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sched: fix user_mask double free

PATCH In review [email protected] 5 participants 10 messages Nov 21, 2022 – Nov 25, 2022 3 messages not in the archive Scheduler

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#0 lore raw

cover sched: fix user_mask double free

From: wangbiao3 <[email protected]>

    Clone/Fork a new task,call dup_task_struct->arch_dup_task_struct(tsk,orig)
    which copy the data of parent/sibling task inclding p->user_cpus_ptr,so
    the user_cpus_ptr of newtask is the same with orig task's.When
    dup_task_struct call dup_user_cpus_ptr(tsk, orig, node),it return 0
    dircetly if src->user_cpus_ptris free by other task,in this case ,
    the newtask's address of user_cpus_ptr is not changed. Finally,
    wakup newtask to execute, call task_cpu_possible_mask-->
    do_set_cpus_allowed to set new task's user_cpus_ptr(user_mask) which
    call kfree user_mask at the end. So cause a slub double free panic.

    Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr in dup_user_cpus_ptr and
    clear dst->user_cpus_ptr when found src->user_cpus_ptr is null

    kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:363!
    Call trace:
     __slab_free+0x230/0x28c
     kfree+0x220/0x2cc
     do_set_cpus_allowed+0x74/0xa4
     select_fallback_rq+0x12c/0x200
     wake_up_new_task+0x26c/0x304
     kernel_clone+0x2c0/0x470
     __arm64_sys_clone+0x5c/0x8c
     invoke_syscall+0x60/0x150
     el0_svc_common.llvm.13030543509303927816+0x98/0x114
     do_el0_svc_compat+0x20/0x30
     el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x90
     el0t_32_sync_handler+0x7c/0xbc
     el0t_32_sync+0x1b8/0x1bc

wangbiao3 (1):
sched: fix user_mask double free

 kernel/sched/core.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--
2.38.1

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#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 sched: fix user_mask double free

From: wangbiao3 <[email protected]>

Clone/Fork a new task,call dup_task_struct->arch_dup_task_struct(tsk,orig) which copy the data of parent/sibling task inclding p->user_cpus_ptr,so the user_cpus_ptr of newtask is the same with orig task's.When dup_task_struct call dup_user_cpus_ptr(tsk, orig, node),it return 0 dircetly if src->user_cpus_ptris free by other task,in this case , the newtask's address of user_cpus_ptr is not changed. Finally, wakup newtask to execute, call task_cpu_possible_mask--> do_set_cpus_allowed to set new task's user_cpus_ptr(user_mask) which call kfree user_mask at the end. So cause a slub double free panic.

Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr in dup_user_cpus_ptr and clear dst->user_cpus_ptr when found src->user_cpus_ptr is null

kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:363!

Call trace:
 __slab_free+0x230/0x28c
 kfree+0x220/0x2cc
 do_set_cpus_allowed+0x74/0xa4
 select_fallback_rq+0x12c/0x200
 wake_up_new_task+0x26c/0x304
 kernel_clone+0x2c0/0x470
 __arm64_sys_clone+0x5c/0x8c
 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x150
 el0_svc_common.llvm.13030543509303927816+0x98/0x114
 do_el0_svc_compat+0x20/0x30
 el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x90
 el0t_32_sync_handler+0x7c/0xbc
 el0t_32_sync+0x1b8/0x1bc
---
 kernel/sched/core.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/core.c +20 -11
index daff72f00385..b013d8b777b4 100644
@@ -2584,29 +2584,38 @@ void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask)
        __do_set_cpus_allowed(p, new_mask, 0);
 }
 
+static inline struct cpumask *clear_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+       struct cpumask *user_mask = NULL;
+
+       swap(p->user_cpus_ptr, user_mask);
+
+       return user_mask;
+}
+
 int dup_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src,
                      int node)
 {
-       if (!src->user_cpus_ptr)
-               return 0;
+       unsigned long flags;
+       struct cpumask *user_mask = NULL;
 
        dst->user_cpus_ptr = kmalloc_node(cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL, node);
        if (!dst->user_cpus_ptr)
                return -ENOMEM;
 
