. ++ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location) ++ + def test_get(self): + #constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer + response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test') +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000000..029d437190de +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ ++:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server ++when an URI path starts with ``//``. Vulnerability discovered, and initial ++fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan.
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.13.bb +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0001-python3-Do-not-hardcode-lib-for-distutils.patch \ file://0020-configure.ac-setup.py-do-not-add-a-curses-include-pa.patch \ file://makerace.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-28861.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_class-native = " \
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 2/9 tiff: Fix for CVE-2022-2867/8/9
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Virendra Thakur <[email protected]>
Add Patch to fix CVE-2022-2867, CVE-2022-2868
CVE-2022-2869
--- ...022-2867-CVE-2022-2868-CVE-2022-2869.patch | 159 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 160 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-2867-CVE-2022-2868-CVE-2022-2869.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-2867-CVE-2022-2868-CVE-2022-2869.patch new file +159 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +From 07d79fcac2ead271b60e32aeb80f7b4f3be9ac8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Su Laus <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 21:31:29 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] tiffcrop.c: Fix issue #352 heap-buffer-overflow by correcting + uint32_t underflow. + +CVE: CVE-2022-2867 CVE-2022-2868 CVE-2022-2869 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/07d79fcac2ead271b60e32aeb80f7b4f3be9ac8c] +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <[email protected]> +--- +Index: tiff-4.1.0/tools/tiffcrop.c +=================================================================== +--- tiff-4.1.0.orig/tools/tiffcrop.c ++++ tiff-4.1.0/tools/tiffcrop.c +@@ -5153,29 +5153,45 @@ computeInputPixelOffsets(struct crop_mas + y1 = _TIFFClampDoubleToUInt32(crop->corners[i].Y1); + y2 = _TIFFClampDoubleToUInt32(crop->corners[i].Y2); + } +- if (x1 < 1) +- crop->regionlist[i].x1 = 0; +- else +- crop->regionlist[i].x1 = (uint32) (x1 - 1); ++ /* a) Region needs to be within image sizes 0.. width-1; 0..length-1 ++ * b) Corners are expected to be submitted as top-left to bottom-right. ++ * Therefore, check that and reorder input. ++ * (be aware x,y are already casted to (uint32_t) and avoid (0 - 1) ) ++ */ ++ uint32_t aux; ++ if (x1 > x2) { ++ aux = x1; ++ x1 = x2; ++ x2 = aux; ++ } ++ if (y1 > y2) { ++ aux = y1; ++ y1 = y2; ++ y2 = aux; ++ } ++ if (x1 > image->width - 1) ++ crop->regionlist[i].x1 = image->width - 1; ++ else if (x1 > 0) ++ crop->regionlist[i].x1 = (uint32_t)(x1 - 1); + + if (x2 > image->width - 1) + crop->regionlist[i].x2 = image->width - 1; +- else +- crop->regionlist[i].x2 = (uint32) (x2 - 1); +- zwidth = crop->regionlist[i].x2 - crop->regionlist[i].x1 + 1; +- +- if (y1 < 1) +- crop->regionlist[i].y1 = 0; +- else +- crop->regionlist[i].y1 = (uint32) (y1 - 1); ++ else if (x2 > 0) ++ crop->regionlist[i].x2 = (uint32_t)(x2 - 1); ++ ++ zwidth = crop->regionlist[i].x2 - crop->regionlist[i].x1 + 1; ++ ++ if (y1 > image->length - 1) ++ crop->regionlist[i].y1 = image->length - 1; ++ else if (y1 > 0) ++ crop->regionlist[i].y1 = (uint32_t)(y1 - 1); + + if (y2 > image->length - 1) + crop->regionlist[i].y2 = image->length - 1; +- else +- crop->regionlist[i].y2 = (uint32) (y2 - 1); +- +- zlength = crop->regionlist[i].y2 - crop->regionlist[i].y1 + 1; ++ else if (y2 > 0) ++ crop->regionlist[i].y2 = (uint32_t)(y2 - 1); + ++ zlength = crop->regionlist[i].y2 - crop->regionlist[i].y1 + 1; + if (zwidth > max_width) + max_width = zwidth; + if (zlength > max_length) +@@ -5205,7 +5221,7 @@ computeInputPixelOffsets(struct crop_mas + } + } + return (0); +- } ++ } /* crop_mode == CROP_REGIONS */ + + /* Convert crop margins into offsets into image + * Margins are expressed as pixel rows and columns, not bytes +@@ -5241,7 +5257,7 @@ computeInputPixelOffsets(struct crop_mas + bmargin = (uint32) 