Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of patches for kirkstone and have comments back by end of day Tuesday.
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/5269
The following changes since commit 2d67702bdfc64358d364dd6484ae41842ee7c52f:
glibc: stable 2.35 branch updates. (2023-04-28 03:55:33 -1000)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/kirkstone-nut
http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/kirkstone-nut
Arturo Buzarra (1):
run-postinsts: Set dependency for ldconfig to avoid boot issues
Deepthi Hemraj (4):
binutils : Fix CVE-2023-25584
binutils : Fix CVE-2023-25585
binutils : Fix CVE-2023-1972
binutils : Fix CVE-2023-25588
Hitendra Prajapati (1):
connman: fix CVE-2023-28488 DoS in client.c
Kai Kang (1):
webkitgtk: fix CVE-2022-32888 & CVE-2022-32923
Narpat Mali (2):
ffmpeg: fix for CVE-2022-48434
python3-cryptography: fix for CVE-2023-23931
Randolph Sapp (2):
wic/bootimg-efi: if fixed-size is set then use that for mkdosfs
kernel-devicetree: allow specification of dtb directory
Ranjitsinh Rathod (1):
libbsd: Add correct license for all packages
Shubham Kulkarni (1):
go: Security fix for CVE-2023-24538
Vivek Kumbhar (2):
freetype: fix CVE-2023-2004 integer overflowin in
tt_hvadvance_adjust() in src/truetype/ttgxvar.c
go: fix CVE-2023-24534 denial of service from excessive memory
allocation
meta/classes/kernel-devicetree.bbclass | 22 +- meta/classes/kernel.bbclass | 2 + .../connman/connman/CVE-2023-28488.patch | 60 ++ .../connman/connman_1.41.bb | 1 + .../binutils/binutils-2.38.inc | 6 + .../binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-1.patch | 56 ++ .../binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-2.patch | 38 ++ .../binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-3.patch | 534 ++++++++++++++++++ .../binutils/0023-CVE-2023-25585.patch | 54 ++ .../binutils/0025-CVE-2023-25588.patch | 147 +++++ .../binutils/0026-CVE-2023-1972.patch | 41 ++ meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc | 2 + .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-24534.patch | 200 +++++++ .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-24538.patch | 208 +++++++ .../python3-cryptography/CVE-2023-23931.patch | 49 ++ .../python/python3-cryptography_36.0.2.bb | 1 + .../run-postinsts/run-postinsts.service | 2 +- .../freetype/freetype/CVE-2023-2004.patch | 41 ++ .../freetype/freetype_2.11.1.bb | 1 + .../ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2022-48434.patch | 130 +++++ .../recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg_5.0.1.bb | 3 +- .../webkit/webkitgtk/CVE-2022-32888.patch | 41 ++ .../webkit/webkitgtk/CVE-2022-32923.patch | 435 ++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-sato/webkit/webkitgtk_2.36.8.bb | 2 + meta/recipes-support/libbsd/libbsd_0.11.5.bb | 7 + scripts/lib/wic/plugins/source/bootimg-efi.py | 7 + 26 files changed, 2083 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2023-28488.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-3.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2023-25585.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0025-CVE-2023-25588.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0026-CVE-2023-1972.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-24534.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-24538.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2023-23931.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/freetype/freetype/CVE-2023-2004.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2022-48434.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-sato/webkit/webkitgtk/CVE-2022-32888.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-sato/webkit/webkitgtk/CVE-2022-32923.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 1/15 ffmpeg: fix for CVE-2022-48434
From: Narpat Mali <[email protected]>
libavcodec/pthread_frame.c in FFmpeg before 5.1.2, as used in VLC and other products, leaves stale hwaccel state in worker threads, which allows attackers to trigger a use-after-free and execute arbitrary code in some circumstances (e.g., hardware re-initialization upon a mid-video SPS change when Direct3D11 is used).