+       /* Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr */
+       raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&src->pi_lock, flags);
+       if (!src->user_cpus_ptr) {
+               user_mask = clear_user_cpus_ptr(dst);
+               raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->pi_lock, flags);
+               kfree(user_mask);
+               return 0;
+       }
        cpumask_copy(dst->user_cpus_ptr, src->user_cpus_ptr);
+       raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->pi_lock, flags);
        return 0;
 }
 
-static inline struct cpumask *clear_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-       struct cpumask *user_mask = NULL;
-
-       swap(p->user_cpus_ptr, user_mask);
-
-       return user_mask;
-}
-
 void release_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *p)
 {
        kfree(clear_user_cpus_ptr(p));

--
2.38.1

#/******���ʼ����丽������С�׹�˾�ı�����Ϣ�������ڷ��͸������ַ���г��ĸ��˻�Ⱥ�顣��ֹ�κ����������κ���ʽʹ�ã�������������ȫ���򲿷ֵ�й¶�����ơ���ɢ�������ʼ��е���Ϣ������������˱��ʼ������������绰���ʼ�֪ͨ�����˲�ɾ�����ʼ��� This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from XIAOMI, which is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by phone or email immediately and delete it!******/#

#2 lore raw

+CC the missing people from get_maintainers.pl

Quoted 48 lines · On Monday 21 Nov 2022 at 18:04:20 (+0800), [email protected] wrote:

From: wangbiao3 <[email protected]>

Clone/Fork a new task,call dup_task_struct->arch_dup_task_struct(tsk,orig) which copy the data of parent/sibling task inclding p->user_cpus_ptr,so the user_cpus_ptr of newtask is the same with orig task's.When dup_task_struct call dup_user_cpus_ptr(tsk, orig, node),it return 0 dircetly if src->user_cpus_ptris free by other task,in this case , the newtask's address of user_cpus_ptr is not changed. Finally, wakup newtask to execute, call task_cpu_possible_mask--> do_set_cpus_allowed to set new task's user_cpus_ptr(user_mask) which call kfree user_mask at the end. So cause a slub double free panic.

Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr in dup_user_cpus_ptr and clear dst->user_cpus_ptr when found src->user_cpus_ptr is null

kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:363!

Call trace:
 __slab_free+0x230/0x28c
 kfree+0x220/0x2cc
 do_set_cpus_allowed+0x74/0xa4
 select_fallback_rq+0x12c/0x200
 wake_up_new_task+0x26c/0x304
 kernel_clone+0x2c0/0x470
 __arm64_sys_clone+0x5c/0x8c
 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x150
 el0_svc_common.llvm.13030543509303927816+0x98/0x114
 do_el0_svc_compat+0x20/0x30
 el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x90
 el0t_32_sync_handler+0x7c/0xbc
 el0t_32_sync+0x1b8/0x1bc
---
 kernel/sched/core.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/core.c +4 -0
index daff72f00385..b013d8b777b4 100644
@@ -2584,29 +2584,38 @@ void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask)
        __do_set_cpus_allowed(p, new_mask, 0);
 }
 
+static inline struct cpumask *clear_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+       struct cpumask *user_mask = NULL;
+

kernel/sched/core.c void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask) · line 2591

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/sched/core.c +5 -2
+       swap(p->user_cpus_ptr, user_mask);
+
+       return user_mask;
+}
+
 int dup_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src,
                      int node)
 {
-       if (!src->user_cpus_ptr)
-               return 0;

Removing this puts the kmalloc_node() (and kfree()) below on the fast path for everyone. It wouldn't be surprising if this causes regressions for some people ...

Can we optimize that?

