Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of changes for dunfell and have comments back by end of day Thursday, November 30
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/6252
The following changes since commit ff7dbcc0206203e2ece68ca91a37050a4bc822a2:
selftest: skip virgl test on all fedora (2023-11-14 06:35:38 -1000)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/dunfell-nut
http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/dunfell-nut
Archana Polampalli (1):
vim: Upgrade 9.0.2048 -> 9.0.2068
Etienne Cordonnier (1):
vim: update obsolete comment
Hitendra Prajapati (1):
grub: fix CVE-2023-4692 & CVE-2023-4693
Lee Chee Yang (3):
wayland: fix CVE-2021-3782
python3-setuptools: fix CVE-2022-40897
curl: fix CVE-2023-28321 CVE-2023-28322
Richard Purdie (1):
vim: Improve locale handling
Steve Sakoman (1):
vim: use upstream generated .po files
Vijay Anusuri (5):
libx11: Fix for CVE-2023-43785 CVE-2023-43786 and CVE-2023-43787
shadow: backport patch to fix CVE-2023-29383
bind: Backport fix for CVE-2023-3341
avahi: backport Debian patches to fix multiple CVE's
tiff: backport Debian patch to fix CVE-2022-40090
.../grub/files/CVE-2023-4692.patch | 97 ++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch | 62 ++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 2 + meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi.inc | 9 + .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-1981.patch | 60 ++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-1.patch | 48 ++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-2.patch | 65 +++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-1.patch | 57 ++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-2.patch | 53 ++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-1.patch | 73 +++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-2.patch | 52 ++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38472.patch | 45 ++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38473.patch | 109 ++++ .../bind/bind/CVE-2023-3341.patch | 175 ++++++ .../recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.37.bb | 1 + .../python/python-setuptools.inc | 2 + .../python3-setuptools/CVE-2022-40897.patch | 29 + .../files/0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch | 66 +++ .../shadow/files/CVE-2023-29383.patch | 54 ++ meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc | 2 + .../wayland/wayland/CVE-2021-3782.patch | 111 ++++ .../wayland/wayland_1.18.0.bb | 1 + .../xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43785.patch | 63 ++ .../xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43786-1.patch | 42 ++ .../xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43786-2.patch | 46 ++ .../xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43787-1.patch | 52 ++ .../xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43787-2.patch | 64 ++ .../recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11_1.6.9.bb | 5 + .../libtiff/files/CVE-2022-40090.patch | 548 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb | 1 + .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-28321.patch | 272 +++++++++ .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-28322.patch | 380 ++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb | 2 + meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 25 +- 34 files changed, 2658 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4692.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-1981.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38472.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38473.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2023-3341.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools/CVE-2022-40897.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-29383.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/wayland/wayland/CVE-2021-3782.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43785.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43786-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43786-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43787-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43787-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-40090.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28321.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28322.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 1/13 libx11: Fix for CVE-2023-43785 CVE-2023-43786 and CVE-2023-43787
From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
import patches from ubuntu to fix
CVE-2023-43785
CVE-2023-43786
CVE-2023-43787
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libx11/tree/debian/patches?h=ubuntu/focal-security
Upstream commit
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11/-/commit/6858d468d9ca55fb4c5fd70b223dbc78a3358a7f
&
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11/-/commit/204c3393c4c90a29ed6bef64e43849536e863a86
&
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11/-/commit/73a37d5f2fcadd6540159b432a70d80f442ddf4a
&
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11/-/commit/b4031fc023816aca07fbd592ed97010b9b48784b
&
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11/-/commit/7916869d16bdd115ac5be30a67c3749907aea6a0]
Reference: https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libx11/2:1.6.9-2ubuntu1.6
--- .../xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43785.patch | 63 ++++++++++++++++++ .../xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43786-1.patch | 42 ++++++++++++ .../xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43786-2.patch | 46 +++++++++++++ .../xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43787-1.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++ .../xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43787-2.patch | 64 +++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11_1.6.9.bb | 5 ++ 6 files changed, 272 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43785.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43786-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43786-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43787-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43787-2.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43785.patch new file +63 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From 6858d468d9ca55fb4c5fd70b223dbc78a3358a7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 17 Sep 2023 14:19:40 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH libX11 1/5] CVE-2023-43785: out-of-bounds memory access in + _XkbReadKeySyms() + +Make sure we allocate enough memory in the first place, and +also handle error returns from _XkbReadBufferCopyKeySyms() when +it detects out-of-bounds issues. + +Reported-by: Gregory James DUCK <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libx11/tree/debian/patches/0001-CVE-2023-43785-out-of-bounds-memory-access-in-_XkbRe.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security +Upstream commit https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11/-/commit/6858d468d9ca55fb4c5fd70b223dbc78a3358a7f] +CVE: CVE-2023-43785 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + src/xkb/XKBGetMap.c | 14 +++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/xkb/XKBGetMap.c b/src/xkb/XKBGetMap.c +index 2891d21e..31199e4a 100644 +--- a/src/xkb/XKBGetMap.c ++++ b/src/xkb/XKBGetMap.c +@@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ _XkbReadKeySyms(XkbReadBufferPtr buf, XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbGetMapReply *rep) + if (offset + newMap->nSyms >= map->size_syms) { + register int sz; + +- sz = map->size_syms + 128; ++ sz = offset + newMap->nSyms; ++ sz = ((sz + (unsigned) 128) / 128) * 128; + _XkbResizeArray(map->syms, map->size_syms, sz, KeySym); + if (map->syms == NULL) { + map->size_syms = 0; +@@ -191,8 +192,9 @@ _XkbReadKeySyms(XkbReadBufferPtr buf, XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbGetMapReply *rep) + map->size_syms = sz; + } + if (newMap->nSyms > 0) { +- _XkbReadBufferCopyKeySyms(buf, (KeySym *) &map->syms[offset], +- newMap->nSyms); ++ if (_XkbReadBufferCopyKeySyms(buf, (KeySym *) &map->syms[offset], ++ newMap->nSyms) == 0) ++ return BadLength; + offset += newMap->nSyms; + } + else { +@@ -222,8 +224,10 @@ _XkbReadKeySyms(XkbReadBufferPtr buf, XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbGetMapReply *rep) + newSyms = XkbResizeKeySyms(xkb, i + rep->firstKeySym, tmp); + if (newSyms == NULL) + return BadAlloc; +- if (newMap->nSyms > 0) +- _XkbReadBufferCopyKeySyms(buf, newSyms, newMap->nSyms); ++ if (newMap->nSyms > 0) { ++ if (_XkbReadBufferCopyKeySyms(buf, newSyms, newMap->nSyms) == 0) ++ return BadLength; ++ } + else + newSyms[0] = NoSymbol; + oldMap->kt_index[0] = newMap->ktIndex[0]; +-- +2.39.3 +
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43786-1.patch new file +42 -0
42 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43786-2.patch new file +46 -0
46 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43787-1.patch new file +52 -0
52 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11/CVE-2023-43787-2.patch new file +64 -0
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meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libx11_1.6.9.bb +5 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ SRC_URI += "file://Fix-hanging-issue-in-_XReply.patch \ file://CVE-2022-3554.patch \ file://CVE-2022-3555.patch \ file://CVE-2023-3138.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-43785.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-43786-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-43786-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-43787-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-43787-2.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "55adbfb6d4370ecac5e70598c4e7eed2"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 2/13 wayland: fix CVE-2021-3782
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
take CVE-2021-3782.patch from OE-core rev 09b8ff8d2361b2db001bc963f481db294ccf2170.
