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PATCH New Steve Sakoman 1 participant 9 messages Jan 26, 2024

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cover Patch review

Please review this set of changes for dunfell and have comments back by end of day Tuesday, January 30

Passed a-full on autobuilder:

https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/6495

The following changes since commit 82e67bd9c77f0c5cbb652ca91071b9e57bdcfb33:

build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision (2024-01-22 03:34:05 -1000)

are available in the Git repository at:

https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/dunfell-nut
http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/dunfell-nut

Khem Raj (1):
systemtap: Fix build with gcc-12

Ranjitsinh Rathod (1):
openssh: Fix CVE-2023-51385

Vijay Anusuri (5):
sqlite3: Backport fix for CVE-2023-7104
gnutls: Backport fix for CVE-2023-5981
gnutls: Backport fix for CVE-2024-0553
pam: Fix for CVE-2024-22365
xserver-xorg: Multiple CVE fixes

virendra thakur (1):
opkg: Fix bad memory access error observe in file_read_line_alloc

 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch      |  95 ++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb                  |   1 +
 ...possible-bad-memory-access-in-file_r.patch |  50 ++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/opkg/opkg_0.4.2.bb      |   1 +
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2024-22365.patch           |  59 +++++
 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.1.bb     |   1 +
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2023-6816.patch          |  55 +++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-1.patch        |  87 +++++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-2.patch        | 221 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-3.patch        |  41 ++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-4.patch        |  45 ++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0408.patch          |  64 +++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0409.patch          |  46 ++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21885.patch         | 113 +++++++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-1.patch       |  74 ++++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-2.patch       |  57 +++++
 .../xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.14.bb      |  10 +
 ...ility-re-tweak-for-rhel6-use-functio.patch |  49 ++++
 .../recipes-kernel/systemtap/systemtap_git.bb |   4 +-
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-5981.patch         | 206 ++++++++++++++++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2024-0553.patch         | 125 ++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb  |   2 +
 .../sqlite/files/CVE-2023-7104.patch          |  46 ++++
 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.31.1.bb |   1 +
 24 files changed, 1452 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/opkg/opkg/0001-file_util.c-fix-possible-bad-memory-access-in-file_r.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2024-22365.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2023-6816.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-4.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0408.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0409.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21885.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-kernel/systemtap/systemtap/0001-gcc12-c-compatibility-re-tweak-for-rhel6-use-functio.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-5981.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2024-0553.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2023-7104.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2023-51385

From: Ranjitsinh Rathod <[email protected]>

OS command injection might occur if a user name or host name has shell metacharacters, and this name is referenced by an expansion token in certain situations. For example, an untrusted Git repository can have a submodule with shell metacharacters in a user name or host name.

This patch fixes the above issue

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch      | 95 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch new file +95 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ba8c312d0
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+From 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:47:44 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: ban user/hostnames with most shell metacharacters
+
+This makes ssh(1) refuse user or host names provided on the
+commandline that contain most shell metacharacters.
+
+Some programs that invoke ssh(1) using untrusted data do not filter
+metacharacters in arguments they supply. This could create
+interactions with user-specified ProxyCommand and other directives
+that allow shell injection attacks to occur.
+
+It's a mistake to invoke ssh(1) with arbitrary untrusted arguments,
+but getting this stuff right can be tricky, so this should prevent
+most obvious ways of creating risky situations. It however is not
+and cannot be perfect: ssh(1) has no practical way of interpreting
+what shell quoting rules are in use and how they interact with the
+user's specified ProxyCommand.
+
+To allow configurations that use strange user or hostnames to
+continue to work, this strictness is applied only to names coming
+from the commandline. Names specified using User or Hostname
+directives in ssh_config(5) are not affected.
+
+feedback/ok millert@ markus@ dtucker@ deraadt@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b487348b5964f3e77b6b4d3da4c3b439e94b2d9
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-51385
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a]
+Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <[email protected]>
+Comment: Hunks refreshed to apply cleanly
+
+---
+ ssh.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 35c48e62d18..48d93ddf2a9 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -583,6 +583,41 @@ set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++static int
++valid_hostname(const char *s)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	if (*s == '-')
++		return 0;
++	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
++		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
++			return 0;
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++valid_ruser(const char *s)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	if (*s == '-')
++		return 0;
++	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
++			return 0;
++		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
++		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
++			return 0;
++		/* Disallow \ in last position */
++		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
++			return 0;
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Main program for the ssh client.
+  */
+@@ -1069,6 +1104,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (!host)
+ 		usage();
+ 
++	if (!valid_hostname(host))
++		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
++	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
++		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
+ 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb +1 -0
index eb3089cd8a..9d6cf7da6c 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2023-38408-11.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-38408-12.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-48795.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-51385.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3076e6413e8dbe56d33848c1054ac091"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "43925151e6cf6cee1450190c0e9af4dc36b41c12737619edff8bcebdff64e671"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/8 sqlite3: Backport fix for CVE-2023-7104

