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KVM TDX basic feature support

PATCH Superseded [email protected] 3 participants 120 messages Oct 16, 2023 – Nov 20, 2023 Page 1 of 2

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v16 cover KVM TDX basic feature support

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

KVM TDX basic feature support

Hello. This is v16 the patch series vof KVM TDX support. This is based on v6.6-rc2 + the following patch series + minor fixes.

Related patch series This patch is based on:
- v12 KVM: guest_memfd() and per-page attributes
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

- KVM: guest_memfd fixes
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

- TDX host kernel support v13
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

The tree can be found at https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream
The corresponding qemu branch is found at
https://github.com/yamahata/qemu/tree/tdx/qemu-upm
How to run/test: It's describe at https://github.com/intel/tdx/wiki/TDX-KVM

More features tree is found at
https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream-workaround

Isaku Yamahata

Changes from v15:
- Added KVM_TDX_RELEASE_VM to reduce the destruction time
- Catch up the TDX module interface to use struct tdx_module_args instead of struct tdx_module_output
- Add tdh_mem_sept_rd() for SEPT_VE_DISABLE=1 and handle Secure-EPT violation with SEPT_VE_DISABLE case.
- Simplified tdx_reclaim_page()
- Reorganize the locking of tdx_release_hkid(), and use smp_call_mask() instead of smp_call_on_cpu() to hold spinlock to race with invalidation on releasing guest memfd
- Removed AMX check as the KVM upstream supports AMX.
- Added CET flag to guest supported xss
- add check if nr_pages isn't large with
(nr_page << PAGE_SHIFT) >> PAGE_SHIFT
- use __seamcall_saved_ret()
- As struct tdx_module_args doesn't match with vcpu.arch.regs, copy regs before/after calling __seamcall_saved_ret().

Changes from v14:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
- rebased to v6.5-rc2, v11 KVM guest_memfd(), v11 TDX host kernel support
- ABI change to add reserved member for future compatibility, dropped unused member.
- handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI
- handle FEAT_CTL MSR access

Changes from v13:
- rbased to v6.4-rc3
- Make use of KVM gmem.
- Added check_cpuid callback for KVM_SET_CPUID2 as RFC patch.
- ABI change of KVM_TDX_VM_INIT as VM scoped KVM ioctl.
- Make TDX initialization non-depend on kvm hardware_enable. Use vmx_hardware_enable directly.
- Drop a patch to prohibit dirty logging as new KVM gmem code base
- Drop parameter only checking for some TDG.VP.VMCALL. Just default part

Changes from v12:
- ABI change of KVM_TDX_VM_INIT
- Rename kvm_gfn_{private, shared} to kvm_gfn_to_{private, shared}
- Move APIC BASE MSI initialization to KVM_TDX_VCPU_INIT
- Fix MTRR patch
- Make MapGpa hypercall always pass it to user space VMM
- Split hooks to TDP MMU into two part. populating and zapping.

Changes from v11:
- ABI change of KVM_TDX_VM_INIT
- Split the hook of TDP MMU to not modify handle_changed_spte()
- Enhanced commit message on mtrr patch
- Made KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS to x86 specific

Changes from v10:
- rebased to v6.2-rc3
- support mtrr with its own patches
- Integrated fd-based private page v10
- Integrated TDX host kernel support v8
- Integrated kvm_init rework v2
- removed struct tdx_td_page and its initialization logic
- cleaned up mmio spte and require enable_mmio_caching=true for TDX
- removed dubious WARN_ON_ONCE()
- split a patch adding methods as nop into several patches

Changes from v9:
- rebased to v6.1-rc2
- Integrated fd-based private page v9 as prerequisite.
- Integrated TDX host kernel support v6
- TDP MMU: Make handle_change_spte() return value.
- TDX: removed seamcall_lock and return -EAGAIN so that TDP MMU can retry

Changes from v8:
- rebased to v6.0-rc7
- Integrated with kvm hardware initialization. Check all packages has at least one online CPU when creating guest TD and refuse cpu offline during guest TDs are running.
- Integrated fd-based private page v8 as prerequisite.
- TDP MMU: Introduced more callbacks instead of single callback.

Changes from v7:
- Use xarray to track whether GFN is private or shared. Drop SPTE_SHARED_MASK. The complex state machine with SPTE_SHARED_MASK was ditched.
- Large page support is implemented. But will be posted as independent RFC patch.
- fd-based private page v7 is integrated. This is mostly same to Chao's patches. It's in github.

Changes from v6:
- rebased to v5.19

Changes from v5:
- export __seamcall and use it
- move mutex lock from callee function of smp_call_on_cpu to the caller.
- rename mmu_prezap => flush_shadow_all_private() and tdx_mmu_release_hkid
- updated comment
- drop the use of tdh_mng_key.reclaimid(): as the function is for backward compatibility to only return success
- struct kvm_tdx_cmd: metadata => flags, added __u64 error.
- make this ioctl systemwide ioctl
- ABI change to struct kvm_init_vm
- guest_tsc_khz: use kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz
- rename BUILD_BUG_ON_MEMCPY to MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE
- drop exporting kvm_set_tsc_khz().
- fix kvm_tdp_page_fault() for mtrr emulation
- rename it to kvm_gfn_shared_mask(), dropped kvm_gpa_shared_mask()
- drop kvm_is_private_gfn(), kept kvm_is_private_gpa()
keep kvm_{gfn, gpa}_private(), kvm_gpa_private()
- update commit message
- rename shadow_init_value => shadow_nonprsent_value
- added ept_violation_ve_test mode
- shadow_nonpresent_value => SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in tdp_mmu.c
- legacy MMU case
=> - mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(), kvm_mmu_create()
- FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
- #VE warning:
- rename: REMOVED_SPTE => __REMOVED_SPTE, SHADOW_REMOVED_SPTE => REMOVED_SPTE
- merge into Like we discussed, this patch should be merged with patch "KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero init value for shadow PTE".
- fix pointed by Sagi. check !is_private check => (kvm_gfn_shared_mask && !is_private)
- introduce kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, gfn)
- add only_shared argument to kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn()
- use kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported()
- rename SPTE_PRIVATE_PROHIBIT to SPTE_SHARED_MASK.
- rename: is_private_prohibit_spte() => spte_shared_mask()
- fix: shadow_nonpresent_value => SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in comment
- dropped this patch as the change was merged into kvm/queue
- update vt_apicv_post_state_restore()
- use is_64_bit_hypercall()
- comment: expand MSMI -> Machine Check System Management Interrupt
- fixed TDX_SEPT_PFERR
- tdvmcall_p[1234]_{write, read}() => tdvmcall_a[0123]_{read,write}()
- rename tdmvcall_exit_readon() => tdvmcall_leaf()
- remove optional zero check of argument.
- do a check for static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(kvm, MSR_IA32_SMBASE) in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_smi and __apic_accept_irq.
- WARN_ON_ONCE in tdx_smi_allowed and tdx_enable_smi_window.
- introduce vcpu_deliver_init to x86_ops
- sprinkeled KVM_BUG_ON()

Changes from v4:
- rebased to TDX host kernel patch series.
- include all the patches to make this patch series working.
- add [MARKER] patches to mark the patch layer clear.

---
* What's TDX?
TDX stands for Trust Domain Extensions, which extends Intel Virtual Machines Extensions (VMX) to introduce a kind of virtual machine guest called a Trust Domain (TD) for confidential computing.

A TD runs in a CPU mode that is designed to protect the confidentiality of its memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including the hosting Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), unless explicitly shared by the TD itself.

We have more detailed explanations below (***). We have the high-level design of TDX KVM below (****).

In this patch series, we use "TD" or "guest TD" to differentiate it from the current "VM" (Virtual Machine), which is supported by KVM today.

* The organization of this patch series
This patch series is on top of the patches series "TDX host kernel support":
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

This patch series is available at
https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream

The related repositories (TDX qemu, TDX OVMF(tdvf) etc) are described at
https://github.com/intel/tdx/wiki/TDX-KVM

The relations of the layers are depicted as follows.
The arrows below show the order of patch reviews we would like to have.

The below layers are chosen so that the device model, for example, qemu can exercise each layering step by step. Check if TDX is supported, create TD VM, create TD vcpu, allow vcpu running, populate TD guest private memory, and handle vcpu exits/hypercalls/interrupts to run TD fully.

TDX vcpu
interrupt/exits/hypercall<------------\

        ^                               |
        |                               |
  TD finalization                       |
        ^                               |
        |                               |
  TDX EPT violation<------------\       |
        ^                       |       |
        |                       |       |
  TD vcpu enter/exit            |       |
        ^                       |       |
        |                       |       |
  TD vcpu creation/destruction  |       \-------KVM TDP MMU MapGPA
        ^                       |                       ^
        |                       |                       |
  TD VM creation/destruction    \---------------KVM TDP MMU hooks

^ ^
| |
TDX architectural definitions KVM TDP refactoring for TDX
^ ^
| |
TDX, VMX <--------TDX host kernel KVM MMU GPA stolen bits
coexistence support

The followings are explanations of each layer. Each layer has a dummy commit that starts with [MARKER] in subject. It is intended to help to identify where each layer starts.

TDX host kernel support:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
The guts of system-wide initialization of TDX module. There is an independent patch series for host x86. TDX KVM patches call functions this patch series provides to initialize the TDX module.

TDX, VMX coexistence:
Infrastructure to allow TDX to coexist with VMX and trigger the initialization of the TDX module.
This layer starts with
"KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX"
TDX architectural definitions:
Add TDX architectural definitions and helper functions
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions".
TD VM creation/destruction:
Guest TD creation/destroy allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction".
TD vcpu creation/destruction:
guest TD creation/destroy Allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction"
TDX EPT violation:
Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement. Handle secure EPT violations to populate guest pages with TDX SEAMCALLs. This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation"
TD vcpu enter/exit:
Allow TDX vcpu to enter into TD and exit from TD. Save CPU state before entering into TD. Restore CPU state after exiting from TD.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit"
TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:
Handle various exits/hypercalls and allow interrupts to be injected so that TD vcpu can continue running.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls"

KVM MMU GPA shared bit:
Introduce framework to handle shared bit repurposed bit of GPA TDX repurposed a bit of GPA to indicate shared or private. If it's shared, it's the same as the conventional VMX EPT case. VMM can access shared guest pages. If it's private, it's handled by Secure-EPT and the guest page is encrypted.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA stolen bits"
KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:
TDX Secure EPT requires different constants. e.g. initial value EPT entry value etc. Various refactoring for those differences. This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX"
KVM TDP MMU hooks:
Introduce framework to TDP MMU to add hooks in addition to direct EPT access TDX added Secure EPT which is an enhancement to VMX EPT. Unlike conventional VMX EPT, CPU can't directly read/write Secure EPT. Instead, use TDX SEAMCALLs to operate on Secure EPT.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks"
KVM TDP MMU MapGPA:
Introduce framework to handle switching guest pages from private/shared to shared/private. For a given GPA, a guest page can be assigned to a private GPA or a shared GPA exclusively. With TDX MapGPA hypercall, guest TD converts GPA assignments from private (or shared) to shared (or private).
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA "

KVM guest private memory: (not shown in the above diagram)
[PATCH v4 00/12] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private
memory: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/1/18/395
Guest private memory requires different memory management in KVM. The patch proposes a way for it. Integration with TDX KVM.

(***)
* TDX module
A CPU-attested software module called the "TDX module" is designed to implement the TDX architecture, and it is loaded by the UEFI firmware today. It can be loaded by the kernel or driver at runtime, but in this patch series we assume that the TDX module is already loaded and initialized.

The TDX module provides two main new logical modes of operation built upon the new SEAM (Secure Arbitration Mode) root and non-root CPU modes added to the VMX architecture. TDX root mode is mostly identical to the VMX root operation mode, and the TDX functions (described later) are triggered by the new SEAMCALL instruction with the desired interface function selected by an input operand (leaf number, in RAX). TDX non-root mode is used for TD guest operation. TDX non-root operation (i.e. "guest TD" mode) is similar to the VMX non-root operation (i.e. guest VM), with changes and restrictions to better assure that no other software or hardware has direct visibility of the TD memory and state.

TDX transitions between TDX root operation and TDX non-root operation include TD Entries, from TDX root to TDX non-root mode, and TD Exits from TDX non-root to TDX root mode. A TD Exit might be asynchronous, triggered by some external event (e.g., external interrupt or SMI) or an exception, or it might be synchronous, triggered by a TDCALL (TDG.VP.VMCALL) function.

TD VCPUs can be entered using SEAMCALL(TDH.VP.ENTER) by KVM. TDH.VP.ENTER is one of the TDX interface functions as mentioned above, and "TDH" stands for Trust Domain Host. Those host-side TDX interface functions are categorized into various areas just for better organization, such as SYS (TDX module management), MNG (TD management), VP (VCPU), PHYSMEM (physical memory), MEM (private memory), etc. For example, SEAMCALL(TDH.SYS.INFO) returns the TDX module information.

TDCS (Trust Domain Control Structure) is the main control structure of a guest TD, and encrypted (using the guest TD's ephemeral private key). At a high level, TDCS holds information for controlling TD operation as a whole, execution, EPTP, MSR bitmaps, etc that KVM needs to set it up. Note that MSR bitmaps are held as part of TDCS (unlike VMX) because they are meant to have the same value for all VCPUs of the same TD.

Trust Domain Virtual Processor State (TDVPS) is the root control structure of a TD VCPU. It helps the TDX module control the operation of the VCPU, and holds the VCPU state while the VCPU is not running. TDVPS is opaque to software and DMA access, accessible only by using the TDX module interface functions (such as TDH.VP.RD, TDH.VP.WR). TDVPS includes TD VMCS, and TD VMCS auxiliary structures, such as virtual APIC page, virtualization exception information, etc.

Several VMX control structures (such as Shared EPT and Posted interrupt descriptor) are directly managed and accessed by the host VMM. These control structures are pointed to by fields in the TD VMCS.

The above means that 1) KVM needs to allocate different data structures for TDs,
2) KVM can reuse the existing code for TDs for some operations, 3) it needs to define TD-specific handling for others. 3) Redirect operations to . 3) Redirect operations to the TDX specific callbacks, like "if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) tdx_callback() else vmx_callback();".

*TD Private Memory
TD private memory is designed to hold TD private content, encrypted by the CPU using the TD ephemeral key. An encryption engine holds a table of encryption keys, and an encryption key is selected for each memory transaction based on a Host Key Identifier (HKID). By design, the host VMM does not have access to the encryption keys.

In the first generation of MKTME, HKID is "stolen" from the physical address by allocating a configurable number of bits from the top of the physical address. The HKID space is partitioned into shared HKIDs for legacy MKTME accesses and private HKIDs for SEAM-mode-only accesses. We use 0 for the shared HKID on the host so that MKTME can be opaque or bypassed on the host.

During TDX non-root operation (i.e. guest TD), memory accesses can be qualified as either shared or private, based on the value of a new SHARED bit in the Guest Physical Address (GPA). The CPU translates shared GPAs using the usual VMX EPT (Extended Page Table) or "Shared EPT" (in this document), which resides in host VMM memory. The Shared EPT is directly managed by the host VMM - the same as with the current VMX. Since guest TDs usually require I/O, and the data exchange needs to be done via shared memory, thus KVM needs to use the current EPT functionality even for TDs.

* Secure EPT and Minoring using the TDP code
The CPU translates private GPAs using a separate Secure EPT. The Secure EPT pages are encrypted and integrity-protected with the TD's ephemeral private key. Secure EPT can be managed _indirectly_ by the host VMM, using the TDX interface functions, and thus conceptually Secure EPT is a subset of EPT (why "subset"). Since execution of such interface functions takes much longer time than accessing memory directly, in KVM we use the existing TDP code to minor the Secure EPT for the TD.

This way, we can effectively walk Secure EPT without using the TDX interface functions.

* VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
The userspace VMM, such as QEMU, needs to build and treat TDs differently. For example, a TD needs to boot in private memory, and the host software cannot copy the initial image to private memory.

* TSC Virtualization
The TDX module helps TDs maintain reliable TSC (Time Stamp Counter) values (e.g. consistent among the TD VCPUs) and the virtual TSC frequency is determined by TD configuration, i.e. when the TD is created, not per VCPU. The current KVM owns TSC virtualization for VMs, but the TDX module does for TDs.

* MCE support for TDs
The TDX module doesn't allow VMM to inject MCE. Instead PV way is needed for TD to communicate with VMM. For now, KVM silently ignores MCE request by VMM. MSRs related to MCE (e.g, MCE bank registers) can be naturally emulated by paravirtualizing MSR access.

[1] For details, the specifications, [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], are available.

* Restrictions or future work
Some features are not included to reduce patch size. Those features are addressed as future independent patch series.
- large page (2M, 1G)
- qemu gdb stub
- guest PMU
- and more

* Prerequisites
It's required to load the TDX module and initialize it. It's out of the scope of this patch series. Another independent patch for the common x86 code is planned. It defines CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST and this patch series uses CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST. It's assumed that With CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=y, the TDX module is initialized and ready for KVM to use the TDX module APIs for TDX guest life cycle like tdh.mng.init are ready to use.

Concretely Global initialization, LP (Logical Processor) initialization, global configuration, the key configuration, and TDMR and PAMT initialization are done. The state of the TDX module is SYS_READY. Please refer to the TDX module specification, the chapter Intel TDX Module Lifecycle State Machine

** Detecting the TDX module readiness.
TDX host patch series implements the detection of the TDX module availability and its initialization so that KVM can use it. Also it manages Host KeyID (HKID) assigned to guest TD.
The assumed APIs the TDX host patch series provides are
- const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
Return the system wide information about the TDX module. NULL if the TDX isn't initialized.
- int tdx_enable(void);
Initialization of TDX module so that the TDX module is ready for KVM to use.
- extern u32 tdx_global_keyid __read_mostly;
global host key id that is used for the TDX module itself.
- u32 tdx_get_num_keyid(void);
return the number of available TDX private host key id.
- int tdx_keyid_alloc(void);
Allocate HKID for guest TD.
- void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid);
Free HKID for guest TD.

(****)
* TDX KVM high-level design
- Host key ID management
Host Key ID (HKID) needs to be assigned to each TDX guest for memory encryption. It is assumed The TDX host patch series implements necessary functions, u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void), int tdx_keyid_alloc(void) and,
void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid).

- Data structures and VM type
Because TDX is different from VMX, define its own VM/VCPU structures, struct kvm_tdx and struct vcpu_tdx instead of struct kvm_vmx and struct vcpu_vmx. To identify the VM, introduce VM-type to specify which VM type, VMX (default) or TDX, is used.

- VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
Re-purpose the existing KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to add TDX specific operations. New commands are used to get the TDX system parameters, set TDX specific VM/VCPU parameters, set initial guest memory and measurement.

The creation of TDX VM requires five additional operations in addition to the conventional VM creation.
- Get KVM system capability to check if TDX VM type is supported
- VM creation (KVM_CREATE_VM)
- New: Get the TDX specific system parameters. KVM_TDX_GET_CAPABILITY.
- New: Set TDX specific VM parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VM.
- VCPU creation (KVM_CREATE_VCPU)
- New: Set TDX specific VCPU parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU.
- New: Initialize guest memory as boot state and extend the measurement with the memory. KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION.
- New: Finalize VM. KVM_TDX_FINALIZE. Complete measurement of the initial TDX VM contents.
- VCPU RUN (KVM_VCPU_RUN)

- Protected guest state
Because the guest state (CPU state and guest memory) is protected, the KVM VMM can't operate on them. For example, accessing CPU registers, injecting exceptions, and accessing guest memory. Those operations are handled as silently ignored, returning zero or initial reset value when it's requested via KVM API ioctls.

VM/VCPU state and callbacks for TDX specific operations. Define tdx specific VM state and VCPU state instead of VMX ones. Redirect operations to TDX specific callbacks. "if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()".

Operations on the CPU state
silently ignore operations on the guest state. For example, the write to CPU registers is ignored and the read from CPU registers returns 0.

. ignore access to CPU registers except for allowed ones.
. TSC: add a check if tsc is immutable and return an error. Because the KVM
implementation updates the internal tsc state and it's difficult to back out those changes. Instead, skip the logic.
. dirty logging: add check if dirty logging is supported.
. exceptions/SMI/MCE/SIPI/INIT: silently ignore

Note: virtual external interrupt and NMI can be injected into TDX guests.

- KVM MMU integration
One bit of the guest physical address (bit 51 or 47) is repurposed to indicate if the guest physical address is private (the bit is cleared) or shared (the bit is set). The bits are called stolen bits.

- Stolen bits framework
systematically tracks which guest physical address, shared or private, is used.

- Shared EPT and secure EPT
There are two EPTs. Shared EPT (the conventional one) and Secure EPT(the new one). Shared EPT is handled the same for the stolen bit set. Secure EPT points to private guest pages. To resolve EPT violation, KVM walks one of two EPTs based on faulted GPA. Because it's costly to access secure EPT during walking EPTs with SEAMCALLs for the private guest physical address, another private EPT is used as a shadow of Secure-EPT with the existing logic at the cost of extra memory.

The following depicts the relationship.

                    KVM                             |       TDX module
                     |                              |           |
        -------------+----------                    |           |
        |                      |                    |           |
        V                      V                    |           |
     shared GPA           private GPA               |           |
  CPU shared EPT pointer  KVM private EPT pointer   |  CPU secure EPT pointer
        |                      |                    |           |
        |                      |                    |           |
        V                      V                    |           V
  shared EPT                private EPT--------mirror----->Secure EPT
        |                      |                    |           |
        |                      \--------------------+------\    |
        |                                           |      |    |
        V                                           |      V    V
  shared guest page                                 |    private guest page
                                                    |
                                                    |
                              non-encrypted memory  |    encrypted memory
                                                    |

- Operating on Secure EPT
Use the TDX module APIs to operate on Secure EPT. To call the TDX API during resolving EPT violation, add hooks to additional operation and wiring it to TDX backend.

* References

[1] TDX specification
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
[2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
[3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf
[4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-module-1.0-public-spec-v0.931.pdf
[5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf
[6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
[7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.01.pdf
[8] intel public github
kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm
TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest
qemu TDX https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx
[9] TDVF
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF
This was merged into EDK2 main branch. https://github.com/tianocore/edk2

Chao Gao (2):
KVM: x86/mmu: Assume guest MMIOs are shared
KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o
wrmsr

Isaku Yamahata (93):
KVM: x86/vmx: initialize loaded_vmcss_on_cpu in vmx_hardware_setup()
KVM: x86/vmx: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions
KVM: VMX: Reorder vmx initialization with kvm vendor initialization
KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel
module
KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure
KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural
definitions
KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions
KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module
KVM: TDX: Retry SEAMCALL on the lack of entropy error
KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about
TDX module
KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl
KVM: x86, tdx: Make KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS backend specific
KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters
KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case
KVM: TDX: Refuse to unplug the last cpu on the package [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
creation/destruction
KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure
KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits
KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU
KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of
GPA
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for
TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE
KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to
shadow_mmio_mask/shadow_present_mask
KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis
KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA
KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at
allocation
KVM: x86/mmu: Add a new is_private member for union kvm_mmu_page_role
KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Sprinkle __must_check
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation
KVM: TDX: Add accessors VMX VMCS helpers
KVM: TDX: Require TDP MMU and mmio caching for TDX
KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support
KVM: TDX: MTRR: implement get_mt_mask() for TDX
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization
KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory
KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit
KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path
KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs)
KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD
KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
exits/interrupts/hypercalls
KVM: TDX: complete interrupts after tdexit
KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit
KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor
KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched
behavior
KVM: TDX: remove use of struct vcpu_vmx from posted_interrupt.c
KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection
KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit
KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI
KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit
KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI
KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit
KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT
KVM: TDX: Handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI with MSMI
KVM: TDX: Add a place holder for handler of TDX hypercalls

    (TDG.VP.VMCALL)

KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL
KVM: TDX: Add KVM Exit for TDX TDG.VP.VMCALL
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall
KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle MSR MTRRCap and MTRRDefType access
KVM: TDX: Handle MSR IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR and IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL
KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall
KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request
KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore guest instruction emulation
KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore dirty logging
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore VMX preemption timer
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to TSC
KVM: TDX: Ignore setting up mce
KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore for TDX to ignore hypercall patch
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore virtual apic related operation
KVM: TDX: Inhibit APICv for TDX guest Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)
KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU
KVM: TDX: Add hint TDX ioctl to release Secure-EPT
RFC: KVM: x86: Add x86 callback to check cpuid
RFC: KVM: x86, TDX: Add check for KVM_SET_CPUID2 [MARKER] the end of (the first phase of) TDX KVM patch series

Sean Christopherson (17):
KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX
KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes
KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters
KVM: Allow page-sized MMU caches to be initialized with custom 64-bit
values
KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed
SPTE
KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases
KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function
KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code
KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX
KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC
KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is proteced
KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function
argument
KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper
KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall

Yan Zhao (1):
KVM: x86/mmu: TDX: Do not enable page track for TD guest

Yang Weijiang (1):
KVM: TDX: Add TSX_CTRL msr into uret_msrs list

Yao Yuan (1):
KVM: TDX: Handle vmentry failure for INTEL TD guest

Yuan Yao (1):
KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT

 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst             |    9 +-
 Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst           |    1 +
 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst       |    2 +
 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst   |  362 +++
 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst |  443 +++
 arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c                 |    1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h      |    1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h         |   17 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h            |   84 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h                 |   85 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h                 |   14 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h            |   89 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h            |    5 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig                       |    6 +
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile                      |    3 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                       |   27 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h                       |    2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/irq.c                         |    3 +
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c                       |   33 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h                       |    2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h                         |   31 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c                     |  196 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h            |  109 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c              |    3 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h             |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c                    |   17 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h                    |   27 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h                |   14 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c                 |  421 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h                 |    7 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/smm.h                         |    7 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                     |    1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h                  |  166 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c                    | 1239 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c               |   46 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h               |   28 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c             |   43 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h             |   13 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c                     | 3229 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h                     |  272 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h                |  221 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h               |   43 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c               |   20 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h                 |  267 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h                    |    5 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                     |  676 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h                     |   52 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h                 |  257 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                         |  117 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h                         |    2 +
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S           |    4 +
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c                |   48 +-
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h                |   51 -
 include/linux/kvm_host.h                   |    1 +
 include/linux/kvm_types.h                  |    1 +
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                   |   87 +
 tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h      |   96 +
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c                        |   31 +-
 58 files changed, 8280 insertions(+), 759 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst
 create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v16 1/116 KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

KVM accesses Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS) with VMX instructions to operate on VM. TDX doesn't allow VMM to operate VMCS directly. Instead, TDX has its own data structures, and TDX SEAMCALL APIs for VMM to indirectly operate those data structures. This means we must have a TDX version of kvm_x86_ops.

The existing global struct kvm_x86_ops already defines an interface which fits with TDX. But kvm_x86_ops is system-wide, not per-VM structure. To allow VMX to coexist with TDs, the kvm_x86_ops callbacks will have wrappers "if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()" to switch VMX or TDX at run time.

To split the runtime switch, the VMX implementation, and the TDX implementation, add main.c, and move out the vmx_x86_ops hooks in preparation for adding TDX, which can coexist with VMX, i.e. KVM can run both VMs and TDs. Use 'vt' for the naming scheme as a nod to VT-x and as a concatenation of VmxTdx.

The current code looks as follows.
In vmx.c
static vmx_op() { ... }

  static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops = {
        .op = vmx_op,

initialization code

The eventually converted code will look like In vmx.c, keep the VMX operations.
vmx_op() { ... }
VMX initialization
In tdx.c, define the TDX operations.
tdx_op() { ... }
TDX initialization
In x86_ops.h, declare the VMX and TDX operations.
vmx_op();
tdx_op();
In main.c, define common wrappers for VMX and TDX.
static vt_ops() { if (tdx) tdx_ops() else vmx_ops() }

  static struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops = {
        .op = vt_op,

initialization to call VMX and TDX initialization

Opportunistically, fix the name inconsistency from vmx_create_vcpu() and vmx_free_vcpu() to vmx_vcpu_create() and vxm_vcpu_free().

---
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile      |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 167 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c     | 376 ++++++++++---------------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 125 ++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 396 insertions(+), 274 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +1 -1
index 80e3fe184d17..0e894ae23cbc 100644
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN)	+= xen.o
 kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_SMM)	+= smm.o
 
 kvm-intel-y		+= vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \
-			   vmx/hyperv.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o
+			   vmx/hyperv.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o
 kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM)	+= vmx/sgx.o
 
 kvm-amd-y		+= svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o \
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c new file +167 -0

167 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +103 -273

931 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h new file +125 -0

125 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH v16 2/116 KVM: x86/vmx: initialize loaded_vmcss_on_cpu in vmx_hardware_setup()

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

vmx_hardware_disable() accesses loaded_vmcss_on_cpu via hardware_disable_all(). To allow hardware_enable/disable_all() before kvm_init(), initialize it in vmx_hardware_setup() so that tdx module initialization, hardware_setup method, can reference the variable.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +5 -4
index f733629c4706..3627b704ff37 100644
@@ -8266,8 +8266,12 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)
 {
 	unsigned long host_bndcfgs;
 	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	int cpu;
 	int r;
 
+	/* vmx_hardware_disable() accesses loaded_vmcss_on_cpu. */
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
 	store_idt(&dt);
 	host_idt_base = dt.address;
 
@@ -8510,11 +8514,8 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
 	if (r)
 		goto err_l1d_flush;
 
-	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
-		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
-
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
 		pi_init_cpu(cpu);
-	}
 
 	cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(vmx_emergency_disable);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH v16 3/116 KVM: x86/vmx: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Currently, KVM VMX module initialization/exit functions are a single function each. Refactor KVM VMX module initialization functions into KVM common part and VMX part so that TDX specific part can be added cleanly. Opportunistically refactor module exit function as well.

The current module initialization flow is,
0.) Check if VMX is supported,
1.) hyper-v specific initialization,
2.) system-wide x86 specific and vendor specific initialization, 3.) Final VMX specific system-wide initialization,
4.) calculate the sizes of VMX kvm structure and VMX vcpu structure, 5.) report those sizes to the KVM common layer and KVM common
initialization

Refactor the KVM VMX module initialization function into functions with a wrapper function to separate VMX logic in vmx.c from a file, main.c, common among VMX and TDX. Introduce a wrapper function for vmx_init().

The KVM architecture common layer allocates struct kvm with reported size for architecture-specific code. The KVM VMX module defines its structure as struct vmx_kvm { struct kvm; VMX specific members;} and uses it as struct vmx kvm. Similar for vcpu structure. TDX KVM patches will define TDX specific kvm and vcpu structures.

The current module exit function is also a single function, a combination of VMX specific logic and common KVM logic. Refactor it into VMX specific logic and KVM common logic. This is just refactoring to keep the VMX specific logic in vmx.c from main.c.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c     | 54 +++++---------------------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 13 ++++++++-
 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +50 -0
index 3b89cb721fe8..4059364fc5e0 100644
@@ -165,3 +165,53 @@ struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
 	.runtime_ops = &vt_x86_ops,
 	.pmu_ops = &intel_pmu_ops,
 };
+
+static int __init vt_init(void)
+{
+	unsigned int vcpu_size, vcpu_align;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!kvm_is_vmx_supported())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, hv_init_evmcs() touches only VMX knobs, i.e. there's nothing
+	 * to unwind if a later step fails.
+	 */
+	hv_init_evmcs();
+
+	r = kvm_x86_vendor_init(&vt_init_ops);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = vmx_init();
+	if (r)
+		goto err_vmx_init;
+
+	/*
+	 * Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
+	 * exposed to userspace!
+	 */
+	vcpu_size = sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx);
+	vcpu_align = __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx);
+	r = kvm_init(vcpu_size, vcpu_align, THIS_MODULE);
+	if (r)
+		goto err_kvm_init;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_kvm_init:
+	vmx_exit();
+err_vmx_init:
+	kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+	return r;
+}
+module_init(vt_init);
+
+static void vt_exit(void)
+{
+	kvm_exit();
+	kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+	vmx_exit();
+}
+module_exit(vt_exit);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +6 -48

104 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +12 -1
index 0c8fbd29b969..c6bb2fe9ddb9 100644
@@ -6,11 +6,22 @@
 
 #include "x86.h"
 
-__init int vmx_hardware_setup(void);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+__init void hv_init_evmcs(void);
+void hv_reset_evmcs(void);
+#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
+static inline void hv_init_evmcs(void) {}
+static inline void hv_reset_evmcs(void) {}
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
+
+bool kvm_is_vmx_supported(void);
+int __init vmx_init(void);
+void vmx_exit(void);
 
 extern struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata;
 extern struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata;
 
+__init int vmx_hardware_setup(void);
 void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void);
 int vmx_check_processor_compat(void);
 int vmx_hardware_enable(void);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH v16 4/116 KVM: VMX: Reorder vmx initialization with kvm vendor initialization

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

To match vmx_exit cleanup.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +5 -5
index 4059364fc5e0..2e8a0de2c96a 100644
@@ -180,11 +180,11 @@ static int __init vt_init(void)
 	 */
 	hv_init_evmcs();
 
-	r = kvm_x86_vendor_init(&vt_init_ops);
+	r = vmx_init();
 	if (r)
-		return r;
+		goto err_vmx_init;
 
-	r = vmx_init();
+	r = kvm_x86_vendor_init(&vt_init_ops);
 	if (r)
 		goto err_vmx_init;
 
@@ -201,9 +201,9 @@ static int __init vt_init(void)
 	return 0;
 
 err_kvm_init:
-	vmx_exit();
-err_vmx_init:
 	kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+err_vmx_init:
+	vmx_exit();
 	return r;
 }
 module_init(vt_init);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH v16 5/116 KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX requires several initialization steps for KVM to create guest TDs. Detect CPU feature, enable VMX (TDX is based on VMX) on all online CPUs, detect the TDX module availability, initialize it and disable VMX.

To enable/disable VMX on all online CPUs, utilize vmx_hardware_enable/disable(). The method also initializes each CPU for TDX. TDX requires calling a TDX initialization function per logical processor (LP) before the LP uses TDX. When the CPU is becoming online, call the TDX LP initialization API. If it fails to initialize TDX, refuse CPU online for simplicity instead of TDX avoiding the failed LP.

There are several options on when to initialize the TDX module. A.) kernel module loading time, B.) the first guest TD creation time. A.) was chosen. With B.), a user may hit an error of the TDX initialization when trying to create the first guest TD. The machine that fails to initialize the TDX module can't boot any guest TD further. Such failure is undesirable and a surprise because the user expects that the machine can accommodate guest TD, but not. So A.) is better than B.).

Introduce a module parameter, kvm_intel.tdx, to explicitly enable TDX KVM support. It's off by default to keep the same behavior for those who don't use TDX. Implement hardware_setup method to detect TDX feature of CPU and initialize TDX module.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile      |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 34 ++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  8 ++++
 4 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +1 -0
index 0e894ae23cbc..4b01ab842ab7 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_SMM)	+= smm.o
 kvm-intel-y		+= vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \
 			   vmx/hyperv.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o
 kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM)	+= vmx/sgx.o
+kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST)	+= vmx/tdx.o
 
 kvm-amd-y		+= svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o \
 			   svm/sev.o svm/hyperv.o
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +32 -2
index 2e8a0de2c96a..14ab7d5cdded 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,36 @@
 #include "nested.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
 
+static bool enable_tdx __ro_after_init;
+module_param_named(tdx, enable_tdx, bool, 0444);
+
+static int vt_hardware_enable(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = vmx_hardware_enable();
+	if (ret || !enable_tdx)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = tdx_cpu_enable();
+	if (ret)
+		vmx_hardware_disable();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = vmx_hardware_setup();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_hardware_setup(&vt_x86_ops);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #define VMX_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS				\
 	(BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE)|			\
 	 BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT) |			\
@@ -22,7 +52,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup,
 
-	.hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
+	.hardware_enable = vt_hardware_enable,
 	.hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
 	.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
 
@@ -159,7 +189,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 };
 
 struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
-	.hardware_setup = vmx_hardware_setup,
+	.hardware_setup = vt_hardware_setup,
 	.handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL,
 
 	.runtime_ops = &vt_x86_ops,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c new file +84 -0

84 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +8 -0
index c6bb2fe9ddb9..2c4fe3aff285 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ bool kvm_is_vmx_supported(void);
 int __init vmx_init(void);
 void vmx_exit(void);
 
+__init int vmx_hardware_setup(void);
+
 extern struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata;
 extern struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata;
 
@@ -133,4 +135,10 @@ void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 #endif
 void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
+#else
+static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH v16 6/116 KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add placeholders TDX VM/vcpu structure that overlays with VMX VM/vcpu structures. Initialize VM structure size and vcpu size/align so that x86 KVM common code knows those size irrespective of VMX or TDX. Those structures will be populated as guest creation logic develops.

Add helper functions to check if the VM is guest TD and add conversion functions between KVM VM/VCPU and TDX VM/VCPU.