Quoted 35 lines
kernel/sched/core.c +11 -10
+       unsigned long flags;
+       struct cpumask *user_mask = NULL;
 
        dst->user_cpus_ptr = kmalloc_node(cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL, node);
        if (!dst->user_cpus_ptr)
                return -ENOMEM;
 
+       /* Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr */
+       raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&src->pi_lock, flags);
+       if (!src->user_cpus_ptr) {
+               user_mask = clear_user_cpus_ptr(dst);
+               raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->pi_lock, flags);
+               kfree(user_mask);
+               return 0;
+       }
        cpumask_copy(dst->user_cpus_ptr, src->user_cpus_ptr);
+       raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->pi_lock, flags);
        return 0;
 }
 
-static inline struct cpumask *clear_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-       struct cpumask *user_mask = NULL;
-
-       swap(p->user_cpus_ptr, user_mask);
-
-       return user_mask;
-}
-
 void release_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *p)
 {
        kfree(clear_user_cpus_ptr(p));
--

2.38.1

Quoted 1 line

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Note that this legalese must be removed from your email before anybody can apply this patch, please see Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.

Thanks,
Quentin

maintainer
#3 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]

So you failed:

- to Cc the original author of this code (Will Deacon)
- to report what version this is against (apparently Linus' tree)
- to check if this still applies to the latest tree (it doesn't)
- to Cc the author of the code it now conflicts with (Waiman)
- write something coherent in the changelog.
- to include a Fixes tag.

Still, let me try and make sense of things...

Quoted 8 lines · On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 06:04:20PM +0800, [email protected] wrote:

From: wangbiao3 <[email protected]>

Clone/Fork a new task,call dup_task_struct->arch_dup_task_struct(tsk,orig) which copy the data of parent/sibling task inclding p->user_cpus_ptr,so the user_cpus_ptr of newtask is the same with orig task's.When dup_task_struct call dup_user_cpus_ptr(tsk, orig, node),it return 0 dircetly if src->user_cpus_ptris free by other task,in this case , the newtask's address of user_cpus_ptr is not changed.

(even just inserting some whitespace would've made it so much easier to read)

But, the only way that would be possible is if force_compatible_cpus_allowed_ptr() were to be called on !current, and that just doesn't happen, the only callsite is:

arch/arm64/kernel/process.c: force_compatible_cpus_allowed_ptr(current);

And you can't be in fork() and exec() at the same time.

If it were possible to call restrict_cpus_allowed_ptr() on a non-current task then yes, absolutely, which is why:

8f9ea86fdf99 ("sched: Always preserve the user requested cpumask")

also wraps the thing in pi_lock, but looking at it now, perhaps it needs to do the alloc/copy first and swap under pi_lock instead.

(leaving the rest for the newly Cc'ed)

Quoted 87 lines

Finally,
wakup newtask to execute, call task_cpu_possible_mask--> do_set_cpus_allowed to set new task's user_cpus_ptr(user_mask) which call kfree user_mask at the end. So cause a slub double free panic.

Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr in dup_user_cpus_ptr and clear dst->user_cpus_ptr when found src->user_cpus_ptr is null

kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:363!

Call trace:
 __slab_free+0x230/0x28c
 kfree+0x220/0x2cc
 do_set_cpus_allowed+0x74/0xa4
 select_fallback_rq+0x12c/0x200
 wake_up_new_task+0x26c/0x304
 kernel_clone+0x2c0/0x470
 __arm64_sys_clone+0x5c/0x8c
 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x150
 el0_svc_common.llvm.13030543509303927816+0x98/0x114
 do_el0_svc_compat+0x20/0x30
 el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x90
 el0t_32_sync_handler+0x7c/0xbc
 el0t_32_sync+0x1b8/0x1bc
---
 kernel/sched/core.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/core.c +20 -12
index daff72f00385..b013d8b777b4 100644
@@ -2584,29 +2584,38 @@ void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask)
        __do_set_cpus_allowed(p, new_mask, 0);
 }
 
+static inline struct cpumask *clear_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+       struct cpumask *user_mask = NULL;
+
+       swap(p->user_cpus_ptr, user_mask);
+
+       return user_mask;
+}
+
 int dup_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src,
                      int node)
 {
-       if (!src->user_cpus_ptr)
-               return 0;
+       unsigned long flags;
+       struct cpumask *user_mask = NULL;
 
        dst->user_cpus_ptr = kmalloc_node(cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL, node);
        if (!dst->user_cpus_ptr)
                return -ENOMEM;
 