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>

Backport https://sqlite.org/src/info/0e4e7a05c4204b47

---
 .../sqlite/files/CVE-2023-7104.patch          | 46 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.31.1.bb |  1 +
 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2023-7104.patch
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2023-7104.patch new file +46 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..01ff29ff5e
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From eab426c5fba69d2c77023939f72b4ad446834e3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: dan <Dan Kennedy>
+Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 13:53:09 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overread in the sessions extension that could occur when processing a corrupt changeset.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sqlite.org/src/info/0e4e7a05c4204b47]
+CVE: CVE-2023-7104
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
+---
+ sqlite3.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sqlite3.c b/sqlite3.c
+index 972ef18..c645ac8 100644
+--- a/sqlite3.c
++++ b/sqlite3.c
+@@ -203301,15 +203301,19 @@ static int sessionReadRecord(
+         }
+       }
+       if( eType==SQLITE_INTEGER || eType==SQLITE_FLOAT ){
+-        sqlite3_int64 v = sessionGetI64(aVal);
+-        if( eType==SQLITE_INTEGER ){
+-          sqlite3VdbeMemSetInt64(apOut[i], v);
++	if( (pIn->nData-pIn->iNext)<8 ){
++	  rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
+         }else{
+-          double d;
+-          memcpy(&d, &v, 8);
+-          sqlite3VdbeMemSetDouble(apOut[i], d);
++	  sqlite3_int64 v = sessionGetI64(aVal);
++	  if( eType==SQLITE_INTEGER ){
++	    sqlite3VdbeMemSetInt64(apOut[i], v);
++	  }else{
++	    double d;
++	    memcpy(&d, &v, 8);
++	    sqlite3VdbeMemSetDouble(apOut[i], d);
++	  }
++	  pIn->iNext += 8;
+         }
+-        pIn->iNext += 8;
+       }
+     }
+   }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.31.1.bb +1 -0
index ef12ef0db2..0e7bcfa5a7 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.sqlite.org/2020/sqlite-autoconf-${SQLITE_PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2020-35525.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-35527.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-20223.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-7104.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2d0a553534c521504e3ac3ad3b90f125"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "62284efebc05a76f909c580ffa5c008a7d22a1287285d68b7825a2b6b51949ae"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/8 gnutls: Backport fix for CVE-2023-5981

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>

Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/gnutls28/3.6.13-2ubuntu1.9/gnutls28_3.6.13-2ubuntu1.9.debian.tar.xz
Upstream-Commit: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/29d6298d0b04cfff970b993915db71ba3f580b6d]