---
v14 -> v15:
- use KVM_X86_TDX_VM

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 18 +++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c  |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h  | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +16 -2
index 14ab7d5cdded..1d423abd124b 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include "vmx.h"
 #include "nested.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
+#include "tdx.h"
 
 static bool enable_tdx __ro_after_init;
 module_param_named(tdx, enable_tdx, bool, 0444);
@@ -210,6 +211,21 @@ static int __init vt_init(void)
 	 */
 	hv_init_evmcs();
 
+	/*
+	 * kvm_x86_ops is updated with vt_x86_ops.  vt_x86_ops.vm_size must
+	 * be set before kvm_x86_vendor_init().
+	 */
+	vcpu_size = sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx);
+	vcpu_align = __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx);
+	if (enable_tdx) {
+		vt_x86_ops.vm_size = max_t(unsigned int, vt_x86_ops.vm_size,
+					   sizeof(struct kvm_tdx));
+		vcpu_size = max_t(unsigned int, vcpu_size,
+				  sizeof(struct vcpu_tdx));
+		vcpu_align = max_t(unsigned int, vcpu_align,
+				   __alignof__(struct vcpu_tdx));
+	}
+
 	r = vmx_init();
 	if (r)
 		goto err_vmx_init;
@@ -222,8 +238,6 @@ static int __init vt_init(void)
 	 * Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
 	 * exposed to userspace!
 	 */
-	vcpu_size = sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx);
-	vcpu_align = __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx);
 	r = kvm_init(vcpu_size, vcpu_align, THIS_MODULE);
 	if (r)
 		goto err_kvm_init;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +1 -0
index 8a378fb6f1d4..1c9884164566 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include "capabilities.h"
 #include "x86_ops.h"
 #include "x86.h"
+#include "tdx.h"
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h new file +50 -0

50 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#7 lore raw

PATCH v16 7/116 KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

NOTE: This patch is in position of the patch series for developers to be able to test codes during the middle of the patch series although this patch series doesn't provide functional features until the all the patches of this patch series. When merging this patch series, this patch can be moved to the end.

As first step TDX VM support, return that TDX VM type supported to device model, e.g. qemu. The callback to create guest TD is vm_init callback for KVM_CREATE_VM.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     |  6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c     |  6 ------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  3 ++-
 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +16 -2
index 1d423abd124b..8ca23adfcfb8 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,12 @@
 static bool enable_tdx __ro_after_init;
 module_param_named(tdx, enable_tdx, bool, 0444);
 
+static bool vt_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
+{
+	return __kvm_is_vm_type_supported(type) ||
+		(enable_tdx && tdx_is_vm_type_supported(type));
+}
+
 static int vt_hardware_enable(void)
 {
 	int ret;
@@ -37,6 +43,14 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (is_td(kvm))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;	/* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */
+
+	return vmx_vm_init(kvm);
+}
+
 #define VMX_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS				\
 	(BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE)|			\
 	 BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT) |			\
@@ -57,9 +71,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
 	.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
 
-	.is_vm_type_supported = vmx_is_vm_type_supported,
+	.is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
 	.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
-	.vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
+	.vm_init = vt_vm_init,
 	.vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
 
 	.vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +6 -0
index 1c9884164566..9d3f593eacb8 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
+{
+	/* enable_tdx check is done by the caller. */
+	return type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;
+}
+
 struct vmx_tdx_enabled {
 	cpumask_var_t vmx_enabled;
 	atomic_t err;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0 -6
index d9f2f00af427..0b8bf04e283d 100644
@@ -7532,12 +7532,6 @@ int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return err;
 }
 
-bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
-{
-	/* TODO: Check if TDX is supported. */
-	return __kvm_is_vm_type_supported(type);
-}
-
 #define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
 #define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +2 -1
index 2c4fe3aff285..99fb6c9c0282 100644
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void);
 int vmx_check_processor_compat(void);
 int vmx_hardware_enable(void);
 void vmx_hardware_disable(void);
-bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
 int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
 void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
 int vmx_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm);
@@ -137,8 +136,10 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
 int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
+bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
 #else
 static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#8 lore raw

PATCH v16 8/116 The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TDX architectural definitions.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst              |  2 ++
 .../virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst       | 29 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst +2 -0
index ad13ec55ddfe..ccff56dca2b1 100644
@@ -19,3 +19,5 @@ KVM
    vcpu-requests
    halt-polling
    review-checklist
+
+   intel-tdx-layer-status
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst new file +29 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f11ea701dc19
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================================
+Intel Trust Dodmain Extensions(TDX)
+===================================
+
+Layer status
+============
+What qemu can do
+----------------
+- TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu.
+- Qemu can try to create VM of TDX VM type and then fails.
+
+Patch Layer status
+------------------
+  Patch layer                          Status
+
+* TDX, VMX coexistence:                 Applied
+* TDX architectural definitions:        Applying
+* TD VM creation/destruction:           Not yet
+* TD vcpu creation/destruction:         Not yet
+* TDX EPT violation:                    Not yet
+* TD finalization:                      Not yet
+* TD vcpu enter/exit:                   Not yet
+* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:    Not yet
+
+* KVM MMU GPA shared bits:              Not yet
+* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:          Not yet
+* KVM TDP MMU hooks:                    Not yet
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#9 lore raw

PATCH v16 9/116 KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Define architectural definitions for KVM to issue the TDX SEAMCALLs.

Structures and values that are architecturally defined in the TDX module specifications the chapter of ABI Reference.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 213 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 213 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h new file +213 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..845b6ef9f787
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* architectural constants/data definitions for TDX SEAMCALLs */
+
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H
+#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * TDX SEAMCALL API function leaves
+ */
+#define TDH_VP_ENTER			0
+#define TDH_MNG_ADDCX			1
+#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD		2
+#define TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD		3
+#define TDH_VP_ADDCX			4
+#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_RELOCATE		5
+#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG		6
+#define TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK		7
+#define TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG		8
+#define TDH_MNG_CREATE			9
+#define TDH_VP_CREATE			10
+#define TDH_MNG_RD			11
+#define TDH_MR_EXTEND			16
+#define TDH_MR_FINALIZE			17
+#define TDH_VP_FLUSH			18
+#define TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE		19
+#define TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID		20
+#define TDH_MNG_INIT			21
+#define TDH_VP_INIT			22
+#define TDH_MEM_SEPT_RD			25
+#define TDH_VP_RD			26
+#define TDH_MNG_KEY_RECLAIMID		27
+#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM		28
+#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE		29
+#define TDH_MEM_SEPT_REMOVE		30
+#define TDH_MEM_TRACK			38
+#define TDH_MEM_RANGE_UNBLOCK		39
+#define TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB		40
+#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD		41
+#define TDH_VP_WR			43
+#define TDH_SYS_LP_SHUTDOWN		44
+
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_TD_VM_CALL_INFO		0x10000
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_MAP_GPA				0x10001
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_QUOTE				0x10002
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR		0x10003
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_SETUP_EVENT_NOTIFY_INTERRUPT	0x10004
+
+/* TDX control structure (TDR/TDCS/TDVPS) field access codes */
+#define TDX_NON_ARCH			BIT_ULL(63)
+#define TDX_CLASS_SHIFT			56
+#define TDX_FIELD_MASK			GENMASK_ULL(31, 0)
+
+#define __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(non_arch, class, field)	\
+	(((non_arch) ? TDX_NON_ARCH : 0) |		\
+	 ((u64)(class) << TDX_CLASS_SHIFT) |		\
+	 ((u64)(field) & TDX_FIELD_MASK))
+
+#define BUILD_TDX_FIELD(class, field)			\
+	__BUILD_TDX_FIELD(false, (class), (field))
+
+#define BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH(class, field)		\
+	__BUILD_TDX_FIELD(true, (class), (field))
+
+
+/* Class code for TD */
+#define TD_CLASS_EXECUTION_CONTROLS	17ULL
+
+/* Class code for TDVPS */
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_VMCS		0ULL
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_GUEST_GPR		16ULL
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST		17ULL
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_MANAGEMENT		32ULL
+
+enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control {
+	TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET = 10,
+};
+
+/* @field is any of enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control */
+#define TDCS_EXEC(field)		BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TD_CLASS_EXECUTION_CONTROLS, (field))
+
+/* @field is the VMCS field encoding */
+#define TDVPS_VMCS(field)		BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_VMCS, (field))
+
+enum tdx_vcpu_guest_other_state {
+	TD_VCPU_STATE_DETAILS_NON_ARCH = 0x100,
+};
+
+union tdx_vcpu_state_details {
+	struct {
+		u64 vmxip	: 1;
+		u64 reserved	: 63;
+	};
+	u64 full;
+};
+
+/* @field is any of enum tdx_guest_other_state */
+#define TDVPS_STATE(field)		BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST, (field))
+#define TDVPS_STATE_NON_ARCH(field)	BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH(TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST, (field))
+
+/* Management class fields */
+enum tdx_vcpu_guest_management {
+	TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI = 11,
+};
+
+/* @field is any of enum tdx_vcpu_guest_management */
+#define TDVPS_MANAGEMENT(field)		BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_MANAGEMENT, (field))
+
+#define TDX_EXTENDMR_CHUNKSIZE		256
+
+struct tdx_cpuid_value {
+	u32 eax;
+	u32 ebx;
+	u32 ecx;
+	u32 edx;
+} __packed;
+
+#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG		BIT_ULL(0)
+#define TDX_TD_ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE	BIT_ULL(28)
+#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PKS		BIT_ULL(30)
+#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_KL		BIT_ULL(31)
+#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PERFMON	BIT_ULL(63)
+
+/*
+ * TD_PARAMS is provided as an input to TDH_MNG_INIT, the size of which is 1024B.
+ */
+#define TDX_MAX_VCPUS	(~(u16)0)
+
+struct td_params {
+	u64 attributes;
+	u64 xfam;
+	u16 max_vcpus;
+	u8 reserved0[6];
+
+	u64 eptp_controls;
+	u64 exec_controls;
+	u16 tsc_frequency;
+	u8  reserved1[38];
+
+	u64 mrconfigid[6];
+	u64 mrowner[6];
+	u64 mrownerconfig[6];
+	u64 reserved2[4];
+
+	union {
+		DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct tdx_cpuid_value, cpuid_values);
+		u8 reserved3[768];
+	};
+} __packed __aligned(1024);
+
+/*
+ * Guest uses MAX_PA for GPAW when set.
+ * 0: GPA.SHARED bit is GPA[47]
+ * 1: GPA.SHARED bit is GPA[51]
+ */
+#define TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW      BIT_ULL(0)
+
+/*
+ * TDX requires the frequency to be defined in units of 25MHz, which is the
+ * frequency of the core crystal clock on TDX-capable platforms, i.e. the TDX
+ * module can only program frequencies that are multiples of 25MHz.  The
+ * frequency must be between 100mhz and 10ghz (inclusive).
+ */
+#define TDX_TSC_KHZ_TO_25MHZ(tsc_in_khz)	((tsc_in_khz) / (25 * 1000))
+#define TDX_TSC_25MHZ_TO_KHZ(tsc_in_25mhz)	((tsc_in_25mhz) * (25 * 1000))
+#define TDX_MIN_TSC_FREQUENCY_KHZ		(100 * 1000)
+#define TDX_MAX_TSC_FREQUENCY_KHZ		(10 * 1000 * 1000)
+
+union tdx_sept_entry {
+	struct {
+		u64 r		:  1;
+		u64 w		:  1;
+		u64 x		:  1;
+		u64 mt		:  3;
+		u64 ipat	:  1;
+		u64 leaf	:  1;
+		u64 a		:  1;
+		u64 d		:  1;
+		u64 xu		:  1;
+		u64 ignored0	:  1;
+		u64 pfn		: 40;
+		u64 reserved	:  5;
+		u64 vgp		:  1;
+		u64 pwa		:  1;
+		u64 ignored1	:  1;
+		u64 sss		:  1;
+		u64 spp		:  1;
+		u64 ignored2	:  1;
+		u64 sve		:  1;
+	};
+	u64 raw;
+};
+
+enum tdx_sept_entry_state {
+	TDX_SEPT_FREE = 0,
+	TDX_SEPT_BLOCKED = 1,
+	TDX_SEPT_PENDING = 2,
+	TDX_SEPT_PENDING_BLOCKED = 3,
+	TDX_SEPT_PRESENT = 4,
+};
+
+union tdx_sept_level_state {
+	struct {
+		u64 level	:  3;
+		u64 reserved0	:  5;
+		u64 state	:  8;
+		u64 reserved1	: 48;
+	};
+	u64 raw;
+};
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#10 lore raw

PATCH v16 10/116 KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add error codes for the TDX SEAMCALLs both for TDX VMM side for TDH SEAMCALL and TDX guest side for TDG.VP.VMCALL. KVM issues the TDX SEAMCALLs and checks its error code. KVM handles hypercall from the TDX guest and may return an error. So error code for the TDX guest is also needed.

TDX SEAMCALL uses bits 31:0 to return more information, so these error codes will only exactly match RAX[63:32]. Error codes for TDG.VP.VMCALL is defined by TDX Guest-Host-Communication interface spec.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h new file +42 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ec76740dc6a1
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* architectural status code for SEAMCALL */
+
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H
+#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H
+
+#define TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK		0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL
+
+/*
+ * TDX SEAMCALL Status Codes (returned in RAX)
+ */
+#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_VCPU		0x4000000100000000ULL
+#define TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE		0x8000000300000000ULL
+#define TDX_OPERAND_INVALID			0xC000010000000000ULL
+#define TDX_OPERAND_BUSY			0x8000020000000000ULL
+#define TDX_PREVIOUS_TLB_EPOCH_BUSY		0x8000020100000000ULL
+#define TDX_VCPU_NOT_ASSOCIATED			0x8000070200000000ULL
+#define TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED		0x8000080000000000ULL
+#define TDX_KEY_STATE_INCORRECT			0xC000081100000000ULL
+#define TDX_KEY_CONFIGURED			0x0000081500000000ULL
+#define TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE		0x0000082100000000ULL
+#define TDX_FLUSHVP_NOT_DONE			0x8000082400000000ULL
+#define TDX_EPT_WALK_FAILED			0xC0000B0000000000ULL
+#define TDX_EPT_ENTRY_NOT_FREE			0xC0000B0200000000ULL
+
+/*
+ * TDG.VP.VMCALL Status Codes (returned in R10)
+ */
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS			0x0000000000000000ULL
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_RETRY			0x0000000000000001ULL
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND		0x8000000000000000ULL
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_TDREPORT_FAILED		0x8000000000000001ULL
+
+/*
+ * TDX module operand ID, appears in 31:0 part of error code as
+ * detail information
+ */
+#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX			0x01
+#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT			0x92
+#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_TD_EPOCH			0xa9
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#11 lore raw

PATCH v16 11/116 KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

A VMM interacts with the TDX module using a new instruction (SEAMCALL). For instance, a TDX VMM does not have full access to the VM control structure corresponding to VMX VMCS. Instead, a VMM induces the TDX module to act on behalf via SEAMCALLs.

Export __seamcall and define C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs for readability.

Some SEAMCALL APIs donate host pages to TDX module or guest TD, and the donated pages are encrypted. Those require the VMM to flush the cache lines to avoid cache line alias.

---
v15 -> v16:
- use struct tdx_module_args instead of struct tdx_module_output
- Add tdh_mem_sept_rd() for SEPT_VE_DISABLE=1.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h            |  12 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h            | 226 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S      |   4 +
 4 files changed, 243 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +1 -0
index b1a98fa38828..1a8feb440252 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/checksum.h>
 #include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
 
 #include <asm-generic/asm-prototypes.h>
 
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +12 -0
index 9aaf40107819..ec2b8e67fe07 100644
@@ -116,6 +116,18 @@ int tdx_enable(void);
 void tdx_reset_memory(void);
 bool tdx_is_private_mem(unsigned long phys);
 #else
+static inline u64 __seamcall(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args)
+{
+	return TDX_SEAMCALL_UD;
+}
+static inline u64 __seamcall_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args)
+{
+	return TDX_SEAMCALL_UD;
+}
+static inline u64 __seamcall_saved_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args)
+{
+	return TDX_SEAMCALL_UD;
+}
 static inline bool platform_tdx_enabled(void) { return false; }
 static inline int tdx_cpu_enable(void) { return -ENODEV; }
 static inline int tdx_enable(void)  { return -ENODEV; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h new file +226 -0

226 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S +4 -0
index 5b1f2286aea9..73042f7f23be 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/export.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
 
 #include "tdxcall.S"
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@
 SYM_FUNC_START(__seamcall)
 	TDX_MODULE_CALL host=1
 SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__seamcall)
 
 /*
  * __seamcall_ret() - Host-side interface functions to SEAM software
@@ -40,6 +42,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall)
 SYM_FUNC_START(__seamcall_ret)
 	TDX_MODULE_CALL host=1 ret=1
 SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall_ret)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__seamcall_ret)
 
 /*
  * __seamcall_saved_ret() - Host-side interface functions to SEAM software
@@ -59,3 +62,4 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall_ret)
 SYM_FUNC_START(__seamcall_saved_ret)
 	TDX_MODULE_CALL host=1 ret=1 saved=1
 SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall_saved_ret)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__seamcall_saved_ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#12 lore raw

PATCH v16 12/116 KVM: TDX: Retry SEAMCALL on the lack of entropy error

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Some SEAMCALL may return TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY error when the entropy is lacking. Retry SEAMCALL on the error following rdrand_long() to retry RDRAND_RETRY_LOOPS times.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h   | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h +1 -0
index ec76740dc6a1..dbee050b2356 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #define TDX_OPERAND_INVALID			0xC000010000000000ULL
 #define TDX_OPERAND_BUSY			0x8000020000000000ULL
 #define TDX_PREVIOUS_TLB_EPOCH_BUSY		0x8000020100000000ULL
+#define TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY			0x8000020300000000ULL
 #define TDX_VCPU_NOT_ASSOCIATED			0x8000070200000000ULL
 #define TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED		0x8000080000000000ULL
 #define TDX_KEY_STATE_INCORRECT			0xC000081100000000ULL
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h +23 -17
index 12fd6b8d49e0..a55977626ae3 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 
+#include <asm/archrandom.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_host.h>
@@ -17,25 +18,30 @@
 static inline u64 tdx_seamcall(u64 op, u64 rcx, u64 rdx, u64 r8, u64 r9,
 			       struct tdx_module_args *out)
 {
+	int retry;
 	u64 ret;
 
-	if (out) {
-		*out = (struct tdx_module_args) {
-			.rcx = rcx,
-			.rdx = rdx,
-			.r8 = r8,
-			.r9 = r9,
-		};
-		ret = __seamcall_ret(op, out);
-	} else {
-		struct tdx_module_args args = {
-			.rcx = rcx,
-			.rdx = rdx,
-			.r8 = r8,
-			.r9 = r9,
-		};
-		ret = __seamcall(op, &args);
-	}
+	/* Mimic the existing rdrand_long() to retry RDRAND_RETRY_LOOPS times. */
+	retry = RDRAND_RETRY_LOOPS;
+	do {
+		if (out) {
+			*out = (struct tdx_module_args) {
+				.rcx = rcx,
+				.rdx = rdx,
+				.r8 = r8,
+				.r9 = r9,
+			};
+			ret = __seamcall_ret(op, out);
+		} else {
+			struct tdx_module_args args = {
+				.rcx = rcx,
+				.rdx = rdx,
+				.r8 = r8,
+				.r9 = r9,
+			};
+			ret = __seamcall(op, &args);
+		}
+	} while (unlikely(ret == TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY) && --retry);
 	if (unlikely(ret == TDX_SEAMCALL_UD)) {
 		/*
 		 * SEAMCALLs fail with TDX_SEAMCALL_UD returned when VMX is off.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#13 lore raw

PATCH v16 13/116 KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add helper functions to print out errors from the TDX module in a uniform manner.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h   |  5 +++++
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +1 -1
index 4b01ab842ab7..e3354b784e10 100644
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_SMM)	+= smm.o
 kvm-intel-y		+= vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \
 			   vmx/hyperv.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o
 kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM)	+= vmx/sgx.o
-kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST)	+= vmx/tdx.o
+kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST)	+= vmx/tdx.o vmx/tdx_error.o
 
 kvm-amd-y		+= svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o \
 			   svm/sev.o svm/hyperv.o
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c new file +20 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d083c79a2331
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* functions to record TDX SEAMCALL error */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+
+#include "tdx_ops.h"
+
+void pr_tdx_error(u64 op, u64 error_code, const struct tdx_module_args *out)
+{
+	if (!out) {
+		pr_err_ratelimited("SEAMCALL[%lld] failed: 0x%llx\n",
+				   op, error_code);
+		return;
+	}
+
+#define MSG	"SEAMCALL[%lld] failed: 0x%llx RCX 0x%llx RDX 0x%llx R8 0x%llx R9 0x%llx R10 0x%llx R11 0x%llx\n"
+	pr_err_ratelimited(MSG, op, error_code, out->rcx, out->rdx, out->r8,
+			   out->r9, out->r10, out->r11);
+}
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h +5 -0
index a55977626ae3..c9f74b2400a7 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_host.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
 
 #include "tdx_errno.h"
 #include "tdx_arch.h"
@@ -57,6 +58,10 @@ static inline u64 tdx_seamcall(u64 op, u64 rcx, u64 rdx, u64 r8, u64 r9,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+void pr_tdx_error(u64 op, u64 error_code, const struct tdx_module_args *out);
+#endif
+
 static inline u64 tdh_mng_addcx(hpa_t tdr, hpa_t addr)
 {
 	clflush_cache_range(__va(addr), PAGE_SIZE);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#14 lore raw

PATCH v16 14/116 The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD VM creation/destruction.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +2 -2
index f11ea701dc19..098150da6ea2 100644
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ Patch Layer status
   Patch layer                          Status
 
 * TDX, VMX coexistence:                 Applied
-* TDX architectural definitions:        Applying
-* TD VM creation/destruction:           Not yet
+* TDX architectural definitions:        Applied
+* TD VM creation/destruction:           Applying
 * TD vcpu creation/destruction:         Not yet
 * TDX EPT violation:                    Not yet
 * TD finalization:                      Not yet
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#15 lore raw

PATCH v16 15/116 x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id (HKID), and export the global TDX HKID.

The memory controller encrypts TDX memory with the assigned TDX HKIDs. The global TDX HKID is to encrypt the TDX module, its memory, and some dynamic data (TDR). The private TDX HKID is assigned to guest TD to encrypt guest memory and the related data. When VMM releases an encrypted page for reuse, the page needs a cache flush with the used HKID. VMM needs the global TDX HKID and the private TDX HKIDs to flush encrypted pages.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h  | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +12 -0
index ec2b8e67fe07..e50129a1f13e 100644
@@ -115,6 +115,16 @@ int tdx_cpu_enable(void);
 int tdx_enable(void);
 void tdx_reset_memory(void);
 bool tdx_is_private_mem(unsigned long phys);
+
+/*
+ * Key id globally used by TDX module: TDX module maps TDR with this TDX global
+ * key id.  TDR includes key id assigned to the TD.  Then TDX module maps other
+ * TD-related pages with the assigned key id.  TDR requires this TDX global key
+ * id for cache flush unlike other TD-related pages.
+ */
+extern u32 tdx_global_keyid;
+int tdx_guest_keyid_alloc(void);
+void tdx_guest_keyid_free(int keyid);
 #else
 static inline u64 __seamcall(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args)
 {
@@ -133,6 +143,8 @@ static inline int tdx_cpu_enable(void) { return -ENODEV; }
 static inline int tdx_enable(void)  { return -ENODEV; }
 static inline void tdx_reset_memory(void) { }
 static inline bool tdx_is_private_mem(unsigned long phys) { return false; }
+static inline int tdx_guest_keyid_alloc(void) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+static inline void tdx_guest_keyid_free(int keyid) { }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
 
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +27 -1
index 04b3c81b35e5..5b8f2085d293 100644
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static __always_inline bool seamcall_err_is_kernel_defined(u64 err)
 	SEAMCALL_PRERR(seamcall_saved_ret, (__fn), (__args),			\
 			seamcall_err_saved_ret)
 
-static u32 tdx_global_keyid __ro_after_init;
+u32 tdx_global_keyid __ro_after_init;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_global_keyid);
 static u32 tdx_guest_keyid_start __ro_after_init;
 static u32 tdx_nr_guest_keyids __ro_after_init;
 
@@ -136,6 +137,31 @@ static struct tdmr_info_list tdx_tdmr_list;
 
 static atomic_t tdx_may_have_private_mem;
 
+/* TDX KeyID pool */
+static DEFINE_IDA(tdx_guest_keyid_pool);
+
+int tdx_guest_keyid_alloc(void)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tdx_guest_keyid_start || !tdx_nr_guest_keyids))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* The first keyID is reserved for the global key. */
+	return ida_alloc_range(&tdx_guest_keyid_pool, tdx_guest_keyid_start + 1,
+			       tdx_guest_keyid_start + tdx_nr_guest_keyids - 1,
+			       GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_guest_keyid_alloc);
+
+void tdx_guest_keyid_free(int keyid)
+{
+	/* keyid = 0 is reserved. */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(keyid <= 0))
+		return;
+
+	ida_free(&tdx_guest_keyid_pool, keyid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_guest_keyid_free);
+
 /*
  * Do the module global initialization if not done yet.  It can be
  * done on any cpu.  It's always called with interrupts disabled.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#16 lore raw

PATCH v16 16/116 x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about TDX module

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX KVM needs system-wide information about the TDX module, struct tdsysinfo_struct. Add a helper function tdx_get_sysinfo() to return it instead of KVM getting it with various error checks. Make KVM call the function and stash the info. Move out the struct definition about it to common place arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h  | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c      | 15 +++++++++-
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 20 +++++++++++--
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 51 --------------------------------
 4 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +59 -0
index e50129a1f13e..800ed1783b94 100644
@@ -110,6 +110,62 @@ u64 __seamcall_saved_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args);
 #define seamcall_saved_ret(__fn, __args)				\
 	SEAMCALL_NO_ENTROPY_RETRY(__seamcall_saved_ret, (__fn), (__args))
 
+struct tdx_cpuid_config {
+	__struct_group(tdx_cpuid_config_leaf, leaf_sub_leaf, __packed,
+		u32 leaf;
+		u32 sub_leaf;
+	);
+	__struct_group(tdx_cpuid_config_value, value, __packed,
+		u32 eax;
+		u32 ebx;
+		u32 ecx;
+		u32 edx;
+	);
+} __packed;
+
+#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE		1024
+#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT	1024
+
+/*
+ * The size of this structure itself is flexible.  The actual structure
+ * passed to TDH.SYS.INFO must be padded to TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE bytes
+ * and TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT bytes aligned.
+ */
+struct tdsysinfo_struct {
+	/* TDX-SEAM Module Info */
+	u32	attributes;
+	u32	vendor_id;
+	u32	build_date;
+	u16	build_num;
+	u16	minor_version;
+	u16	major_version;
+	u8	reserved0[14];
+	/* Memory Info */
+	u16	max_tdmrs;
+	u16	max_reserved_per_tdmr;
+	u16	pamt_entry_size;
+	u8	reserved1[10];
+	/* Control Struct Info */
+	u16	tdcs_base_size;
+	u8	reserved2[2];
+	u16	tdvps_base_size;
+	u8	tdvps_xfam_dependent_size;
+	u8	reserved3[9];
+	/* TD Capabilities */
+	u64	attributes_fixed0;
+	u64	attributes_fixed1;
+	u64	xfam_fixed0;
+	u64	xfam_fixed1;
+	u8	reserved4[32];
+	u32	num_cpuid_config;
+	/*
+	 * The actual number of CPUID_CONFIG depends on above
+	 * 'num_cpuid_config'.
+	 */
+	DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct tdx_cpuid_config, cpuid_configs);
+} __packed;
+
+const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
 bool platform_tdx_enabled(void);
 int tdx_cpu_enable(void);
 int tdx_enable(void);
@@ -138,6 +194,9 @@ static inline u64 __seamcall_saved_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args)
 {
 	return TDX_SEAMCALL_UD;
 }
+
+struct tdsysinfo_struct;
+static inline const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void) { return NULL; }
 static inline bool platform_tdx_enabled(void) { return false; }
 static inline int tdx_cpu_enable(void) { return -ENODEV; }
 static inline int tdx_enable(void)  { return -ENODEV; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +14 -1
index 9d3f593eacb8..b0e3409da5a8 100644
@@ -11,9 +11,18 @@
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
+#define TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS					\
+	((TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE -					\
+		offsetof(struct tdsysinfo_struct, cpuid_configs))	\
+		/ sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config))
+
 static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
 {
-	int ret;
+	const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*tdsysinfo) > TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS != 37);
 
 	ret = tdx_enable();
 	if (ret) {
@@ -21,6 +30,10 @@ static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	/* Sanitary check just in case. */
+	tdsysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo();
+	WARN_ON(tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config > TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +18 -2
index 5b8f2085d293..ec0eb9edfa21 100644
@@ -284,6 +284,20 @@ static int get_tdx_sysinfo(struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
+
+const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void)
+{
+	const struct tdsysinfo_struct *r = NULL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&tdx_module_lock);
+	if (tdx_module_status == TDX_MODULE_INITIALIZED)
+		r = tdsysinfo;
+	mutex_unlock(&tdx_module_lock);
+	return r;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_get_sysinfo);
+
 /*
  * Add a memory region as a TDX memory block.  The caller must make sure
  * all memory regions are added in address ascending order and don't
@@ -1109,7 +1123,6 @@ static int init_tdmrs(struct tdmr_info_list *tdmr_list)
 
 static int init_tdx_module(void)
 {
-	struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
 	struct cmr_info *cmr_array;
 	int tdsysinfo_size;
 	int cmr_array_size;
@@ -1208,7 +1221,10 @@ static int init_tdx_module(void)
 	 * For now both @sysinfo and @cmr_array are only used during
 	 * module initialization, so always free them.
 	 */
-	kfree(tdsysinfo);
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(tdsysinfo);
+		tdsysinfo = NULL;
+	}
 	kfree(cmr_array);
 	return ret;
 
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h +0 -51

57 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#17 lore raw

PATCH v16 17/116 KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP was introduced for VM-scoped operations specific for guest state-protected VM. It defined subcommands for technology-specific operations under KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP. Despite its name, the subcommands are not limited to memory encryption, but various technology-specific operations are defined. It's natural to repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP for TDX specific operations and define subcommands.

TDX requires VM-scoped TDX-specific operations for device model, for example, qemu. Getting system-wide parameters, TDX-specific VM initialization.

Add a place holder function for TDX specific VM-scoped ioctl as mem_enc_op. TDX specific sub-commands will be added to retrieve/pass TDX specific parameters. Make mem_enc_ioctl non-optional as it's always filled.

---
v15:
- change struct kvm_tdx_cmd to drop unused member.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c            | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c             | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h         |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 |  4 ----
 6 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1 -1
index daaa1bef1b2d..8a5770b12546 100644
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(enter_smm)
 KVM_X86_OP(leave_smm)
 KVM_X86_OP(enable_smi_window)
 #endif
-KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_ioctl)
+KVM_X86_OP(mem_enc_ioctl)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_register_region)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_unregister_region)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_copy_enc_context_from)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +26 -0
index aa7a56a47564..615fb60b3717 100644
@@ -567,4 +567,30 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
 #define KVM_X86_TDX_VM		2
 #define KVM_X86_SNP_VM		3
 
+/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
+enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
+	KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
+
+	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx_cmd {
+	/* enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id */
+	__u32 id;
+	/* flags for sub-commend. If sub-command doesn't use this, set zero. */
+	__u32 flags;
+	/*
+	 * data for each sub-command. An immediate or a pointer to the actual
+	 * data in process virtual address.  If sub-command doesn't use it,
+	 * set zero.
+	 */
+	__u64 data;
+	/*
+	 * Auxiliary error code.  The sub-command may return TDX SEAMCALL
+	 * status code in addition to -Exxx.
+	 * Defined for consistency with struct kvm_sev_cmd.
+	 */
+	__u64 error;
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +10 -0
index 8ca23adfcfb8..e9661954d250 100644
@@ -51,6 +51,14 @@ static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 	return vmx_vm_init(kvm);
 }
 
+static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+	if (!is_td(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	return tdx_vm_ioctl(kvm, argp);
+}
+
 #define VMX_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS				\
 	(BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE)|			\
 	 BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT) |			\
@@ -201,6 +209,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,
 
 	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+
+	.mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl,
 };
 
 struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +26 -0
index b0e3409da5a8..ead229e34813 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,32 @@
 		offsetof(struct tdsysinfo_struct, cpuid_configs))	\
 		/ sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config))
 
+int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd;
+	int r;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&tdx_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cmd)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	if (tdx_cmd.error)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+	switch (tdx_cmd.id) {
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_user(argp, &tdx_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cmd)))
+		r = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
 static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
 {
 	const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +4 -0
index 99fb6c9c0282..601aca7a011e 100644
@@ -137,9 +137,13 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
 int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
 bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
+
+int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 #else
 static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
+
+static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +0 -4
index 344413dededc..1824fd257f41 100644
@@ -7053,10 +7053,6 @@ int kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 		goto out;
 	}
 	case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP: {
-		r = -ENOTTY;
-		if (!kvm_x86_ops.mem_enc_ioctl)
-			goto out;
-
 		r = static_call(kvm_x86_mem_enc_ioctl)(kvm, argp);
 		break;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#18 lore raw

PATCH v16 18/116 KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Implement an ioctl to get system-wide parameters for TDX. Although the function is systemwide, vm scoped mem_enc ioctl works for userspace VMM like qemu and device scoped version is not define, re-use vm scoped mem_enc.

---
v14 -> v15:
- ABI change: added supported_gpaw and reserved area,

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h       | 24 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c                | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 140 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +24 -0
index 615fb60b3717..3fbd43d5177b 100644
@@ -593,4 +593,28 @@ struct kvm_tdx_cmd {
 	__u64 error;
 };
 
+struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config {
+	__u32 leaf;
+	__u32 sub_leaf;
+	__u32 eax;
+	__u32 ebx;
+	__u32 ecx;
+	__u32 edx;
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
+	__u64 attrs_fixed0;
+	__u64 attrs_fixed1;
+	__u64 xfam_fixed0;
+	__u64 xfam_fixed1;
+#define TDX_CAP_GPAW_48	(1 << 0)
+#define TDX_CAP_GPAW_52	(1 << 1)
+	__u32 supported_gpaw;
+	__u32 padding;
+	__u64 reserved[251];
+
+	__u32 nr_cpuid_configs;
+	struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[];
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +64 -0

82 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +52 -0

56 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#19 lore raw

PATCH v16 19/116 KVM: x86, tdx: Make KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS backend specific

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX has its own limitation on the maximum number of vcpus that the guest can accommodate. Allow x86 kvm backend to implement its own KVM_ENABLE_CAP handler and implement TDX backend for KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS. user space VMM, e.g. qemu, can specify its value instead of KVM_MAX_VCPUS.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c            | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c             | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h             |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h         |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 |  4 ++++
 7 files changed, 68 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +2 -0
index 8a5770b12546..214dcaa3b384 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ KVM_X86_OP(hardware_unsetup)
 KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr)
 KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid)
 KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(max_vcpus);
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_enable_cap)
 KVM_X86_OP(vm_init)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
index 4bbd2ec0e324..9dde92c8ee2f 100644
@@ -1566,7 +1566,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	void (*vcpu_after_set_cpuid)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 	bool (*is_vm_type_supported)(unsigned long vm_type);
+	int (*max_vcpus)(struct kvm *kvm);
 	unsigned int vm_size;
+	int (*vm_enable_cap)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap);
 	int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);
 	void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm);
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +22 -0
index e9661954d250..5579557fa6f6 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include "nested.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
 #include "tdx.h"
+#include "tdx_arch.h"
 
 static bool enable_tdx __ro_after_init;
 module_param_named(tdx, enable_tdx, bool, 0444);
@@ -16,6 +17,17 @@ static bool vt_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
 		(enable_tdx && tdx_is_vm_type_supported(type));
 }
 
+static int vt_max_vcpus(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (!kvm)
+		return KVM_MAX_VCPUS;
+
+	if (is_td(kvm))
+		return min3(kvm->max_vcpus, KVM_MAX_VCPUS, TDX_MAX_VCPUS);
+
+	return kvm->max_vcpus;
+}
+
 static int vt_hardware_enable(void)
 {
 	int ret;
@@ -43,6 +55,14 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int vt_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
+{
+	if (is_td(kvm))
+		return tdx_vm_enable_cap(kvm, cap);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	if (is_td(kvm))
@@ -80,7 +100,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
 
 	.is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
+	.max_vcpus = vt_max_vcpus,
 	.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
+	.vm_enable_cap = vt_vm_enable_cap,
 	.vm_init = vt_vm_init,
 	.vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +30 -0
index f9e80582865d..331fbaa10d46 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,36 @@
 		offsetof(struct tdsysinfo_struct, cpuid_configs))	\
 		/ sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config))
 
+int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	switch (cap->cap) {
+	case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS: {
+		if (cap->flags || cap->args[0] == 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (cap->args[0] > KVM_MAX_VCPUS)
+			return -E2BIG;
+		if (cap->args[0] > TDX_MAX_VCPUS)
+			return -E2BIG;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		if (kvm->created_vcpus)
+			r = -EBUSY;
+		else {
+			kvm->max_vcpus = cap->args[0];
+			r = 0;
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
 static int tdx_get_capabilities(struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
 {
 	struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +3 -0
index 473013265bd8..22c0b57f69ca 100644
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
 #define __KVM_X86_TDX_H
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+
+#include "tdx_ops.h"
+
 struct kvm_tdx {
 	struct kvm kvm;
 	/* TDX specific members follow. */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +5 -0
index 601aca7a011e..c3fc3148dcf3 100644
@@ -138,11 +138,16 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
 bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
 
+int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap);
 int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 #else
 static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
 
+static inline int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+};
 static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 #endif
 
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +4 -0
index 1824fd257f41..a1354274ffe4 100644
@@ -4586,6 +4586,8 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS:
 		r = KVM_MAX_VCPUS;
+		if (kvm_x86_ops.max_vcpus)
+			r = static_call(kvm_x86_max_vcpus)(kvm);
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID:
 		r = KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS;
@@ -6518,6 +6520,8 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
 		break;
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (kvm_x86_ops.vm_enable_cap)
+			r = static_call(kvm_x86_vm_enable_cap)(kvm, cap);
 		break;
 	}
 	return r;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#20 lore raw

PATCH v16 20/116 KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct. Assign TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory encryption and allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On destruction, free allocated pages, and HKID.

Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources of the guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. HKID must have been reclaimed, etc). Add mmu notifier release callback before tearing down private page tables for it.

Add vm_free() of kvm_x86_ops hook at the end of kvm_arch_destroy_vm() because some per-VM TDX resources, e.g. TDR, need to be freed after other TDX resources, e.g. HKID, were freed.

---
v16:
- Simplified tdx_reclaim_page()
- Reorganize the locking of tdx_release_hkid(), and use smp_call_mask() instead of smp_call_on_cpu() to hold spinlock to race with invalidation on releasing guest memfd

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig               |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c             |   7 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c            |  35 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c             | 471 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h             |   6 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h         |   8 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 |   1 +
 9 files changed, 528 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +2 -0
index 214dcaa3b384..d5a900842535 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(max_vcpus);
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_enable_cap)
 KVM_X86_OP(vm_init)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_shadow_all_private)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_free)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate)
 KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create)
 KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
index 9dde92c8ee2f..f23557850c27 100644
@@ -1570,7 +1570,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	unsigned int vm_size;
 	int (*vm_enable_cap)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap);
 	int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);
+	void (*flush_shadow_all_private)(struct kvm *kvm);
 	void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm);
+	void (*vm_free)(struct kvm *kvm);
 
 	/* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */
 	int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm);
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +2 -0
index 8452ed0228cb..4a864dbaa982 100644
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
 config KVM_INTEL
 	tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support"
 	depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL
+	select KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM if INTEL_TDX_HOST
+	select KVM_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST
 	help
 	  Provides support for KVM on processors equipped with Intel's VT
 	  extensions, a.k.a. Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX).
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +7 -0
index bffa50927739..c3d0f8461e1c 100644
@@ -6791,6 +6791,13 @@ static void kvm_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
+	/*
+	 * kvm_mmu_zap_all() zaps both private and shared page tables.  Before
+	 * tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some TD resources to
+	 * be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc).  Invoke
+	 * kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private() for this.
+	 */
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private)(kvm);
 	kvm_mmu_zap_all(kvm);
 }
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +32 -3
index 5579557fa6f6..463ba7214392 100644
@@ -63,14 +63,41 @@ static int vt_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+static void vt_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+	if (enable_tdx)
+		tdx_hardware_unsetup();
+	vmx_hardware_unsetup();
+}
+
 static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	if (is_td(kvm))
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;	/* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */
+		return tdx_vm_init(kvm);
 
 	return vmx_vm_init(kvm);
 }
 
+static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (is_td(kvm))
+		tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
+}
+
+static void vt_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (is_td(kvm))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_vm_destroy(kvm);
+}
+
+static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (is_td(kvm))
+		tdx_vm_free(kvm);
+}
+
 static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -93,7 +120,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compat,
 
-	.hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup,
+	.hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup,
 
 	.hardware_enable = vt_hardware_enable,
 	.hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
@@ -104,7 +131,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
 	.vm_enable_cap = vt_vm_enable_cap,
 	.vm_init = vt_vm_init,
-	.vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
+	.flush_shadow_all_private = vt_flush_shadow_all_private,
+	.vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy,
+	.vm_free = vt_vm_free,
 
 	.vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
 	.vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +469 -2

515 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +5 -1
index 22c0b57f69ca..ae117f864cfb 100644
@@ -8,7 +8,11 @@
 
 struct kvm_tdx {
 	struct kvm kvm;
-	/* TDX specific members follow. */
+
+	unsigned long tdr_pa;
+	unsigned long *tdcs_pa;
+
+	int hkid;
 };
 
 struct vcpu_tdx {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +8 -0
index c3fc3148dcf3..01f3b02a5b46 100644
@@ -136,18 +136,26 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
 int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
+void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);
 bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
 
 int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap);
+int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
+void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
+void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);
 int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 #else
 static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
 static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
 
 static inline int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 };
+static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}
+static inline void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) {}
 static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 #endif
 
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -0
index a1354274ffe4..fbd80f2e403e 100644
@@ -12538,6 +12538,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
 	kvm_page_track_cleanup(kvm);
 	kvm_xen_destroy_vm(kvm);
 	kvm_hv_destroy_vm(kvm);
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_vm_free)(kvm);
 }
 
 static void memslot_rmap_free(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#21 lore raw

PATCH v16 21/116 KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX requires additional parameters for TDX VM for confidential execution to protect the confidentiality of its memory contents and CPU state from any other software, including VMM. When creating a guest TD VM before creating vcpu, the number of vcpu, TSC frequency (the values are the same among vcpus, and it can't change.) CPUIDs which the TDX module emulates. Guest TDs can trust those CPUIDs and sha384 values for measurement.

Add a new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, to pass parameters for the TDX guest. It assigns an encryption key to the TDX guest for memory encryption. TDX encrypts memory per guest basis. The device model, say qemu, passes per-VM parameters for the TDX guest. The maximum number of vcpus, TSC frequency (TDX guest has fixed VM-wide TSC frequency, not per vcpu. The TDX guest can not change it.), attributes (production or debug), available extended features (which configure guest XCR0, IA32_XSS MSR), CPUIDs, sha384 measurements, etc.

Call this subcommand before creating vcpu and KVM_SET_CPUID2, i.e. CPUID configurations aren't available yet. So CPUIDs configuration values need to be passed in struct kvm_tdx_init_vm. The device model's responsibility to make this CPUID config for KVM_TDX_INIT_VM and KVM_SET_CPUID2.

---
v15 -> v16:
- Removed AMX check as the KVM upstream supports AMX.
- Added CET flag to guest supported xss

v14 -> v15:
- add check if the reserved area of init_vm is zero

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h            |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h       |  27 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                  |   7 +
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h                  |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c                | 263 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h                |  18 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h           |   6 +
 tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |  33 ++++
 8 files changed, 348 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +2 -0
index 800ed1783b94..3fc63ffed22e 100644
@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ u64 __seamcall_saved_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args);
 #define seamcall_saved_ret(__fn, __args)				\
 	SEAMCALL_NO_ENTROPY_RETRY(__seamcall_saved_ret, (__fn), (__args))
 
+/* -1 indicates CPUID leaf with no sub-leaves. */
+#define TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF	((u32)-1)
 struct tdx_cpuid_config {
 	__struct_group(tdx_cpuid_config_leaf, leaf_sub_leaf, __packed,
 		u32 leaf;
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +27 -0
index 3fbd43d5177b..7112546bd1d0 100644
@@ -570,6 +570,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
 /* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
 enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
 	KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
+	KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
 
 	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
 };
@@ -617,4 +618,30 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
 	struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[];
 };
 
+struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
+	__u64 attributes;
+	__u64 mrconfigid[6];	/* sha384 digest */
+	__u64 mrowner[6];	/* sha384 digest */
+	__u64 mrownerconfig[6];	/* sha348 digest */
+	/*
+	 * For future extensibility to make sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 8KB.
+	 * This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024.
+	 * 8KB was chosen given because
+	 * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(=256) = 8KB.
+	 */
+	__u64 reserved[1004];
+
+	/*
+	 * Call KVM_TDX_INIT_VM before vcpu creation, thus before
+	 * KVM_SET_CPUID2.
+	 * This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID2s for VCPUs because the
+	 * TDX module directly virtualizes those CPUIDs without VMM.  The user
+	 * space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make KVM_SET_CPUID2 consistent with
+	 * those values.  If it doesn't, KVM may have wrong idea of vCPUIDs of
+	 * the guest, and KVM may wrongly emulate CPUIDs or MSRs that the TDX
+	 * module doesn't virtualize.
+	 */
+	struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +7 -0
index 0544e30b4946..da46f284ec65 100644
@@ -1426,6 +1426,13 @@ int kvm_dev_ioctl_get_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
 	return r;
 }
 
+struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry2(
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent, u32 function, u64 index)
+{
+	return cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, function, index);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_find_cpuid_entry2);
+
 struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 						    u32 function, u32 index)
 {
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +2 -0
index 284fa4704553..a6fb9562eade 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void);
 
 void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_update_pv_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry2(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries,
+					       int nent, u32 function, u64 index);
 struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 						    u32 function, u32 index);
 struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +253 -10

315 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +18 -0
index ae117f864cfb..184fe394da86 100644
@@ -12,7 +12,11 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
 	unsigned long tdr_pa;
 	unsigned long *tdcs_pa;
 
+	u64 attributes;
+	u64 xfam;
 	int hkid;
+
+	u64 tsc_offset;
 };
 
 struct vcpu_tdx {
@@ -39,6 +43,20 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu);
 }
+
+static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 field)
+{
+	struct tdx_module_args out;
+	u64 err;
+
+	err = tdh_mng_rd(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, TDCS_EXEC(field), &out);
+	if (unlikely(err)) {
+		pr_err("TDH_MNG_RD[EXEC.0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n", field, err);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return out.r8;
+}
+
 #else
 struct kvm_tdx {
 	struct kvm kvm;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h +6 -0
index 845b6ef9f787..fc9a8898765c 100644
@@ -122,6 +122,12 @@ struct tdx_cpuid_value {
 #define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_KL		BIT_ULL(31)
 #define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PERFMON	BIT_ULL(63)
 
+/*
+ * TODO: Once XFEATURE_CET_{U, S} in arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h is
+ * defined, Replace these with define ones.
+ */
+#define TDX_TD_XFAM_CET	(BIT(11) | BIT(12))
+
 /*
  * TD_PARAMS is provided as an input to TDH_MNG_INIT, the size of which is 1024B.
  */
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +33 -0
index 7a08723e99e2..61ce7d174fcf 100644
@@ -565,6 +565,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
 /* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
 enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
 	KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
+	KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
 
 	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
 };
@@ -614,4 +615,36 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
 	struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[];
 };
 
+struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
+	__u64 attributes;
+	__u32 max_vcpus;
+	__u32 padding;
+	__u64 mrconfigid[6];    /* sha384 digest */
+	__u64 mrowner[6];       /* sha384 digest */
+	__u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
+	union {
+		/*
+		 * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before
+		 * KVM_SET_CPUID2.  CPUID configurations needs to be passed.
+		 *
+		 * This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}.
+		 * The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent
+		 * with this values.
+		 * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256)
+		 * = 8KB.
+		 */
+		struct {
+			struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
+			/* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */
+			struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[];
+		};
+		/*
+		 * For future extensibility.
+		 * The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB.
+		 * This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024
+		 */
+		__u64 reserved[2028];
+	};
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#22 lore raw

PATCH v16 22/116 KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because TDX KVM doesn't support PMU yet (it's future work of TDX KVM support as another patch series) and pmu_intel.c touches vmx specific structure in vcpu initialization, as workaround add dummy structure to struct vcpu_tdx and pmu_intel.c can ignore TDX case.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h       |  8 ++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c       |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h       | 32 +------------------------
 5 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c +45 -1
index f2efa0bf7ae8..d7cdb9fc4e2b 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include "lapic.h"
 #include "nested.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
+#include "tdx.h"
 
 #define MSR_PMC_FULL_WIDTH_BIT      (MSR_IA32_PMC0 - MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0)
 
@@ -68,6 +69,26 @@ static int fixed_pmc_events[] = {
 	[2] = PSEUDO_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES,
 };
 
+struct lbr_desc *vcpu_to_lbr_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return &to_tdx(vcpu)->lbr_desc;
+#endif
+
+	return &to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc;
+}
+
+struct x86_pmu_lbr *vcpu_to_lbr_records(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return &to_tdx(vcpu)->lbr_desc.records;
+#endif
+
+	return &to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc.records;
+}
+
 static void reprogram_fixed_counters(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u64 data)
 {
 	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
@@ -179,6 +200,23 @@ static inline struct kvm_pmc *get_fw_gp_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u32 msr)
 	return get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PMC0);
 }
 
+bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return false;
+	return cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct x86_pmu_lbr *lbr = vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	return lbr->nr && (vcpu_get_perf_capabilities(vcpu) & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT);
+}
+
 static bool intel_pmu_is_valid_lbr_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index)
 {
 	struct x86_pmu_lbr *records = vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu);
@@ -285,6 +323,9 @@ int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 					PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER,
 	};
 
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+		return 0;
+
 	if (unlikely(lbr_desc->event)) {
 		__set_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, pmu->pmc_in_use);
 		return 0;
@@ -580,7 +621,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC, pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters);
 
 	perf_capabilities = vcpu_get_perf_capabilities(vcpu);
-	if (cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu) &&
+	if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible(vcpu) &&
 	    (perf_capabilities & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT))
 		x86_perf_get_lbr(&lbr_desc->records);
 	else
@@ -636,6 +677,9 @@ static void intel_pmu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	struct kvm_pmc *pmc = NULL;
 	int i;
 
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < KVM_INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC; i++) {
 		pmc = &pmu->gp_counters[i];
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h new file +28 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..66bba47c1269
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H
+#define  __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H
+
+struct lbr_desc *vcpu_to_lbr_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+struct x86_pmu_lbr *vcpu_to_lbr_records(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+struct lbr_desc {
+	/* Basic info about guest LBR records. */
+	struct x86_pmu_lbr records;
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulate LBR feature via passthrough LBR registers when the
+	 * per-vcpu guest LBR event is scheduled on the current pcpu.
+	 *
+	 * The records may be inaccurate if the host reclaims the LBR.
+	 */
+	struct perf_event *event;
+
+	/* True if LBRs are marked as not intercepted in the MSR bitmap */
+	bool msr_passthrough;
+};
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +7 -1
index 184fe394da86..173ed19207fb 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
 
+#include "pmu_intel.h"
 #include "tdx_ops.h"
 
 struct kvm_tdx {
@@ -21,7 +22,12 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
 
 struct vcpu_tdx {
 	struct kvm_vcpu	vcpu;
-	/* TDX specific members follow. */
+
+	/*
+	 * Dummy to make pmu_intel not corrupt memory.
+	 * TODO: Support PMU for TDX.  Future work.
+	 */
+	struct lbr_desc lbr_desc;
 };
 
 static inline bool is_td(struct kvm *kvm)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -1
index 0b8bf04e283d..724bce9387e0 100644
@@ -2421,7 +2421,7 @@ int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 			if ((data & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) !=
 			    (kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT))
 				return 1;
-			if (!cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu))
+			if (!intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible(vcpu))
 				return 1;
 		}
 		if (data & PERF_CAP_PEBS_FORMAT) {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +1 -31
index c2130d2c8e24..41ad0e7a25fd 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include "capabilities.h"
 #include "../kvm_cache_regs.h"
 #include "posted_intr.h"
+#include "pmu_intel.h"
 #include "vmcs.h"
 #include "vmx_ops.h"
 #include "../cpuid.h"
@@ -93,22 +94,6 @@ union vmx_exit_reason {
 	u32 full;
 };
 
-struct lbr_desc {
-	/* Basic info about guest LBR records. */
-	struct x86_pmu_lbr records;
-
-	/*
-	 * Emulate LBR feature via passthrough LBR registers when the
-	 * per-vcpu guest LBR event is scheduled on the current pcpu.
-	 *
-	 * The records may be inaccurate if the host reclaims the LBR.
-	 */
-	struct perf_event *event;
-
-	/* True if LBRs are marked as not intercepted in the MSR bitmap */
-	bool msr_passthrough;
-};
-
 /*
  * The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need
  * for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu.
@@ -655,21 +640,6 @@ static __always_inline struct vcpu_vmx *to_vmx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu);
 }
 
-static inline struct lbr_desc *vcpu_to_lbr_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	return &to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc;
-}
-
-static inline struct x86_pmu_lbr *vcpu_to_lbr_records(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	return &vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu)->records;
-}
-
-static inline bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	return !!vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu)->nr;
-}
-
 void intel_pmu_cross_mapped_check(struct kvm_pmu *pmu);
 int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void vmx_passthrough_lbr_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#23 lore raw

PATCH v16 23/116 KVM: TDX: Refuse to unplug the last cpu on the package

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

In order to reclaim TDX HKID, (i.e. when deleting guest TD), needs to call TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.WBINVD on all packages. If we have active TDX HKID, refuse to offline the last online cpu to guarantee at least one CPU online per package. Add arch callback for cpu offline.
Because TDX doesn't support suspend by the TDX 1.0 spec, this also refuses suspend if TDs are running. If no TD is running, suspend is allowed.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c            |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c             | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h         |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 |  5 ++++
 include/linux/kvm_host.h           |  1 +
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c                | 12 +++++++--
 8 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1 -0
index d5a900842535..e1adeb7d4e26 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(check_processor_compatibility)
 KVM_X86_OP(hardware_enable)
 KVM_X86_OP(hardware_disable)
 KVM_X86_OP(hardware_unsetup)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(offline_cpu)
 KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr)
 KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid)
 KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
index f23557850c27..24d9a9ab338d 100644
@@ -1562,6 +1562,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	int (*hardware_enable)(void);
 	void (*hardware_disable)(void);
 	void (*hardware_unsetup)(void);
+	int (*offline_cpu)(void);
 	bool (*has_emulated_msr)(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index);
 	void (*vcpu_after_set_cpuid)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +1 -0
index 463ba7214392..0bb087e3bbdf 100644
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compat,
 
 	.hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup,
+	.offline_cpu = tdx_offline_cpu,
 
 	.hardware_enable = vt_hardware_enable,
 	.hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +41 -0

62 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +2 -0
index 01f3b02a5b46..ef14c3873fe0 100644
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
 void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);
 bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
+int tdx_offline_cpu(void);
 
 int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap);
 int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
@@ -148,6 +149,7 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
 static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
+static inline int tdx_offline_cpu(void) { return 0; }
 
 static inline int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
 {
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +5 -0
index fbd80f2e403e..714685a31baf 100644
@@ -12301,6 +12301,11 @@ void kvm_arch_hardware_disable(void)
 	drop_user_return_notifiers();
 }
 
+int kvm_arch_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_offline_cpu)();
+}
+
 bool kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return vcpu->kvm->arch.bsp_vcpu_id == vcpu->vcpu_id;
include/linux/kvm_host.h +1 -0
index 8c5c017ab4e9..9f90cda7149f 100644
@@ -1502,6 +1502,7 @@ static inline void kvm_create_vcpu_debugfs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void);
 void kvm_arch_hardware_disable(void);
 #endif
+int kvm_arch_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
 int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 bool kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +10 -2
index e0563477830f..aa9426472bb4 100644
@@ -5581,13 +5581,21 @@ static void hardware_disable_nolock(void *junk)
 	__this_cpu_write(hardware_enabled, false);
 }
 
+__weak int kvm_arch_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int kvm_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 {
+	int r = 0;
+
 	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
-	if (kvm_usage_count)
+	r = kvm_arch_offline_cpu(cpu);
+	if (!r && kvm_usage_count)
 		hardware_disable_nolock(NULL);
 	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
-	return 0;
+	return r;
 }
 
 static void hardware_disable_all_nolock(void)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#24 lore raw

PATCH v16 24/116 The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD vcpu creation/destruction.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +3 -3
index 098150da6ea2..25082e9c0b20 100644
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Layer status
 What qemu can do
 ----------------
 - TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu.
-- Qemu can try to create VM of TDX VM type and then fails.
+- Qemu can create/destroy guest of TDX vm type.
 
 Patch Layer status
 ------------------
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ Patch Layer status
 
 * TDX, VMX coexistence:                 Applied
 * TDX architectural definitions:        Applied
-* TD VM creation/destruction:           Applying
-* TD vcpu creation/destruction:         Not yet
+* TD VM creation/destruction:           Applied
+* TD vcpu creation/destruction:         Applying
 * TDX EPT violation:                    Not yet
 * TD finalization:                      Not yet
 * TD vcpu enter/exit:                   Not yet
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#25 lore raw

PATCH v16 25/116 KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The next step of TDX guest creation is to create vcpu. Allocate TDX vcpu structures, initialize it that doesn't require TDX SEAMCALL. TDX specific vcpu initialization will be implemented as independent KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU so that when error occurs it's easy to determine which component has the issue, KVM or TDX.

---
v15 -> v16:
- Add AMX support as the KVM upstream supports it.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 10 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c         |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +40 -4
index 0bb087e3bbdf..7a9ee3ec0785 100644
@@ -98,6 +98,42 @@ static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
 		tdx_vm_free(kvm);
 }
 
+static int vt_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (is_td(kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	return vmx_vcpu_precreate(kvm);
+}
+
+static int vt_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return tdx_vcpu_create(vcpu);
+
+	return vmx_vcpu_create(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		tdx_vcpu_free(vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_vcpu_free(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		tdx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
+}
+
 static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -136,10 +172,10 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy,
 	.vm_free = vt_vm_free,
 
-	.vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
-	.vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
-	.vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free,
-	.vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
+	.vcpu_precreate = vt_vcpu_precreate,
+	.vcpu_create = vt_vcpu_create,
+	.vcpu_free = vt_vcpu_free,
+	.vcpu_reset = vt_vcpu_reset,
 
 	.prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
 	.vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +49 -0

55 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +10 -0
index ef14c3873fe0..9b01104946b8 100644
@@ -144,7 +144,12 @@ int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap);
 int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
 void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
 void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);
+
 int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+
+int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
 #else
 static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
@@ -158,7 +163,12 @@ static inline int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
 static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}
 static inline void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) {}
+
 static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+
+static inline int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +2 -0
index 714685a31baf..7aff6f88f575 100644
@@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ int kvm_set_apic_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 	kvm_recalculate_apic_map(vcpu->kvm);
 	return 0;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_apic_base);
 
 /*
  * Handle a fault on a hardware virtualization (VMX or SVM) instruction.
@@ -12310,6 +12311,7 @@ bool kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return vcpu->kvm->arch.bsp_vcpu_id == vcpu->vcpu_id;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp);
 
 bool kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#26 lore raw

PATCH v16 26/116 KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TD guest vcpu needs TDX specific initialization before running. Repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to vcpu-scope, add a new sub-command KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU, and implement the callback for it.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h    |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h       |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h       |   1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c               |   9 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c                | 180 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h                |   7 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h            |   4 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                    |   6 +
 tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |   1 +
 9 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1 -0
index e1adeb7d4e26..d740a3f19d96 100644
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(leave_smm)
 KVM_X86_OP(enable_smi_window)
 #endif
 KVM_X86_OP(mem_enc_ioctl)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_register_region)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_unregister_region)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_copy_enc_context_from)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
index 24d9a9ab338d..a21c060ffc68 100644
@@ -1737,6 +1737,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 #endif
 
 	int (*mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+	int (*vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
 	int (*mem_enc_register_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
 	int (*mem_enc_unregister_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
 	int (*vm_copy_enc_context_from)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd);
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +1 -0
index 7112546bd1d0..311a7894b712 100644
@@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
 enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
 	KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
+	KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
 
 	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
 };
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +9 -0
index 7a9ee3ec0785..5d88d2196822 100644
@@ -142,6 +142,14 @@ static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	return tdx_vm_ioctl(kvm, argp);
 }
 
+static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
+{
+	if (!is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return tdx_vcpu_ioctl(vcpu, argp);
+}
+
 #define VMX_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS				\
 	(BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE)|			\
 	 BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT) |			\
@@ -299,6 +307,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
 
 	.mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl,
+	.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl = vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl,
 };
 
 struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +178 -2

223 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +7 -0
index 173ed19207fb..961a7da2452a 100644
@@ -17,12 +17,19 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
 	u64 xfam;
 	int hkid;
 
+	bool finalized;
+
 	u64 tsc_offset;
 };
 
 struct vcpu_tdx {
 	struct kvm_vcpu	vcpu;
 
+	unsigned long tdvpr_pa;
+	unsigned long *tdvpx_pa;
+
+	bool initialized;
+
 	/*
 	 * Dummy to make pmu_intel not corrupt memory.
 	 * TODO: Support PMU for TDX.  Future work.
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +4 -0
index 9b01104946b8..88e117db748c 100644
@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
+
+int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
 #else
 static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
@@ -169,6 +171,8 @@ static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOP
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
+
+static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +6 -0
index 7aff6f88f575..69d9d15ef70d 100644
@@ -6086,6 +6086,12 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	case KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR:
 		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_device_attr(vcpu, ioctl, argp);
 		break;
+	case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP:
+		r = -ENOTTY;
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl)
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(vcpu, argp);
+		break;
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 	}
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +1 -0
index 61ce7d174fcf..83bd9e3118d1 100644
@@ -566,6 +566,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
 enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
 	KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
+	KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
 
 	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#27 lore raw

PATCH v16 27/116 The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of KVM MMU GPA shared bits.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +3 -2
index 25082e9c0b20..8b8186e7bfeb 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ What qemu can do
 ----------------
 - TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu.
 - Qemu can create/destroy guest of TDX vm type.
+- Qemu can create/destroy vcpu of TDX vm type.
 
 Patch Layer status
 ------------------
@@ -18,12 +19,12 @@ Patch Layer status
 * TDX, VMX coexistence:                 Applied
 * TDX architectural definitions:        Applied
 * TD VM creation/destruction:           Applied
-* TD vcpu creation/destruction:         Applying
+* TD vcpu creation/destruction:         Applied
 * TDX EPT violation:                    Not yet
 * TD finalization:                      Not yet
 * TD vcpu enter/exit:                   Not yet
 * TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:    Not yet
 
-* KVM MMU GPA shared bits:              Not yet
+* KVM MMU GPA shared bits:              Applying
 * KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:          Not yet
 * KVM TDP MMU hooks:                    Not yet
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#28 lore raw

PATCH v16 28/116 KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

To keep the case of non TDX intact, introduce a new config option for private KVM MMU support. At the moment, this is synonym for CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST && CONFIG_KVM_INTEL. The config makes it clear that the config is only for x86 KVM MMU.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +4 -0
index 4a864dbaa982..e08cc4ad5749 100644
@@ -168,4 +168,8 @@ config KVM_PROVE_MMU
 config KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING
 	bool
 
+config KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+	def_bool y
+	depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST && KVM_INTEL
+
 endif # VIRTUALIZATION
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#29 lore raw

PATCH v16 29/116 KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of GPA

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX repurposes one GPA bit (51 bit or 47 bit based on configuration) to indicate the GPA is private(if cleared) or shared (if set) with VMM. If GPA.shared is set, GPA is covered by the existing conventional EPT pointed by EPTP. If GPA.shared bit is cleared, GPA is covered by TDX module. VMM has to issue SEAMCALLs to operate.

Add a member to remember GPA shared bit for each guest TDs, add address conversion functions between private GPA and shared GPA and test if GPA is private.

Because struct kvm_arch (or struct kvm which includes struct kvm_arch. See kvm_arch_alloc_vm() that passes __GPF_ZERO) is zero-cleared when allocated, the new member to remember GPA shared bit is guaranteed to be zero with this patch unless it's initialized explicitly.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h              | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c          |  5 +++++
 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +4 -0
index a21c060ffc68..742e97f23573 100644
@@ -1467,6 +1467,10 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 	 */
 #define SPLIT_DESC_CACHE_MIN_NR_OBJECTS (SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE + 1)
 	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache split_desc_cache;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+	gfn_t gfn_shared_mask;
+#endif
 };
 
 struct kvm_vm_stat {
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +27 -0
index 253fb2093d5d..f5ba6cf589aa 100644
@@ -304,4 +304,31 @@ static inline gpa_t kvm_translate_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		return gpa;
 	return translate_nested_gpa(vcpu, gpa, access, exception);
 }
+
+static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_shared_mask(const struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+	return kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask;
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_to_shared(const struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	return gfn | kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
+}
+
+static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_to_private(const struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	return gfn & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_is_private_gpa(const struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	gfn_t mask = kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
+
+	return mask && !(gpa_to_gfn(gpa) & mask);
+}
+
 #endif
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +5 -0
index c1a8560981a3..fe793425d393 100644
@@ -878,6 +878,11 @@ static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
 	kvm_tdx->attributes = td_params->attributes;
 	kvm_tdx->xfam = td_params->xfam;
 
+	if (td_params->exec_controls & TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW)
+		kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask = gpa_to_gfn(BIT_ULL(51));
+	else
+		kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask = gpa_to_gfn(BIT_ULL(47));
+
 out:
 	/* kfree() accepts NULL. */
 	kfree(init_vm);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#30 lore raw

PATCH v16 30/116 The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of KVM TDP refactoring for TDX.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +2 -2
index 8b8186e7bfeb..e893a3d714c7 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,6 @@ Patch Layer status
 * TD vcpu enter/exit:                   Not yet
 * TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:    Not yet
 
-* KVM MMU GPA shared bits:              Applying
-* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:          Not yet
+* KVM MMU GPA shared bits:              Applied
+* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:          Applying
 * KVM TDP MMU hooks:                    Not yet
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#31 lore raw

PATCH v16 31/116 KVM: Allow page-sized MMU caches to be initialized with custom 64-bit values

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add support to MMU caches for initializing a page with a custom 64-bit value, e.g. to pre-fill an entire page table with non-zero PTE values. The functionality will be used by x86 to support Intel's TDX, which needs to set bit 63 in all non-present PTEs in order to prevent !PRESENT page faults from getting reflected into the guest (Intel's EPT Violation #VE architecture made the less than brilliant decision of having the per-PTE behavior be opt-out instead of opt-in).

---
 include/linux/kvm_types.h |  1 +
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c       | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/kvm_types.h +1 -0
index 9d1f7835d8c1..60c8d5c9eab9 100644
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ struct gfn_to_pfn_cache {
 struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache {
 	gfp_t gfp_zero;
 	gfp_t gfp_custom;
+	u64 init_value;
 	struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache;
 	int capacity;
 	int nobjs;
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +14 -2
index aa9426472bb4..eb45bd2ca706 100644
@@ -403,12 +403,17 @@ static void kvm_flush_shadow_all(struct kvm *kvm)
 static inline void *mmu_memory_cache_alloc_obj(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *mc,
 					       gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
+	void *page;
+
 	gfp_flags |= mc->gfp_zero;
 
 	if (mc->kmem_cache)
 		return kmem_cache_alloc(mc->kmem_cache, gfp_flags);
-	else
-		return (void *)__get_free_page(gfp_flags);
+
+	page = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp_flags);
+	if (page && mc->init_value)
+		memset64(page, mc->init_value, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(mc->init_value));
+	return page;
 }
 
 int __kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *mc, int capacity, int min)
@@ -423,6 +428,13 @@ int __kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *mc, int capacity,
 		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!capacity))
 			return -EIO;
 
+		/*
+		 * Custom init values can be used only for page allocations,
+		 * and obviously conflict with __GFP_ZERO.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mc->init_value && (mc->kmem_cache || mc->gfp_zero)))
+			return -EIO;
+
 		mc->objects = kvmalloc_array(sizeof(void *), capacity, gfp);
 		if (!mc->objects)
 			return -ENOMEM;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#32 lore raw

PATCH v16 32/116 KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The TDX support will need the "suppress #VE" bit (bit 63) set as the initial value for SPTE. To reduce code change size, introduce a new macro SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE for the initial value for the shadow page table entry (SPTE) and replace hard-coded value 0 for it. Initialize shadow page tables with their value.

The plan is to unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit for both AMD and Intel as: 1) AMD hardware uses the bit 63 as NX for present SPTE and ignored for non-present SPTE; 2) for conventional VMX guests, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS control and "suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c         | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h        |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c     | 14 +++++++-------
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +15 -5
index c3d0f8461e1c..8cf3ac95bb30 100644
@@ -571,9 +571,9 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)
 
 	if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte) ||
 	    !spte_has_volatile_bits(old_spte))
-		__update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
+		__update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 	else
-		old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, 0ull);
+		old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 
 	if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte))
 		return old_spte;
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)
  */
 static void mmu_spte_clear_no_track(u64 *sptep)
 {
-	__update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
+	__update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 }
 
 static u64 mmu_spte_get_lockless(u64 *sptep)
@@ -1954,7 +1954,8 @@ static bool kvm_sync_page_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 
 static int kvm_sync_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int i)
 {
-	if (!sp->spt[i])
+	/* sp->spt[i] has initial value of shadow page table allocation */
+	if (sp->spt[i] == SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE)
 		return 0;
 
 	return vcpu->arch.mmu->sync_spte(vcpu, sp, i);
@@ -6118,7 +6119,16 @@ int kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.kmem_cache = mmu_page_header_cache;
 	vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
 
-	vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
+	/*
+	 * When X86_64, initial SEPT entries are initialized with
+	 * SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE.  Otherwise zeroed.  See
+	 * mmu_memory_cache_alloc_obj().
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
+		vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.init_value =
+			SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE;
+	if (!vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.init_value)
+		vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
 
 	vcpu->arch.mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
 	vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +1 -1
index c85255073f67..bc73290415d2 100644
@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ static int FNAME(sync_spte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int
 	gpa_t pte_gpa;
 	gfn_t gfn;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->spt[i]))
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->spt[i] == SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE))
 		return 0;
 
 	first_pte_gpa = FNAME(get_level1_sp_gpa)(sp);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +2 -0
index a129951c9a88..4d1799ba2bf8 100644
@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);
 
 #define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK		GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0)
 
+#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE	0ULL
+
 extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
 extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
 extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +7 -7
index ca7ec39f17d3..4f6f782d9e02 100644
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
 	 * here since the SPTE is going from non-present to non-present.  Use
 	 * the raw write helper to avoid an unnecessary check on volatile bits.
 	 */
-	__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, 0);
+	__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -767,8 +767,8 @@ static void __tdp_mmu_zap_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
 			continue;
 
 		if (!shared)
-			tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
-		else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, 0))
+			tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
+		else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE))
 			goto retry;
 	}
 }
@@ -824,8 +824,8 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte)))
 		return false;
 
-	tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), sp->ptep, old_spte, 0,
-			 sp->gfn, sp->role.level + 1);
+	tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), sp->ptep, old_spte,
+			 SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, sp->gfn, sp->role.level + 1);
 
 	return true;
 }
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
 		    !is_last_spte(iter.old_spte, iter.level))
 			continue;
 
-		tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
+		tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 		flush = true;
 	}
 
@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
 	 * invariant that the PFN of a present * leaf SPTE can never change.
 	 * See handle_changed_spte().
 	 */
-	tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, iter, 0);
+	tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 
 	if (!pte_write(range->arg.pte)) {
 		new_spte = kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(iter->old_spte,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#33 lore raw

PATCH v16 33/116 KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

For TD guest, the current way to emulate MMIO doesn't work any more, as KVM is not able to access the private memory of TD guest and do the emulation. Instead, TD guest expects to receive #VE when it accesses the MMIO and then it can explicitly make hypercall to KVM to get the expected information.

To achieve this, the TDX module always enables "EPT-violation #VE" in the VMCS control. And accordingly, for the MMIO spte for the shared GPA,
1. KVM needs to set "suppress #VE" bit for the non-present SPTE so that EPT violation happens on TD accessing MMIO range. 2. On EPT violation, KVM sets the MMIO spte to clear "suppress #VE" bit so the TD guest can receive the #VE instead of EPT misconfigration unlike VMX case. For the shared GPA that is not populated yet, EPT violation need to be triggered when TD guest accesses such shared GPA. The non-present SPTE value for shared GPA should set "suppress #VE" bit.

Add "suppress #VE" bit (bit 63) to SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE and REMOVED_SPTE. Unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit (which is bit 63) for both AMD and Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit when present bit is off; 2) for normal VMX guest, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS control and "suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +14 -1
index 4d1799ba2bf8..26bc95bbc962 100644
@@ -149,7 +149,20 @@ static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);
 
 #define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK		GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0)
 
+/*
+ * Non-present SPTE value for both VMX and SVM for TDP MMU.
+ * For SVM NPT, for non-present spte (bit 0 = 0), other bits are ignored.
+ * For VMX EPT, bit 63 is ignored if #VE is disabled. (EPT_VIOLATION_VE=0)
+ *              bit 63 is #VE suppress if #VE is enabled. (EPT_VIOLATION_VE=1)
+ * For TDX:
+ *   TDX module sets EPT_VIOLATION_VE for Secure-EPT and conventional EPT
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE	BIT_ULL(63)
+static_assert(!(SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK));
+#else
 #define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE	0ULL
+#endif
 
 extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
 extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
@@ -196,7 +209,7 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
  *
  * Only used by the TDP MMU.
  */
-#define REMOVED_SPTE	0x5a0ULL
+#define REMOVED_SPTE	(SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE | 0x5a0ULL)
 
 /* Removed SPTEs must not be misconstrued as shadow present PTEs. */
 static_assert(!(REMOVED_SPTE & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK));
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#34 lore raw

PATCH v16 34/116 KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to shadow_mmio_mask/shadow_present_mask

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

To make use of the same value of shadow_mmio_mask and shadow_present_mask for TDX and VMX, add Suppress-VE bit to shadow_mmio_mask and shadow_present_mask so that they can be common for both VMX and TDX.