--- .../ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2022-48434.patch | 130 ++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg_5.0.1.bb | 3 +- 2 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2022-48434.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2022-48434.patch new file +130 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +From e40c964a0678908e2c756741343ed50d6a99ee12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Anton Khirnov <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2023 11:45:30 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] lavc/pthread_frame: avoid leaving stale hwaccel state in + worker threads + +This state is not refcounted, so make sure it always has a well-defined +owner. + +Remove the block added in 091341f, as +this commit also solves that issue in a more general way. + +CVE:CVE-2022-48434 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/cc867f2c09d2b69cee8a0eccd62aff002cbbfe11] + +Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali <[email protected]> +--- + libavcodec/pthread_frame.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libavcodec/pthread_frame.c b/libavcodec/pthread_frame.c +index 85a6bc9..e40dced 100644 +--- a/libavcodec/pthread_frame.c ++++ b/libavcodec/pthread_frame.c +@@ -145,6 +145,12 @@ typedef struct FrameThreadContext { + * Set for the first N packets, where N is the number of threads. + * While it is set, ff_thread_en/decode_frame won't return any results. + */ ++ ++ /* hwaccel state is temporarily stored here in order to transfer its ownership ++ * to the next decoding thread without the need for extra synchronization */ ++ const AVHWAccel *stash_hwaccel; ++ void *stash_hwaccel_context; ++ void *stash_hwaccel_priv; + } FrameThreadContext; + + #if FF_API_THREAD_SAFE_CALLBACKS +@@ -229,9 +235,17 @@ FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS + ff_thread_finish_setup(avctx); + + if (p->hwaccel_serializing) { ++ /* wipe hwaccel state to avoid stale pointers lying around; ++ * the state was transferred to FrameThreadContext in ++ * ff_thread_finish_setup(), so nothing is leaked */ ++ avctx->hwaccel = NULL; ++ avctx->hwaccel_context = NULL; ++ avctx->internal->hwaccel_priv_data = NULL; ++ + p->hwaccel_serializing = 0; + pthread_mutex_unlock(&p->parent->hwaccel_mutex); + } ++ av_assert0(!avctx->hwaccel); + + if (p->async_serializing) { + p->async_serializing = 0; +@@ -294,14 +308,10 @@ static int update_context_from_thread(AVCodecContext *dst, AVCodecContext *src, + dst->color_range = src->color_range; + dst->chroma_sample_location = src->chroma_sample_location; + +- dst->hwaccel = src->hwaccel; +- dst->hwaccel_context = src->hwaccel_context; +- + dst->channels = src->channels; + dst->sample_rate = src->sample_rate; + dst->sample_fmt = src->sample_fmt; + dst->channel_layout = src->channel_layout; +- dst->internal->hwaccel_priv_data = src->internal->hwaccel_priv_data; + + if (!!dst->hw_frames_ctx != !!src->hw_frames_ctx || + (dst->hw_frames_ctx && dst->hw_frames_ctx->data != src->hw_frames_ctx->data)) { +@@ -442,6 +452,12 @@ static int submit_packet(PerThreadContext *p, AVCodecContext *user_avctx, + pthread_mutex_unlock(&p->mutex); + return err; + } ++ ++ /* transfer hwaccel state stashed from previous thread, if any */ ++ av_assert0(!p->avctx->hwaccel); ++ FFSWAP(const AVHWAccel*, p->avctx->hwaccel, fctx->stash_hwaccel); ++ FFSWAP(void*, p->avctx->hwaccel_context, fctx->stash_hwaccel_context); ++ FFSWAP(void*, p->avctx->internal->hwaccel_priv_data, fctx->stash_hwaccel_priv); + } + + av_packet_unref(p->avpkt); +@@ -647,6 +663,14 @@ void ff_thread_finish_setup(AVCodecContext *avctx) { + async_lock(p->parent); + } + ++ /* save hwaccel state for passing to the next thread; ++ * this is done here so that this worker thread can wipe its own hwaccel ++ * state after decoding, without requiring synchronization */ ++ av_assert0(!p->parent->stash_hwaccel); ++ p->parent->stash_hwaccel = avctx->hwaccel; ++ p->parent->stash_hwaccel_context = avctx->hwaccel_context; ++ p->parent->stash_hwaccel_priv = avctx->internal->hwaccel_priv_data; ++ + pthread_mutex_lock(&p->progress_mutex); + if(atomic_load(&p->state) == STATE_SETUP_FINISHED){ + av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Multiple ff_thread_finish_setup() calls\n"); +@@ -700,13 +724,6 @@ void ff_frame_thread_free(AVCodecContext *avctx, int thread_count) + + park_frame_worker_threads(fctx, thread_count); + +- if (fctx->prev_thread && avctx->internal->hwaccel_priv_data != +- fctx->prev_thread->avctx->internal->hwaccel_priv_data) { +- if (update_context_from_thread(avctx, fctx->prev_thread->avctx, 1) < 0) { +- av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Failed to update user thread.\n"); +- } +- } +- + if (fctx->prev_thread && fctx->prev_thread != fctx->threads) + if (update_context_from_thread(fctx->threads->avctx, fctx->prev_thread->avctx, 0) < 0) { + av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Final thread update failed\n"); +@@ -760,6 +777,13 @@ void ff_frame_thread_free(AVCodecContext *avctx, int thread_count) + av_freep(&fctx->threads); + ff_pthread_free(fctx, thread_ctx_offsets); + ++ /* if we have stashed hwaccel state, move it to the user-facing context, ++ * so it will be freed in avcodec_close() */ ++ av_assert0(!avctx->hwaccel); ++ FFSWAP(const AVHWAccel*, avctx->hwaccel, fctx->stash_hwaccel); ++ FFSWAP(void*, avctx->hwaccel_context, fctx->stash_hwaccel_context); ++ FFSWAP(void*, avctx->internal->hwaccel_priv_data, fctx->stash_hwaccel_priv); ++ + av_freep(&avctx->internal->thread_ctx); + } + +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg_5.0.1.bb +2 -1
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.ffmpeg.org/releases/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://0001-avcodec-smcenc-stop-accessing-out-of-bounds-frame.patch \ file://0001-avcodec-vp3-Add-missing-check-for-av_malloc.patch \ file://0001-avformat-nutdec-Add-check-for-avformat_new_stream.patch \ - " + file://CVE-2022-48434.patch \ + " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ef2efae259ce80a240de48ec85ecb062cecca26e4352ffb3fda562c21a93007b"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 2/15 connman: fix CVE-2023-28488 DoS in client.c
