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PATCH New Steve Sakoman 1 participant 7 messages Mar 14, 2023

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cover Patch review

Please review this final set of patches for the dunfell 3.1.24 release.

We hope to do the release build this Thursday, so please have any comments back as soon as possible.

Passed a-full on autobuilder:

https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/5043

The following changes since commit 51424b9955374196307aaf73cf4b6c184ce4fb6d:

devshell: Do not add scripts/git-intercept to PATH (2023-03-06 04:54:35 -1000)

are available in the Git repository at:

https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/dunfell-nut
http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/dunfell-nut

Ming Liu (1):
linux: inherit pkgconfig in kernel.bbclass

Richard Purdie (1):
oeqa/selftest/prservice: Improve debug output for failure

Ross Burton (2):
shadow: ignore CVE-2016-15024
vim: add missing pkgconfig inherit

Siddharth Doshi (1):
harfbuzz: Security fix for CVE-2023-25193

Vivek Kumbhar (1):
gnutls: fix CVE-2023-0361 timing side-channel in the TLS RSA key
exchange code

 meta/classes/kernel.bbclass                   |   2 +-
 meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/prservice.py     |   2 +-
 meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow_4.8.1.bb  |   4 +
 .../harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre0.patch        | 335 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre1.patch        | 135 +++++++
 .../harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193.patch    | 179 ++++++++++
 .../harfbuzz/harfbuzz_2.6.4.bb                |   5 +-
 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-dev.bb  |   2 -
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch         |  85 +++++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb  |   1 +
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc              |   2 +-
 11 files changed, 746 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre0.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/6 gnutls: fix CVE-2023-0361 timing side-channel in the TLS RSA key exchange code

From: Vivek Kumbhar <[email protected]>

Remove branching that depends on secret data.

since the ok variable isn't used any more, we can remove all code used to calculate it

---
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch         | 85 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 86 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch new file +85 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..943f4ca704
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From 80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:05:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] auth/rsa: side-step potential side-channel
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <[email protected]>
+Tested-by: Hubert Kario <[email protected]>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a
+                           https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/4b7ff428291c7ed77c6d2635577c83a43bbae558]
+CVE: CVE-2023-0361
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa.c | 30 +++---------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+index 8108ee8..858701f 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+@@ -155,13 +155,10 @@ static int
+ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+		   size_t _data_size)
+ {
+-	const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n";
+	gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
+	int ret, dsize;
+	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+	volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
+-	volatile uint8_t check_ver_min;
+-	volatile uint32_t ok;
+
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SSL3
+	if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) {
+@@ -187,7 +184,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+
+	ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+	ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+-	check_ver_min = (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0);
+
+	session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+	if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
+@@ -206,10 +202,9 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+-	ret =
+-	    gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
+-					 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
+-					 session->key.key.size);
++	gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
++				     0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
++				     session->key.key.size);
+	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
+@@ -225,25 +220,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+	 * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+	 */
+
+-	/* ok is 0 in case of error and 1 in case of success. */
+-
+-	/* if ret < 0 */
+-	ok = CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+-	/* session->key.key.data[0] must equal ver_maj */
+-	ok &= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[0], ver_maj);
+-	/* if check_ver_min then session->key.key.data[1] must equal ver_min */
+-	ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
+-	        CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
+-
+-	if (ok) {
+-		/* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are
+-		 * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug
+-		 * logging is disabled */
+-		_gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error);
+-	} else {
+-		_gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error);
+-	}
+-
+	/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+	 * discussed above.
+	 */
+--
+2.25.1
+
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb +1 -0
index f1757871ce..0c3392d521 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2021-20232.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-2509.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-4209.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-0361.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5630751adec7025b8ef955af4d141d00d252a985769f51b4059e5affa3d39d63"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/6 harfbuzz: Security fix for CVE-2023-25193

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>

Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/commit/8708b9e081192786c027bb7f5f23d76dbe5c19e8]