TDX will require shadow_mmio_mask and shadow_present_mask to include VMX_SUPPRESS_VE for shared GPA so that EPT violation is triggered for shared GPA. For VMX, VMX_SUPPRESS_VE doesn't matter for MMIO because the spte value is required to cause EPT misconfig. the additional bit doesn't affect VMX logic to add the bit to shadow_mmio_{value, mask}.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c    | 6 ++++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +1 -0
index 0e73616b82f3..76ed39541a52 100644
@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 #define VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT    			(1ull << 6)
 #define VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT			(1ull << 8)
 #define VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT			(1ull << 9)
+#define VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT			(1ull << 63)
 #define VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK                        (VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK |       \
 						 VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK |       \
 						 VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +4 -2
index 4a599130e9c9..02a466de2991 100644
@@ -429,7 +429,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
 	shadow_dirty_mask	= has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull;
 	shadow_nx_mask		= 0ull;
 	shadow_x_mask		= VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK;
-	shadow_present_mask	= has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK;
+	/* VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT is needed for W or X violation. */
+	shadow_present_mask	=
+		(has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT;
 	/*
 	 * EPT overrides the host MTRRs, and so KVM must program the desired
 	 * memtype directly into the SPTEs.  Note, this mask is just the mask
@@ -446,7 +448,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
 	 * of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute).
 	 */
 	kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE,
-				   VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK, 0);
+				   VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT, 0);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#35 lore raw

PATCH v16 35/116 KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX will use a different shadow PTE entry value for MMIO from VMX. Add members to kvm_arch and track value for MMIO per-VM instead of global variables. By using the per-VM EPT entry value for MMIO, the existing VMX logic is kept working. Introduce a separate setter function so that guest TD can override later.

Also require mmio spte cachcing for TDX. Actually this is true case because TDX require EPT and KVM EPT allows mmio spte caching.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h              |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c          |  7 ++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c         | 10 ++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h         |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c      |  6 +++---
 6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
index 742e97f23573..a2fd25fb2f9c 100644
@@ -1280,6 +1280,8 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 	 */
 	spinlock_t mmu_unsync_pages_lock;
 
+	u64 shadow_mmio_value;
+
 	struct list_head assigned_dev_head;
 	struct iommu_domain *iommu_domain;
 	bool iommu_noncoherent;
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +1 -0
index f5ba6cf589aa..c30fefa39bb4 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ static inline u8 kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(void)
 }
 
 void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask);
+void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mmio_value);
 void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(u64 me_value, u64 me_mask);
 void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only);
 
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +4 -3
index 8cf3ac95bb30..469e73283824 100644
@@ -2519,7 +2519,7 @@ static int mmu_page_zap_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
 				return kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, child,
 								invalid_list);
 		}
-	} else if (is_mmio_spte(pte)) {
+	} else if (is_mmio_spte(kvm, pte)) {
 		mmu_spte_clear_no_track(spte);
 	}
 	return 0;
@@ -4180,7 +4180,7 @@ static int handle_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct)
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reserved))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (is_mmio_spte(spte)) {
+	if (is_mmio_spte(vcpu->kvm, spte)) {
 		gfn_t gfn = get_mmio_spte_gfn(spte);
 		unsigned int access = get_mmio_spte_access(spte);
 
@@ -4751,7 +4751,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_new_pgd);
 static bool sync_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep, gfn_t gfn,
 			   unsigned int access)
 {
-	if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(*sptep))) {
+	if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(vcpu->kvm, *sptep))) {
 		if (gfn != get_mmio_spte_gfn(*sptep)) {
 			mmu_spte_clear_no_track(sptep);
 			return true;
@@ -6273,6 +6273,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	int r;
 
+	kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = shadow_mmio_value;
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.possible_nx_huge_pages);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +8 -2
index 02a466de2991..318135daf685 100644
@@ -74,10 +74,10 @@ u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)
 	u64 spte = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen);
 	u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
 
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(!shadow_mmio_value);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value);
 
 	access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask;
-	spte |= shadow_mmio_value | access;
+	spte |= vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value | access;
 	spte |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
 	spte |= (gpa & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask)
 		<< SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN;
@@ -411,6 +411,12 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask);
 
+void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mmio_value)
+{
+	kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value);
+
 void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(u64 me_value, u64 me_mask)
 {
 	/* shadow_me_value must be a subset of shadow_me_mask */
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +2 -2
index 26bc95bbc962..1a163aee9ec6 100644
@@ -264,9 +264,9 @@ static inline struct kvm_mmu_page *root_to_sp(hpa_t root)
 	return spte_to_child_sp(root);
 }
 
-static inline bool is_mmio_spte(u64 spte)
+static inline bool is_mmio_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 spte)
 {
-	return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == shadow_mmio_value &&
+	return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
 	       likely(enable_mmio_caching);
 }
 
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +3 -3
index 4f6f782d9e02..7712b1b86bd2 100644
@@ -522,8 +522,8 @@ static void handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
 		 * impact the guest since both the former and current SPTEs
 		 * are nonpresent.
 		 */
-		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_mmio_spte(old_spte) &&
-				 !is_mmio_spte(new_spte) &&
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_mmio_spte(kvm, old_spte) &&
+				 !is_mmio_spte(kvm, new_spte) &&
 				 !is_removed_spte(new_spte)))
 			pr_err("Unexpected SPTE change! Nonpresent SPTEs\n"
 			       "should not be replaced with another,\n"
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	}
 
 	/* If a MMIO SPTE is installed, the MMIO will need to be emulated. */
-	if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(new_spte))) {
+	if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(vcpu->kvm, new_spte))) {
 		vcpu->stat.pf_mmio_spte_created++;
 		trace_mark_mmio_spte(rcu_dereference(iter->sptep), iter->gfn,
 				     new_spte);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#36 lore raw

PATCH v16 36/116 KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX requires TDX SEAMCALL to operate Secure EPT instead of direct memory access and TDX SEAMCALL is heavy operation. Fast page fault on private GPA doesn't make sense. Disallow fast page fault on private GPA.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +10 -2
index 469e73283824..1e3ddf2e7dbf 100644
@@ -3343,8 +3343,16 @@ static int kvm_handle_noslot_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
 }
 
-static bool page_fault_can_be_fast(struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+static bool page_fault_can_be_fast(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 {
+	/*
+	 * TDX private mapping doesn't support fast page fault because the EPT
+	 * entry is read/written with TDX SEAMCALLs instead of direct memory
+	 * access.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, fault->addr))
+		return false;
+
 	/*
 	 * Page faults with reserved bits set, i.e. faults on MMIO SPTEs, only
 	 * reach the common page fault handler if the SPTE has an invalid MMIO
@@ -3454,7 +3462,7 @@ static int fast_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 	u64 *sptep = NULL;
 	uint retry_count = 0;
 
-	if (!page_fault_can_be_fast(fault))
+	if (!page_fault_can_be_fast(vcpu->kvm, fault))
 		return ret;
 
 	walk_shadow_page_lockless_begin(vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#37 lore raw

PATCH v16 37/116 KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

TDX requires special handling to support large private page. For simplicity, only support 4K page for TD guest for now. Add per-VM maximum page level support to support different maximum page sizes for TD guest and conventional VMX guest.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c          | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
index a2fd25fb2f9c..3970473d1807 100644
@@ -1253,6 +1253,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 	unsigned long n_requested_mmu_pages;
 	unsigned long n_max_mmu_pages;
 	unsigned int indirect_shadow_pages;
+	int tdp_max_page_level;
 	u8 mmu_valid_gen;
 	struct hlist_head mmu_page_hash[KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES];
 	struct list_head active_mmu_pages;
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1 -0
index 1e3ddf2e7dbf..eee5a46f5ce3 100644
@@ -6301,6 +6301,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
 	kvm->arch.split_desc_cache.kmem_cache = pte_list_desc_cache;
 	kvm->arch.split_desc_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
 
+	kvm->arch.tdp_max_page_level = KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL;
 	return 0;
 }
 
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +1 -1
index 83dbe8245ebf..8de1192b1cca 100644
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
 		.nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled =
 			is_nx_huge_page_enabled(vcpu->kvm),
 
-		.max_level = KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL,
+		.max_level = vcpu->kvm->arch.tdp_max_page_level,
 		.req_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
 		.goal_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
 	};
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#38 lore raw

PATCH v16 38/116 KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

To support TDX, KVM is enhanced to operate with #VE. For TDX, KVM programs to inject #VE conditionally and set #VE suppress bit in EPT entry. For VMX case, #VE isn't used. If #VE happens for VMX, it's a bug. To be defensive (test that VMX case isn't broken), introduce option ept_violation_ve_test and when it's set, set error.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 12 +++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h    |  5 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c     | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h     |  6 +++-
 4 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +12 -0
index 76ed39541a52..f703bae0c4ac 100644
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING		VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(ENCLS_EXITING)
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING		VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(RDSEED_EXITING)
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML               VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PAGE_MOD_LOGGING)
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE		VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(EPT_VIOLATION_VE)
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX		VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PT_CONCEAL_VMX)
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES		VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(XSAVES)
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC	VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC)
@@ -225,6 +226,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 	VMREAD_BITMAP_HIGH              = 0x00002027,
 	VMWRITE_BITMAP                  = 0x00002028,
 	VMWRITE_BITMAP_HIGH             = 0x00002029,
+	VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS		= 0x0000202A,
+	VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS_HIGH	= 0x0000202B,
 	XSS_EXIT_BITMAP                 = 0x0000202C,
 	XSS_EXIT_BITMAP_HIGH            = 0x0000202D,
 	ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP		= 0x0000202E,
@@ -630,4 +633,13 @@ enum vmx_l1d_flush_state {
 
 extern enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation;
 
+struct vmx_ve_information {
+	u32 exit_reason;
+	u32 delivery;
+	u64 exit_qualification;
+	u64 guest_linear_address;
+	u64 guest_physical_address;
+	u16 eptp_index;
+};
+
 #endif
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h +5 -0
index 7c1996b433e2..b25625314658 100644
@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static inline bool is_nm_fault(u32 intr_info)
 	return is_exception_n(intr_info, NM_VECTOR);
 }
 
+static inline bool is_ve_fault(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_exception_n(intr_info, VE_VECTOR);
+}
+
 /* Undocumented: icebp/int1 */
 static inline bool is_icebp(u32 intr_info)
 {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +68 -1

124 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +5 -1
index 41ad0e7a25fd..2847e368c8e6 100644
@@ -347,6 +347,9 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 		DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
 		DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
 	} shadow_msr_intercept;
+
+	/* ve_info must be page aligned. */
+	struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info;
 };
 
 struct kvm_vmx {
@@ -557,7 +560,8 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
 	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |					\
 	 SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION |				\
 	 SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING |				\
-	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE)
 
 #define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL 0
 #define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL			\
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#39 lore raw

PATCH v16 39/116 The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of KVM TDP MMU hooks.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +2 -2
index e893a3d714c7..7903473abad1 100644
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ Patch Layer status
 * TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:    Not yet
 
 * KVM MMU GPA shared bits:              Applied
-* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:          Applying
-* KVM TDP MMU hooks:                    Not yet
+* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:          Applied
+* KVM TDP MMU hooks:                    Applying
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#40 lore raw

PATCH v16 40/116 KVM: x86/mmu: Assume guest MMIOs are shared

In reply to [email protected]

From: Chao Gao <[email protected]>

Guest TD doesn't necessarily invoke MAP_GPA to convert the virtual MMIO range to shared before accessing it. When TD tries to access the virtual device's MMIO as shared, an EPT violation is raised first. kvm_mem_is_private() checks whether the GFN is shared or private. If MAP_GPA is not called for the GPA, KVM thinks the GPA is private and refuses shared access, and doesn't set up shared EPT entry. The guest can't make progress.

Instead of requiring the guest to invoke MAP_GPA for regions of virtual MMIOs assume regions of virtual MMIOs are shared in KVM as well (i.e., GPAs either have no kvm_memory_slot or are backed by host MMIOs). So that guests can access those MMIO regions.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +6 -1
index eee5a46f5ce3..4ac34a0cc33e 100644
@@ -4367,7 +4367,12 @@ static int __kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
 			return RET_PF_EMULATE;
 	}
 
-	if (fault->is_private != kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, fault->gfn)) {
+	/*
+	 * !fault->slot means MMIO.  Don't require explicit GPA conversion for
+	 * MMIO because MMIO is assigned at the boot time.
+	 */
+	if (fault->slot &&
+	    fault->is_private != kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, fault->gfn)) {
 		if (vcpu->kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM)
 			return RET_PF_RETRY;
 		kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#41 lore raw

PATCH v16 41/116 KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at allocation

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Refactor tdp_mmu_alloc_sp() and tdp_mmu_init_sp and eliminate tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(). Currently tdp_mmu_init_sp() (or tdp_mmu_init_child_sp()) sets kvm_mmu_page.role after tdp_mmu_alloc_sp() allocating struct kvm_mmu_page and its page table page. This patch makes tdp_mmu_alloc_sp() initialize kvm_mmu_page.role instead of tdp_mmu_init_sp().

To handle private page tables, argument of is_private needs to be passed down. Given that already page level is passed down, it would be cumbersome to add one more parameter about sp. Instead replace the level argument with union kvm_mmu_page_role. Thus the number of argument won't be increased and more info about sp can be passed down.

For private sp, secure page table will be also allocated in addition to struct kvm_mmu_page and page table (spt member). The allocation functions (tdp_mmu_alloc_sp() and __tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split()) need to know if the allocation is for the conventional page table or private page table. Pass union kvm_mmu_role to those functions and initialize role member of struct kvm_mmu_page.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 12 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c  | 44 ++++++++++++++++---------------------
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h +12 -0
index fae559559a80..e1e40e3f5eb7 100644
@@ -135,4 +135,16 @@ void tdp_iter_start(struct tdp_iter *iter, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
 void tdp_iter_next(struct tdp_iter *iter);
 void tdp_iter_restart(struct tdp_iter *iter);
 
+static inline union kvm_mmu_page_role tdp_iter_child_role(struct tdp_iter *iter)
+{
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role child_role;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *parent_sp;
+
+	parent_sp = sptep_to_sp(rcu_dereference(iter->sptep));
+
+	child_role = parent_sp->role;
+	child_role.level--;
+	return child_role;
+}
+
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_MMU_TDP_ITER_H */
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +19 -25

119 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#42 lore raw

PATCH v16 42/116 KVM: x86/mmu: Add a new is_private member for union kvm_mmu_page_role

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because TDX support introduces private mapping, add a new member in union kvm_mmu_page_role with access functions to check the member.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h         |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +27 -0
index 3970473d1807..f8664becb1e4 100644
@@ -341,7 +341,12 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
 		unsigned ad_disabled:1;
 		unsigned guest_mode:1;
 		unsigned passthrough:1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+		unsigned is_private:1;
+		unsigned :4;
+#else
 		unsigned :5;
+#endif
 
 		/*
 		 * This is left at the top of the word so that
@@ -353,6 +358,28 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
 	};
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+{
+	return !!role.is_private;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_page_role_set_private(union kvm_mmu_page_role *role)
+{
+	role->is_private = 1;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_page_role_set_private(union kvm_mmu_page_role *role)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * kvm_mmu_extended_role complements kvm_mmu_page_role, tracking properties
  * relevant to the current MMU configuration.   When loading CR0, CR4, or EFER,
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +5 -0
index 8de1192b1cca..a510f0a16853 100644
@@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_page_as_id(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 	return kvm_mmu_role_as_id(sp->role);
 }
 
+static inline bool is_private_sp(const struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	return kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(sp->role);
+}
+
 static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 {
 	/*
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +6 -0
index 1a163aee9ec6..88db32cba0fd 100644
@@ -264,6 +264,12 @@ static inline struct kvm_mmu_page *root_to_sp(hpa_t root)
 	return spte_to_child_sp(root);
 }
 
+static inline bool is_private_sptep(u64 *sptep)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!sptep);
+	return is_private_sp(sptep_to_sp(sptep));
+}
+
 static inline bool is_mmio_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 spte)
 {
 	return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#43 lore raw

PATCH v16 43/116 KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

For private GPA, CPU refers a private page table whose contents are encrypted. The dedicated APIs to operate on it (e.g. updating/reading its PTE entry) are used and their cost is expensive.

When KVM resolves KVM page fault, it walks the page tables. To reuse the existing KVM MMU code and mitigate the heavy cost to directly walk private page table, allocate one more page to copy the dummy page table for KVM MMU code to directly walk. Resolve KVM page fault with the existing code, and do additional operations necessary for the private page table. To distinguish such cases, the existing KVM page table is called a shared page table (i.e. not associated with private page table), and the page table with private page table is called a private page table. The relationship is depicted below.

Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page for private page table and add helper functions to allocate/initialize/free a private page table page.

              KVM page fault                     |
                     |                           |
                     V                           |
        -------------+----------                 |
        |                      |                 |
        V                      V                 |
     shared GPA           private GPA            |
        |                      |                 |
        V                      V                 |
    shared PT root      dummy PT root            |    private PT root
        |                      |                 |           |
        V                      V                 |           V
     shared PT            dummy PT ----propagate---->   private PT
        |                      |                 |           |
        |                      \-----------------+------\    |
        |                                        |      |    |
        V                                        |      V    V
  shared guest page                              |    private guest page
                                                 |
                           non-encrypted memory  |    encrypted memory
                                                 |

PT: page table
- Shared PT is visible to KVM and it is used by CPU.
- Private PT is used by CPU but it is invisible to KVM.
- Dummy PT is visible to KVM but not used by CPU. It is used to propagate PT change to the actual private PT which is used by CPU.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  5 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c          |  7 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c      |  1 +
 4 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +5 -0
index f8664becb1e4..432b94a61ab1 100644
@@ -817,6 +817,11 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_shadow_page_cache;
 	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_shadowed_info_cache;
 	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_page_header_cache;
+	/*
+	 * This cache is to allocate private page table. E.g.  Secure-EPT used
+	 * by the TDX module.
+	 */
+	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_private_spt_cache;
 
 	/*
 	 * QEMU userspace and the guest each have their own FPU state.
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +7 -0
index 4ac34a0cc33e..6636be590583 100644
@@ -689,6 +689,12 @@ static int mmu_topup_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool maybe_indirect)
 				       1 + PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + PTE_PREFETCH_NUM);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
+	if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_private_spt_cache,
+					       PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
 	r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache,
 				       PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
 	if (r)
@@ -708,6 +714,7 @@ static void mmu_free_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_pte_list_desc_cache);
 	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache);
 	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadowed_info_cache);
+	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_private_spt_cache);
 	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache);
 }
 
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +79 -4

101 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +1 -0
index 0c5c7eadb1ba..583888bbb87d 100644
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 static void tdp_mmu_free_sp(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 {
+	kvm_mmu_free_private_spt(sp);
 	free_page((unsigned long)sp->spt);
 	kmem_cache_free(mmu_page_header_cache, sp);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#44 lore raw

PATCH v16 44/116 KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

TDX supports only write-back(WB) memory type for private memory architecturally so that (virtualized) memory type change doesn't make sense for private memory. Also currently, page migration isn't supported for TDX yet. (TDX architecturally supports page migration. it's KVM and kernel implementation issue.)

Regarding memory type change (mtrr virtualization and lapic page mapping change), pages are zapped by kvm_zap_gfn_range(). On the next KVM page fault, the SPTE entry with a new memory type for the page is populated. Regarding page migration, pages are zapped by the mmu notifier. On the next KVM page fault, the new migrated page is populated. Don't zap private pages on unmapping for those two cases.

When deleting/moving a KVM memory slot, zap private pages. Typically tearing down VM. Don't invalidate private page tables. i.e. zap only leaf SPTEs for KVM mmu that has a shared bit mask. The existing kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots() depends on role.invalid with read-lock of mmu_lock so that other vcpu can operate on KVM mmu concurrently. It marks the root page table invalid and zaps SPTEs of the root page tables. The TDX module doesn't allow to unlink a protected root page table from the hardware and then allocate a new one for it. i.e. replacing a protected root page table. Instead, zap only leaf SPTEs for KVM mmu with a shared bit mask set.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c     | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h |  5 +--
 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +59 -3
index 6636be590583..4b58205b2d82 100644
@@ -6256,7 +6256,7 @@ static void kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(struct kvm *kvm)
 	 * e.g. before kvm_zap_obsolete_pages() could drop mmu_lock and yield.
 	 */
 	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
-		kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(kvm);
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(kvm, true);
 
 	/*
 	 * Notify all vcpus to reload its shadow page table and flush TLB.
@@ -6385,8 +6385,18 @@ void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end)
 
 	if (tdp_mmu_enabled) {
 		for (i = 0; i < kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(kvm); i++)
+			/*
+			 * zap_private = true. Zap both private/shared pages.
+			 *
+			 * kvm_zap_gfn_range() is used when MTRR or PAT memory
+			 * type was changed.  Later on the next kvm page fault,
+			 * populate it with updated spte entry.
+			 * Because only WB is supported for private pages, don't
+			 * care of private pages.
+			 */
 			flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, i, gfn_start,
-						      gfn_end, true, flush);
+						      gfn_end, true, flush,
+						      false);
 	}
 
 	if (flush)
@@ -6833,10 +6843,56 @@ void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(struct kvm *kvm)
 	kvm_mmu_zap_all(kvm);
 }
 
+static void kvm_mmu_zap_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	bool flush = false;
+
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Zapping non-leaf SPTEs, a.k.a. not-last SPTEs, isn't required, worst
+	 * case scenario we'll have unused shadow pages lying around until they
+	 * are recycled due to age or when the VM is destroyed.
+	 */
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled) {
+		struct kvm_gfn_range range = {
+		      .slot = slot,
+		      .start = slot->base_gfn,
+		      .end = slot->base_gfn + slot->npages,
+		      .may_block = true,
+
+		      /*
+		       * This handles both private gfn and shared gfn.
+		       * All private page should be zapped on memslot deletion.
+		       */
+		      .only_private = true,
+		      .only_shared = true,
+		};
+
+		flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, &range, flush);
+	} else {
+		/* TDX supports only TDP-MMU case. */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		flush = true;
+	}
+	if (flush)
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
+
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+}
+
 void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
 				   struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
 {
-	kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
+	if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm))
+		/*
+		 * Secure-EPT requires to release PTs from the leaf.  The
+		 * optimization to zap root PT first with child PT doesn't
+		 * work.
+		 */
+		kvm_mmu_zap_memslot(kvm, slot);
+	else
+		kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
 }
 
 void kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +31 -6
index 583888bbb87d..d76c1ad44638 100644
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu(struct kvm *kvm)
 	 * for zapping and thus puts the TDP MMU's reference to each root, i.e.
 	 * ultimately frees all roots.
 	 */
-	kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(kvm);
+	kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(kvm, false);
 
 	/*
 	 * Destroying a workqueue also first flushes the workqueue, i.e. no
@@ -831,7 +831,8 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
  * operation can cause a soft lockup.
  */
 static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
-			      gfn_t start, gfn_t end, bool can_yield, bool flush)
+			      gfn_t start, gfn_t end, bool can_yield, bool flush,
+			      bool zap_private)
 {
 	struct tdp_iter iter;
 
@@ -839,6 +840,10 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
 
 	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
 
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(zap_private && !is_private_sp(root));
+	if (!zap_private && is_private_sp(root))
+		return false;
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, PG_LEVEL_4K, start, end) {
@@ -871,12 +876,13 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
  * more SPTEs were zapped since the MMU lock was last acquired.
  */
 bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
-			   bool can_yield, bool flush)
+			   bool can_yield, bool flush, bool zap_private)
 {
 	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
 
 	for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, as_id)
-		flush = tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, root, start, end, can_yield, flush);
+		flush = tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, root, start, end, can_yield, flush,
+					  zap_private && is_private_sp(root));
 
 	return flush;
 }
@@ -924,7 +930,7 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots(struct kvm *kvm)
  * Note, the asynchronous worker is gifted the TDP MMU's reference.
  * See kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa().
  */
-void kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(struct kvm *kvm)
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(struct kvm *kvm, bool skip_private)
 {
 	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
 
@@ -952,6 +958,12 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(struct kvm *kvm)
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(root, &kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_roots, link) {
+		/*
+		 * Skip private root since private page table
+		 * is only torn down when VM is destroyed.
+		 */
+		if (skip_private && is_private_sp(root))
+			continue;
 		if (!root->role.invalid) {
 			root->role.invalid = true;
 			tdp_mmu_schedule_zap_root(kvm, root);
@@ -1136,11 +1148,24 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/* Used by mmu notifier via kvm_unmap_gfn_range() */
 bool kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
 				 bool flush)
 {
+	bool zap_private = false;
+
+	if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm)) {
+		if (!range->only_private && !range->only_shared)
+			/* attributes change */
+			zap_private = !(range->arg.attributes &
+					KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE);
+		else
+			zap_private = range->only_private;
+	}
+
 	return kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, range->slot->as_id, range->start,
-				     range->end, range->may_block, flush);
+				     range->end, range->may_block, flush,
+				     zap_private);
 }
 
 typedef bool (*tdp_handler_t)(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h +3 -2
index 0a63b1afabd3..3df604352648 100644
@@ -21,10 +21,11 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
 			  bool shared);
 
 bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t start,
-				 gfn_t end, bool can_yield, bool flush);
+			   gfn_t end, bool can_yield, bool flush,
+			   bool zap_private);
 bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
 void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm);
-void kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(struct kvm *kvm, bool skip_private);
 void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots(struct kvm *kvm);
 
 int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#45 lore raw

PATCH v16 45/116 KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Sprinkle __must_check

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDP MMU allows tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic() and tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic() to return -EBUSY or -EAGAIN error. The caller must check the return value and retry. Sprinkle __must_check to guarantee it.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +5 -5
index d76c1ad44638..882848b24941 100644
@@ -567,9 +567,9 @@ static void handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
  *            no side-effects other than setting iter->old_spte to the last
  *            known value of the spte.
  */
-static inline int tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
-					  struct tdp_iter *iter,
-					  u64 new_spte)
+static inline int __must_check tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
+						       struct tdp_iter *iter,
+						       u64 new_spte)
 {
 	u64 *sptep = rcu_dereference(iter->sptep);
 
@@ -599,8 +599,8 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
-					  struct tdp_iter *iter)
+static inline int __must_check tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
+						       struct tdp_iter *iter)
 {
 	int ret;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#46 lore raw

PATCH v16 46/116 KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Allocate protected page table for private page table, and add hooks to operate on protected page table. This patch adds allocation/free of protected page tables and hooks. When calling hooks to update SPTE entry, freeze the entry, call hooks and unfreeze the entry to allow concurrent updates on page tables. Which is the advantage of TDP MMU. As kvm_gfn_shared_mask() returns false always, those hooks aren't called yet with this patch.

When the faulting GPA is private, the KVM fault is called private. When resolving private KVM fault, allocate protected page table and call hooks to operate on protected page table. On the change of the private PTE entry, invoke kvm_x86_ops hook in __handle_changed_spte() to propagate the change to protected page table. The following depicts the relationship.

  private KVM page fault   |
      |                    |
      V                    |
 private GPA               |     CPU protected EPTP
      |                    |           |
      V                    |           V
 private PT root           |     protected PT root
      |                    |           |
      V                    |           V
   private PT --hook to propagate-->protected PT
      |                    |           |
      \--------------------+------\    |
                           |      |    |
                           |      V    V
                           |    private guest page
                           |
                           |
     non-encrypted memory  |    encrypted memory
                           |

PT: page table

The existing KVM TDP MMU code uses atomic update of SPTE. On populating the EPT entry, atomically set the entry. However, it requires TLB shootdown to zap SPTE. To address it, the entry is frozen with the special SPTE value that clears the present bit. After the TLB shootdown, the entry is set to the eventual value (unfreeze).

For protected page table, hooks are called to update protected page table in addition to direct access to the private SPTE. For the zapping case, it works to freeze the SPTE. It can call hooks in addition to TLB shootdown. For populating the private SPTE entry, there can be a race condition without further protection

vcpu 1: populating 2M private SPTE
vcpu 2: populating 4K private SPTE
vcpu 2: TDX SEAMCALL to update 4K protected SPTE => error vcpu 1: TDX SEAMCALL to update 2M protected SPTE

To avoid the race, the frozen SPTE is utilized. Instead of atomic update of the private entry, freeze the entry, call the hook that update protected SPTE, set the entry to the final value.

Support 4K page only at this stage. 2M page support can be done in future patches.

---
v14 -> v15:
- Refined is_private condition check in kvm_tdp_mmu_map(). Add kvm_gfn_shared_mask() check.
- catch up for struct kvm_range change

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  11 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c             |  13 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h    |  19 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h        |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c         | 309 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h         |   2 +-
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c                |   1 +
 8 files changed, 323 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +5 -0
index d740a3f19d96..6ec58c078523 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,11 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(set_tss_addr)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(set_identity_map_addr)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(get_mt_mask)
 KVM_X86_OP(load_mmu_pgd)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(link_private_spt)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(free_private_spt)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(set_private_spte)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(remove_private_spte)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(zap_private_spte)
 KVM_X86_OP(has_wbinvd_exit)
 KVM_X86_OP(get_l2_tsc_offset)
 KVM_X86_OP(get_l2_tsc_multiplier)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +11 -0
index 432b94a61ab1..8e6bcafd947b 100644
@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ struct kvm_mmu {
 	int (*sync_spte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			 struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int i);
 	struct kvm_mmu_root_info root;
+	hpa_t private_root_hpa;
 	union kvm_cpu_role cpu_role;
 	union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role;
 
@@ -1719,6 +1720,16 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	void (*load_mmu_pgd)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
 			     int root_level);
 
+	int (*link_private_spt)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
+				void *private_spt);
+	int (*free_private_spt)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
+				void *private_spt);
+	int (*set_private_spte)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
+				 kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+	int (*remove_private_spte)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
+				    kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+	int (*zap_private_spte)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level);
+
 	bool (*has_wbinvd_exit)(void);
 
 	u64 (*get_l2_tsc_offset)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +11 -2
index 4b58205b2d82..e1f42fdcd248 100644
@@ -3711,7 +3711,12 @@ static int mmu_alloc_direct_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	if (tdp_mmu_enabled) {
-		root = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm) &&
+		    !VALID_PAGE(mmu->private_root_hpa)) {
+			root = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(vcpu, true);
+			mmu->private_root_hpa = root;
+		}
+		root = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(vcpu, false);
 		mmu->root.hpa = root;
 	} else if (shadow_root_level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL) {
 		root = mmu_alloc_root(vcpu, 0, 0, shadow_root_level);
@@ -4602,7 +4607,7 @@ int kvm_tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 	if (shadow_memtype_mask && kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm)) {
 		for ( ; fault->max_level > PG_LEVEL_4K; --fault->max_level) {
 			int page_num = KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(fault->max_level);
-			gfn_t base = gfn_round_for_level(fault->gfn,
+			gfn_t base = gfn_round_for_level(gpa_to_gfn(fault->addr),
 							 fault->max_level);
 
 			if (kvm_mtrr_check_gfn_range_consistency(vcpu, base, page_num))
@@ -6083,6 +6088,7 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
 
 	mmu->root.hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
 	mmu->root.pgd = 0;
+	mmu->private_root_hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
 	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++)
 		mmu->prev_roots[i] = KVM_MMU_ROOT_INFO_INVALID;
 
@@ -7138,6 +7144,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_vendor_module_init(void)
 void kvm_mmu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		mmu_free_root_page(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.mmu->private_root_hpa,
+				NULL);
 	free_mmu_pages(&vcpu->arch.root_mmu);
 	free_mmu_pages(&vcpu->arch.guest_mmu);
 	mmu_free_memory_caches(vcpu);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +18 -1
index 398f30fc89a9..908504bcc2cd 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_host.h>
 
+#include "mmu.h"
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PROVE_MMU
 #define KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(x) WARN_ON_ONCE(x)
 #else
@@ -206,6 +208,15 @@ static inline void kvm_mmu_free_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 	if (sp->private_spt)
 		free_page((unsigned long)sp->private_spt);
 }
+
+static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_for_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+				     gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	if (is_private_sp(root))
+		return kvm_gfn_to_private(kvm, gfn);
+	else
+		return kvm_gfn_to_shared(kvm, gfn);
+}
 #else
 static inline void *kvm_mmu_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 {
@@ -223,6 +234,12 @@ static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_m
 static inline void kvm_mmu_free_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 {
 }
+
+static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_for_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+				     gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	return gfn;
+}
 #endif
 
 static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
@@ -383,7 +400,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
 	int r;
 
 	if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {
-		fault.gfn = fault.addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		fault.gfn = gpa_to_gfn(fault.addr) & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm);
 		fault.slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, fault.gfn);
 	}
 
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h +1 -1
index e1e40e3f5eb7..a9c9cd0db20a 100644
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct tdp_iter {
 	tdp_ptep_t pt_path[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL];
 	/* A pointer to the current SPTE */
 	tdp_ptep_t sptep;
-	/* The lowest GFN mapped by the current SPTE */
+	/* The lowest GFN (shared bits included) mapped by the current SPTE */
 	gfn_t gfn;
 	/* The level of the root page given to the iterator */
 	int root_level;
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +275 -34

471 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h +1 -1
index 3df604352648..6ae311b5e988 100644
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 int kvm_mmu_init_tdp_mmu(struct kvm *kvm);
 void kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu(struct kvm *kvm);
 
-hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool private);
 
 __must_check static inline bool kvm_tdp_mmu_get_root(struct kvm_mmu_page *root)
 {
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1 -0
index eb45bd2ca706..0ae59d680145 100644
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ struct page *kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
 
 	return NULL;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page);
 
 /*
  * Switches to specified vcpu, until a matching vcpu_put()
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#47 lore raw

PATCH v16 47/116 The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TDX EPT violation.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +2 -2
index 7903473abad1..c4d67dd9ddf8 100644
@@ -20,11 +20,11 @@ Patch Layer status
 * TDX architectural definitions:        Applied
 * TD VM creation/destruction:           Applied
 * TD vcpu creation/destruction:         Applied
-* TDX EPT violation:                    Not yet
+* TDX EPT violation:                    Applying
 * TD finalization:                      Not yet
 * TD vcpu enter/exit:                   Not yet
 * TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:    Not yet
 
 * KVM MMU GPA shared bits:              Applied
 * KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:          Applied
-* KVM TDP MMU hooks:                    Applying
+* KVM TDP MMU hooks:                    Applied
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#48 lore raw

PATCH v16 48/116 KVM: x86/mmu: TDX: Do not enable page track for TD guest

In reply to [email protected]

From: Yan Zhao <[email protected]>

TDX does not support write protection and hence page track. Though !tdp_enabled and kvm_shadow_root_allocated(kvm) are always false for TD guest, should also return false when external write tracking is enabled.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c +3 -0
index c87da11f3a04..ce698ab213c1 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
 
 bool kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
+	if (kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM)
+		return false;
+
 	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING) ||
 	       !tdp_enabled || kvm_shadow_root_allocated(kvm);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#49 lore raw

PATCH v16 49/116 KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

The difference of TDX EPT violation is how to retrieve information, GPA, and exit qualification. To share the code to handle EPT violation, split out the guts of EPT violation handler so that VMX/TDX exit handler can call it after retrieving GPA and exit qualification.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 25 +++----------------------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h new file +33 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..235908f3e044
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_COMMON_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_COMMON_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include "mmu.h"
+
+static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+					     unsigned long exit_qualification)
+{
+	u64 error_code;
+
+	/* Is it a read fault? */
+	error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
+		     ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
+	/* Is it a write fault? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE)
+		      ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0;
+	/* Is it a fetch fault? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
+		      ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
+	/* ept page table entry is present? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK)
+		      ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
+
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) != 0 ?
+	       PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
+
+	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_COMMON_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +3 -22
index 0dc56051589e..4ea2f95a554c 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #include <asm/vmx.h>
 
 #include "capabilities.h"
+#include "common.h"
 #include "cpuid.h"
 #include "hyperv.h"
 #include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
@@ -5780,11 +5781,8 @@ static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
 	gpa_t gpa;
-	u64 error_code;
-
-	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
 
 	/*
 	 * EPT violation happened while executing iret from NMI,
@@ -5799,23 +5797,6 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
 	trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, exit_qualification);
-
-	/* Is it a read fault? */
-	error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
-		     ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
-	/* Is it a write fault? */
-	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE)
-		      ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0;
-	/* Is it a fetch fault? */
-	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
-		      ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
-	/* ept page table entry is present? */
-	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK)
-		      ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
-
-	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) != 0 ?
-	       PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
-
 	vcpu->arch.exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
 
 	/*
@@ -5829,7 +5810,7 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (unlikely(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr && kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, gpa)))
 		return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
 
-	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
+	return __vmx_handle_ept_violation(vcpu, gpa, exit_qualification);
 }
 
 static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#50 lore raw

PATCH v16 50/116 KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

EPT MMU masks are used commonly for VMX and TDX. The value needs to be initialized in common code before both VMX/TDX-specific initialization code.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c  | 4 ----
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +9 -0
index 5d88d2196822..eab31d389916 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include "x86_ops.h"
 #include "vmx.h"
 #include "nested.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
 #include "tdx.h"
 #include "tdx_arch.h"
@@ -50,6 +51,14 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	/*
+	 * As kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks() updates enable_mmio_caching, call it
+	 * before checking enable_mmio_caching.
+	 */
+	if (enable_ept)
+		kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(enable_ept_ad_bits,
+				      cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only());
+
 	enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_hardware_setup(&vt_x86_ops);
 
 	return 0;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0 -4
index 4ea2f95a554c..82ca1ae3963a 100644
@@ -8412,10 +8412,6 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)
 
 	set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */
 
-	if (enable_ept)
-		kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(enable_ept_ad_bits,
-				      cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only());
-
 	/*
 	 * Setup shadow_me_value/shadow_me_mask to include MKTME KeyID
 	 * bits to shadow_zero_check.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#51 lore raw

PATCH v16 51/116 KVM: TDX: Add accessors VMX VMCS helpers

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX defines SEAMCALL APIs to access TDX control structures corresponding to the VMX VMCS. Introduce helper accessors to hide its SEAMCALL ABI details.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 95 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +95 -0
index 961a7da2452a..d92a75c78e6e 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,101 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu);
 }
 
+static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits)
+{
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK	0x1UL
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_FULL	0x0UL
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH	0x1UL
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field)	((field) & VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK)
+
+	/* TDX is 64bit only.  HIGH field isn't supported. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+			 VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) == VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH,
+			 "Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported");
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(bits != 16 && bits != 32 && bits != 64);
+
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK	GENMASK(14, 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT	(0UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT	(1UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT	(2UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL	(3UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field)	((field) & VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK)
+
+	/* TDX is 64bit only.  i.e. natural width = 64bit. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 64 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+			 (VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT ||
+			  VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL),
+			 "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 32 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+			 VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT,
+			 "Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 16 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+			 VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT,
+			 "Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field");
+}
+
+static __always_inline void tdvps_state_non_arch_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
+static __always_inline void tdvps_management_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
+
+#define TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(bits, uclass, lclass)				\
+static __always_inline u##bits td_##lclass##_read##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx,	\
+							u32 field)		\
+{										\
+	struct tdx_module_args out;						\
+	u64 err;								\
+										\
+	tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits);					\
+	err = tdh_vp_rd(tdx->tdvpr_pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), &out);		\
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, tdx->vcpu.kvm)) {					\
+		pr_err("TDH_VP_RD["#uclass".0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n",		\
+		       field, err);						\
+		return 0;							\
+	}									\
+	return (u##bits)out.r8;							\
+}										\
+static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_write##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx,	\
+						      u32 field, u##bits val)	\
+{										\
+	struct tdx_module_args out;						\
+	u64 err;								\
+										\
+	tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits);					\
+	err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr_pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), val,		\
+		      GENMASK_ULL(bits - 1, 0), &out);				\
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, tdx->vcpu.kvm))					\
+		pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] = 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n",	\
+		       field, (u64)val, err);					\
+}										\
+static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_setbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx,	\
+						       u32 field, u64 bit)	\
+{										\
+	struct tdx_module_args out;						\
+	u64 err;								\
+										\
+	tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits);					\
+	err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr_pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), bit, bit, &out);	\
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, tdx->vcpu.kvm))					\
+		pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] |= 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n",	\
+		       field, bit, err);					\
+}										\
+static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_clearbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx,	\
+							 u32 field, u64 bit)	\
+{										\
+	struct tdx_module_args out;						\
+	u64 err;								\
+										\
+	tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits);					\
+	err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr_pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), 0, bit, &out);	\
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, tdx->vcpu.kvm))					\
+		pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] &= ~0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n",	\
+		       field, bit,  err);					\
+}
+
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(16, VMCS, vmcs);
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(32, VMCS, vmcs);
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);
+
 static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 field)
 {
 	struct tdx_module_args out;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#52 lore raw

PATCH v16 52/116 KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

For virtual IO, the guest TD shares guest pages with VMM without encryption. Shared EPT is used to map guest pages in unprotected way.