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Upstream-Status: Backport from https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=99e2c16ea1cced34a5dc450d76287a1c3e762138
--- .../connman/connman/CVE-2023-28488.patch | 60 +++++++++++++++++++ .../connman/connman_1.41.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2023-28488.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2023-28488.patch new file +60 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From 99e2c16ea1cced34a5dc450d76287a1c3e762138 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Wagner <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2023 08:12:56 +0200 +Subject: gdhcp: Verify and sanitize packet length first + +Avoid overwriting the read packet length after the initial test. Thus +move all the length checks which depends on the total length first +and do not use the total lenght from the IP packet afterwards. + +Reported by Polina Smirnova <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2023-28488 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=99e2c16ea1cced34a5dc450d76287a1c3e762138] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + gdhcp/client.c | 16 +++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/gdhcp/client.c b/gdhcp/client.c +index 3016dfc..28fa606 100644 +--- a/gdhcp/client.c ++++ b/gdhcp/client.c +@@ -1319,9 +1319,9 @@ static bool sanity_check(struct ip_udp_dhcp_packet *packet, int bytes) + static int dhcp_recv_l2_packet(struct dhcp_packet *dhcp_pkt, int fd, + struct sockaddr_in *dst_addr) + { +- int bytes; + struct ip_udp_dhcp_packet packet; + uint16_t check; ++ int bytes, tot_len; + + memset(&packet, 0, sizeof(packet)); + +@@ -1329,15 +1329,17 @@ static int dhcp_recv_l2_packet(struct dhcp_packet *dhcp_pkt, int fd, + if (bytes < 0) + return -1; + +- if (bytes < (int) (sizeof(packet.ip) + sizeof(packet.udp))) +- return -1; +- +- if (bytes < ntohs(packet.ip.tot_len)) ++ tot_len = ntohs(packet.ip.tot_len); ++ if (bytes > tot_len) { ++ /* ignore any extra garbage bytes */ ++ bytes = tot_len; ++ } else if (bytes < tot_len) { + /* packet is bigger than sizeof(packet), we did partial read */ + return -1; ++ } + +- /* ignore any extra garbage bytes */ +- bytes = ntohs(packet.ip.tot_len); ++ if (bytes < (int) (sizeof(packet.ip) + sizeof(packet.udp))) ++ return -1; + + if (!sanity_check(&packet, bytes)) + return -1; +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.41.bb +1 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2022-32293_p1.patch \ file://CVE-2022-32293_p2.patch \ file://CVE-2022-32292.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-28488.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:libc-musl = " file://0002-resolve-musl-does-not-implement-res_ninit.patch"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 3/15 freetype: fix CVE-2023-2004 integer overflowin in tt_hvadvance_adjust() in src/truetype/ttgxvar.c
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Vivek Kumbhar <[email protected]>
Fix An integer overflow vulnerability was discovered in Freetype in tt_hvadvance_adjust() function in src/truetype/ttgxvar.c
--- .../freetype/freetype/CVE-2023-2004.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++ .../freetype/freetype_2.11.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/freetype/freetype/CVE-2023-2004.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/freetype/freetype/CVE-2023-2004.patch new file +41 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From e6fda039ad638866b7a6a5d046f03278ba1b7611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2022 19:18:19 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] * src/truetype/ttgxvar.c (tt_hvadvance_adjust): Integer + overflow. + +Reported as + + https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=50462 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/freetype/freetype/commit/e6fda039ad638866b7a6a5d046f03278ba1b7611] +CVE: CVE-2023-2004 +Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <[email protected]> +--- + src/truetype/ttgxvar.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/truetype/ttgxvar.c b/src/truetype/ttgxvar.c +index 7f2db0c..8968111 100644 +--- a/src/truetype/ttgxvar.c ++++ b/src/truetype/ttgxvar.c +@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ + #include <ft2build.h> + #include <freetype/internal/ftdebug.h> + #include FT_CONFIG_CONFIG_H ++#include <freetype/internal/ftcalc.h> + #include <freetype/internal/ftstream.h> + #include <freetype/internal/sfnt.h> + #include <freetype/tttags.h> +@@ -1147,7 +1148,7 @@ + delta == 1 ? "" : "s", + vertical ? "VVAR" : "HVAR" )); + +- *avalue += delta; ++ *avalue = ADD_INT( *avalue, delta ); + + Exit: + return error; +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-graphics/freetype/freetype_2.11.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SAVANNAH_GNU_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2022-27404.patch \ file://CVE-2022-27405.patch \ file://CVE-2022-27406.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-2004.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "3333ae7cfda88429c97a7ae63b7d01ab398076c3b67182e960e5684050f2c5c8"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 4/15 go: fix CVE-2023-24534 denial of service from excessive memory allocation
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Vivek Kumbhar <[email protected]>
A parsed MIME header is a map[string][]string. In the common case, a header contains many one-element []string slices. To avoid allocating a separate slice for each key, ReadMIMEHeader looks ahead in the input to predict the number of keys that will be parsed, and allocates a single []string of that length. The individual slices are then allocated out of the larger one.
