TDX host: kexec() support
Subsystems (5)
cover TDX host: kexec() support
Currently kexec() support and TDX host are muturally exclusive in the Kconfig. This series adds the TDX host kexec support so that they can work together and can be enabled at the same time in the Kconfig.
This follows Dave's suggestion to add the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT attribute to unify both Intel and AMD, instead of having Intel/AMD specific checks around [1].
Hi Tom,
I've tested on my TDX testig machine but I don't have AMD machine to test. I highly appreciate if you or any AMD guy can help to review and/or test this series to make sure I didn't break anything.
Thanks a lot!
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Kai Huang (4):
x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec x86/virt/tdx: Advertise the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT for TDX host x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum x86/virt/tdx: Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 34 +++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 18 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 14 +--- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 11 +++- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/cc_platform.h | 16 +++++ 8 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
base-commit: a6f0b57202b0ee50dc042bae16494008dc6dc992
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 1/4 x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
From: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Currently on AMD SME platforms, during kexec() caches are flushed manually before jumping to the new kernel due to memory encryption. Intel TDX needs to flush cachelines of TDX private memory before jumping to the second kernel too, otherwise they may silently corrupt the new kernel.
Instead of sprinkling both AMD and Intel's specific checks around, introduce a new CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT attribute to unify both Intel and AMD, and simplify the logic:
Could the old kernel leave incoherent caches around? If so, do WBINVD.
Convert the AMD SME to use this new CC attribute. A later patch will utilize this new attribute for Intel TDX too.
Specifically, AMD SME flushes caches at two places: 1) stop_this_cpu();
2) relocate_kernel(). stop_this_cpu() checks the CPUID directly to do WBINVD for the reason that the current kernel's SME enabling status may not match the new kernel's choice. However the relocate_kernel() only does the WBINVD when the current kernel has enabled SME for the reason that the new kernel is always placed in an "unencrypted" area.
To simplify the logic, for AMD SME change to always use the way that is done in stop_this_cpu(). This will cause an additional WBINVD in relocate_kernel() when the current kernel hasn't enabled SME (e.g., disabled by kernel command line), but this is acceptable for the sake of having less complicated code (see [1] for the relevant discussion).
Note currently the kernel only advertises CC vendor for AMD SME when SME is actually enabled by the kernel. To always advertise the new CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT regardless of the kernel's SME enabling status, change to set CC vendor as long as the hardware has enabled SME.
Note "advertising CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT when the hardware has enabled SME" is still different from "checking the CPUID" (the way that is done in stop_this_cpu()), but technically the former also serves the purpose and is actually more accurate.
Such change allows sme_me_mask to be 0 while CC vendor reports as AMD. But this doesn't impact other CC attributes on AMD platforms, nor does it impact the cc_mkdec()/cc_mkenc().
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
--- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 14 +++----------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 11 ++++++++++- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/core.c +13 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,19 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT :return sme_me_mask && !(sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ); +case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT : +/* +* CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT represents whether SME has +* enabled on the platform regardless whether the kernel +* has actually enabled the SME. +*/ +return !(sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ); + +/* +* For all CC_ATTR_GUEST_* there's no need to check sme_me_mask +* as it must be true when there's any SEV enable bit set in +* sev_status. +*/ case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT :return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ;
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +1 -1
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) (unsigned long )page_list, image->start, image->preserve_context, - cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)); + cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT));#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context)
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +3 -11
@@ -813,18 +813,10 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)mcheck_cpu_clear (c);/* -* Use wbinvd on processors that support SME. This provides support -* for performing a successful kexec when going from SME inactive -* to SME active (or vice-versa). The cache must be cleared so that -* if there are entries with the same physical address, both with and -* without the encryption bit, they don't race each other when flushed -* and potentially end up with the wrong entry being committed to -* memory. -* -* Test the CPUID bit directly because the machine might've cleared -* X86_FEATURE_SME due to cmdline options. +* Use wbinvd on processors that the first kernel *could* +* potentially leave incoherent cachelines. */ -if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ) &BIT (0 ))) +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT ))native_wbinvd ();/*
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +10 -1
@@ -570,9 +570,19 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) msr =__rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG );if (!(msr &MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT ))return ; + +/* +* Always set CC vendor when the platform has SME enabled +* regardless whether the kernel will actually activates the +* SME or not. This reports the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT +* being true as long as the platform has SME enabled so that +* stop_this_cpu() can do necessary WBINVD during kexec(). +*/ + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ; }else {/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ; goto out; }
@@ -608,7 +618,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) out:if (sme_me_mask) { physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask; - cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ;cc_set_mask (sme_me_mask); } }
include/linux/cc_platform.h +15 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,21 @@ enum cc_attr {*/ CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT , +/** +* @CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT: Host memory encryption can be +* incoherent +* +* The platform/OS is running as a bare-metal system or a hypervisor. +* The memory encryption engine might have left non-cache-coherent +* data in the caches that needs to be flushed. +* +* Use this in places where the cache coherency of the memory matters +* but the encryption status does not. +* +* Includes all systems that set CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT. +*/ + CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT, +/** * @CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT: Guest memory encryption is active *
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 2/4 x86/virt/tdx: Advertise the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT for TDX host
In reply to Huang, KaiFrom: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
On the TDX capable platform, during kexec() the old kernel needs to flush dirty cachelines of all TDX private memory otherwise they may silently corrupt the new kernel's memory.
Advertise the new introduced CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT attribute for TDX host platform so the cache will be flushed during kexec().
Note theoretically cache flush is only needed when TDX module is initialized, but the module initialization is done at runtime so just advertise the CC attribute when the platform has TDX enabled.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/coco/core.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 3 +++ include/linux/cc_platform.h | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -1975,6 +1975,7 @@ config INTEL_TDX_HOST depends on CONTIG_ALLOC depends on !KEXEC_CORE depends on X86_MCE + select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM help Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious host and certain physical attacks. This option enables necessary TDX
arch/x86/coco/core.c +20 -1
@@ -12,11 +12,12 @@#include <asm/coco.h> #include <asm/processor.h> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> enum cc_vendor cc_vendor__ro_after_init =CC_VENDOR_NONE ;static u64 cc_mask__ro_after_init ; -static bool noinstr intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) +static bool noinstr intel_cc_platform_guest_has(enum cc_attr attr) {switch (attr) {case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO :
@@ -29,6 +30,24 @@ static bool noinstr intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) } } +static bool noinstr intel_cc_platform_host_has(enum cc_attr attr) +{ +switch (attr) { +case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT : +return true; +default : +return false; + } +} + +static bool noinstr intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) +{ +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM )) +return intel_cc_platform_host_has (attr); + +return intel_cc_platform_guest_has (attr); +} +/* * Handle the SEV-SNP vTOM case where sme_me_mask is zero, and * the other levels of SME/SEV functionality, including C-bit
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +3 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@#include <asm/intel-family.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/mce.h> +#include <asm/coco.h> #include "tdx.h" static u32 tdx_global_keyid__ro_after_init ;
@@ -1488,5 +1489,7 @@ void __init tdx_init(void)setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM ); + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_INTEL ; +check_tdx_erratum (); }
include/linux/cc_platform.h +2 -1
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ enum cc_attr {* Use this in places where the cache coherency of the memory matters * but the encryption status does not. * -* Includes all systems that set CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT. +* Includes all systems that set CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT, but +* additionally adds TDX hosts. */ CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT,
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 3/4 x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
In reply to Huang, KaiFrom: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
The first few generations of TDX hardware have an erratum. A partial write to a TDX private memory cacheline will silently "poison" the line. Subsequent reads will consume the poison and generate a machine check. According to the TDX hardware spec, neither of these things should have happened.
== Background ==
Virtually all kernel memory accesses operations happen in full cachelines. In practice, writing a "byte" of memory usually reads a 64 byte cacheline of memory, modifies it, then writes the whole line back. Those operations do not trigger this problem.
This problem is triggered by "partial" writes where a write transaction of less than cacheline lands at the memory controller. The CPU does these via non-temporal write instructions (like MOVNTI), or through UC/WC memory mappings. The issue can also be triggered away from the CPU by devices doing partial writes via DMA.
== Problem ==
A fast warm reset doesn't reset TDX private memory. Kexec() can also boot into the new kernel directly. Thus if the old kernel has enabled TDX on the platform with this erratum, the new kernel may get unexpected machine check.
Note that w/o this erratum any kernel read/write on TDX private memory should never cause machine check, thus it's OK for the old kernel to leave TDX private pages as is.
== Solution ==
In short, with this erratum, the kernel needs to explicitly convert all TDX private pages back to normal to give the new kernel a clean slate after kexec(). The BIOS is also expected to disable fast warm reset as a workaround to this erratum, thus this implementation doesn't try to reset TDX private memory for the reboot case in the kernel but depend on the BIOS to enable the workaround.
Convert TDX private pages back to normal after all remote cpus has been stopped and cache flush has been done on all cpus, when no more TDX activity can happen further. Do it in machine_kexec() to avoid the additional overhead to the normal reboot/shutdown as the kernel depends on the BIOS to disable fast warm reset for the reboot case.
For now TDX private memory can only be PAMT pages. It would be ideal to cover all types of TDX private memory here, but there are practical problems to do so:
1) There's no existing infrastructure to track TDX private pages;
2) It's not feasible to query the TDX module about page type because VMX has already been stopped when KVM receives the reboot notifier, plus the result from the TDX module may not be accurate (e.g., the remote CPU could be stopped right before MOVDIR64B).
One temporary solution is to blindly convert all memory pages, but it's problematic to do so too, because not all pages are mapped as writable in the direct mapping. It can be done by switching to the identical mapping created for kexec() or a new page table, but the complexity looks overkill.
Therefore, rather than doing something dramatic, only reset PAMT pages here. Other kernel components which use TDX need to do the conversion on their own by intercepting the rebooting/shutdown notifier (KVM already does that).
Note kexec() can happen at anytime, including when TDX module is being initialized. Register TDX reboot notifier callback to stop further TDX module initialization. If there's any ongoing module initialization, wait until it finishes. This makes sure the TDX module status is stable after the reboot notifier callback, and the later kexec() code can read module status to decide whether PAMTs are stable and available.