0; + return (-1); + } +- } ++ } /* crop_mode == CROP_MARGINS */ + else + { /* no margins requested */ + tmargin = (uint32) 0; +@@ -5332,24 +5348,23 @@ computeInputPixelOffsets(struct crop_mas + off->endx = endx; + off->endy = endy; + +- crop_width = endx - startx + 1; +- crop_length = endy - starty + 1; +- +- if (crop_width <= 0) ++ if (endx + 1 <= startx) + { + TIFFError("computeInputPixelOffsets", + "Invalid left/right margins and /or image crop width requested"); + return (-1); + } ++ crop_width = endx - startx + 1; + if (crop_width > image->width) + crop_width = image->width; + +- if (crop_length <= 0) ++ if (endy + 1 <= starty) + { + TIFFError("computeInputPixelOffsets", + "Invalid top/bottom margins and /or image crop length requested"); + return (-1); + } ++ crop_length = endy - starty + 1; + if (crop_length > image->length) + crop_length = image->length; + +@@ -5449,10 +5464,17 @@ getCropOffsets(struct image_data *image, + else + crop->selections = crop->zones; + +- for (i = 0; i < crop->zones; i++) ++ /* Initialize regions iterator i */ ++ i = 0; ++ for (int j = 0; j < crop->zones; j++) + { +- seg = crop->zonelist[i].position; +- total = crop->zonelist[i].total; ++ seg = crop->zonelist[j].position; ++ total = crop->zonelist[j].total; ++ ++ /* check for not allowed zone cases like 0:0; 4:3; etc. and skip that input */ ++ if (seg == 0 || total == 0 || seg > total) { ++ continue; ++ } + + switch (crop->edge_ref) + { +@@ -5581,8 +5603,11 @@ getCropOffsets(struct image_data *image, + i + 1, (uint32)zwidth, (uint32)zlength, + crop->regionlist[i].x1, crop->regionlist[i].x2, + crop->regionlist[i].y1, crop->regionlist[i].y2); ++ /* increment regions iterator */ ++ i++; + } +- ++ /* set number of generated regions out of given zones */ ++ crop->selections = i; + return (0); + } /* end getCropOffsets */ + +-- +GitLab
meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb +1 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.osgeo.org/libtiff/tiff-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2022-0924.patch \ file://CVE-2022-2056-CVE-2022-2057-CVE-2022-2058.patch \ file://CVE-2022-34526.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-2867-CVE-2022-2868-CVE-2022-2869.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2165e7aba557463acc0664e71a3ed424" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5d29f32517dadb6dbcd1255ea5bbc93a2b54b94fbf83653b4d65c7d6775b8634"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 3/9 tiff: Security fixes CVE-2022-1354 and CVE-2022-1355
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Yi Zhao <[email protected]>
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1354
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-1354
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1355
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-1355
Patches from:
CVE-2022-1354:
https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/87f580f39011109b3bb5f6eca13fac543a542798
CVE-2022-1355:
https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/c1ae29f9ebacd29b7c3e0c7db671af7db3584bc2
(From OE-Core rev: 6c373c041f1dd45458866408d1ca16d47cacbd86)
--- .../libtiff/tiff/CVE-2022-1354.patch | 212 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libtiff/tiff/CVE-2022-1355.patch | 62 +++++ meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 276 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/CVE-2022-1354.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/CVE-2022-1355.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/CVE-2022-1354.patch new file +212 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +From 87881e093691a35c60b91cafed058ba2dd5d9807 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2021 14:37:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] TIFFReadDirectory: fix OJPEG hack (fixes #319) + +to avoid having the size of the strip arrays inconsistent with the +number of strips returned by TIFFNumberOfStrips(), which may cause +out-ouf-bounds array read afterwards. + +One of the OJPEG hack that alters SamplesPerPixel may influence the +number of strips. Hence compute tif_dir.td_nstrips only afterwards. + +CVE: CVE-2022-1354 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/87f580f39011109b3bb5f6eca13fac543a542798] + +Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <[email protected]> +--- + libtiff/tif_dirread.c | 162 