+       /* Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr */
+       raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&src->pi_lock, flags);
+       if (!src->user_cpus_ptr) {
+               user_mask = clear_user_cpus_ptr(dst);
+               raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->pi_lock, flags);
+               kfree(user_mask);
+               return 0;
+       }
        cpumask_copy(dst->user_cpus_ptr, src->user_cpus_ptr);
+       raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->pi_lock, flags);
        return 0;
 }
 
-static inline struct cpumask *clear_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-       struct cpumask *user_mask = NULL;
-
-       swap(p->user_cpus_ptr, user_mask);
-
-       return user_mask;
-}
-
 void release_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *p)
 {
        kfree(clear_user_cpus_ptr(p));
--

2.38.1

#/******?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from XIAOMI, which is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by phone or email immediately and delete it!******/#

maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Peter Zijlstra

So you failed:

Quoted 1 line

#/******?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from XIAOMI, which is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by phone or email immediately and delete it!******/#

Also, that ^ is super fail, you're sending this to a public list. Please tell your (IT) manager it makes your corporation look like an idiot.

#5 lore raw
In reply to Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 31 lines · Peter Zijlstra

So you failed:

- to Cc the original author of this code (Will Deacon)
- to report what version this is against (apparently Linus' tree)
- to check if this still applies to the latest tree (it doesn't)
- to Cc the author of the code it now conflicts with (Waiman)
- write something coherent in the changelog.
- to include a Fixes tag.

Still, let me try and make sense of things...

Quoted 8 lines · On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 06:04:20PM +0800, [email protected] wrote:

From: wangbiao3 <[email protected]>

Clone/Fork a new task,call dup_task_struct->arch_dup_task_struct(tsk,orig) which copy the data of parent/sibling task inclding p->user_cpus_ptr,so the user_cpus_ptr of newtask is the same with orig task's.When dup_task_struct call dup_user_cpus_ptr(tsk, orig, node),it return 0 dircetly if src->user_cpus_ptris free by other task,in this case , the newtask's address of user_cpus_ptr is not changed.

(even just inserting some whitespace would've made it so much easier to read)

But, the only way that would be possible is if force_compatible_cpus_allowed_ptr() were to be called on !current, and that just doesn't happen, the only callsite is:

arch/arm64/kernel/process.c: force_compatible_cpus_allowed_ptr(current);

And you can't be in fork() and exec() at the same time.

Quoted 7 lines

If it were possible to call restrict_cpus_allowed_ptr() on a non-current task then yes, absolutely, which is why:

8f9ea86fdf99 ("sched: Always preserve the user requested cpumask")

also wraps the thing in pi_lock, but looking at it now, perhaps it needs to do the alloc/copy first and swap under pi_lock instead.

With the latest change, user_cpus_ptr, once set, will not be cleared until when the task dies. That is why I don't recheck if user_cpus_ptr is NULL under pi_lock. The user_cpus_ptr value can certainly changes during its lifetime, but it will be stable under pi_lock. clear_user_cpus_ptr() is called by release_user_cpus_ptr() only. As said before, it is only call when the task dies at free_task() and so there shouldn't be any other racing conditions that can happen at the same time.

David, can you try the latest tip tree to see if the problem is still reproducible ?

Thanks,
Longman

#6 lore raw
Quoted 36 lines · Waiman Long
Quoted 34 lines · Peter Zijlstra

So you failed:

  - to Cc the original author of this code (Will Deacon)
  - to report what version this is against (apparently Linus' tree)
  - to check if this still applies to the latest tree (it doesn't)
  - to Cc the author of the code it now conflicts with (Waiman)
  - write something coherent in the changelog.
  - to include a Fixes tag.

Still, let me try and make sense of things...