References:
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-5981

---
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-5981.patch         | 206 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb  |   1 +
 2 files changed, 207 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-5981.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-5981.patch new file +206 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c518cfa0ac
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 29d6298d0b04cfff970b993915db71ba3f580b6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2023 09:26:57 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] auth/rsa_psk: side-step potential side-channel
+
+This removes branching that depends on secret data, porting changes
+for regular RSA key exchange from
+4804febddc2ed958e5ae774de2a8f85edeeff538 and
+80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a.  This also removes the
+allow_wrong_pms as it was used sorely to control debug output
+depending on the branching.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/gnutls28/3.6.13-2ubuntu1.9/gnutls28_3.6.13-2ubuntu1.9.debian.tar.xz
+Upstream-Commit: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/29d6298d0b04cfff970b993915db71ba3f580b6d]
+CVE: CVE-2023-5981
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa.c     |  2 +-
+ lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
+ lib/gnutls_int.h   |  4 ---
+ lib/priority.c     |  1 -
+ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t sess
+ 				     session->key.key.size);
+ 	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+ 	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+-	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
++	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
+ 
+ 	/* Error handling logic:
+ 	 * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+@@ -264,14 +264,13 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_se
+ {
+ 	gnutls_datum_t username;
+ 	psk_auth_info_t info;
+-	gnutls_datum_t plaintext;
+ 	gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
+ 	gnutls_datum_t pwd_psk = { NULL, 0 };
+ 	int ret, dsize;
+-	int randomize_key = 0;
+ 	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+ 	gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
+ 	gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
++	volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
+ 
+ 	cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
+ 	    _gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK);
+@@ -327,71 +326,47 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_se
+ 	}
+ 	ciphertext.size = dsize;
+ 
+-	ret =
+-	    gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
+-					&ciphertext, &plaintext);
+-	if (ret < 0 || plaintext.size != GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE) {
+-		/* In case decryption fails then don't inform
+-		 * the peer. Just use a random key. (in order to avoid
+-		 * attack against pkcs-1 formatting).
+-		 */
+-		gnutls_assert();
+-		_gnutls_debug_log
+-		    ("auth_rsa_psk: Possible PKCS #1 format attack\n");
+-		if (ret >= 0) {
+-			gnutls_free(plaintext.data);
+-		}
+-		randomize_key = 1;
+-	} else {
+-		/* If the secret was properly formatted, then
+-		 * check the version number.
+-		 */
+-		if (_gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session) !=
+-		    plaintext.data[0]
+-		    || (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0
+-			&& _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session) !=
+-			plaintext.data[1])) {
+-			/* No error is returned here, if the version number check
+-			 * fails. We proceed normally.
+-			 * That is to defend against the attack described in the paper
+-			 * "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by Vlastimil Klima,
+-			 * Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+-			 */
+-			gnutls_assert();
+-			_gnutls_debug_log
+-			    ("auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 version check format attack\n");
+-		}
+-	}
++	ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
++	ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+ 
++	premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
++	if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
++		gnutls_assert();
++		return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
++	}
++	premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
+ 
+-	if (randomize_key != 0) {
+-		premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
+-		premaster_secret.data =
+-		    gnutls_malloc(premaster_secret.size);
+-		if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
+-			gnutls_assert();
+-			return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
+-		}
+-
+-		/* we do not need strong random numbers here.
+-		 */
+-		ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
+-				  premaster_secret.size);
+-		if (ret < 0) {
+-			gnutls_assert();
+-			goto cleanup;
+-		}
+-	} else {
+-		premaster_secret.data = plaintext.data;
+-		premaster_secret.size = plaintext.size;
++	/* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
++	ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
++			 premaster_secret.size);
++	if (ret < 0) {
++		gnutls_assert();
++		goto cleanup;
+ 	}
+ 
++	gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
++				     &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
++				     premaster_secret.size);
++	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
++	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
++	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
++
++	/* Error handling logic:
++	 * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
++	 * random key previously generated. (in order to avoid attack against
++	 * pkcs-1 formatting).
++	 *
++	 * If we get version mismatches no error is returned either. We
++	 * proceed normally. This is to defend against the attack described
++	 * in the paper "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by
++	 * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
++	 */
++
+ 	/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+ 	 * discussed above.
+ 	 */
+-
+-	premaster_secret.data[0] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+-	premaster_secret.data[1] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
++	premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
++	premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
+ 
+ 	/* find the key of this username
+ 	 */
+--- a/lib/gnutls_int.h
++++ b/lib/gnutls_int.h
+@@ -989,7 +989,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
+ 	bool _no_etm;
+ 	bool _no_ext_master_secret;
+ 	bool _allow_key_usage_violation;
+-	bool _allow_wrong_pms;
+ 	bool _dumbfw;
+ 	unsigned int _dh_prime_bits;	/* old (deprecated) variable */
+ 
+@@ -1007,7 +1006,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
+ 	      (x)->no_etm = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
+-	      (x)->allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->dumbfw = 1
+ 
+ #define ENABLE_PRIO_COMPAT(x) \
+@@ -1016,7 +1014,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
+ 	      (x)->_no_etm = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->_no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->_allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
+-	      (x)->_allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->_dumbfw = 1
+ 
+ /* DH and RSA parameters types.
+@@ -1141,7 +1138,6 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	bool no_etm;
+ 	bool no_ext_master_secret;
+ 	bool allow_key_usage_violation;
+-	bool allow_wrong_pms;
+ 	bool dumbfw;
+ 
+ 	/* old (deprecated) variable. This is used for both srp_prime_bits
+--- a/lib/priority.c
++++ b/lib/priority.c
+@@ -681,7 +681,6 @@ gnutls_priority_set(gnutls_session_t ses
+ 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_etm);
+ 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_ext_master_secret);
+ 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_key_usage_violation);
+-	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_wrong_pms);
+ 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dumbfw);
+ 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dh_prime_bits);
+ 
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb +1 -0
index 0c3392d521..406f0b54c5 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2022-2509.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-4209.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-0361.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-5981.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5630751adec7025b8ef955af4d141d00d252a985769f51b4059e5affa3d39d63"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/8 gnutls: Backport fix for CVE-2024-0553