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- + 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libtiff/tif_dirread.c b/libtiff/tif_dirread.c +index 8f434ef5..14c031d1 100644 +--- a/libtiff/tif_dirread.c ++++ b/libtiff/tif_dirread.c +@@ -3794,50 +3794,7 @@ TIFFReadDirectory(TIFF* tif) + MissingRequired(tif,"ImageLength"); + goto bad; + } +- /* +- * Setup appropriate structures (by strip or by tile) +- */ +- if (!TIFFFieldSet(tif, FIELD_TILEDIMENSIONS)) { +- tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(tif); +- tif->tif_dir.td_tilewidth = tif->tif_dir.td_imagewidth; +- tif->tif_dir.td_tilelength = tif->tif_dir.td_rowsperstrip; +- tif->tif_dir.td_tiledepth = tif->tif_dir.td_imagedepth; +- tif->tif_flags &= ~TIFF_ISTILED; +- } else { +- tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips = TIFFNumberOfTiles(tif); +- tif->tif_flags |= TIFF_ISTILED; +- } +- if (!tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips) { +- TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, +- "Cannot handle zero number of %s", +- isTiled(tif) ? "tiles" : "strips"); +- goto bad; +- } +- tif->tif_dir.td_stripsperimage = tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips; +- if (tif->tif_dir.td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) +- tif->tif_dir.td_stripsperimage /= tif->tif_dir.td_samplesperpixel; +- if (!TIFFFieldSet(tif, FIELD_STRIPOFFSETS)) { +-#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT +- if ((tif->tif_dir.td_compression==COMPRESSION_OJPEG) && +- (isTiled(tif)==0) && +- (tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips==1)) { +- /* +- * XXX: OJPEG hack. +- * If a) compression is OJPEG, b) it's not a tiled TIFF, +- * and c) the number of strips is 1, +- * then we tolerate the absence of stripoffsets tag, +- * because, presumably, all required data is in the +- * JpegInterchangeFormat stream. +- */ +- TIFFSetFieldBit(tif, FIELD_STRIPOFFSETS); +- } else +-#endif +- { +- MissingRequired(tif, +- isTiled(tif) ? "TileOffsets" : "StripOffsets"); +- goto bad; +- } +- } ++ + /* + * Second pass: extract other information. + */ +@@ -4042,41 +3999,6 @@ TIFFReadDirectory(TIFF* tif) + } /* -- if (!dp->tdir_ignore) */ + } /* -- for-loop -- */ + +- if( tif->tif_mode == O_RDWR && +- tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry.tdir_tag != 0 && +- tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry.tdir_count == 0 && +- tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry.tdir_type == 0 && +- tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry.tdir_offset.toff_long8 == 0 && +- tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry.tdir_tag != 0 && +- tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry.tdir_count == 0 && +- tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry.tdir_type == 0 && +- tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry.tdir_offset.toff_long8 == 0 ) +- { +- /* Directory typically created with TIFFDeferStrileArrayWriting() */ +- TIFFSetupStrips(tif); +- } +- else if( !(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_DEFERSTRILELOAD) ) +- { +- if( tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry.tdir_tag != 0 ) +- { +- if (!TIFFFetchStripThing(tif,&(tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry), +- tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips, +- &tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_p)) +- { +- goto bad; +- } +- } +- if( tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry.tdir_tag != 0 ) +- { +- if (!TIFFFetchStripThing(tif,&(tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry), +- tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips, +- &tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_p)) +- { +- goto bad; +- } +- } +- } +- + /* + * OJPEG hack: + * - If a) compression is OJPEG, and b) photometric tag is missing, +@@ -4147,6 +4069,88 @@ TIFFReadDirectory(TIFF* tif) + } + } + ++ /* ++ * Setup appropriate structures (by strip or by tile) ++ * We do that only after the above OJPEG hack which alters SamplesPerPixel ++ * and thus influences the number of strips in the separate planarconfig. ++ */ ++ if (!TIFFFieldSet(tif, FIELD_TILEDIMENSIONS)) { ++ tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(tif); ++ tif->tif_dir.td_tilewidth = tif->tif_dir.td_imagewidth; ++ tif->tif_dir.td_tilelength = tif->tif_dir.td_rowsperstrip; ++ tif->tif_dir.td_tiledepth = tif->tif_dir.td_imagedepth; ++ tif->tif_flags &= ~TIFF_ISTILED; ++ } else { ++ tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips = TIFFNumberOfTiles(tif); ++ tif->tif_flags |= TIFF_ISTILED; ++ } ++ if (!tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips) { ++ TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, ++ "Cannot handle zero number of %s", ++ isTiled(tif) ? "tiles" : "strips"); ++ goto bad; ++ } ++ tif->tif_dir.td_stripsperimage = tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips; ++ if (tif->tif_dir.td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) ++ tif->tif_dir.td_stripsperimage /= tif->tif_dir.td_samplesperpixel; ++ if (!TIFFFieldSet(tif, FIELD_STRIPOFFSETS)) { ++#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT ++ if ((tif->tif_dir.td_compression==COMPRESSION_OJPEG) && ++ (isTiled(tif)==0) && ++ (tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips==1)) { ++ /* ++ * XXX: OJPEG hack. ++ * If a) compression is OJPEG, b) it's not a tiled TIFF, ++ * and c) the number of strips is 1, ++ * then we tolerate the absence of stripoffsets tag, ++ * because, presumably, all required data is in the ++ * JpegInterchangeFormat stream. ++ */ ++ TIFFSetFieldBit(tif, FIELD_STRIPOFFSETS); ++ } else ++#endif ++ { ++ MissingRequired(tif, ++ isTiled(tif) ? "TileOffsets" : "StripOffsets"); ++ goto bad; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if( tif->tif_mode == O_RDWR && ++ tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry.tdir_tag != 0 && ++ tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry.tdir_count == 0 && ++ tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry.tdir_type == 0 && ++ tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry.tdir_offset.toff_long8 == 0 && ++ tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry.tdir_tag != 0 && ++ tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry.tdir_count == 0 && ++ tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry.tdir_type == 0 && ++ tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry.tdir_offset.toff_long8 == 0 ) ++ { ++ /* Directory typically created with TIFFDeferStrileArrayWriting() */ ++ TIFFSetupStrips(tif); ++ } ++ else if( !(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_DEFERSTRILELOAD) ) ++ { ++ if( tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry.tdir_tag != 0 ) ++ { ++ if (!TIFFFetchStripThing(tif,&(tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_entry), ++ tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips, ++ &tif->tif_dir.td_stripoffset_p)) ++ { ++ goto bad; ++ } ++ } ++ if( tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry.tdir_tag != 0 ) ++ { ++ if (!TIFFFetchStripThing(tif,&(tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_entry), ++ tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips, ++ &tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount_p)) ++ { ++ goto bad; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ + /* + * Make sure all non-color channels are extrasamples. + * If it's not the case, define them as such. +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/CVE-2022-1355.patch new file +62 -0
62 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb +2 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.osgeo.org/libtiff/tiff-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2022-2056-CVE-2022-2057-CVE-2022-2058.patch \ file://CVE-2022-34526.patch \ file://CVE-2022-2867-CVE-2022-2868-CVE-2022-2869.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-1354.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-1355.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2165e7aba557463acc0664e71a3ed424" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5d29f32517dadb6dbcd1255ea5bbc93a2b54b94fbf83653b4d65c7d6775b8634"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 4/9 connman: fix CVE-2022-32292
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]>