Quoted 8 lines · On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 06:04:20PM +0800, [email protected] wrote:

From: wangbiao3 <[email protected]>

Clone/Fork a new task,call dup_task_struct->arch_dup_task_struct(tsk,orig) which copy the data of parent/sibling task inclding p->user_cpus_ptr,so the user_cpus_ptr of newtask is the same with orig task's.When dup_task_struct call dup_user_cpus_ptr(tsk, orig, node),it return 0 dircetly if src->user_cpus_ptris free by other task,in this case , the newtask's address of user_cpus_ptr is not changed.

(even just inserting some whitespace would've made it so much easier to read)

But, the only way that would be possible is if force_compatible_cpus_allowed_ptr() were to be called on !current, and that just doesn't happen, the only callsite is:

arch/arm64/kernel/process.c: force_compatible_cpus_allowed_ptr(current);

And you can't be in fork() and exec() at the same time.

If it were possible to call restrict_cpus_allowed_ptr() on a non-current task then yes, absolutely, which is why:

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

   8f9ea86fdf99 ("sched: Always preserve the user requested cpumask")

also wraps the thing in pi_lock, but looking at it now, perhaps it needs to do the alloc/copy first and swap under pi_lock instead.

With the latest change, user_cpus_ptr, once set, will not be cleared until when the task dies. That is why I don't recheck if user_cpus_ptr is NULL under pi_lock. The user_cpus_ptr value can certainly changes during its lifetime, but it will be stable under pi_lock. clear_user_cpus_ptr() is called by release_user_cpus_ptr() only. As said before, it is only call when the task dies at free_task() and so there shouldn't be any other racing conditions that can happen at the same time.

On second thought, do_set_cpus_allowed() can put NULL into user_cpus_ptr. So I think we should do null check in dup_user_cpus_ptr() inside the pi_lock. Will send a patch to do that.

Cheers,
Longman

#10 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive
Quoted 69 lines · David Wang 王标

Dear Waiman,

Yes, we have read https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/  and checked it  carefully.

We mean dup_user_cpus_ptr should not judge if the src->user_cpus_ptr is null at the entry of the
Function dup_user_cpus_ptr.
If do this when user_cpus_ptr is freed by othe thread, but the parent task copy the user_cpus_ptr
data for new task through dup_task_struct <https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?refs=dup_task_struct&project=KERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0>
-> arch_dup_task_struct
<https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/xref/KERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0/kernel_platform/common/kernel/fork.c#arch_dup_task_struct>(tsk <https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=tsk&project=KERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0>, orig <https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=orig&project=KERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0>) before the user_cpus_ptr
,
is freed, ,next , when dup_task_struct <https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?refs=dup_task_struct&project=KERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0> call dup_user_cpus_ptr <https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=dup_user_cpus_ptr&project=KERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0>(tsk <https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=tsk&project=KERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0>, orig <https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=orig&project=KERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0>, node <https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=node&project=KERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0>),it will return directly without doing nothing.  When wake up new task , then call select_fallback_rqàdo_set_cpus_allowed,
it will meet slub double free issue.  Then new path can not fix issue in this scenario.
void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask)
{
        struct affinity_context ac = {
               .new_mask  = new_mask,
               .user_mask = NULL,
               .flags     = SCA_USER,      /* clear the user requested mask */
        };
        __do_set_cpus_allowed(p, &ac);
        kfree(ac.user_mask);
}
Kfree kfree(ac.user_mask) cause double free issue. New patch just cover the user_cpus_ptr is freed
after  code running into raw_spin_lock_irqsave, if it can not enter into pi_lock critical section,
what will happen.

Maybe should delte following code at the entry of fuction . Please help check it.

-       if (!src->user_cpus_ptr)     //delete this

-              return 0;            //delete  this

We think maybe path needs a little more modification like following :

kernel/sched/core.c <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/#Z31kernel:sched:core.c> | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--

1 file changed <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/#related>, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/#iZ31kernel:sched:core.c>
--git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c

index 8df51b08bb38..6b259d9e127a 100644

--- a/kernel/sched/core.c

+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c

(quoted diff) +1 -0
@@ -2624,8 +2624,14 @@ void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, 
 const struct cpumask *new_mask)
 
 int dup_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src,
 
       int node)
 
 {
 
+ cpumask_t *user_mask = NULL;

       unsigned long flags;

+ /*

+ * This check is racy and losing the race is a valid situation.