Also stop further TDX module initialization in case of machine shutdown and halt, but not limited to kexec(), as there's no reason to do so in these cases too.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 16 +++++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 116 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +2 -0
@@ -116,11 +116,13 @@ static inline u64 sc_retry(sc_func_t func, u64 fn,int tdx_cpu_enable (void );int tdx_enable (void );const char *tdx_dump_mce_info (struct mce *m); +void tdx_reset_memory (void );#else static inline void tdx_init (void ) { }static inline int tdx_cpu_enable (void ) {return -ENODEV ; }static inline int tdx_enable (void ) {return -ENODEV ; }static inline const char *tdx_dump_mce_info (struct mce *m) {return NULL ; } +static inline void tdx_reset_memory (void ) { }#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +16 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <asm/setup.h> #include <asm/set_memory.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> +#include <asm/tdx.h> #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI /*
@@ -298,9 +299,24 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)void *control_page;int save_ftrace_enabled; +/* +* For platforms with TDX "partial write machine check" erratum, +* all TDX private pages need to be converted back to normal +* before booting to the new kernel, otherwise the new kernel +* may get unexpected machine check. +* +* But skip this when preserve_context is on. The second kernel +* shouldn't write to the first kernel's memory anyway. Skipping +* this also avoids killing TDX in the first kernel, which would +* require more complicated handling. +*/ #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context)save_processor_state (); +else +tdx_reset_memory (); +#else +tdx_reset_memory ();#endif save_ftrace_enabled =__ftrace_enabled_save ();
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +98 -0
128 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 4/4 x86/virt/tdx: Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency
In reply to Huang, KaiFrom: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Now TDX host can work with kexec(). Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -1973,7 +1973,6 @@ config INTEL_TDX_HOST depends on X86_X2APIC select ARCH_KEEP_MEMBLOCK depends on CONTIG_ALLOC - depends on !KEXEC_CORE depends on X86_MCE select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM help
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH 2/4] x86/virt/tdx: Advertise the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT for TDX host
In reply to Huang, KaiQuoted 8 lines · Kai
From: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
On the TDX capable platform, during
kexec()the old kernel needs to flush dirty cachelines of all TDX private memory otherwise they may silently corrupt the new kernel's memory.Advertise the new introduced
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTattribute for TDX host platform so the cache will be flushed duringkexec().
So, you're setting a new bit, CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT. The way I like to deal with these is to go back and look at the definition of CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT and see whether the changelog here convinces me that CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT is being set appropriately. Bonus points if this changelog uses the same nomenclature as the comment describing CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT.
How well does this match the comment above CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT?
Quoted 3 lines
Note theoretically cache flush is only needed when TDX module is initialized, but the module initialization is done at runtime so just advertise the CC attribute when the platform has TDX enabled.
I find this really hard to parse. Here's a rewrite, as usual:
A TDX-host-capable system might not actually have any incoherent memory. This can occur if a TDX module was never initialized or if the caches have been flushed since the last time TDX was used. Ignore that case. Eliminate the need for any locking and assume that any TDX-host-capable system might have incoherent memory by always setting CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT.
Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
In reply to Huang, KaiQuoted 15 lines · Kai
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +2
-0@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <asm/setup.h> #include <asm/set_memory.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> +#include <asm/tdx.h> #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI /* @@ -298,9 +299,24 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)void *control_page;int save_ftrace_enabled; +/*
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) · line 312
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +10
-0+* For platforms with TDX "partial write machine check" erratum, +* all TDX private pages need to be converted back to normal +* before booting to the new kernel, otherwise the new kernel +* may get unexpected machine check. +* +* But skip this when preserve_context is on. The second kernel +* shouldn't write to the first kernel's memory anyway. Skipping +* this also avoids killing TDX in the first kernel, which would +* require more complicated handling. +*/
This is waaaaaaaaaaaaaaay too much information to stick in a generic function. Just call tdx_reset_memory() and make the argument about
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) · line 320
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +4
-0#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context)save_processor_state (); +else +tdx_reset_memory (); +#else +tdx_reset_memory ();#endif
Wow, that's awfully hard to read. I really wish folks' gag reflex would kick in when they see stuff like this to get them to spend an additional 15 seconds to turn this into:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP) && image->preserve_context) save_processor_state(); else tdx_reset_memory();
Quoted 23 lines
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +0
-0save_ftrace_enabled =__ftrace_enabled_save ();arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +3
-0@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <linux/acpi.h> #include <linux/suspend.h> #include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <linux/reboot.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/special_insns.h> #include <asm/msr-index.h> @@ -54,6 +55,8 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_module_lock);/* All TDX-usable memory regions. Protected by mem_hotplug_lock. */ static LIST_HEAD (tdx_memlist); +static bool tdx_rebooting; +typedef void (*sc_err_func_t )(u64 fn,u64 err,struct tdx_module_args *args);static inline void seamcall_err (u64 fn,u64 err,struct tdx_module_args *args)
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static int __tdx_enable(void) · line 1194
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +2
-0@@ -1187,6 +1190,9 @@ static int __tdx_enable(void) {int ret; +if (tdx_rebooting) +return -EAGAIN ;
This whole 'tdx_rebooting' deserves to at least be in its own patch. Also -EAGAIN seems to be a really odd return code for a permanent failure.
Quoted 26 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +19
-0ret =init_tdx_module ();if (ret) {pr_err ("module initialization failed (%d)\n" , ret);@@ -1420,6 +1426,90 @@ static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { .notifier_call = tdx_memory_notifier, }; +/* +* Convert TDX private pages back to normal on platforms with +* "partial write machine check" erratum. +* +* Called from machine_kexec() before booting to the new kernel. +*/ +void tdx_reset_memory (void ) +{ +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM )) +return ; + +/* +* Kernel read/write to TDX private memory doesn't +* cause machine check on hardware w/o this erratum. +*/ +if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE )) +return ; + +/* Called from kexec() when only rebooting cpu is alive */
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { · line 1457
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +10
-0+WARN_ON_ONCE (num_online_cpus () !=1 ); + +/* +* tdx_reboot_notifier() waits until ongoing TDX module +* initialization to finish, and module initialization is +* rejected after that. Therefore @tdx_module_status is +* stable here and can be read w/o holding lock. +*/ +if (tdx_module_status !=TDX_MODULE_INITIALIZED ) +return ;
kexec() can't happen until after reboot notifiers are called. tdx_reboot_notifier() makes 'tdx_module_status' stable, so no lock is needed.
Right?
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { · line 1463
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +5
-0+/* +* Flush cache of all TDX private memory _before_ converting +* them back to avoid silent memory corruption. +*/ +native_wbinvd ();
Since this is single-threaded, it also needs to mention where all the other CPU caches got flushed.
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +4
-0+/* +* Convert PAMTs back to normal. All other cpus are already +* dead and TDMRs/PAMTs are stable. +*
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { · line 1478
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +10
-0+* Ideally it's better to cover all types of TDX private pages +* here, but it's impractical: +* +* - There's no existing infrastructure to tell whether a page +* is TDX private memory or not. +* +* - Using SEAMCALL to query TDX module isn't feasible either: +* - VMX has been turned off by reaching here so SEAMCALL +* cannot be made; +* - Even SEAMCALL can be made the result from TDX module may
^ if ^ a ^,
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +6
-0+* not be accurate (e.g., remote CPU can be stopped while +* the kernel is in the middle of reclaiming TDX private +* page and doing MOVDIR64B). +* +* One temporary solution could be just converting all memory +* pages, but it's problematic too, because not all pages are
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { · line 1494
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +10
-0+* mapped as writable in direct mapping. It can be done by +* switching to the identical mapping for kexec() or a new page +* table which maps all pages as writable, but the complexity is +* overkill. +* +* Thus instead of doing something dramatic to convert all pages, +* only convert PAMTs here. Other kernel components which use +* TDX need to do the conversion on their own by intercepting the +* rebooting/shutdown notifier (KVM already does that). +*/
I'd leave the extended alternatives discussion in the changelog, not here.
Focus on what _this_ is doing and why it is imperfect:
1. Just reset the PAMDs
2. This leaves A, B, and C undealt with
3. The risk of leaving those is ...
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { · line 1507
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +13
-0+tdmrs_reset_pamt_all (&tdx_tdmr_list); +} + +static int tdx_reboot_notifier (struct notifier_block *nb,unsigned long mode, +void *unused) +{ +/* Wait ongoing TDX initialization to finish */ +mutex_lock (&tdx_module_lock); + tdx_rebooting = true; +mutex_unlock (&tdx_module_lock); + +return NOTIFY_OK ; +}
Why is 'tdx_rebooting' a new variable instead of a new state in tdx_module_status?
Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
Quoted 13 lines · Dave Hansen
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) · line 320
Quoted 8 lines
#ifdef
CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMParch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +4
-0if (image->preserve_context)save_processor_state (); +else +tdx_reset_memory (); +#else +tdx_reset_memory ();#endif Wow, that's awfully hard to read. I really wish folks' gag reflex would kick in when they see stuff like this to get them to spend an additional 15 seconds to turn this into:
Quoted 4 lines
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP) && image->preserve_context) save_processor_state(); else tdx_reset_memory();
save_processor_state() is declared under CONFIG_PM_SLEEP, so I guess your variant might break build in some cases without updated suspend.h.
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
Quoted 14 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 13 lines · Dave Hansen
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) · line 320
Quoted 8 lines
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context) save_processor_state();arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +4
-0+ else +tdx_reset_memory (); +#else +tdx_reset_memory ();#endif Wow, that's awfully hard to read. I really wish folks' gag reflex would kick in when they see stuff like this to get them to spend an additional 15 seconds to turn this into:
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP) && image->preserve_context) save_processor_state(); else tdx_reset_memory();
save_processor_state()is declared underCONFIG_PM_SLEEP, so I guess your variant might break build in some cases without updatedsuspend.h.
I tried. If I turn off both SUSPEND and HIBERNATION in the Kconfig I got build error:
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c:325:17: error: implicit declaration of function ‘save_processor_state’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
325 | save_processor_state();
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
In reply to Dave HansenQuoted 15 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 14 lines · Kai
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +1
-0@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <asm/setup.h> #include <asm/set_memory.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> +#include <asm/tdx.h> #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI /* @@ -298,9 +299,24 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)void *control_page;int save_ftrace_enabled;
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arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) · line 312
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arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +11
-0+/* +* For platforms with TDX "partial write machine check" erratum, +* all TDX private pages need to be converted back to normal +* before booting to the new kernel, otherwise the new kernel +* may get unexpected machine check. +* +* But skip this when preserve_context is on. The second kernel +* shouldn't write to the first kernel's memory anyway. Skipping +* this also avoids killing TDX in the first kernel, which would +* require more complicated handling. +*/ This is waaaaaaaaaaaaaaay too much information to stick in a generic function. Just call
tdx_reset_memory()and make the argument about
Hi Dave,
Thanks for review.