--- .../wayland/wayland/CVE-2021-3782.patch | 111 ++++++++++++++++++ .../wayland/wayland_1.18.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/wayland/wayland/CVE-2021-3782.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/wayland/wayland/CVE-2021-3782.patch new file +111 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +From 5eed6609619cc2e4eaa8618d11c15d442abf54be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Derek Foreman <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 13:18:37 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] util: Limit size of wl_map + +Since server IDs are basically indistinguishable from really big client +IDs at many points in the source, it's theoretically possible to overflow +a map and either overflow server IDs into the client ID space, or grow +client IDs into the server ID space. This would currently take a massive +amount of RAM, but the definition of massive changes yearly. + +Prevent this by placing a ridiculous but arbitrary upper bound on the +number of items we can put in a map: 0xF00000, somewhere over 15 million. +This should satisfy pathological clients without restriction, but stays +well clear of the 0xFF000000 transition point between server and client +IDs. It will still take an improbable amount of RAM to hit this, and a +client could still exhaust all RAM in this way, but our goal is to prevent +overflow and undefined behaviour. + +Fixes #224 + +Signed-off-by: Derek Foreman <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2021-3782 + +Reference to upstream patch: +https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/wayland/wayland/-/commit/b19488c7154b902354cb26a27f11415d7799b0b2 + +[DP: adjust context for wayland version 1.20.0] +Signed-off-by: Dragos-Marian Panait <[email protected]> +--- + src/wayland-private.h | 1 + + src/wayland-util.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/wayland-private.h b/src/wayland-private.h +index 9bf8cb7..35dc40e 100644 +--- a/src/wayland-private.h ++++ b/src/wayland-private.h +@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ + #define WL_MAP_SERVER_SIDE 0 + #define WL_MAP_CLIENT_SIDE 1 + #define WL_SERVER_ID_START 0xff000000 ++#define WL_MAP_MAX_OBJECTS 0x00f00000 + #define WL_CLOSURE_MAX_ARGS 20 + + struct wl_object { +diff --git a/src/wayland-util.c b/src/wayland-util.c +index d5973bf..3e45d19 100644 +--- a/src/wayland-util.c ++++ b/src/wayland-util.c +@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ wl_map_insert_new(struct wl_map *map, uint32_t flags, void *data) + union map_entry *start, *entry; + struct wl_array *entries; + uint32_t base; ++ uint32_t count; + + if (map->side == WL_MAP_CLIENT_SIDE) { + entries = &map->client_entries; +@@ -215,10 +216,25 @@ wl_map_insert_new(struct wl_map *map, uint32_t flags, void *data) + start = entries->data; + } + ++ /* wl_array only grows, so if we have too many objects at ++ * this point there's no way to clean up. We could be more ++ * pro-active about trying to avoid this allocation, but ++ * it doesn't really matter because at this point there is ++ * nothing to be done but disconnect the client and delete ++ * the whole array either way. ++ */ ++ count = entry - start; ++ if (count > WL_MAP_MAX_OBJECTS) { ++ /* entry->data is freshly malloced garbage, so we'd ++ * better make it a NULL so wl_map_for_each doesn't ++ * dereference it later. */ ++ entry->data = NULL; ++ return 0; ++ } + entry->data = data; + entry->next |= (flags & 0x1) << 1; + +- return (entry - start) + base; ++ return count + base; + } + + int +@@ -235,6 +251,9 @@ wl_map_insert_at(struct wl_map *map, uint32_t flags, uint32_t i, void *data) + i -= WL_SERVER_ID_START; + } + ++ if (i > WL_MAP_MAX_OBJECTS) ++ return -1; ++ + count = entries->size / sizeof *start; + if (count < i) + return -1; +@@ -269,8 +288,10 @@ wl_map_reserve_new(struct wl_map *map, uint32_t i) + i -= WL_SERVER_ID_START; + } + +- count = entries->size / sizeof *start; ++ if (i > WL_MAP_MAX_OBJECTS) ++ return -1; + ++ count = entries->size / sizeof *start; + if (count < i) + return -1; + +-- +2.37.3
meta/recipes-graphics/wayland/wayland_1.18.0.bb +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://wayland.freedesktop.org/releases/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0002-Do-not-hardcode-the-path-to-wayland-scanner.patch \ file://0001-build-Fix-strndup-detection-on-MinGW.patch \ file://0001-meson-tests-add-missing-dependencies-on-protocol-hea.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3782.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "23317697b6e3ff2e1ac8c5ba3ed57b65" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4675a79f091020817a98fd0484e7208c8762242266967f55a67776936c2e294d"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 3/13 python3-setuptools: fix CVE-2022-40897
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
import patch from ubuntu setuptools_45.2.0-1ubuntu0.1 .
--- .../python/python-setuptools.inc | 2 ++ .../python3-setuptools/CVE-2022-40897.patch | 29 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools/CVE-2022-40897.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python-setuptools.inc +2 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ PYPI_PACKAGE_EXT = "zip" inherit pypi +SRC_URI += " file://CVE-2022-40897.patch " + SRC_URI_append_class-native = " file://0001-conditionally-do-not-fetch-code-by-easy_install.patch" SRC_URI[md5sum] = "0c956eea142af9c2b02d72e3c042af30"
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools/CVE-2022-40897.patch new file +29 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From 43a9c9bfa6aa626ec2a22540bea28d2ca77964be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason R. Coombs" <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2022 13:47:53 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Limit the amount of whitespace to search/backtrack. Fixes + #3659. + +CVE: CVE-2022-40897 +Upstream-Status: Backport [ +Upstream : https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/43a9c9bfa6aa626ec2a22540bea28d2ca77964be +Import from Ubuntu: http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/s/setuptools/setuptools_45.2.0-1ubuntu0.1.debian.tar.xz +] +Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]> + +--- + setuptools/package_index.py | 2 +- + setuptools/tests/test_packageindex.py | 1 - + 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- setuptools-45.2.0.orig/setuptools/package_index.py ++++ setuptools-45.2.0/setuptools/package_index.py +@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ def unique_values(func): + return wrapper + + +-REL = re.compile(r"""<([^>]*\srel\s*=\s*['"]?([^'">]+)[^>]*)>""", re.I) ++REL = re.compile(r"""<([^>]*\srel\s{0,10}=\s{0,10}['"]?([^'" >]+)[^>]*)>""", re.I) + # this line is here to fix emacs' cruddy broken syntax highlighting + +
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 4/13 shadow: backport patch to fix CVE-2023-29383
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
The fix of CVE-2023-29383.patch contains a bug that it rejects all characters that are not control ones, so backup another patch named "0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch" from upstream to fix it.
(From OE-Core rev: ab48ab23de6f6bb1f05689c97724140d4bef8faa)
Upstream-Status: Backport
[https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/e5905c4b84d4fb90aefcd96ee618411ebfac663d
&
https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4]
--- .../files/0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch | 66 +++++++++++++++++++ .../shadow/files/CVE-2023-29383.patch | 54 +++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc | 2 + 3 files changed, 122 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-29383.patch
meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch new file +66 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From 2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:46:50 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Overhaul valid_field() + +e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for +control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all +characters that are not control ones. + +Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character +checking functions to avoid UB. + +Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4] + +Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + lib/fields.c | 24 ++++++++++-------------- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c +index fb51b582..53929248 100644 +--- a/lib/fields.c ++++ b/lib/fields.c +@@ -37,26 +37,22 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal) + + /* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list + * of illegal characters. */ ++ if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) { ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ /* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */ + for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) { +- if (strchr (illegal, *cp) != NULL) { ++ unsigned char c = *cp; ++ if (!isprint (c)) { ++ err = 1; ++ } ++ if (iscntrl (c)) { + err = -1; + break; + } + } + +- if (0 == err) { +- /* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */ +- for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) { +- if (!isprint (*cp)) { +- err = 1; +- } +- if (!iscntrl (*cp)) { +- err = -1; +- break; +- } +- } +- } +- + return err; + } + +-- +2.34.1 +
meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-29383.patch new file +54 -0
54 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc +2 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/${PV}/${BP}. file://shadow-4.1.3-dots-in-usernames.patch \ ${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'pam', '${PAM_SRC_URI}', '', d)} \ file://shadow-relaxed-usernames.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-29383.patch \ + file://0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_class-target = " \
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 5/13 curl: fix CVE-2023-28321 CVE-2023-28322
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
import patch from ubuntu curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.20.
minor change to CVE-2023-28321.patch tests/data/test1397 part so the patch can be apply.