+ * It is not worth the extra overhead of taking the pi_lock on

Quoted 8 lines

+ * every fork/clone.

+ */

-       if (!src->user_cpus_ptr) //delete this

-              return 0;            //delete this

The clearing of user_cpus_ptr is protected by pi_lock. IOW, racing between dup_user_cpus_ptr() and do_set_cpus_allowed is not possible and double free like what you have suggested should not happen. Yes, the user_cpus_ptr check here is racy. The worst case result is that a user_cpus_ptr has just been set in the task to be cloned, but it fail to copy over the user mask. With or without the check, the race can happen. The check is an optimization. Its effect is just make one outcome more likely than the other.

Cheers,
Longman

#11 lore raw

Hi, Waiman.

"The clearing of user_cpus_ptr is protected by pi_lock. IOW, racing between dup_user_cpus_ptr() and do_set_cpus_allowed is not possible and double free like what you have suggested should not happen." We still can understand why it is impossible to happen. Because we indeed met this issue. Following is we got from ftrace.

1. Task A pid 27961 run on core6 and is forking/cloning task pid 28051, and task B pid 28051 will copy task struct data from task A pid 27961. So task A p->user_cpus_ptr = ffffff884fbf9200 is equal to task B p->user_cpus_ptr=ffffff884fbf9200 through arch_dup_task_struct.

2. Then core6 met hotplug which will task migration/6 pid 61 preempt schedule task A 27961
Trac log: rso-inner-27961 [006] 56114.972822: sched_switch: rso-inner:27961 [139] R ==> migration/6:61 [0]

3. Then task migration/6 pid 61 migrate task A 27961 from core6 to core0 and clear task A 27961 p->user_cpus_ptr through this process: migrate_tasks -> select_fallback_rq -> do_set_cpus_allowed -> free user_cpus_ptr and change task A 27961 user_cpus_ptr = NULL.

              Trace log:  migration/6-61    [006] 56114.972937: bprint:               do_set_cpus_allowed: do_set_cpus_allowed: p->comm:rso-inner pid:27961, maskp:0 ac.user_mask:ffffff884fbf9200

4. Then task A pid 27961 enqueue on core0 and run on core0.

	Ttrace log : binder:27524_5-27775 [000] 56114.973592: sched_switch:         binder:27524_5:27775 [120] S ==> rso-inner:27961 [139]

5. Then task A pid 27961 call dup_user_cpus_ptr which found src->user_cpus_ptr is NULL, So It will directly return and will not allocate task B pid 28051's user_cpus_ptr. So task B pid 28051's user_cpus_ptr still is ffffff884fbf9200.

6. Then task A pid 27961 wake up task B28051 in this process "kernel_clone-> wake_up_new_task-> select_fallback_rq -> do_set_cpus_allowed" which will call do_set_cpus_allowed again will double free ffffff884fbf9200:

                Trace log:    rso-inner-27961 [000] 56114.973966: bprint:               do_set_cpus_allowed: do_set_cpus_allowed: p->comm:rso-inner pid:28051, maskp:0 ac.user_mask:ffffff884fbf9200

Thanks

-----Original Message-----
From: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, November 24, 2022 12:00 PM
To: David Wang 王标 <[email protected]>; Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; Wenjie Li (Evan) <[email protected]>; 陈冠有 <[email protected]>; Will Deacon <[email protected]>; Ting11 Wang 王婷 <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: 答复: [External Mail]Re: [PATCH 1/1] sched: fix user_mask double free

WARNING: This email originated from outside of Qualcomm. Please be wary of any links or attachments, and do not enable macros.

Quoted 115 lines · David Wang 王标

Dear Waiman,

Yes, we have read
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
m/
and checked it carefully.