--- .../connman/connman/CVE-2022-32292.patch | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ .../connman/connman_1.37.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-32292.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-32292.patch new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From d1a5ede5d255bde8ef707f8441b997563b9312bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nathan Crandall <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 08:56:34 +0200 +Subject: gweb: Fix OOB write in received_data() + +There is a mismatch of handling binary vs. C-string data with memchr +and strlen, resulting in pos, count, and bytes_read to become out of +sync and result in a heap overflow. Instead, do not treat the buffer +as an ASCII C-string. We calculate the count based on the return value +of memchr, instead of strlen. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-32292 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=d1a5ede5d255bde8ef707f8441b997563b9312b +CVE: CVE-2022-32292 +Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]> +--- + gweb/gweb.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/gweb/gweb.c b/gweb/gweb.c +index 12fcb1d8..13c6c5f2 100644 +--- a/gweb/gweb.c ++++ b/gweb/gweb.c +@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ static gboolean received_data(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition cond, + } + + *pos = '\0'; +- count = strlen((char *) ptr); ++ count = pos - ptr; + if (count > 0 && ptr[count - 1] == '\r') { + ptr[--count] = '\0'; + bytes_read--; +-- +cgit +
meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.37.bb +1 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2021-33833.patch \ file://CVE-2022-23096-7.patch \ file://CVE-2022-23098.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-32292.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0002-resolve-musl-does-not-implement-res_ninit.patch"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 5/9 gnutls: fix CVE-2021-4209
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]>
--- .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-4209.patch | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-4209.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-4209.patch new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 3db352734472d851318944db13be73da61300568 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2021 09:12:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wrap_nettle_hash_fast: avoid calling _update with zero-length + input + +As Nettle's hash update functions internally call memcpy, providing +zero-length input may cause undefined behavior. + +Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]> + +https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/3db352734472d851318944db13be73da61300568 +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2021-4209 +Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]> +--- + lib/nettle/mac.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/lib/nettle/mac.c b/lib/nettle/mac.c +index f9d4d7a8df..35e070fab0 100644 +--- a/lib/nettle/mac.c ++++ b/lib/nettle/mac.c +@@ -788,7 +788,9 @@ static int wrap_nettle_hash_fast(gnutls_digest_algorithm_t algo, + if (ret < 0) + return gnutls_assert_val(ret); + +- ctx.update(&ctx, text_size, text); ++ if (text_size > 0) { ++ ctx.update(&ctx, text_size, text); ++ } + ctx.digest(&ctx, ctx.length, digest); + + return 0; +-- +GitLab +
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb +1 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar file://CVE-2021-20231.patch \ file://CVE-2021-20232.patch \ file://CVE-2022-2509.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-4209.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5630751adec7025b8ef955af4d141d00d252a985769f51b4059e5affa3d39d63"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 6/9 virglrenderer: fix CVE-2022-0135
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]>
--- .../virglrenderer/CVE-2022-0135.patch | 100 ++++++++++++++++++ .../virglrenderer/virglrenderer_0.8.2.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 101 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/virglrenderer/virglrenderer/CVE-2022-0135.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/virglrenderer/virglrenderer/CVE-2022-0135.patch new file +100 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +From 95e581fd181b213c2ed7cdc63f2abc03eaaa77ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gert Wollny <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 10:17:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] vrend: Add test to resource OOB write and fix it + +v2: Also check that no depth != 1 has been send when none is due + +Closes: #250 +Signed-off-by: Gert Wollny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Chia-I Wu <[email protected]> + +https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/virgl/virglrenderer/-/commit/95e581fd181b213c2ed7cdc63f2abc03eaaa77ec +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2022-0135 +Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]> +--- + src/vrend_renderer.c | 3 +++ + tests/test_fuzzer_formats.