Add the VMCS field encoding for the shared EPTP, which will be used by TDX to have separate EPT walks for private GPAs (existing EPTP) versus shared GPAs (new shared EPTP).

Set shared EPT pointer value for the TDX guest to initialize TDX MMU.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 13 ++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  4 ++++
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +1 -0
index f703bae0c4ac..9deb663a42e3 100644
@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 	TSC_MULTIPLIER_HIGH             = 0x00002033,
 	TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL	= 0x00002034,
 	TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL_HIGH	= 0x00002035,
+	SHARED_EPT_POINTER		= 0x0000203C,
 	PID_POINTER_TABLE		= 0x00002042,
 	PID_POINTER_TABLE_HIGH		= 0x00002043,
 	GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS          = 0x00002400,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +12 -1
index eab31d389916..17d119f3c4a8 100644
@@ -143,6 +143,17 @@ static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
 }
 
+static void vt_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
+			int pgd_level)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		tdx_load_mmu_pgd(vcpu, root_hpa, pgd_level);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_load_mmu_pgd(vcpu, root_hpa, pgd_level);
+}
+
 static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -275,7 +286,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.write_tsc_offset = vmx_write_tsc_offset,
 	.write_tsc_multiplier = vmx_write_tsc_multiplier,
 
-	.load_mmu_pgd = vmx_load_mmu_pgd,
+	.load_mmu_pgd = vt_load_mmu_pgd,
 
 	.check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
 	.handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +5 -0
index fe793425d393..d26b96cf94f9 100644
@@ -425,6 +425,11 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	 */
 }
 
+void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
+{
+	td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
+}
+
 static int tdx_get_capabilities(struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
 {
 	struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +4 -0
index 88e117db748c..36dfdf3f17e7 100644
@@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
 
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
+
+void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level);
 #else
 static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
@@ -173,6 +175,8 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
 
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+
+static inline void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level) {}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#53 lore raw

PATCH v16 53/116 KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT

In reply to [email protected]

From: Yuan Yao <[email protected]>

TDX module internally uses locks to protect internal resources. It tries to acquire the locks. If it fails to obtain the lock, it returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY error without spin because its execution time limitation.

TDX SEAMCALL API reference describes what resources are used. It's known which TDX SEAMCALL can cause contention with which resources. VMM can avoid contention inside the TDX module by avoiding contentious TDX SEAMCALL with, for example, spinlock. Because OS knows better its process scheduling and its scalability, a lock at OS/VMM layer would work better than simply retrying TDX SEAMCALLs.

TDH.MEM.* API except for TDH.MEM.TRACK operates on a secure EPT tree and the TDX module internally tries to acquire the lock of the secure EPT tree. They return TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT in case of failure to get the lock. TDX KVM allows sept callbacks to return error so that TDP MMU layer can retry.

TDH.VP.ENTER is an exception with zero-step attack mitigation. Normally TDH.VP.ENTER uses only TD vcpu resources and it doesn't cause contention. When a zero-step attack is suspected, it obtains a secure EPT tree lock and tracks the GPAs causing a secure EPT fault. Thus TDG.VP.ENTER may result in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT. Also TDH.MEM.* SEAMCALLs may result in TDX_OPERAN_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT.

Retry TDX TDH.MEM.* API and TDH.VP.ENTER on the error because the error is a rare event caused by zero-step attack mitigation and spinlock can not be used for TDH.VP.ENTER due to indefinite time execution.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h +39 -9
index c9f74b2400a7..fd73a1731bf8 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,36 @@ static inline u64 tdx_seamcall(u64 op, u64 rcx, u64 rdx, u64 r8, u64 r9,
 void pr_tdx_error(u64 op, u64 error_code, const struct tdx_module_args *out);
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * TDX module acquires its internal lock for resources.  It doesn't spin to get
+ * locks because of its restrictions of allowed execution time.  Instead, it
+ * returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with an operand id.
+ *
+ * Multiple VCPUs can operate on SEPT.  Also with zero-step attack mitigation,
+ * TDH.VP.ENTER may rarely acquire SEPT lock and release it when zero-step
+ * attack is suspected.  It results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT
+ * with TDH.MEM.* operation.  Note: TDH.MEM.TRACK is an exception.
+ *
+ * Because TDP MMU uses read lock for scalability, spin lock around SEAMCALL
+ * spoils TDP MMU effort.  Retry several times with the assumption that SEPT
+ * lock contention is rare.  But don't loop forever to avoid lockup.  Let TDP
+ * MMU retry.
+ */
+#define TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY    (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT)
+
+static inline u64 tdx_seamcall_sept(u64 op, u64 rcx, u64 rdx, u64 r8, u64 r9,
+				    struct tdx_module_args *out)
+{
+#define SEAMCALL_RETRY_MAX     16
+	int retry = SEAMCALL_RETRY_MAX;
+	u64 ret;
+
+	do {
+		ret = tdx_seamcall(op, rcx, rdx, r8, r9, out);
+	} while (ret == TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY && retry-- > 0);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static inline u64 tdh_mng_addcx(hpa_t tdr, hpa_t addr)
 {
 	clflush_cache_range(__va(addr), PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -72,26 +102,26 @@ static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_add(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t hpa, hpa_t source
 				   struct tdx_module_args *out)
 {
 	clflush_cache_range(__va(hpa), PAGE_SIZE);
-	return tdx_seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, gpa, tdr, hpa, source, out);
+	return tdx_seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, gpa, tdr, hpa, source, out);
 }
 
 static inline u64 tdh_mem_sept_add(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level, hpa_t page,
 				   struct tdx_module_args *out)
 {
 	clflush_cache_range(__va(page), PAGE_SIZE);
-	return tdx_seamcall(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, gpa | level, tdr, page, 0, out);
+	return tdx_seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, gpa | level, tdr, page, 0, out);
 }
 
 static inline u64 tdh_mem_sept_rd(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
 				  struct tdx_module_args *out)
 {
-	return tdx_seamcall(TDH_MEM_SEPT_RD, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+	return tdx_seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_SEPT_RD, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
 }
 
 static inline u64 tdh_mem_sept_remove(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
 				      struct tdx_module_args *out)
 {
-	return tdx_seamcall(TDH_MEM_SEPT_REMOVE, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+	return tdx_seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_SEPT_REMOVE, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
 }
 
 static inline u64 tdh_vp_addcx(hpa_t tdvpr, hpa_t addr)
@@ -104,20 +134,20 @@ static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_relocate(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t hpa,
 					struct tdx_module_args *out)
 {
 	clflush_cache_range(__va(hpa), PAGE_SIZE);
-	return tdx_seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_RELOCATE, gpa, tdr, hpa, 0, out);
+	return tdx_seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_PAGE_RELOCATE, gpa, tdr, hpa, 0, out);
 }
 
 static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_aug(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t hpa,
 				   struct tdx_module_args *out)
 {
 	clflush_cache_range(__va(hpa), PAGE_SIZE);
-	return tdx_seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, gpa, tdr, hpa, 0, out);
+	return tdx_seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, gpa, tdr, hpa, 0, out);
 }
 
 static inline u64 tdh_mem_range_block(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
 				      struct tdx_module_args *out)
 {
-	return tdx_seamcall(TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+	return tdx_seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
 }
 
 static inline u64 tdh_mng_key_config(hpa_t tdr)
@@ -199,7 +229,7 @@ static inline u64 tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(hpa_t page,
 static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_remove(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
 				      struct tdx_module_args *out)
 {
-	return tdx_seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+	return tdx_seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
 }
 
 static inline u64 tdh_sys_lp_shutdown(void)
@@ -215,7 +245,7 @@ static inline u64 tdh_mem_track(hpa_t tdr)
 static inline u64 tdh_mem_range_unblock(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
 					struct tdx_module_args *out)
 {
-	return tdx_seamcall(TDH_MEM_RANGE_UNBLOCK, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+	return tdx_seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_RANGE_UNBLOCK, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
 }
 
 static inline u64 tdh_phymem_cache_wb(bool resume)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#54 lore raw

PATCH v16 54/116 KVM: TDX: Require TDP MMU and mmio caching for TDX

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

As TDP MMU is becoming main stream than the legacy MMU, the legacy MMU support for TDX isn't implemented. TDX requires KVM mmio caching. Disable TDX support when TDP MMU or mmio caching aren't supported.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c  |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 11 +++++++++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1 -0
index e1f42fdcd248..91250b2a7081 100644
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ module_param_named(flush_on_reuse, force_flush_and_sync_on_reuse, bool, 0644);
  * If the hardware supports that we don't need to do shadow paging.
  */
 bool tdp_enabled = false;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdp_enabled);
 
 static bool __ro_after_init tdp_mmu_allowed;
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +11 -0
index 17d119f3c4a8..fda13fd37cae 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,17 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
 	if (enable_ept)
 		kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(enable_ept_ad_bits,
 				      cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only());
+	/* TDX requires KVM TDP MMU. */
+	if (enable_tdx && !tdp_enabled) {
+		enable_tdx = false;
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("TDX requires TDP MMU.  Please enable TDP MMU for TDX.\n");
+	}
+
+	/* TDX requires MMIO caching. */
+	if (enable_tdx && !enable_mmio_caching) {
+		enable_tdx = false;
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("TDX requires mmio caching.  Please enable mmio caching for TDX.\n");
+	}
 
 	enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_hardware_setup(&vt_x86_ops);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#55 lore raw

PATCH v16 55/116 KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Implement hooks of TDP MMU for TDX backend. TLB flush, TLB shootdown, propagating the change private EPT entry to Secure EPT and freeing Secure EPT page. TLB flush handles both shared EPT and private EPT. It flushes shared EPT same as VMX. It also waits for the TDX TLB shootdown. For the hook to free Secure EPT page, unlinks the Secure EPT page from the Secure EPT so that the page can be freed to OS.

Propagate the entry change to Secure EPT. The possible entry changes are present -> non-present(zapping) and non-present -> present(population). On population just link the Secure EPT page or the private guest page to the Secure EPT by TDX SEAMCALL. Because TDP MMU allows concurrent zapping/population, zapping requires synchronous TLB shoot down with the frozen EPT entry. It zaps the secure entry, increments TLB counter, sends IPI to remote vcpus to trigger TLB flush, and then unlinks the private guest page from the Secure EPT. For simplicity, batched zapping with exclude lock is handled as concurrent zapping. Although it's inefficient, it can be optimized in the future.

For MMIO SPTE, the spte value changes as follows.
initial value (suppress VE bit is set)
-> Guest issues MMIO and triggers EPT violation
-> KVM updates SPTE value to MMIO value (suppress VE bit is cleared) -> Guest MMIO resumes. It triggers VE exception in guest TD -> Guest VE handler issues TDG.VP.VMCALL<MMIO>
-> KVM handles MMIO
-> Guest VE handler resumes its execution after MMIO instruction

---
v15 -> v16:
- Add the handling of TD_ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE case.

v14 -> v15:
- Implemented tdx_flush_tlb_current()
- Removed unnecessary invept in tdx_flush_tlb(). It was carry over from the very old code base.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c    |   3 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    |  71 +++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 360 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h     |   7 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |   6 +
 5 files changed, 442 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +2 -1
index 318135daf685..83926a35ea47 100644
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)
 	u64 spte = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen);
 	u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
 
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
+		     !kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm));
 
 	access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask;
 	spte |= vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value | access;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +67 -4

97 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +360 -0

392 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +7 -0
index d92a75c78e6e..57ecb83e2f35 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
 	int hkid;
 
 	bool finalized;
+	atomic_t tdh_mem_track;
 
 	u64 tsc_offset;
 };
@@ -165,6 +166,12 @@ static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 fiel
 	return out.r8;
 }
 
+static __always_inline int pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(enum pg_level level)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(level == PG_LEVEL_NONE);
+	return level - 1;
+}
+
 #else
 struct kvm_tdx {
 	struct kvm kvm;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +6 -0
index 36dfdf3f17e7..562e567953c0 100644
@@ -153,6 +153,9 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
 
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
 
+void tdx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int tdx_sept_flush_remote_tlbs(struct kvm *kvm);
 void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level);
 #else
 static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
@@ -176,6 +179,9 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
 
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 
+static inline void tdx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline void tdx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline int tdx_sept_flush_remote_tlbs(struct kvm *kvm) { return 0; }
 static inline void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level) {}
 #endif
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#56 lore raw

PATCH v16 56/116 KVM: TDX: MTRR: implement get_mt_mask() for TDX

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because TDX virtualize cpuid[0x1].EDX[MTRR: bit 12] to fixed 1, guest TD thinks MTRR is supported. Although TDX supports only WB for private GPA, it's desirable to support MTRR for shared GPA. As guest access to MTRR MSRs causes #VE and KVM/x86 tracks the values of MTRR MSRs, the remining part is to implement get_mt_mask method for TDX for shared GPA.

Pass around shared bit from kvm fault handler to get_mt_mask method so that it can determine if the gfn is shared or private. Implement get_mt_mask() following vmx case for shared GPA and return WB for private GPA. the existing vmx_get_mt_mask() can't be directly used as CPU state(CR0.CD) is protected. GFN passed to kvm_mtrr_check_gfn_range_consistency() should include shared bit.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 10 +++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +9 -1
index 077eee12e7b6..22b9d44ee29f 100644
@@ -228,6 +228,14 @@ static void vt_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
 	vmx_load_mmu_pgd(vcpu, root_hpa, pgd_level);
 }
 
+static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return tdx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);
+
+	return vmx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);
+}
+
 static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -347,7 +355,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
 	.set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
-	.get_mt_mask = vmx_get_mt_mask,
+	.get_mt_mask = vt_get_mt_mask,
 
 	.get_exit_info = vmx_get_exit_info,
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +23 -0
index cad6f9beda50..a5f1b3e75764 100644
@@ -363,6 +363,29 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
+{
+	if (is_mmio)
+		return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm))
+		return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
+
+	/*
+	 * TDX enforces CR0.CD = 0 and KVM MTRR emulation enforces writeback.
+	 * TODO: implement MTRR MSR emulation so that
+	 * MTRRCap: SMRR=0: SMRR interface unsupported
+	 *          WC=0: write combining unsupported
+	 *          FIX=0: Fixed range registers unsupported
+	 *          VCNT=0: number of variable range regitsers = 0
+	 * MTRRDefType: E=1, FE=0, type=writeback only. Don't allow other value.
+	 *              E=1: enable MTRR
+	 *              FE=0: disable fixed range MTRRs
+	 *              type: default memory type=writeback
+	 */
+	return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+}
+
 int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +2 -0
index 562e567953c0..e2a8b59adf2d 100644
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
+u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio);
 
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
 
@@ -176,6 +177,7 @@ static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOP
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
+static inline u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio) { return 0; }
 
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#57 lore raw

PATCH v16 57/116 The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD finalization.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +3 -2
index c4d67dd9ddf8..46ae049b6b85 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ What qemu can do
 - TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu.
 - Qemu can create/destroy guest of TDX vm type.
 - Qemu can create/destroy vcpu of TDX vm type.
+- Qemu can populate initial guest memory image.
 
 Patch Layer status
 ------------------
@@ -20,8 +21,8 @@ Patch Layer status
 * TDX architectural definitions:        Applied
 * TD VM creation/destruction:           Applied
 * TD vcpu creation/destruction:         Applied
-* TDX EPT violation:                    Applying
-* TD finalization:                      Not yet
+* TDX EPT violation:                    Applied
+* TD finalization:                      Applying
 * TD vcpu enter/exit:                   Not yet
 * TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:    Not yet
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#58 lore raw

PATCH v16 58/116 KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Introduce a helper to directly (pun intended) fault-in a TDP page without having to go through the full page fault path. This allows TDX to get the resulting pfn and also allows the RET_PF_* enums to stay in mmu.c where they belong.

---
v14 -> v15:
- Remove loop in kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() and return error code based on RET_FP_xxx value to avoid potential infinite loop. The caller should loop on -EAGAIN instead now.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h     |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +3 -0
index c30fefa39bb4..cb332d90c57f 100644
@@ -176,6 +176,9 @@ static inline void kvm_mmu_refresh_passthrough_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	__kvm_mmu_refresh_passthrough_bits(vcpu, mmu);
 }
 
+int kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code,
+			 int max_level);
+
 /*
  * Check if a given access (described through the I/D, W/R and U/S bits of a
  * page fault error code pfec) causes a permission fault with the given PTE
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +57 -0

63 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#59 lore raw

PATCH v16 59/116 KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because the guest memory is protected in TDX, the creation of the initial guest memory requires a dedicated TDX module API, tdh_mem_page_add, instead of directly copying the memory contents into the guest memory in the case of the default VM type. KVM MMU page fault handler callback, private_page_add, handles it.

Define new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION, of VM-scoped KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP. It assigns the guest page, copies the initial memory contents into the guest memory, encrypts the guest memory. At the same time, optionally it extends memory measurement of the TDX guest. It calls the KVM MMU page fault(EPT-violation) handler to trigger the callbacks for it.

---
v15 -> v16:
- add check if nr_pages isn't large with
(nr_page << PAGE_SHIFT) >> PAGE_SHIFT

v14 -> v15:
- add a check if TD is finalized or not to tdx_init_mem_region()
- return -EAGAIN when partial population

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h       |   9 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c                |   1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c                | 167 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h                |   2 +
 tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |   9 ++
 5 files changed, 185 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +9 -0
index 311a7894b712..a1815fcbb0be 100644
@@ -572,6 +572,7 @@ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
 	KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
+	KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
 
 	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
 };
@@ -645,4 +646,12 @@ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
 	struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
 };
 
+#define KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION	(1UL << 0)
+
+struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region {
+	__u64 source_addr;
+	__u64 gpa;
+	__u64 nr_pages;
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1 -0
index 107cf27505fe..63a4efd1e40a 100644
@@ -5652,6 +5652,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 out:
 	return r;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvm_mmu_load);
 
 void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +164 -3

197 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +2 -0
index 57ecb83e2f35..4ae9cd66cefc 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
 	u64 xfam;
 	int hkid;
 
+	hpa_t source_pa;
+
 	bool finalized;
 	atomic_t tdh_mem_track;
 
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +9 -0
index 83bd9e3118d1..a3408f6e1124 100644
@@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
 	KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
+	KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
 
 	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
 };
@@ -648,4 +649,12 @@ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
 	};
 };
 
+#define KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION	(1UL << 0)
+
+struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region {
+	__u64 source_addr;
+	__u64 gpa;
+	__u64 nr_pages;
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#60 lore raw

RE: [PATCH v16 059/116] KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory

Quoted 244 lines · On Tuesday, October 17, 2023 12:14 AM, [email protected] wrote:

Because the guest memory is protected in TDX, the creation of the initial guest memory requires a dedicated TDX module API, tdh_mem_page_add, instead of directly copying the memory contents into the guest memory in the case of the default VM type. KVM MMU page fault handler callback, private_page_add, handles it.

Define new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION, of VM-scoped KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP. It assigns the guest page, copies the initial memory contents into the guest memory, encrypts the guest memory. At the same time, optionally it extends memory measurement of the TDX guest. It calls the KVM MMU page fault(EPT-violation) handler to trigger the callbacks for it.

---
v15 -> v16:
- add check if nr_pages isn't large with
(nr_page << PAGE_SHIFT) >> PAGE_SHIFT

v14 -> v15:
- add a check if TD is finalized or not to tdx_init_mem_region()
- return -EAGAIN when partial population

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h       |   9 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c                |   1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c                | 167 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h                |   2 +
 tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |   9 ++
 5 files changed, 185 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h index 311a7894b712..a1815fcbb0be 100644

arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +9 -0
@@ -572,6 +572,7 @@ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
 	KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
+	KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
 
 	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
 };
@@ -645,4 +646,12 @@ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
 	struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
 };
 
+#define KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION	(1UL << 0)
+
+struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region {
+	__u64 source_addr;
+	__u64 gpa;
+	__u64 nr_pages;
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index renamed from arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0 -0

107cf27505fe..63a4efd1e40a 100644

arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1 -0
@@ -5652,6 +5652,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 out:
 	return r;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvm_mmu_load);
 
 void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)  { diff --git

a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c index a5f1b3e75764..dc17c212cb38 100644

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +26 -0
@@ -470,6 +470,21 @@ void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
 	td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa &
 PAGE_MASK);  }
 
+static void tdx_measure_page(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, hpa_t gpa) {
+	struct tdx_module_args out;
+	u64 err;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += TDX_EXTENDMR_CHUNKSIZE) {
+		err = tdh_mr_extend(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, gpa + i, &out);
+		if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, &kvm_tdx->kvm)) {
+			pr_tdx_error(TDH_MR_EXTEND, err, &out);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static void tdx_unpin(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)  {
 	struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
@@ -533,6 +548,61 @@ static int tdx_sept_page_aug(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t
 gfn,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int tdx_sept_page_add(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+			     enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn) {
+	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+	hpa_t hpa = pfn_to_hpa(pfn);
+	gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+	struct tdx_module_args out;
+	hpa_t source_pa;
+	bool measure;
+	u64 err;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM_INIT_MEM_REGION, tdx_init_mem_region(), supports only 4K

page

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +11 -0
+	 * because tdh_mem_page_add() supports only 4K page.
+	 */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * In case of TDP MMU, fault handler can run concurrently.  Note
+	 * 'source_pa' is a TD scope variable, meaning if there are multiple
+	 * threads reaching here with all needing to access 'source_pa', it
+	 * will break.  However fortunately this won't happen, because below
+	 * TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD code path is only used when VM is being

created

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +1 -0
+	 * before it is running, using KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION ioctl

(which

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +8 -0
+	 * always uses vcpu 0's page table and protected by vcpu->mutex).
+	 */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_tdx->source_pa == INVALID_PAGE, kvm)) {
+		tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	source_pa = kvm_tdx->source_pa &

~KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION;

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +1 -0
+	measure = kvm_tdx->source_pa &

KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION;

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +4 -0
+	kvm_tdx->source_pa = INVALID_PAGE;
+
+	do {
+		err = tdh_mem_page_add(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, gpa, hpa,

source_pa,

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +17 -1
+				       &out);
+		/*
+		 * This path is executed during populating initial guest memory
+		 * image. i.e. before running any vcpu.  Race is rare.
+		 */
+	} while (unlikely(err == TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY));
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+		pr_tdx_error(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, err, &out);
+		tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
+		return -EIO;
+	} else if (measure)
+		tdx_measure_page(kvm_tdx, gpa);
+
+	return 0;
+
+}
+
 static int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
 				     enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn)  { @@
-555,9 +625,7 @@ static int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t

gfn,

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +3 -3
 	if (likely(is_td_finalized(kvm_tdx)))
 		return tdx_sept_page_aug(kvm, gfn, level, pfn);
 
-	/* TODO: tdh_mem_page_add() comes here for the initial memory. */
-
-	return 0;
+	return tdx_sept_page_add(kvm, gfn, level, pfn);
 }
 
 static int tdx_sept_drop_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, @@ -1265,6
+1333,96 @@ void tdx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	tdx_track(vcpu->kvm);
 }
 
+#define TDX_SEPT_PFERR	(PFERR_WRITE_MASK |

PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK)

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +15 -0
+
+static int tdx_init_mem_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd
+*cmd) {
+	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+	struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region region;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	struct page *page;
+	int idx, ret = 0;
+	bool added = false;
+
+	/* Once TD is finalized, the initial guest memory is fixed. */
+	if (is_td_finalized(kvm_tdx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* The BSP vCPU must be created before initializing memory regions.

*/

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +17 -0
+	if (!atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (cmd->flags & ~KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&region, (void __user *)cmd->data, sizeof(region)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* Sanity check */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(region.source_addr, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	    !IS_ALIGNED(region.gpa, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	    !region.nr_pages ||
+	    region.nr_pages & GENMASK_ULL(63, 63 - PAGE_SHIFT) ||
+	    region.gpa + (region.nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT) <= region.gpa ||
+	    !kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, region.gpa) ||
+	    !kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, region.gpa + (region.nr_pages <<

PAGE_SHIFT)))

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +31 -0
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, 0);
+	if (mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex))
+		return -EINTR;
+
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
+
+	while (region.nr_pages) {
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (need_resched())
+			cond_resched();
+
+		/* Pin the source page. */
+		ret = get_user_pages_fast(region.source_addr, 1, 0, &page);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+		if (ret != 1) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		kvm_tdx->source_pa = pfn_to_hpa(page_to_pfn(page)) |
+				     (cmd->flags &
Quoted 2 lines

KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION);
+

Is it fundamentally correct to take a userspace mapped page to add as a TD private page? Maybe take the corresponding page from gmem and do a copy to it?
For example:
ret = get_user_pages_fast(region.source_addr, 1, 0, &user_page);
...
kvm_gmem_get_pfn(kvm, gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn), gfn, &gmem_pfn, NULL); memcpy(__va(gmem_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT), page_to_virt(user_page), PAGE_SIZE); kvm_tdx->source_pa = pfn_to_hpa(gmem_pfn) |

                                     (cmd->flags & KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION);
#61 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v16 059/116] KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory

Quoted 256 lines · Wei W
Quoted 244 lines · On Tuesday, October 17, 2023 12:14 AM, [email protected] wrote:

Because the guest memory is protected in TDX, the creation of the initial guest memory requires a dedicated TDX module API, tdh_mem_page_add, instead of directly copying the memory contents into the guest memory in the case of the default VM type. KVM MMU page fault handler callback, private_page_add, handles it.

Define new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION, of VM-scoped KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP. It assigns the guest page, copies the initial memory contents into the guest memory, encrypts the guest memory. At the same time, optionally it extends memory measurement of the TDX guest. It calls the KVM MMU page fault(EPT-violation) handler to trigger the callbacks for it.

---
v15 -> v16:
- add check if nr_pages isn't large with
(nr_page << PAGE_SHIFT) >> PAGE_SHIFT

v14 -> v15:
- add a check if TD is finalized or not to tdx_init_mem_region()
- return -EAGAIN when partial population

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h       |   9 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c                |   1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c                | 167 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h                |   2 +
 tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |   9 ++
 5 files changed, 185 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h index 311a7894b712..a1815fcbb0be 100644

arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +9 -0
@@ -572,6 +572,7 @@ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
 	KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
+	KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
 
 	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
 };
@@ -645,4 +646,12 @@ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
 	struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
 };
 
+#define KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION	(1UL << 0)
+
+struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region {
+	__u64 source_addr;
+	__u64 gpa;
+	__u64 nr_pages;
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index renamed from arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0 -0

107cf27505fe..63a4efd1e40a 100644

arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1 -0
@@ -5652,6 +5652,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 out:
 	return r;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvm_mmu_load);
 
 void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)  { diff --git

a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c index a5f1b3e75764..dc17c212cb38 100644

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +26 -0
@@ -470,6 +470,21 @@ void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
 	td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa &
 PAGE_MASK);  }
 
+static void tdx_measure_page(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, hpa_t gpa) {
+	struct tdx_module_args out;
+	u64 err;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += TDX_EXTENDMR_CHUNKSIZE) {
+		err = tdh_mr_extend(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, gpa + i, &out);
+		if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, &kvm_tdx->kvm)) {
+			pr_tdx_error(TDH_MR_EXTEND, err, &out);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static void tdx_unpin(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)  {
 	struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
@@ -533,6 +548,61 @@ static int tdx_sept_page_aug(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t
 gfn,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int tdx_sept_page_add(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+			     enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn) {
+	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+	hpa_t hpa = pfn_to_hpa(pfn);
+	gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+	struct tdx_module_args out;
+	hpa_t source_pa;
+	bool measure;
+	u64 err;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM_INIT_MEM_REGION, tdx_init_mem_region(), supports only 4K

page

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +11 -0
+	 * because tdh_mem_page_add() supports only 4K page.
+	 */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * In case of TDP MMU, fault handler can run concurrently.  Note
+	 * 'source_pa' is a TD scope variable, meaning if there are multiple
+	 * threads reaching here with all needing to access 'source_pa', it
+	 * will break.  However fortunately this won't happen, because below
+	 * TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD code path is only used when VM is being

created

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +1 -0
+	 * before it is running, using KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION ioctl

(which

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +8 -0
+	 * always uses vcpu 0's page table and protected by vcpu->mutex).
+	 */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_tdx->source_pa == INVALID_PAGE, kvm)) {
+		tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	source_pa = kvm_tdx->source_pa &

~KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION;

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +1 -0
+	measure = kvm_tdx->source_pa &

KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION;

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +4 -0
+	kvm_tdx->source_pa = INVALID_PAGE;
+
+	do {
+		err = tdh_mem_page_add(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, gpa, hpa,

source_pa,

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +17 -1
+				       &out);
+		/*
+		 * This path is executed during populating initial guest memory
+		 * image. i.e. before running any vcpu.  Race is rare.
+		 */
+	} while (unlikely(err == TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY));
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+		pr_tdx_error(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, err, &out);
+		tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
+		return -EIO;
+	} else if (measure)
+		tdx_measure_page(kvm_tdx, gpa);
+
+	return 0;
+
+}
+
 static int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
 				     enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn)  { @@
-555,9 +625,7 @@ static int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t

gfn,

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +3 -3
 	if (likely(is_td_finalized(kvm_tdx)))
 		return tdx_sept_page_aug(kvm, gfn, level, pfn);
 
-	/* TODO: tdh_mem_page_add() comes here for the initial memory. */
-
-	return 0;
+	return tdx_sept_page_add(kvm, gfn, level, pfn);
 }
 
 static int tdx_sept_drop_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, @@ -1265,6
+1333,96 @@ void tdx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	tdx_track(vcpu->kvm);
 }
 
+#define TDX_SEPT_PFERR	(PFERR_WRITE_MASK |

PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK)

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +15 -0
+
+static int tdx_init_mem_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd
+*cmd) {
+	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+	struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region region;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	struct page *page;
+	int idx, ret = 0;
+	bool added = false;
+
+	/* Once TD is finalized, the initial guest memory is fixed. */
+	if (is_td_finalized(kvm_tdx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* The BSP vCPU must be created before initializing memory regions.

*/

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +17 -0
+	if (!atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (cmd->flags & ~KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&region, (void __user *)cmd->data, sizeof(region)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* Sanity check */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(region.source_addr, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	    !IS_ALIGNED(region.gpa, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	    !region.nr_pages ||
+	    region.nr_pages & GENMASK_ULL(63, 63 - PAGE_SHIFT) ||
+	    region.gpa + (region.nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT) <= region.gpa ||
+	    !kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, region.gpa) ||
+	    !kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, region.gpa + (region.nr_pages <<

PAGE_SHIFT)))

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +31 -0
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, 0);
+	if (mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex))
+		return -EINTR;
+
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
+
+	while (region.nr_pages) {
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (need_resched())
+			cond_resched();
+
+		/* Pin the source page. */
+		ret = get_user_pages_fast(region.source_addr, 1, 0, &page);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+		if (ret != 1) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		kvm_tdx->source_pa = pfn_to_hpa(page_to_pfn(page)) |
+				     (cmd->flags &
Quoted 2 lines

KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION);
+

Is it fundamentally correct to take a userspace mapped page to add as a TD private page? Maybe take the corresponding page from gmem and do a copy to it?
For example:
ret = get_user_pages_fast(region.source_addr, 1, 0, &user_page);
...
kvm_gmem_get_pfn(kvm, gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn), gfn, &gmem_pfn, NULL); memcpy(__va(gmem_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT), page_to_virt(user_page), PAGE_SIZE); kvm_tdx->source_pa = pfn_to_hpa(gmem_pfn) |

Quoted 1 line
                                     (cmd->flags & KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION);

Please refer to
static int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn)

The guest memfd provides the page of gfn which is different from kvm_tdx->source_pa. The function calls tdh_mem_page_add().

tdh_mem_page_add(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, gpa, hpa, source_pa, &out);
gpa: corresponds to the page from guest memfd
source_pa: corresopnds to the page tdx_init_mem_region() pinned down.

tdh_mem_page_add() copies the page contents from source_pa to gpa and gives gpa to the TD guest. not source_pa.

Signature · 1 line
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
#62 lore raw

RE: [PATCH v16 059/116] KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory

Quoted 7 lines · Isaku Yamahata

Please refer to
static int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn)

The guest memfd provides the page of gfn which is different from kvm_tdx-

Quoted 1 line

source_pa. The function calls tdh_mem_page_add().

Quoted 7 lines

tdh_mem_page_add(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, gpa, hpa, source_pa, &out);
gpa: corresponds to the page from guest memfd
source_pa: corresopnds to the page tdx_init_mem_region() pinned down.

tdh_mem_page_add() copies the page contents from source_pa to gpa and gives gpa to the TD guest. not source_pa.
--

Yes, that's right, thanks.

#63 lore raw

PATCH v16 60/116 KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

To protect the initial contents of the guest TD, the TDX module measures the guest TD during the build process as SHA-384 measurement. The measurement of the guest TD contents needs to be completed to make the guest TD ready to run.

Add a new subcommand, KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM, for VM-scoped KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to finalize the measurement and mark the TDX VM ready to run.

---
v14 -> v15:
- removed unconditional tdx_track() by tdx_flush_tlb_current() that does tdx_track().

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h       |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c                | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |  1 +
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +1 -0
index a1815fcbb0be..1b4134247837 100644
@@ -573,6 +573,7 @@ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
+	KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM,
 
 	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
 };
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +21 -0
index dc17c212cb38..f4a8f57c2b35 100644
@@ -1423,6 +1423,24 @@ static int tdx_init_mem_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int tdx_td_finalizemr(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+	u64 err;
+
+	if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx) || is_td_finalized(kvm_tdx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = tdh_mr_finalize(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+		pr_tdx_error(TDH_MR_FINALIZE, err, NULL);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	kvm_tdx->finalized = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd;
@@ -1445,6 +1463,9 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	case KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION:
 		r = tdx_init_mem_region(kvm, &tdx_cmd);
 		break;
+	case KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM:
+		r = tdx_td_finalizemr(kvm);
+		break;
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +1 -0
index a3408f6e1124..4753a29a22ec 100644
@@ -568,6 +568,7 @@ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
 	KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
+	KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM,
 
 	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#64 lore raw

PATCH v16 61/116 The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD vcpu enter/exit.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +3 -2
index 46ae049b6b85..33e107bcb5cf 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ What qemu can do
 - Qemu can create/destroy guest of TDX vm type.
 - Qemu can create/destroy vcpu of TDX vm type.
 - Qemu can populate initial guest memory image.
+- Qemu can finalize guest TD.
 