--- .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-28321.patch | 272 +++++++++++++ .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-28322.patch | 380 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 654 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28321.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28322.patch
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28321.patch new file +272 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.20 with +minor change to tests/data/test1397 part so the patch can be apply. +upstream: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/199f2d440d8659b42 ] +CVE: CVE-2023-28321 +Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]> + +This backport was obtained from SUSE. + +From 199f2d440d8659b42670c1b796220792b01a97bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2023 21:07:02 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] hostcheck: fix host name wildcard checking + +The leftmost "label" of the host name can now only match against single +'*'. Like the browsers have worked for a long time. + +- extended unit test 1397 for this +- move some SOURCE variables from unit/Makefile.am to unit/Makefile.inc + +Reported-by: Hiroki Kurosawa +Closes #11018 +--- + lib/hostcheck.c | 50 +++++++-------- + tests/data/test1397 | 10 ++- + tests/unit/Makefile.am | 94 ---------------------------- + tests/unit/Makefile.inc | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + tests/unit/unit1397.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- + 5 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 180 deletions(-) + +--- a/lib/hostcheck.c ++++ b/lib/hostcheck.c +@@ -58,15 +58,19 @@ + * apparent distinction between a name and an IP. We need to detect the use of + * an IP address and not wildcard match on such names. + * ++ * Only match on "*" being used for the leftmost label, not "a*", "a*b" nor ++ * "*b". ++ * ++ * @unittest: 1397 ++ * + * NOTE: hostmatch() gets called with copied buffers so that it can modify the + * contents at will. + */ + + static int hostmatch(char *hostname, char *pattern) + { +- const char *pattern_label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end; +- int wildcard_enabled; +- size_t prefixlen, suffixlen; ++ const char *pattern_label_end, *hostname_label_end; ++ size_t suffixlen; + struct in_addr ignored; + #ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + struct sockaddr_in6 si6; +@@ -80,13 +84,12 @@ static int hostmatch(char *hostname, cha + if(pattern[len-1]=='.') + pattern[len-1] = 0; + +- pattern_wildcard = strchr(pattern, '*'); +- if(pattern_wildcard == NULL) ++ if(strncmp(pattern, "*.", 2)) + return strcasecompare(pattern, hostname) ? + CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; + + /* detect IP address as hostname and fail the match if so */ +- if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &ignored) > 0) ++ else if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &ignored) > 0) + return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; + #ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &si6.sin6_addr) > 0) +@@ -95,14 +98,9 @@ static int hostmatch(char *hostname, cha + + /* We require at least 2 dots in pattern to avoid too wide wildcard + match. */ +- wildcard_enabled = 1; + pattern_label_end = strchr(pattern, '.'); +- if(pattern_label_end == NULL || strchr(pattern_label_end + 1, '.') == NULL || +- pattern_wildcard > pattern_label_end || +- strncasecompare(pattern, "xn--", 4)) { +- wildcard_enabled = 0; +- } +- if(!wildcard_enabled) ++ if(pattern_label_end == NULL || ++ strchr(pattern_label_end + 1, '.') == NULL) + return strcasecompare(pattern, hostname) ? + CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; + +@@ -117,11 +115,9 @@ static int hostmatch(char *hostname, cha + if(hostname_label_end - hostname < pattern_label_end - pattern) + return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; + +- prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern; +- suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern_wildcard + 1); +- return strncasecompare(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) && +- strncasecompare(pattern_wildcard + 1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen, +- suffixlen) ? ++ suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern + 1); ++ return strncasecompare(pattern + 1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen, ++ suffixlen) ? + CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; + } + +--- a/tests/data/test1397 ++++ b/tests/data/test1397 +@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@ + <info> + <keywords> + unittest +-ssl +-wildcard ++Curl_cert_hostcheck + </keywords> + </info> + +@@ -16,9 +15,8 @@ none + <features> + unittest + </features> +- <name> +-Check wildcard certificate matching function Curl_cert_hostcheck +- </name> ++<name> ++Curl_cert_hostcheck unit tests ++</name> + </client> +- + </testcase> +--- a/tests/unit/unit1397.c ++++ b/tests/unit/unit1397.c +@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ + ***************************************************************************/ + #include "curlcheck.h" + +-#include "hostcheck.h" /* from the lib dir */ +- + static CURLcode unit_setup(void) + { + return CURLE_OK; +@@ -30,50 +28,94 @@ static CURLcode unit_setup(void) + + static void unit_stop(void) + { +- /* done before shutting down and exiting */ + } + +-UNITTEST_START ++* only these backends define the tested functions */ ++#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_GSKIT) || \ ++ defined(USE_SCHANNEL) ++#include "hostcheck.h" ++struct testcase { ++ const char *host; ++ const char *pattern; ++ bool match; ++}; ++ ++static struct testcase tests[] = { ++ {"", "", FALSE}, ++ {"a", "", FALSE}, ++ {"", "b", FALSE}, ++ {"a", "b", FALSE}, ++ {"aa", "bb", FALSE}, ++ {"\xff", "\xff", TRUE}, ++ {"aa.aa.aa", "aa.aa.bb", FALSE}, ++ {"aa.aa.aa", "aa.aa.aa", TRUE}, ++ {"aa.aa.aa", "*.aa.bb", FALSE}, ++ {"aa.aa.aa", "*.aa.aa", TRUE}, ++ {"192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1", TRUE}, ++ {"192.168.0.1", "*.168.0.1", FALSE}, ++ {"192.168.0.1", "*.0.1", FALSE}, ++ {"h.ello", "*.ello", FALSE}, ++ {"h.ello.", "*.ello", FALSE}, ++ {"h.ello", "*.ello.", FALSE}, ++ {"h.e.llo", "*.e.llo", TRUE}, ++ {"h.e.llo", " *.e.llo", FALSE}, ++ {" h.e.llo", "*.e.llo", TRUE}, ++ {"h.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE}, ++ {"*.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE}, ++ {"************.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE}, ++ {"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" ++ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" ++ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC" ++ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD" ++ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE" ++ ".e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE}, ++ {"\xfe\xfe.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE}, ++ {"h.e.llo.", "*.e.llo.", TRUE}, ++ {"h.e.llo", "*.e.llo.", TRUE}, ++ {".h.e.llo", "*.e.llo.", FALSE}, ++ {"h.e.llo", "*.*.llo.", FALSE}, ++ {"h.e.llo", "h.*.llo", FALSE}, ++ {"h.e.llo", "h.e.*", FALSE}, ++ {"hello", "*.ello", FALSE}, ++ {"hello", "**llo", FALSE}, ++ {"bar.foo.example.com", "*.example.com", FALSE}, ++ {"foo.example.com", "*.example.com", TRUE}, ++ {"baz.example.net", "b*z.example.net", FALSE}, ++ {"foobaz.example.net", "*baz.example.net", FALSE}, ++ {"xn--l8j.example.local", "x*.example.local", FALSE}, ++ {"xn--l8j.example.net", "*.example.net", TRUE}, ++ {"xn--l8j.example.net", "*j.example.net", FALSE}, ++ {"xn--l8j.example.net", "xn--l8j.example.net", TRUE}, ++ {"xn--l8j.example.net", "xn--l8j.*.net", FALSE}, ++ {"xl8j.example.net", "*.example.net", TRUE}, ++ {"fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", "*::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", FALSE}, ++ {"fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", "fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", TRUE}, ++ {NULL, NULL, FALSE} ++}; + +-/* only these backends define the tested functions */ +-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_GSKIT) ++UNITTEST_START ++{ ++ int i; ++ for(i = 0; tests[i].host; i++) { ++ if(tests[i].match != Curl_cert_hostcheck(tests[i].pattern, ++ tests[i].host)) { ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "HOST: %s\n" ++ "PTRN: %s\n" ++ "did %sMATCH\n", ++ tests[i].host, ++ tests[i].pattern, ++ tests[i].match ? "NOT ": ""); ++ unitfail++; ++ } ++ } ++} + +- /* here you start doing things and checking that the results are good */ ++UNITTEST_STOP ++#else + +-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("www.example.com", "www.example.com"), +- "good 1"); +-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.com", "www.example.com"), +- "good 2"); +-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("xxx*.example.com", "xxxwww.example.com"), +- "good 3"); +-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("f*.example.com", "foo.example.com"), +- "good 4"); +-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("192.168.0.0", "192.168.0.0"), +- "good 5"); +- +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("xxx.example.com", "www.example.com"), "bad 1"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*", "www.example.com"), "bad 2"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.