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/vrend_renderer.c b/src/vrend_renderer.c +index 28f669727..357b81b20 100644 +--- a/src/vrend_renderer.c ++++ b/src/vrend_renderer.c +@@ -7833,8 +7833,11 @@ static int vrend_renderer_transfer_write_iov(struct vrend_context *ctx, + info->box->height) * elsize; + if (res->target == GL_TEXTURE_3D || + res->target == GL_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY || ++ res->target == GL_TEXTURE_2D_MULTISAMPLE_ARRAY || + res->target == GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_ARRAY) + send_size *= info->box->depth; ++ else if (need_temp && info->box->depth != 1) ++ return EINVAL; + + if (need_temp) { + data = malloc(send_size); +diff --git a/tests/test_fuzzer_formats.c b/tests/test_fuzzer_formats.c +index 59d6fb671..2de9a9a3f 100644 +--- a/tests/test_fuzzer_formats.c ++++ b/tests/test_fuzzer_formats.c +@@ -957,6 +957,48 @@ static void test_vrend_set_signle_abo_heap_overflow() { + virgl_renderer_submit_cmd((void *) cmd, ctx_id, 0xde); + } + ++/* Test adapted from [email protected]: ++ * https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/virgl/virglrenderer/-/issues/250 ++*/ ++static void test_vrend_3d_resource_overflow() { ++ ++ struct virgl_renderer_resource_create_args resource; ++ resource.handle = 0x4c474572; ++ resource.target = PIPE_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY; ++ resource.format = VIRGL_FORMAT_Z24X8_UNORM; ++ resource.nr_samples = 2; ++ resource.last_level = 0; ++ resource.array_size = 3; ++ resource.bind = VIRGL_BIND_SAMPLER_VIEW; ++ resource.depth = 1; ++ resource.width = 8; ++ resource.height = 4; ++ resource.flags = 0; ++ ++ virgl_renderer_resource_create(&resource, NULL, 0); ++ virgl_renderer_ctx_attach_resource(ctx_id, resource.handle); ++ ++ uint32_t size = 0x400; ++ uint32_t cmd[size]; ++ int i = 0; ++ cmd[i++] = (size - 1) << 16 | 0 << 8 | VIRGL_CCMD_RESOURCE_INLINE_WRITE; ++ cmd[i++] = resource.handle; ++ cmd[i++] = 0; // level ++ cmd[i++] = 0; // usage ++ cmd[i++] = 0; // stride ++ cmd[i++] = 0; // layer_stride ++ cmd[i++] = 0; // x ++ cmd[i++] = 0; // y ++ cmd[i++] = 0; // z ++ cmd[i++] = 8; // w ++ cmd[i++] = 4; // h ++ cmd[i++] = 3; // d ++ memset(&cmd[i], 0, size - i); ++ ++ virgl_renderer_submit_cmd((void *) cmd, ctx_id, size); ++} ++ ++ + int main() + { + initialize_environment(); +@@ -979,6 +1021,7 @@ int main() + test_cs_nullpointer_deference(); + test_vrend_set_signle_abo_heap_overflow(); + ++ test_vrend_3d_resource_overflow(); + + virgl_renderer_context_destroy(ctx_id); + virgl_renderer_cleanup(&cookie); +-- +GitLab +
meta/recipes-graphics/virglrenderer/virglrenderer_0.8.2.bb +1 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRCREV = "7d204f3927be65fb3365dce01dbcd04d447a4985" SRC_URI = "git://anongit.freedesktop.org/git/virglrenderer;branch=master \ file://0001-gallium-Expand-libc-check-to-be-platform-OS-check.patch \ file://0001-meson.build-use-python3-directly-for-python.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-0135.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 7/9 systemd: Fix unwritable /var/lock when no sysvinit handling
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Commit 8089cefed8e83c0348037768c292058f1bcbbbe5 ("systemd: Add PACKAGECONFIG for sysvinit") decoupled enabling of systemd's sysvinit handling behavior behind a distinct PACKAGECONFIG feature.
This new option affects among other things the installing of tmpfiles.d/legacy.conf, which is responsible for creating /run/lock directory, which is pointed to by /var/lock symlink provided by base-files package.
In case the option is not enabled, then base-files provided /var/lock is a dangling symlink on resulting rootfs, causing problems with certain Linux userspace components that rely on existence of writable /var/lock directory. As an example:
# fw_printenv Error opening lock file /var/lock/fw_printenv.lock
Since Filesystem Hierarchy Standard Version 3.0 states in
https://refspecs.linuxfoundation.org/FHS_3.0/fhs/ch05s09.html that
Lock files should be stored within the /var/lock directory structure.