The prediction of the number of header keys was done by counting newlines in the input buffer, which does not take into account header continuation lines (where a header key/value spans multiple lines) or the end of the header block and the start of the body. This could lead to a substantial amount of overallocation, for example when the body consists of nothing but a large block of newlines.
Fix header key count prediction to take into account the end of the headers (indicated by a blank line) and continuation lines (starting with whitespace).
Thanks to Jakob Ackermann (@das7pad) for reporting this issue.
Fixes CVE-2023-24534
For #58975
Fixes #59267
--- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc | 1 + .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-24534.patch | 200 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 201 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-24534.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc +1 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\ file://cve-2022-41725.patch \ file://CVE-2022-41722.patch \ file://CVE-2023-24537.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-24534.patch \ " SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "a1a48b23afb206f95e7bbaa9b898d965f90826f6f1d1fc0c1d784ada0cd300fd"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-24534.patch new file +200 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 5/15 go: Security fix for CVE-2023-24538
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Shubham Kulkarni <[email protected]>
html/template: disallow actions in JS template literals
Backport from https://github.com/golang/go/commit/b1e3ecfa06b67014429a197ec5e134ce4303ad9b
--- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc | 1 + .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-24538.patch | 208 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 209 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-24538.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\ file://CVE-2022-41722.patch \ file://CVE-2023-24537.patch \ file://CVE-2023-24534.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-24538.patch \ " SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "a1a48b23afb206f95e7bbaa9b898d965f90826f6f1d1fc0c1d784ada0cd300fd"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-24538.patch new file +208 -0
208 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 6/15 binutils : Fix CVE-2023-25584
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Deepthi Hemraj <[email protected]>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=77c225bdeb410cf60da804879ad41622f5f1aa44]
--- .../binutils/binutils-2.38.inc | 3 + .../binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-1.patch | 56 ++ .../binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-2.patch | 38 ++ .../binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-3.patch | 534 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 631 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-3.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.38.inc +3 -0
@@ -50,5 +50,8 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://0021-CVE-2023-1579-2.patch \ file://0021-CVE-2023-1579-3.patch \ file://0021-CVE-2023-1579-4.patch \ + file://0022-CVE-2023-25584-1.patch \ + file://0022-CVE-2023-25584-2.patch \ + file://0022-CVE-2023-25584-3.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-1.patch new file +56 -0
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meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-2.patch new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From da928f639002002dfc649ed9f50492d5d6cb4cee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nick Clifton <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 11:11:44 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix an illegal memory access when parsing a corrupt VMS Alpha + file. +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Fix an illegal memory access when parsing a corrupt VMS Alpha file. + + PR 29848 + * vms-alpha.c (parse_module): Fix potential out of bounds memory + access. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=942fa4fb32738ecbb447546d54f1e5f0312d2ed4] + +CVE: CVE-2023-25584 + +Signed-off-by: Deepthi Hemraj <[email protected]> + +--- + bfd/vms-alpha.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/bfd/vms-alpha.c b/bfd/vms-alpha.c +index c548722c..53b3f1bf 100644 +--- a/bfd/vms-alpha.c ++++ b/bfd/vms-alpha.c +@@ -4361,7 +4361,7 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *module, unsigned char *ptr, + return false; + module->line_table = curr_line; + +- while (length == -1 || ptr < maxptr) ++ while (length == -1 || (ptr + 3) < maxptr) + { + /* The first byte is not counted in the recorded length. */ + int rec_length = bfd_getl16 (ptr) + 1;
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0022-CVE-2023-25584-3.patch new file +534 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 7/15 binutils : Fix CVE-2023-25585
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Deepthi Hemraj <[email protected]>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=65cf035b8dc1df5d8020e0b1449514a3c42933e7]
--- .../binutils/binutils-2.38.inc | 1 + .../binutils/0023-CVE-2023-25585.patch | 54 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2023-25585.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.38.inc +1 -0
@@ -53,5 +53,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://0022-CVE-2023-25584-1.patch \ file://0022-CVE-2023-25584-2.patch \ file://0022-CVE-2023-25584-3.patch \ + file://0023-CVE-2023-25585.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0023-CVE-2023-25585.patch new file +54 -0