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>

CVE-2024-0553
A vulnerability was found in GnuTLS. The response times to malformed ciphertexts in RSA-PSK ClientKeyExchange differ from response times of ciphertexts with correct PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. This issue may allow a remote attacker to perform a timing side-channel attack in the RSA-PSK key exchange, potentially leading to the leakage of sensitive data. CVE-2024-0553 is designated as an incomplete resolution for CVE-2023-5981.

Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/40dbbd8de499668590e8af51a15799fbc430595e]

---
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2024-0553.patch         | 125 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb  |   1 +
 2 files changed, 126 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2024-0553.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2024-0553.patch new file +125 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f15c470879
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 40dbbd8de499668590e8af51a15799fbc430595e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 19:13:17 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] rsa-psk: minimize branching after decryption
+
+This moves any non-trivial code between gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2
+and the function return in _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx up until the
+decryption.  This also avoids an extra memcpy to session->key.key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/40dbbd8de499668590e8af51a15799fbc430595e]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0553
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+index 93c2dc9..c6cfb92 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+@@ -269,7 +269,6 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ 	int ret, dsize;
+ 	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+ 	gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
+-	gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
+ 	volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
+ 
+ 	cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
+@@ -329,24 +328,48 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ 	ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+ 	ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+ 
+-	premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+-	if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
++	/* Find the key of this username. A random value will be
++	 * filled in if the key is not found.
++	 */
++	ret = _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username,
++			                 strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
++	if (ret < 0)
++		return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
++
++	/* Allocate memory for premaster secret, and fill in the
++	 * fields except the decryption result.
++	 */
++	session->key.key.size = 2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2 + pwd_psk.size;
++	session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(session->key.key.size);
++	if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
+ 		gnutls_assert();
++		_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
++		/* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
++		_gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
+ 		return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
+ 	}
+-	premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
+ 
+ 	/* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
+-	ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
+-			 premaster_secret.size);
++	ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, session->key.key.data + 2,
++			 GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+ 	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		gnutls_assert();
+-		goto cleanup;
++		_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
++		/* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
++		_gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
++		return ret;
+ 	}
+ 
++	_gnutls_write_uint16(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE, session->key.key.data);
++	_gnutls_write_uint16(pwd_psk.size,
++			     &session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE]);
++	memcpy(&session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2], pwd_psk.data,
++	       pwd_psk.size);
++	_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
++
+ 	gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
+-				     &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
+-				     premaster_secret.size);
++				     &ciphertext, session->key.key.data + 2,
++				     GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+ 	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+ 	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+ 	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
+@@ -365,31 +388,10 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ 	/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+ 	 * discussed above.
+ 	 */
+-	premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
+-	premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
++	session->key.key.data[2] = ver_maj;
++	session->key.key.data[3] = ver_min;
+ 
+-	/* find the key of this username
+-	 */
+-	ret =
+-	    _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
+-	if (ret < 0) {
+-		gnutls_assert();
+-		goto cleanup;
+-	}
+-
+-	ret =
+-	    set_rsa_psk_session_key(session, &pwd_psk, &premaster_secret);
+-	if (ret < 0) {
+-		gnutls_assert();
+-		goto cleanup;
+-	}
+-
+-	ret = 0;
+-      cleanup:
+-	_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
+-	_gnutls_free_temp_key_datum(&premaster_secret);
+-
+-	return ret;
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb +1 -0
index 406f0b54c5..a1451daf2c 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2021-4209.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-0361.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-5981.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0553.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5630751adec7025b8ef955af4d141d00d252a985769f51b4059e5affa3d39d63"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/8 pam: Fix for CVE-2024-22365