Ensure the /run/lock directory is always created, so that lock files can be stored under /var/lock also when 'sysvinit' handling is disabled.
(From OE-Core rev: 85e5ee2c35cf5778c3aefda45f526e8f6a511131)
--- meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/00-create-volatile.conf | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/00-create-volatile.conf +1 -0
@@ -3,5 +3,6 @@ # inside /var/log. +d /run/lock 1777 - - - d /var/volatile/log - - - - d /var/volatile/tmp 1777 - -
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 8/9 systemd: Add 'no-dns-fallback' PACKAGECONFIG option
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
systemd defines a default set of fallback DNS servers in
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/v251/meson_options.txt#L328-L330
By adding a PACKAGECONFIG knob providing a convenient way to opt out, and then adding that value to systemd's PACKAGECONFIG, the output from runtime 'resolvectl status' command no longer contains the following line:
Fallback DNS Servers: 1.1.1.1#cloudflare-dns.com 8.8.8.8#dns.google 1.0.0.1#cloudflare-dns.com 8.8.4.4#dns.google 2606:4700:4700::1111#cloudflare-dns.com 2001:4860:4860::8888#dns.google 2606:4700:4700::1001#cloudflare-dns.com 2001:4860:4860::8844#dns.google
(From OE-Core rev: 2b300d6b9ec6288a99d9dacb24a86949caf99e55)
--- meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_244.5.bb | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_244.5.bb +1 -0
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[manpages] = "-Dman=true,-Dman=false,libxslt-native xmlto-native do PACKAGECONFIG[microhttpd] = "-Dmicrohttpd=true,-Dmicrohttpd=false,libmicrohttpd" PACKAGECONFIG[myhostname] = "-Dnss-myhostname=true,-Dnss-myhostname=false,,libnss-myhostname" PACKAGECONFIG[networkd] = "-Dnetworkd=true,-Dnetworkd=false" +PACKAGECONFIG[no-dns-fallback] = "-Ddns-servers=" PACKAGECONFIG[nss] = "-Dnss-systemd=true,-Dnss-systemd=false" PACKAGECONFIG[nss-mymachines] = "-Dnss-mymachines=true,-Dnss-mymachines=false" PACKAGECONFIG[nss-resolve] = "-Dnss-resolve=true,-Dnss-resolve=false"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 9/9 binutils : CVE-2022-38533
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Florin Diaconescu <[email protected]>
Upstream-Status: Backport
[https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=ef186fe54aa6d281a3ff8a9528417e5cc614c797]
--- .../binutils/binutils-2.34.inc | 1 + .../binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-38533.patch | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-38533.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.34.inc +1 -0
@@ -52,5 +52,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://CVE-2021-3549.patch \ file://CVE-2020-16593.patch \ file://0001-CVE-2021-45078.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-38533.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-38533.patch new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From ef186fe54aa6d281a3ff8a9528417e5cc614c797 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Modra <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 13 Aug 2022 15:32:47 +0930 +Subject: [PATCH] PR29482 - strip: heap-buffer-overflow + + PR 29482 + * coffcode.h (coff_set_section_contents): Sanity check _LIB. + +CVE: CVE-2022-38533 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=ef186fe54aa6d281a3ff8a9528417e5cc614c797] + +Signed-off-by: Florin Diaconescu <[email protected]> + +--- + bfd/coffcode.h | 7 +++++-- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bfd/coffcode.h b/bfd/coffcode.h +index dec2e9c6370..75c18d88602 100644 +--- a/bfd/coffcode.h ++++ b/bfd/coffcode.h +@@ -4170,10 +4170,13 @@ coff_set_section_contents (bfd * abfd, + + rec = (bfd_byte *) location; + recend = rec + count; +- while (rec < recend) ++ while (recend - rec >= 4) + { ++ size_t len = bfd_get_32 (abfd, rec); ++ if (len == 0 || len > (size_t) (recend - rec) / 4) ++ break; ++ rec += len * 4; + ++section->lma; +- rec += bfd_get_32 (abfd, rec) * 4; + } + + BFD_ASSERT (rec == recend);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1