*.com", "www.example.com"), "bad 3"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.com", "baa.foo.example.com"), "bad 4"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("f*.example.com", "baa.example.com"), "bad 5"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.com", "example.com"), "bad 6"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*fail.com", "example.com"), "bad 7"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.", "www.example."), "bad 8"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.", "www.example"), "bad 9"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("", "www"), "bad 10"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*", "www"), "bad 11"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.168.0.0", "192.168.0.0"), "bad 12"); +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("www.example.com", "192.168.0.0"), "bad 13"); +- +-#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", +- "fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619"), "bad 14"); +-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", +- "fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619"), "good 6"); +-#endif ++UNITTEST_START + ++UNITTEST_STOP + #endif + +- /* you end the test code like this: */ +- +-UNITTEST_STOP
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28322.patch new file +380 -0
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meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb +2 -0
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://CVE-2023-32001.patch \ file://CVE-2023-38545.patch \ file://CVE-2023-38546.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-28321.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-28322.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ec5fc263f898a3dfef08e805f1ecca42"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 6/13 bind: Backport fix for CVE-2023-3341
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/commit/c4fac5ca98efd02fbaef43601627c7a3a09f5a71]
--- .../bind/bind/CVE-2023-3341.patch | 175 ++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.37.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 176 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2023-3341.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2023-3341.patch new file +175 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +From c4fac5ca98efd02fbaef43601627c7a3a09f5a71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Andrews <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 15:21:36 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Limit isccc_cc_fromwire recursion depth + +Named and rndc do not need a lot of recursion so the depth is +set to 10. + +Taken from BIND 9.16.44 change. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/commit/c4fac5ca98efd02fbaef43601627c7a3a09f5a71] +CVE: CVE-2023-3341 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + lib/isccc/cc.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- + lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h | 4 +++- + lib/isccc/result.c | 4 +++- + 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/isccc/cc.c b/lib/isccc/cc.c +index e012685..8eac3d6 100644 +--- a/lib/isccc/cc.c ++++ b/lib/isccc/cc.c +@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ + + #define MAX_TAGS 256 + #define DUP_LIFETIME 900 ++#ifndef ISCCC_MAXDEPTH ++#define ISCCC_MAXDEPTH \ ++ 10 /* Big enough for rndc which just sends a string each way. */ ++#endif + + typedef isccc_sexpr_t *sexpr_ptr; + +@@ -561,19 +565,25 @@ verify(isccc_sexpr_t *alist, unsigned char *data, unsigned int length, + + static isc_result_t + table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret, +- uint32_t algorithm, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp); ++ uint32_t algorithm, unsigned int depth, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp); + + static isc_result_t +-list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **listp); ++list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, unsigned int depth, ++ isccc_sexpr_t **listp); + + static isc_result_t +-value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) { ++value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, unsigned int depth, ++ isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) { + unsigned int msgtype; + uint32_t len; + isccc_sexpr_t *value; + isccc_region_t active; + isc_result_t result; + ++ if (depth > ISCCC_MAXDEPTH) { ++ return (ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH); ++ } ++ + if (REGION_SIZE(*source) < 1 + 4) + return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND); + GET8(msgtype, source->rstart); +@@ -591,9 +601,9 @@ value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) { + } else + result = ISC_R_NOMEMORY; + } else if (msgtype == ISCCC_CCMSGTYPE_TABLE) +- result = table_fromwire(&active, NULL, 0, valuep); ++ result = table_fromwire(&active, NULL, 0, depth + 1, valuep); + else if (msgtype == ISCCC_CCMSGTYPE_LIST) +- result = list_fromwire(&active, valuep); ++ result = list_fromwire(&active, depth + 1, valuep); + else + result = ISCCC_R_SYNTAX; + +@@ -602,7 +612,7 @@ value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) { + + static isc_result_t + table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret, +- uint32_t algorithm, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp) ++ uint32_t algorithm, unsigned int depth, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp) + { + char key[256]; + uint32_t len; +@@ -613,6 +623,10 @@ table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret, + + REQUIRE(alistp != NULL && *alistp == NULL); + ++ if (depth > ISCCC_MAXDEPTH) { ++ return (ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH); ++ } ++ + checksum_rstart = NULL; + first_tag = true; + alist = isccc_alist_create(); +@@ -628,7 +642,7 @@ table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret, + GET_MEM(key, len, source->rstart); + key[len] = '\0'; /* Ensure NUL termination. */ + value = NULL; +- result = value_fromwire(source, &value); ++ result = value_fromwire(source, depth + 1, &value); + if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) + goto bad; + if (isccc_alist_define(alist, key, value) == NULL) { +@@ -661,14 +675,18 @@ table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret, + } + + static isc_result_t +-list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **listp) { ++list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, unsigned int depth, isccc_sexpr_t **listp) { + isccc_sexpr_t *list, *value; + isc_result_t result; + ++ if (depth > ISCCC_MAXDEPTH) { ++ return (ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH); ++ } ++ + list = NULL; + while (!REGION_EMPTY(*source)) { + value = NULL; +- result = value_fromwire(source, &value); ++ result = value_fromwire(source, depth + 1, &value); + if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { + isccc_sexpr_free(&list); + return (result); +@@ -699,7 +717,7 @@ isccc_cc_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp, + if (version != 1) + return (ISCCC_R_UNKNOWNVERSION); + +- return (table_fromwire(source, secret, algorithm, alistp)); ++ return (table_fromwire(source, secret, algorithm, 0, alistp)); + } + + static isc_result_t +diff --git a/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h b/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h +index 6c79dd7..a85861c 100644 +--- a/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h ++++ b/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h +@@ -47,8 +47,10 @@ + #define ISCCC_R_CLOCKSKEW (ISC_RESULTCLASS_ISCCC + 4) + /*% Duplicate */ + #define ISCCC_R_DUPLICATE (ISC_RESULTCLASS_ISCCC + 5) ++/*% Maximum recursion depth */ ++#define ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH (ISC_RESULTCLASS_ISCCC + 6) + +-#define ISCCC_R_NRESULTS 6 /*%< Number of results */ ++#define ISCCC_R_NRESULTS 7 /*%< Number of results */ + + ISC_LANG_BEGINDECLS + +diff --git a/lib/isccc/result.c b/lib/isccc/result.c +index 8419bbb..325200b 100644 +--- a/lib/isccc/result.c ++++ b/lib/isccc/result.c +@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ static const char *text[ISCCC_R_NRESULTS] = { + "bad auth", /* 3 */ + "expired", /* 4 */ + "clock skew", /* 5 */ +- "duplicate" /* 6 */ ++ "duplicate", /* 6 */ ++ "max depth", /* 7 */ + }; + + static const char *ids[ISCCC_R_NRESULTS] = { +@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ static const char *ids[ISCCC_R_NRESULTS] = { + "ISCCC_R_EXPIRED", + "ISCCC_R_CLOCKSKEW", + "ISCCC_R_DUPLICATE", ++ "ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH", + }; + + #define ISCCC_RESULT_RESULTSET 2 +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.37.bb +1 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2022-38177.patch \ file://CVE-2022-38178.patch \ file://CVE-2023-2828.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-3341.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0d8efbe7ec166ada90e46add4267b7e7c934790cba9bd5af6b8380a4fbfb5aff"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 7/13 avahi: backport Debian patches to fix multiple CVE's