Agreed too much info here. But I don't quite understand your second sentence here. Can I have your suggestion again?
Quoted 14 lines
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) · line 320
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arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +4
-0#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context)save_processor_state (); +else +tdx_reset_memory (); +#else +tdx_reset_memory ();#endif Wow, that's awfully hard to read. I really wish folks' gag reflex would kick in when they see stuff like this to get them to spend an additional 15 seconds to turn this into:
Quoted 5 lines
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP) && image->preserve_context) save_processor_state(); else tdx_reset_memory();
Yeah this is way better, but as Kirill pointed out we will have build error when both SUSPEND and HIBERNATION is off.
Maybe below?
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context) save_processor_state(); else #endif tdx_reset_memory();
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arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +0
-0save_ftrace_enabled =__ftrace_enabled_save ();arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +3
-0@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <linux/acpi.h> #include <linux/suspend.h> #include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <linux/reboot.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/special_insns.h> #include <asm/msr-index.h> @@ -54,6 +55,8 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_module_lock);/* All TDX-usable memory regions. Protected by mem_hotplug_lock. */ static LIST_HEAD (tdx_memlist); +static bool tdx_rebooting; +typedef void (*sc_err_func_t )(u64 fn,u64 err,struct tdx_module_args *args);static inline void seamcall_err (u64 fn,u64 err,struct tdx_module_args *args)@@ -1187,6 +1190,9 @@ static int __tdx_enable(void) {int ret;
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arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static int __tdx_enable(void) · line 1194
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +2
-0+if (tdx_rebooting) +return -EAGAIN ;This whole '
tdx_rebooting' deserves to at least be in its own patch. Also-EAGAINseems to be a really odd return code for a permanent failure.
Will move to a separate patch.
How about just -EINVAL?
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arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +19
-0ret =init_tdx_module ();if (ret) {pr_err ("module initialization failed (%d)\n" , ret);@@ -1420,6 +1426,90 @@ static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { .notifier_call = tdx_memory_notifier, }; +/* +* Convert TDX private pages back to normal on platforms with +* "partial write machine check" erratum. +* +* Called from machine_kexec() before booting to the new kernel. +*/ +void tdx_reset_memory (void ) +{ +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM )) +return ; + +/* +* Kernel read/write to TDX private memory doesn't +* cause machine check on hardware w/o this erratum. +*/ +if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE )) +return ; + +/* Called from kexec() when only rebooting cpu is alive */ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { · line 1457
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +10
-0+WARN_ON_ONCE (num_online_cpus () !=1 ); + +/* +* tdx_reboot_notifier() waits until ongoing TDX module +* initialization to finish, and module initialization is +* rejected after that. Therefore @tdx_module_status is +* stable here and can be read w/o holding lock. +*/ +if (tdx_module_status !=TDX_MODULE_INITIALIZED ) +return ;
kexec()can't happen until after reboot notifiers are called.tdx_reboot_notifier()makes 'tdx_module_status' stable, so no lock is needed.
Quoted 1 line
Right?
Yes. I can replace the comment with your words.
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arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { · line 1463
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arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +5
-0+/* +* Flush cache of all TDX private memory _before_ converting +* them back to avoid silent memory corruption. +*/ +native_wbinvd ();Since this is single-threaded, it also needs to mention where all the other CPU caches got flushed.
OK will point out.
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arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +4
-0+/* +* Convert PAMTs back to normal. All other cpus are already +* dead and TDMRs/PAMTs are stable. +* arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { · line 1478
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arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +10
-0+* Ideally it's better to cover all types of TDX private pages +* here, but it's impractical: +* +* - There's no existing infrastructure to tell whether a page +* is TDX private memory or not. +* +* - Using SEAMCALL to query TDX module isn't feasible either: +* - VMX has been turned off by reaching here so SEAMCALL +* cannot be made; +* - Even SEAMCALL can be made the result from TDX module may ^ if ^ a ^,
Thanks. Will add.
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arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +6
-0+* not be accurate (e.g., remote CPU can be stopped while +* the kernel is in the middle of reclaiming TDX private +* page and doing MOVDIR64B). +* +* One temporary solution could be just converting all memory +* pages, but it's problematic too, because not all pages are arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { · line 1494
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +10
-0+* mapped as writable in direct mapping. It can be done by +* switching to the identical mapping for kexec() or a new page +* table which maps all pages as writable, but the complexity is +* overkill. +* +* Thus instead of doing something dramatic to convert all pages, +* only convert PAMTs here. Other kernel components which use +* TDX need to do the conversion on their own by intercepting the +* rebooting/shutdown notifier (KVM already does that). +*/ I'd leave the extended alternatives discussion in the changelog, not here.
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Focus on what _this_ is doing and why it is imperfect:
1. Just reset the PAMDs
2. This leaves A, B, and C undealt with
3. The risk of leaving those is ...
Agreed. Will do.
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arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +3
-0+tdmrs_reset_pamt_all (&tdx_tdmr_list); +} +arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c static struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = { · line 1507
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +10
-0+static int tdx_reboot_notifier (struct notifier_block *nb,unsigned long mode, +void *unused) +{ +/* Wait ongoing TDX initialization to finish */ +mutex_lock (&tdx_module_lock); + tdx_rebooting = true; +mutex_unlock (&tdx_module_lock); + +return NOTIFY_OK ; +}Why is '
tdx_rebooting' a new variable instead of a new state intdx_module_status?
I think we can but I believe using tdx_rebooting is more clear.
For instance, if we want to add a new state TDX_MODULE_ABORT for this case, when tdx_reboot_notifier() is called after module initialization, then the tdx_module_status (which is already TDX_MODULE_INITIALIZED) will be overwritten and we will lose the information that module initialization has been done successfully.
We may be able to avoid these using more complicated logic but I think using a separate tdx_rebooting is straightforward.
Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
In reply to Huang, KaiQuoted 25 lines · Kai
Quoted 14 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 13 lines · Dave Hansen
Review
Quoted 8 lines
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context) save_processor_state();(quoted diff) +4
-0+ else + tdx_reset_memory(); +#else + tdx_reset_memory(); #endifWow, that's awfully hard to read. I really wish folks' gag reflex would kick in when they see stuff like this to get them to spend an additional 15 seconds to turn this into:
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP) && image->preserve_context) save_processor_state(); else tdx_reset_memory();
save_processor_state()is declared underCONFIG_PM_SLEEP, so I guess your variant might break build in some cases without updatedsuspend.h.
Quoted 7 lines
I tried. If I turn off both SUSPEND and HIBERNATION in the
KconfigI got build error:
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c:325:17: error: implicit declaration of function ‘save_processor_state’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]325 | save_processor_state(); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Moving save_processor_state() declaration outside all defines would do the trick.
Something like the patch below.
But finding the right spot for the move can be tricky. I don't particular like where I moved it.
include/linux/suspend.h +3 -2
@@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ struct platform_s2idle_ops {void (*end)(void ); }; +void save_processor_state (void ); +void restore_processor_state (void ); +#ifdef CONFIG_SUSPEND extern suspend_state_t pm_suspend_target_state;extern suspend_state_t mem_sleep_current;
@@ -491,8 +494,6 @@ static inline int is_hibernate_resume_dev(dev_t dev) { return 0; }extern struct mutex system_transition_mutex;#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP -void save_processor_state (void ); -void restore_processor_state (void );/* kernel/power/main.c */ extern int register_pm_notifier (struct notifier_block *nb);
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Re: [PATCH 2/4] x86/virt/tdx: Advertise the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT for TDX host
In reply to Dave HansenQuoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Kai
From: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
On the TDX capable platform, during
kexec()the old kernel needs to flush dirty cachelines of all TDX private memory otherwise they may silently corrupt the new kernel's memory.Advertise the new introduced
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTattribute for TDX host platform so the cache will be flushed duringkexec().
Quoted 8 lines
So, you're setting a new bit,
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT. The way I like to deal with these is to go back and look at the definition ofCC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTand see whether the changelog here convinces me thatCC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTis being set appropriately. Bonus points if this changelog uses the same nomenclature as the comment describingCC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT.How well does this match the comment above
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT?
I will try to improve the changelog: explain what does CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT mean, and why it is suitable for TDX host.
Please let me know if you have more comments. Thanks.
Quoted 5 lines
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Note theoretically cache flush is only needed when TDX module is initialized, but the module initialization is done at runtime so just advertise the CC attribute when the platform has TDX enabled.
Quoted 8 lines
I find this really hard to parse. Here's a rewrite, as usual:
A TDX-host-capable system might not actually have any incoherent memory. This can occur if a TDX module was never initialized or if the caches have been flushed since the last time TDX was used. Ignore that case. Eliminate the need for any locking and assume that any TDX-host-capable system might have incoherent memory by always setting
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT.
I appreciate, as usual. :-)
Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovQuoted 34 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 25 lines · Kai
Quoted 14 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 13 lines · Dave Hansen
Review
Quoted 8 lines
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context) save_processor_state();(quoted diff) +4
-0+ else + tdx_reset_memory(); +#else + tdx_reset_memory(); #endifWow, that's awfully hard to read. I really wish folks' gag reflex would kick in when they see stuff like this to get them to spend an additional 15 seconds to turn this into:
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP) && image->preserve_context) save_processor_state(); else tdx_reset_memory();
save_processor_state()is declared underCONFIG_PM_SLEEP, so I guess your variant might break build in some cases without updatedsuspend.h.Quoted 7 lines
I tried. If I turn off both SUSPEND and HIBERNATION in the
KconfigI got build error:
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c:325:17: error: implicit declaration of function ‘save_processor_state’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]325 | save_processor_state(); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Quoted 8 lines
Moving
save_processor_state()declaration outside all defines would do the trick.Something like the patch below.
But finding the right spot for the move can be tricky. I don't particular like where I moved it.
I don't feel I have enough justification to do such change.
As I replied in another email, how about:
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
if (image->preserve_context)
save_processor_state();
else
#endif
tdx_reset_memory();Not ideal, but looks slightly better?
But I'll leave to Dave to comment.
Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovQuoted 10 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 10 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context) save_processor_state();(quoted diff) +4
-0+ else + tdx_reset_memory(); +#else + tdx_reset_memory(); #endif
...
include/linux/suspend.h static inline int is_hibernate_resume_dev(dev_t dev) { return 0; } · line 495
Quoted 12 lines
include/linux/suspend.h +3
-2+void save_processor_state (void ); +void restore_processor_state (void ); +#ifdef CONFIG_SUSPEND extern suspend_state_t pm_suspend_target_state;extern suspend_state_t mem_sleep_current;@@ -491,8 +494,6 @@ static inline int is_hibernate_resume_dev(dev_t dev) { return 0; }extern struct mutex system_transition_mutex;#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP -void save_processor_state (void ); -void restore_processor_state (void );
It's a little funky that we've got a #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP in the .c file and then we're dodging around an #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP in the header. This is one of the reasons we shouldn't be putting #ifdefs in .c files in the first place. But I digress...
Either way, if you focus on getting the dang #ifdef out of the main code flow, the rest will fall in place easily. Heck, if you even do this in the x86 kexec code:
static void kexec_save_processor_start(image)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context) save_processor_state();
#endif
}
it'll leave you with:
kexec_save_processor_start(image); /* Give a good reason here */ if (!image->preserve_context) tdx_reset_memory();
which is *FINE*. No funky #ifdefs, indentation or else's dangling about.
Quoted 8 lines · Kai
Currently
kexec()support and TDX host are muturally exclusive in theKconfig. This series adds the TDX host kexec support so that they can work together and can be enabled at the same time in theKconfig.This follows Dave's suggestion to add the
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTattribute to unify both Intel and AMD, instead of having Intel/AMD specific checks around [1].
Quoted 5 lines
Hi Tom,
I've tested on my TDX testig machine but I don't have AMD machine to test. I highly appreciate if you or any AMD guy can help to review and/or test this series to make sure I didn't break anything.
Hi Kai,
I'm adding Ashish to the thread to take a look at this as he's been focusing on kexec related things recently.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 23 lines
Thanks a lot!
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Kai Huang (4):
x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec x86/virt/tdx: Advertise theCC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTfor TDX host x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum x86/virt/tdx: Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependencyarch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 34 +++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 18 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 14 +--- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 11 +++- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/cc_platform.h | 16 +++++ 8 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)base-commit:
a6f0b57202b0ee50dc042bae16494008dc6dc992
Edgecombe, Rick P
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/4] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
In reply to Huang, KaiQuoted 10 lines · Kai
Note
kexec()can happen at anytime, including when TDX module is being
initialized. Register TDX reboot notifier callback to stop further TDX
module initialization. If there's any ongoing module initialization, wait until it finishes. This makes sure the TDX module status is stable
after the reboot notifier callback, and the laterkexec()code can read
module status to decide whether PAMTs are stable and available.
I don't see how this works with the crash kernel flavor of kexec. Did you look at that scenario?
Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
Quoted 12 lines · Rick P
Quoted 10 lines · Kai
Note
kexec()can happen at anytime, including when TDX module is being
initialized. Register TDX reboot notifier callback to stop further TDX
module initialization. If there's any ongoing module initialization, wait until it finishes. This makes sure the TDX module status is stable
after the reboot notifier callback, and the laterkexec()code can read
module status to decide whether PAMTs are stable and available.
Quoted 4 lines
I don't see how this works with the crash kernel flavor of kexec. Did you look at that scenario?
Hmm right this doesn't work for crash kexec. Thanks for pointing out.
We need a way that doesn't depend on the reboot notifier. Previously we used a variable to indicate the point where it's possible to have any TDX private pages. I'll switch back to use that.
Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
In reply to Dave HansenQuoted 44 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 10 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context) save_processor_state();(quoted diff) +4
-0+ else + tdx_reset_memory(); +#else + tdx_reset_memory(); #endif...
include/linux/suspend.h static inline int is_hibernate_resume_dev(dev_t dev) { return 0; } · line 495
Quoted 12 lines
include/linux/suspend.h +3
-2+void save_processor_state (void ); +void restore_processor_state (void ); +#ifdef CONFIG_SUSPEND extern suspend_state_t pm_suspend_target_state;extern suspend_state_t mem_sleep_current;@@ -491,8 +494,6 @@ static inline int is_hibernate_resume_dev(dev_t dev) { return 0; }extern struct mutex system_transition_mutex;#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP -void save_processor_state (void ); -void restore_processor_state (void );It's a little funky that we've got a #ifdef
CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMPin the .c file and then we're dodging around an #ifdefCONFIG_PM_SLEEPin the header. This is one of the reasons we shouldn't be putting #ifdefs in .c files in the first place. But I digress...Either way, if you focus on getting the dang #ifdef out of the main code flow, the rest will fall in place easily. Heck, if you even do this in the x86 kexec code:
static void
kexec_save_processor_start(image)
{#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context) save_processor_state();#endif
}it'll leave you with:
Quoted 9 lines
kexec_save_processor_start(image); /* Give a good reason here */ if (!image->preserve_context) tdx_reset_memory();which is *FINE*. No funky #ifdefs, indentation or else's dangling about.
Thanks for the insight and explanation! I'll use this in the new version.
Quoted 11 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 10 lines · Kai
Currently
kexec()support and TDX host are muturally exclusive in theKconfig.This series adds the TDX host kexec support so that they can work together and can be enabled at the same time in theKconfig.This follows Dave's suggestion to add the
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTattribute to unify both Intel and AMD, instead of having Intel/AMD specific checks around [1].Hi Tom,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I've tested on my TDX testig machine but I don't have AMD machine to test. I highly appreciate if you or any AMD guy can help to review and/or test this series to make sure I didn't break anything.
Hi Kai,
I'm adding Ashish to the thread to take a look at this as he's been focusing on kexec related things recently.
Thanks Tom.
Hi Ashish,
I appreciate if you can help to review and test the first patch. Thanks!
Quoted 20 lines · Kai
Quoted 17 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 8 lines · Kai
Currently
kexec()support and TDX host are muturally exclusive in theKconfig.This series adds the TDX host kexec support so that they can work together and can be enabled at the same time in theKconfig.This follows Dave's suggestion to add the
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTattribute to unify both Intel and AMD, instead of having Intel/AMD specific checks around [1].Quoted 5 lines
Hi Tom,
I've tested on my TDX testig machine but I don't have AMD machine to test. I highly appreciate if you or any AMD guy can help to review and/or test this series to make sure I didn't break anything.
Hi Kai,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I'm adding Ashish to the thread to take a look at this as he's been focusing on kexec related things recently.
Thanks Tom.
Hi Ashish,
I appreciate if you can help to review and test the first patch. Thanks!
Hello Kai,
Yes, i am currently working on SNP guest kexec support on top of Kirill's TDX guest kexec patches, i will have a look your patch-set and test and review it.
Thanks, Ashish
Quoted 6 lines
Hello Kai,
Yes, i am currently working on SNP guest kexec support on top of Kirill's TDX guest kexec patches, i will have a look your patch-set and test and review it.
Thanks, Ashish
Hi Ashish,
I appreciate!
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
In reply to Huang, KaiQuoted 8 lines · Kai
From: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Currently on AMD SME platforms, during
kexec()caches are flushed manually before jumping to the new kernel due to memory encryption. Intel TDX needs to flush cachelines of TDX private memory before jumping to the second kernel too, otherwise they may silently corrupt the new kernel.
Quoted 5 lines
Instead of sprinkling both AMD and Intel's specific checks around, introduce a new
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTattribute to unify both Intel and AMD, and simplify the logic:Could the old kernel leave incoherent caches around?
"Is it possible that the kernel could leave caches in incoherent state?"
Quoted 6 lines
If so, do WBINVD.
Convert the AMD SME to use this new CC attribute.
A later patch will
utilize this new attribute for Intel TDX too.
Yeah, once those are all in git, the concept of "subsequent patch" becomes ambiguous depending on how you're sorting them. So try to read that commit message out of the context of all those "subsequent patches" and see if it still makes sense.
IOW, you should strive for your commit messages to make sense on their own, without referencing other patches.
In this particular case, that "later patch" can go.
Quoted 44 lines
Specifically, AMD SME flushes caches at two places: 1)
stop_this_cpu();
2)relocate_kernel().stop_this_cpu()checks the CPUID directly to do WBINVD for the reason that the current kernel's SME enabling status may not match the new kernel's choice. However therelocate_kernel()only does the WBINVD when the current kernel has enabled SME for the reason that the new kernel is always placed in an "unencrypted" area.To simplify the logic, for AMD SME change to always use the way that is done in
stop_this_cpu(). This will cause an additional WBINVD inrelocate_kernel()when the current kernel hasn't enabled SME (e.g., disabled by kernel command line), but this is acceptable for the sake of having less complicated code (see [1] for the relevant discussion).Note currently the kernel only advertises CC vendor for AMD SME when SME is actually enabled by the kernel. To always advertise the new
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTregardless of the kernel's SME enabling status, change to set CC vendor as long as the hardware has enabled SME.Note "advertising
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTwhen the hardware has enabled SME" is still different from "checking the CPUID" (the way that is done instop_this_cpu()), but technically the former also serves the purpose and is actually more accurate.Such change allows
sme_me_maskto be 0 while CC vendor reports as AMD. But this doesn't impact other CC attributes on AMD platforms, nor does it impact the cc_mkdec()/cc_mkenc().[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Suggested-by Dave Hansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 14 +++----------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 11 ++++++++++- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)arch/x86/coco/core.c +0
-0
arch/x86/coco/core.c static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) · line 80
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/coco/core.c +6
-0@@ -72,6 +72,19 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT :return sme_me_mask && !(sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ); +case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT : +/* +* CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT represents whether SME has +* enabled on the platform regardless whether the kernel +* has actually enabled the SME. +
"represents whether SME has [been] enabled ... regardless whether the kernel has enabled SME"?!?
I think this needs to be:
arch/x86/coco/core.c +7 -0
@@ -67,6 +67,13 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)switch (attr) {case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT : + +/* +* CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT represents whether SME has +* enabled on the platform regardless whether the kernel +* has actually enabled the SME. +*/ +case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT :return sme_me_mask;case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT :
arch/x86/coco/core.c static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) · line 87
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/coco/core.c +7
-0+return !(sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ); + +/* +* For all CC_ATTR_GUEST_* there's no need to check sme_me_mask +* as it must be true when there's any SEV enable bit set in +* sev_status. +*/
Superfluous comment.