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>

Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/031bb5a5d0d950253b68138b498dc93be69a64cb

---
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2024-22365.patch           | 59 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.1.bb     |  1 +
 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2024-22365.patch
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2024-22365.patch new file +59 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..33ac37b7f0
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 031bb5a5d0d950253b68138b498dc93be69a64cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthias Gerstner <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2023 14:01:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_namespace: protect_dir(): use O_DIRECTORY to prevent
+ local DoS situations
+
+Without O_DIRECTORY the path crawling logic is subject to e.g. FIFOs
+being placed in user controlled directories, causing the PAM module to
+block indefinitely during `openat()`.
+
+Pass O_DIRECTORY to cause the `openat()` to fail if the path does not
+refer to a directory.
+
+With this the check whether the final path element is a directory
+becomes unnecessary, drop it.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/031bb5a5d0d950253b68138b498dc93be69a64cb]
+CVE: CVE-2024-22365
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
+---
+ modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 18 +-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+index 2528cff86..f72d67189 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir,
+ 	int dfd = AT_FDCWD;
+ 	int dfd_next;
+ 	int save_errno;
+-	int flags = O_RDONLY;
++	int flags = O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY;
+ 	int rv = -1;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+@@ -1255,22 +1255,6 @@ static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir,
+ 		rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (rv != -1) {
+-		if (fstat(rv, &st) != 0) {
+-			save_errno = errno;
+-			close(rv);
+-			rv = -1;
+-			errno = save_errno;
+-			goto error;
+-		}
+-		if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+-			close(rv);
+-			errno = ENOTDIR;
+-			rv = -1;
+-			goto error;
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ 	if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) {
+ 		/* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
+ 		if (protect_mount(rv, p, idata) == -1) {
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.1.bb +1 -0
index bc72afe6ad..527a368e2d 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/releases/download/v${PV}/Linux
            file://pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch \
            file://pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch \
            file://crypt_configure.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-22365.patch \
           "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "558ff53b0fc0563ca97f79e911822165"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/8 xserver-xorg: Multiple CVE fixes

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>

Fix below CVE's
CVE-2023-6816
CVE-2024-0229
CVE-2024-21885
CVE-2024-21886
CVE-2024-0408
CVE-2024-0409