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
import patches from ubuntu to fix
CVE-2023-1981
CVE-2023-38469
CVE-2023-38470
CVE-2023-38471
CVE-2023-38472
CVE-2023-38473
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/avahi/tree/debian/patches?h=ubuntu/focal-security
Upstream commit
https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/a2696da2f2c50ac43b6c4903f72290d5c3fa9f6f
&
https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/a337a1ba7d15853fb56deef1f464529af6e3a1cf
&
https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/c6cab87df290448a63323c8ca759baa516166237
&
https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/94cb6489114636940ac683515417990b55b5d66c
&
https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/20dec84b2480821704258bc908e7b2bd2e883b24
&
https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/894f085f402e023a98cbb6f5a3d117bd88d93b09
&
https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/b675f70739f404342f7f78635d6e2dcd85a13460
&
https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/b024ae5749f4aeba03478e6391687c3c9c8dee40
&
https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/b448c9f771bada14ae8de175695a9729f8646797]
--- meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi.inc | 9 ++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-1981.patch | 60 ++++++++++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-1.patch | 48 ++++++++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-2.patch | 65 +++++++++++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-1.patch | 57 +++++++++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-2.patch | 53 +++++++++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-1.patch | 73 ++++++++++++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-2.patch | 52 +++++++++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38472.patch | 45 ++++++++ .../avahi/files/CVE-2023-38473.patch | 109 ++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 571 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-1981.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38472.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38473.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi.inc +9 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,15 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=2d5025d4aa3495befef8f17206a5b0a1 \ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/releases/download/v${PV}/avahi-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://fix-CVE-2017-6519.patch \ file://CVE-2021-3468.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-1981.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38469-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38469-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38470-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38470-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38471-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38471-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38472.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38473.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/releases/"
meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-1981.patch new file +60 -0
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meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-1.patch new file +48 -0
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meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-2.patch new file +65 -0
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meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-1.patch new file +57 -0
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meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-2.patch new file +53 -0
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meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-1.patch new file +73 -0
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meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-2.patch new file +52 -0
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meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38472.patch new file +45 -0
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meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38473.patch new file +109 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 8/13 grub: fix CVE-2023-4692 & CVE-2023-4693
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Upstream-Status: Backport from https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea && https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94
--- .../grub/files/CVE-2023-4692.patch | 97 +++++++++++++++++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch | 62 ++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 2 + 3 files changed, 161 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4692.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4692.patch new file +97 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +From 43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Maxim Suhanov <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:31:57 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST + attribute for the $MFT file + +When parsing an extremely fragmented $MFT file, i.e., the file described +using the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute, current NTFS code will reuse a buffer +containing bytes read from the underlying drive to store sector numbers, +which are consumed later to read data from these sectors into another buffer. + +These sectors numbers, two 32-bit integers, are always stored at predefined +offsets, 0x10 and 0x14, relative to first byte of the selected entry within +the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute. Usually, this won't cause any problem. + +However, when parsing a specially-crafted file system image, this may cause +the NTFS code to write these integers beyond the buffer boundary, likely +causing the GRUB memory allocator to misbehave or fail. These integers contain +values which are controlled by on-disk structures of the NTFS file system. + +Such modification and resulting misbehavior may touch a memory range not +assigned to the GRUB and owned by firmware or another EFI application/driver. + +This fix introduces checks to ensure that these sector numbers are never +written beyond the boundary. + +Fixes: CVE-2023-4692 + +Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea] +CVE: CVE-2023-4692 +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +index 2f34f76..c8d3683 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + } + if (at->attr_end) + { +- grub_uint8_t *pa; ++ grub_uint8_t *pa, *pa_end; + + at->emft_buf = grub_malloc (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR); + if (at->emft_buf == NULL) +@@ -209,11 +209,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + } + at->attr_nxt = at->edat_buf; + at->attr_end = at->edat_buf + u32at (pa, 0x30); ++ pa_end = at->edat_buf + n; + } + else + { + at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14); + at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4); ++ pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR); + } + at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST; + while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end) +@@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS; + at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt; + pa = at->attr_cur; ++ ++ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x10, + grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start)); + grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x14, +@@ -240,6 +249,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + { + if (*pa != attr) + break; ++ ++ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + if (read_attr + (at, pa + 0x10, + u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR), +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch new file +62 -0
62 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +2 -0
@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2020-27749.patch \ file://CVE-2021-20225.patch \ file://CVE-2021-20233.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-4692.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-4693.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 9/13 tiff: backport Debian patch to fix CVE-2022-40090
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
import patch from ubuntu to fix
CVE-2022-40090
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/tiff/tree/debian/patches?h=ubuntu/focal-security