54 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 8/15 binutils : Fix CVE-2023-1972
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Deepthi Hemraj <[email protected]>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=c22d38baefc5a7a1e1f5cdc9dbb556b1f0ec5c57]
--- .../binutils/binutils-2.38.inc | 1 + .../binutils/0026-CVE-2023-1972.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0026-CVE-2023-1972.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.38.inc +1 -0
@@ -54,5 +54,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://0022-CVE-2023-25584-2.patch \ file://0022-CVE-2023-25584-3.patch \ file://0023-CVE-2023-25585.patch \ + file://0026-CVE-2023-1972.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0026-CVE-2023-1972.patch new file +41 -0
41 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 9/15 binutils : Fix CVE-2023-25588
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Deepthi Hemraj <[email protected]>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=d12f8998d2d086f0a6606589e5aedb7147e6f2f1]
--- .../binutils/binutils-2.38.inc | 1 + .../binutils/0025-CVE-2023-25588.patch | 147 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 148 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0025-CVE-2023-25588.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.38.inc +1 -0
@@ -55,5 +55,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://0022-CVE-2023-25584-3.patch \ file://0023-CVE-2023-25585.patch \ file://0026-CVE-2023-1972.patch \ + file://0025-CVE-2023-25588.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0025-CVE-2023-25588.patch new file +147 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 10/15 webkitgtk: fix CVE-2022-32888 & CVE-2022-32923
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Kai Kang <[email protected]>
Backport patches to fix CVE-2022-32888 and CVE-2022-32923 for webkitgtk 2.36.8. The bugzilla IDs of the CVEs are from https://support.apple.com
which have been listed in patch headers.
--- .../webkit/webkitgtk/CVE-2022-32888.patch | 41 ++ .../webkit/webkitgtk/CVE-2022-32923.patch | 435 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-sato/webkit/webkitgtk_2.36.8.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 478 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-sato/webkit/webkitgtk/CVE-2022-32888.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-sato/webkit/webkitgtk/CVE-2022-32923.patch
meta/recipes-sato/webkit/webkitgtk/CVE-2022-32888.patch new file +41 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +CVE: CVE-2022-32888 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/WebKit/WebKit/commit/a3dd7dc] + +[1]: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213446 +[2]: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=242047 + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> + +From a3dd7dc5f60b87a7cfd14c372e40ebd339076763 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yusuke Suzuki <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 21:34:55 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] [JSC] Drop wasm stale assertion + https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=242047 rdar://95866655 + +Reviewed by Mark Lam. + +This patch drops stale assertion in addDelegateToUnreachable. + +* Source/JavaScriptCore/wasm/WasmLLIntGenerator.cpp: +(JSC::Wasm::LLIntGenerator::addDelegateToUnreachable): + +Canonical link: https://commits.webkit.org/251902@main +--- + Source/JavaScriptCore/wasm/WasmLLIntGenerator.cpp | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Source/JavaScriptCore/wasm/WasmLLIntGenerator.cpp b/Source/JavaScriptCore/wasm/WasmLLIntGenerator.cpp +index 39fb39b3331f..d0d2b9725991 100644 +--- a/Source/JavaScriptCore/wasm/WasmLLIntGenerator.cpp ++++ b/Source/JavaScriptCore/wasm/WasmLLIntGenerator.cpp +@@ -1182,7 +1182,6 @@ auto LLIntGenerator::addDelegateToUnreachable(ControlType& target, ControlType& + + ControlTry& tryData = std::get<ControlTry>(data); + m_codeBlock->addExceptionHandler({ HandlerType::Delegate, tryData.m_try->location(), delegateLabel->location(), 0, m_tryDepth, targetDepth }); +- checkConsistency(); + return { }; + } + +-- +2.34.1 +
meta/recipes-sato/webkit/webkitgtk/CVE-2022-32923.patch new file +435 -0
435 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-sato/webkit/webkitgtk_2.36.8.bb +2 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.webkitgtk.org/releases/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://0001-Fix-build-without-opengl-or-es.patch \ file://reproducibility.patch \ file://0001-When-building-introspection-files-do-not-quote-CFLAG.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-32888.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-32923.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0ad9fb6bf28308fe3889faf184bd179d13ac1b46835d2136edbab2c133d00437"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 11/15 python3-cryptography: fix for CVE-2023-23931
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Narpat Mali <[email protected]>
cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers. In affected versions Cipher.update_into would accept Python objects which implement the buffer protocol, but provide only immutable buffers. This would allow immutable objects (such as bytes) to be mutated, thus violating fundamental rules of Python and resulting in corrupted output. This now correctly raises an exception. This issue has been present since update_into was originally introduced in cryptography 1.8.