---
 .../harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre0.patch        | 335 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre1.patch        | 135 +++++++
 .../harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193.patch    | 179 ++++++++++
 .../harfbuzz/harfbuzz_2.6.4.bb                |   5 +-
 4 files changed, 653 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre0.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre0.patch new file +335 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..90d4cfefb4
@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+From 3122c2cdc45a964efedad8953a2df67205c3e3a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Behdad Esfahbod <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 4 Dec 2021 19:50:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] [buffer] Add HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT
+
+Fixes https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/issues/1463
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/commit/3122c2cdc45a964efedad8953a2df67205c3e3a8]
+Comment1: To backport the fix for CVE-2023-25193, add defination for HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT. This patch is needed along with CVE-2023-25193-pre1.patch for sucessfull porting.
+Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/hb-buffer.cc             | 10 ++---
+ src/hb-buffer.h              | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ src/hb-buffer.hh             | 33 ++++++++++------
+ src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh | 39 +++++++++++++++---
+ src/hb-ot-shape.cc           |  8 +---
+ 5 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/hb-buffer.cc b/src/hb-buffer.cc
+index 6131c86..bba5eae 100644
+--- a/src/hb-buffer.cc
++++ b/src/hb-buffer.cc
+@@ -610,14 +610,14 @@ done:
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-hb_buffer_t::unsafe_to_break_impl (unsigned int start, unsigned int end)
++hb_buffer_t::unsafe_to_break_impl (unsigned int start, unsigned int end, hb_mask_t mask)
+ {
+   unsigned int cluster = (unsigned int) -1;
+   cluster = _unsafe_to_break_find_min_cluster (info, start, end, cluster);
+-  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (info, start, end, cluster);
++  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (info, start, end, cluster, mask);
+ }
+ void
+-hb_buffer_t::unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int end)
++hb_buffer_t::unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int end, hb_mask_t mask)
+ {
+   if (!have_output)
+   {
+@@ -631,8 +631,8 @@ hb_buffer_t::unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int en
+   unsigned int cluster = (unsigned int) -1;
+   cluster = _unsafe_to_break_find_min_cluster (out_info, start, out_len, cluster);
+   cluster = _unsafe_to_break_find_min_cluster (info, idx, end, cluster);
+-  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (out_info, start, out_len, cluster);
+-  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (info, idx, end, cluster);
++  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (out_info, start, out_len, cluster, mask);
++  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (info, idx, end, cluster, mask);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/src/hb-buffer.h b/src/hb-buffer.h
+index d5cb746..42dc92a 100644
+--- a/src/hb-buffer.h
++++ b/src/hb-buffer.h
+@@ -77,26 +77,76 @@ typedef struct hb_glyph_info_t
+  * @HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK: Indicates that if input text is broken at the
+  * 				   beginning of the cluster this glyph is part of,
+  * 				   then both sides need to be re-shaped, as the
+- * 				   result might be different.  On the flip side,
+- * 				   it means that when this flag is not present,
+- * 				   then it's safe to break the glyph-run at the
+- * 				   beginning of this cluster, and the two sides
+- * 				   represent the exact same result one would get
+- * 				   if breaking input text at the beginning of
+- * 				   this cluster and shaping the two sides
+- * 				   separately.  This can be used to optimize
+- * 				   paragraph layout, by avoiding re-shaping
+- * 				   of each line after line-breaking, or limiting
+- * 				   the reshaping to a small piece around the
+- * 				   breaking point only.
++ * 				   result might be different.
++ *
++ * 				   On the flip side, it means that when this
++ * 				   flag is not present, then it is safe to break
++ * 				   the glyph-run at the beginning of this
++ * 				   cluster, and the two sides will represent the
++ * 				   exact same result one would get if breaking
++ * 				   input text at the beginning of this cluster
++ * 				   and shaping the two sides separately.
++ *
++ * 				   This can be used to optimize paragraph
++ * 				   layout, by avoiding re-shaping of each line
++ * 				   after line-breaking.
++ *
++ * @HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT: Indicates that if input text is changed on one
++ * 				   side of the beginning of the cluster this glyph