Quoted 26 lines
arch/x86/coco/core.c +0
-0case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT :return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ;arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +1
-1@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) (unsigned long )page_list, image->start, image->preserve_context, - cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)); + cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT));#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context)arch/x86/kernel/process.c +0
-2@@ -813,18 +813,10 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)mcheck_cpu_clear (c);/* -* Use wbinvd on processors that support SME. This provides support -* for performing a successful kexec when going from SME inactive
arch/x86/kernel/process.c void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy) · line 817
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +2
-8-* to SME active (or vice-versa). The cache must be cleared so that -* if there are entries with the same physical address, both with and -* without the encryption bit, they don't race each other when flushed -* and potentially end up with the wrong entry being committed to -* memory. -* -* Test the CPUID bit directly because the machine might've cleared -* X86_FEATURE_SME due to cmdline options. +* Use wbinvd on processors that the first kernel *could* +* potentially leave incoherent cachelines.
No need for that comment anymore - people can grep for CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT's definition simply.
Quoted 20 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1
-1*/ -if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ) &BIT (0 ))) +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT ))native_wbinvd ();/* arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +6
-0@@ -570,9 +570,19 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) msr =__rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG );if (!(msr &MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT ))return ; + +/* +* Always set CC vendor when the platform has SME enabled +* regardless whether the kernel will actually activates the +* SME or not. This reports the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT +* being true as long as the platform has SME enabled so that
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) · line 588
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +4
-0+* stop_this_cpu() can do necessary WBINVD during kexec(). +*/ + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ; }else {/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ; goto out; }
So you can't put it before the if - just slap it in both branches. Geez!
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +2 -1
@@ -549,6 +549,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)if (snp && !(msr &MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED ))snp_abort (); + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ; +/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */ if (feature_mask ==AMD_SME_BIT ) {/*
@@ -597,6 +599,5 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) out:RIP_REL_REF (sme_me_mask) = me_mask; physical_mask &= ~me_mask; - cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ;cc_set_mask (me_mask); }
Btw, pls do your patches ontop of tip/master as other patches in there are touching this file.
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +0
-1@@ -608,7 +618,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) out:if (sme_me_mask) { physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask; - cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ;cc_set_mask (sme_me_mask); } }include/linux/cc_platform.h +0
-0
include/linux/cc_platform.h enum cc_attr { · line 44
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/cc_platform.h +0
-0@@ -42,6 +42,21 @@ enum cc_attr {*/ CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT,
This goes to the end of the enum.
include/linux/cc_platform.h enum cc_attr { · line 47
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/cc_platform.h +3
-0+/** +* @CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT: Host memory encryption can be +* incoherent
"...can leave caches in an incoherent state."
include/linux/cc_platform.h enum cc_attr { · line 56
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/cc_platform.h +9
-0+* +* The platform/OS is running as a bare-metal system or a hypervisor. +* The memory encryption engine might have left non-cache-coherent +* data in the caches that needs to be flushed. +* +* Use this in places where the cache coherency of the memory matters +* but the encryption status does not. +* +* Includes all systems that set CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT.
If that is the case, why do you even need a new CC_ATTR define?
Might as well do:
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) native_wbinvd();
?
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/cc_platform.h +3
-0+*/ + CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT, +
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Quoted 98 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 8 lines · Kai
From: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Currently on AMD SME platforms, during
kexec()caches are flushed manually before jumping to the new kernel due to memory encryption. Intel TDX needs to flush cachelines of TDX private memory before jumping to the second kernel too, otherwise they may silently corrupt the new kernel.Quoted 5 lines
Instead of sprinkling both AMD and Intel's specific checks around, introduce a new
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTattribute to unify both Intel and AMD, and simplify the logic:Could the old kernel leave incoherent caches around?
"Is it possible that the kernel could leave caches in incoherent state?"
Quoted 6 lines
If so, do WBINVD.
Convert the AMD SME to use this new CC attribute.
A later patch will
utilize this new attribute for Intel TDX too.Yeah, once those are all in git, the concept of "subsequent patch" becomes ambiguous depending on how you're sorting them. So try to read that commit message out of the context of all those "subsequent patches" and see if it still makes sense.
IOW, you should strive for your commit messages to make sense on their own, without referencing other patches.
In this particular case, that "later patch" can go.
Quoted 44 lines
Specifically, AMD SME flushes caches at two places: 1)
stop_this_cpu();
2)relocate_kernel().stop_this_cpu()checks the CPUID directly to do WBINVD for the reason that the current kernel's SME enabling status may not match the new kernel's choice. However therelocate_kernel()only does the WBINVD when the current kernel has enabled SME for the reason that the new kernel is always placed in an "unencrypted" area.To simplify the logic, for AMD SME change to always use the way that is done in
stop_this_cpu(). This will cause an additional WBINVD inrelocate_kernel()when the current kernel hasn't enabled SME (e.g., disabled by kernel command line), but this is acceptable for the sake of having less complicated code (see [1] for the relevant discussion).Note currently the kernel only advertises CC vendor for AMD SME when SME is actually enabled by the kernel. To always advertise the new
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTregardless of the kernel's SME enabling status, change to set CC vendor as long as the hardware has enabled SME.Note "advertising
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTwhen the hardware has enabled SME" is still different from "checking the CPUID" (the way that is done instop_this_cpu()), but technically the former also serves the purpose and is actually more accurate.Such change allows
sme_me_maskto be 0 while CC vendor reports as AMD. But this doesn't impact other CC attributes on AMD platforms, nor does it impact the cc_mkdec()/cc_mkenc().[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Suggested-by Dave Hansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 14 +++----------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 11 ++++++++++- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)arch/x86/coco/core.c +0
-0arch/x86/coco/core.c static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) · line 80
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/coco/core.c +6
-0@@ -72,6 +72,19 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT :return sme_me_mask && !(sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ); +case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT : +/* +* CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT represents whether SME has +* enabled on the platform regardless whether the kernel +* has actually enabled the SME. +"represents whether SME has [been] enabled ... regardless whether the kernel has enabled SME"?!?
I think this needs to be:
arch/x86/coco/core.c +0
-0
arch/x86/coco/core.c static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) · line 76
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/coco/core.c +7
-0@@ -67,6 +67,13 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)switch (attr) {case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT : + +/* +* CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT represents whether SME has +* enabled on the platform regardless whether the kernel +* has actually enabled the SME. +*/ +case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT :
This change won't return the correct answer. The check needs to remain against the sev_status value.
Quoted 79 lines
arch/x86/coco/core.c +0
-0return sme_me_mask;case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT :arch/x86/coco/core.c static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) · line 87
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/coco/core.c +7
-0+return !(sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ); + +/* +* For all CC_ATTR_GUEST_* there's no need to check sme_me_mask +* as it must be true when there's any SEV enable bit set in +* sev_status. +*/ Superfluous comment.
Quoted 26 lines
arch/x86/coco/core.c +0
-0case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT :return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ;arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +1
-1@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) (unsigned long )page_list, image->start, image->preserve_context, - cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)); + cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT));#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context)arch/x86/kernel/process.c +0
-2@@ -813,18 +813,10 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)mcheck_cpu_clear (c);/* -* Use wbinvd on processors that support SME. This provides support -* for performing a successful kexec when going from SME inactive arch/x86/kernel/process.c void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy) · line 817
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +2
-8-* to SME active (or vice-versa). The cache must be cleared so that -* if there are entries with the same physical address, both with and -* without the encryption bit, they don't race each other when flushed -* and potentially end up with the wrong entry being committed to -* memory. -* -* Test the CPUID bit directly because the machine might've cleared -* X86_FEATURE_SME due to cmdline options. +* Use wbinvd on processors that the first kernel *could* +* potentially leave incoherent cachelines. No need for that comment anymore - people can grep for CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT's definition simply.
Quoted 24 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1
-1*/ -if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ) &BIT (0 ))) +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT ))native_wbinvd ();/* arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +9
-0@@ -570,9 +570,19 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) msr =__rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG );if (!(msr &MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT ))return ; + +/* +* Always set CC vendor when the platform has SME enabled +* regardless whether the kernel will actually activates the +* SME or not. This reports the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT +* being true as long as the platform has SME enabled so that +* stop_this_cpu() can do necessary WBINVD during kexec(). +*/ + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ; }else {
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) · line 588
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +1
-0/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ; goto out; }So you can't put it before the if - just slap it in both branches. Geez!
I think that will still work because sme_me_mask and sev_status will both be 0 on bare-metal if 'msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT' doesn't evaluate to true. However, that will cause any platform that hasn't enabled memory encryption (see SYS_CFG MSR), to also perform the WBINVD.
The idea looks like it was to keep existing behavior where cc_vendor wasn't set if 'msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT' is false.
Quoted 62 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +2
-1@@ -549,6 +549,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)if (snp && !(msr &MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED ))snp_abort (); + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ; +/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */ if (feature_mask ==AMD_SME_BIT ) {/* @@ -597,6 +599,5 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) out:RIP_REL_REF (sme_me_mask) = me_mask; physical_mask &= ~me_mask; - cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ;cc_set_mask (me_mask); }Btw, pls do your patches ontop of tip/master as other patches in there are touching this file.
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +0
-1@@ -608,7 +618,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) out:if (sme_me_mask) { physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask; - cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ;cc_set_mask (sme_me_mask); } }include/linux/cc_platform.h +0
-0include/linux/cc_platform.h enum cc_attr { · line 44
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/cc_platform.h +0
-0@@ -42,6 +42,21 @@ enum cc_attr {*/ CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT,This goes to the end of the enum.
include/linux/cc_platform.h enum cc_attr { · line 47
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/cc_platform.h +3
-0+/** +* @CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT: Host memory encryption can be +* incoherent "...can leave caches in an incoherent state."
include/linux/cc_platform.h enum cc_attr { · line 56
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/cc_platform.h +9
-0+* +* The platform/OS is running as a bare-metal system or a hypervisor. +* The memory encryption engine might have left non-cache-coherent +* data in the caches that needs to be flushed. +* +* Use this in places where the cache coherency of the memory matters +* but the encryption status does not. +* +* Includes all systems that set CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT. If that is the case, why do you even need a new
CC_ATTRdefine?
Quoted 4 lines
Might as well do:
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) native_wbinvd();
That won't work, because the current system may not have SME active. The cases that needs to be caught are kexec'ing from a mem_encrypt=off to a mem_encrypt=on or from a mem_encrypt=on to a mem_encrypt=off.
For the first case, you need to determine if the system is SME capable, because cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT) will return false if SME is not active.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 8 lines
?
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/cc_platform.h +3
-0+*/ + CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT, +
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Quoted 2 lines · Tom Lendacky
This change won't return the correct answer. The check needs to remain against the
sev_statusvalue.
Feel free to explain because this patch is confusing me.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
So you can't put it before the if - just slap it in both branches. Geez!