 Patch Layer status
 ------------------
@@ -22,8 +23,8 @@ Patch Layer status
 * TD VM creation/destruction:           Applied
 * TD vcpu creation/destruction:         Applied
 * TDX EPT violation:                    Applied
-* TD finalization:                      Applying
-* TD vcpu enter/exit:                   Not yet
+* TD finalization:                      Applied
+* TD vcpu enter/exit:                   Applying
 * TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:    Not yet
 
 * KVM MMU GPA shared bits:              Applied
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#65 lore raw

PATCH v16 62/116 KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This patch implements running TDX vcpu. Once vcpu runs on the logical processor (LP), the TDX vcpu is associated with it. When the TDX vcpu moves to another LP, the TDX vcpu needs to flush its status on the LP. When destroying TDX vcpu, it needs to complete flush and flush cpu memory cache. Track which LP the TDX vcpu run and flush it as necessary.

Do nothing on sched_in event as TDX doesn't support pause loop.

TDX vcpu execution requires restoring PMU debug store after returning back to KVM because the TDX module unconditionally resets the value. To reuse the existing code, export perf_restore_debug_store.

---
Changes v15 -> v16:
- use __seamcall_saved_ret()
- As struct tdx_module_args doesn't match with vcpu.arch.regs, copy regs before/after calling __seamcall_saved_ret().

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 21 +++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h     | 33 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c         |  1 +
 5 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +19 -2
index 22b9d44ee29f..c45b8fc3e8d3 100644
@@ -169,6 +169,23 @@ static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
 }
 
+static int vt_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		/* Unconditionally continue to vcpu_run(). */
+		return 1;
+
+	return vmx_vcpu_pre_run(vcpu);
+}
+
+static fastpath_t vt_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return tdx_vcpu_run(vcpu);
+
+	return vmx_vcpu_run(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
@@ -321,8 +338,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.flush_tlb_gva = vt_flush_tlb_gva,
 	.flush_tlb_guest = vt_flush_tlb_guest,
 
-	.vcpu_pre_run = vmx_vcpu_pre_run,
-	.vcpu_run = vmx_vcpu_run,
+	.vcpu_pre_run = vt_vcpu_pre_run,
+	.vcpu_run = vt_vcpu_run,
 	.handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
 	.skip_emulated_instruction = vmx_skip_emulated_instruction,
 	.update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +84 -0

96 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +33 -0
index 4ae9cd66cefc..04942488e6d1 100644
@@ -25,12 +25,45 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
 	u64 tsc_offset;
 };
 
+union tdx_exit_reason {
+	struct {
+		/* 31:0 mirror the VMX Exit Reason format */
+		u64 basic		: 16;
+		u64 reserved16		: 1;
+		u64 reserved17		: 1;
+		u64 reserved18		: 1;
+		u64 reserved19		: 1;
+		u64 reserved20		: 1;
+		u64 reserved21		: 1;
+		u64 reserved22		: 1;
+		u64 reserved23		: 1;
+		u64 reserved24		: 1;
+		u64 reserved25		: 1;
+		u64 bus_lock_detected	: 1;
+		u64 enclave_mode	: 1;
+		u64 smi_pending_mtf	: 1;
+		u64 smi_from_vmx_root	: 1;
+		u64 reserved30		: 1;
+		u64 failed_vmentry	: 1;
+
+		/* 63:32 are TDX specific */
+		u64 details_l1		: 8;
+		u64 class		: 8;
+		u64 reserved61_48	: 14;
+		u64 non_recoverable	: 1;
+		u64 error		: 1;
+	};
+	u64 full;
+};
+
 struct vcpu_tdx {
 	struct kvm_vcpu	vcpu;
 
 	unsigned long tdvpr_pa;
 	unsigned long *tdvpx_pa;
 
+	union tdx_exit_reason exit_reason;
+
 	bool initialized;
 
 	/*
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +2 -0
index e2a8b59adf2d..87cfa1c5afa3 100644
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
+fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio);
 
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -177,6 +178,7 @@ static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOP
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
+static inline fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE; }
 static inline u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio) { return 0; }
 
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -0
index 69d9d15ef70d..f524a7d3fda8 100644
@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ const struct kvm_stats_header kvm_vcpu_stats_header = {
 };
 
 u64 __read_mostly host_xcr0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_xcr0);
 
 static struct kmem_cache *x86_emulator_cache;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#66 lore raw

PATCH v16 63/116 KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs)

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

On entering/exiting TDX vcpu, Preserved or clobbered CPU state is different from VMX case. Add TDX hooks to save/restore host/guest CPU state. Save/restore kernel GS base MSR.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h     |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  4 ++++
 4 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +28 -2
index c45b8fc3e8d3..bc75ed8ff371 100644
@@ -169,6 +169,32 @@ static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
 }
 
+static void vt_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * All host state is saved/restored across SEAMCALL/SEAMRET, and the
+	 * guest state of a TD is obviously off limits.  Deferring MSRs and DRs
+	 * is pointless because the TDX module needs to load *something* so as
+	 * not to expose guest state.
+	 */
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		tdx_vcpu_put(vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_vcpu_put(vcpu);
+}
+
 static int vt_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -304,9 +330,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.vcpu_free = vt_vcpu_free,
 	.vcpu_reset = vt_vcpu_reset,
 
-	.prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
+	.prepare_switch_to_guest = vt_prepare_switch_to_guest,
 	.vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
-	.vcpu_put = vmx_vcpu_put,
+	.vcpu_put = vt_vcpu_put,
 
 	.update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
 	.get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +42 -0

68 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +4 -0
index 04942488e6d1..610bd3f4e952 100644
@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {
 
 	bool initialized;
 
+	bool host_state_need_save;
+	bool host_state_need_restore;
+	u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base;
+
 	/*
 	 * Dummy to make pmu_intel not corrupt memory.
 	 * TODO: Support PMU for TDX.  Future work.
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +4 -0
index 87cfa1c5afa3..02da72dfb2cf 100644
@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
 fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio);
 
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -179,6 +181,8 @@ static inline int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
 static inline fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE; }
+static inline void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio) { return 0; }
 
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#67 lore raw

PATCH v16 64/116 KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

On exiting from the guest TD, xsave state is clobbered. Restore xsave state on TD exit.

---
v15 -> v16:
- Added CET flag mask

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +19 -0
index add9a0083adb..98827160c6f9 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/mmu_context.h>
 
+#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
 #include <asm/tdx.h>
 
 #include "capabilities.h"
@@ -508,6 +509,23 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	 */
 }
 
+static void tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+	    host_xcr0 != (kvm_tdx->xfam & kvm_caps.supported_xcr0))
+		xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, host_xcr0);
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+	    /* PT can be exposed to TD guest regardless of KVM's XSS support */
+	    host_xss != (kvm_tdx->xfam &
+			 (kvm_caps.supported_xss | XFEATURE_MASK_PT | TDX_TD_XFAM_CET)))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss);
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
+	    (kvm_tdx->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU))
+		write_pkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
+}
+
 static noinstr void tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx)
 {
 	struct tdx_module_args args;
@@ -583,6 +601,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(tdx);
 
+	tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
 	tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;
 
 	vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#68 lore raw

PATCH v16 65/116 KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o wrmsr

In reply to [email protected]

From: Chao Gao <[email protected]>

Several MSRs are constant and only used in userspace(ring 3). But VMs may have different values. KVM uses kvm_set_user_return_msr() to switch to guest's values and leverages user return notifier to restore them when the kernel is to return to userspace. To eliminate unnecessary wrmsr, KVM also caches the value it wrote to an MSR last time.

TDX module unconditionally resets some of these MSRs to architectural INIT state on TD exit. It makes the cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs are inconsistent with values in hardware. This inconsistency needs to be fixed. Otherwise, it may mislead kvm_on_user_return() to skip restoring some MSRs to the host's values. kvm_set_user_return_msr() can help correct this case, but it is not optimal as it always does a wrmsr. So, introduce a variation of kvm_set_user_return_msr() to update cached values and skip that wrmsr.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
index 8e6bcafd947b..777981e97f1a 100644
@@ -2217,6 +2217,7 @@ int kvm_pv_send_ipi(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long ipi_bitmap_low,
 int kvm_add_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
 int kvm_find_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
 int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);
+void kvm_user_return_update_cache(unsigned int index, u64 val);
 
 static inline bool kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
 {
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +20 -5
index f524a7d3fda8..916c462f7d8b 100644
@@ -440,6 +440,15 @@ static void kvm_user_return_msr_cpu_online(void)
 	}
 }
 
+static void kvm_user_return_register_notifier(struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs)
+{
+	if (!msrs->registered) {
+		msrs->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
+		user_return_notifier_register(&msrs->urn);
+		msrs->registered = true;
+	}
+}
+
 int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
 {
 	unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
@@ -454,15 +463,21 @@ int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
 		return 1;
 
 	msrs->values[slot].curr = value;
-	if (!msrs->registered) {
-		msrs->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
-		user_return_notifier_register(&msrs->urn);
-		msrs->registered = true;
-	}
+	kvm_user_return_register_notifier(msrs);
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_user_return_msr);
 
+/* Update the cache, "curr", and register the notifier */
+void kvm_user_return_update_cache(unsigned int slot, u64 value)
+{
+	struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
+
+	msrs->values[slot].curr = value;
+	kvm_user_return_register_notifier(msrs);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_user_return_update_cache);
+
 static void drop_user_return_notifiers(void)
 {
 	unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#69 lore raw

PATCH v16 66/116 KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Several user ret MSRs are clobbered on TD exit. Restore those values on TD exit and before returning to ring 3. Because TSX_CTRL requires special treat, this patch doesn't address it.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +43 -0
index 98827160c6f9..87ed1a255c3b 100644
@@ -509,6 +509,28 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	 */
 }
 
+struct tdx_uret_msr {
+	u32 msr;
+	unsigned int slot;
+	u64 defval;
+};
+
+static struct tdx_uret_msr tdx_uret_msrs[] = {
+	{.msr = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .defval = 0x20200 },
+	{.msr = MSR_STAR,},
+	{.msr = MSR_LSTAR,},
+	{.msr = MSR_TSC_AUX,},
+};
+
+static void tdx_user_return_update_cache(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++)
+		kvm_user_return_update_cache(tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot,
+					     tdx_uret_msrs[i].defval);
+}
+
 static void tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
@@ -601,6 +623,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(tdx);
 
+	tdx_user_return_update_cache();
 	tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
 	tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;
 
@@ -1833,6 +1856,26 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++) {
+		/*
+		 * Here it checks if MSRs (tdx_uret_msrs) can be saved/restored
+		 * before returning to user space.
+		 *
+		 * this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs)->registered isn't checked
+		 * because the registration is done at vcpu runtime by
+		 * kvm_set_user_return_msr().
+		 * Here is setting up cpu feature before running vcpu,
+		 * registered is already false.
+		 */
+		tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot = kvm_find_user_return_msr(tdx_uret_msrs[i].msr);
+		if (tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot == -1) {
+			/* If any MSR isn't supported, it is a KVM bug */
+			pr_err("MSR %x isn't included by kvm_find_user_return_msr\n",
+				tdx_uret_msrs[i].msr);
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+	}
+
 	max_pkgs = topology_max_packages();
 	tdx_mng_key_config_lock = kcalloc(max_pkgs, sizeof(*tdx_mng_key_config_lock),
 				   GFP_KERNEL);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#70 lore raw

PATCH v16 67/116 KVM: TDX: Add TSX_CTRL msr into uret_msrs list

In reply to [email protected]

From: Yang Weijiang <[email protected]>

TDX module resets the TSX_CTRL MSR to 0 at TD exit if TSX is enabled for TD. Or it preserves the TSX_CTRL MSR if TSX is disabled for TD. VMM can rely on uret_msrs mechanism to defer the reload of host value until exiting to user space.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h |  8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +31 -2
index 87ed1a255c3b..b5493d6c7cdd 100644
@@ -521,14 +521,21 @@ static struct tdx_uret_msr tdx_uret_msrs[] = {
 	{.msr = MSR_LSTAR,},
 	{.msr = MSR_TSC_AUX,},
 };
+static unsigned int tdx_uret_tsx_ctrl_slot;
 
-static void tdx_user_return_update_cache(void)
+static void tdx_user_return_update_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++)
 		kvm_user_return_update_cache(tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot,
 					     tdx_uret_msrs[i].defval);
+	/*
+	 * TSX_CTRL is reset to 0 if guest TSX is supported. Otherwise
+	 * preserved.
+	 */
+	if (to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->tsx_supported && tdx_uret_tsx_ctrl_slot != -1)
+		kvm_user_return_update_cache(tdx_uret_tsx_ctrl_slot, 0);
 }
 
 static void tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -623,7 +630,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(tdx);
 
-	tdx_user_return_update_cache();
+	tdx_user_return_update_cache(vcpu);
 	tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
 	tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;
 
@@ -1167,6 +1174,22 @@ static int setup_tdparams_xfam(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid, struct td_params *td_pa
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool tdparams_tsx_supported(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid)
+{
+	const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+	u64 mask;
+	u32 ebx;
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry2(cpuid->entries, cpuid->nent, 0x7, 0);
+	if (entry)
+		ebx = entry->ebx;
+	else
+		ebx = 0;
+
+	mask = __feature_bit(X86_FEATURE_HLE) | __feature_bit(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+	return ebx & mask;
+}
+
 static int setup_tdparams(struct kvm *kvm, struct td_params *td_params,
 			struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm)
 {
@@ -1212,6 +1235,7 @@ static int setup_tdparams(struct kvm *kvm, struct td_params *td_params,
 	MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrowner, init_vm->mrowner);
 	MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrownerconfig, init_vm->mrownerconfig);
 
+	to_kvm_tdx(kvm)->tsx_supported = tdparams_tsx_supported(cpuid);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1875,6 +1899,11 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
 			return -EIO;
 		}
 	}
+	tdx_uret_tsx_ctrl_slot = kvm_find_user_return_msr(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL);
+	if (tdx_uret_tsx_ctrl_slot == -1 && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL)) {
+		pr_err("MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL isn't included by kvm_find_user_return_msr\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
 
 	max_pkgs = topology_max_packages();
 	tdx_mng_key_config_lock = kcalloc(max_pkgs, sizeof(*tdx_mng_key_config_lock),
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +8 -0
index 610bd3f4e952..45f5c2744d78 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,14 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
 	u64 xfam;
 	int hkid;
 
+	/*
+	 * Used on each TD-exit, see tdx_user_return_update_cache().
+	 * TSX_CTRL value on TD exit
+	 * - set 0     if guest TSX enabled
+	 * - preserved if guest TSX disabled
+	 */
+	bool tsx_supported;
+
 	hpa_t source_pa;
 
 	bool finalized;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#71 lore raw

PATCH v16 68/116 The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD vcpu exits, interrupts, and hypercalls.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst +2 -1
index 33e107bcb5cf..7a16fa284b6f 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ What qemu can do
 - Qemu can create/destroy vcpu of TDX vm type.
 - Qemu can populate initial guest memory image.
 - Qemu can finalize guest TD.
+- Qemu can start to run vcpu. But vcpu can not make progress yet.
 
 Patch Layer status
 ------------------
@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ Patch Layer status
 * TD vcpu creation/destruction:         Applied
 * TDX EPT violation:                    Applied
 * TD finalization:                      Applied
-* TD vcpu enter/exit:                   Applying
+* TD vcpu enter/exit:                   Applied
 * TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:    Not yet
 
 * KVM MMU GPA shared bits:              Applied
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#72 lore raw

PATCH v16 69/116 KVM: TDX: complete interrupts after tdexit

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This corresponds to VMX __vmx_complete_interrupts(). Because TDX virtualize vAPIC, KVM only needs to care NMI injection.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +10 -0
index b5493d6c7cdd..e29df39630e8 100644
@@ -509,6 +509,14 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	 */
 }
 
+static void tdx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* Avoid costly SEAMCALL if no nmi was injected */
+	if (vcpu->arch.nmi_injected)
+		vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = td_management_read8(to_tdx(vcpu),
+							      TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI);
+}
+
 struct tdx_uret_msr {
 	u32 msr;
 	unsigned int slot;
@@ -637,6 +645,8 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
 	trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
 
+	tdx_complete_interrupts(vcpu);
+
 	return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
 }
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +2 -0
index 45f5c2744d78..c700792c08e2 100644
@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(16, VMCS, vmcs);
 TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(32, VMCS, vmcs);
 TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);
 
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(8, MANAGEMENT, management);
+
 static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 field)
 {
 	struct tdx_module_args out;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#73 lore raw

PATCH v16 70/116 KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because debug store is clobbered, restore it on TD exit.

---
 arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c +1 -0
index eb8dd8b8a1e8..58e86b726436 100644
@@ -2428,3 +2428,4 @@ void perf_restore_debug_store(void)
 
 	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DS_AREA, (unsigned long)ds);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_restore_debug_store);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +1 -0
index e29df39630e8..a4401ae851d4 100644
@@ -639,6 +639,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(tdx);
 
 	tdx_user_return_update_cache(vcpu);
+	perf_restore_debug_store();
 	tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
 	tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#74 lore raw

PATCH v16 71/116 KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

For vcpu migration, in the case of VMX, VMCS is flushed on the source pcpu, and load it on the target pcpu. There are corresponding TDX SEAMCALL APIs, call them on vcpu migration. The logic is mostly same as VMX except the TDX SEAMCALLs are used.

When shutting down the machine, (VMX or TDX) vcpus needs to be shutdown on each pcpu. Do the similar for TDX with TDX SEAMCALL APIs.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    |  32 ++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 190 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h     |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |   4 +
 4 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +29 -3
index bc75ed8ff371..994ed4487605 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,14 @@ static int vt_hardware_enable(void)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static void vt_hardware_disable(void)
+{
+	/* Note, TDX *and* VMX need to be disabled if TDX is enabled. */
+	if (enable_tdx)
+		tdx_hardware_disable();
+	vmx_hardware_disable();
+}
+
 static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
 {
 	int ret;
@@ -212,6 +220,16 @@ static fastpath_t vt_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return vmx_vcpu_run(vcpu);
 }
 
+static void vt_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		tdx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
@@ -271,6 +289,14 @@ static void vt_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
 	vmx_load_mmu_pgd(vcpu, root_hpa, pgd_level);
 }
 
+static void vt_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_sched_in(vcpu, cpu);
+}
+
 static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -313,7 +339,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.offline_cpu = tdx_offline_cpu,
 
 	.hardware_enable = vt_hardware_enable,
-	.hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
+	.hardware_disable = vt_hardware_disable,
 	.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
 
 	.is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
@@ -331,7 +357,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.vcpu_reset = vt_vcpu_reset,
 
 	.prepare_switch_to_guest = vt_prepare_switch_to_guest,
-	.vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
+	.vcpu_load = vt_vcpu_load,
 	.vcpu_put = vt_vcpu_put,
 
 	.update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
@@ -418,7 +444,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.request_immediate_exit = vmx_request_immediate_exit,
 
-	.sched_in = vmx_sched_in,
+	.sched_in = vt_sched_in,
 
 	.cpu_dirty_log_size = PML_ENTITY_NUM,
 	.update_cpu_dirty_logging = vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +186 -4

268 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +2 -0
index c700792c08e2..4f803814126a 100644
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {
 	unsigned long tdvpr_pa;
 	unsigned long *tdvpx_pa;
 
+	struct list_head cpu_list;
+
 	union tdx_exit_reason exit_reason;
 
 	bool initialized;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +4 -0
index 02da72dfb2cf..0b7437368e91 100644
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
 int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
 void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);
+void tdx_hardware_disable(void);
 bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
 int tdx_offline_cpu(void);
 
@@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
 fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
 u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio);
 
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -164,6 +166,7 @@ void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level);
 #else
 static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
+static inline void tdx_hardware_disable(void) {}
 static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
 static inline int tdx_offline_cpu(void) { return 0; }
 
@@ -183,6 +186,7 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
 static inline fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE; }
 static inline void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) {}
 static inline u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio) { return 0; }
 
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#75 lore raw

PATCH v16 72/116 KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched behavior

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add a flag, KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCHED_GUEST, to skip saving/restoring DRs irrespective of any other flags. TDX-SEAM unconditionally saves and restores guest DRs and reset to architectural INIT state on TD exit. So, KVM needs to save host DRs before TD enter without restoring guest DRs and restore host DRs after TD exit.

Opportunistically convert the KVM_DEBUGREG_* definitions to use BIT().

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 10 ++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c          |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 11 ++++++++---
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +8 -2
index 777981e97f1a..b19e8eac4c80 100644
@@ -604,8 +604,14 @@ struct kvm_pmu {
 struct kvm_pmu_ops;
 
 enum {
-	KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED = 1,
-	KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT = 2,
+	KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED		= BIT(0),
+	KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT		= BIT(1),
+	/*
+	 * Guest debug registers (DR0-3 and DR6) are saved/restored by hardware
+	 * on exit from or enter to guest. KVM needn't switch them. Because DR7
+	 * is cleared on exit from guest, DR7 need to be saved/restored.
+	 */
+	KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH	= BIT(2),
 };
 
 struct kvm_mtrr_range {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +1 -0
index 511ba2496372..b936c98f601c 100644
@@ -560,6 +560,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;
 
+	vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs = KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH;
 	vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
 	vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
 
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +8 -3
index 916c462f7d8b..a75b0b9ce9bf 100644
@@ -10792,7 +10792,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
 
-	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs)) {
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & ~KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH)) {
 		set_debugreg(0, 7);
 		set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[0], 0);
 		set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
@@ -10838,6 +10838,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) {
 		WARN_ON(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP);
+		WARN_ON(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH);
 		static_call(kvm_x86_sync_dirty_debug_regs)(vcpu);
 		kvm_update_dr0123(vcpu);
 		kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
@@ -10850,8 +10851,12 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * care about the messed up debug address registers. But if
 	 * we have some of them active, restore the old state.
 	 */
-	if (hw_breakpoint_active())
-		hw_breakpoint_restore();
+	if (hw_breakpoint_active()) {
+		if (!(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH))
+			hw_breakpoint_restore();
+		else
+			set_debugreg(__this_cpu_read(cpu_dr7), 7);
+	}
 
 	vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu = vcpu->cpu;
 	vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc());
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#76 lore raw

PATCH v16 73/116 KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add flag and hook to KVM's local APIC management to support determining whether or not a TDX guest as a pending IRQ. For TDX vCPUs, the virtual APIC page is owned by the TDX module and cannot be accessed by KVM. As a result, registers that are virtualized by the CPU, e.g. PPR, cannot be read or written by KVM. To deliver interrupts for TDX guests, KVM must send an IRQ to the CPU on the posted interrupt notification vector. And to determine if TDX vCPU has a pending interrupt, KVM must check if there is an outstanding notification.

Return "no interrupt" in kvm_apic_has_interrupt() if the guest APIC is protected to short-circuit the various other flows that try to pull an IRQ out of the vAPIC, the only valid operation is querying _if_ an IRQ is pending, KVM can't do anything based on _which_ IRQ is pending.

Intentionally omit sanity checks from other flows, e.g. PPR update, so as not to degrade non-TDX guests with unnecessary checks. A well-behaved KVM and userspace will never reach those flows for TDX guests, but reaching them is not fatal if something does go awry.

Note, this doesn't handle interrupts that have been delivered to the vCPU but not yet recognized by the core, i.e. interrupts that are sitting in vmcs.GUEST_INTR_STATUS. Querying that state requires a SEAMCALL and will be supported in a future patch.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/irq.c                 |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c               |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h               |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c            | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c             |  6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h         |  2 ++
 8 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1 -0
index 6ec58c078523..19e1f22b92b1 100644
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(pi_update_irte)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(pi_start_assignment)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(apicv_post_state_restore)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(protected_apic_has_interrupt)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(set_hv_timer)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(cancel_hv_timer)
 KVM_X86_OP(setup_mce)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
index b19e8eac4c80..fcd1e2d0dc92 100644
@@ -1778,6 +1778,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	void (*pi_start_assignment)(struct kvm *kvm);
 	void (*apicv_post_state_restore)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 	bool (*dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+	bool (*protected_apic_has_interrupt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 	int (*set_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
 			    bool *expired);
arch/x86/kvm/irq.c +3 -0
index b2c397dd2bc6..fd6af5530c32 100644
@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ int kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
 	if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(v))
 		return 1;
 
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(v) && v->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected)
+		return static_call(kvm_x86_protected_apic_has_interrupt)(v);
+
 	return kvm_apic_has_interrupt(v) != -1;	/* LAPIC */
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_has_interrupt);
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +3 -0
index dcd60b39e794..cce4a5a29bd8 100644
@@ -2855,6 +2855,9 @@ int kvm_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
 		return -1;
 
+	if (apic->guest_apic_protected)
+		return -1;
+
 	__apic_update_ppr(apic, &ppr);
 	return apic_has_interrupt_for_ppr(apic, ppr);
 }
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h +2 -0
index 0a0ea4b5dd8c..749b7b629c47 100644
@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ struct kvm_lapic {
 	bool sw_enabled;
 	bool irr_pending;
 	bool lvt0_in_nmi_mode;
+	/* Select registers in the vAPIC cannot be read/written. */
+	bool guest_apic_protected;
 	/* Number of bits set in ISR. */
 	s16 isr_count;
 	/* The highest vector set in ISR; if -1 - invalid, must scan ISR. */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +10 -0
index 994ed4487605..302db8f4afc2 100644
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
 
 	if (enable_tdx)
 		vt_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs = vt_flush_remote_tlbs;
+	else
+		vt_x86_ops.protected_apic_has_interrupt = NULL;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ static void vt_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 	vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
 }
 
+static bool vt_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	KVM_BUG_ON(!is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm);
+
+	return tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
@@ -421,6 +430,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr,
 	.deliver_interrupt = vmx_deliver_interrupt,
 	.dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = pi_has_pending_interrupt,
+	.protected_apic_has_interrupt = vt_protected_apic_has_interrupt,
 
 	.set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
 	.set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +6 -0
index b936c98f601c..173a29b36432 100644
@@ -557,6 +557,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
+	vcpu->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected = true;
 
 	vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;
 
@@ -598,6 +599,11 @@ void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 	local_irq_enable();
 }
 
+bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return pi_has_pending_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+
 void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +2 -0
index 0b7437368e91..3ab0b270b1f9 100644
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
+bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio);
 
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ static inline fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return EXIT_FASTP
 static inline void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) {}
+static inline bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
 static inline u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio) { return 0; }
 
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#77 lore raw

PATCH v16 74/116 KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is proteced

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

If APIC state is protected, i.e. the vCPU is a TDX guest, assume a timer IRQ was injected when deciding whether or not to busy wait in the "timer advanced" path. The "real" vIRR is not readable/writable, so trying to query for a pending timer IRQ will return garbage.

Note, TDX can scour the PIR if it wants to be more precise and skip the "wait" call entirely.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +10 -1
index cce4a5a29bd8..e037923edb5e 100644
@@ -1775,8 +1775,17 @@ static void apic_update_lvtt(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
 static bool lapic_timer_int_injected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
-	u32 reg = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT);
+	u32 reg;
 
+	/*
+	 * Assume a timer IRQ was "injected" if the APIC is protected.  KVM's
+	 * copy of the vIRR is bogus, it's the responsibility of the caller to
+	 * precisely check whether or not a timer IRQ is pending.
+	 */
+	if (apic->guest_apic_protected)
+		return true;
+
+	reg  = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT);
 	if (kvm_apic_hw_enabled(apic)) {
 		int vec = reg & APIC_VECTOR_MASK;
 		void *bitmap = apic->regs + APIC_ISR;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#78 lore raw

PATCH v16 75/116 KVM: TDX: remove use of struct vcpu_vmx from posted_interrupt.c

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

As TDX will use posted_interrupt.c, the use of struct vcpu_vmx is a blocker. Because the members of struct pi_desc pi_desc and struct list_head pi_wakeup_list are only used in posted_interrupt.c, introduce common structure, struct vcpu_pi, make vcpu_vmx and vcpu_tdx has same layout in the top of structure.

To minimize the diff size, avoid code conversion like, vmx->pi_desc => vmx->common->pi_desc. Instead add compile time check if the layout is expected.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h | 11 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c         |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h         |  8 +++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h         | 14 +++++++-----
 5 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c +32 -9
index af662312fd07..b66add9da0f3 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include "posted_intr.h"
 #include "trace.h"
 #include "vmx.h"
+#include "tdx.h"
 
 /*
  * Maintain a per-CPU list of vCPUs that need to be awakened by wakeup_handler()
@@ -31,9 +32,29 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu);
  */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(raw_spinlock_t, wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock);
 
+/*
+ * The layout of the head of struct vcpu_vmx and struct vcpu_tdx must match with
+ * struct vcpu_pi.
+ */
+static_assert(offsetof(struct vcpu_pi, pi_desc) ==
+	      offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, pi_desc));
+static_assert(offsetof(struct vcpu_pi, pi_wakeup_list) ==
+	      offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, pi_wakeup_list));
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+static_assert(offsetof(struct vcpu_pi, pi_desc) ==
+	      offsetof(struct vcpu_tdx, pi_desc));
+static_assert(offsetof(struct vcpu_pi, pi_wakeup_list) ==
+	      offsetof(struct vcpu_tdx, pi_wakeup_list));
+#endif
+
+static inline struct vcpu_pi *vcpu_to_pi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return (struct vcpu_pi *)vcpu;
+}
+
 static inline struct pi_desc *vcpu_to_pi_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	return &(to_vmx(vcpu)->pi_desc);
+	return &vcpu_to_pi(vcpu)->pi_desc;
 }
 
 static int pi_try_set_control(struct pi_desc *pi_desc, u64 *pold, u64 new)
@@ -52,8 +73,8 @@ static int pi_try_set_control(struct pi_desc *pi_desc, u64 *pold, u64 new)
 
 void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 {
-	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
-	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_pi *vcpu_pi = vcpu_to_pi(vcpu);
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = &vcpu_pi->pi_desc;
 	struct pi_desc old, new;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	unsigned int dest;
@@ -90,7 +111,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 	 */
 	if (pi_desc->nv == POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR) {
 		raw_spin_lock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
-		list_del(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list);
+		list_del(&vcpu_pi->pi_wakeup_list);
 		raw_spin_unlock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
 	}
 
@@ -145,15 +166,15 @@ static bool vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(struct kvm *kvm)
  */
 static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
-	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_pi *vcpu_pi = vcpu_to_pi(vcpu);
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = &vcpu_pi->pi_desc;
 	struct pi_desc old, new;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 
 	raw_spin_lock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
-	list_add_tail(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list,
+	list_add_tail(&vcpu_pi->pi_wakeup_list,
 		      &per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu, vcpu->cpu));
 	raw_spin_unlock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
 
@@ -190,7 +211,8 @@ static bool vmx_needs_pi_wakeup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * notification vector is switched to the one that calls
 	 * back to the pi_wakeup_handler() function.
 	 */
-	return vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu) || vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(vcpu->kvm);
+	return (vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu) && !is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) ||
+		vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(vcpu->kvm);
 }
 
 void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -200,7 +222,8 @@ void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!vmx_needs_pi_wakeup(vcpu))
 		return;
 
-	if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu) && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
+	if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu) &&
+	    (is_td_vcpu(vcpu) || !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu)))
 		pi_enable_wakeup_handler(vcpu);
 
 	/*
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h +11 -0
index 26992076552e..2fe8222308b2 100644
@@ -94,6 +94,17 @@ static inline bool pi_test_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
 			(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
 }
 
+struct vcpu_pi {
+	struct kvm_vcpu	vcpu;
+
+	/* Posted interrupt descriptor */
+	struct pi_desc pi_desc;
+
+	/* Used if this vCPU is waiting for PI notification wakeup. */
+	struct list_head pi_wakeup_list;
+	/* Until here common layout betwwn vcpu_vmx and vcpu_tdx. */
+};
+
 void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
 void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void pi_wakeup_handler(void);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +1 -0
index 173a29b36432..81f659e23b78 100644
@@ -558,6 +558,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
 	vcpu->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected = true;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tdx->pi_wakeup_list);
 
 	vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +8 -0
index 4f803814126a..b29fcda2892b 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
 
+#include "posted_intr.h"
 #include "pmu_intel.h"
 #include "tdx_ops.h"
 
@@ -67,6 +68,13 @@ union tdx_exit_reason {
 struct vcpu_tdx {
 	struct kvm_vcpu	vcpu;
 
+	/* Posted interrupt descriptor */
+	struct pi_desc pi_desc;
+
+	/* Used if this vCPU is waiting for PI notification wakeup. */
+	struct list_head pi_wakeup_list;
+	/* Until here same layout to struct vcpu_pi. */
+
 	unsigned long tdvpr_pa;
 	unsigned long *tdvpx_pa;
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +8 -6
index 2847e368c8e6..c89cc546f8df 100644
@@ -233,6 +233,14 @@ struct nested_vmx {
 
 struct vcpu_vmx {
 	struct kvm_vcpu       vcpu;
+
+	/* Posted interrupt descriptor */
+	struct pi_desc pi_desc;
+
+	/* Used if this vCPU is waiting for PI notification wakeup. */
+	struct list_head pi_wakeup_list;
+	/* Until here same layout to struct vcpu_pi. */
+
 	u8                    fail;
 	u8		      x2apic_msr_bitmap_mode;
 
@@ -302,12 +310,6 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 
 	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason;
 
-	/* Posted interrupt descriptor */
-	struct pi_desc pi_desc;
-
-	/* Used if this vCPU is waiting for PI notification wakeup. */
-	struct list_head pi_wakeup_list;
-
 	/* Support for a guest hypervisor (nested VMX) */
 	struct nested_vmx nested;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#79 lore raw

PATCH v16 76/116 KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX supports interrupt inject into vcpu with posted interrupt. Wire up the corresponding kvm x86 operations to posted interrupt. Move kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt() from vmx.c to common.h to share the code.

VMX can inject interrupt by setting interrupt information field, VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, of VMCS. TDX supports interrupt injection only by posted interrupt. Ignore the execution path to access VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD.