++ * 				   is part of, then the shaping results for the
++ * 				   other side might change.
++ *
++ * 				   Note that the absence of this flag will NOT by
++ * 				   itself mean that it IS safe to concat text.
++ * 				   Only two pieces of text both of which clear of
++ * 				   this flag can be concatenated safely.
++ *
++ * 				   This can be used to optimize paragraph
++ * 				   layout, by avoiding re-shaping of each line
++ * 				   after line-breaking, by limiting the
++ * 				   reshaping to a small piece around the
++ * 				   breaking positin only, even if the breaking
++ * 				   position carries the
++ * 				   #HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK or when
++ * 				   hyphenation or other text transformation
++ * 				   happens at line-break position, in the following
++ * 				   way:
++ *
++ * 				   1. Iterate back from the line-break position till
++ * 				   the the first cluster start position that is
++ * 				   NOT unsafe-to-concat, 2. shape the segment from
++ * 				   there till the end of line, 3. check whether the
++ * 				   resulting glyph-run also is clear of the
++ * 				   unsafe-to-concat at its start-of-text position;
++ * 				   if it is, just splice it into place and the line
++ * 				   is shaped; If not, move on to a position further
++ * 				   back that is clear of unsafe-to-concat and retry
++ * 				   from there, and repeat.
++ *
++ * 				   At the start of next line a similar algorithm can
++ * 				   be implemented. A slight complication will arise,
++ * 				   because while our buffer API has a way to
++ * 				   return flags for position corresponding to
++ * 				   start-of-text, there is currently no position
++ * 				   corresponding to end-of-text.  This limitation
++ * 				   can be alleviated by shaping more text than needed
++ * 				   and looking for unsafe-to-concat flag within text
++ * 				   clusters.
++ *
++ * 				   The #HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK flag will
++ * 				   always imply this flag.
++ *
++ * 				   Since: REPLACEME
++ *
+  * @HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED: All the currently defined flags.
+  *
+  * Since: 1.5.0
+  */
+ typedef enum { /*< flags >*/
+   HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK		= 0x00000001,
++  HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT	= 0x00000002,
+ 
+-  HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED			= 0x00000001 /* OR of all defined flags */
++  HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED			= 0x00000003 /* OR of all defined flags */
+ } hb_glyph_flags_t;
+ 
+ HB_EXTERN hb_glyph_flags_t
+diff --git a/src/hb-buffer.hh b/src/hb-buffer.hh
+index b5596d9..beac7b6 100644
+--- a/src/hb-buffer.hh
++++ b/src/hb-buffer.hh
+@@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ enum hb_buffer_scratch_flags_t {
+   HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_DEFAULT_IGNORABLES		= 0x00000002u,
+   HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_SPACE_FALLBACK		= 0x00000004u,
+   HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_GPOS_ATTACHMENT		= 0x00000008u,
+-  HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK		= 0x00000010u,
+-  HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_CGJ			= 0x00000020u,
++  HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_CGJ			= 0x00000010u,
++  HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_GLYPH_FLAGS		= 0x00000020u,
+ 
+   /* Reserved for complex shapers' internal use. */
+   HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_COMPLEX0			= 0x01000000u,
+@@ -324,8 +324,19 @@ struct hb_buffer_t
+       return;
+     unsafe_to_break_impl (start, end);
+   }
+-  HB_INTERNAL void unsafe_to_break_impl (unsigned int start, unsigned int end);
+-  HB_INTERNAL void unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int end);
++  void unsafe_to_concat (unsigned int start,
++			 unsigned int end)
++  {
++    if (end - start < 2)
++      return;
++    unsafe_to_break_impl (start, end, HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT);
++  }
++  HB_INTERNAL void unsafe_to_break_impl (unsigned int start, unsigned int end,
++					 hb_mask_t mask = HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK | HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT);
++  HB_INTERNAL void unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int end,
++						   hb_mask_t mask = HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK | HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT);
++  void unsafe_to_concat_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int end)
++  { unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (start, end, HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT); }
+ 
+ 
+   /* Internal methods */
+@@ -377,12 +388,7 @@ struct hb_buffer_t
+   set_cluster (hb_glyph_info_t &inf, unsigned int cluster, unsigned int mask = 0)
+   {
+     if (inf.cluster != cluster)
+-    {
+-      if (mask & HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK)