I think that will still work because
sme_me_maskandsev_statuswill both be 0 on bare-metal if 'msr &MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT' doesn't evaluate to true. However, that will cause any platform that hasn't enabled memory encryption (seeSYS_CFGMSR), to also perform the WBINVD.
If it keeps the code simpler I don't mind. That's so not a fast path.
Quoted 3 lines
That won't work, because the current system may not have SME active. The cases that needs to be caught are kexec'ing from a mem_encrypt=off to a mem_encrypt=on or from a mem_encrypt=on to a mem_encrypt=off.
And I'm saying, we should keep it simple and simply WBINVD on SME capable machines, regardless of the encryption setting.
Any downsides to that which are actually real and noticeable?
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Tom Lendacky
This change won't return the correct answer. The check needs to remain against the
sev_statusvalue.Feel free to explain because this patch is confusing me.
In your previous email, you want to put the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT case statement with the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT case which is returning sme_me_mask. That will be zero/false if SME is not active, skipping the WBINVD. But, in reality you still need to perform the WBINVD in case the kexec target is doing mem_encrypt=on.
That's why the '!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)' works here. Basically, if you are bare-metal, it will return true. And it will only return true for machines that support SME and have the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT bit set in SYS_CFG MSR because of where the 'cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD' assignment is. However, if you move the 'cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD' to before the if statement, then you will have the WBINVD called for any machine that supports SME, even if SME is not possible because the proper bit in the SYS_CFG MSR hasn't been set.
I know what I'm trying to say, let me know if it is making sense...
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So you can't put it before the if - just slap it in both branches. Geez!
I think that will still work because
sme_me_maskandsev_statuswill both be 0 on bare-metal if 'msr &MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT' doesn't evaluate to true. However, that will cause any platform that hasn't enabled memory encryption (seeSYS_CFGMSR), to also perform the WBINVD.
Quoted 8 lines
If it keeps the code simpler I don't mind. That's so not a fast path.
Quoted 3 lines
That won't work, because the current system may not have SME active. The cases that needs to be caught are kexec'ing from a mem_encrypt=off to a mem_encrypt=on or from a mem_encrypt=on to a mem_encrypt=off.
And I'm saying, we should keep it simple and simply WBINVD on SME capable machines, regardless of the encryption setting.
In that case, CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT needs to be separate from CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT as the original patch has it. The comment might make more sense as:
* CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT represents whether SME is possible
* on the platform, regardless of whether mem_encrypt=on has been
* used to make SME active.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 5 lines
Any downsides to that which are actually real and noticeable?
Thx.
Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Quoted 19 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Tom Lendacky
This change won't return the correct answer. The check needs to remain against the
sev_statusvalue.Feel free to explain because this patch is confusing me.
In your previous email, you want to put the
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTcase statement with theCC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPTcase which is returningsme_me_mask. That will be zero/false if SME is not active, skipping the WBINVD. But, in reality you still need to perform the WBINVD in case the kexec target is doing mem_encrypt=on.That's why the '!(sev_status &
MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)' works here. Basically, if you are bare-metal, it will return true. And it will only return true for machines that support SME and have theMSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPTbit set inSYS_CFGMSR because of where the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' assignment is.
[...]
Quoted 4 lines
However, if you move the
'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' to before the if statement, then you will have the WBINVD called for any machine that supports SME, even if SME is not possible because the proper bit in theSYS_CFGMSR hasn't been set.
Hi Tom,
Thanks for clarifying. However it seems to me that this is the behaviour in the current upstream code. The stop_this_cpu() checks CPUID directly w/o checking the SYS_CFG MSR:
if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f &&
(cpuid_eax(0x8000001f) & BIT(0)))
native_wbinvd(); I believe the BIT(0) in CPUID, which is "Secure Memory Encryption Support", will always be true regardless of whether the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT is set in SYS_CFG MSR?
If so, IIUC moving the 'cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD' to the place right before the if statement as suggested by Boris seems just follows the current behaviour in the upstream code.
Of course we need to always return true for CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT but not querying sme_me_mask.
Quoted 24 lines
I know what I'm trying to say, let me know if it is making sense...
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So you can't put it before the if - just slap it in both branches. Geez!
I think that will still work because
sme_me_maskandsev_statuswill both be 0 on bare-metal if 'msr &MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT' doesn't evaluate to true. However, that will cause any platform that hasn't enabled memory encryption (seeSYS_CFGMSR), to also perform the WBINVD.Quoted 8 lines
If it keeps the code simpler I don't mind. That's so not a fast path.
Quoted 3 lines
That won't work, because the current system may not have SME active. The cases that needs to be caught are kexec'ing from a mem_encrypt=off to a mem_encrypt=on or from a mem_encrypt=on to a mem_encrypt=off.
And I'm saying, we should keep it simple and simply WBINVD on SME capable machines, regardless of the encryption setting.
In that case,
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTneeds to be separate fromCC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPTas the original patch has it. The comment might make more sense as:
Quoted 6 lines
*
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTrepresents whether SME is possible
* on the platform, regardless of whether mem_encrypt=on has been
* used to make SME active.Thanks,
Tom
This looks good to me. Thanks!
Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 8 lines · Kai
From: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Currently on AMD SME platforms, during
kexec()caches are flushed manually before jumping to the new kernel due to memory encryption. Intel TDX needs to flush cachelines of TDX private memory before jumping to the second kernel too, otherwise they may silently corrupt the new kernel.
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Instead of sprinkling both AMD and Intel's specific checks around, introduce a new
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTattribute to unify both Intel and AMD, and simplify the logic:Could the old kernel leave incoherent caches around?
"Is it possible that the kernel could leave caches in incoherent state?"
Will do. Thanks.
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If so, do WBINVD.
Convert the AMD SME to use this new CC attribute.
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A later patch will
utilize this new attribute for Intel TDX too.Yeah, once those are all in git, the concept of "subsequent patch" becomes ambiguous depending on how you're sorting them. So try to read that commit message out of the context of all those "subsequent patches" and see if it still makes sense.
Right. Makes sense.
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IOW, you should strive for your commit messages to make sense on their own, without referencing other patches.
In this particular case, that "later patch" can go.
Will remove the "later patch" sentence. Thanks.
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Specifically, AMD SME flushes caches at two places: 1)
stop_this_cpu();
2)relocate_kernel().stop_this_cpu()checks the CPUID directly to do WBINVD for the reason that the current kernel's SME enabling status may not match the new kernel's choice. However therelocate_kernel()only does the WBINVD when the current kernel has enabled SME for the reason that the new kernel is always placed in an "unencrypted" area.To simplify the logic, for AMD SME change to always use the way that is done in
stop_this_cpu(). This will cause an additional WBINVD inrelocate_kernel()when the current kernel hasn't enabled SME (e.g., disabled by kernel command line), but this is acceptable for the sake of having less complicated code (see [1] for the relevant discussion).Note currently the kernel only advertises CC vendor for AMD SME when SME is actually enabled by the kernel. To always advertise the new
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTregardless of the kernel's SME enabling status, change to set CC vendor as long as the hardware has enabled SME.Note "advertising
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTwhen the hardware has enabled SME" is still different from "checking the CPUID" (the way that is done instop_this_cpu()), but technically the former also serves the purpose and is actually more accurate.Such change allows
sme_me_maskto be 0 while CC vendor reports as AMD. But this doesn't impact other CC attributes on AMD platforms, nor does it impact the cc_mkdec()/cc_mkenc().[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Suggested-by Dave Hansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 14 +++----------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 11 ++++++++++- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)arch/x86/coco/core.c +0
-0arch/x86/coco/core.c static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) · line 80
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arch/x86/coco/core.c +6
-0@@ -72,6 +72,19 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT :return sme_me_mask && !(sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ); +case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT : +/* +* CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT represents whether SME has +* enabled on the platform regardless whether the kernel +* has actually enabled the SME. +"represents whether SME has [been] enabled ... regardless whether the kernel has enabled SME"?!?
I think this needs to be:
arch/x86/coco/core.c +0
-0@@ -67,6 +67,13 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
arch/x86/coco/core.c static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) · line 77
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arch/x86/coco/core.c +7
-0switch (attr) {case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT : + +/* +* CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT represents whether SME has +* enabled on the platform regardless whether the kernel +* has actually enabled the SME. +*/ +case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT :return sme_me_mask;
As Tom pointed out this will return false when kernel doesn't active SME due to command line, and WBINVD won't be done.
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arch/x86/coco/core.c +0
-0case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT :
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arch/x86/coco/core.c static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) · line 87
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arch/x86/coco/core.c +7
-0+return !(sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ); + +/* +* For all CC_ATTR_GUEST_* there's no need to check sme_me_mask +* as it must be true when there's any SEV enable bit set in +* sev_status. +*/ Superfluous comment.
Will remove.
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arch/x86/coco/core.c +0
-0case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT :return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ;arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +1
-1@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) (unsigned long )page_list, image->start, image->preserve_context, - cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)); + cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT));#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context)arch/x86/kernel/process.c +0
-0@@ -813,18 +813,10 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)mcheck_cpu_clear (c);
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arch/x86/kernel/process.c void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy) · line 817
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arch/x86/kernel/process.c +2
-10/* -* Use wbinvd on processors that support SME. This provides support -* for performing a successful kexec when going from SME inactive -* to SME active (or vice-versa). The cache must be cleared so that -* if there are entries with the same physical address, both with and -* without the encryption bit, they don't race each other when flushed -* and potentially end up with the wrong entry being committed to -* memory. -* -* Test the CPUID bit directly because the machine might've cleared -* X86_FEATURE_SME due to cmdline options. +* Use wbinvd on processors that the first kernel *could* +* potentially leave incoherent cachelines. No need for that comment anymore - people can grep for CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT's definition simply.
Will remove. Thanks.
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arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1
-1*/ -if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ) &BIT (0 ))) +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT ))native_wbinvd ();/* arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +9
-0@@ -570,9 +570,19 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) msr =__rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG );if (!(msr &MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT ))return ; + +/* +* Always set CC vendor when the platform has SME enabled +* regardless whether the kernel will actually activates the +* SME or not. This reports the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT +* being true as long as the platform has SME enabled so that +* stop_this_cpu() can do necessary WBINVD during kexec(). +*/ + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ; }else {
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arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) · line 588
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arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +1
-0/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ; goto out; }So you can't put it before the if - just slap it in both branches. Geez!
I think we can. Please see my reply to Tom's email.