As cpu state is protected and apicv is enabled for the TDX guest, VMM can inject interrupt by updating posted interrupt descriptor. Treat interrupt can be injected always.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h      | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c        | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h |  2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c         | 25 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c         | 67 +-----------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h     |  7 ++-
 7 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h +71 -0
index 235908f3e044..6f21d0d48809 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 
+#include "posted_intr.h"
 #include "mmu.h"
 
 static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
@@ -30,4 +31,74 @@ static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
 	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
 }
 
+static inline void kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						     int pi_vec)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+	if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
+		/*
+		 * The vector of the virtual has already been set in the PIR.
+		 * Send a notification event to deliver the virtual interrupt
+		 * unless the vCPU is the currently running vCPU, i.e. the
+		 * event is being sent from a fastpath VM-Exit handler, in
+		 * which case the PIR will be synced to the vIRR before
+		 * re-entering the guest.
+		 *
+		 * When the target is not the running vCPU, the following
+		 * possibilities emerge:
+		 *
+		 * Case 1: vCPU stays in non-root mode. Sending a notification
+		 * event posts the interrupt to the vCPU.
+		 *
+		 * Case 2: vCPU exits to root mode and is still runnable. The
+		 * PIR will be synced to the vIRR before re-entering the guest.
+		 * Sending a notification event is ok as the host IRQ handler
+		 * will ignore the spurious event.
+		 *
+		 * Case 3: vCPU exits to root mode and is blocked. vcpu_block()
+		 * has already synced PIR to vIRR and never blocks the vCPU if
+		 * the vIRR is not empty. Therefore, a blocked vCPU here does
+		 * not wait for any requested interrupts in PIR, and sending a
+		 * notification event also results in a benign, spurious event.
+		 */
+
+		if (vcpu != kvm_get_running_vcpu())
+			__apic_send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
+		return;
+	}
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * The vCPU isn't in the guest; wake the vCPU in case it is blocking,
+	 * otherwise do nothing as KVM will grab the highest priority pending
+	 * IRQ via ->sync_pir_to_irr() in vcpu_enter_guest().
+	 */
+	kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send interrupt to vcpu via posted interrupt way.
+ * 1. If target vcpu is running(non-root mode), send posted interrupt
+ * notification to vcpu and hardware will sync PIR to vIRR atomically.
+ * 2. If target vcpu isn't running(root mode), kick it to pick up the
+ * interrupt from PIR in next vmentry.
+ */
+static inline void __vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						  struct pi_desc *pi_desc, int vector)
+{
+	if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, pi_desc))
+		return;
+
+	/* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do.  */
+	if (pi_test_and_set_on(pi_desc))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * The implied barrier in pi_test_and_set_on() pairs with the smp_mb_*()
+	 * after setting vcpu->mode in vcpu_enter_guest(), thus the vCPU is
+	 * guaranteed to see PID.ON=1 and sync the PIR to IRR if triggering a
+	 * posted interrupt "fails" because vcpu->mode != IN_GUEST_MODE.
+	 */
+	kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+}
+
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_COMMON_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +84 -9

127 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c +1 -1
index b66add9da0f3..c86768b83f0b 100644
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static inline struct vcpu_pi *vcpu_to_pi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return (struct vcpu_pi *)vcpu;
 }
 
-static inline struct pi_desc *vcpu_to_pi_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+struct pi_desc *vcpu_to_pi_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return &vcpu_to_pi(vcpu)->pi_desc;
 }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h +2 -0
index 2fe8222308b2..0f9983b6910b 100644
@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ struct vcpu_pi {
 	/* Until here common layout betwwn vcpu_vmx and vcpu_tdx. */
 };
 
+struct pi_desc *vcpu_to_pi_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
 void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
 void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void pi_wakeup_handler(void);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +25 -0
index 81f659e23b78..beb3fa2d3e41 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 #include "capabilities.h"
 #include "x86_ops.h"
+#include "common.h"
 #include "mmu.h"
 #include "tdx.h"
 #include "vmx.h"
@@ -577,6 +578,9 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	tdx->host_state_need_save = true;
 	tdx->host_state_need_restore = false;
 
+	tdx->pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
+	tdx->pi_desc.sn = 1;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -584,6 +588,7 @@ void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
 
+	vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
 	if (vcpu->cpu == cpu)
 		return;
 
@@ -822,6 +827,12 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	trace_kvm_entry(vcpu);
 
+	if (pi_test_on(&tdx->pi_desc)) {
+		apic->send_IPI_self(POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+
+		kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
+	}
+
 	tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(tdx);
 
 	tdx_user_return_update_cache(vcpu);
@@ -1207,6 +1218,16 @@ static int tdx_sept_remove_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
 	return tdx_sept_drop_private_spte(kvm, gfn, level, pfn);
 }
 
+void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+			   int trig_mode, int vector)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
+	struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+	/* TDX supports only posted interrupt.  No lapic emulation. */
+	__vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, &tdx->pi_desc, vector);
+}
+
 static int tdx_get_capabilities(struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
 {
 	struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
@@ -1994,6 +2015,10 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	td_vmcs_write16(tdx, POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+	td_vmcs_write64(tdx, POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa(&tdx->pi_desc));
+	td_vmcs_setbit32(tdx, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR);
+
 	tdx->initialized = true;
 	return 0;
 }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -66

85 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +6 -1
index 3ab0b270b1f9..454f28099868 100644
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 bool vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void vmx_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-void vmx_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(enum kvm_apicv_inhibit reason);
 void vmx_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr);
 void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(int max_isr);
@@ -158,6 +157,9 @@ void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
 bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio);
 
+void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+			   int trig_mode, int vector);
+
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
 
 void tdx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -191,6 +193,9 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) {}
 static inline bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
 static inline u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio) { return 0; }
 
+static inline void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+					 int trig_mode, int vector) {}
+
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 
 static inline void tdx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#80 lore raw

PATCH v16 77/116 KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Now we are able to inject interrupts into TDX vcpu, it's ready to block TDX vcpu. Wire up kvm x86 methods for blocking/unblocking vcpu for TDX. To unblock on pending events, request immediate exit methods is also needed.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +11 -1
index 37d28ee08c79..0ce9578a1453 100644
@@ -381,6 +381,16 @@ static void vt_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vmx_enable_irq_window(vcpu);
 }
 
+static void vt_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		__kvm_request_immediate_exit(vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_request_immediate_exit(vcpu);
+}
+
 static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -527,7 +537,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
 	.handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
 
-	.request_immediate_exit = vmx_request_immediate_exit,
+	.request_immediate_exit = vt_request_immediate_exit,
 
 	.sched_in = vt_sched_in,
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#81 lore raw

PATCH v16 78/116 KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX vcpu control structure defines one bit for pending NMI for VMM to inject NMI by setting the bit without knowing TDX vcpu NMI states. Because the vcpu state is protected, VMM can't know about NMI states of TDX vcpu. The TDX module handles actual injection and NMI states transition.

Add methods for NMI and treat NMI can be injected always.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     |  6 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +59 -5
index 0ce9578a1453..91e2ad643a47 100644
@@ -315,6 +315,60 @@ static void vt_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vmx_flush_tlb_guest(vcpu);
 }
 
+static void vt_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		tdx_inject_nmi(vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_inject_nmi(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vt_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The TDX module manages NMI windows and NMI reinjection, and hides NMI
+	 * blocking, all KVM can do is throw an NMI over the wall.
+	 */
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	return vmx_nmi_allowed(vcpu, for_injection);
+}
+
+static bool vt_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Assume NMIs are always unmasked.  KVM could query PEND_NMI and treat
+	 * NMIs as masked if a previous NMI is still pending, but SEAMCALLs are
+	 * expensive and the end result is unchanged as the only relevant usage
+	 * of get_nmi_mask() is to limit the number of pending NMIs, i.e. it
+	 * only changes whether KVM or the TDX module drops an NMI.
+	 */
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	return vmx_get_nmi_mask(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, masked);
+}
+
+static void vt_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* Refer the comment in vt_get_nmi_mask(). */
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_enable_nmi_window(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
 			int pgd_level)
 {
@@ -493,14 +547,14 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.get_interrupt_shadow = vt_get_interrupt_shadow,
 	.patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
 	.inject_irq = vt_inject_irq,
-	.inject_nmi = vmx_inject_nmi,
+	.inject_nmi = vt_inject_nmi,
 	.inject_exception = vmx_inject_exception,
 	.cancel_injection = vt_cancel_injection,
 	.interrupt_allowed = vt_interrupt_allowed,
-	.nmi_allowed = vmx_nmi_allowed,
-	.get_nmi_mask = vmx_get_nmi_mask,
-	.set_nmi_mask = vmx_set_nmi_mask,
-	.enable_nmi_window = vmx_enable_nmi_window,
+	.nmi_allowed = vt_nmi_allowed,
+	.get_nmi_mask = vt_get_nmi_mask,
+	.set_nmi_mask = vt_set_nmi_mask,
+	.enable_nmi_window = vt_enable_nmi_window,
 	.enable_irq_window = vt_enable_irq_window,
 	.update_cr8_intercept = vmx_update_cr8_intercept,
 	.set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +6 -0
index beb3fa2d3e41..f5e29f8f1b6a 100644
@@ -848,6 +848,12 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
 }
 
+void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
+	td_management_write8(to_tdx(vcpu), TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI, 1);
+}
+
 void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
 {
 	td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +2 -0
index 454f28099868..9a949273bf47 100644
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio);
 
 void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
 			   int trig_mode, int vector);
+void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
 
@@ -195,6 +196,7 @@ static inline u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
 
 static inline void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
 					 int trig_mode, int vector) {}
+static inline void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#82 lore raw

PATCH v16 79/116 KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function argument

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

TDX uses different ABI to get information about VM exit. Pass intr_info to the NMI and INTR handlers instead of pulling it from vcpu_vmx in preparation for sharing the bulk of the handlers with TDX.

When the guest TD exits to VMM, RAX holds status and exit reason, RCX holds exit qualification etc rather than the VMCS fields because VMM doesn't have access to the VMCS. The eventual code will be

VMX:
- get exit reason, intr_info, exit_qualification, and etc from VMCS
- call NMI/INTR handlers (common code)

TDX:
- get exit reason, intr_info, exit_qualification, and etc from guest registers
- call NMI/INTR handlers (common code)

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 16 +++++++---------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +7 -9
index 484c3c7b46c8..b1c36525a81a 100644
@@ -6913,24 +6913,22 @@ static void handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
 }
 
-static void handle_exception_irqoff(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+static void handle_exception_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 intr_info)
 {
-	u32 intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(&vmx->vcpu);
-
 	/* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
 	if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
-		vmx->vcpu.arch.apf.host_apf_flags = kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
+		vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags = kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
 	/* if exit due to NM, handle before interrupts are enabled */
 	else if (is_nm_fault(intr_info))
-		handle_nm_fault_irqoff(&vmx->vcpu);
+		handle_nm_fault_irqoff(vcpu);
 	/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
 	else if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
 		kvm_machine_check();
 }
 
-static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					     u32 intr_info)
 {
-	u32 intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
 	unsigned int vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
 	gate_desc *desc = (gate_desc *)host_idt_base + vector;
 
@@ -6953,9 +6951,9 @@ void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return;
 
 	if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
-		handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu);
+		handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
 	else if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
-		handle_exception_irqoff(vmx);
+		handle_exception_irqoff(vcpu, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#83 lore raw

PATCH v16 80/116 KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

TDX mostly handles NMI/exception exit mostly the same to VMX case. The difference is how to retrieve exit qualification. To share the code with TDX, move NMI/exception to a common header, common.h.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 68 +++++----------------------------------
 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h +59 -0
index 6f21d0d48809..632af7a76d0a 100644
@@ -4,8 +4,67 @@
 
 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+
 #include "posted_intr.h"
 #include "mmu.h"
+#include "vmcs.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+
+extern unsigned long vmx_host_idt_base;
+void vmx_do_interrupt_irqoff(unsigned long entry);
+void vmx_do_nmi_irqoff(void);
+
+static inline void vmx_handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Save xfd_err to guest_fpu before interrupt is enabled, so the
+	 * MSR value is not clobbered by the host activity before the guest
+	 * has chance to consume it.
+	 *
+	 * Do not blindly read xfd_err here, since this exception might
+	 * be caused by L1 interception on a platform which doesn't
+	 * support xfd at all.
+	 *
+	 * Do it conditionally upon guest_fpu::xfd. xfd_err matters
+	 * only when xfd contains a non-zero value.
+	 *
+	 * Queuing exception is done in vmx_handle_exit. See comment there.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd)
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
+}
+
+static inline void vmx_handle_exception_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					       u32 intr_info)
+{
+	/* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
+	if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
+		vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags = kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
+	/* if exit due to NM, handle before interrupts are enabled */
+	else if (is_nm_fault(intr_info))
+		vmx_handle_nm_fault_irqoff(vcpu);
+	/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
+	else if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
+		kvm_machine_check();
+}
+
+static inline void vmx_handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+							u32 intr_info)
+{
+	unsigned int vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+	gate_desc *desc = (gate_desc *)vmx_host_idt_base + vector;
+
+	if (KVM_BUG(!is_external_intr(intr_info), vcpu->kvm,
+	    "unexpected VM-Exit interrupt info: 0x%x", intr_info))
+		return;
+
+	kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_IRQ);
+	vmx_do_interrupt_irqoff(gate_offset(desc));
+	kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = true;
+}
 
 static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
 					     unsigned long exit_qualification)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +8 -60

111 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#84 lore raw

PATCH v16 81/116 KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

By necessity, TDX will use a different register ABI for hypercalls. Break out the core functionality so that it may be reused for TDX.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  4 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +4 -0
index fcd1e2d0dc92..641f769b30d1 100644
@@ -2135,6 +2135,10 @@ static inline void kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(struct kvm *kvm,
 	kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, reason, false);
 }
 
+unsigned long __kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long nr,
+				      unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
+				      unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3,
+				      int op_64_bit, int cpl);
 int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 error_code,
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +38 -18

89 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#85 lore raw

PATCH v16 82/116 KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up handle_exit and handle_exit_irqoff methods and add a place holder to handle VM exit. Add helper functions to get exit info, exit qualification, etc.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    |  37 ++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  10 ++++
 3 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +34 -3
index 91e2ad643a47..4356b10d68b6 100644
@@ -239,6 +239,25 @@ static bool vt_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(vcpu);
 }
 
+static int vt_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			     enum exit_fastpath_completion fastpath)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return tdx_handle_exit(vcpu, fastpath);
+
+	return vmx_handle_exit(vcpu, fastpath);
+}
+
+static void vt_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		tdx_handle_exit_irqoff(vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct pi_desc *pi = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
@@ -445,6 +464,18 @@ static void vt_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vmx_request_immediate_exit(vcpu);
 }
 
+static void vt_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+			u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		tdx_get_exit_info(vcpu, reason, info1, info2, intr_info,
+				  error_code);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_get_exit_info(vcpu, reason, info1, info2, intr_info, error_code);
+}
+
 static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -540,7 +571,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.vcpu_pre_run = vt_vcpu_pre_run,
 	.vcpu_run = vt_vcpu_run,
-	.handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
+	.handle_exit = vt_handle_exit,
 	.skip_emulated_instruction = vmx_skip_emulated_instruction,
 	.update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
 	.set_interrupt_shadow = vt_set_interrupt_shadow,
@@ -575,7 +606,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
 	.get_mt_mask = vt_get_mt_mask,
 
-	.get_exit_info = vmx_get_exit_info,
+	.get_exit_info = vt_get_exit_info,
 
 	.vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,
 
@@ -589,7 +620,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.load_mmu_pgd = vt_load_mmu_pgd,
 
 	.check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
-	.handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
+	.handle_exit_irqoff = vt_handle_exit_irqoff,
 
 	.request_immediate_exit = vt_request_immediate_exit,
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +110 -0

134 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +10 -0
index 9a949273bf47..cf12b94eb35c 100644
@@ -155,11 +155,16 @@ void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
 bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+		enum exit_fastpath_completion fastpath);
 u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio);
 
 void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
 			   int trig_mode, int vector);
 void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+		u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code);
 
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
 
@@ -192,11 +197,16 @@ static inline void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) {}
 static inline bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
+static inline void tdx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+		enum exit_fastpath_completion fastpath) { return 0; }
 static inline u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio) { return 0; }
 
 static inline void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
 					 int trig_mode, int vector) {}
 static inline void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason, u64 *info1,
+				     u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code) {}
 
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#86 lore raw

PATCH v16 83/116 KVM: TDX: Handle vmentry failure for INTEL TD guest

In reply to [email protected]

From: Yao Yuan <[email protected]>

TDX module passes control back to VMM if it failed to vmentry for a TD, use same exit reason to notify user space, align with VMX.
If VMM corrupted TD VMCS, machine check during entry can happens. vm exit reason will be EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY. If VMM corrupted TD VMCS with debug TD by TDH.VP.WR, the exit reason would be EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE or EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +22 -0
index be73b8322a66..306d555dda35 100644
@@ -1314,6 +1314,28 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
 		goto unhandled_exit;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * When TDX module saw VMEXIT_REASON_FAILED_VMENTER_MC etc, TDH.VP.ENTER
+	 * returns with TDX_SUCCESS | exit_reason with failed_vmentry = 1.
+	 * Because TDX module maintains TD VMCS correctness, usually vmentry
+	 * failure shouldn't happen.  In some corner cases it can happen.  For
+	 * example
+	 * - machine check during entry: EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY
+	 * - TDH.VP.WR with debug TD.  VMM can corrupt TD VMCS
+	 *   - EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE
+	 *   - EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(exit_reason.failed_vmentry)) {
+		pr_err("TDExit: exit_reason 0x%016llx qualification=%016lx ext_qualification=%016lx\n",
+		       exit_reason.full, tdexit_exit_qual(vcpu), tdexit_ext_exit_qual(vcpu));
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
+			= exit_reason.full;
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE);
 
 	switch (exit_reason.basic) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#87 lore raw

PATCH v16 84/116 KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

If the control reaches EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI, #SMI is delivered and handled right after returning from the TDX module to KVM nothing needs to be done in KVM. Continue TDX vcpu execution.

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c          | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h +1 -0
index a5faf6d88f1b..b3a30ef3efdd 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #define EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT        2
 #define EXIT_REASON_INIT_SIGNAL			3
 #define EXIT_REASON_SIPI_SIGNAL         4
+#define EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI           6
 
 #define EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW    7
 #define EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW          8
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +7 -0
index 306d555dda35..618c2ecec26a 100644
@@ -1339,6 +1339,13 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE);
 
 	switch (exit_reason.basic) {
+	case EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI:
+		/*
+		 * If reach here, it's not a Machine Check System Management
+		 * Interrupt(MSMI).  #SMI is delivered and handled right after
+		 * SEAMRET, nothing needs to be done in KVM.
+		 */
+		return 1;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#88 lore raw

PATCH v16 85/116 KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

On EPT violation, call a common function, __vmx_handle_ept_violation() to trigger x86 MMU code. On EPT misconfiguration, exit to ring 3 with KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN. because EPT misconfiguration can't happen as MMIO is trigged by TDG.VP.VMCALL. No point to set a misconfiguration value for the fast path.

---
v14 -> v15:
- use PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK to tell the fault is private

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c    | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h +3 -0
index 632af7a76d0a..027aa4175d2c 100644
@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
 	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) != 0 ?
 	       PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
 
+	if (kvm_is_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, gpa))
+		error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK;
+
 	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
 }
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +46 -0

58 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#89 lore raw

PATCH v16 86/116 KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because guest TD state is protected, exceptions in guest TDs can't be intercepted. TDX VMM doesn't need to handle exceptions. tdx_handle_exit_irqoff() handles NMI and machine check. Ignore NMI and machine check and continue guest TD execution.

For external interrupt, increment stats same to the VMX case.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +23 -0
index f98b27cb9003..6bed75c4069c 100644
@@ -892,6 +892,25 @@ void tdx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vmx_handle_exception_irqoff(vcpu, tdexit_intr_info(vcpu));
 }
 
+static int tdx_handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 intr_info = tdexit_intr_info(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_nmi(intr_info) || is_machine_check(intr_info))
+		return 1;
+
+	kvm_pr_unimpl("unexpected exception 0x%x(exit_reason 0x%llx qual 0x%lx)\n",
+		intr_info,
+		to_tdx(vcpu)->exit_reason.full, tdexit_exit_qual(vcpu));
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+
+static int tdx_handle_external_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_exits;
+	return 1;
+}
+
 static int tdx_handle_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
@@ -1381,6 +1400,10 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE);
 
 	switch (exit_reason.basic) {
+	case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
+		return tdx_handle_exception(vcpu);
+	case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
+		return tdx_handle_external_interrupt(vcpu);
 	case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
 		return tdx_handle_ept_violation(vcpu);
 	case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#90 lore raw

PATCH v16 87/116 KVM: TDX: Handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI with MSMI

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

When BIOS eMCA MCE-SMI morphing is enabled, the #MC is morphed to MSMI (Machine Check System Management Interrupt). Then the SMI causes TD exit with the read reason of EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI with MSMI bit set in the exit qualification to KVM instead of EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI with MC exception.

Handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI with MSMI bit set in the exit qualification as MCE(Machine Check Exception) happened during TD guest running.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c      | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +37 -3
index 6bed75c4069c..44558f1c13e4 100644
@@ -890,6 +890,30 @@ void tdx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 						     tdexit_intr_info(vcpu));
 	else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
 		vmx_handle_exception_irqoff(vcpu, tdexit_intr_info(vcpu));
+	else if (unlikely(tdx->exit_reason.non_recoverable ||
+		 tdx->exit_reason.error)) {
+		/*
+		 * The only reason it gets EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI is there is an
+		 * #MSMI(Machine Check System Management Interrupt) with
+		 * exit_qualification bit 0 set in TD guest.
+		 * The #MSMI is delivered right after SEAMCALL returns,
+		 * and an #MC is delivered to host kernel after SMI handler
+		 * returns.
+		 *
+		 * The #MC right after SEAMCALL is fixed up and skipped in #MC
+		 * handler because it's an #MC happens in TD guest we cannot
+		 * handle it with host's context.
+		 *
+		 * Call KVM's machine check handler explicitly here.
+		 */
+		if (tdx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI) {
+			unsigned long exit_qual;
+
+			exit_qual = tdexit_exit_qual(vcpu);
+			if (exit_qual & TD_EXIT_OTHER_SMI_IS_MSMI)
+				kvm_machine_check();
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 static int tdx_handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -1372,6 +1396,11 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
 			      exit_reason.full, exit_reason.basic,
 			      to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->hkid,
 			      set_hkid_to_hpa(0, to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->hkid));
+
+		/*
+		 * tdx_handle_exit_irqoff() handled EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI.  It
+		 * must be handled before enabling preemption because it's #MC.
+		 */
 		goto unhandled_exit;
 	}
 
@@ -1410,9 +1439,14 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
 		return tdx_handle_ept_misconfig(vcpu);
 	case EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI:
 		/*
-		 * If reach here, it's not a Machine Check System Management
-		 * Interrupt(MSMI).  #SMI is delivered and handled right after
-		 * SEAMRET, nothing needs to be done in KVM.
+		 * Unlike VMX, all the SMI in SEAM non-root mode (i.e. when
+		 * TD guest vcpu is running) will cause TD exit to TDX module,
+		 * then SEAMRET to KVM. Once it exits to KVM, SMI is delivered
+		 * and handled right away.
+		 *
+		 * - If it's an Machine Check System Management Interrupt
+		 *   (MSMI), it's handled above due to non_recoverable bit set.
+		 * - If it's not an MSMI, don't need to do anything here.
 		 */
 		return 1;
 	default:
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h +2 -0
index fc9a8898765c..9f93250d22b9 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@
 #define TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR		0x10003
 #define TDG_VP_VMCALL_SETUP_EVENT_NOTIFY_INTERRUPT	0x10004
 
+#define TD_EXIT_OTHER_SMI_IS_MSMI	BIT(1)
+
 /* TDX control structure (TDR/TDCS/TDVPS) field access codes */
 #define TDX_NON_ARCH			BIT_ULL(63)
 #define TDX_CLASS_SHIFT			56
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#91 lore raw

PATCH v16 88/116 KVM: TDX: Add a place holder for handler of TDX hypercalls (TDG.VP.VMCALL)

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The TDX module specification defines TDG.VP.VMCALL API (TDVMCALL for short) for the guest TD to call hypercall to VMM. When the guest TD issues TDG.VP.VMCALL, the guest TD exits to VMM with a new exit reason of TDVMCALL. The arguments from the guest TD and returned values from the VMM are passed in the guest registers. The guest RCX registers indicates which registers are used. Define helper functions to access those registers as ABI.

Define the TDVMCALL exit reason, which is carved out from the VMX exit reason namespace as the TDVMCALL exit from TDX guest to TDX-SEAM is really just a VM-Exit. Add a place holder to handle TDVMCALL exit.

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h |  4 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c          | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h          | 13 ++++++++
 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h +3 -1
index b3a30ef3efdd..f0f4a4cf84a7 100644
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
 #define EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE              68
 #define EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK            74
 #define EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY              75
+#define EXIT_REASON_TDCALL              77
 
 #define VMX_EXIT_REASONS \
 	{ EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI,         "EXCEPTION_NMI" }, \
@@ -156,7 +157,8 @@
 	{ EXIT_REASON_UMWAIT,                "UMWAIT" }, \
 	{ EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE,                "TPAUSE" }, \
 	{ EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK,              "BUS_LOCK" }, \
-	{ EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY,                "NOTIFY" }
+	{ EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY,                "NOTIFY" }, \
+	{ EXIT_REASON_TDCALL,                "TDCALL" }
 
 #define VMX_EXIT_REASON_FLAGS \
 	{ VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY,	"FAILED_VMENTRY" }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +53 -0

77 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +13 -0
index b29fcda2892b..870a0d15e073 100644
@@ -80,6 +80,19 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {
 
 	struct list_head cpu_list;
 
+	union {
+		struct {
+			union {
+				struct {
+					u16 gpr_mask;
+					u16 xmm_mask;
+				};
+				u32 regs_mask;
+			};
+			u32 reserved;
+		};
+		u64 rcx;
+	} tdvmcall;
 	union tdx_exit_reason exit_reason;
 
 	bool initialized;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#92 lore raw

PATCH v16 89/116 KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The TDX Guest-Host communication interface (GHCI) specification defines
the ABI for the guest TD to issue hypercall. It reserves vendor specific
arguments for VMM specific use. Use it as KVM hypercall and handle it.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +33 -0
index fa1cf0a8b5f9..89e92c696760 100644
@@ -982,8 +982,41 @@ static int tdx_handle_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int tdx_emulate_vmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * ABI for KVM tdvmcall argument:
+	 * In Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface(GHCI) specification,
+	 * Non-zero leaf number (R10 != 0) is defined to indicate
+	 * vendor-specific.  KVM uses this for KVM hypercall.  NOTE: KVM
+	 * hypercall number starts from one.  Zero isn't used for KVM hypercall
+	 * number.
+	 *
+	 * R10: KVM hypercall number
+	 * arguments: R11, R12, R13, R14.
+	 */
+	nr = kvm_r10_read(vcpu);
+	a0 = kvm_r11_read(vcpu);
+	a1 = kvm_r12_read(vcpu);
+	a2 = kvm_r13_read(vcpu);
+	a3 = kvm_r14_read(vcpu);
+
+	ret = __kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu, nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, true, 0);
+
+	tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, ret);
+
+	if (nr == KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE && !ret)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
 static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
+	if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
+		return tdx_emulate_vmcall(vcpu);
+
 	switch (tdvmcall_leaf(vcpu)) {
 	default:
 		break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#93 lore raw

PATCH v16 90/116 KVM: TDX: Add KVM Exit for TDX TDG.VP.VMCALL

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Some of TDG.VP.VMCALL require device model, for example, qemu, to handle them on behalf of kvm kernel module. TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR, TDG_VP_VMCALL_MAP_GPA, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SETUP_EVENT_NOTIFY_INTERRUPT, and TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_QUOTE requires user space VMM handling.

Introduce new kvm exit, KVM_EXIT_TDX, and functions to setup it. TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND is set as default return value to avoid random value. Device model should update R10 if necessary.

---
v14 -> v15:
- updated struct kvm_tdx_exit with union
- export constants for reg bitmask

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c   | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +82 -2
index 89e92c696760..eb6ba2eee16c 100644
@@ -1012,6 +1012,78 @@ static int tdx_emulate_vmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static int tdx_complete_vp_vmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_tdx_vmcall *tdx_vmcall = &vcpu->run->tdx.u.vmcall;
+	__u64 reg_mask = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+
+#define COPY_REG(MASK, REG)							\
+	do {									\
+		if (reg_mask & TDX_VMCALL_REG_MASK_ ## MASK)			\
+			kvm_## REG ## _write(vcpu, tdx_vmcall->out_ ## REG);	\
+	} while (0)
+
+
+	COPY_REG(R10, r10);
+	COPY_REG(R11, r11);
+	COPY_REG(R12, r12);
+	COPY_REG(R13, r13);
+	COPY_REG(R14, r14);
+	COPY_REG(R15, r15);
+	COPY_REG(RBX, rbx);
+	COPY_REG(RDI, rdi);
+	COPY_REG(RSI, rsi);
+	COPY_REG(R8, r8);
+	COPY_REG(R9, r9);
+	COPY_REG(RDX, rdx);
+
+#undef COPY_REG
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_vp_vmcall_to_user(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_tdx_vmcall *tdx_vmcall = &vcpu->run->tdx.u.vmcall;
+	__u64 reg_mask;
+
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = tdx_complete_vp_vmcall;
+	memset(tdx_vmcall, 0, sizeof(*tdx_vmcall));
+
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_TDX;
+	vcpu->run->tdx.type = KVM_EXIT_TDX_VMCALL;
+
+	reg_mask = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+	tdx_vmcall->reg_mask = reg_mask;
+
+#define COPY_REG(MASK, REG)							\
+	do {									\
+		if (reg_mask & TDX_VMCALL_REG_MASK_ ## MASK) {			\
+			tdx_vmcall->in_ ## REG = kvm_ ## REG ## _read(vcpu);	\
+			tdx_vmcall->out_ ## REG = tdx_vmcall->in_ ## REG;	\
+		}								\
+	} while (0)
+
+
+	COPY_REG(R10, r10);
+	COPY_REG(R11, r11);
+	COPY_REG(R12, r12);
+	COPY_REG(R13, r13);
+	COPY_REG(R14, r14);
+	COPY_REG(R15, r15);
+	COPY_REG(RBX, rbx);
+	COPY_REG(RDI, rdi);
+	COPY_REG(RSI, rsi);
+	COPY_REG(R8, r8);
+	COPY_REG(R9, r9);
+	COPY_REG(RDX, rdx);
+
+#undef COPY_REG
+
+	/* notify userspace to handle the request */
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -1022,8 +1094,16 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		break;
 	}
 
-	tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
-	return 1;
+	/*
+	 * Unknown VMCALL.  Toss the request to the user space VMM, e.g. qemu,
+	 * as it may know how to handle.
+	 *
+	 * Those VMCALLs require user space VMM:
+	 * TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR, TDG_VP_VMCALL_MAP_GPA,
+	 * TDG_VP_VMCALL_SETUP_EVENT_NOTIFY_INTERRUPT, and
+	 * TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_QUOTE.
+	 */
+	return tdx_vp_vmcall_to_user(vcpu);
 }
 
 void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +87 -0

105 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#94 lore raw

PATCH v16 91/116 KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up TDX PV CPUID hypercall to the KVM backend function.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +22 -0
index eb6ba2eee16c..9430091fec80 100644
@@ -1084,12 +1084,34 @@ static int tdx_vp_vmcall_to_user(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int tdx_emulate_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+	/* EAX and ECX for cpuid is stored in R12 and R13. */
+	eax = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+	ecx = tdvmcall_a1_read(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_cpuid(vcpu, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx, false);
+
+	tdvmcall_a0_write(vcpu, eax);
+	tdvmcall_a1_write(vcpu, ebx);
+	tdvmcall_a2_write(vcpu, ecx);
+	tdvmcall_a3_write(vcpu, edx);
+
+	tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
 static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
 		return tdx_emulate_vmcall(vcpu);
 
 	switch (tdvmcall_leaf(vcpu)) {
+	case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
+		return tdx_emulate_cpuid(vcpu);
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#95 lore raw

PATCH v16 92/116 KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up TDX PV HLT hypercall to the KVM backend function.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +41 -1
index 9430091fec80..2f8bb0e9394e 100644
@@ -662,7 +662,32 @@ void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 
 bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	return pi_has_pending_interrupt(vcpu);
+	bool ret = pi_has_pending_interrupt(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+	if (ret || vcpu->arch.mp_state != KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED)
+		return true;
+
+	if (tdx->interrupt_disabled_hlt)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * This is for the case where the virtual interrupt is recognized,
+	 * i.e. set in vmcs.RVI, between the STI and "HLT".  KVM doesn't have
+	 * access to RVI and the interrupt is no longer in the PID (because it
+	 * was "recognized".  It doesn't get delivered in the guest because the
+	 * TDCALL completes before interrupts are enabled.
+	 *
+	 * TDX modules sets RVI while in an STI interrupt shadow.
+	 * - TDExit(typically TDG.VP.VMCALL<HLT>) from the guest to TDX module.
+	 *   The interrupt shadow at this point is gone.
+	 * - It knows that there is an interrupt that can be delivered
+	 *   (RVI > PPR && EFLAGS.IF=1, the other conditions of 29.2.2 don't
+	 *    matter)
+	 * - It forwards the TDExit nevertheless, to a clueless hypervisor that
+	 *   has no way to glean either RVI or PPR.
+	 */
+	return !!xchg(&tdx->buggy_hlt_workaround, 0);
 }
 
 void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -1104,6 +1129,17 @@ static int tdx_emulate_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static int tdx_emulate_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+	/* See tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt() to avoid heavy seamcall */
+	tdx->interrupt_disabled_hlt = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+
+	tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+	return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
+}
+
 static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -1112,6 +1148,8 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	switch (tdvmcall_leaf(vcpu)) {
 	case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
 		return tdx_emulate_cpuid(vcpu);
+	case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
+		return tdx_emulate_hlt(vcpu);
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1504,6 +1542,8 @@ void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
 	struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
 
+	/* See comment in tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(). */
+	tdx->buggy_hlt_workaround = 1;
 	/* TDX supports only posted interrupt.  No lapic emulation. */
 	__vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, &tdx->pi_desc, vector);
 }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +3 -0
index 870a0d15e073..4ddcf804c0a4 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {
 	bool host_state_need_restore;
 	u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base;
 
+	bool interrupt_disabled_hlt;
+	unsigned int buggy_hlt_workaround;
+
 	/*
 	 * Dummy to make pmu_intel not corrupt memory.
 	 * TODO: Support PMU for TDX.  Future work.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#96 lore raw

PATCH v16 93/116 KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up TDX PV port IO hypercall to the KVM backend function.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +57 -0
index 2f8bb0e9394e..fd6907d5ba9d 100644
@@ -1140,6 +1140,61 @@ static int tdx_emulate_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
 }
 
+static int tdx_complete_pio_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+	unsigned long val = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.pio.count != 1);
+
+	ret = ctxt->ops->pio_in_emulated(ctxt, vcpu->arch.pio.size,
+					 vcpu->arch.pio.port, &val, 1);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!ret);
+
+	tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+	tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_emulate_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+	unsigned long val = 0;
+	unsigned int port;
+	int size, ret;
+	bool write;
+
+	++vcpu->stat.io_exits;
+
+	size = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+	write = tdvmcall_a1_read(vcpu);
+	port = tdvmcall_a2_read(vcpu);
+
+	if (size != 1 && size != 2 && size != 4) {
+		tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (write) {
+		val = tdvmcall_a3_read(vcpu);
+		ret = ctxt->ops->pio_out_emulated(ctxt, size, port, &val, 1);
+
+		/* No need for a complete_userspace_io callback. */
+		vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
+	} else {
+		ret = ctxt->ops->pio_in_emulated(ctxt, size, port, &val, 1);
+		if (!ret)
+			vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = tdx_complete_pio_in;
+		else
+			tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+	}
+	if (ret)
+		tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -1150,6 +1205,8 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return tdx_emulate_cpuid(vcpu);
 	case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
 		return tdx_emulate_hlt(vcpu);
+	case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
+		return tdx_emulate_io(vcpu);
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#97 lore raw

PATCH v16 94/116 KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall

In reply to [email protected]

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Export kvm_io_bus_read and kvm_mmio tracepoint and wire up TDX PV MMIO hypercall to the KVM backend functions.

kvm_io_bus_read/write() searches KVM device emulated in kernel of the given MMIO address and emulates the MMIO. As TDX PV MMIO also needs it, export kvm_io_bus_read(). kvm_io_bus_write() is already exported. TDX PV MMIO emulates some of MMIO itself. To add trace point consistently with x86 kvm, export kvm_mmio tracepoint.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     |   1 +
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c    |   2 +
 3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +114 -0
index fd6907d5ba9d..24800d1e597d 100644
@@ -1195,6 +1195,118 @@ static int tdx_emulate_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int tdx_complete_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long val = 0;
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	int size;
+
+	KVM_BUG_ON(vcpu->mmio_needed != 1, vcpu->kvm);
+	vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
+
+	if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write) {
+		gpa = vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa;
+		size = vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].len;
+
+		memcpy(&val, vcpu->run->mmio.data, size);
+		tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, size, gpa, &val);
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static inline int tdx_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int size,
+				 unsigned long val)
+{
+	if (kvm_iodevice_write(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.apic->dev, gpa, size, &val) &&
+	    kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, gpa, size, &val))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, size, gpa, &val);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int tdx_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int size)
+{
+	unsigned long val;
+
+	if (kvm_iodevice_read(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.apic->dev, gpa, size, &val) &&
+	    kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, gpa, size, &val))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+	trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, size, gpa, &val);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_emulate_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	int size, write, r;
+	unsigned long val;
+	gpa_t gpa;
+
+	KVM_BUG_ON(vcpu->mmio_needed, vcpu->kvm);
+
+	size = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+	write = tdvmcall_a1_read(vcpu);
+	gpa = tdvmcall_a2_read(vcpu);
+	val = write ? tdvmcall_a3_read(vcpu) : 0;
+
+	if (size != 1 && size != 2 && size != 4 && size != 8)
+		goto error;
+	if (write != 0 && write != 1)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* Strip the shared bit, allow MMIO with and without it set. */
+	gpa = gpa & ~gfn_to_gpa(kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm));
+
+	if (size > 8u || ((gpa + size - 1) ^ gpa) & PAGE_MASK)
+		goto error;
+
+	slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
+	if (slot && !(slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (!kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS, gpa, 0, NULL)) {
+		trace_kvm_fast_mmio(gpa);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (write)
+		r = tdx_mmio_write(vcpu, gpa, size, val);
+	else
+		r = tdx_mmio_read(vcpu, gpa, size);
+	if (!r) {
+		/* Kernel completed device emulation. */
+		tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Request the device emulation to userspace device model. */
+	vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
+	vcpu->mmio_is_write = write;
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = tdx_complete_mmio;
+
+	vcpu->run->mmio.phys_addr = gpa;
+	vcpu->run->mmio.len = size;
+	vcpu->run->mmio.is_write = write;
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
+
+	if (write) {
+		memcpy(vcpu->run->mmio.data, &val, size);
+	} else {
+		vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa = gpa;
+		vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].len = size;
+		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, size, gpa, NULL);
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+error:
+	tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+	return 1;
+}
+
 static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -1207,6 +1319,8 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return tdx_emulate_hlt(vcpu);
 	case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
 		return tdx_emulate_io(vcpu);
+	case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
+		return tdx_emulate_mmio(vcpu);
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -0
index d68e99f4f5ea..6145143c32ee 100644
@@ -13734,6 +13734,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_sev_es_string_io);
 
 EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_entry);
 EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmio);
 EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_mmio);
 EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_inj_virq);
 EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_page_fault);
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +2 -0
index 0ae59d680145..f5768c394efb 100644
@@ -2686,6 +2686,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot *kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn
 
 	return NULL;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot);
 
 bool kvm_is_visible_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
 {
@@ -5920,6 +5921,7 @@ int kvm_io_bus_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_bus bus_idx, gpa_t addr,
 	r = __kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, bus, &range, val);
 	return r < 0 ? r : 0;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_io_bus_read);
 
 /* Caller must hold slots_lock. */
 int kvm_io_bus_register_dev(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_bus bus_idx, gpa_t addr,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#98 lore raw

PATCH v16 95/116 KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Implements set_msr/get_msr/has_emulated_msr methods for TDX to handle hypercall from guest TD for paravirtualized rdmsr and wrmsr. The TDX module virtualizes MSRs. For some MSRs, it injects #VE to the guest TD upon RDMSR or WRMSR. The exact list of such MSRs are defined in the spec.