+-	inf.mask |= HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK;
+-      else
+-	inf.mask &= ~HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK;
+-    }
++      inf.mask = (inf.mask & ~HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED) | (mask & HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED);
+     inf.cluster = cluster;
+   }
+ 
+@@ -398,13 +404,14 @@ struct hb_buffer_t
+   void
+   _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (hb_glyph_info_t *infos,
+ 			     unsigned int start, unsigned int end,
+-			     unsigned int cluster)
++			     unsigned int cluster,
++			     hb_mask_t mask)
+   {
+     for (unsigned int i = start; i < end; i++)
+       if (cluster != infos[i].cluster)
+       {
+-	scratch_flags |= HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK;
+-	infos[i].mask |= HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK;
++	scratch_flags |= HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_GLYPH_FLAGS;
++	infos[i].mask |= mask;
+       }
+   }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh b/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
+index 579d178..a6ca456 100644
+--- a/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
++++ b/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
+@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ struct hb_ot_apply_context_t :
+     may_skip (const hb_glyph_info_t &info) const
+     { return matcher.may_skip (c, info); }
+ 
+-    bool next ()
++    bool next (unsigned *unsafe_to = nullptr)
+     {
+       assert (num_items > 0);
+       while (idx + num_items < end)
+@@ -392,11 +392,17 @@ struct hb_ot_apply_context_t :
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (skip == matcher_t::SKIP_NO)
++	{
++	  if (unsafe_to)
++	    *unsafe_to = idx + 1;
+ 	  return false;
++	}
+       }
++      if (unsafe_to)
++        *unsafe_to = end;
+       return false;
+     }
+-    bool prev ()
++    bool prev (unsigned *unsafe_from = nullptr)
+     {
+       assert (num_items > 0);
+       while (idx > num_items - 1)
+@@ -419,8 +425,14 @@ struct hb_ot_apply_context_t :
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (skip == matcher_t::SKIP_NO)
++	{
++	  if (unsafe_from)
++	    *unsafe_from = hb_max (1u, idx) - 1u;
+ 	  return false;
++	}
+       }
++      if (unsafe_from)
++        *unsafe_from = 0;
+       return false;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -834,7 +846,12 @@ static inline bool match_input (hb_ot_apply_context_t *c,
+   match_positions[0] = buffer->idx;
+   for (unsigned int i = 1; i < count; i++)
+   {
+-    if (!skippy_iter.next ()) return_trace (false);
++    unsigned unsafe_to;
++    if (!skippy_iter.next (&unsafe_to))
++    {
++      c->buffer->unsafe_to_concat (c->buffer->idx, unsafe_to);
++      return_trace (false);
++    }
+ 
+     match_positions[i] = skippy_iter.idx;
+ 
+@@ -1022,8 +1039,14 @@ static inline bool match_backtrack (hb_ot_apply_context_t *c,
+   skippy_iter.set_match_func (match_func, match_data, backtrack);
+ 
+   for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++)
+-    if (!skippy_iter.prev ())
++  {
++    unsigned unsafe_from;
++    if (!skippy_iter.prev (&unsafe_from))
++    {
++      c->buffer->unsafe_to_concat_from_outbuffer (unsafe_from, c->buffer->idx);
+       return_trace (false);
++    }
++  }
+ 
+   *match_start = skippy_iter.idx;
+ 
+@@ -1045,8 +1068,14 @@ static inline bool match_lookahead (hb_ot_apply_context_t *c,
+   skippy_iter.set_match_func (match_func, match_data, lookahead);
+ 
+   for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++)
+-    if (!skippy_iter.next ())
++  {
++    unsigned unsafe_to;
++    if (!skippy_iter.next (&unsafe_to))
++    {
++      c->buffer->unsafe_to_concat (c->buffer->idx + offset, unsafe_to);
+       return_trace (false);
++    }
++  }
+ 
+   *end_index = skippy_iter.idx + 1;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/hb-ot-shape.cc b/src/hb-ot-shape.cc
+index 5d9a70c..5d10b30 100644
+--- a/src/hb-ot-shape.cc
++++ b/src/hb-ot-shape.cc
+@@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ hb_propagate_flags (hb_buffer_t *buffer)
+   /* Propagate cluster-level glyph flags to be the same on all cluster glyphs.
+    * Simplifies using them. */
+ 
+-  if (!(buffer->scratch_flags & HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK))
++  if (!(buffer->scratch_flags & HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_GLYPH_FLAGS))
+     return;
+ 
+   hb_glyph_info_t *info = buffer->info;
+@@ -1017,11 +1017,7 @@ hb_propagate_flags (hb_buffer_t *buffer)
+   {
+     unsigned int mask = 0;
+     for (unsigned int i = start; i < end; i++)
+-      if (info[i].mask & HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK)
+-      {
+-	 mask = HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK;
+-	 break;
+-      }
++      mask |= info[i].mask & HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED;
+     if (mask)
+       for (unsigned int i = start; i < end; i++)
+ 	info[i].mask |= mask;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre1.patch new file +135 -0