--- .../python3-cryptography/CVE-2023-23931.patch | 49 +++++++++++++++++++ .../python/python3-cryptography_36.0.2.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2023-23931.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2023-23931.patch new file +49 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 9fbf84efc861668755ab645530ec7be9cf3c6696 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alex Gaynor <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2023 11:34:18 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] Don't allow update_into to mutate immutable objects (#8230) + +CVE: CVE-2023-23931 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/9fbf84efc861668755ab645530ec7be9cf3c6696] + +Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali <[email protected]> +--- + src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/ciphers.py | 2 +- + tests/hazmat/primitives/test_ciphers.py | 8 ++++++++ + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/ciphers.py b/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/ciphers.py +index 286583f93..075d68fb9 100644 +--- a/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/ciphers.py ++++ b/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/ciphers.py +@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ class _CipherContext: + data_processed = 0 + total_out = 0 + outlen = self._backend._ffi.new("int *") +- baseoutbuf = self._backend._ffi.from_buffer(buf) ++ baseoutbuf = self._backend._ffi.from_buffer(buf, require_writable=True) + baseinbuf = self._backend._ffi.from_buffer(data) + + while data_processed != total_data_len: +diff --git a/tests/hazmat/primitives/test_ciphers.py b/tests/hazmat/primitives/test_ciphers.py +index 02127dd9c..bf3b047de 100644 +--- a/tests/hazmat/primitives/test_ciphers.py ++++ b/tests/hazmat/primitives/test_ciphers.py +@@ -318,6 +318,14 @@ class TestCipherUpdateInto: + with pytest.raises(ValueError): + encryptor.update_into(b"testing", buf) + ++ def test_update_into_immutable(self, backend): ++ key = b"\x00" * 16 ++ c = ciphers.Cipher(AES(key), modes.ECB(), backend) ++ encryptor = c.encryptor() ++ buf = b"\x00" * 32 ++ with pytest.raises((TypeError, BufferError)): ++ encryptor.update_into(b"testing", buf) ++ + @pytest.mark.supported( + only_if=lambda backend: backend.cipher_supported( + AES(b"\x00" * 16), modes.GCM(b"\x00" * 12) +-- +2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography_36.0.2.bb +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI += " \ file://0001-Cargo.toml-specify-pem-version.patch \ file://0002-Cargo.toml-edition-2018-2021.patch \ file://fix-leak-metric.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-23931.patch \ " inherit pypi python_setuptools3_rust
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 12/15 wic/bootimg-efi: if fixed-size is set then use that for mkdosfs
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Randolph Sapp <[email protected]>
This is a bit of a compatibility issue more than anything. Some devices get upset if the FAT file system contains less blocks than the partition.
The fixed-size argument is currently respected by the partition creation step but not by the file system creation step. Let's make it so the file system respects this value as well.
--- scripts/lib/wic/plugins/source/bootimg-efi.py | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
scripts/lib/wic/plugins/source/bootimg-efi.py +7 -0
@@ -390,6 +390,13 @@ class BootimgEFIPlugin(SourcePlugin): logger.debug("Added %d extra blocks to %s to get to %d total blocks", extra_blocks, part.mountpoint, blocks) + # required for compatibility with certain devices expecting file system + # block count to be equal to partition block count + if blocks < part.fixed_size: + blocks = part.fixed_size + logger.debug("Overriding %s to %d total blocks for compatibility", + part.mountpoint, blocks) + # dosfs image, created by mkdosfs bootimg = "%s/boot.img" % cr_workdir
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 13/15 kernel-devicetree: allow specification of dtb directory
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Randolph Sapp <[email protected]>
Fedora/Redhat and Arch are somewhat standardized on their dtb directory structure. Let's add some flags to configure yocto to mimic that behavior.
Add the following variables to the kernel class:
- KERNEL_DTBDEST (controls the destination directory for dtbs)
- KERNEL_DTBVENDORED (controls if vendor subdirectories are to be respected)
Currently KERNEL_DTBDEST is expected to be a subdir of KERNEL_IMAGEDEST and KERNEL_DTBVENDORED is expected to be "true"/"false". This only applies to the package directory structure. The deploydir structure is purposely left untouched for compatibility with existing recipes.
By default this is configured to behave the same as the current recipe and produce a flat dtb directory at KERNEL_IMAGEDEST.