Upon #VE, the guest TD may execute hypercalls, TDG.VP.VMCALL<INSTRUCTION.RDMSR> and TDG.VP.VMCALL<INSTRUCTION.WRMSR>, which are defined in GHCI (Guest-Host Communication Interface) so that the host VMM (e.g. KVM) can virtualize the MSRs.

There are three classes of MSRs virtualization.
- non-configurable: TDX module directly virtualizes it. VMM can't configure. the value set by KVM_SET_MSR_INDEX_LIST is ignored.
- configurable: TDX module directly virtualizes it. VMM can configure at the VM creation time. The value set by KVM_SET_MSR_INDEX_LIST is used.
- #VE case
Guest TD would issue TDG.VP.VMCALL<INSTRUCTION.{WRMSR,RDMSR> and VMM handles the MSR hypercall. The value set by KVM_SET_MSR_INDEX_LIST is used.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  6 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c         |  1 -
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h         |  2 ++
 5 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +40 -4
index 4356b10d68b6..982022993700 100644
@@ -258,6 +258,42 @@ static void vt_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(vcpu);
 }
 
+static int vt_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	if (unlikely(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+		return tdx_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+	return vmx_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The kvm parameter can be NULL (module initialization, or invocation before
+ * VM creation). Be sure to check the kvm parameter before using it.
+ */
+static bool vt_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
+{
+	if (kvm && is_td(kvm))
+		return tdx_has_emulated_msr(index, true);
+
+	return vmx_has_emulated_msr(kvm, index);
+}
+
+static int vt_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	if (unlikely(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+		return tdx_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+	return vmx_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+}
+
+static void vt_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_msr_filter_changed(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct pi_desc *pi = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
@@ -519,7 +555,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.hardware_enable = vt_hardware_enable,
 	.hardware_disable = vt_hardware_disable,
-	.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
+	.has_emulated_msr = vt_has_emulated_msr,
 
 	.is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
 	.max_vcpus = vt_max_vcpus,
@@ -541,8 +577,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
 	.get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
-	.get_msr = vmx_get_msr,
-	.set_msr = vmx_set_msr,
+	.get_msr = vt_get_msr,
+	.set_msr = vt_set_msr,
 	.get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
 	.get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
 	.set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
@@ -652,7 +688,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
 	.migrate_timers = vmx_migrate_timers,
 
-	.msr_filter_changed = vmx_msr_filter_changed,
+	.msr_filter_changed = vt_msr_filter_changed,
 	.complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,
 
 	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +70 -0

76 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +6 -0
index cf12b94eb35c..fd52c7df0cd8 100644
@@ -165,6 +165,9 @@ void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
 void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
 		u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code);
+bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write);
+int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
+int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
 
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
 
@@ -207,6 +210,9 @@ static inline void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mo
 static inline void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason, u64 *info1,
 				     u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code) {}
+static inline bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write) { return false; }
+static inline int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
+static inline int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
 
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +0 -1
index 6145143c32ee..e96b1f250cc8 100644
@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@
 #include "trace.h"
 
 #define MAX_IO_MSRS 256
-#define KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS 32
 
 struct kvm_caps kvm_caps __read_mostly = {
 	.supported_mce_cap = MCG_CTL_P | MCG_SER_P,
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +2 -0
index a3b2c3d5e18f..0ca67e6fcdb2 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
 #include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
 #include "kvm_emulate.h"
 
+#define KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS 32
+
 bool __kvm_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
 
 struct kvm_caps {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#99 lore raw

PATCH v16 96/116 KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall to the KVM backend function.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +39 -0
index 7e24683e430b..41f7ad98cab5 100644
@@ -1307,6 +1307,41 @@ static int tdx_emulate_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static int tdx_emulate_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 index = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+	u64 data;
+
+	if (!kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ) ||
+	    kvm_get_msr(vcpu, index, &data)) {
+		trace_kvm_msr_read_ex(index);
+		tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	trace_kvm_msr_read(index, data);
+
+	tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+	tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, data);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_emulate_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 index = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+	u64 data = tdvmcall_a1_read(vcpu);
+
+	if (!kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE) ||
+	    kvm_set_msr(vcpu, index, data)) {
+		trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(index, data);
+		tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_msr_write(index, data);
+	tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+	return 1;
+}
+
 static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -1321,6 +1356,10 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return tdx_emulate_io(vcpu);
 	case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
 		return tdx_emulate_mmio(vcpu);
+	case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
+		return tdx_emulate_rdmsr(vcpu);
+	case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
+		return tdx_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#100 lore raw

PATCH v16 97/116 KVM: TDX: Handle MSR MTRRCap and MTRRDefType access

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Handle MTRRCap RO MSR to return all features are unsupported and handle MTRRDefType MSR to accept only E=1,FE=0,type=writeback. enable MTRR, disable Fixed range MTRRs, default memory type=writeback

TDX virtualizes that cpuid to report MTRR to guest TD and TDX enforces guest CR0.CD=0. If guest tries to set CR0.CD=1, it results in #GP. While updating MTRR requires to set CR0.CD=1 (and other cache flushing operations). It means guest TD can't update MTRR. Virtualize MTRR as all features disabled and default memory type as writeback.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 82 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +82 -17
index 41f7ad98cab5..726e28f30354 100644
@@ -580,18 +580,7 @@ u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
 	if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm))
 		return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
 
-	/*
-	 * TDX enforces CR0.CD = 0 and KVM MTRR emulation enforces writeback.
-	 * TODO: implement MTRR MSR emulation so that
-	 * MTRRCap: SMRR=0: SMRR interface unsupported
-	 *          WC=0: write combining unsupported
-	 *          FIX=0: Fixed range registers unsupported
-	 *          VCNT=0: number of variable range regitsers = 0
-	 * MTRRDefType: E=1, FE=0, type=writeback only. Don't allow other value.
-	 *              E=1: enable MTRR
-	 *              FE=0: disable fixed range MTRRs
-	 *              type: default memory type=writeback
-	 */
+	/* TDX enforces CR0.CD = 0 and KVM MTRR emulation enforces writeback. */
 	return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
 }
 
@@ -1930,7 +1919,9 @@ bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write)
 	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
 	case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
 	case MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL:
+	case MSR_MTRRcap:
 	case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+	case MSR_MTRRdefType:
 	case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
 	case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
 	case MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
@@ -1972,16 +1963,47 @@ bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write)
 
 int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 {
-	if (tdx_has_emulated_msr(msr->index, false))
-		return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
-	return 1;
+	switch (msr->index) {
+	case MSR_MTRRcap:
+		/*
+		 * Override kvm_mtrr_get_msr() which hardcodes the value.
+		 * Report SMRR = 0, WC = 0, FIX = 0 VCNT = 0 to disable MTRR
+		 * effectively.
+		 */
+		msr->data = 0;
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		if (tdx_has_emulated_msr(msr->index, false))
+			return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
+		return 1;
+	}
 }
 
 int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 {
-	if (tdx_has_emulated_msr(msr->index, true))
+	switch (msr->index) {
+	case MSR_MTRRdefType:
+		/*
+		 * Allow writeback only for all memory.
+		 * Because it's reported that fixed range MTRR isn't supported
+		 * and VCNT=0, enforce MTRRDefType.FE = 0 and don't care
+		 * variable range MTRRs. Only default memory type matters.
+		 *
+		 * bit 11 E: MTRR enable/disable
+		 * bit 12 FE: Fixed-range MTRRs enable/disable
+		 * (E, FE) = (1, 1): enable MTRR and Fixed range MTRR
+		 * (E, FE) = (1, 0): enable MTRR, disable Fixed range MTRR
+		 * (E, FE) = (0, *): disable all MTRRs.  all physical memory
+		 *                   is UC
+		 */
+		if (msr->data != ((1 << 11) | MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK))
+			return 1;
 		return kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
-	return 1;
+	default:
+		if (tdx_has_emulated_msr(msr->index, true))
+			return kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
+		return 1;
+	}
 }
 
 static int tdx_get_capabilities(struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
@@ -2730,6 +2752,45 @@ static int tdx_td_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 vcpu_rcx)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int tdx_vcpu_init_mtrr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct msr_data msr;
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * To avoid confusion with reporting VNCT = 0, explicitly disable
+	 * vaiale-range reisters.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR; i++) {
+		/* phymask */
+		msr = (struct msr_data) {
+			.host_initiated = true,
+			.index = 0x200 + 2 * i + 1,
+			.data = 0,	/* valid = 0 to disable. */
+		};
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, &msr);
+		if (ret)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Set MTRR to use writeback on reset. */
+	msr = (struct msr_data) {
+		.host_initiated = true,
+		.index = MSR_MTRRdefType,
+		/*
+		 * Set E(enable MTRR)=1, FE(enable fixed range MTRR)=0, default
+		 * type=writeback on reset to avoid UC.  Note E=0 means all
+		 * memory is UC.
+		 */
+		.data = (1 << 11) | MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK,
+	};
+	ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, &msr);
+	if (ret)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct msr_data apic_base_msr;
@@ -2767,6 +2828,10 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
 	if (kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, &apic_base_msr))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	ret = tdx_vcpu_init_mtrr(vcpu);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	ret = tdx_td_vcpu_init(vcpu, (u64)cmd.data);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#101 lore raw

PATCH v16 98/116 KVM: TDX: Handle MSR IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR and IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

MCE and MCA is advertised via cpuid based on the TDX module spec. Guest kernel can access IA32_FEAT_CTL for checking if LMCE is enabled by platform and IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL to enable LMCE. Make TDX KVM handle them. Otherwise guest MSR access to them with TDG.VP.VMCALL<MSR> on VE results in GP in guest.

Because LMCE is disabled with qemu by default, "-cpu lmce=on" to qemu command line is needed to reproduce it.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +20 -0
index 726e28f30354..7f8c89fd556a 100644
@@ -1950,6 +1950,7 @@ bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write)
 		default:
 			return true;
 		}
+	case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
 	case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
 	case MSR_EFER:
 		return !write;
@@ -1964,6 +1965,20 @@ bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write)
 int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 {
 	switch (msr->index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
+		/*
+		 * MCE and MCA are advertised via cpuid. guest kernel could
+		 * check if LMCE is enabled or not.
+		 */
+		msr->data = FEAT_CTL_LOCKED;
+		if (vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P)
+			msr->data |= FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED;
+		return 0;
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+		if (!msr->host_initiated && !(vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P))
+			return 1;
+		msr->data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl;
+		return 0;
 	case MSR_MTRRcap:
 		/*
 		 * Override kvm_mtrr_get_msr() which hardcodes the value.
@@ -1982,6 +1997,11 @@ int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 {
 	switch (msr->index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+		if (!msr->host_initiated && !(vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P))
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl = msr->data;
+		return 0;
 	case MSR_MTRRdefType:
 		/*
 		 * Allow writeback only for all memory.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#102 lore raw

PATCH v16 99/116 KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Implement TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall. If the input value is zero, return success code and zero in output registers.

TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall is a subleaf of TDG.VP.VMCALL to enumerate which TDG.VP.VMCALL sub leaves are supported. This hypercall is for future enhancement of the Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI) specification. The GHCI version of 344426-001US defines it to require input R12 to be zero and to return zero in output registers, R11, R12, R13, and R14 so that guest TD enumerates no enhancement.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +16 -0
index 7f8c89fd556a..b4a0fa51ee62 100644
@@ -1331,6 +1331,20 @@ static int tdx_emulate_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static int tdx_get_td_vm_call_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu))
+		tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+	else {
+		tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+		kvm_r11_write(vcpu, 0);
+		tdvmcall_a0_write(vcpu, 0);
+		tdvmcall_a1_write(vcpu, 0);
+		tdvmcall_a2_write(vcpu, 0);
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
 static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -1349,6 +1363,8 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return tdx_emulate_rdmsr(vcpu);
 	case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
 		return tdx_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
+	case TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_TD_VM_CALL_INFO:
+		return tdx_get_td_vm_call_info(vcpu);
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#103 lore raw

PATCH v16 100/116 KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX doesn't support system-management mode (SMM) and system-management interrupt (SMI) in guest TDs. Because guest state (vcpu state, memory state) is protected, it must go through the TDX module APIs to change guest state, injecting SMI and changing vcpu mode into SMM. The TDX module doesn't provide a way for VMM to inject SMI into guest TD and a way for VMM to switch guest vcpu mode into SMM.

We have two options in KVM when handling SMM or SMI in the guest TD or the device model (e.g. QEMU): 1) silently ignore the request or 2) return a meaningful error.

For simplicity, we implemented the option 1).

---
 arch/x86/kvm/smm.h         |  7 +++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 12 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/smm.h +6 -1
index a1cf2ac5bd78..bc77902f5c18 100644
@@ -142,7 +142,12 @@ union kvm_smram {
 
 static inline int kvm_inject_smi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu);
+	/*
+	 * If SMM isn't supported (e.g. TDX), silently discard SMI request.
+	 * Assume that SMM supported = MSR_IA32_SMBASE supported.
+	 */
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(vcpu->kvm, MSR_IA32_SMBASE))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu);
 	return 0;
 }
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +41 -4

57 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +29 -0
index b4a0fa51ee62..f368f9c950ad 100644
@@ -2042,6 +2042,35 @@ int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 	}
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+int tdx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+	/* SMI isn't supported for TDX. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	return false;
+}
+
+int tdx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union kvm_smram *smram)
+{
+	/* smi_allowed() is always false for TDX as above. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int tdx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const union kvm_smram *smram)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void tdx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* SMI isn't supported for TDX.  Silently discard SMI request. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	vcpu->arch.smi_pending = false;
+}
+#endif
+
 static int tdx_get_capabilities(struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
 {
 	struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +12 -0
index fd52c7df0cd8..092676b50dc2 100644
@@ -222,4 +222,16 @@ static inline int tdx_sept_flush_remote_tlbs(struct kvm *kvm) { return 0; }
 static inline void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level) {}
 #endif
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST) && defined(CONFIG_KVM_SMM)
+int tdx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection);
+int tdx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union kvm_smram *smram);
+int tdx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const union kvm_smram *smram);
+void tdx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+#else
+static inline int tdx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection) { return false; }
+static inline int tdx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union kvm_smram *smram) { return 0; }
+static inline int tdx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const union kvm_smram *smram) { return 0; }
+static inline void tdx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#104 lore raw

PATCH v16 101/116 KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The TDX module API doesn't provide API for VMM to inject INIT IPI and SIPI. Instead it defines the different protocols to boot application processors. Ignore INIT and SIPI events for the TDX guest.

There are two options. 1) (silently) ignore INIT/SIPI request or 2) return error to guest TDs somehow. Given that TDX guest is paravirtualized to boot AP, the option 1 is chosen for simplicity.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c               | 19 +++++++++++-------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c             |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c            | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c             |  4 ++--
 6 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1 -0
index 19e1f22b92b1..8b3c5f2179cf 100644
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(migrate_timers)
 KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed)
 KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr)
 KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)
+KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_init)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
 
 #undef KVM_X86_OP
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
index 641f769b30d1..529c7e610d47 100644
@@ -1814,6 +1814,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	int (*complete_emulated_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err);
 
 	void (*vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
+	void (*vcpu_deliver_init)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 	/*
 	 * Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons
@@ -2050,6 +2051,7 @@ void kvm_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
 void kvm_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
 int kvm_load_segment_descriptor(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 selector, int seg);
 void kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
+void kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 int kvm_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 tss_selector, int idt_index,
 		    int reason, bool has_error_code, u32 error_code);
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +12 -7
index e037923edb5e..13d5f5c45c79 100644
@@ -3261,6 +3261,16 @@ int kvm_lapic_set_pv_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data, unsigned long len)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true);
+	if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu))
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+	else
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_deliver_init);
+
 int kvm_apic_accept_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
@@ -3292,13 +3302,8 @@ int kvm_apic_accept_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &apic->pending_events)) {
-		kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true);
-		if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(apic->vcpu))
-			vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
-		else
-			vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED;
-	}
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &apic->pending_events))
+		static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_deliver_init)(vcpu);
 	if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_APIC_SIPI, &apic->pending_events)) {
 		if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED) {
 			/* evaluate pending_events before reading the vector */
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -0
index 70c1f7999399..30d9cc11a4b5 100644
@@ -5017,6 +5017,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.complete_emulated_msr = svm_complete_emulated_msr,
 
 	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+	.vcpu_deliver_init = kvm_vcpu_deliver_init,
 	.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
 };
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +30 -2
index ad91efcc2413..dd050a6196ae 100644
@@ -331,6 +331,14 @@ static void vt_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 }
 #endif
 
+static bool vt_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	return vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct pi_desc *pi = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
@@ -359,6 +367,25 @@ static void vt_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
 	vmx_deliver_interrupt(apic, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
 }
 
+static void vt_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		/* TDX doesn't support INIT.  Ignore INIT event */
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
@@ -722,13 +749,14 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 #endif
 
 	.can_emulate_instruction = vmx_can_emulate_instruction,
-	.apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+	.apic_init_signal_blocked = vt_apic_init_signal_blocked,
 	.migrate_timers = vmx_migrate_timers,
 
 	.msr_filter_changed = vt_msr_filter_changed,
 	.complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,
 
-	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = vt_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+	.vcpu_deliver_init = vt_vcpu_deliver_init,
 
 	.mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl,
 	.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl = vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +2 -2
index f368f9c950ad..14ab1450dda4 100644
@@ -757,8 +757,8 @@ void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 {
 
-	/* Ignore INIT silently because TDX doesn't support INIT event. */
-	if (init_event)
+	/* vcpu_deliver_init method silently discards INIT event. */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(init_event, vcpu->kvm))
 		return;
 	if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu_created(to_tdx(vcpu)), vcpu->kvm))
 		return;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#105 lore raw

PATCH v16 102/116 KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX protects TDX guest state from VMM. Implement access methods for TDX guest state to ignore them or return zero. Because those methods can be called by kvm ioctls to set/get cpu registers, they don't have KVM_BUG_ON except one method.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 289 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     |  48 +++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  13 ++
 3 files changed, 321 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +262 -27
index dd050a6196ae..582fea1b60b6 100644
@@ -386,6 +386,200 @@ static void vt_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(vcpu);
 }
 
+static void vt_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 vt_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return tdx_get_segment_base(vcpu, seg);
+
+	return vmx_get_segment_base(vcpu, seg);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var,
+			      int seg)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		tdx_get_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var,
+			      int seg)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_set_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
+}
+
+static int vt_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return tdx_get_cpl(vcpu);
+
+	return vmx_get_cpl(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		*db = 0;
+		*l = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(vcpu, db, l);
+}
+
+static bool vt_is_valid_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	return vmx_is_valid_cr0(vcpu, cr0);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, cr0);
+}
+
+static bool vt_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	return vmx_is_valid_cr4(vcpu, cr4);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4);
+}
+
+static int vt_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	return vmx_set_efer(vcpu, efer);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		memset(dt, 0, sizeof(*dt));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_get_idt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_set_idt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		memset(dt, 0, sizeof(*dt));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_get_gdt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_set_gdt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_set_dr7(vcpu, val);
+}
+
+static void vt_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * MOV-DR exiting is always cleared for TD guest, even in debug mode.
+	 * Thus KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT can never be set and it should never
+	 * reach here for TD vcpu.
+	 */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		tdx_cache_reg(vcpu, reg);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmx_cache_reg(vcpu, reg);
+}
+
+static unsigned long vt_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return tdx_get_rflags(vcpu);
+
+	return vmx_get_rflags(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
+}
+
+static bool vt_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	return vmx_get_if_flag(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
@@ -530,6 +724,14 @@ static void vt_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
 	vmx_inject_irq(vcpu, reinjected);
 }
 
+static void vt_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_inject_exception(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -576,6 +778,39 @@ static void vt_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
 	vmx_get_exit_info(vcpu, reason, info1, info2, intr_info, error_code);
 }
 
+
+static void vt_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_update_cr8_intercept(vcpu, tpr, irr);
+}
+
+static void vt_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(vcpu, eoi_exit_bitmap);
+}
+
+static int vt_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
+{
+	if (is_td(kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	return vmx_set_tss_addr(kvm, addr);
+}
+
+static int vt_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)
+{
+	if (is_td(kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	return vmx_set_identity_map_addr(kvm, ident_addr);
+}
+
 static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -639,30 +874,30 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.vcpu_load = vt_vcpu_load,
 	.vcpu_put = vt_vcpu_put,
 
-	.update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
+	.update_exception_bitmap = vt_update_exception_bitmap,
 	.get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
 	.get_msr = vt_get_msr,
 	.set_msr = vt_set_msr,
-	.get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
-	.get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
-	.set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
-	.get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
-	.get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
-	.is_valid_cr0 = vmx_is_valid_cr0,
-	.set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
-	.is_valid_cr4 = vmx_is_valid_cr4,
-	.set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
-	.set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
-	.get_idt = vmx_get_idt,
-	.set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
-	.get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
-	.set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
-	.set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
-	.sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
-	.cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
-	.get_rflags = vmx_get_rflags,
-	.set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
-	.get_if_flag = vmx_get_if_flag,
+	.get_segment_base = vt_get_segment_base,
+	.get_segment = vt_get_segment,
+	.set_segment = vt_set_segment,
+	.get_cpl = vt_get_cpl,
+	.get_cs_db_l_bits = vt_get_cs_db_l_bits,
+	.is_valid_cr0 = vt_is_valid_cr0,
+	.set_cr0 = vt_set_cr0,
+	.is_valid_cr4 = vt_is_valid_cr4,
+	.set_cr4 = vt_set_cr4,
+	.set_efer = vt_set_efer,
+	.get_idt = vt_get_idt,
+	.set_idt = vt_set_idt,
+	.get_gdt = vt_get_gdt,
+	.set_gdt = vt_set_gdt,
+	.set_dr7 = vt_set_dr7,
+	.sync_dirty_debug_regs = vt_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
+	.cache_reg = vt_cache_reg,
+	.get_rflags = vt_get_rflags,
+	.set_rflags = vt_set_rflags,
+	.get_if_flag = vt_get_if_flag,
 
 	.flush_tlb_all = vt_flush_tlb_all,
 	.flush_tlb_current = vt_flush_tlb_current,
@@ -679,7 +914,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
 	.inject_irq = vt_inject_irq,
 	.inject_nmi = vt_inject_nmi,
-	.inject_exception = vmx_inject_exception,
+	.inject_exception = vt_inject_exception,
 	.cancel_injection = vt_cancel_injection,
 	.interrupt_allowed = vt_interrupt_allowed,
 	.nmi_allowed = vt_nmi_allowed,
@@ -687,11 +922,11 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.set_nmi_mask = vt_set_nmi_mask,
 	.enable_nmi_window = vt_enable_nmi_window,
 	.enable_irq_window = vt_enable_irq_window,
-	.update_cr8_intercept = vmx_update_cr8_intercept,
+	.update_cr8_intercept = vt_update_cr8_intercept,
 	.set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
 	.set_apic_access_page_addr = vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr,
 	.refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
-	.load_eoi_exitmap = vmx_load_eoi_exitmap,
+	.load_eoi_exitmap = vt_load_eoi_exitmap,
 	.apicv_post_state_restore = vt_apicv_post_state_restore,
 	.required_apicv_inhibits = VMX_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS,
 	.hwapic_irr_update = vmx_hwapic_irr_update,
@@ -702,13 +937,13 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = pi_has_pending_interrupt,
 	.protected_apic_has_interrupt = vt_protected_apic_has_interrupt,
 
-	.set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
-	.set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
+	.set_tss_addr = vt_set_tss_addr,
+	.set_identity_map_addr = vt_set_identity_map_addr,
 	.get_mt_mask = vt_get_mt_mask,
 
 	.get_exit_info = vt_get_exit_info,
 
-	.vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,
+	.vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vt_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,
 
 	.has_wbinvd_exit = cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit,
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +46 -2

60 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +13 -0
index 092676b50dc2..8dacab1bc3d7 100644
@@ -169,6 +169,12 @@ bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write);
 int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
 int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
 
+int tdx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
+unsigned long tdx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+u64 tdx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg);
+void tdx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
+
 int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
 
 void tdx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -214,6 +220,13 @@ static inline bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write) { return false; }
 static inline int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
 static inline int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
 
+static inline int tdx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return 0; }
+static inline void tdx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg) {}
+static inline unsigned long tdx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return 0; }
+static inline u64 tdx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg) { return 0; }
+static inline void tdx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var,
+				   int seg) {}
+
 static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
 
 static inline void tdx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#106 lore raw

PATCH v16 103/116 KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore guest instruction emulation

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because TDX protects TDX guest state from VMM, instructions in guest memory cannot be emulated. Implement methods to ignore guest instruction emulator.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +26 -2
index 582fea1b60b6..5e4091dbf1e8 100644
@@ -331,6 +331,30 @@ static void vt_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 }
 #endif
 
+static bool vt_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+				       void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	return vmx_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, emul_type, insn, insn_len);
+}
+
+static int vt_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				 struct x86_instruction_info *info,
+				 enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
+				 struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	/*
+	 * This call back is triggered by the x86 instruction emulator. TDX
+	 * doesn't allow guest memory inspection.
+	 */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	return vmx_check_intercept(vcpu, info, stage, exception);
+}
+
 static bool vt_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -954,7 +978,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.load_mmu_pgd = vt_load_mmu_pgd,
 
-	.check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
+	.check_intercept = vt_check_intercept,
 	.handle_exit_irqoff = vt_handle_exit_irqoff,
 
 	.request_immediate_exit = vt_request_immediate_exit,
@@ -983,7 +1007,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.enable_smi_window = vt_enable_smi_window,
 #endif
 
-	.can_emulate_instruction = vmx_can_emulate_instruction,
+	.can_emulate_instruction = vt_can_emulate_instruction,
 	.apic_init_signal_blocked = vt_apic_init_signal_blocked,
 	.migrate_timers = vmx_migrate_timers,
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#107 lore raw

PATCH v16 104/116 KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore dirty logging

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Currently TDX KVM doesn't support tracking dirty pages (yet). Implement a method to ignore it. Because the flag for kvm memory slot to enable dirty logging isn't accepted for TDX, warn on the method is called for TDX.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +9 -1
index 5e4091dbf1e8..06eb0896a87a 100644
@@ -843,6 +843,14 @@ static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
 	return vmx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);
 }
 
+static void vt_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(vcpu);
+}
+
 static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -986,7 +994,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.sched_in = vt_sched_in,
 
 	.cpu_dirty_log_size = PML_ENTITY_NUM,
-	.update_cpu_dirty_logging = vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging,
+	.update_cpu_dirty_logging = vt_update_cpu_dirty_logging,
 
 	.nested_ops = &vmx_nested_ops,
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#108 lore raw

PATCH v16 105/116 KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore VMX preemption timer

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX doesn't support VMX preemption timer. Implement access methods for VMM to ignore VMX preemption timer.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +23 -2
index 06eb0896a87a..eb02a73f3bb0 100644
@@ -851,6 +851,27 @@ static void vt_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(vcpu);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static int vt_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
+			      bool *expired)
+{
+	/* VMX-preemption timer isn't available for TDX. */
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return vmx_set_hv_timer(vcpu, guest_deadline_tsc, expired);
+}
+
+static void vt_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* VMX-preemption timer can't be set.  See vt_set_hv_timer(). */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_cancel_hv_timer(vcpu);
+}
+#endif
+
 static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -1002,8 +1023,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.pi_start_assignment = vmx_pi_start_assignment,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	.set_hv_timer = vmx_set_hv_timer,
-	.cancel_hv_timer = vmx_cancel_hv_timer,
+	.set_hv_timer = vt_set_hv_timer,
+	.cancel_hv_timer = vt_cancel_hv_timer,
 #endif
 
 	.setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#109 lore raw

PATCH v16 106/116 KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to TSC

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX protects TDX guest TSC state from VMM. Implement access methods to ignore guest TSC.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +40 -4
index eb02a73f3bb0..d5ee4069f684 100644
@@ -843,6 +843,42 @@ static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
 	return vmx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);
 }
 
+static u64 vt_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* TDX doesn't support L2 guest at the moment. */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	return vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 vt_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* TDX doesn't support L2 guest at the moment. */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	return vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* In TDX, tsc offset can't be changed. */
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_write_tsc_offset(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* In TDX, tsc multiplier can't be changed. */
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
@@ -1000,10 +1036,10 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.has_wbinvd_exit = cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit,
 
-	.get_l2_tsc_offset = vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset,
-	.get_l2_tsc_multiplier = vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
-	.write_tsc_offset = vmx_write_tsc_offset,
-	.write_tsc_multiplier = vmx_write_tsc_multiplier,
+	.get_l2_tsc_offset = vt_get_l2_tsc_offset,
+	.get_l2_tsc_multiplier = vt_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
+	.write_tsc_offset = vt_write_tsc_offset,
+	.write_tsc_multiplier = vt_write_tsc_multiplier,
 
 	.load_mmu_pgd = vt_load_mmu_pgd,
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#110 lore raw

PATCH v16 107/116 KVM: TDX: Ignore setting up mce

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because vmx_set_mce function is VMX specific and it cannot be used for TDX. Add vt stub to ignore setting up mce for TDX.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +9 -1
index d5ee4069f684..df84a12aa232 100644
@@ -908,6 +908,14 @@ static void vt_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 }
 #endif
 
+static void vt_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_setup_mce(vcpu);
+}
+
 static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -1063,7 +1071,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.cancel_hv_timer = vt_cancel_hv_timer,
 #endif
 
-	.setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
+	.setup_mce = vt_setup_mce,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
 	.smi_allowed = vt_smi_allowed,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#111 lore raw

PATCH v16 108/116 KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore for TDX to ignore hypercall patch

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because guest TD memory is protected, VMM patching guest binary for hypercall instruction isn't possible. Add a method to ignore hypercall patching with a warning. Note: guest TD kernel needs to be modified to use TDG.VP.VMCALL for hypercall.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +14 -1
index df84a12aa232..0d0af3fadc75 100644
@@ -740,6 +740,19 @@ static u32 vt_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu);
 }
 
+static void vt_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  unsigned char *hypercall)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Because guest memory is protected, guest can't be patched. TD kernel
+	 * is modified to use TDG.VP.VMCAL for hypercall.
+	 */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_patch_hypercall(vcpu, hypercall);
+}
+
 static void vt_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -1008,7 +1021,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
 	.set_interrupt_shadow = vt_set_interrupt_shadow,
 	.get_interrupt_shadow = vt_get_interrupt_shadow,
-	.patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
+	.patch_hypercall = vt_patch_hypercall,
 	.inject_irq = vt_inject_irq,
 	.inject_nmi = vt_inject_nmi,
 	.inject_exception = vt_inject_exception,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#112 lore raw

PATCH v16 109/116 KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore virtual apic related operation

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX protects TDX guest APIC state from VMM. Implement access methods of TDX guest vAPIC state to ignore them or return zero.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     |  6 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  3 ++
 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +55 -6
index 0d0af3fadc75..eb44f5784f18 100644
@@ -363,6 +363,14 @@ static bool vt_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(vcpu);
 }
 
+static void vt_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return tdx_set_virtual_apic_mode(vcpu);
+
+	return vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct pi_desc *pi = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
@@ -371,6 +379,31 @@ static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	memset(pi->pir, 0, sizeof(pi->pir));
 }
 
+static void vt_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	return vmx_hwapic_irr_update(vcpu, max_irr);
+}
+
+static void vt_hwapic_isr_update(int max_isr)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(kvm_get_running_vcpu()))
+		return;
+
+	return vmx_hwapic_isr_update(max_isr);
+}
+
+static bool vt_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* TDX doesn't support L2 at the moment. */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+		return false;
+
+	return vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+
 static int vt_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -824,6 +857,22 @@ static void vt_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
 	vmx_update_cr8_intercept(vcpu, tpr, irr);
 }
 
+static void vt_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(vcpu);
+}
+
 static void vt_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
 {
 	if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -1033,15 +1082,15 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.enable_nmi_window = vt_enable_nmi_window,
 	.enable_irq_window = vt_enable_irq_window,
 	.update_cr8_intercept = vt_update_cr8_intercept,
-	.set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
-	.set_apic_access_page_addr = vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr,
-	.refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
+	.set_virtual_apic_mode = vt_set_virtual_apic_mode,
+	.set_apic_access_page_addr = vt_set_apic_access_page_addr,
+	.refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vt_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
 	.load_eoi_exitmap = vt_load_eoi_exitmap,
 	.apicv_post_state_restore = vt_apicv_post_state_restore,
 	.required_apicv_inhibits = VMX_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS,
-	.hwapic_irr_update = vmx_hwapic_irr_update,
-	.hwapic_isr_update = vmx_hwapic_isr_update,
-	.guest_apic_has_interrupt = vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt,
+	.hwapic_irr_update = vt_hwapic_irr_update,
+	.hwapic_isr_update = vt_hwapic_isr_update,
+	.guest_apic_has_interrupt = vt_guest_apic_has_interrupt,
 	.sync_pir_to_irr = vt_sync_pir_to_irr,
 	.deliver_interrupt = vt_deliver_interrupt,
 	.dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = pi_has_pending_interrupt,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +6 -0
index 1628e54d816b..527fbcd7e2c5 100644
@@ -2078,6 +2078,12 @@ void tdx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 }
 #endif
 
+void tdx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* Only x2APIC mode is supported for TD. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu) != LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC);
+}
+
 int tdx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return 0;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +3 -0
index 8dacab1bc3d7..7c377b7d76b9 100644
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
 bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write);
 int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
 int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
+void tdx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 int tdx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
@@ -220,6 +221,8 @@ static inline bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write) { return false; }
 static inline int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
 static inline int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
 
+static inline void tdx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+
 static inline int tdx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return 0; }
 static inline void tdx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg) {}
 static inline unsigned long tdx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return 0; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#113 lore raw

PATCH v16 110/116 KVM: TDX: Inhibit APICv for TDX guest

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX doesn't support APICV, inhibit APICv for TDX guest. Follow how SEV does it. Define a new inhibit reason for TDX, set it on TD initialization, and add the flag to kvm_x86_ops.required_apicv_inhibits.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c         | 3 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c          | 6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +9 -0
index 529c7e610d47..f0674ef1c17e 100644
@@ -1284,6 +1284,15 @@ enum kvm_apicv_inhibit {
 	 * mapping between logical ID and vCPU.
 	 */
 	APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_LOGICAL_ID_ALIASED,
+
+	/*********************************************************/
+	/* INHIBITs that are relevant only to the Intel's APICv. */
+	/*********************************************************/
+
+	/*
+	 * APICv is disabled because TDX doesn't support it.
+	 */
+	APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_TDX,
 };
 
 struct kvm_arch {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +2 -1
index eb44f5784f18..5d61f5306ae3 100644
@@ -1001,7 +1001,8 @@ static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
 	 BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ) |			\
 	 BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PHYSICAL_ID_ALIASED) |	\
 	 BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_ID_MODIFIED) |		\
-	 BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_BASE_MODIFIED))
+	 BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_BASE_MODIFIED) |		\
+	 BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_TDX))
 
 struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +6 -0
index 527fbcd7e2c5..924cbf97404a 100644
@@ -2486,6 +2486,8 @@ static int __tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct td_params *td_params,
 		goto teardown;
 	}
 
+	kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_TDX);
+
 	return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -2849,6 +2851,10 @@ static int tdx_td_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 vcpu_rcx)
 	}
 
 	vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_apicv_activated(vcpu->kvm));
+	vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active = false;
+
 	return 0;
 
 free_tdvpx:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#114 lore raw

PATCH v16 111/116 Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add documentation to Intel Trusted Domain Extensions(TDX) support.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst           |   9 +-
 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst     |   1 +
 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst | 362 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 371 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +8 -1
index 5e08f2a157ef..73d26dd62ddd 100644
@@ -1373,6 +1373,9 @@ the memory region are automatically reflected into the guest.  For example, an
 mmap() that affects the region will be made visible immediately.  Another
 example is madvise(MADV_DROP).
 
+For TDX guest, deleting/moving memory region loses guest memory contents.
+Read only region isn't supported.  Only as-id 0 is supported.
+
 Note: On arm64, a write generated by the page-table walker (to update
 the Access and Dirty flags, for example) never results in a
 KVM_EXIT_MMIO exit when the slot has the KVM_MEM_READONLY flag. This
@@ -4692,7 +4695,7 @@ H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall.
 
 :Capability: basic
 :Architectures: x86
-:Type: vm
+:Type: vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
 :Parameters: an opaque platform specific structure (in/out)
 :Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
 
@@ -4704,6 +4707,10 @@ Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Secure Encrypted Virtualization
 (SEV) commands on AMD Processors. The SEV commands are defined in
 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst.
 
+Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Trusted Domain Extensions
+(TDX) commands on Intel Processors. The TDX commands are defined in
+Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst.
+
 4.111 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION
 -----------------------------------
 
Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst +1 -0
index 9ece6b8dc817..851e99174762 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ KVM for x86 systems
    cpuid
    errata
    hypercalls
+   intel-tdx
    mmu
    msr
    nested-vmx
Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst new file +362 -0

362 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#115 lore raw

PATCH v16 112/116 KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU

In reply to [email protected]

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add a high level design document on TDX changes to TDP MMU.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst       |   1 +
 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst | 443 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 444 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst +1 -0
index 851e99174762..63a78bd41b16 100644
@@ -16,4 +16,5 @@ KVM for x86 systems
    msr
    nested-vmx
    running-nested-guests
+   tdx-tdp-mmu
    timekeeping
Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst new file +443 -0

443 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1