We mean dup_user_cpus_ptr should not judge if the src->user_cpus_ptr is null at the entry of the Function dup_user_cpus_ptr.
If do this when user_cpus_ptr is freed by othe thread, but the parent task copy the user_cpus_ptr data for new task through dup_task_struct
<https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?refs=dup_task_struct&project=K
ERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0>
-> arch_dup_task_struct
<https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/xref/KERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0/kernel_
platform/common/kernel/fork.c#arch_dup_task_struct>(tsk
<https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=tsk&project=KERNEL.PLATFO
RM.2.0>,
orig
<https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=orig&project=KERNEL.PLATF
ORM.2.0>)
before the user_cpus_ptr
,
is freed, ,next , when dup_task_struct
<https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?refs=dup_task_struct&project=K
ERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0>
call dup_user_cpus_ptr
<https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=dup_user_cpus_ptr&project
=KERNEL.PLATFORM.2.0>(tsk
<https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=tsk&project=KERNEL.PLATFO
RM.2.0>,
orig
<https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=orig&project=KERNEL.PLATF
ORM.2.0>,
node
<https://opengrok.qualcomm.com/source/s?defs=node&project=KERNEL.PLATF
ORM.2.0>),it
will return directly
without doing nothing. When wake up new task , then call select_fallback_rqàdo_set_cpus_allowed,
it will meet slub double free issue. Then new path can not fix issue in this scenario.
void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask)
{
struct affinity_context ac = {
.new_mask = new_mask,
.user_mask = NULL,
.flags = SCA_USER, /* clear the user requested
mask */

        };
        __do_set_cpus_allowed(p, &ac);
        kfree(ac.user_mask);
}

Kfree kfree(ac.user_mask) cause double free issue. New patch just cover the user_cpus_ptr is freed after code running into raw_spin_lock_irqsave, if it can not enter into pi_lock critical section, what will happen.

Maybe should delte following code at the entry of fuction . Please help check it.

(quoted diff) +0 -2
-       if (!src->user_cpus_ptr)     //delete this
 
-              return 0;            //delete  this

We think maybe path needs a little more modification like following :

kernel/sched/core.c
<https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
om/#Z31kernel:sched:core.c>
| 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--

1 file changed

<https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
om/#related>,
21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff
<https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
om/#iZ31kernel:sched:core.c> --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c

index 8df51b08bb38..6b259d9e127a 100644

--- a/kernel/sched/core.c

+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c

(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -2624,8 +2624,14 @@ void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, 
 const struct cpumask *new_mask)
 

int dup_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src,

int node)

{

+ cpumask_t *user_mask = NULL;

       unsigned long flags;

+ /*

+ * This check is racy and losing the race is a valid situation.

+ * It is not worth the extra overhead of taking the pi_lock on

+ * every fork/clone.

+ */

Review

Quoted 3 lines
(quoted diff) +0 -2
-       if (!src->user_cpus_ptr) //delete this
 
-              return 0;            //delete this

The clearing of user_cpus_ptr is protected by pi_lock. IOW, racing between dup_user_cpus_ptr() and do_set_cpus_allowed is not possible and double free like what you have suggested should not happen. Yes, the user_cpus_ptr check here is racy. The worst case result is that a user_cpus_ptr has just been set in the task to be cloned, but it fail to copy over the user mask. With or without the check, the race can happen. The check is an optimization. Its effect is just make one outcome more likely than the other.

Cheers,
Longman

#12 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Wenjie Li (Evan)

Hi, Waiman.

"The clearing of user_cpus_ptr is protected by pi_lock. IOW, racing between dup_user_cpus_ptr() and do_set_cpus_allowed is not possible and double free like what you have suggested should not happen." We still can understand why it is impossible to happen. Because we indeed met this issue. Following is we got from ftrace.

1. Task A pid 27961 run on core6 and is forking/cloning task pid 28051, and task B pid 28051 will copy task struct data from task A pid 27961. So task A p->user_cpus_ptr = ffffff884fbf9200 is equal to task B p->user_cpus_ptr=ffffff884fbf9200 through arch_dup_task_struct.

You are right. I forgot the fact that the value of dst->user_cpus_ptr is a copy of src. I have posted a v3 patch to address that. Thanks for the spotting that.

Cheers,
Longman