--- meta/classes/kernel-devicetree.bbclass | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- meta/classes/kernel.bbclass | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
meta/classes/kernel-devicetree.bbclass +17 -5
@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@ python () { d.appendVar("PACKAGES", " ${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-image-zimage-bundle") } -FILES:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-devicetree = "/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/*.dtb /${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/*.dtbo" +FILES:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-devicetree = " \ + /${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/*.dtb \ + /${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/*.dtbo \ + /${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/*/*.dtb \ + /${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/*/*.dtbo \ +" FILES:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-image-zimage-bundle = "/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/zImage-*.dtb.bin" # Generate kernel+devicetree bundle
@@ -67,12 +72,16 @@ do_compile:append() { } do_install:append() { + install -d ${D}/${KERNEL_DTBDEST} for dtbf in ${KERNEL_DEVICETREE}; do dtb=`normalize_dtb "$dtbf"` - dtb_ext=${dtb##*.} - dtb_base_name=`basename $dtb .$dtb_ext` dtb_path=`get_real_dtb_path_in_kernel "$dtb"` - install -m 0644 $dtb_path ${D}/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/$dtb_base_name.$dtb_ext + if [ ${KERNEL_DTBVENDORED} == "false" ]; then + dtb_ext=${dtb##*.} + dtb_base_name=`basename $dtb .$dtb_ext` + dtb=$dtb_base_name.$dtb_ext + fi + install -Dm 0644 $dtb_path ${D}/${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/$dtb done }
@@ -82,7 +91,10 @@ do_deploy:append() { dtb_ext=${dtb##*.} dtb_base_name=`basename $dtb .$dtb_ext` install -d $deployDir - install -m 0644 ${D}/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/$dtb_base_name.$dtb_ext $deployDir/$dtb_base_name-${KERNEL_DTB_NAME}.$dtb_ext + if [ ${KERNEL_DTBVENDORED} == "false" ]; then + dtb=$dtb_base_name.$dtb_ext + fi + install -m 0644 ${D}/${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/$dtb $deployDir/$dtb_base_name-${KERNEL_DTB_NAME}.$dtb_ext if [ "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE_SYMLINK}" = "1" ] ; then ln -sf $dtb_base_name-${KERNEL_DTB_NAME}.$dtb_ext $deployDir/$dtb_base_name.$dtb_ext fi
meta/classes/kernel.bbclass +2 -0
@@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ KERNEL_RELEASE ?= "${KERNEL_VERSION}" # The directory where built kernel lies in the kernel tree KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR ?= "arch/${ARCH}/boot" KERNEL_IMAGEDEST ?= "boot" +KERNEL_DTBDEST ?= "${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}" +KERNEL_DTBVENDORED ?= "false" # # configuration
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 14/15 libbsd: Add correct license for all packages
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Ranjitsinh Rathod <[email protected]>
BSD-4-Clause is only applicable to the {PN}-doc package as when I check for the source code I find below files which only uses the license BSD-4-Clause
~/sources/libbsd$ grep -rl "All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software" *|grep -v \.1|grep -v \.5|grep -v \.8 | sort COPYING
man/arc4random.3bsd
man/getprogname.3bsd
~/sources/libbsd$ grep -rnB5 "BSD-4"
COPYING-9-Files:
COPYING-10- man/arc4random.3bsd
COPYING-11-Copyright:
COPYING-12- Copyright 1997 Niels Provos <[email protected]> COPYING-13- All rights reserved.
COPYING:14:License: BSD-4-clause-Niels-Provos
--- meta/recipes-support/libbsd/libbsd_0.11.5.bb | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-support/libbsd/libbsd_0.11.5.bb +7 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,13 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://libbsd.freedesktop.org/wiki/" # License: public-domain-Colin-Plumb LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause & BSD-4-Clause & ISC & PD" LICENSE:${PN} = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD" +LICENSE:${PN}-dbg = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD" +LICENSE:${PN}-dev = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD" +LICENSE:${PN}-doc = "BSD-3-Clause & BSD-4-Clause & ISC & PD" +LICENSE:${PN}-locale = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD" +LICENSE:${PN}-src = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD" +LICENSE:${PN}-staticdev = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD" + LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=0b31944ca2c1075410a30f0c17379d3b" SECTION = "libs"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 15/15 run-postinsts: Set dependency for ldconfig to avoid boot issues
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Arturo Buzarra <[email protected]>
If a package with a postsints script requires ldconfig, the package class adds a ldconfig postinst fragment to initialize it before. Systemd has its own ldconfig.service to initialize it and sometimes if both services are running at the same time in the first boot, the first one will work, but the second one will fail with the following error:
ldconfig[141]: /sbin/ldconfig: Renaming of /etc/ld.so.cache~ to /etc/ld.so.cache failed: No such file or directory
This commit adds a ordering dependency between them to make sure that only one service is running at the same time.