---
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2023-6816.patch          |  55 +++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-1.patch        |  87 +++++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-2.patch        | 221 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-3.patch        |  41 ++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-4.patch        |  45 ++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0408.patch          |  64 +++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0409.patch          |  46 ++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21885.patch         | 113 +++++++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-1.patch       |  74 ++++++
 .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-2.patch       |  57 +++++
 .../xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.14.bb      |  10 +
 11 files changed, 813 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2023-6816.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-4.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0408.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0409.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21885.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-2.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2023-6816.patch new file +55 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0bfff268e7
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] dix: allocate enough space for logical button maps
+
+Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for
+each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped
+to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping.
+
+CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3]
+CVE: CVE-2023-6816
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
+---
+ Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +--
+ dix/enterleave.c    | 5 +++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
+index 5b77b1a444..2b05ac5f39 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
++++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
+@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client)
+     if (pDev->button) {
+         int i;
+ 
+-        rep.buttons_len =
+-            bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons));
++        rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */
+         rep.length += rep.buttons_len;
+         buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4);
+         if (!buttons)
+diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
+index 867ec74363..ded8679d76 100644
+--- a/dix/enterleave.c
++++ b/dix/enterleave.c
+@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail,
+ 
+     mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER);
+ 
+-    /* XI 2 event */
+-    btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0;
++    /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8
++     * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */
++    btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0;
+     btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen);
+     len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4;
+ 
+-- 
+GitLab
+
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-1.patch new file +87 -0

87 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-2.patch new file +221 -0

221 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-3.patch new file +41 -0

41 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-4.patch new file +45 -0

45 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0408.patch new file +64 -0

64 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0409.patch new file +46 -0

46 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21885.patch new file +113 -0

113 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-1.patch new file +74 -0

74 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-2.patch new file +57 -0

57 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.14.bb +10 -0
index 4fdf3a0ec3..d6c6c5bd45 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,16 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.pat
            file://CVE-2023-5380.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-6377.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-6478.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-6816.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0229-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0229-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0229-3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0229-4.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-21885.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-21886-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-21886-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0408.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0409.patch \
 "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "453fc86aac8c629b3a5b77e8dcca30bf"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "54b199c9280ff8bf0f73a54a759645bd0eeeda7255d1c99310d5b7595f3ac066"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/8 opkg: Fix bad memory access error observe in file_read_line_alloc

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: virendra thakur <[email protected]>

In the case of a zero length string being returned by fgets(), the condition checking for a trailing new line would perform a bad memory access outside of buf. This might happen when line with a leading null byte is read.

Avoid this case by checking that the string has a length of at least one byte.

---
 ...possible-bad-memory-access-in-file_r.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/opkg/opkg_0.4.2.bb      |  1 +
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/opkg/opkg/0001-file_util.c-fix-possible-bad-memory-access-in-file_r.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/opkg/opkg/0001-file_util.c-fix-possible-bad-memory-access-in-file_r.patch new file +50 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bec21e67f4
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 8b45a3c4cab95382beea1ecdddeb2e4a9ed14aba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jo-Philipp Wich <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2020 21:47:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 001/104] file_util.c: fix possible bad memory access in
+ file_read_line_alloc()
+
+In the case of a zero length string being returned by fgets(), the condition
+checking for a trailing new line would perform a bad memory access outside
+of `buf`. This might happen when line with a leading null byte is read.
+
+Avoid this case by checking that the string has a length of at least one
+byte. Also change the unsigned int types to size_t to store length values
+while we're at it.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ndmsystems/opkg/commit/8b45a3c4cab95382beea1ecdddeb2e4a9ed14aba]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro del Castillo <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: virendra thakur <[email protected]>
+---
+ libopkg/file_util.c | 7 ++-----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libopkg/file_util.c b/libopkg/file_util.c
+index fbed7b4..ee9f59d 100644
+--- a/libopkg/file_util.c
++++ b/libopkg/file_util.c
+@@ -127,17 +127,14 @@ char *file_readlink_alloc(const char *file_name)
+ */
+ char *file_read_line_alloc(FILE * fp)
+ {
++    size_t buf_len, line_size;
+     char buf[BUFSIZ];
+-    unsigned int buf_len;
+     char *line = NULL;
+-    unsigned int line_size = 0;
+     int got_nl = 0;
+ 
+-    buf[0] = '\0';
+-
+     while (fgets(buf, BUFSIZ, fp)) {
+         buf_len = strlen(buf);
+-        if (buf[buf_len - 1] == '\n') {
++        if (buf_len > 0 && buf[buf_len - 1] == '\n') {
+             buf_len--;
+             buf[buf_len] = '\0';
+             got_nl = 1;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
meta/recipes-devtools/opkg/opkg_0.4.2.bb +1 -0
index 55be6547c0..3ebc27c8ee 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz
            file://opkg.conf \
            file://0001-opkg_conf-create-opkg.lock-in-run-instead-of-var-run.patch \
            file://sourcedateepoch.patch \
+           file://0001-file_util.c-fix-possible-bad-memory-access-in-file_r.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
 "
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/8 systemtap: Fix build with gcc-12