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arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +2
-1@@ -549,6 +549,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)if (snp && !(msr &MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED ))snp_abort (); + cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ; +/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */ if (feature_mask ==AMD_SME_BIT ) {/* @@ -597,6 +599,5 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) out:RIP_REL_REF (sme_me_mask) = me_mask; physical_mask &= ~me_mask; - cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ;cc_set_mask (me_mask); }
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Btw, pls do your patches ontop of tip/master as other patches in there are touching this file.
Yeah will do. I believe this series was generated based on tip/master but this was 3 weeks ago.
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arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +0
-1@@ -608,7 +618,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) out:if (sme_me_mask) { physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask; - cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ;cc_set_mask (sme_me_mask); } }include/linux/cc_platform.h +0
-0include/linux/cc_platform.h enum cc_attr { · line 44
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include/linux/cc_platform.h +0
-0@@ -42,6 +42,21 @@ enum cc_attr {*/ CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT,This goes to the end of the enum.
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include/linux/cc_platform.h enum cc_attr { · line 47
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include/linux/cc_platform.h +3
-0+/** +* @CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT: Host memory encryption can be +* incoherent "...can leave caches in an incoherent state."
Will do. And I'll move this CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT to the end of the enum if I understand you correctly.
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include/linux/cc_platform.h enum cc_attr { · line 56
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include/linux/cc_platform.h +9
-0+* +* The platform/OS is running as a bare-metal system or a hypervisor. +* The memory encryption engine might have left non-cache-coherent +* data in the caches that needs to be flushed. +* +* Use this in places where the cache coherency of the memory matters +* but the encryption status does not. +* +* Includes all systems that set CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT. If that is the case, why do you even need a new
CC_ATTRdefine?
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Might as well do:
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) native_wbinvd();?
As Tom pointed out using the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT will miss WBINVD when kernel disables SME by commandline.
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include/linux/cc_platform.h +3
-0+*/ + CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT, +
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
In reply to Tom LendackyQuoted 1 line · Tom Lendacky
That's why the '!(sev_status &
MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)' works here.
I would've never figured that out just from staring at the test. :-\
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Basically, if you are bare-metal, it will return true. And it will only return true for machines that support SME and have the
MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPTbit set inSYS_CFGMSR because of where the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' assignment is. However, if you move the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' to before the if statement, then you will have the WBINVD called for any machine that supports SME, even if SME is not possible because the proper bit in theSYS_CFGMSR hasn't been set.I know what I'm trying to say, let me know if it is making sense...
Yah, thanks for taking the time to explain.
Here's an even more radical idea:
Why not do WBINVD *unconditionally* on the CPU down path?
- it is the opposite of a fast path, i.e., no one cares
- it'll take care of every possible configuration without ugly logic
- it wouldn't hurt to have the caches nice and coherent before going down
Hmmm.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
In reply to Huang, KaiQuoted 28 lines · Kai
Quoted 19 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Tom Lendacky
This change won't return the correct answer. The check needs to remain against the
sev_statusvalue.Feel free to explain because this patch is confusing me.
In your previous email, you want to put the
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTcase statement with theCC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPTcase which is returningsme_me_mask. That will be zero/false if SME is not active, skipping the WBINVD. But, in reality you still need to perform the WBINVD in case the kexec target is doing mem_encrypt=on.That's why the '!(sev_status &
MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)' works here. Basically, if you are bare-metal, it will return true. And it will only return true for machines that support SME and have theMSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPTbit set inSYS_CFGMSR because of where the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' assignment is.[...]
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However, if you move the
'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' to before the if statement, then you will have the WBINVD called for any machine that supports SME, even if SME is not possible because the proper bit in theSYS_CFGMSR hasn't been set.
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Hi Tom,
Thanks for clarifying. However it seems to me that this is the behaviour in the current upstream code. The
stop_this_cpu()checks CPUID directly w/o checking theSYS_CFGMSR:
Correct, it will match the upstream behavior this way. It would have been improved slightly with your original patch by avoiding the WBINVD if the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT wasn't set.
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if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f &&
(cpuid_eax(0x8000001f) & BIT(0)))
native_wbinvd();Quoted 7 lines
I believe the BIT(0) in CPUID, which is "Secure Memory Encryption Support", will always be true regardless of whether the
MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPTis set inSYS_CFGMSR?If so, IIUC moving the '
cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' to the place right before the if statement as suggested by Boris seems just follows the current behaviour in the upstream code.
Yep, that's how I see it, too.
Thanks,
Tom
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Of course we need to always return true for
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTbut not queryingsme_me_mask.Quoted 24 lines
I know what I'm trying to say, let me know if it is making sense...
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So you can't put it before the if - just slap it in both branches. Geez!
I think that will still work because
sme_me_maskandsev_statuswill both be 0 on bare-metal if 'msr &MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT' doesn't evaluate to true. However, that will cause any platform that hasn't enabled memory encryption (seeSYS_CFGMSR), to also perform the WBINVD.Quoted 8 lines
If it keeps the code simpler I don't mind. That's so not a fast path.
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That won't work, because the current system may not have SME active. The cases that needs to be caught are kexec'ing from a mem_encrypt=off to a mem_encrypt=on or from a mem_encrypt=on to a mem_encrypt=off.
And I'm saying, we should keep it simple and simply WBINVD on SME capable machines, regardless of the encryption setting.
In that case,
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTneeds to be separate fromCC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPTas the original patch has it. The comment might make more sense as:Quoted 6 lines
*
CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENTrepresents whether SME is possible
* on the platform, regardless of whether mem_encrypt=on has been
* used to make SME active.Thanks,
TomThis looks good to me. Thanks!
Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 21 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Tom Lendacky
That's why the '!(sev_status &
MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)' works here.I would've never figured that out just from staring at the test. :-\
Quoted 9 lines
Basically, if you are bare-metal, it will return true. And it will only return true for machines that support SME and have the
MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPTbit set inSYS_CFGMSR because of where the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' assignment is. However, if you move the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' to before the if statement, then you will have the WBINVD called for any machine that supports SME, even if SME is not possible because the proper bit in theSYS_CFGMSR hasn't been set.I know what I'm trying to say, let me know if it is making sense...
Yah, thanks for taking the time to explain.
Here's an even more radical idea:
Why not do WBINVD *unconditionally* on the CPU down path?
Quoted 8 lines
- it is the opposite of a fast path, i.e., no one cares
- it'll take care of every possible configuration without ugly logic
- it wouldn't hurt to have the caches nice and coherent before going down
Hmmm.
That's what I initially did, but errors were reported, see commit:
f23d74f6c66c ("x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation in stop_this_cpu()")
But that may be because of the issue solved by commit:
1f5e7eb7868e ("x86/smp: Make stop_other_cpus() more robust")
So...
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 1 line
Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Quoted 26 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 25 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Tom Lendacky
That's why the '!(sev_status &
MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)' works here.I would've never figured that out just from staring at the test. :-\
Quoted 9 lines
Basically, if you are bare-metal, it will return true. And it will only return true for machines that support SME and have the
MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPTbit set inSYS_CFGMSR because of where the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' assignment is. However, if you move the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' to before the if statement, then you will have the WBINVD called for any machine that supports SME, even if SME is not possible because the proper bit in theSYS_CFGMSR hasn't been set.I know what I'm trying to say, let me know if it is making sense...
Yah, thanks for taking the time to explain.
Here's an even more radical idea:
Why not do WBINVD *unconditionally* on the CPU down path?
- it is the opposite of a fast path, i.e., no one cares
- it'll take care of every possible configuration without ugly logic
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- it wouldn't hurt to have the caches nice and coherent before going down
Hmmm.
That's what I initially did, but errors were reported, see commit:
f23d74f6c66c("x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation instop_this_cpu()")
This changelog only mentions "Some issues". Do you know exactly what kind issues did you see? Are these issues only appeared on SME enabled system or other non-SME-capable systems too?
Because ...
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But that may be because of the issue solved by commit:
1f5e7eb7868e ("x86/smp: Make stop_other_cpus() more robust")
... the issue resolved in this commit seems to be hang.
Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Quoted 30 lines · Kai
Quoted 29 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 28 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Tom Lendacky
That's why the '!(sev_status &
MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)' works here.I would've never figured that out just from staring at the test. :-\
Quoted 9 lines
Basically, if you are bare-metal, it will return true. And it will only return true for machines that support SME and have the
MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPTbit set inSYS_CFGMSR because of where the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' assignment is. However, if you move the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' to before the if statement, then you will have the WBINVD called for any machine that supports SME, even if SME is not possible because the proper bit in theSYS_CFGMSR hasn't been set.I know what I'm trying to say, let me know if it is making sense...
Yah, thanks for taking the time to explain.
Here's an even more radical idea:
Why not do WBINVD *unconditionally* on the CPU down path?
- it is the opposite of a fast path, i.e., no one cares
- it'll take care of every possible configuration without ugly logic
- it wouldn't hurt to have the caches nice and coherent before going down
Quoted 8 lines
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Quoted 1 line
Hmmm.
That's what I initially did, but errors were reported, see commit:
f23d74f6c66c ("x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation in stop_this_cpu()")This changelog only mentions "Some issues". Do you know exactly what kind issues did you see? Are these issues only appeared on SME enabled system or other non-SME-capable systems too?
I believe the issues were that different Intel systems would hang or reset and it was bisected to that commit that added the WBINVD. It was a while ago, but I remember that they were similar to what the 1f5e7eb7868e commit ended up fixing, which was debugged because sometimes the WBINVD was still occasionally issued resulting in the following patch
9b040453d444 ("x86/smp: Dont access non-existing CPUID leaf")
It just means that if we go to an unconditional WBINVD, then we need to be careful.
Thanks,
Tom
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Because ...
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But that may be because of the issue solved by commit:
1f5e7eb7868e ("x86/smp: Make stop_other_cpus() more robust")... the issue resolved in this commit seems to be hang.
Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Quoted 46 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 30 lines · Kai
Quoted 29 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 28 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Tom Lendacky
That's why the '!(sev_status &
MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)' works here.I would've never figured that out just from staring at the test. :-\
Quoted 9 lines
Basically, if you are bare-metal, it will return true. And it will only return true for machines that support SME and have the
MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPTbit set inSYS_CFGMSR because of where the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' assignment is. However, if you move the 'cc_vendor=CC_VENDOR_AMD' to before the if statement, then you will have the WBINVD called for any machine that supports SME, even if SME is not possible because the proper bit in theSYS_CFGMSR hasn't been set.I know what I'm trying to say, let me know if it is making sense...
Yah, thanks for taking the time to explain.