Upstream commit
https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/c7caec9a4d8f24c17e667480d2c7d0d51c9fae41]
--- .../libtiff/files/CVE-2022-40090.patch | 548 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 549 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-40090.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-40090.patch new file +548 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,548 @@ +From d385738335deb0c4bb70449f12e411f2203c0d01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Su_Laus <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2022 21:20:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Improved IFD-Loop Handling (fixes #455) + +Basic approach: +- The order in the entire chain must be checked, and not only whether an offset has already been read once. +- To do this, pairs of directory number and offset are stored and checked. +- The offset of a directory number can change. +- TIFFAdvanceDirectory() must also perform an IFD loop check. +- TIFFCheckDirOffset() is replaced by _TIFFCheckDirNumberAndOffset(). + +Rules for the check: +- If an offset is already in the list, it must have the same IFD number. Otherwise it is an IDF loop. +- If the offset is not in the list and the IFD number is greater than there are list entries, a new list entry is added. +- Otherwise, the offset of the IFD number is updated. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/tiff/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-40090.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security +Upstream commit +https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/c7caec9a4d8f24c17e667480d2c7d0d51c9fae41] +CVE: CVE-2022-40090 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + libtiff/tif_close.c | 6 ++- + libtiff/tif_dir.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- + libtiff/tif_dir.h | 1 + + libtiff/tif_dirread.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- + libtiff/tif_open.c | 3 +- + libtiff/tiffiop.h | 3 +- + 6 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) + +--- tiff-4.1.0+git191117.orig/libtiff/tif_close.c ++++ tiff-4.1.0+git191117/libtiff/tif_close.c +@@ -52,8 +52,10 @@ TIFFCleanup(TIFF* tif) + (*tif->tif_cleanup)(tif); + TIFFFreeDirectory(tif); + +- if (tif->tif_dirlist) +- _TIFFfree(tif->tif_dirlist); ++ if (tif->tif_dirlistoff) ++ _TIFFfree(tif->tif_dirlistoff); ++ if (tif->tif_dirlistdirn) ++ _TIFFfree(tif->tif_dirlistdirn); + + /* + * Clean up client info links. +--- tiff-4.1.0+git191117.orig/libtiff/tif_dir.c ++++ tiff-4.1.0+git191117/libtiff/tif_dir.c +@@ -1463,12 +1463,22 @@ TIFFDefaultDirectory(TIFF* tif) + } + + static int +-TIFFAdvanceDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint64* nextdir, uint64* off) ++TIFFAdvanceDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint64* nextdiroff, uint64* off, uint16* nextdirnum) + { + static const char module[] = "TIFFAdvanceDirectory"; ++ ++ /* Add this directory to the directory list, if not already in. */ ++ if (!_TIFFCheckDirNumberAndOffset(tif, *nextdirnum, *nextdiroff)) { ++ TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Starting directory %hu at offset 0x%lx (%lu) might cause an IFD loop", ++ *nextdirnum, *nextdiroff, *nextdiroff); ++ *nextdiroff = 0; ++ *nextdirnum = 0; ++ return(0); ++ } ++ + if (isMapped(tif)) + { +- uint64 poff=*nextdir; ++ uint64 poff=*nextdiroff; + if (!(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_BIGTIFF)) + { + tmsize_t poffa,poffb,poffc,poffd; +@@ -1479,7 +1489,7 @@ TIFFAdvanceDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint64* + if (((uint64)poffa!=poff)||(poffb<poffa)||(poffb<(tmsize_t)sizeof(uint16))||(poffb>tif->tif_size)) + { + TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Error fetching directory count"); +- *nextdir=0; ++ *nextdiroff=0; + return(0); + } + _TIFFmemcpy(&dircount,tif->tif_base+poffa,sizeof(uint16)); +@@ -1497,7 +1507,7 @@ TIFFAdvanceDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint64* + _TIFFmemcpy(&nextdir32,tif->tif_base+poffc,sizeof(uint32)); + if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB) + TIFFSwabLong(&nextdir32); +- *nextdir=nextdir32; ++ *nextdiroff=nextdir32; + } + else + { +@@ -1529,11 +1539,10 @@ TIFFAdvanceDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint64* + } + if (off!=NULL) + *off=(uint64)poffc; +- _TIFFmemcpy(nextdir,tif->tif_base+poffc,sizeof(uint64)); ++ _TIFFmemcpy(nextdiroff,tif->tif_base+poffc,sizeof(uint64)); + if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB) +- TIFFSwabLong8(nextdir); ++ TIFFSwabLong8(nextdiroff); + } +- return(1); + } + else + { +@@ -1541,7 +1550,7 @@ TIFFAdvanceDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint64* + { + uint16 dircount; + uint32 nextdir32; +- if (!SeekOK(tif, *nextdir) || ++ if (!SeekOK(tif, *nextdiroff) || + !ReadOK(tif, &dircount, sizeof (uint16))) { + TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "%s: Error fetching directory count", + tif->tif_name); +@@ -1562,13 +1571,13 @@ TIFFAdvanceDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint64* + } + if (tif->tif_flags & TIFF_SWAB) + TIFFSwabLong(&nextdir32); +- *nextdir=nextdir32; ++ *nextdiroff=nextdir32; + } + else + { + uint64 dircount64; + uint16 dircount16; +- if (!SeekOK(tif, *nextdir) || ++ if (!SeekOK(tif, *nextdiroff) || + !ReadOK(tif, &dircount64, sizeof (uint64))) { + TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "%s: Error fetching directory count", + tif->tif_name); +@@ -1588,17 +1597,27 @@ TIFFAdvanceDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint64* + else + (void) TIFFSeekFile(tif, + dircount16*20, SEEK_CUR); +- if (!ReadOK(tif, nextdir, sizeof (uint64))) { ++ if (!ReadOK(tif, nextdiroff, sizeof (uint64))) { + TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, + "%s: Error fetching directory link", + tif->tif_name); + return (0); + } + if (tif->tif_flags & TIFF_SWAB) +- TIFFSwabLong8(nextdir); ++ TIFFSwabLong8(nextdiroff); + } +- return (1); + } ++ if (*nextdiroff != 0) { ++ (*nextdirnum)++; ++ /* Check next directory for IFD looping and if so, set it as last directory. */ ++ if (!_TIFFCheckDirNumberAndOffset(tif, *nextdirnum, *nextdiroff)) { ++ TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "the next directory %hu at offset 0x%lx (%lu) might be an IFD loop. Treating directory %hu as last directory", ++ *nextdirnum, *nextdiroff, *nextdiroff, *nextdirnum-1); ++ *nextdiroff = 0; ++ (*nextdirnum)--; ++ } ++ } ++ return (1); + } + + /* +@@ -1608,14 +1627,16 @@ uint16 + TIFFNumberOfDirectories(TIFF* tif) + { + static const char module[] = "TIFFNumberOfDirectories"; +- uint64 nextdir; ++ uint64 nextdiroff; ++ uint16 nextdirnum; + uint16 n; + if (!(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_BIGTIFF)) +- nextdir = tif->tif_header.classic.tiff_diroff; ++ nextdiroff = tif->tif_header.classic.tiff_diroff; + else +- nextdir = tif->tif_header.big.tiff_diroff; ++ nextdiroff = tif->tif_header.big.tiff_diroff; ++ nextdirnum = 0; + n = 0; +- while (nextdir != 0 && TIFFAdvanceDirectory(tif, &nextdir, NULL)) ++ while (nextdiroff != 0 && TIFFAdvanceDirectory(tif, &nextdiroff, NULL, &nextdirnum)) + { + if (n != 65535) { + ++n; +@@ -1638,28 +1659,30 @@ TIFFNumberOfDirectories(TIFF* tif) + int + TIFFSetDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint16 dirn) + { +- uint64 nextdir; ++ uint64 nextdiroff; ++ uint16 nextdirnum; + uint16 n; + + if (!(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_BIGTIFF)) +- nextdir = tif->tif_header.classic.tiff_diroff; ++ nextdiroff = tif->tif_header.classic.tiff_diroff; + else +- nextdir = tif->tif_header.big.tiff_diroff; +- for (n = dirn; n > 0 && nextdir != 0; n--) +- if (!TIFFAdvanceDirectory(tif, &nextdir, NULL)) ++ nextdiroff = tif->tif_header.big.tiff_diroff; ++ nextdirnum = 0; ++ for (n = dirn; n > 0 && nextdiroff != 0; n--) ++ if (!TIFFAdvanceDirectory(tif, &nextdiroff, NULL, &nextdirnum)) + return (0); +- tif->tif_nextdiroff = nextdir; ++ /* If the n-th directory could not be reached (does not exist), ++ * return here without touching anything further. */ ++ if (nextdiroff == 0 || n > 0) ++ return (0); ++ ++ tif->tif_nextdiroff = nextdiroff; + /* + * Set curdir to the actual directory index. The + * -1 is because TIFFReadDirectory will increment + * tif_curdir after successfully reading the directory. + */ + tif->tif_curdir = (dirn - n) - 1; +- /* +- * Reset tif_dirnumber counter and start new list of seen directories. +- * We need this to prevent IFD loops. +- */ +- tif->tif_dirnumber = 0; + return (TIFFReadDirectory(tif)); + } + +@@ -1672,13 +1695,42 @@ TIFFSetDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint16 dirn) + int + TIFFSetSubDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint64 diroff) + { +- tif->tif_nextdiroff = diroff; +- /* +- * Reset tif_dirnumber counter and start new list of seen directories. +- * We need this to prevent IFD loops. ++ /* Match nextdiroff and curdir for consistent IFD-loop checking. ++ * Only with TIFFSetSubDirectory() the IFD list can be corrupted with invalid offsets ++ * within the main IFD tree. ++ * In the case of several subIFDs of a main image, ++ * there are two possibilities that are not even mutually exclusive. ++ * a.) The subIFD tag contains an array with all offsets of the subIFDs. ++ * b.) The SubIFDs are concatenated with their NextIFD parameters. ++ * (refer to https://www.awaresystems.be/imaging/tiff/specification/TIFFPM6.pdf.) + */ +- tif->tif_dirnumber = 0; +- return (TIFFReadDirectory(tif)); ++ int retval; ++ uint16 curdir = 0; ++ int8 probablySubIFD = 0; ++ if (diroff == 0) { ++ /* Special case to invalidate the tif_lastdiroff member. */ ++ tif->tif_curdir = 65535; ++ } else { ++ if (!