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Khem Raj <[email protected]>

Backport a patch to fix
| ../git/util.cxx:1766:56: error: 'std::pointer_to_unary_function<_Arg, _Result> std::ptr_fun(_Result (*)(_Arg)) [with _Arg = int; _Result = int]' is deprecated: use 'std::function' instea d [-Werror=deprecated-declarations]

|  1766 |                        std::not1(std::ptr_fun<int, int>(std::isspace))));
|       |                                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(cherry picked from commit 0b360d12203aafd8bf96433d11221a6ed910a11f)
---
 ...ility-re-tweak-for-rhel6-use-functio.patch | 49 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-kernel/systemtap/systemtap_git.bb |  4 +-
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-kernel/systemtap/systemtap/0001-gcc12-c-compatibility-re-tweak-for-rhel6-use-functio.patch
meta/recipes-kernel/systemtap/systemtap/0001-gcc12-c-compatibility-re-tweak-for-rhel6-use-functio.patch new file +49 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f885c44460
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From f199d1982ef8a6c6d5c06c082d057b8793bcc6aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serhei Makarov <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 18:21:46 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] gcc12 c++ compatibility re-tweak for rhel6: use function
+ pointer instead of lambdas instead of ptr_fun<>
+
+Saving 2 lines in ltrim/rtrim is probably not a good reason to drop
+compatibility with the RHEL6 system compiler.  Actually declaring a
+named function and passing the function pointer is compatible with
+everything.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=systemtap.git;a=commit;h=f199d1982ef8a6c6d5c06c082d057b8793bcc6aa]
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
+---
+ util.cxx | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/util.cxx
++++ b/util.cxx
+@@ -1757,21 +1757,24 @@ flush_to_stream (const string &fname, os
+   return 1; // Failure
+ }
+ 
++int
++not_isspace(unsigned char c)
++{
++  return !std::isspace(c);
++}
++
+ // trim from start (in place)
+ void
+ ltrim(std::string &s)
+ {
+-  s.erase(s.begin(),
+-	  std::find_if(s.begin(), s.end(),
+-		       std::not1(std::ptr_fun<int, int>(std::isspace))));
++  s.erase(s.begin(), std::find_if(s.begin(), s.end(), not_isspace));
+ }
+ 
+ // trim from end (in place)
+ void
+ rtrim(std::string &s)
+ {
+-  s.erase(std::find_if(s.rbegin(), s.rend(),
+-	  std::not1(std::ptr_fun<int, int>(std::isspace))).base(), s.end());
++  s.erase(std::find_if(s.rbegin(), s.rend(), not_isspace).base(), s.end());
+ }
+ 
+ // trim from both ends (in place)
meta/recipes-kernel/systemtap/systemtap_git.bb +3 -1
index bdd8fb83b0..a8b2cf1eac 100644
@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://sourceware.org/systemtap/"
 
 require systemtap_git.inc
 
-SRC_URI += "file://0001-improve-reproducibility-for-c-compiling.patch"
+SRC_URI += "file://0001-improve-reproducibility-for-c-compiling.patch \
+            file://0001-gcc12-c-compatibility-re-tweak-for-rhel6-use-functio.patch \
+           "
 
 DEPENDS = "elfutils"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1