Here's an even more radical idea:
Why not do WBINVD *unconditionally* on the CPU down path?
- it is the opposite of a fast path, i.e., no one cares
- it'll take care of every possible configuration without ugly logic
- it wouldn't hurt to have the caches nice and coherent before going down
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Hmmm.
That's what I initially did, but errors were reported, see commit:
f23d74f6c66c ("x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation in stop_this_cpu()")This changelog only mentions "Some issues". Do you know exactly what kind issues did you see? Are these issues only appeared on SME enabled system or other non-SME-capable systems too?
I believe the issues were that different Intel systems would hang or reset and it was bisected to that commit that added the WBINVD. It was a while ago, but I remember that they were similar to what the
1f5e7eb7868ecommit ended up fixing, which was debugged because sometimes the WBINVD was still occasionally issued resulting in the following patch
Quoted 6 lines
9b040453d444 ("x86/smp: Dont access non-existing CPUID leaf")It just means that if we go to an unconditional WBINVD, then we need to be careful.
Thanks Tom for the info. That helps a lot.
Hi Boris, Dave,
I think I still prefer to keeping the existing SME kexec behaviour, that is, to have the new CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT attribute, because in this way there will be no risk.
However based on the information above I believe the risk is small if we switch to unconditional WBINVD, in which way we don't need the new attribute and there's also no new code needed for TDX to do cache flush.
Btw, I want to point out stop_this_cpu() is not the only place that needs to do WBINVD for SME/TDX, the relocate_kernel() assembly also needs to:
image->start = relocate_kernel((unsigned long)image->head,
(unsigned long)page_list,
image->start,
image->preserve_context,
cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT));The last function argument cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT) is for SME. The relocate_kernel() assembly checks the last argument and does WBINVD if it is true. If we go with unconditional WBINVD, I think we can just change the assembly to do unconditional WBINVD and remove the last function parameter.
Please let me know your preference?
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
In reply to Tom LendackyQuoted 10 lines · Tom Lendacky
I believe the issues were that different Intel systems would hang or reset and it was bisected to that commit that added the WBINVD. It was a while ago, but I remember that they were similar to what the
1f5e7eb7868ecommit ended up fixing, which was debugged because sometimes the WBINVD was still occasionally issued resulting in the following patch
9b040453d444("x86/smp: Dont access non-existing CPUID leaf")It just means that if we go to an unconditional WBINVD, then we need to be careful.
Let's try it.
Dave, do you remember what issues
f23d74f6c66c ("x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation in stop_this_cpu()")
fixed?
If so, can you try the below diff ontop of latest tip/master to see if those issues would reappear?
Thx.
---
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1 -2
@@ -824,8 +824,7 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)* Test the CPUID bit directly because the machine might've cleared * X86_FEATURE_SME due to cmdline options. */ -if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ) &BIT (0 ))) -native_wbinvd (); +native_wbinvd ();/* * This brings a cache line back and dirties it, but
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Quoted 33 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 10 lines · Tom Lendacky
I believe the issues were that different Intel systems would hang or reset and it was bisected to that commit that added the WBINVD. It was a while ago, but I remember that they were similar to what the
1f5e7eb7868ecommit ended up fixing, which was debugged because sometimes the WBINVD was still occasionally issued resulting in the following patch
9b040453d444("x86/smp: Dont access non-existing CPUID leaf")It just means that if we go to an unconditional WBINVD, then we need to be careful.
Let's try it.
Dave, do you remember what issues
f23d74f6c66c("x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation instop_this_cpu()")fixed?
If so, can you try the below diff ontop of latest tip/master to see if those issues would reappear?
Thx.
---
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/process.c void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy) · line 830
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1
-2@@ -824,8 +824,7 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)* Test the CPUID bit directly because the machine might've cleared * X86_FEATURE_SME due to cmdline options. */ -if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ) &BIT (0 ))) -native_wbinvd (); +native_wbinvd ();/* * This brings a cache line back and dirties it, but
I really appreciate if Dave can help here.
I will also reach out to see whether there's anyone in Intel met this before.
Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Hi,
Quoted 41 lines · Kai
Quoted 39 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 10 lines · Tom Lendacky
I believe the issues were that different Intel systems would hang or reset and it was bisected to that commit that added the WBINVD. It was a while ago, but I remember that they were similar to what the
1f5e7eb7868ecommit ended up fixing, which was debugged because sometimes the WBINVD was still occasionally issued resulting in the following patch
9b040453d444("x86/smp: Dont access non-existing CPUID leaf")It just means that if we go to an unconditional WBINVD, then we need to be careful.
Let's try it.
Dave, do you remember what issues
f23d74f6c66c("x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation instop_this_cpu()")fixed?
If so, can you try the below diff ontop of latest tip/master to see if those issues would reappear?
Thx.
---
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1
-2@@ -824,8 +824,7 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)* Test the CPUID bit directly because the machine might've cleared * X86_FEATURE_SME due to cmdline options. */ -if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ) &BIT (0 ))) -native_wbinvd (); +native_wbinvd ();
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process.c void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy) · line 830
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +0
-0/* * This brings a cache line back and dirties it, but I really appreciate if Dave can help here.
I will also reach out to see whether there's anyone in Intel met this before.
I forgot the details now, let me recall and try the patches if possible.
Thanks
Dave
Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 13 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 10 lines · Tom Lendacky
I believe the issues were that different Intel systems would hang or reset and it was bisected to that commit that added the WBINVD. It was a while ago, but I remember that they were similar to what the
1f5e7eb7868ecommit ended up fixing, which was debugged because sometimes the WBINVD was still occasionally issued resulting in the following patch
9b040453d444("x86/smp: Dont access non-existing CPUID leaf")It just means that if we go to an unconditional WBINVD, then we need to be careful.
Quoted 7 lines
Let's try it.
Dave, do you remember what issues
f23d74f6c66c("x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation instop_this_cpu()")fixed?
It should be a kexec reboot failure describe in below thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Quoted 3 lines
If so, can you try the below diff ontop of latest tip/master to see if those issues would reappear?
It was reproduced on an old laptop (Thinkpad t440s or t480s, I can not remember), but I have replaced them with a new different one. I tried the latest tip-master with the if condition commented out, kexec reboot works fine.
Let me try to find an old laptop to see if I can do more tests, will get back later next week.
Quoted 26 lines
Thx.
---
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1
-3@@ -824,8 +824,7 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)* Test the CPUID bit directly because the machine might've cleared * X86_FEATURE_SME due to cmdline options. */ -if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ) &BIT (0 ))) -native_wbinvd (); +native_wbinvd ();/* * This brings a cache line back and dirties it, but -- Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Quoted 30 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 13 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 10 lines · Tom Lendacky
I believe the issues were that different Intel systems would hang or reset and it was bisected to that commit that added the WBINVD. It was a while ago, but I remember that they were similar to what the
1f5e7eb7868ecommit ended up fixing, which was debugged because sometimes the WBINVD was still occasionally issued resulting in the following patch
9b040453d444("x86/smp: Dont access non-existing CPUID leaf")It just means that if we go to an unconditional WBINVD, then we need to be careful.
Quoted 7 lines
Let's try it.
Dave, do you remember what issues
f23d74f6c66c("x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation instop_this_cpu()")fixed?
It should be a kexec reboot failure describe in below thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Quoted 3 lines
If so, can you try the below diff ontop of latest tip/master to see if those issues would reappear?
Quoted 7 lines
It was reproduced on an old laptop (Thinkpad t440s or t480s, I can not remember), but I have replaced them with a new different one. I tried the latest tip-master with the if condition commented out, kexec reboot works fine.
Let me try to find an old laptop to see if I can do more tests, will get back later next week.
Update: tested on an old laptop as well, I did not find any problems with unconditional native_wbinvd(), kexec and kdump works fine.
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 27 lines
Thx.
---
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1
-3@@ -824,8 +824,7 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)* Test the CPUID bit directly because the machine might've cleared * X86_FEATURE_SME due to cmdline options. */ -if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ) &BIT (0 ))) -native_wbinvd (); +native_wbinvd ();/* * This brings a cache line back and dirties it, but -- Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Quoted 36 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 35 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 13 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 10 lines · Tom Lendacky
I believe the issues were that different Intel systems would hang or reset and it was bisected to that commit that added the WBINVD. It was a while ago, but I remember that they were similar to what the
1f5e7eb7868ecommit ended up fixing, which was debugged because sometimes the WBINVD was still occasionally issued resulting in the following patch
9b040453d444("x86/smp: Dont access non-existing CPUID leaf")It just means that if we go to an unconditional WBINVD, then we need to be careful.
Quoted 7 lines
Let's try it.
Dave, do you remember what issues
f23d74f6c66c("x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation instop_this_cpu()")fixed?
It should be a kexec reboot failure describe in below thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Quoted 3 lines
If so, can you try the below diff ontop of latest tip/master to see if those issues would reappear?
It was reproduced on an old laptop (Thinkpad t440s or t480s, I can not remember), but I have replaced them with a new different one. I tried the latest tip-master with the if condition commented out, kexec reboot works fine.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Let me try to find an old laptop to see if I can do more tests, will get back later next week.
Update: tested on an old laptop as well, I did not find any problems with unconditional
native_wbinvd(), kexec and kdump works fine.
Hi DaveY,
Thanks for getting back and I appreciate your help.
Hi Boris/DaveH,
Based on this I'll change to do unconditional WBINVD during kexec() for in stop_this_cpu() and relocate_kernel(). Please let me know if you have any comments.
Thanks all!
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
In reply to Dave YoungQuoted 2 lines · Dave Young
Update: tested on an old laptop as well, I did not find any problems with unconditional
native_wbinvd(), kexec and kdump works fine.
Thanks a lot for testing it!
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteBorislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
In reply to Huang, KaiQuoted 3 lines · Kai
Based on this I'll change to do unconditional WBINVD during
kexec()for instop_this_cpu()andrelocate_kernel(). Please let me know if you have any comments.
Yes, pls make sure to summarize in the commit message what this thread figured out. But basically, we want to try the simple approach and WBINVD unconditionally on the CPU stopping path so that caches are clean and there's no potential issues...
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Kai
Based on this I'll change to do unconditional WBINVD during
kexec()for instop_this_cpu()andrelocate_kernel(). Please let me know if you have any comments.Yes, pls make sure to summarize in the commit message what this thread figured out. But basically, we want to try the simple approach and WBINVD unconditionally on the CPU stopping path so that caches are clean and there's no potential issues...
Yes will do. Thanks for the feedback.