135 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193.patch new file +179 -0

179 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz_2.6.4.bb +4 -1
index ee08c12bee..0cfe01f1e5 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ LICENSE = "MIT"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=e11f5c3149cdec4bb309babb020b32b9 \
                     file://src/hb-ucd.cc;beginline=1;endline=15;md5=29d4dcb6410429195df67efe3382d8bc"
 
-SRC_URI = "http://www.freedesktop.org/software/harfbuzz/release/${BP}.tar.xz"
+SRC_URI = "http://www.freedesktop.org/software/harfbuzz/release/${BP}.tar.xz \
+           file://CVE-2023-25193-pre0.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-25193-pre1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-25193.patch"
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2b3a4dfdb3e5e50055f941978944da9f"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9413b8d96132d699687ef914ebb8c50440efc87b3f775d25856d7ec347c03c12"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/6 shadow: ignore CVE-2016-15024

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Ross Burton <[email protected]>

This recently got an updated CPE which matches this recipe, but the issue is related to an entirely different shadow project so ignore it.

(cherry picked from commit 2331e98abb09cbcd56625d65c4e5d258dc29dd04)
---
 meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow_4.8.1.bb | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow_4.8.1.bb +4 -0
index ff4aad926f..9dfcd4bc10 100644
@@ -9,3 +9,7 @@ BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
 # Severity is low and marked as closed and won't fix.
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=884658
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2013-4235"
+
+# This is an issue for a different shadow
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2016-15024"
+
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/6 oeqa/selftest/prservice: Improve debug output for failure

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>

We keep seeing this failure on the autobuilder but the output amounts to "False is not True". Improve the debug message on the chance it may make the issue clearer.

(cherry picked from commit d03f4cf19c2cc96e9d942252a451521dfec42ebc)
---
 meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/prservice.py | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/prservice.py +1 -1
index 578b2b4dd9..fdc1e40058 100644
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ class BitbakePrTests(OESelftestTestCase):
         exported_db_path = os.path.join(self.builddir, 'export.inc')
         export_result = runCmd("bitbake-prserv-tool export %s" % exported_db_path, ignore_status=True)
         self.assertEqual(export_result.status, 0, msg="PR Service database export failed: %s" % export_result.output)
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(exported_db_path))
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(exported_db_path), msg="%s didn't exist, tool output %s" % (exported_db_path, export_result.output))
 
         if replace_current_db:
             current_db_path = os.path.join(get_bb_var('PERSISTENT_DIR'), 'prserv.sqlite3')
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/6 vim: add missing pkgconfig inherit

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Ross Burton <[email protected]>

Vim uses pkgconfig to find dependencies but it wasn't present, so it silently doesn't enable features like GTK+ UI.

[ YOCTO #15044 ]

(cherry picked from commit 70900616298f5e70732a34e7406e585e323479ed)
---
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -1
index 234ecd0027..828cf84757 100644
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 
 VIMDIR = "vim${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[0]}${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[1]}"
 
-inherit autotools-brokensep update-alternatives mime-xdg
+inherit autotools-brokensep update-alternatives mime-xdg pkgconfig
 
 CLEANBROKEN = "1"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/6 linux: inherit pkgconfig in kernel.bbclass

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Ming Liu <[email protected]>

pkgconfig is being required to find dependencies for building kernel native tools, move "inherit pkgconfig" to kernel.bbclass so BSP kernel recipes can also benefit from it.

(cherry picked from commit 8a84bd98e3fbc16c782f83064801e469d086911e)
---
 meta/classes/kernel.bbclass                  | 2 +-
 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-dev.bb | 2 --
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
meta/classes/kernel.bbclass +1 -1
index 8b89360991..c6310d8de7 100644
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ do_savedefconfig() {
 do_savedefconfig[nostamp] = "1"
 addtask savedefconfig after do_configure
 
-inherit cml1
+inherit cml1 pkgconfig
 
 KCONFIG_CONFIG_COMMAND_append = " LD='${KERNEL_LD}' HOSTLDFLAGS='${BUILD_LDFLAGS}'"
 
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-dev.bb +0 -2
index 06a9108fab..a1c0de9981 100644
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
 
 inherit kernel
 require recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto.inc
-# for ncurses tests
-inherit pkgconfig
 
 # provide this .inc to set specific revisions
 include recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-dev-revisions.inc
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1