--- .../run-postinsts/run-postinsts/run-postinsts.service | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-devtools/run-postinsts/run-postinsts/run-postinsts.service +1 -1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ [Unit] Description=Run pending postinsts DefaultDependencies=no -After=systemd-remount-fs.service systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service tmp.mount +After=systemd-remount-fs.service systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service tmp.mount ldconfig.service Before=sysinit.target [Service]
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [OE-core][kirkstone 13/15] kernel-devicetree: allow specification of dtb directory
In reply to Steve SakomanThis one doesn't work correctly, maybe better to postpone this until a fix is in master, see:
https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/180981
and possible fix:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/commit/?h=jansa/master&id=e2a6da5202a6671113758f9746ddbd8141a75757
Regards,
Quoted 113 lines · Steve Sakoman
From: Randolph Sapp <[email protected]>
Fedora/Redhat and Arch are somewhat standardized on their dtb directory structure. Let's add some flags to configure yocto to mimic that behavior.
Add the following variables to the kernel class:
-KERNEL_DTBDEST(controls the destination directory for dtbs)
-KERNEL_DTBVENDORED(controls if vendor subdirectories are to be respected)Currently
KERNEL_DTBDESTis expected to be a subdir ofKERNEL_IMAGEDESTandKERNEL_DTBVENDOREDis expected to be "true"/"false". This only applies to the package directory structure. The deploydir structure is purposely left untouched for compatibility with existing recipes.By default this is configured to behave the same as the current recipe and produce a flat dtb directory at
KERNEL_IMAGEDEST.Signed-off-by Randolph Sapp <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steve Sakoman <[email protected]>--- meta/classes/kernel-devicetree.bbclass | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- meta/classes/kernel.bbclass | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)meta/classes/kernel-devicetree.bbclass +0
-1@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@ python () { d.appendVar("PACKAGES", " ${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-image-zimage-bundle") } -FILES:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-devicetree = "/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/*.dtb/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/*.dtbo"
meta/classes/kernel-devicetree.bbclass +6
-0+FILES:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-devicetree = " \ + /${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/*.dtb \ + /${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/*.dtbo \ + /${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/*/*.dtb \ + /${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/*/*.dtbo \ +" FILES:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-image-zimage-bundle ="/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/zImage-*.dtb.bin"
# Generate kernel+devicetree bundle
meta/classes/kernel-devicetree.bbclass +1
-3@@ -67,12 +72,16 @@ do_compile:append() { } do_install:append() { + install -d ${D}/${KERNEL_DTBDEST} for dtbf in ${KERNEL_DEVICETREE}; do dtb=`normalize_dtb "$dtbf"` - dtb_ext=${dtb##*.} - dtb_base_name=`basename $dtb .$dtb_ext` dtb_path=`get_real_dtb_path_in_kernel "$dtb"` - install -m 0644 $dtb_path${D}/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/$dtb_base_name.$dtb_ext
meta/classes/kernel-devicetree.bbclass +6
-1+ if [ ${KERNEL_DTBVENDORED} == "false" ]; then + dtb_ext=${dtb##*.} + dtb_base_name=`basename $dtb .$dtb_ext` + dtb=$dtb_base_name.$dtb_ext + fi + install -Dm 0644 $dtb_path ${D}/${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/$dtb done }@@ -82,7 +91,10 @@ do_deploy:append() { dtb_ext=${dtb##*.} dtb_base_name=`basename $dtb .$dtb_ext` install -d $deployDir - install -m 0644${D}/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/$dtb_base_name.$dtb_ext $deployDir/$dtb_base_name-${KERNEL_DTB_NAME}.$dtb_ext
meta/classes/kernel-devicetree.bbclass +4
-0+ if [ ${KERNEL_DTBVENDORED} == "false" ]; then + dtb=$dtb_base_name.$dtb_ext + fi + install -m 0644 ${D}/${KERNEL_DTBDEST}/$dtb$deployDir/$dtb_base_name-${KERNEL_DTB_NAME}.$dtb_ext
if [ "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE_SYMLINK}" = "1" ] ; then ln -sf $dtb_base_name-${KERNEL_DTB_NAME}.$dtb_ext$deployDir/$dtb_base_name.$dtb_ext
fimeta/classes/kernel.bbclass +2
-1@@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ KERNEL_RELEASE ?= "${KERNEL_VERSION}" # The directory where built kernel lies in the kernel tree KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR ?= "arch/${ARCH}/boot" KERNEL_IMAGEDEST ?= "boot" +KERNEL_DTBDEST ?= "${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}" +KERNEL_DTBVENDORED ?= "false" # # configuration --2.34.1
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