_TIFFGetDirNumberFromOffset(tif, diroff, &curdir)) { ++ /* Non-existing offsets might point to a SubIFD or invalid IFD.*/ ++ probablySubIFD = 1; ++ } ++ /* -1 because TIFFReadDirectory() will increment tif_curdir. */ ++ tif->tif_curdir = curdir - 1; ++ } ++ ++ tif->tif_nextdiroff = diroff; ++ retval = TIFFReadDirectory(tif); ++ /* If failed, curdir was not incremented in TIFFReadDirectory(), so set it back. */ ++ if (!retval )tif->tif_curdir++; ++ if (retval && probablySubIFD) { ++ /* Reset IFD list to start new one for SubIFD chain and also start SubIFD chain with tif_curdir=0. */ ++ tif->tif_dirnumber = 0; ++ tif->tif_curdir = 0; /* first directory of new chain */ ++ /* add this offset to new IFD list */ ++ _TIFFCheckDirNumberAndOffset(tif, tif->tif_curdir, diroff); ++ } ++ return (retval); + } + + /* +@@ -1702,12 +1754,15 @@ TIFFLastDirectory(TIFF* tif) + + /* + * Unlink the specified directory from the directory chain. ++ * Note: First directory starts with number dirn=1. ++ * This is different to TIFFSetDirectory() where the first directory starts with zero. + */ + int + TIFFUnlinkDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint16 dirn) + { + static const char module[] = "TIFFUnlinkDirectory"; + uint64 nextdir; ++ uint16 nextdirnum; + uint64 off; + uint16 n; + +@@ -1731,19 +1786,21 @@ TIFFUnlinkDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint16 di + nextdir = tif->tif_header.big.tiff_diroff; + off = 8; + } ++ nextdirnum = 0; /* First directory is dirn=0 */ ++ + for (n = dirn-1; n > 0; n--) { + if (nextdir == 0) { + TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Directory %d does not exist", dirn); + return (0); + } +- if (!TIFFAdvanceDirectory(tif, &nextdir, &off)) ++ if (!TIFFAdvanceDirectory(tif, &nextdir, &off, &nextdirnum)) + return (0); + } + /* + * Advance to the directory to be unlinked and fetch + * the offset of the directory that follows. + */ +- if (!TIFFAdvanceDirectory(tif, &nextdir, NULL)) ++ if (!TIFFAdvanceDirectory(tif, &nextdir, NULL, &nextdirnum)) + return (0); + /* + * Go back and patch the link field of the preceding +--- tiff-4.1.0+git191117.orig/libtiff/tif_dir.h ++++ tiff-4.1.0+git191117/libtiff/tif_dir.h +@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ extern int _TIFFMergeFields(TIFF*, const + extern const TIFFField* _TIFFFindOrRegisterField(TIFF *, uint32, TIFFDataType); + extern TIFFField* _TIFFCreateAnonField(TIFF *, uint32, TIFFDataType); + extern int _TIFFCheckFieldIsValidForCodec(TIFF *tif, ttag_t tag); ++extern int _TIFFCheckDirNumberAndOffset(TIFF *tif, uint16 dirn, uint64 diroff); ++extern int _TIFFGetDirNumberFromOffset(TIFF *tif, uint64 diroff, uint16 *dirn); + + #if defined(__cplusplus) + } +--- tiff-4.1.0+git191117.orig/libtiff/tif_dirread.c ++++ tiff-4.1.0+git191117/libtiff/tif_dirread.c +@@ -158,7 +158,6 @@ static void TIFFReadDirectoryFindFieldIn + + static int EstimateStripByteCounts(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* dir, uint16 dircount); + static void MissingRequired(TIFF*, const char*); +-static int TIFFCheckDirOffset(TIFF* tif, uint64 diroff); + static int CheckDirCount(TIFF*, TIFFDirEntry*, uint32); + static uint16 TIFFFetchDirectory(TIFF* tif, uint64 diroff, TIFFDirEntry** pdir, uint64* nextdiroff); + static int TIFFFetchNormalTag(TIFF*, TIFFDirEntry*, int recover); +@@ -3584,12 +3583,19 @@ TIFFReadDirectory(TIFF* tif) + int bitspersample_read = FALSE; + int color_channels; + +- tif->tif_diroff=tif->tif_nextdiroff; +- if (!TIFFCheckDirOffset(tif,tif->tif_nextdiroff)) +- return 0; /* last offset or bad offset (IFD looping) */ +- (*tif->tif_cleanup)(tif); /* cleanup any previous compression state */ +- tif->tif_curdir++; +- nextdiroff = tif->tif_nextdiroff; ++ if (tif->tif_nextdiroff == 0) { ++ /* In this special case, tif_diroff needs also to be set to 0. */ ++ tif->tif_diroff = tif->tif_nextdiroff; ++ return 0; /* last offset, thus no checking necessary */ ++ } ++ ++ nextdiroff = tif->tif_nextdiroff; ++ /* tif_curdir++ and tif_nextdiroff should only be updated after SUCCESSFUL reading of the directory. Otherwise, invalid IFD offsets could corrupt the IFD list. */ ++ if (!_TIFFCheckDirNumberAndOffset(tif, tif->tif_curdir + 1, nextdiroff)) { ++ TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, ++ "Didn't read next directory due to IFD looping at offset 0x%lx (%lu) to offset 0x%lx (%lu)", tif->tif_diroff, tif->tif_diroff, nextdiroff, nextdiroff); ++ return 0; /* bad offset (IFD looping) */ ++ } + dircount=TIFFFetchDirectory(tif,nextdiroff,&dir,&tif->tif_nextdiroff); + if (!dircount) + { +@@ -3597,6 +3603,11 @@ TIFFReadDirectory(TIFF* tif) + "Failed to read directory at offset " TIFF_UINT64_FORMAT,nextdiroff); + return 0; + } ++ /* Set global values after a valid directory has been fetched. ++ * tif_diroff is already set to nextdiroff in TIFFFetchDirectory() in the beginning. */ ++ tif->tif_curdir++; ++ (*tif->tif_cleanup)(tif); /* cleanup any previous compression state */ ++ + TIFFReadDirectoryCheckOrder(tif,dir,dircount); + + /* +@@ -4628,13 +4639,17 @@ MissingRequired(TIFF* tif, const char* t + } + + /* +- * Check the directory offset against the list of already seen directory +- * offsets. This is a trick to prevent IFD looping. The one can create TIFF +- * file with looped directory pointers. We will maintain a list of already +- * seen directories and check every IFD offset against that list. ++ * Check the directory number and offset against the list of already seen ++ * directory numbers and offsets. This is a trick to prevent IFD looping. ++ * The one can create TIFF file with looped directory pointers. We will ++ * maintain a list of already seen directories and check every IFD offset ++ * and its IFD number against that list. However, the offset of an IFD number ++ * can change - e.g. when writing updates to file. ++ * Returns 1 if all is ok; 0 if last directory or IFD loop is encountered, ++ * or an error has occured. + */ +-static int +-TIFFCheckDirOffset(TIFF* tif, uint64 diroff) ++int ++_TIFFCheckDirNumberAndOffset(TIFF* tif, uint16 dirn, uint64 diroff) + { + uint16 n; + +@@ -4646,35 +4661,64 @@ TIFFCheckDirOffset(TIFF* tif, uint64 dir + return 0; + } + +- for (n = 0; n < tif->tif_dirnumber && tif->tif_dirlist; n++) { +- if (tif->tif_dirlist[n] == diroff) +- return 0; ++ /* Check if offset is already in the list: ++ * - yes: check, if offset is at the same IFD number - if not, it is an IFD loop ++ * - no: add to list or update offset at that IFD number ++ */ ++ for (n = 0; n < tif->tif_dirnumber && tif->tif_dirlistdirn && tif->tif_dirlistoff; n++) { ++ if (tif->tif_dirlistoff[n] == diroff) { ++ if (tif->tif_dirlistdirn[n] == dirn) { ++ return 1; ++ } else { ++ TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "_TIFFCheckDirNumberAndOffset", ++ "TIFF directory %hu has IFD looping to directory %hu at offset 0x%lx (%lu)", ++ dirn-1, tif->tif_dirlistdirn[n], diroff, diroff); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ /* Check if offset of an IFD has been changed and update offset of that IFD number. */ ++ if (dirn < tif->tif_dirnumber && tif->tif_dirlistdirn && tif->tif_dirlistoff) { ++ /* tif_dirlistdirn can have IFD numbers dirn in random order */ ++ for (n = 0; n < tif->tif_dirnumber; n++) { ++ if (tif->tif_dirlistdirn[n] == dirn) { ++ tif->tif_dirlistoff[n] = diroff; ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } + } + ++ /* Add IFD offset and dirn to IFD directory list */ + tif->tif_dirnumber++; + +- if (tif->tif_dirlist == NULL || tif->tif_dirnumber > tif->tif_dirlistsize) { +- uint64* new_dirlist; +- ++ if (tif->tif_dirlistoff == NULL || tif->tif_dirlistdirn == NULL || tif->tif_dirnumber > tif->tif_dirlistsize) { ++ uint64 *new_dirlist; + /* + * XXX: Reduce memory allocation granularity of the dirlist + * array. + */ +- new_dirlist = (uint64*)_TIFFCheckRealloc(tif, tif->tif_dirlist, +- tif->tif_dirnumber, 2 * sizeof(uint64), "for IFD list"); ++ if (tif->tif_dirnumber >= 32768) ++ tif->tif_dirlistsize = 65535; ++ else ++ tif->tif_dirlistsize = 2 * tif->tif_dirnumber; ++ ++ new_dirlist = (uint64 *)_TIFFCheckRealloc(tif, tif->tif_dirlistoff, ++ tif->tif_dirlistsize, sizeof(uint64), "for IFD offset list"); + if (!new_dirlist) + return 0; +- if( tif->tif_dirnumber >= 32768 ) +- tif->tif_dirlistsize = 65535; +- else +- tif->tif_dirlistsize = 2 * tif->tif_dirnumber; +- tif->tif_dirlist = new_dirlist; ++ tif->tif_dirlistoff = new_dirlist; ++ new_dirlist = (uint64 *)_TIFFCheckRealloc(tif, tif->tif_dirlistdirn, ++ tif->tif_dirlistsize, sizeof(uint16), "for IFD dirnumber list"); ++ if (!new_dirlist) ++ return 0; ++ tif->tif_dirlistdirn = (uint16 *)new_dirlist; + } + +- tif->tif_dirlist[tif->tif_dirnumber - 1] = diroff; ++ tif->tif_dirlistoff[tif->tif_dirnumber - 1] = diroff; ++ tif->tif_dirlistdirn[tif->tif_dirnumber - 1] = dirn; + + return 1; +-} ++} /* --- _TIFFCheckDirNumberAndOffset() ---*/ + + /* + * Check the count field of a directory entry against a known value. The +@@ -4703,6 +4747,47 @@ CheckDirCount(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* d + } + + /* ++ * Retrieve the matching IFD directory number of a given IFD offset ++ * from the list of directories already seen. ++ * Returns 1 if the offset was in the list and the directory number ++ * can be returned. ++ * Otherwise returns 0 or if an error occured. ++ */ ++int ++_TIFFGetDirNumberFromOffset(TIFF *tif, uint64 diroff, uint16* dirn) ++{ ++ uint16 n; ++ ++ if (diroff == 0) /* no more directories */ ++ return 0; ++ if (tif->tif_dirnumber == 65535) { ++ TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "_TIFFGetDirNumberFromOffset", ++ "Cannot handle more than 65535 TIFF directories"); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Check if offset is already in the list and return matching directory number. ++ * Otherwise update IFD list using TIFFNumberOfDirectories() ++ * and search again in IFD list. ++ */ ++ for (n = 0; n < tif->tif_dirnumber && tif->tif_dirlistoff && tif->tif_dirlistdirn; n++) { ++ if (tif->tif_dirlistoff[n] == diroff) { ++ *dirn = tif->tif_dirlistdirn[n]; ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } ++ TIFFNumberOfDirectories(tif); ++ for (n = 0; n < tif->tif_dirnumber && tif->tif_dirlistoff && tif->tif_dirlistdirn; n++) { ++ if (tif->tif_dirlistoff[n] == diroff) { ++ *dirn = tif->tif_dirlistdirn[n]; ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } ++ return 0; ++} /*--- _TIFFGetDirNumberFromOffset() ---*/ ++ ++ ++/* + * Read IFD structure from the specified offset. If the pointer to + * nextdiroff variable has been specified, read it too. Function returns a + * number of fields in the directory or 0 if failed. +--- tiff-4.1.0+git191117.orig/libtiff/tif_open.c ++++ tiff-4.1.0+git191117/libtiff/tif_open.c +@@ -353,7 +353,8 @@ TIFFClientOpen( + if (!TIFFDefaultDirectory(tif)) + goto bad; + tif->tif_diroff = 0; +- tif->tif_dirlist = NULL; ++ tif->tif_dirlistoff = NULL; ++ tif->tif_dirlistdirn = NULL; + tif->tif_dirlistsize = 0; + tif->tif_dirnumber = 0; + return (tif); +--- tiff-4.1.0+git191117.orig/libtiff/tiffiop.h ++++ tiff-4.1.0+git191117/libtiff/tiffiop.h +@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ struct tiff { + #define TIFF_CHOPPEDUPARRAYS 0x4000000U /* set when allocChoppedUpStripArrays() has modified strip array */ + uint64 tif_diroff; /* file offset of current directory */ + uint64 tif_nextdiroff; /* file offset of following directory */ +- uint64* tif_dirlist; /* list of offsets to already seen directories to prevent IFD looping */ ++ uint64* tif_dirlistoff; /* list of offsets to already seen directories to prevent IFD looping */ ++ uint16* tif_dirlistdirn; /* list of directory numbers to already seen directories to prevent IFD looping */ + uint16 tif_dirlistsize; /* number of entries in offset list */ + uint16 tif_dirnumber; /* number of already seen directories */ + TIFFDirectory tif_dir; /* internal rep of current directory */
meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb +1 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.osgeo.org/libtiff/tiff-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2023-3618.patch \ file://CVE-2023-40745.patch \ file://CVE-2023-41175.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-40090.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2165e7aba557463acc0664e71a3ed424" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5d29f32517dadb6dbcd1255ea5bbc93a2b54b94fbf83653b4d65c7d6775b8634"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 10/13 vim: Improve locale handling
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
When making checkouts from git, the timestamps can vary and occasionally two files can end up with the same stamp. This triggers make to regenerate ru.cp1251.po from ru.po for example. If it isn't regenerated, the output isn't quite the same leading to reproducibility issues (CP1251 vs cp1251).
Since we added all locales to buildtools tarball now, we can drop the locale restrictions too. We need to generate a native binary for the sjis conversion tool so also tweak that.
--- meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +4 -10
@@ -41,22 +41,16 @@ do_configure () { cd src rm -f auto/* touch auto/config.mk + # git timestamps aren't reliable and we want to consistently regenerate these generated files + rm -f po/cs.cp1250.po po/ja.euc-jp.po po/ja.sjis.po po/ko.po po/pl.UTF-8.po po/pl.cp1250.po po/ru.cp1251.po po/sk.cp1250.po po/uk.cp1251.po po/zh_CN.po po/zh_CN.cp936.po po/zh_TW.po aclocal autoconf cd .. oe_runconf touch src/auto/configure touch src/auto/config.mk src/auto/config.h -} - -do_compile() { - # We do not support fully / correctly the following locales. Attempting - # to use these with msgfmt in order to update the ".desktop" files exposes - # this problem and leads to the compile failing. - for LOCALE in cs fr ko pl sk zh_CN zh_TW;do - echo -n > src/po/${LOCALE}.po - done - autotools_do_compile + # need a native tool, not a target one + ${BUILD_CC} src/po/sjiscorr.c -o src/po/sjiscorr } PACKAGECONFIG ??= "\
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 11/13 vim: update obsolete comment
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Etienne Cordonnier <[email protected]>
vim 8.3 has been out for a long time, so this comment is obsolete. However we still need UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN, since we ignore the last digit of the upstream version number.
Test result:
$ devtool check-upgrade-status vim ... INFO: vim 9.0.1592 UNKNOWN Tom Rini <[email protected]> c0370529c027abc5b1698d53fcfb8c02a0c515da
(From OE-Core rev: 65f5de85c3f488136d1ec2b1f7fe8d8426d6c5b3)
--- meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +2 -3
@@ -22,11 +22,10 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ PV .= ".2048" SRCREV = "982ef16059bd163a77271107020defde0740bbd6" -# Remove when 8.3 is out -UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1" - # Do not consider .z in x.y.z, as that is updated with every commit UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "(?P<pver>\d+\.\d+)\.0" +# Ignore that the upstream version .z in x.y.z is always newer +UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1" S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 12/13 vim: Upgrade 9.0.2048 -> 9.0.2068
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
This includes CVE fix for CVE-2023-46246.9198c1f2b (tag: v9.0.2068) patch 9.0.2068: [security] overflow in :history
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46246
--- meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +2 -2
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://no-path-adjust.patch \ " -PV .= ".2048" -SRCREV = "982ef16059bd163a77271107020defde0740bbd6" +PV .= ".2068" +SRCREV = "9198c1f2b1ddecde22af918541e0de2a32f0f45a" # Do not consider .z in x.y.z, as that is updated with every commit UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "(?P<pver>\d+\.\d+)\.0"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 13/13 vim: use upstream generated .po files
In reply to Steve SakomanA previous commit attempted to fix reproducibility errors by forcing regeneration of .po files. Unfortunately this triggered a different type of reproducibility issue.
Work around this by adjusting the timestamps of the troublesome .po files so they are not regenerated and we use the shipped upstream versions of the files.
The shipped version of ru.cp1251.po doesn't seem to have been created with the vim tooling and specifies CP1251 instead of cp1251, fix that.
--- meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +4 -2
@@ -40,8 +40,10 @@ do_configure () { cd src rm -f auto/* touch auto/config.mk - # git timestamps aren't reliable and we want to consistently regenerate these generated files - rm -f po/cs.cp1250.po po/ja.euc-jp.po po/ja.sjis.po po/ko.po po/pl.UTF-8.po po/pl.cp1250.po po/ru.cp1251.po po/sk.cp1250.po po/uk.cp1251.po po/zh_CN.po po/zh_CN.cp936.po po/zh_TW.po + # git timestamps aren't reliable, so touch the shipped .po files so they aren't regenerated + touch -c po/cs.cp1250.po po/ja.euc-jp.po po/ja.sjis.po po/ko.po po/pl.UTF-8.po po/pl.cp1250.po po/ru.cp1251.po po/sk.cp1250.po po/uk.cp1251.po po/zh_CN.po po/zh_CN.cp936.po po/zh_TW.po + # ru.cp1251.po uses CP1251 rather than cp1251, fix that + sed -i -e s/CP1251/cp1251/ po/ru.cp1251.po aclocal autoconf cd ..
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1